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Patricia
BLACKMON
Classification: Murderer
Characteristics:
Parricide
Number of victims: 1
Date of murder: May 29, 1999
Date of arrest:
Same day
Date of birth: November 3, 1969
Victim profile:
Her
two-year-old adopted daughter Dominiqua Bryant
Method of murder: Beating (multiple
blunt-force injuries to her head, chest, abdomen, and extremities)
Location: Dothan, Alabama, USA
Status:
Sentenced to death on June 7, 2002
Blackmon, Patricia:
Black; age 29 at crime (DOB 11-3-1969); murder of black female age 2
(her adopted daughter) in Dothan in May 1999; sentenced on 6-7-2002.
Patricia Blackmon
was 29 years old when she killed her two-year-old adopted daughter in
Dothan, AL in May 1999.
Blackmon,
Patricia: Black; age 29 at crime and now age 35 (DOB 11-3-1969);
murder of black female age 2 (her adopted daughter) in Dothan in May
1999; sentenced on 6-7-2002.
Patricia Blackmon sentenced to death for murder
of her two yr old adopted daughter, Dominiqua Bryant
Patricia Blackmon was 29 years old when she
committed the crime that landed her on death row. May 1999, in Dothan
Alabama, Patricia Blackmon brutally murdered her two-year-old adopted
daughter Dominiqua Bryant. She subsequently was found guilty and
sentenced to the death penalty.
She recently appealed to the court on their
decision, stating that she was not deserving of the death penalty. Her
argument against her sentence included her idea that she possibly
knocked the child unconscious before the entire brutal beating took
place. Dominiqua suffered multiple skull fractures, broken bones, and
was beaten so badly a foot imprint was left on her chest. I guess in
her eyes if the child was unconscious she didn’t feel the pain of the
subsequent blows and therefore she should receive a lesser sentence.
Well not in the eyes of the court, in a unanimous
decision in August 2005 the court denied her appeal, along with her
request for a retrial. Patricia Blackmon requested the retrial at the
same time of the appeal stating that she was unfairly tried because
the jury was persuaded by pretrial publicity.
Patricia Blackmon
On Death Row for the Brutal Murder of Her Daughter
By Charles Montaldo - About.com
On May 29, 1999 Patricia Blackmon, age 29, called
911 in Dothan, Alabama because her 28-month old adopted daughter
Dominiqua was not breathing.
The Injuries
Eddie Smith, a paramedic in Dothan, arrived at
Blackmon's mobile home at around 9:30 p.m. and found Dominiqua lying
on the floor of the master bedroom -- she was wearing only a diaper
and blood-soaked socks, was covered in vomit, and she was not
breathing. There was a large bump on her forehead and blood on her
chest. After the paramedics attempted to revive her, she was
transported to Flowers Hospital Emergency Room where she died shortly
thereafter.
Two doctors examed Dominiqua and found that she had
multiple bruises and contusions and an imprint of the sole of a shoe
on her chest as well as scars from previous injuries.
The Autopsy
Included in the 30 separate injuries found on her
body, the medical examiner Dr. Alfredo Parades, found bruises on the
front part of her lower chest and upper abdomen and around the right
groin. She had also suffered a fractured leg.
He also found that Dominiqua had two broken bones
and many other injuries that were in various stages of healing.
The Shoe Print
Another discovery found on Dominiqua was an imprint
of the sole of a shoe on her chest that was so clearly defined that it
was captured in a photograph taken by the doctor.
The Trial
Dr. James Downs, chief medical examiner for the
State of Alabama, testified that he compared the sandals Blackmon was
wearing on the day of the murder with the scanned image of the
victim's chest, and it was his opinion that the imprint on Dominiqua's
chest was consistent with the sole of the sandals.
Downs also testified that it was his opinion that
Dominiqua's recent injuries were consistent with having been made by a
pool cue.
Along with the medical findings there was testimony
that Blackmon had adopted Dominiqua approximately nine months before
she was killed. Testimony also showed that Blackmon had sole charge of
the child from the time her father-in-law saw the two of them earlier
on the evening of the murder until the time of the child's death.
Wayne Johnson, Blackmon's father-in-law, testified
that on the night Dominiqua was killed he saw Dominiqua and she was
playing and acting normal. He said that Blackmon and Dominiqua left
his house at around 8:00 p.m.
A search of Blackmon's mobile home revealed several
blood-splattered items. Forensic tests revealed the presence of blood
on a broken pool cue, a child's T-shirt, a pink flat bed sheet, a
quilt, and two napkins. The blood matched Dominiqua's blood.
Blackmon's Defense
In her defense, Blackmon said that the child was
injured when she fell off of the bed. Blackmon called several
witnesses to testify in her defense. Judy Whatley, an employee of the
Department of Human Resources, said that she had had contact with
Dominiqua and Blackmon once a month for five months before August 1998
and that she noticed that the two had a good relationship. Tammy
Freeman, Blackmon's neighbor, testified that she frequently left her
children with Blackmon.
Convicted
The jury convicted Blackmon of capital murder. A
separate sentencing hearing was held, at which the State relied on the
aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel to support a death sentence. After the sentencing
hearing the jury, by a vote of 10 to 2, recommended that Blackmon be
sentenced to death.
Appeals
In August 2005, Blackmon appealed to the court that
her crimes were not deserving of the death penalty because she
believed that Dominiqua was knocked unconscious before being beaten
and so therefor her crime was not heinous or cruel. Her appeal was
turned down.
Patricia Blackmon now sits on death row at Tutwiler
Prison for Women in Wetumpka, Alabama.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama
Blackmon v. State
Patricia BLACKMON v. STATE of Alabama.
CR-01-2126.
August 05, 2005
Brief on original submission filed by Clark Maurice
Parker, Dothan, for appellant.Michael Crespi, Dothan, and Bryan
Stevenson, Montgomery, for appellant on application for
rehearing.William H. Pryor, Jr., and Troy King, attys. gen., and Bill
Lisenby, Jr., deputy atty. gen., and Stephen Shows and Cheryl Ann
Schuetze, asst. attys. gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Patricia Blackmon, was convicted of
capital murder in the beating death of her 28-month-old daughter,
Dominiqua. See § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala.Code 1975, which makes capital
the intentional murder of a child under 14 years of age. The jury,
by a vote of 10 to 2, recommended that Blackmon be sentenced to death.
The circuit court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced
Blackmon to death. This appeal followed.
The State's evidence tended to show that on May 29,
1999, Blackmon telephoned emergency 911 to summon paramedics to her
mobile home in Dothan. She told the 911 operator that her child was
not breathing. Eddie Smith, a paramedic in Dothan, testified that he
arrived at Blackmon's mobile home at around 9:30 p.m. and that he
found Dominiqua lying on the floor of the master bedroom-she was
wearing only a diaper and blood-soaked socks, was covered in vomit,
and was not breathing. There was a hematoma on her forehead and
blood on her chest. After the paramedics attempted to revive her,
she was transported to Flowers Hospital Emergency Room.
Dr. Matthew Krista testified that he treated
Dominiqua when she was brought to the emergency room. He said that
he first established an airway but that at 10:22 p.m. she was
pronounced dead. Dominiqua's pediatrician, Dr. Robert Head, was also
called to the emergency room. Both doctors testified that the child
had multiple bruises and contusions and an imprint of the sole of a
shoe on her chest.1
They also said that they observed marks from previous injuries on her
body.
Dr. Alfredo Parades, the medical examiner who
conducted the autopsy, testified that Dominiqua died of multiple
blunt-force injuries to her head, chest, abdomen, and extremities-he
detailed some 30 injuries that he discovered on the child's body.
Dr. Parades testified:
“She has bruises in the front part of the lower
chest and upper abdomen. Bruises around the right groin. She has a
fracture, this is the fracture of the leg. And, on her side, she has
bruises on the left temporal area above the ear. She has bruises on
․ the ear on the left. She had a bruise on the right cheek area.
She had a bruise on the side of the heel and foot area. Then on the
back, she had multiple bruises on the lower back, bilaterally. That
is both sides. Bruises of the buttocks, bruises behind the knee area
and below the knee area. And in addition to that, she had numerous
linear, what I describe as in parallel, like a train tack. There
were numerous injuries with a pale area in between ․ the left buttock
area.”
(R. 873.) Parades also said that Dominiqua had
two broken bones and many other injuries that were in various stages
of healing. Parades also described many internal injuries. He said
that Dominiqua also had an imprint of the sole of a shoe on her chest.
Dr. James Downs, chief medical examiner for the
State of Alabama, testified that he compared the sandals Blackmon was
wearing on the day of the murder with the scanned image of the
victim's chest, and it was his opinion that the imprint on Dominiqua's
chest was consistent with the sole of the sandals. Downs also
testified that it was his opinion that Dominiqua's recent injuries
were consistent with having been made by a pool cue.
There was testimony indicating that Blackmon had
adopted Dominiqua approximately nine months before she was killed.
Testimony also showed that Blackmon had sole charge of the child from
the time her father-in-law saw the two of them earlier on the evening
of the murder until the time of the child's death. Wayne Johnson,
Blackmon's father-in-law, testified that on the night Dominiqua was
killed he saw Dominiqua and she was playing and acting normal. He
said that Blackmon and Dominiqua left his house at around 8:00 p.m.
A search of Blackmon's mobile home revealed several
blood-splattered items. Forensic tests revealed the presence of
blood on a broken pool cue, a child's T-shirt, a pink flat bed sheet,
a quilt, and two napkins. The blood matched Dominiqua's blood.
Blackmon called several witnesses to testify in her
defense. Judy Whatley, an employee of the Department of Human
Resources, said that she had had contact with Dominiqua and Blackmon
once a month for five months before August 1998 and that she noticed
that the two had a good relationship. Tammy Freeman, Blackmon's
neighbor, testified that she frequently left her children with
Blackmon.
The jury convicted Blackmon of capital murder. A
separate sentencing hearing was held, at which the State relied on the
aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel to support a death sentence. After the
sentencing hearing the jury, by a vote of 10 to 2, recommended that
Blackmon be sentenced to death. The circuit court held a separate
sentencing hearing after the presentence report was prepared. The
circuit court sentenced Blackmon to death. This appeal, which is
automatic in a case involving the death penalty, followed. See
§ 13A-5-55, Ala.Code 1975.
Standard of Review
Blackmon has been sentenced to death. According
to Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P., this Court must review this case for plain
error. Rule 45A states:
“In all cases in which the death penalty has been
imposed, the Court of Criminal Appeals shall notice any plain error or
defect in the proceedings under review, whether or not brought to the
attention of the trial court, and take appropriate appellate action by
reason thereof, whenever such error has or probably has adversely
affected the substantial right of the appellant.”
When discussing the application of the plain-error
standard of review, this Court has stated:
“The standard of review in reviewing a claim under
the plain-error doctrine is stricter than the standard used in
reviewing an issue that was properly raised in the trial court or on
appeal. As the United States Supreme Court stated in United States
v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the
plain-error doctrine applies only if the error is ‘particularly
egregious' and if it ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ See Ex parte Price, 725
So.2d 1063 (Ala.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S.Ct. 1809,
143 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1999); Burgess v. State, 723 So.2d 742
(Ala.Cr.App.1997), aff'd, 723 So.2d 770 (Ala.1998), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1052, 119 S.Ct. 1360, 143 L.Ed.2d 521 (1999); Johnson v. State,
620 So.2d 679, 701 (Ala.Cr.App.1992), rev'd on other grounds, 620
So.2d 709 (Ala.1993), on remand, 620 So.2d 714 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 905, 114 S.Ct. 285, 126 L.Ed.2d 235 (1993).”
Hall v. State, 820 So.2d 113, 121-22
(Ala.Crim.App.1999), aff'd, 820 So.2d 152 (Ala.2001), cert. denied,
535 U.S. 1080, 122 S.Ct. 1966, 152 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2002). While the
failure to object will not preclude our review, it will weigh against
any claim of prejudice. See Dill v. State, 600 So.2d 343
(Ala.Crim.App.1991), aff'd, 600 So.2d 372 (Ala.1992).
