Houston man executed Tuesday

By Brian Lacy - The Huntsville Item

August 24, 2005

With his parents and sister watching in one room, and his victim's parents, husband and siblings watching from another, a 30-year-old Houston area man was executed Tuesday evening inside the Huntsville "Walls" Unit.

Robert Alan Shields was convicted for the Sept. 21, 1994 stabbing death of Paula Stiner, 27, who was killed inside her Friendswood home. Shields did not make a final statement. He never acknowledged Stiner's family, and only briefly looked over at his own parents and sister as they entered the execution chamber. He stared at the ceiling as the lethal does of chemicals entered his body. He then coughed, sputtered and slowly exhaled.

Shields' father, Robert Shields Sr., pointed toward prison officials and said, "Murder," following his son's final breath. "Murdered by the state." he said shortly before he son was pronounced dead at 6:15 p.m.

Stiner's husband, Tracey, joined hands with Paula's parents, John and Jan Ross, and brothers Steve Ross and Christopher Ross, to watch the execution. "As the offender is entitled to a speedy trial, the victim and the victim's family should be entitled to see a speedy administration of justice," John Ross said, reading a handwritten statement after the execution. "Waiting 10 years to see justice is further offensive to the family."

According to evidence at the trial, Shields' fingerprints and bloody shoeprints were in the laundry room where Stiner's body was found. About 90 minutes after Stiner was killed, Shields used her credit card to buy some clothes. And when he was arrested three days later about 50 miles away, he had her car.

Testimony at his trial showed he probably broke in to the Stiners' home using a screwdriver taken from the garage at his parents' home, where unknown to them he spent the night before the slaying in their garage. Shields had moved out earlier, saying he couldn't live under his father's rules after a 1992 theft and burglary arrest resulted in probation, which he ignored. Police arrested him in The Woodlands in Montgomery County, where Shields had friends and was living in empty houses.

He had previous arrests for burglary and auto theft, including an auto theft arrest in Florida where he and some friends were accused of driving a stolen car and leaving a trail of shoplifting from there to Texas.

His mother testified at his trial that she and his father had changed the locks on their home at least twice to keep him from stealing from them. A social worker testified Shields drank alcohol continuously since he was 14 and focused much of his time since the age of 17 on drugs and alcohol.

Shields v. Dretke, 122 Fed.Appx. 133 (5th Cir. 2005) (Habeas).

Background: Following affirmance of his conviction for capital murder and sentence of death, and denial of state habeas relief, defendant sought federal habeas relief. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Galveston, denied petition, denied his request for evidentiary hearing, and rendered summary judgment in favor of State, and subsequently denied certificate of appealability (COA). Defendant appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals held that:

(1) petitioner's ineffective assistance claims which he failed to fairly present to state court were procedurally defaulted;
(2) probative value of hammer and knives admitted in evidence was not outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice; and
(3) denial of evidentiary hearing was proper. COA denied.

Petitioner-Appellant Robert Alan Shields seeks a certificate of appealability ("COA") on multiple issues that the district court deemed unworthy of collateral review. Shields also appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of respondent-appellee Doug Dretke ("the State"). Shields further appeals the district court's order denying an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

Because Shields has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, we deny his application for a COA on all of his claims after a threshold inquiry on the merits. We further find that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Shields an evidentiary hearing.

I. PROCEEDINGS

In 1994, a Texas grand jury indicted Shields for the murder of Paula Stiner while in the course of committing and attempting to commit burglary and robbery. In 1995, a jury found Shields guilty of capital murder. After the penalty phase, the jury recommended the death penalty, and, in October 1995, the trial court sentenced Shields to death.

Shields directly appealed his conviction and sentence to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ("TCCA"). In 1998, the TCCA affirmed Shields's conviction and sentence. [FN1] Shields filed a motion for rehearing, which that court denied. FN1. See Shields v. State, No. 72,278 (Tex. Crim App. Feb. 25, 1998) (unpublished).

Shields timely filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the state trial court. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending that relief be denied. [FN2] The TCCA adopted the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied relief after its own review of the record. [FN3] FN2. See Ex parte Shields, No. 94CR1685-83 (112nd Judicial District Court of Galveston County, Texas, Oct. 14, 1998). FN3. See Ex parte Shields, No. 72,278-01 (Tex.Crim.App. Dec. 9, 1998).

In 1999, Shields timely filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Shields's federal habeas petition contained numerous unexhausted claims.

After the state filed its opposition to Shields's petition, in which it argued that the majority of Shields's claims were unexhausted and therefore procedurally barred, Shields moved to stay the proceedings pending his return to state court to exhaust the unexhausted claims. The district court granted the motion and allowed Shields to return to state court to exhaust his claims. The order further permitted Shields to refile his federal petition within 90 days if the TCCA denied relief. Pursuant to the district court's order, Shields filed a successive habeas application with the TCCA.

In 2002, the TCCA denied Shields's successive state habeas application as an abuse of the writ under state statute. [FN4] Shields then refiled his federal petition in the district court. In 2003, the district court denied Shields's petition, denied his request for an evidentiary hearing, and rendered summary judgment in favor of the State. Shields filed a motion in the district court to alter or to amend its judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), and the district court denied the motion.

FN4. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 5 (Vernon's 1999).

In February 2003, Shields sought a COA in the district court on 28 issues. Based on the TCCA's dismissal of Shields's successive habeas petition, the district court rejected the majority of Shields's claims as procedurally barred. After a threshold inquiry on the merits, the district court rejected those claims on which Shields had not procedurally defaulted. Shields now seeks a COA on these issues from this court.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Guilt-Innocence Phase

The evidence adduced at trial showed that Tracy Stiner, the victim's husband, arrived home from work shortly before 6:00 p.m. on September 21, 1994. He discovered his wife's body in the laundry room. Mrs. Stiner's body lay on its right side on the floor of the laundry room with her back to the washer and dryer. The room and the victim were covered in blood. The breakfast area of the house was in disarray, and the contents of Mrs. Stiner's purse were strewn about.

There was also a hammer on the floor of the breakfast area. As Mr. Stiner searched the house, he noticed that several items--including several pair of socks, shirts, a book bag, and a kitchen knife--were missing. Mr. Stiner testified that he later learned that, at 11:37 a.m.--a time when his wife would have been at work--a telephone call had been made from his home to the home of one of Shields's friends in Spring, Texas.

Dr. William Korndoffer, Galveston County's Chief Medical Examiner, testified that Mrs. Stiner had suffered a blunt trauma to the head and had been repeatedly stabbed in the throat, chest, and torso. Mrs. Stiner also suffered a number of defensive wounds, which indicated that she had struggled with her assailant before she died.

Detective Michael Wayne Tollett of the Friendswood Police Department testified that he was notified of Mrs. Stiner's murder around 6:16 p.m. on September 21 and arrived at the Stiner residence shortly thereafter.

Tollett testified that police lifted Shields's fingerprints from the laundry room and that bloody shoe prints at the scene were consistent with Shields's shoes. Tollett found blood on the purse, the carpet, and a large amount of blood in the laundry room. He also found one screwdriver on the carpet below a broken window and a wooden-handled screwdriver outside. A cigarette butt found at the scene had saliva on it consistent with Shields's saliva. Mrs. Stiner's car was also missing.

The Shields family lived next door to the Stiners. Christine Shields, Shields's mother, testified that a police officer informed her of Mrs. Stiner's murder when she returned home on September 21.

The next day, Mrs. Shields noticed that some items were out of place in her garage--cushions had been arranged to form a makeshift bed, and some drinks were nearby. Mrs. Shields also found Shields's pager and one of his shirts near the cushions, although Shields had not lived with his parents for several months and was not welcome in their home without at least one parent present.

When Mrs. Shields learned from neighbors that a wooden-handled screwdriver like one that she and her husband owned had been used to break into the Stiner home, she began to suspect that her son was involved in the crime. She contacted the police and gave them Shields's friends' phone numbers where he might be reached.