I.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court erred in
denying her motion requesting discovery of the transcript of the
grand-jury proceedings. Specifically, she argues that, because she
was indicted for capital murder, she had a “special” need to review
the grand-jury proceedings.
Blackmon was indicted for capital murder in August
1999. In March 2001, Blackmon moved that she be allowed discovery of
the transcript, exhibits, and any other memorialization of the
grand-jury proceedings. The motion listed only one ground in support
of the discovery of this evidence-that Blackmon had been indicted for
capital murder.
Alabama has long protected the secrecy of
grand-jury proceedings. See § 12-16-214, Ala.Code 1975. “The long
time rule, sanctioned by our courts, is that the proceedings before a
grand jury are essentially secret.” Steward v. State, 55 Ala.App.
238, 240, 314 So.2d 313, 315 (Ala.Crim.App.1975). However, a
defendant may be allowed to inspect grand-jury proceedings if the
defendant meets the threshold test of showing a “particularized need”
for breaching the secrecy of those proceedings. As this Court stated
in Millican v. State, 423 So.2d 268 (Ala.Crim.App.1982):
“Before a defendant is allowed to inspect a
transcript of a State's witness who testified before the grand jury or
before a trial judge should conduct an in camera inspection of such
testimony, see Palermo [v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959),] and
Pate [v. State, 415 So.2d 1140 (Ala.1981)], the defendant should at
least and at a very minimum make some offer of proof (1) that the
matters contained in the witness' grand jury testimony were relevant
to the subject matter of the prosecution; (2) and that there exists
an inconsistency between grand jury testimony and trial testimony.
Unless defense counsel is merely going on a fishing expedition, he
will have some information as to the particular inconsistency in the
defendant's testimony. In this case no such showing was made and the
existence of any inconsistency between the witness' trial and grand
jury testimony was never even alleged. Cooks [v. State, 50 Ala.App.
49, 276 So.2d 634 (Ala.Crim.App.1973)]. Also, there was no showing
that the witness' grand jury testimony, if available, was ‘of such
nature that without it the defendant's trial would be fundamentally
unfair.’ Cooks, 50 Ala.App. at 54, 276 So.2d 634. See also Husch
v. State, 211 Ala. 274, 276, 100 So. 321 (1924). (‘Moreover, if the
solicitor had had such a statement in his possession, defendant could
have required its production by a rule of the court if he thought it
was favorable to him.’)
“In laying the proper predicate for examination of
a witness' grand jury testimony, it should also be established that
the witness testified before the grand jury and that such testimony
was recorded or reduced to writing, unless a grand juror will be
called to disclose the testimony of the witness. Alabama Code 1975,
Section 12-16-201.
“ ‘When the defendant, in effect, asks for the
State District Attorney to produce a document, he should at least
establish that this State official has such document or a copy thereof
in his possession before the trial court will be put in error.’
Strange v. State, 43 Ala.App. 599, 606, 197 So.2d 437 [(1966)], cert.
dismissed, 280 Ala. 718, 197 So.2d 447 (196[7]).
“Once the defendant has laid a proper predicate for
the impeachment of a witness who testified before the grand jury, the
trial judge should conduct an in camera inspection as outlined in
Palermo, supra, and Pate, supra, to determine (1) whether the
statement made by the witness before the grand jury ‘differed in any
respects from statements made to the jury during trial,’ Pate, supra,
and (2) whether the grand jury testimony requested by the defendant
‘was of such a nature that without it the defendant's trial would be
fundamentally unfair.’ Pate, supra. This procedure will best
preserve and protect the legislative determination that ‘it is
essential to the fair and impartial administration of justice that all
grand jury proceedings be secret and that the secrecy of such
proceedings, remain inviolate.’ Alabama Code 1975, Sections
12-16-214 through 226.”
423 So.2d at 270-71.
Nonetheless, Alabama has no statute that requires
that grand-jury proceedings be recorded or otherwise memorialized.
In Stallworth v. State, 868 So.2d 1128 (Ala.Crim.App.2001), the
defendant argued that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to
transcribe the grand-jury testimony. In upholding the circuit
court's ruling, we stated:
“ ‘In Alabama there is no statute requiring that
testimony before a grand jury be recorded. “A Grand Jury is not
required to compile records and the testimony in the absence of a
statute requiring preservation of the proceedings. State ex rel.
Baxley v. Strawbridge, 52 Ala.App. 685, 296 So.2d 779
[(Ala.Crim.App.1974)]. There is no such statute in this state.”
Sommerville v. State, 361 So.2d 386, 388 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied,
361 So.2d 389 (Ala.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1118, 99 S.Ct. 1027,
59 L.Ed.2d 78 (1979). See also Gaines v. State, 52 Ala.App. 29, 30,
288 So.2d 810, 812, cert. denied, 292 Ala. 720, 288 So.2d 813 (1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 851, 95 S.Ct. 92, 42 L.Ed.2d 82 (1974).
Because there was no legal requirement that the grand jury proceedings
be recorded, this contention is without merit.’ ”
Stallworth, 868 So.2d at 1139, quoting Hardy v.
State, 804 So.2d 247, 287 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), aff'd, 804 So.2d 298
(Ala.2000). See also Steward v. State, supra.
At the pretrial hearing on this motion, the
prosecutor stated that it was the policy of the district attorney's
office to not record the grand-jury proceedings and that he had no
knowledge that the grand-jury proceedings had been recorded in this
case. Neither did Blackmon show a “particularized need” to breach
the secrecy of the grand-jury proceedings. Based on the cases cited
above, we conclude that the circuit court committed no error in
denying this motion made after Blackmon had been indicted. Cf.
McKissack v. State, 926 So.2d 367 (Ala.2005) (request to preserve
grand-jury proceedings was made before grand jury was empaneled).
II.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court erred in
denying her motion for a change of venue. Blackmon states in her
brief that there was evidence that approximately 60% of the households
in Houston County may have been exposed to prejudicial pretrial
publicity about the case and that the community was so saturated with
pretrial publicity that she could not get a fair trial there. She
also asserts that by the very nature of the charge against her, there
is a presumption of prejudice.
At the hearing on the motion for a change of venue,
two media representatives testified. Bill Perkins, editorial page
editor for the Dothan Eagle, testified that he retrieved three
articles that had been written about the child's murder and that the
paper circulated to approximately 60% of the households in Houston
County. Wayne May, senior reporter for WTVY television station,
testified that a number of stories had been broadcast about the case.
After the evidentiary hearing the circuit court
issued the following order denying the motion:
“Evidence at the hearing consisted of two
witnesses, a representative for the Dothan Eagle and a reporter for
WTVY television. The newspaper editor testified that a few newspaper
articles were written over a period of time concerning this particular
case. The television station ran a number of stories consisting of
the same information but repeated during newscasts during the day.
The coverage regarding this case has been relatively minor when
compared to other ‘high profile’ capital cases. Nonetheless, several
editorial opinion pieces were denunciatory but made scant mention of
the Defendant․
“The Defendant has failed to show community
saturation or even widespread publicity. As stated in ․ Oryang v.
State, [642 So.2d 979 (Ala.Crim.App.1993)], ‘․ in order for a
defendant to show prejudice, the proper manner for ascertaining
whether adverse publicity may have biased the prospective jurors is
through the voir dire examination.’
“It is therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed
that defendant's motion for a change of venue is hereby denied.”
(C.R. 194-95.)
In Blanton v. State, 886 So.2d 850, 876-77
(Ala.Crim.App.2003), we stated the following concerning a circuit
court's ruling on a motion for a change of venue:
“ ‘ “A trial court is in a better position than an
appellate court to determine what effect, if any, pretrial publicity
might have in a particular case. The trial court has the best
opportunity to evaluate the effects of any pretrial publicity on the
community as a whole and on the individual members of the jury venire.
The trial court's ruling on a motion for a change of venue will be
reversed only when there is a showing that the trial court has abused
its discretion. Nelson v. State, 440 So.2d 1130 (Ala.Cr.App.1983).”
“ ‘Joiner v. State, 651 So.2d 1155, 1156
(Ala.Cr.App.1994).’
“Clemons v. State, 720 So.2d 961, 977
(Ala.Crim.App.1996), aff'd, 720 So.2d 985 (Ala.1998). ‘The mere fact
that publicity and media attention were widespread is not sufficient
to warrant a change of venue. Rather, Ex parte Grayson[, 479 So.2d
76 (Ala.1985),] held that the appellant must show that he suffered
actual prejudice or that the community was saturated with prejudicial
publicity.’ Slagle v. State, 606 So.2d 193, 195 (Ala.Crim.App.1992).
‘ “Moreover, the passage of time cannot be ignored as a factor in
bringing objectivity to trial.” ’ Whisenhant v. State, 555 So.2d 219,
224 (Ala.Crim.App.1988), aff'd, 555 So.2d 235 (Ala.1989) (quoting
Dannelly v. State, 47 Ala.App. 363, 364, 254 So.2d 434, 435
(Ala.Crim.App.1971)).
“ ‘In connection with pretrial publicity, there are
two situations which mandate a change of venue: 1) when the accused
has demonstrated “actual prejudice” against him on the part of the
jurors; 2) when there is “presumed prejudice” resulting from
community saturation with such prejudicial pretrial publicity that no
impartial jury can be selected. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86
S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966); Rideau [v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963)]; Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965); Ex parte Grayson, 479
So.2d 76, 80 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S.Ct. 189, 88
L.Ed.2d 157 (1985); Coleman v. Zant, 708 F.2d 541 (11th.
Cir.1983).’
Here, Blackmon argued that, based on the pretrial
publicity and the alleged community saturation, the presumed-prejudice
standard applied in this case. In Blanton we discussed the enormous
burden that the presumed-prejudice standard imposes on a defendant.
We stated:
“For prejudice to be presumed under this standard,
the defendant must show: 1) that the pretrial publicity was
prejudicial and inflammatory and 2) that the prejudicial pretrial
publicity saturated the community where the trial was held. See
Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir.1985). Under this standard,
a defendant carries an extremely heavy burden of proof.
“ ‘Hunt relies on the “presumed prejudice” standard
announced in Rideau [v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963)], and applied
by the United States Supreme Court in Estes [v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965),] and Sheppard [v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16
L.Ed.2d 600 (1966)]. This standard was defined by the Eleventh Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals in Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487 (11th
Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 106 S.Ct. 2289, 90 L.Ed.2d 730
(1986). The court stated: “Prejudice is presumed from pretrial
publicity when pretrial publicity is sufficiently prejudicial and
inflammatory and the prejudicial pretrial publicity saturated the
community where the trials were held.” 778 F.2d at 1490 (emphasis
added [in Hunt ] ). See also Holladay v. State, 549 So.2d 122, 125
(Ala.Cr.App.1988), affirmed, 549 So.2d 135 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1012, 110 S.Ct. 575, 107 L.Ed.2d 569 (1989).
“ ‘In determining whether the “presumed prejudice”
standard exists the trial court should look at “the totality of the
surrounding facts.” Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 2885,
81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S.Ct.
2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct.
1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). The presumptive prejudice standard is
“rarely” applicable, and is reserved for only “extreme situations”.
Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d at 1537. “In fact, our research has
uncovered only a very few ․ cases in which relief was granted on the
basis of presumed prejudice.” Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d at 1490.
“ ‘Hunt had the burden of showing that “prejudicial
pretrial publicity” saturated the community. Sheppard, supra. “[T]he
burden placed upon the petitioner to show that pretrial publicity
deprived him of his right to a fair trial before an impartial jury is
an extremely heavy one.” Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d at 1537.
“Prejudicial” publicity usually must consist of much more than
stating the charge, and of reportage of the pretrial and trial
processes. “Publicity” and “prejudice” are not the same thing.
Excess publicity does not automatically or necessarily mean that the
publicity was prejudicial.
“ ‘․
“ ‘․ In order to meet the burden of showing the
necessity for a change of venue due to pretrial publicity on the
grounds of community saturation, “the appellant must show more than
the fact ‘that a case generates even widespread publicity.’ ” Oryang
v. State, 642 So.2d 979, 983 (Ala.Cr.App.1993), quoting, Thompson v.
State, 581 So.2d 1216, 1233 (Ala.Cr.App.1991), cert. denied, [502]
U.S. [1030], 112 S.Ct. 868, 116 L.Ed.2d 774 (1992).
“ ‘ “ ‘Newspaper articles alone would not
necessitate a change in venue unless it was shown that the articles so
affected the general citizenry through the insertion of such
sensational, accusational or denunciatory statements, that a fair and
impartial trial was impossible. Patton v. State, 246 Ala. 639, 21
So.2d 844 [(1945)].’ ”
We have reviewed the articles presented in support
of the motion for a change of venue. The majority were factual
accounts of the murder of the child and of Blackmon's arrest. There
were several editorial articles that denounced Blackmon's actions;
however, very little reference was made to her in those articles.
Compared to other capital-murder cases, the publicity in this case was
not extensive.
We have also reviewed the voir dire examination of
the prospective jurors. Only a handful of the prospective jurors had
heard about the case. The voir dire fails to support Blackmon's
claim that the community was saturated with pretrial publicity of the
murder. Clearly, Blackmon failed to meet her burden of showing that
prejudice was presumed and that a change of venue was warranted. The
circuit court correctly denied Blackmon's motion for a change of
venue.
III.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court erred in
denying her Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90
L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), motion. Specifically, Blackmon argues that the
State erroneously removed five of the eight prospective black jurors
on the jury venire and, she argues, the reasons given for striking the
jurors were not sufficient. In her brief, Blackmon fails to identify
any specific juror who was erroneously struck.
The record shows that Blackmon stated that her
reason for the Batson objection was that the State removed five of the
eight black prospective jurors on the jury venire.2
The circuit court held that Blackmon failed to make a prima facie
case of discrimination, but it nonetheless instructed the State to
give its reasons for removing the black jurors.
“Although the trial court acknowledged that the
appellant had failed to prove a prima facie case of racial
discrimination based solely on these numbers, it nevertheless required
the prosecutor to explain his reasons for his strikes. Therefore, we
must examine the stated reasons. ‘[O]nce a prosecutor has offered a
race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial
court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional
discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had
made a prima facie showing becomes moot.’ Hernandez v. New York, 500
U.S. 352, 358-60, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991).”
Dallas v. State, 711 So.2d 1101, 1104
(Ala.Crim.App.1997).
“ ‘It is within the sound discretion of the trial
court to determine if peremptory challenges of black jurors were
motivated by intentional racial discrimination. The court's findings
in this regard are afforded great deference and will not be reversed
on appeal absent clear error. Ex parte Lynn, 543 So.2d 709
(Ala.1988).’ ”
Ex parte McNair, 653 So.2d 353, 357-58 (Ala.1994),
quoting Jelks v. Caputo, 607 So.2d 177, 179 (Ala.1992).
The State gave the following explanations for
removing the black prospective jurors: Juror number 17 was removed
because she had expressed reservations about imposing the death
penalty and because her son had been convicted of a felony. See
Click v. State, 695 So.2d 209 (Ala.Crim.App.1996) (a juror's view on
the death penalty is a valid race-neutral reason for striking the
prospective juror); Lewis v. State, 741 So.2d 452
(Ala.Crim.App.1999), and Thomas v. State, 611 So.2d 416
(Ala.Crim.App.1992) (fact that family members have prior convictions
is valid race-neutral reason for removing juror). Juror number 21
was removed because her son had been prosecuted in Houston County for
burglary. Juror number 34 was struck because she knew Louise
Johnson, Blackmon's mother-in-law, who was expected to testify. See
Temmis v. State, 665 So.2d 953 (Ala.Crim.App.1994) (fact that
prospective juror knows witness is valid race-neutral reason for
removing the juror). Juror number 37 was struck because her
sister-in-law was in prison for a shooting that occurred in 1998.
Juror number 47 was struck because she knew Wayne Johnson, Blackmon's
father-in-law, who was expected to testify. Juror number 58 was struck
because she opposed the death penalty.3
As the above cited cases demonstrate we have upheld
all of the reasons given by the State. The circuit court committed
no error in denying Blackmon's Batson motion.
IV.
Blackmon argues that the trial court erred in
denying her motion for a judgment of acquittal because “the State
introduced no direct evidence that directly connected Blackmon to any
of the alleged causes of death of the victim.” She asserts that
there was insufficient evidence that she committed any crime and that
she was convicted on “mere conjecture, surmise and speculation.”
This Court's duty when reviewing a claim on the
denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal is to determine whether
there was legally sufficient evidence to support a conviction for the
charged offense. See Marlowe v. State, 854 So.2d 1182
(Ala.Crim.App.2002). We review the evidence in a light most
favorable to the State. Fitch v. State, 851 So.2d 103, 120
(Ala.Crim.App.2001). “ ‘The test used in determining the sufficiency
of evidence to sustain a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational finder of
fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ ” Nunn v. State, 697 So.2d 497, 498 (Ala.Crim.App.1997),
quoting O'Neal v. State, 602 So.2d 462, 464 (Ala.Crim.App.1992).
“ ‘Where a defendant's conviction is based solely
on circumstantial evidence, “if the circumstances can be reconciled
with the theory that someone else may have done the act, then the
conviction is due to be reversed.” Ex parte Brown, 499 So.2d 787, 788
(Ala.1986) (emphasis in original). “Circumstantial evidence alone is
enough to support a guilty verdict of the most heinous crime, provided
the jury believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is
guilty.” White v. State, 294 Ala. 265, 272, 314 So.2d 857, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 373, 46 L.Ed.2d 288 (1975).
“Circumstantial evidence is in nowise considered inferior evidence
and is entitled to the same weight as direct evidence provided it
points to the guilt of the accused.” Cochran v. State, 500 So.2d
1161, 1177 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), affirmed in pertinent part, reversed in
part on other grounds, Ex parte Cochran, 500 So.2d 1179 (Ala.1985).
“It is not necessary for a conviction that the defendant be proved
guilty to the ‘exclusion of every possibility of innocence.’ ” Burks
v. State, 117 Ala. 148, 23 So. 530 (1898). “The facts and
circumstances in evidence, if dissevered and disconnected, may be weak
and inconclusive; but their probative force, when combined, as it was
the province of the jury to combine them, under proper instructions
from the court, may have satisfied them of the guilt of the
defendant.” Howard v. State, 108 Ala. 571, 18 So. 813, 815 (1895).'
“White v. State, 546 So.2d 1014, 1017
(Ala.Crim.App.1989). Accord Williams v. State, 795 So.2d 753, 775
(Ala.Crim.App.1999), aff'd, 795 So.2d 785 (Ala.2001).”
Irvin v. State, 940 So.2d 331, 361-62
(Ala.Crim.App.2005).
“[B]ecause intent is a state of mind, it is rarely
susceptible of direct or positive proof. Instead, the element of
intent must usually be inferred from the facts testified to by the
witnesses together with the circumstances as developed by the
evidence. Seaton v. State, 645 So.2d 341, 343 (Ala.Crim.App.1994)
(quoting McCord v. State, 501 So.2d 520, 528-29 (Ala.Crim.App.1986)).
Intent ‘ “ ‘may be inferred from the character of the assault, the
use of a deadly weapon and other attendant circumstances.’ ” '
Farrior v. State, 728 So.2d 691, 695 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) (quoting
Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 569, 574 (Ala.Crim.App.1991), quoting, in
turn, Johnson v. State, 390 So.2d 1160, 1167 (Ala.Crim.App.1980)).
Finally, ‘ “[t]he intent of a defendant at the time of the offense is
a jury question.” ’ C.G. v. State, 841 So.2d 281, 291
(Ala.Crim.App.2001), aff'd, 841 So.2d 292 (Ala.2002), quoting Downing
v. State, 620 So.2d 983, 985 (Ala.Crim.App.1993).”
Pilley v. State, 930 So.2d 550, 564-65
(Ala.Crim.App.2005).
Blackmon was indicted for capital murder under
§ 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala.Code 1975. This section states: “The
following [is a] capital offense [ ]: ․ [m]urder when the victim is
less than fourteen years of age.”
“(a) A person commits the crime of murder if:
“(1) With intent to cause the death of another
person, he causes the death of that person or of another person.”
§ 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975.
The State's evidence showed that 28-month-old
Dominiqua Blackmon was bludgeoned to death with a pool cue.
Dominiqua died of multiple blunt-force injuries. There was blood in
numerous places in Blackmon's trailer. The blood matched
Dominiqua's. Approximately two hours before the paramedics were
called to Blackmon's mobile home, Dominiqua showed no sign of any
injuries. Blackmon was the sole caretaker of the child during that
period. The victim had an imprint of the sole of a shoe on her
chest; that imprint matched the sole of the shoes Blackmon was
wearing at the time of the murder.
Clearly, the evidence presented by the State was
legally sufficient to present the matter of Blackmon's guilt to the
jury for its determination. The circuit court committed no error in
denying Blackmon's motion for a judgment of acquittal.
V.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court erred in
denying her motion for a new trial. She makes several different
arguments in support of this claim.
A.
Blackmon first argues that “the selection of an age
factor for alleged victims as a determining factor in liability for
capital murder prosecution is arbitrary and capricious, lacking in
rational basis.” She asserts that § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala.Code 1975,
which defines a capital offense as “[m]urder when the victim is less
than fourteen years of age” violates her rights to due process and
equal protection of the law.
In Ex parte Woodard, 631 So.2d 1065
(Ala.Crim.App.1993), this Court upheld the constitutionality of
§ 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala.Code 1975. We stated:
“The child-murder provision is not arbitrary and
does not violate any equal protection right.
“ ‘ “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment goes no further than to prohibit invidious discrimination․
If there is some reasonable basis for the recognition of separate
classes, and if the disparate treatment of the classes has a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the lawmakers, the
Constitution is not offended. The transgression arises only when the
classification rests upon grounds wholly irrelevant to achievement of
the State's objective; the separate treatment must admit of but one
conclusion beyond a rational doubt, i.e., that the basis therefore is
arbitrary and unreasonable and without relevance to the legislative
goal.” ’
“Goodson v. State, 588 So.2d 509, 514
(Ala.Cr.App.1991) (quoting State v. Thompson, 133 N.J.Super. 180, 336
A.2d 11, 14 (1975)). ‘ “Because the statute does not proscribe
activities that are legally protected and does not involve any legally
cognizable ‘suspect’ class, ‘the classification must be upheld if “any
state of facts rationally justifying it is demonstrated to or
perceived by the court.” ’ United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215,
1219 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1057, 107 S.Ct. 2199, 95
L.Ed.2d 854 (1987).” ' Hardy v. State, 576 So.2d 685, 686
(Ala.Cr.App.1991) (‘ “The legislature of Alabama ‘wanted to lessen the
risk that drugs would be readily available to school children. It is
surely rational to achieve that goal by increasing penalties for those
who sell drugs near schools.’ ” '). Here, the classification adopted
by the Legislature of child-murder as a capital offense is not
arbitrary and capricious, but reasonable and appropriate.
“․
“It is the holding of this Court that Ala.Code
1975, § 13A-5-40(a)(15) is not unconstitutional.”
631 So.2d at 1073. Other states have likewise
upheld child-murder statutes against claims that there is no rational
basis for distinguishing the victim's age when defining a capital
offense. See State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35, 826 A.2d 1126 (2003)
(upheld statute that defined capital murder as murder of child under
the age of 16); Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544
(Tex.Crim.App.1997) (upheld statute that defined capital offense as
murder of child under the age of 6). Cf. State v. Smith, 193 Ariz.
452, 974 P.2d 431 (1999) (upheld victim's age as statutory aggravating
circumstance to support imposition of death sentence).
For the reasons stated in Woodard, Blackmon's
argument is without merit.
B.
Blackmon also makes several different arguments
concerning the United States Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).