Shields was arrested on September 24, 1994. At the police station, police noticed cuts on his hands. There was also a cut on his right chin and what appeared to be blood on his shoes, which the police took to the lab for analysis. Shields's underwear was also saturated with blood.

Shields's fingerprints were found on Mrs. Stiner's checkbook, on the door leading from the laundry room to the garage, and in Mrs. Stiner's car. Mr. Stiner identified several of the items in Mrs. Stiner's car as having been in his home before his wife's murder. The bloody shoe impression at the crime scene matched the shoes that Shields wore at the time of his arrest.

The blood obtained from Shields's underwear and from a paper towel at the Stiner home were consistent with Shields's blood. Further, evidence showed that Shields had used Mrs. Stiner's credit card after the murder to purchase a suit. Mark Lang was manager of Dejaiz's Men's Clothing in Willowbrook Mall and was working on September 21.

He testified that Shields came into the store around 6:15 p.m. and purchased a suit with a credit card in the name of Paula Stiner. Shields signed the credit card slip in the name of Tracy Stiner, Mrs. Stiner's husband. When Lang noticed a horizontal cut on Shields's finger, Lang was told by Shields that he had cut his finger while splicing wires at work. Shields also had a bandage around his middle finger on his left hand.

Several of Shields's friends also testified for the prosecution. Troy Sterner testified that he knew Shields in 1994 and, at that time, Shields was staying in vacant houses in the Woodlands area. Shortly after the murder, Sterner saw Shields with cuts on his hand. Shields told Sterner that he had cut them while working at a store. Gina Cykala, a friend of Shields, testified that on the day of the murder she saw Shields at McDonald's at around 8:45 p.m. Shields was driving a big white car that she had never seen before. Shields told Cykala that he had borrowed the car from a friend.

Colin Checketts also testified that on September 21, Shields was driving a white car. Shields told Checketts that he had obtained the car from a friend, Ray Holt, and wanted to sell it for $500. He told Checketts that he had cut his hands while working at a store. He then gave Checketts the suit that he had purchased at Dejaiz's Men's Clothing Store. David Chastain and Jarrod Moore, two of Shields's friends, testified the same. The defense put no witnesses on the stand during the guilt-innocence phase. After hearing all of this evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.

B. Penalty Phase

1. Evidence by the State

At the penalty phase, the State introduced evidence that Shields had been assessed deferred adjudication probation for theft/burglary of a motor vehicle in 1992, after which Shields completely disregarded the terms of his probation.

Authorities also arrested Shields in Florida in 1994 for grand theft auto. In January 1994, Shields and two friends, Chastain and Checketts, broke into a car in Friendswood, stole a checkbook and a credit card and charged $150 in cigarettes before the card was reported stolen. Around the same time, the three friends broke into a house next door to Shields's and stole cash, car keys, and, later, the car itself. They then drove to Florida in the car, shoplifting along the way. They were arrested in Florida for grand theft auto. They had also attempted to break into a home in Florida, but they fled when a neighbor spotted them.

The jury also heard testimony that in July 1994, Shields had been involved in stealing credit cards and a cell phone from another car. Based on the testimony of Shields and his mother, the Florida court liaison officer recommended, and the court ordered, that the conditions of probation be amended to allow Shields to enter St. Joseph's Psychiatric Hospital for at least one month to receive psychiatric evaluation and possible drug treatment.

After twelve days, the court allowed Shields to report on an outpatient basis. Shields later missed two appointments in July 1994. On August 10, Mrs. Shields urged the court officer to issue a warrant for Shields so that she could retrieve her missing car, which Shields had stolen.

John Matzelle, a friend of Shields, testified that in June 1994, Shields loaded a pistol and pointed it at him. When Matzelle objected, Shields stood up and shoved the gun in Matzelle's face, stating that he "could point the fucking gun in [his] face if he felt like it." Shields later went in the backyard and fired the gun twice over the fence, returning to tell his friends that he "had just shot at his mail carrier." Detective Tollet testified that no mail carrier recalled a shooting incident on his route that day.