The United States Supreme Court in Apprendi held
that a fact that increases a penalty above the statutory maximum must
be presented to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), the
United States Supreme Court applied its earlier holding in Apprendi to
death-penalty cases and stated “[c]apital defendants ․ are entitled to
a jury determination on any fact on which the legislature conditions
an increased in their maximum punishment.” 4
Ring, 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428.
Since the United States Supreme Court released its
decision in Ring, this Court has had numerous occasions to discuss the
impact of that case. In Stallworth v. State, 868 So.2d 1128
(Ala.Crim.App.2001) (opinion on return to remand), we held that if the
aggravating circumstance that elevated the punishment to death was
also an element of the capital offense, Apprendi was not violated
because the jury's verdict in the guilt phase found that fact to exist
beyond a reasonable doubt. See also Barber v. State, 952 So.2d 393
(Ala.Crim.App.2005); Pilley v. State, 930 So.2d 550
(Ala.Crim.App.2005); Flowers v. State, 922 So.2d 938
(Ala.Crim.App.2005); Walker v. State, 932 So.2d 140
(Ala.Crim.App.2004); Jones v. State, 853 So.2d 1036
(Ala.Crim.App.2002).
Blackmon first argues that the holding in Apprendi
renders Alabama's death-penalty statute unconstitutional because the
jury's verdict is advisory. In Turner v. State, 924 So.2d 737
(Ala.Crim.App.2002), we specifically held that “Ring did not
invalidate Alabama's law that vests the ultimate sentence
determination in the hands of the trial judge and not a jury.” 924
So.2d at 785. We cited the United States Supreme Court's footnote in
Ring, which stated: “Nor does he argue that the Sixth Amendment
required the jury to make the ultimate determination whether to impose
the death penalty.” Ring, 536 U.S. at 597, n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 2428.
Also, in Ex parte Waldrop, 859 So.2d 1181 (Ala.2002), the Alabama
Supreme Court stated:
“[T]he determination whether the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances is not a finding
of fact or an element of the offense. Consequently, Ring and
Apprendi do not require that a jury weigh the aggravating
circumstances and the mitigating circumstances.”
859 So.2d at 1190.
Blackmon also argues that the decision in Apprendi
mandates that a special verdict form be used so that the jury can
designate what aggravating circumstance or circumstances it found to
exist. We specifically addressed and rejected this argument in
Bryant v. State, 951 So.2d 732, 737 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (opinion on
return to remand). We stated:
“[Bryant] contends that the United States Supreme
Court's decisions in Apprendi and Ring mandate the use of such verdict
forms.
“This Court has rejected similar claims in previous
death-penalty decisions. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 932 So.2d 140,
159 (Ala.Crim.App.2004); Adams v. State, 955 So.2d 1037, 1105
(Ala.Crim.App.2003). The Alabama Supreme Court has likewise rejected
this argument. The Supreme Court has held, in numerous cases, that
the jury's verdict finding a defendant guilty of capital murder during
the guilt phase of his trial indicated that the jury had unanimously
found a proffered aggravating circumstance included within the
§ 13A-5-40(a), Ala.Code 1975, definition of the particular
capital-murder offense charged in the indictment. See, e.g., Ex
parte Hodges, 856 So.2d 936 (Ala.2003); Ex parte Waldrop, 859 So.2d
1181 (Ala.2002); Stallworth v. State, 868 So.2d 1128
(Ala.Crim.App.2001) (opinion on return to second remand), cert.
denied, 868 So.2d 1189 (Ala.2003). But see Ex parte McGriff, 908
So.2d 1024, 1039 (Ala.2004) (authorizing prospective use of a
penalty-phase special interrogatory). [5] Moreover, in Ex parte
McNabb, 887 So.2d 998 (Ala.2004), the Supreme Court held that even a
nonunanimous recommendation of death by the jury proved that the jury,
including the jurors who voted against the recommendation of death,
had unanimously found the existence of a proffered aggravating
circumstance, even though the circumstance was not included within the
definition of the particular capital-murder offense charged in the
indictment, because the trial court had specifically instructed the
jury that it could not proceed to a vote on whether to impose the
death penalty unless it had already unanimously agreed that the
aggravating circumstance existed.”
Bryant, 951 So.2d at 750-51.
In this case the only aggravating circumstance that
was alleged and found to exist was that the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel as compared to other capital murders.
See § 13A-5-49(8), Ala.Code 1975. This aggravating circumstance was
not an element of the capital offense. However, the circuit court
instructed the jury in the penalty phase that it could not proceed to
a vote on whether to impose the death penalty unless it first
determined that the aggravating circumstance that the offense was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel was present. The circuit
court's instructions in regard to this issue were very specific and
thorough. The jury recommended, by a vote of 10 to 2, that Blackmon
be sentenced to death.
“Thus, the jury's 10-2 vote recommending death
established that the jury unanimously found the existence of the
‘especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel’ aggravating circumstance,
giving the trial judge the discretion to sentence Duke to death.”
Duke v. State, 889 So.2d 1, 43 (Ala.Crim.App.2002)
(footnote omitted), vacated on other grounds by Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), Duke v. Alabama, 544
U.S. 901, 125 S.Ct. 1588, 161 L.Ed.2d 270 (2005). Thus, there is no
Apprendi or Ring violation in this case.
VI.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court erred in
denying her motion challenging as unconstitutional her sentence of
death by electrocution because the method of imposing the death
sentence had been changed.
Blackmon was sentenced to death on June 7, 2002.
The Alabama Legislature enacted § 15-18-82.1, Ala.Code 1975, effective
July 1, 2002. That statute specifically designates Alabama's method
of execution as lethal injection. Blackmon argues that because the
method of execution was changed after her sentence of death by
electrocution was pronounced, her sentence of death by electrocution
is unconstitutional.
Section § 15-18-82.1(a), Ala.Code 1975, effective
July 1, 2002, provides: “A death sentence shall be executed by lethal
injection, unless the person sentenced to death affirmatively elects
to be executed by electrocution.” This statute applies to every
person on death row in Alabama no matter when his or her sentence of
death was pronounced. As the legislature provided in 15-18-82.1(d):
“The provisions of the opinion and all points of
law decided by the United States Supreme Court in Malloy v. South
Carolina, 237 U.S. 180 (1915), finding that the Ex Post Facto Clause
of the United States Constitution is not violated by a legislatively
enacted change in the method of execution for a sentence of death
validly imposed for previously committed capital murders, are adopted
by the Legislature as the law of this state.”
Alabama's change in its method of execution to
lethal injection applies to Blackmon and renders this claim moot.
VII.
Blackmon argues that the State failed to prove that
the murder was especially, heinous, atrocious, or cruel as compared to
other capital murders. Specifically, she argues that the State
failed to prove that the victim was conscious during any of her attack
and that she suffered.
In Alabama, for the manner of homicide to meet the
statutory definition of especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, the
murder must be unnecessarily torturous to the victim. See Ex parte
Kyzer, 399 So.2d 330, 334 (Ala.1981). In making this determination
we consider whether the violence involved in the killing was beyond
what was necessary to cause death, whether the victim experienced
appreciable suffering after a swift assault, and whether there was
psychological torture. See Norris v. State, 793 So.2d 847
(Ala.Crim.App.1999).
The circuit court, when considering whether to
present this aggravating circumstance to the jury, stated:
“In Norris, the Court stated that the prosecution
offered no evidence from which the Court could reasonably conclude
that in that case [the victim] was conscious and aware after he was
shot the first time. The only express mention of his state of
consciousness was Henson's testimony that, in his telephone
conversation to Norris after Herbert's funeral he told Norris that
Herbert had never regained consciousness. The Court goes on to say,
moreover, the prosecution presented no evidence that Herbert would
have felt pain in the event he was unconscious. And then there's a
note, Compare Brown v. State [, 663 So.2d 1028, 1034
(Ala.Crim.App.1995)] in which the Court sated, especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance was supported by the
medical examiner's testimony that, ‘although the victim was
unconsciousness he still would have been able to feel pain.’ Again,
Dr. Parades testified to that in this situation. That there is some
degree of feeling pain when one is comatose or unconscious. The blow
to the skull causing death possible but not likely. Some injuries
were inflicted while she was conscious. And that said injuries were
painful.”
In the circuit court's order fixing Blackmon's
sentence at death, the court made the following findings concerning
this aggravating circumstance:
“The Court concurs with the jury's finding that
this offense was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel when compared
to other capital cases. Numerous physicians testified that
approximately 30 fresh wounds were found on the body. One wound to
the chest was so forceful as to leave the imprint of a sandal mark on
the child's chest. Evidence also indicated that the child was beaten
repeatedly with cue stick. The Defendant argued that the medical
experts could not tell the precise order in which the injuries were
inflicted nor could they state which injury caused the death of the
child. They further argued that it was possible that the first blow
killed the child and therefore she would not have experienced pain.
However, Dr. Parades testified that bruising would not be caused when
the heart is not pumping. He indicated there were over 30 external
and internal injuries. The victim would have experienced a lot of
pain during the beating. He further stated that the injuries were
beyond that needed to cause death. There were pattern injuries that
took more than one blow the victim would have been conscious during
part of the assault. He further stated the injuries were severe and
the pain associated with them would also be severe. While he could
not tell the order in which the blows fell he believed that some of
the injuries were inflicted while she was still conscious. Dr.
Parades stated that it was possible that the blow to the skull could
have caused unconsciousness but nonetheless even one who is comatose
or unconscious feels some degree of pain. He further stated that the
blow to the skull causing death was possible but not likely. He,
however, could not tell how long she was alive.
“The Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
that this capital murder was heinous, atrocious and cruel when
compared to other capital offenses. The Court concurs with the
jury's finding.”
Dr. Alfredo Parades testified at the penalty-phase
hearing that Dominiqua had bruises all over her body and that a body
will not normally bruise if the heart is not pumping. Parades said
that all of the victim's injuries would have been painful, that they
were extensive-more than necessary to cause death-and he believed,
based on the extent of the injuries, that Dominiqua was conscious
initially and then lost consciousness at some point during the attack.
Evidence also showed that Dominiqua vomited during
the beating. The paramedics testified that Dominiqua was covered in
vomit. Dominiqua's blood was also discovered in several areas of the
trailer; she had no cloths but a diaper and socks on when she was
discovered; and her socks were soaked in blood.
Clearly, there was sufficient evidence for the jury
to conclude that the manner of death in this case was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel when compared to other capital cases.
We have consistently held that brutal beatings that result in death
meet the statutory definition of especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel. See Brooks v. State, 695 So.2d 176 (Ala.Crim.App.1996),
aff'd, 695 So.2d 184 (1997); Smith v. State, 795 So.2d 788
(Ala.Crim.App.2000); Ashley v. State, 651 So.2d 1096
(Ala.Crim.App.1994); McGahee v. State, 632 So.2d 976 (Ala.Crim.App.),
aff'd, 632 So.2d 981 (Ala.1993); Freeman v. State, 555 So.2d 196
(Ala.Crim.App.1988). Other states have also found that brutal
beatings that result in death are especially heinous. See State v.
Gerlaugh, 135 Ariz. 89, 659 P.2d 642 (1983) (brutal beating lasting 15
minutes was sufficient to satisfy aggravating circumstance that the
murder was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved
manner); Scott v. State, 494 So.2d 1134, 1137 (Fla.1986) (“The brutal
senseless beatings which the victim was forced to endure further set
this crime apart form the norm of capital felonies and clearly reflect
the conscienceless, pitiless and unnecessarily torturous nature of
this crime.”); State v. Sepulvado, 672 So.2d 158 (La.1996).
Blackmon brutally bludgeoned to death a helpless
two-year-old child using a pool cue and sometime during the beating
stomped on her chest. By anyone's standards the murder in this case
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. This aggravating
circumstance was correctly found by both the jury and the circuit
court.
VIII.
Last, as required by § 13A-5-53, Ala.Code 1975, we
review the propriety of Blackmon's conviction and sentence of death.
Blackmon was indicted for, and convicted of, murdering her
two-year-old daughter, a violation of § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala.Code
1975.
The record reflects that Blackmon's sentence was
not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary factor. Section 13A-5-53(b)(1), Ala.Code 1975.
The circuit court's sentencing order reflects that
the court found as the sole aggravating circumstance that the murder
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Section 13A-5-59(8),
Ala.Code 1975. We detailed the circuit court's findings on this
circumstance earlier in this opinion and found that this aggravating
circumstance was correctly applied in this case. The circuit court
found no statutory mitigating circumstance but found the following
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances that had been presented by
defense counsel:
“(1) Patricia Blackmon is a devoted wife. She may
have been a devoted wife. However, her husband was in prison and did
not testify. He would be in a better position to know if she was a
devoted wife instead of other family members. Nonetheless, the Court
considered this mitigating circumstance.
(2) Patricia Blackmon is a devoted daughter-in-law.
Louise Johnson, the mother-in-law, testified to this fact. The
Court also considers this mitigating circumstance.
“(3) The juvenile court of Houston County vested
custody of Dominiqua Bryant in Patricia Blackmon. This mitigator was
proved by the evidence and the Court will consider same.
“(4) The Houston County Department of Human
Resources gave physical custody of Dominiqua to Patricia Blackmon.
This mitigator was proved by the evidence and the Court will consider
same.
“(5) Tammy Wigfall repeatedly used Patricia
Blackmon as a caregiver for her children. The Court considers this
mitigator.
“(6) Patricia Blackmon has been a positive
influence in the Houston County Jail. The Court considers this
mitigator.
“(7) Patricia Blackmon is a human being. This
mitigator is axiomatic. All people are human beings. The Court
considers this mitigator.”
The circuit court weighed the aggravating
circumstance and the mitigating circumstances, considered the jury's
recommendation of death, and sentenced Blackmon to death.
Pursuant to § 13A-5-53(b)(2), Ala.Code 1975, we
must independently weigh the aggravating circumstances and the
mitigating circumstances to determine the propriety of Blackmon's
sentence of death. Blackmon, in a cold and brutal manner, bludgeoned
her adopted two-year-old daughter to death with a pool cue. This
Court is convinced, after independently weighing the aggravating
circumstance and the mitigating circumstances that death was the
appropriate punishment in this case.
Neither was Blackmon's sentence disproportionate or
excessive when compared to penalties imposed in similar cases. See
Minor v. State, 914 So.2d 372 (Ala.Crim.App.2004); Freeman v. State,
555 So.2d 196 (Ala.Crim.App.1988).
Last, we have searched the record for any error
that may have adversely affected Blackmon's substantial rights and
have found none. See Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.
Blackmon's conviction and sentence to death are due
to be, and are hereby, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
On Application for Rehearing
The appellant, Patricia Blackmon, was convicted of
capital murder in the beating death of her 28-month-old daughter,
Dominiqua. See § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala.Code 1975, which makes capital
the intentional murder of a child under 14 years of age. The jury
recommended that Blackmon be sentenced to death. The circuit court
accepted the jury's recommendation.
On August 5, 2005, we affirmed Blackmon's
conviction and death sentence in a 41-page opinion.*
See Blackmon v. State, 7 So.3d 397 (Ala.Crim.App.2005). On the same
date we released our decision in her case, Blackmon's attorney was
suspended from the practice of law. Blackmon was appointed new
counsel and that attorney was allowed to withdraw when Blackmon
retained another attorney. Because of the unique facts presented in
this case, we allowed newly retained counsel the rare opportunity of
filing a brief on rehearing that raised new issues that had not been
previously presented to this Court in Blackmon's original brief.1
See Rule 2(a), Ala.R.App.P.
The State filed a petition for a writ of
prohibition in the Alabama Supreme Court attacking this Court's
acceptance of a new brief on rehearing. On December 16, 2005, the
Alabama Supreme Court by order denied the State's petition for a writ
of prohibition. State v. Blackmon [Ms. 1050175]. We now address
Blackmon's claims raised for the first time in her rehearing brief.
I.
Blackmon argues that the State violated the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106
S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), because it used its peremptory
strikes in a racially discriminatory manner.2
Specifically, she argues that the State failed to strike whites for
the same reasons used to strike black prospective jurors; thus, she
argues, there is evidence of disparate treatment of veniremembers in
violation of Batson.
At trial, the only ground raised to support the
Batson motion was the number of strikes the State had used to remove
black potential jurors. This specific argument was not made to the
circuit court; therefore, we review this claim for plain error. See
Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.
We have painstakingly reviewed the voir dire
examination of the prospective jurors and the juror questionnaires
that were completed by the jurors and forwarded to this Court. The
State used 18 peremptory strikes to remove prospective jurors. Of
those 18 strikes, the State struck 6 black prospective jurors; 2
black jurors sat on Blackmon's jury. Blackmon used all of her 18
strikes to remove white prospective jurors.
Our review of the record shows that the State
exercised its strikes to remove the following prospective jurors:
1. Prospective juror number 89, a white male, who
noted on his juror questionnaire that he had a felony conviction in
the State of California and had served time in prison.
2. Prospective juror number 51, a white female, who
indicated on her questionnaire that her son had been convicted of
assault and had served time in prison.
3. Prospective juror number 58, a black female, who
indicated during voir dire examination that she was opposed to the
death penalty.
4. Prospective juror number 47, a black male, who
indicated during voir dire that he knew one of the State's witness.
5. Prospective juror number 72, a white male, who
indicated that he was not sure that he could sentence anyone to death.
6. Prospective juror 34, a black female, who
indicated during voir dire that she knew a relative of the victim's.
7. Prospective juror 17, a black female, who
indicated that she had reservations about the death penalty.
8. Prospective juror number 45, a white male, who
indicated on his questionnaire that he had served on a prior jury and
the jury had rendered a not-guilty verdict.
9. Prospective juror number 83, a white female, who
indicated on her juror questionnaire that she could not truthfully
state her view on the death penalty.
10. Prospective juror number 71, a white male, who
indicated on his questionnaire that his sister had been raped.
11. Prospective juror number 65, a white male, who
indicated on his questionnaire that he had been accused of a crime and
who answered during voir dire that he would not be comfortable sitting
on the case.
12. Prospective juror number 76, a white male, who
indicated during voir dire that the movie “The Green Mile” had had an
impact on how he views the death penalty.
13. Prospective juror number 63, a white male, who
indicated on his juror questionnaire that he had previously been on a
jury on a rape case and the verdict had been not guilty.
14. Prospective juror number 28, a white female,
who indicated that the movie “The Green Mile” had an impact on her
view of the death penalty.
15. Prospective juror number 91, a white female,
who indicated that her niece had been murdered.
16. Prospective juror number 21, a black female,
who indicated that her son had been convicted of burglary.
17. Prospective juror number 37, a black female,
who indicated that her sister-in-law was in prison for a shooting.
18. Prospective juror number 60, a white male who
served as an alternate, who indicated on his questionnaire that he
knew several members of the district attorney's office.
In Blackmon's brief on rehearing she cites four
white prospective jurors who, she argues, were not removed even though
they indicated that they had had involvement with law enforcement or
that their family members had been involved with law enforcement.
She specifically cites prospective jurors 24, 46, 57, and 73.
The record shows that prospective jurors number 24
and 57 were removed by Blackmon's use of her fifth and sixth
peremptory strikes. Prospective juror number 46 indicated during
voir dire that her nephew was involved in a case handled by the
district attorney's office but that the case had not concluded. She
also indicated that she had not seen her nephew in a long time and had
little information about the pending case concerning her nephew.
There is no more information in the record. Prospective juror number
73 indicated that she had been accused of neglect by the Department of
Human Resources. However, she also indicated during voir dire that
she had been treated fairly and that the matter had been resolved to
her satisfaction.
The record also shows that white prospective jurors
89, 51, 65 were removed because of their involvement with the law or a
family member's involvement with the law. It appears that every
potential juror who indicated that they had been in prison or had a
relative who had been or was in prison was removed. Prospective
juror number 46 did not indicate that she had a relative who had been
convicted of any crime.
The United States Supreme Court in Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991), stated the
following concerning the deference that we give a trial court's
finding on a Batson motion:
“In Batson, we explained that the trial court's
decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents
a finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal:
“ ‘In a recent Title VII sex discrimination case,
we stated that “a finding of intentional discrimination is a finding
of fact” entitled to appropriate deference by a reviewing court.
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). Since the
trial judge's findings in the context under consideration here largely
turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should
give those findings great deference. Id., at 575-576.’ Batson,
supra, [476 U.S.,] at 98, n. 21.
“․
“Deference to trial court findings on the issue of
discriminatory intent makes particular sense in this context because,
as we noted in Batson, the finding ‘largely will turn on evaluation of
credibility.’ 476 U.S., at 98, n. 21. In the typical peremptory
challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel's
race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be
believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue,
and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who
exercises the challenge. As with the state of mind of a juror,
evaluation of the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and
credibility lies ‘peculiarly within a trial judge's province.’
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985), citing Patton v. Yount,
467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984).”
500 U.S. at 364-65, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (emphasis
added). “ ‘A circuit court's ruling on a Batson objection is entitled
to great deference, and we will reverse such a ruling only if it is
clearly erroneous.’ ” Brown v. State, 982 So.2d 565, 587
(Ala.Crim.App.2006) (quoting Talley v. State, 687 So.2d 1261, 1267
(Ala.Crim.App.1996)). Based on our review of the record we cannot
say that the circuit court's ruling was clearly erroneous.
Blackmon also argues that the State violated the
United States Supreme Court's holding in J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S.
127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), by discriminating against
jurors based on gender.
This issue is raised for the first time on
rehearing; therefore, we review this issue for plain error. See
Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.
As the Alabama Supreme Court stated in Ex parte
Trawick, 698 So.2d 162 (Ala.1997):
“A party making a Batson or J.E.B. challenge bears
the burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination and, in the
absence of such proof, the prosecution is not required to state its
reasons for its peremptory challenges. Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609
(Ala.1987); Ex parte Bird, 594 So.2d 676 (Ala.1991). In Branch,
this Court discussed a number of relevant factors a defendant could
submit in attempting to establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination; those factors are likewise applicable in the case of
a defendant seeking to establish gender discrimination in the jury
selection process. Those factors, stated in a manner applicable to
gender discrimination, are as follows: (1) evidence that the jurors
in question shared only the characteristic of gender and were in all
other respects as heterogenous as the community as a whole; (2) a
pattern of strikes against jurors of one gender on the particular
venire; (3) the past conduct of the state's attorney in using
peremptory challenges to strike members of one gender; (4) the type
and manner of the state's questions and statements during voir dire;
(5) the type and manner of questions directed to the challenged
juror, including a lack of questions; (6) disparate treatment of
members of the jury venire who had the same characteristics or who
answered a question in the same manner or in a similar manner; and
(7) separate examination of members of the venire. Additionally, the
court may consider whether the State used all or most of its strikes
against members of one gender.”
698 So.2d at 167-68.
To find plain error in the context of a Batson or
J.E.B. violation, the record must supply an inference that the
prosecutor was “engaged in the practice of purposeful discrimination.”
Ex parte Watkins, 509 So.2d 1074, 1076 (Ala.1987). Here, the record
shows that the State struck nine males and nine females. The jury
was composed of eight women and four men. There is no inference of
purposeful discrimination in violation of J.E.B. Accordingly, we
find no plain error.
II.
Blackmon argues that the prosecutor committed
reversible error by making a direct comment on Blackmon's failure to
testify. Specifically, Blackmon challenges the following argument by
the prosecutor in his closing argument in the guilt phase:
“She never did it. She never attempted to perform
CPR. But, they want you to think that she did and she caused the
injuries accidentally.
“We have not had a doctor yet that agreed with
that. Wasn't a failed CPR attempt or trained doctors,
board-certified, some specialists in forensic pathology said no. She
is essentially dead on the floor. She has no pulse․ Not breathing.
Pupils are fixed and dilated. Can't say clinical death because he
is not a doctor. She is dead already because of what Ms. Blackmon
did to her.