To refute the defense psychiatric testimony, the State also called Dr. Edward Gripon as a rebuttal witness. Responding to a hypothetical question that paralleled the facts of Paula Stiner's murder, Dr. Gripon testified that such an offender lacks concern and remorse for his own action. He further testified that Shields's psychiatric records demonstrate poor impulse control and aggressiveness.

Dr. Gripon diagnosed Shields with "personality disorder with features of aggressivity, features of antisocial personality, which is the absence of a social conscience, not caring what one does, that sort of thing." Dr. Gripon testified that in his opinion, Shields is a future danger. Dr. Gripon never personally interviewed Shields.

2. Evidence by the Defense

Mrs. Shields testified that Shields had a close relationship with his family until two years after they moved to Colorado from Texas. At that point, Shields became withdrawn and did not get along with his father. When the family moved back to Texas, Shields's grades were average, and he was a typical fifteen-year old. Shields's relationship with his family deteriorated after an arrest for theft.

He began to associate with "undesirable" people and at times would disappear from home for a day or two. To ensure his graduation, the Shields decided to drop him off and to pick him up every day from high school. A month or two before graduation, however, Shields moved out of his parents' home without notice. Shields returned only to inform his parents that he could not live by his father's rules. When Shields left again, it was to Florida in a neighbor's stolen car.

Mrs. Shields arranged professional counseling for Shields in 1993, but he quit after three or four visits. Shields then refused to see another professional. By June 1994, Shields was no longer taking the anti-depressant medication that the St. Joseph's doctor had prescribed, and his behavior deteriorated. Shields left his parents' home for good in July 1994 to live in an abandoned house in the Woodlands.

Mrs. Shields testified that in her opinion, Shields could not have murdered Mrs. Stiner unless Mrs. Stiner confronted him first. She also testified that she did not believe that he had entered the home with the intent to hurt Mrs. Stiner. On cross-examination, Mrs. Shields admitted that she and her husband had twice changed the locks on the house to prevent Shields from breaking in and stealing.

Clinical social worker Fran St. Peter performed a biopsychosocial assessment on Shields. St. Peter performed a three-hour assessment on Shields the night before her testimony and interviewed Shields's mother, father, sister, and brother-in-law. St. Peter testified that one of Shields's close friends had been killed when Shields was eleven. The incident, she testified, traumatized him.

The family's move to Colorado then isolated him and caused him to withdraw. St. Peter testified that Shields's first introduction to narcotics occurred when he was a thirteen- to fourteen-month old baby, when doctors prescribed medication to him to ease the pain after he burned himself. Shields tried Valium when he was eleven. St. Peter also testified that Shields had consumed alcohol continuously since the age of fourteen. By the age of seventeen, 70 to 75 per cent of Shields's time related to procuring, using, or recovering from drugs and alcohol. St. Peter questioned the Shields' attentiveness to their son and stated that the family essentially led separate lives.

Dr. Fred Fason testified as to Shields's alleged future dangerousness. He testified that a psychiatrist would need to perform a scientifically-based medical evaluation on an individual before making a diagnosis of future dangerousness. He also stated that the American Psychiatric Society has recommended that its members not testify as to future dangerousness because no test has demonstrated that these opinions are scientifically valid. Responding to a hypothetical question that traced the facts of Paula Stiner's murder, Dr. Fason admitted that his diagnostic impression was that "he's a sociopath or antisocial personality disorder."

Dr. James Marquart, a professor of criminal justice at Sam Houston University and a sociologist, testified as to study results that show that the majority of former death row inmates in the general prison population do not commit acts of violence in the prison any more than any other prison inmate. Dr. Marquart testified that it is difficult to predict accurately future dangerousness based solely on the offense committed.

Perry Evans and Jose Lozano, employees of the Galveston County Sheriff's Department, testified that Shields was involved in four instances of jail misbehavior in over a year. Although officials had classified Shields as a minimum security inmate, they based this classification on Shields's representations that he had no prior criminal record, no chemical dependency problem, and lived at his family home. While in jail awaiting trial, Shields was involved in a fight, was in an unauthorized area, and destroyed, altered, or damaged county property or the property of another.