“You never heard anything else about anybody else
being in there. Ms. Blackmon and Dominiqua. She didn't fall and
hit her head once and end up in that condition. It just didn't
happen.”
(R. 1016-17.)
Initially, we observe that Blackmon never objected
to the above-challenged comments. Therefore, we review this issue
for plain error. See Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.
“ ‘ “This court has concluded that the failure to
object to improper prosecutorial arguments ․ should be weighed as part
of our evaluation of the claim on the merits because of its suggestion
that the defense did not consider the comments in question to be
particularly harmful.” ’ Kuenzel v. State, 577 So.2d 474, 489
(Ala.Crim.App.1990), aff'd, 577 So.2d 531 (Ala.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 886, 112 S.Ct. 242, 116 L.Ed.2d 197 (1991), quoting Johnson v.
Wainwright, 778 F.2d 623, 629 n. 6 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 201, 98 L.Ed.2d 152 (1987).”
Johnson v. State, 823 So.2d 1, 45
(Ala.Crim.App.2001).
The Alabama Supreme Court has stated the following
concerning a prosecutor's commenting on a defendant's failure to
testify:
“Comments by a prosecutor on a defendant's failure
to testify are highly prejudicial and harmful, and courts must
carefully guard against a violation of a defendant's constitutional
right not to testify. Whitt [v. State], [370 So.2d 736] at 739
[ (Ala.1979) ]; Ex parte Williams, 461 So.2d 852, 853 (Ala.1984);
see Ex parte Purser, 607 So.2d 301 (Ala.1992). This Court has held
that comments by a prosecutor that a jury may possibly take as a
reference to the defendant's failure to testify violate Art. I, § 6,
of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d 224
(Ala.), cert. denied, [519] U.S. [933], 117 S.Ct. 308, 136 L.Ed.2d 224
(1996); Ex parte McWilliams, 640 So.2d 1015 (Ala.1993); Ex parte
Wilson, [571 So.2d 1251 (Ala.1990) ]; Ex parte Tucker, 454 So.2d 552
(Ala.1984); Beecher v. State, 294 Ala. 674, 320 So.2d 727 (1975).
Additionally, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution may be violated if the prosecutor comments upon the
accused's silence. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct.
1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); Ex parte Land, supra; Ex parte Wilson,
supra. Under federal law, a comment is improper if it was
‘ “ ‘manifestly intended or was of such a character that a jury would
naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of
the accused to testify.’ ” ' United States v. Herring, 955 F.2d 703,
709 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 927, 113 S.Ct. 353, 121
L.Ed.2d 267 (1992) (citations omitted); Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d
1536, 1547 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983, 109 S.Ct. 534, 102
L.Ed.2d 566 (1988); United States v. Betancourt, 734 F.2d 750, 758
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1021, 105 S.Ct. 440, 83 L.Ed.2d
365 (1984). The federal courts characterize comments as either
direct or indirect, and, in either case, hold that an improper comment
may not always mandate reversal.
“Consistent with this reasoning, Alabama law
distinguishes direct comments from indirect comments and establishes
that a direct comment on the defendant's failure to testify mandates
the reversal of the defendant's conviction, if the trial court failed
to promptly cure that comment. Whitt v. State, supra; Ex parte
Yarber, [375 So.2d 1231 (Ala.1979) ]; Ex parte Williams, supra; Ex
parte Wilson, supra. On the other hand, ‘covert,’ or indirect,
comments are construed against the defendant, based upon the literal
construction of Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-220, which created the ‘virtual
identification doctrine.’ Ex parte Yarber, 375 So.2d at 1234. Thus,
in a case in which there has been only an indirect reference to a
defendant's failure to testify, in order for the comment to constitute
reversible error, there must have been a virtual identification of the
defendant as the person who did not become a witness. Ex parte
Yarber, 375 So.2d at 1234; Ex parte Williams, supra; Ex parte
Wilson, supra; Ex parte Purser, supra. A virtual identification
will not exist where the prosecutor's comments were directed toward
the fact that the State's evidence was uncontradicted, or had not been
denied. See Beecher v. State, 294 Ala. 674, 682, 320 So.2d 727, 734
(1975); Ex parte Williams, supra; Ex parte Purser, supra. Yet, in
such circumstances, it becomes important to know whether the defendant
alone could have provided the missing evidence.
“A challenged comment of a prosecutor made during
closing arguments must be viewed in the context of the evidence
presented in the case and the entire closing arguments made to the
jury-both defense counsel's and the prosecutor's. Ex parte Land,
supra; Windsor v. State, 683 So.2d 1021, 1023 (Ala.1994); Ex parte
Musgrove, 638 So.2d 1360, 1368 (Ala.1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 845,
115 S.Ct. 136, 130 L.Ed.2d 78 (1994). Here, defense counsel argued
that the State's evidence, because of its circumstantial nature, was
insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had
committed the crimes. Defense counsel insisted that the evidence
created a reasonable hypothesis of the defendant's innocence because
there were unidentified fingerprints, unidentified pubic hair, and
unidentified semen at the crime scene, which, defense counsel
contended, suggested that another person had committed the crimes.
In rebuttal, the State commented upon the fact that defense counsel
had not presented any evidence in support of this contention and had
failed to contradict the State's evidence. The prosecutor
highlighted the overwhelming evidence implicating the defendant as the
perpetrator of the crimes and, in this context, argued that defense
counsel's contention was hollow.
“Under the particular facts of this case, we cannot
find that the prosecutor's statements were directed toward the
defendant's silence. When viewed in the proper context, it is clear
that they were a response to defense counsel's characterizing the
circumstantial nature of the State's evidence in a way that created a
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Ex parte Musgrove, 638 So.2d 1360
(Ala.1993); see Stephens v. State, 580 So.2d 11 (Ala.Crim.App.1990),
aff'd, 580 So.2d 26 (Ala.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 859, 112 S.Ct. 176,
116 L.Ed.2d 138 (1991); Merritt v. State, 571 So.2d 409
(Ala.Crim.App.1990); Ex parte McWilliams, 640 So.2d 1015, 1019-20
(Ala.1993); Ex parte Wilson, 571 So.2d at 1262. The Court of
Criminal Appeals correctly approved the trial court's ruling that the
prosecutor had appropriately exercised his right to ‘reply in kind.’
Ex parte Musgrove, 638 So.2d at 1369. We conclude that, in the
context of the evidence and the closing arguments of both the defense
and the State, the statements at issue were not a reference to the
defendant's failure to testify, but rather were a reply to the
insufficiency argument made by defense counsel that the evidence
suggested a reasonable hypothesis of the defendant's innocence and
that the State had failed to eliminate that hypothesis. Accordingly,
we find no reversible error.”
Ex parte Brooks, 695 So.2d 184, 188-90 (Ala.1997)
(footnotes omitted).
Here, there was no direct comment on Blackmon's
failure to testify. Blackmon's counsel at trial argued that
Dominiqua's death could have been the result of improperly performed
attempts to revive the victim. The prosecutor's comments were a
response to that argument.
III.
Blackmon argues that the trial court's instructions
regarding the jury's not being able to draw any adverse inference from
Blackmon's failure to testify were erroneous and failed to comply with
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Carter v. Kentucky, 450
U.S. 288, 101 S.Ct. 1112, 67 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981).
The record shows that Blackmon requested the
following jury instruction:
“Patricia Blackmon has chosen not to testify in
this case. Under the United States Constitution and the Alabama
Constitution, Ms. Blackmon has the right to make that choice and I
instruct you that you can draw no inference against her because she
has chosen not to testify.”
(C.R. 268.)
The circuit court gave the following instruction on
Blackmon's decision not to testify:
“The defendant did not testify in her own behalf in
this case. That must not and you cannot take that into consideration
either for or against the defendant. The defendant has the right to
either testify in her own behalf or to not testify in her own behalf.
And, the fact that she did stay off the witness stand and does not
testify cannot be taken and considered by the jury when it goes out to
weigh and consider all of the testimony in this case and make up its
verdict as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.”
(R. 1061.) The circuit court noted when denying
the specific requested jury instruction that it would give an almost
identical instruction and that there was no need to give the
instruction twice.
On appeal, Blackmon argues, for the first time,
that the jury instruction was not sufficient to comply with Carter v.
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 101 S.Ct. 1112, 67 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981). She
challenges the instruction given, which was virtually identical to the
one she requested. “However, the appellant cannot request a jury
instruction and then contend that the instruction was in error. The
error in such a case is invited error. Phillips v. State, 527 So.2d
154 (Ala.1988).” Campbell v. State, 654 So.2d 69, 72
(Ala.Crim.App.1994).
Moreover, the Carter court did not comment on what
constitutes a sufficient instruction on drawing no adverse inference
from a defendant's failure to testify. When discussing the
sufficiency of a no-adverse-inference instruction as it related to a
requested jury instruction on the same subject, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v.
Gomez-Olivas, 897 F.2d 500, 502 (10th Cir.1990), stated:
“In Carter [v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981),] the
Supreme Court stated expressly that ‘a criminal trial judge must give
a “no-adverse-inference” jury instruction’ only ‘when requested by a
defendant to do so.’ 450 U.S. at 300, 101 S.Ct. at 1119; see also
Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1234-35 (10th Cir.1986), cert.
denied, 482 U.S. 909, 107 S.Ct. 2491, 96 L.Ed.2d 383 (1987). We
believe this principle also applies to the compulsion aspect of a
no-adverse-inference instruction. Because the reference to
compulsion underscores the fact that defendant is permitted to take
the stand to testify, some defense counsel may not want the reference
in the instruction. Cf. id. at 1235 (whether to request
no-adverse-inference instruction is within attorney's tactical
discretion). The trial judge is entitled to know when a defendant
wants the compulsion aspect included in the instruction. Because
defendant here did not request that the no-adverse-inference
instruction contain a statement on compulsion, the trial court did not
err in excluding it.
“At trial, defendant's only objection to the trial
court's no-adverse-inference instruction was that it did not conform
to the wording he requested. Of course, it is well settled that the
form of jury instructions is a matter for the trial court's
discretion, and the trial court need not give an instruction in the
exact form and language requested. E.g., United States v. Gallup,
812 F.2d 1271, 1279 (10th Cir.1987). This principle is equally
applicable to a no-adverse-inference instruction. See United States
v. Ladd, 877 F.2d 1083, 1089 (1st Cir.1989); United States v. Russo,
796 F.2d 1443, 1454-55 (11th Cir.1986). The instruction in this case
was adequate under the circumstances.”
We find no plain error for the reasons discussed in
Gomez-Olivas.
IV.
Blackmon next argues that it was reversible error
for the circuit court to allow evidence that tests had been conducted
on the victim's body looking for evidence of sexual assault. The
following occurred during the testimony of Catherine K. McGeehan, a
forensic biologist:
“Q [Prosecutor]: And, the slides and smears
dealing, were you looking for blood and semen or essentially
biological evidence of sexual assault? Correct?
“A [McGeehan]: The slides and smears indicate that
there was no presence of semen or spermatozoa on those samples.
“The Court: All right. And, Gentlemen, I have
now heard from several witnesses there has been some mention of
negative or no evidence of sexual assault. This is not involved in
this case, so let's just stay away from that. I see no relevance in
this case. It was not, there is no evidence of it, so why are we
wasting our time going into such evidence? Approach.
“․
“The Court: Why are you going into sexual assault?
There has been no evidence from Dr. [Robert] Head [Dominiqua's
pediatrician], from this scientist; am I missing something here? Do
you expect to show that somehow she was sexually assaulted?
“[Prosecutor]: No, sir. But, it is to show that
she wasn't. I don't want to leave them open to say some mystery
person came in.
“The Court: So, that is the reason for it?
“[Prosecutor]: Yes, sir. I am not trying to
belabor the point, but trying to foreclose a possibility.
“The Court: If it were raised, you could bring the
people back in rebuttal. But, I think we have heard enough and you
don't need to spend much more time on a nonexistent semen and sexual
assault. Won't y'all agree?
“[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, I have no position
on that.”