After hearing both the State's and the defense's evidence, the jury answered the special issue question of future dangerousness in the affirmative and recommended death.

Shields seeks a COA from this court on multiple issues:

(1) The district court erred when it found that Shields procedurally defaulted on the majority of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
(2) Trial counsel was ineffective in that he failed to present a viable defense during the guilt-innocence phase.
(a) The district court overlooked issues of disputed fact that entitled Shields to proceed on appeal as to all of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
(b) Trial counsel failed to present evidence to contradict the state's theory that Shields had been "lying in wait" for the victim.
(c) Trial counsel was ineffective in that he refused to permit Shields to testify to present an alternative version of events and because he switched defense theories midway through trial.
(3) Trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial in that he:
(a) failed to object to the introduction of the hammer and knives found at the scene of the crime.
(b) failed to object to the testimony of Shields's mother, Christine Shields.
(c) failed to object to the admission of Shields's out-of-court statements to the Woodland subdivision witnesses.
(d) failed to consult with forensic evidence experts to rebut the state's case.
(4) Trial counsel's performance during opening and closing arguments at the guilt-innocence phase constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
(a) Trial counsel failed to object to the state's opening argument that allegedly consisted of victim impact information and characterized the evidence of guilt as conclusive.
(b) Trial counsel failed to present an adequate closing argument.
(5) Trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt-innocence and punishment phases in that he failed to obtain a confidential defense psychiatric expert under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985).
(6) Trial counsel's performance during the state's case-in-chief at the punishment phase constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because he:
(a) failed to require the state to prove the extraneous offenses admitted as evidence of future dangerousness.
(b) allowed incompetent witnesses to testify and failed to investigate the witnesses to impeach them effectively. (7) Trial counsel's performance during the defense's case-in-chief at the punishment stage constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because he:
(a) failed to present the theory of self-defense and Shields's alleged lack of intent to the jury as mitigating evidence.
(b) failed to investigate and to prepare Shields's background history and incompetently presented punishment phase evidence.
(c) failed to prepare adequately the mitigation specialist witness, Fran St. Peter.
(d) admitted damaging evidence through the mitigation specialist that would have otherwise been barred under Estelle v. Smith., 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981).
(e) failed to present effectively mitigating evidence.
(f) failed to present a viable insanity defense or to present evidence on Shields's alleged diminished capacity.
(g) failed to use effectively defense experts Dr. Fason and Dr. Marquart.
(h) elicited positive answers to the special issues--that the jury was to consider to determine whether to impose a life sentence or death--from two defense witnesses.
(8) Trial counsel was ineffective in that he failed to present a coherent defense to the state's case on future dangerousness.
(9) Trial counsel's performance at the punishment phase was ineffective in that he:
(a) opened the door to the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Gripon by introducing psychiatric records produced by the state's mental health expert.
(b) introduced into evidence exhibits that suggested an affirmative answer to the special issues.
(c) failed to object to the state's hypothetical questions posed to Dr. Gripon.
(d) failed to request a hearing under Texas Rule of Evidence 705(b) and to object under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993. to determine the scientific foundations of Dr. Gripon's opinion.
(10) Trial counsel was ineffective at the punishment phase in that he failed to object to the state's comment that Shields lacked remorse.
(11) The cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors prejudiced him and deprived him of effective assistance of counsel.
(12) Trial counsel conducted a deficient voir dire, thereby depriving Shields of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.

* * *

Moreover, we have held that conclusional and unsupported allegations do not entitle a habeas petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. Our review of this record demonstrates that Shields offers us no specific evidence that the jury did not consider at trial. Neither does he point to any specific evidence that would create a factual dispute as to the four claims on which he did not procedurally default.

The district court had before it the affidavit of Shields's state habeas counsel and still determined, as we have done, that state habeas counsel's alleged ineffectiveness does not constitute a sufficient factual dispute to require an evidentiary hearing. The Rules Governing Section 2254 cases " 'do[ ] not authorize fishing expeditions.' "

VII. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court did not err when it denied a COA to Shields and denied Shields an evidentiary hearing. We therefore deny Shields's application for a COA. COA DENIED.