(R. 747-78.) (Emphasis added.) We note that if
any error did occur it was invited by Blackmon's actions. See
Campbell v. State, supra.
Moreover, a similar issue was addressed by this
Court in Kuenzel v. State, 577 So.2d 474 (Ala.Crim.App.1990), where we
stated:
“The defendant also contends that there was error
in the admission of oral, anal, and vaginal swabs taken from the
victim where ‘there was not even the slightest suggestion in the
evidence that the victim was touched in any way other than by
gunshot.’ ․ At trial, defense counsel made no objection to any of
this evidence.
“We fail to see the relevance of this evidence in
this particular case. However, our review of the entire record shows
that the prosecution did not take unfair advantage of either this
evidence or the fingerprint evidence in an attempt to confuse the jury
or in an effort to imply the inference of facts which did not exist.
We do not find that the State attempted to use this evidence to
bolster a weak case against the defendant. The admission of merely
immaterial and not prejudicial evidence is not reversible error. See
Gilley v. Denman, 185 Ala. 561, 567, 64 So. 97, 99 (1913). ‘It has
long been the rule that the erroneous admission of evidence on an
immaterial issue is harmless.’ Forest Investment Corp. v. Commercial
Credit Corp., 271 Ala. 8, 12, 122 So.2d 131 (1960). The admission of
irrelevant evidence which could not have affected the verdict is not
reversible error. Saunders v. Tuscumbia Roofing & Plumbing Co., 148
Ala. 519, 523, 41 So. 982, 984 (1906).”
577 So.2d at 511-12. For the reasons stated in
Kuenzel, we find that if any error did occur, it was harmless.
V.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court improperly
considered a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance when it sentenced
Blackmon to death. Specifically, she argues that the circuit court
erroneously considered as nonstatutory aggravating circumstances that
the victim was adopted and that the victim had been abused. Blackmon
relies on a comment made by the circuit court during the sentencing
hearing before the court. After hearing arguments of counsel, the
circuit court stated:
“But, maybe that is how it should be. Maybe the
Court is a last resort from the impassioned pleas of attorneys, the
passion of the jury verdict, because after all, as I indicated before,
this is a court of law and not passion or emotion. It is hard not to
be passionate or emotional about such a case. I will say this; that
this Court has a natural aversion, a revulsion if you will, of
sentencing a woman to death. At the same time, this Court has a
natural aversion or revulsion to what happened to this two and a half
year old child. A child that was born into this world to a mother
that would give her up. Given over by the State of Alabama to a
woman who would take her life. I hope she is in a better place,
because her life here on this earth, albeit was short, was pure hell.
“I say that because the evidence indicates that not
only was the attack that took her life vicious, but there was a
history of abuse to that child. There were numerous injuries on the
child's body that were old. So, what can we tell from that for two
and a half years she had been beaten repeatedly.
“․
“And, I thought in this case that were your client
the natural mother of this child, that maybe life in prison without
the possibility of parole would be the appropriate sentence so that
every day of her life she might remember that child. But, in this
situation she was not the biological mother of that child. This was
a child whose life was just beginning. No one knows what she might
have become.”
In the circuit court's sentencing order the court
stated:
“The law requires the trial court to enter specific
findings concerning the existence or nonexistence of each aggravating
circumstance enumerated by statute. The Court finds that the State
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one aggravating
circumstance:
“(1) The capital offense was particularly heinous,
atrocious, and cruel when compared to other offenses․”
(C.R. 342-43.) (Emphasis added.) Again at the end
of the sentencing order the circuit court stated: “When the Court
weighs the aggravating circumstance against the mitigating
circumstances in the manner the law requires, there can be little
doubt that the aggravating circumstance far outweighs the mitigating
circumstances.” (Emphasis added.)
The circuit court's sentencing order reflects that
it found and considered only one statutory aggravating
circumstance-that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel when compared to other capital offenses. Clearly, the circuit
court knew the law and correctly applied it.
“We presume that trial court judges know and follow
the law. See Ex parte Slaton, 680 So.2d 909, 924 (Ala.1996) (‘Trial
judges are presumed ․ to know the law and to follow it in making their
decisions.’); and Carter v. State, 627 So.2d 1027, 1028
(Ala.Crim.App.1992) (‘A trial judge's actions are presumptively
correct in the absence of a showing to the contrary.’).”
Ex parte Atchley, 936 So.2d 513, 516 (Ala.2006).
VI.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court erroneously
found that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
We addressed this issue in depth in our original opinion and see no
reason to reconsider our holding on rehearing.
However, as part of this issue Blackmon now argues
that the aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel is unconstitutional because, she argues,
it violates the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution.
Alabama courts have held to the contrary. As we
have stated:
“With respect to Minor's constitutional challenge
to the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance in
§ 13A-5-49(8), Ala.Code 1975, this Court has repeatedly upheld that
circumstance against similar challenges. See Duke v. State, 889
So.2d 1 (Ala.Crim.App.2002); Ingram v. State, 779 So.2d 1225
(Ala.Crim.App.1999), aff'd, 779 So.2d 1283 (Ala.2000); Freeman v.
State, 776 So.2d 160 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), aff'd, 776 So.2d 203
(Ala.2000); Bui v. State, 551 So.2d 1094 (Ala.Crim.App.1988), aff'd,
551 So.2d 1125 (Ala.1989), judgment vacated on other grounds, 499 U.S.
971, 111 S.Ct. 1613, 113 L.Ed.2d 712 (1991); and Hallford v. State,
548 So.2d 526 (Ala.Crim.App.1988), aff'd, 548 So.2d 547 (Ala.1989).”
Minor v. State, 914 So.2d 372, 437
(Ala.Crim.App.2004).
Last, Blackmon now argues that the circuit court's
instructions on this aggravating circumstance were erroneous. We
have thoroughly reviewed the instructions on this aggravating
circumstance. They were both thorough and accurate. Also, this
Court has upheld instructions similar to those given in this case.
See Stallworth v. State, 868 So.2d 1128 (Ala.Crim.App.2001).
VII.
Blackmon argues that her conviction violates the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The majority of
Blackmon's arguments were addressed in our original opinion and will
not be addressed again in this opinion.
In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held
that a fact that increases a penalty above the statutory maximum must
be presented to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This
holding was extended to death-penalty cases in Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002).
Blackmon now argues that the jury instructions here
violated Ring because the circuit court informed the jury that its
verdict in the penalty phase was a recommendation. In Duke v. State,
889 So.2d 1, 43 (Ala.Crim.App.2002), we stated:
“Duke also argues that Ring requires penalty-phase
relief when the jury is told that its verdict is ‘advisory’ or merely
a ‘recommendation.’ Contrary to Duke's contention, Ring does not
address the advisory nature of a jury's sentencing recommendation.
Duke's jury was properly informed that under Alabama law, its verdict
was an advisory one. See § 13A-5-46, Ala.Code 1975. Thus, the jury
was not misled regarding its role in the sentencing decision. See
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86
L.Ed.2d 231 (1985); Ex parte Taylor, 666 So.2d 73, 88 (Ala.1995),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1120, 116 S.Ct. 928, 133 L.Ed.2d 856 (1996).”
Blackmon also argues that her death sentence
violates Ring because the jury was not instructed that it had to
unanimously determine the existence of the aggravating circumstance
and the weight that should be assigned to that aggravating
circumstance. Again, in Duke we stated:
“We note that Ring requires only that the jury
unanimously find the existence of an aggravating circumstance in order
to make the defendant death-eligible. Alabama law does not require
that the jury's advisory verdict be unanimous before it can recommend
death. See § 13A-5-46(f), Ala.Code 1975. Nothing in Ring supports
Duke's claim the jury's advisory verdict be unanimous.”
Duke, 889 So.2d at 43 n. 4.
Blackmon also argues that her conviction violates
Apprendi and Ring because the aggravating circumstance relied on by
the State was not alleged in the indictment. As this Court further
stated in Duke:
“Duke also argues, in relation to the application
of Ring, that his indictment was void because it failed to include in
the indictment the aggravating circumstances the State intended to
prove. This Court rejected a similar claim in Stallworth v. State, 868
So.2d [1128 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) ] (opinion on return to second
remand). We stated:
“ ‘In Poole v. State, 846 So.2d 370
(Ala.Crim.App.2001), we held that, although Apprendi [v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000) ] required that the facts that increased a
sentence above the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
those facts did not have to be alleged in the indictment. Recently,
the Alabama Supreme Court adopted our holding in Poole. See Hale v.
State, 848 So.2d 224 (Ala.2002).
“ ‘Also, the holdings, in Poole and Hale are
consistent with prior caselaw, which holds that aggravating
circumstances do not have to be alleged in the indictment. See Ex
parte Lewis, 811 So.2d 485 (Ala.2001), and Dobard v. State, 435 So.2d
1338 (Ala.Crim.App.1982).’
“868 So.2d at 1186.”
889 So.2d at 43. Blackmon is due no relief on any
of her Ring claims.
VIII.
Blackmon argues that prosecutorial misconduct
denied her a fair trial. She cites several instances of alleged
misconduct in support of this contention. We note that there were no
objections made to any of the alleged instances of misconduct.
Therefore, we review this claim for plain error. See Rule 45A,
Ala.R.App.P.
As this Court has stated:
“ ‘In reviewing allegedly improper prosecutorial
argument, we must first determine if the argument was, in fact,
improper. In doing so, we must evaluate the prosecutor's comments in
the context of the entire trial. Duren v. State, 590 So.2d 360
(Ala.Crim.App.), aff'd, 590 So.2d 369 (Ala.1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 974, 112 S.Ct. 1594, 118 L.Ed.2d 310 (1992). The prosecution,
as well as defense counsel, has the right to present its impressions
from the evidence, and may argue every matter of legitimate inference
that can be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Sanders v. State, 423
So.2d 348 (Ala.Cr.App.1982).’
“Ingram v. State, 779 So.2d 1225, 1251
(Ala.Cr.App.1999). Furthermore, when no objection is made to an
allegedly improper argument, ‘ “ ‘[t]his court has concluded that the
failure to object to improper prosecutorial arguments ․ should be
weighed as part of our evaluation of the claim on the merits because
of its suggestion that the defense did not consider the comments in
question to be particularly harmful.’ ” ' Freeman v. State, 776 So.2d
160 (Ala.Cr.App.1999), quoting Kuenzel v. State, 577 So.2d 474, 489
(Ala.Cr.App.1990), aff'd, 577 So.2d 531 (Ala.), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
886, 112 S.Ct. 242, 116 L.Ed.2d 197 (1991), quoting in turn Johnson v.
Wainwright, 778 F.2d 623, 629 n. 6 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 201, 98 L.Ed.2d 152 (1987).”
Johnson v. State, 820 So.2d 842, 870
(Ala.Crim.App.2000).
Furthermore,
“[I]t ‘is not enough that the prosecutors' remarks
were undesirable or even universally condemned.’ Darden v.
Wainwright, 699 F.2d [1031], at 1036 [ (11th Cir.1983) ]. The
relevant question is whether the prosecutors' comments ‘so infected
the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial
of due process.’ Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974).”
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct.
2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986).
At the beginning of trial the circuit court gave an
instruction concerning the comments made by the prosecutor and defense
counsel. The circuit court instructed the jury:
“Ladies and Gentlemen, as I told you, the opening
statements and closing arguments of the attorneys are intended to help
you in understanding the evidence and applying the law. But, of
course, what they say is not the evidence and not the law.”
(R. 551.) We have examined each of the challenged
remarks and find no evidence that any comment “so infected the trial
with unfairness” that Blackmon's conviction was a denial of due
process. See Darden v. Wainwright.
IX.
Blackmon next challenges several of the circuit
court's jury instructions.
“ ‘ “In setting out the standard for plain error
review of jury instructions, the court in United States v. Chandler,
996 F.2d 1073, 1085, 1097 (11th Cir.1993), cited Boyde v. California,
494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990), for the
proposition that ‘an error occurs only when there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in an improper
manner.’ Williams v. State, 710 So.2d 1276, 1306 (Ala.Cr.App.1996),
aff'd, 710 So.2d 1350 (Ala.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 929, 118
S.Ct. 2325, 141 L.Ed.2d 699 (1998).” '
“Broadnax v. State, 825 So.2d 134, 196
(Ala.Crim.App.2000), quoting Pilley v. State, 789 So.2d 870, 882-83
(Ala.Crim.App.1998). Moreover, ‘[w]hen reviewing a trial court's
jury instructions, we must view them as a whole, not in bits and
pieces, and as a reasonable juror would have interpreted them. Ingram
v. State, 779 So.2d 1225 (Ala.Cr.App.1999).’ Johnson v. State, 820
So.2d 842, 874 (Ala.Crim.App.2000).”
Snyder v. State, 893 So.2d 488, 548
(Ala.Crim.App.2003).
A.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court's
instructions on intent violated the Supreme Court's holding in
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39
(1979).
The circuit court's instruction on intent stated,
in part:
“Intent, being a mental purpose or a state of mind,
it is rarely, if ever, susceptible of direct proof. It is an
inference to be drawn by the jury from the testimony of witnesses and
facts in this case. A specific intent to kill is an essential
ingredient of murder or capital murder as charged in this indictment.
And, it may be inferred from the character of an assault or other
attendant circumstances. Such intent may be inferred if the act is
done deliberately and the death was reasonably to be apprehended or
expected as a natural and probable consequence of the act. But, the
fact upon which such inference is drawn must be proved so clearly as
to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind of a juror that on the
occasion complained of, that the defendant intended to kill the
deceased, Dominiqua Deshay Bryant.
“Now, as I indicated, the element of intent being a
state of mind or mental purpose is usually incapable of direct proof
and may be inferred from the character of the assault or other
attendant circumstances from the nature and amount of force used in
the fatal injury.”
(R. 1053-54.) Blackmon argues that the circuit
court's instruction created an irrebuttable presumption and
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to Blackmon.
“In Sandstrom [v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) ],
the Supreme Court held that instructions which a reasonable jury could
interpret as an ‘irrebuttable direction by the court to find intent’
violate a defendant's due process rights. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 517,
99 S.Ct. at 2455-56. The complained-of instruction in Sandstrom was
as follows: ‘[T]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts.’ The instruction in Sandstrom
created a ‘mandatory presumption.’
“In DeRamus v. State, 565 So.2d 1167
(Ala.Cr.App.1990), the trial court gave a similar instruction to the
jury as the one involved in the instant case. The instruction
stated, ‘ “[Intent] may be inferred from the character of the assault,
the use of a deadly weapon or any other circumstances.” ’ 565 So.2d
at 1170. We stated that this instruction created a ‘permissive
inference,’ and was not error.
“ ‘ “A mandatory presumption instructs the jury
that it must infer the presumed fact if the State proves certain
predicate facts. A permissive reference suggests to the jury a
possible conclusion to be drawn if the State proves predicate facts,
but does not require the jury to draw that conclusion.” Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. [307] at 314, 105 S.Ct. [1965] at 1971 [85 L.Ed.2d
344 (1985) ]. A permissive inference only violates the Due Process
Clause “if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common
sense justify in light of the facts before [the] jury.” 471 U.S. at
314, 105 S.Ct. at 1971.’
“565 So.2d at 1170. The cited instruction in the
instant case created a permissive inference. ‘The specific language
cited by the appellant could not reasonably have been understood as
creating a presumption which relieved the State of its burden of proof
on the element of intent.’ 565 So.2d at 1170.”
Hart v. State, 612 So.2d 520, 529
(Ala.Crim.App.1992). See also McNabb v. State, 887 So.2d 929, 978-79
(Ala.Crim.App.2001).
We have reviewed the instruction in this case; the
instruction created only a permissive presumption and not a
irrebuttable or mandatory presumption. The jury instruction does not
violate Sandstrom v. Montana, supra.
B.
Blackmon further argues that the circuit court's
instructions on the jury's consideration of Blackmon's statements to
police were erroneous. She cites Bush v. State, 523 So.2d 538
(Ala.Crim.App.1988), to support her argument.
The circuit court gave the following instruction:
“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the State has
offered statements it contends Patricia Blackmon made, and you heard,
at the criminal investigation division. You have to determine what
weight and credit you will give each statement and you may consider
all of the circumstances surrounding the taking of that statement.”
(R. 1063.)
As this Court stated in McWhorter v. State, 781
So.2d 257 (Ala.Crim.App.1999):
“The appellant cites Bush v. State, 523 So.2d 538,
560 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), and Ex parte Singleton, 465 So.2d 443, 446
(Ala.1985), to lend support to the principle that the trial court
should have instructed the jury to consider the voluntariness of the
confession; however, those cases addressed situations in which the
trial court had informed the jury that it had already made a
determination that the confession was voluntary and admissible, before
the jury's evaluation of the statement; thus, the appellant's
reliance on these cases is misplaced.”
781 So.2d at 289.
When affirming a similar instruction in McWhorter,
this Court noted that the instruction did not inform the jury that the
court had already made a determination on the voluntariness of the
defendant's statements to police. The same is true of the
instruction given in this case. In fact, we have approved the use of
substantially similar instructions in Gaddy v. State, 698 So.2d 1100,
1120 (Ala.Crim.App.1995).
C.
Blackmon next argues that the jury instructions on
reasonable doubt were erroneous and violated the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112
L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), because, she argues, the instructions diminished
the State's burden of proof.
The circuit court gave the following instruction on
reasonable doubt:
“The phrase reasonable doubt seems somewhat
self-explanatory and efforts to define it do not always clarify the
term. It is not a mere fanciful doubt because everything relating to
human affair is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. A
reasonable doubt is the doubt of a fair-minded juror honestly seeking
the truth after careful and impartial consideration of all of the
evidence in this case. It does not mean a vague or arbitrary notion,
but it is an actual doubt based upon the evidence, lack of evidence,
conflict in the evidence or combination thereof. It is a doubt that
remains after going over in your mind the entire case and giving
consideration to all the testimony. It is distinguished from a doubt
arising from mere possibility, from bare imagination or fanciful
conjecture. The doubt which would justify an acquittal must be a
doubt from which you have a reason, arising from the evidence in part
thereof or any lack of evidence and remaining after a careful
consideration of the testimony such as reasonable and fair minded and
conscientious men and women would entertain under all the
circumstances. The State is not required to prove guilty beyond all
doubt but beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(R. 1048-49.)
The United States Supreme Court in Cage v.
Louisiana, held that a trial court's instructions on reasonable doubt
that contained the terms “moral certainty,” “grave uncertainty,” and
“actual substantial doubt” were improper because they lessened the
State's burden of proof. In Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114
S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994), when revisiting its decision in
Cage, the United States Supreme Court held that use of some of the
terminology condemned in Cage would not automatically mandate reversal
if “ ‘taken as a whole, the instructions correctly conveyed the
concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.’ ” 511 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct.
1239 (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S.Ct.
127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954)).
Here, the instructions were accurate and adequately
defined reasonable doubt. The instructions did not violate Cage v.
Louisiana, supra.
D.
Blackmon asserts that the circuit court's
instructions on mitigating evidence violated Mills v. Maryland, 486
U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988), because the
instructions failed to inform the jury that it need not unanimously
agree on any mitigating circumstances.
The United States Supreme Court in Mills v.
Maryland, held that if there was a substantial probability that jury
instructions in the penalty phase implied that a finding on a
mitigating circumstance must be unanimous, then the death sentence is
due to be vacated.
In discussing the impact of Mills v. Maryland,
this Court in Calhoun v. State, 932 So.2d 923, 972
(Ala.Crim.App.2005), stated:
“As we stated in Tyson v. State, 784 So.2d 328
(Ala.Crim.App.), aff'd, 784 So.2d 357 (Ala.2000):
“ ‘The appellate courts of this state have
consistently held, since the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Mills, that as long as there is no “reasonable likelihood or
probability that the jurors believed that they were required to agree
unanimously on the existence of any particular mitigating
circumstances,” there is no error in the trial court's instruction on
mitigating circumstances. Freeman [v. State], 776 So.2d [160] at 195
[ (Ala.Crim.App.1999) ]. See also Ex parte Martin, 548 So.2d 496
(Ala.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 970, 110 S.Ct. 419, 107 L.Ed.2d 383
(1989); Williams v. State, 710 So.2d 1276 (Ala.Cr.App.1996), aff'd,
710 So.2d 1350 (Ala.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 929, 118 S.Ct. 2325,
141 L.Ed.2d 699 (1998); Brown v. State, 686 So.2d 385
(Ala.Cr.App.1995); Rieber v. State, 663 So.2d 985 (Ala.Cr.App.1994),
aff'd, 663 So.2d 999 (Ala.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 995, 116 S.Ct.
531, 133 L.Ed.2d 437 (1995); Holladay v. State, 629 So.2d 673
(Ala.Cr.App.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1171, 114 S.Ct. 1208, 127
L.Ed.2d 555 (1994).’
“784 So.2d at 351.
“We have carefully reviewed the circuit court's
jury instruction on mitigating circumstances and find no likelihood
that the jury would have believed that its finding as to the existence
of mitigating circumstances had to be unanimous. In fact, the
instructions were similar to the pattern jury instructions. See
Freeman v. State, 776 So.2d 160 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), aff'd, 776 So.2d
203 (Ala.2000).”
We, like this Court in Calhoun, have diligently
reviewed the jury instructions on mitigating circumstances and find
“no likelihood that the jury would have believed that its finding as
to the existence of mitigating circumstances had to be unanimous.”
Calhoun, 932 So.2d at 972. There was no violation of Mills v.
Maryland, supra.
Blackmon also argues that the jury instructions on
mitigating circumstances were erroneous based on the Alabama Supreme
Court's decision in Ex parte Bryant, 951 So.2d 724 (Ala.2002).
In upholding instructions substantially similar to
those given in the present case, the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte
McNabb, 887 So.2d 998, 1004 (Ala.2004), stated:
“The charge in this case was not infected with the
peculiar error present in Bryant, that is, the jury in this case was
not invited to recommend a sentence of death without finding any
aggravating circumstance. It was that invitation in Bryant that
caused the error in that case to rise to the level of plain error,
rather than error reversible only by a proper objection. Thus, in
this case, although the court did not specifically instruct the jury
what to do if it found the mitigating and aggravating circumstances
equally balanced, we cannot conclude, considering the charge in its
entirety, that the error ‘seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of [these] judicial proceedings,’ Ex parte Davis,
718 So.2d [1166] at 1173-74 [ (Ala.1998) ], so as to require a
reversal of the sentence.”
Based on the Supreme Court's rationale in McNabb,
there was no error of the kind in the Supreme Court's decision in
Bryant.
Blackmon also argues, as part of this issue, that
the circuit court erred in refusing to give her instruction on mercy.
First, we note that Blackmon did not request a
mercy instruction. The page number cited by Blackmon in her brief
does not correspond with a requested mercy instruction. The only
reference to mercy in Blackmon's requested jury instructions is this
sentence: “A mitigating circumstance is anything about Patricia
Blackmon or the crime which, in fairness and mercy, should be taken
into account in deciding punishment.” (C.R. 281.)
Moreover, we have held that a juror may not
arbitrarily consider mercy when deciding whether a defendant should be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. As we stated in Stallworth v. State, 868 So.2d 1128, 1167
(Ala.Crim.App.2001):
“In Alabama, a capital jury cannot arbitrarily
consider mercy in arriving at a sentence. As we stated in Gaddy v.
State, 698 So.2d 1100, 1142 (Ala.Crim.App.1995), aff'd, 698 So.2d 1150
(Ala.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1032, 118 S.Ct. 634, 139 L.Ed.2d 613
(1997):
“ ‘Because the requested charge by the appellant
suggests that the jury recommend life without parole arbitrarily and
based solely on mercy, the instruction was improper.
“ ‘ “The jury may not recommend mercy without
reason. See Morrison v. State, 500 So.2d 36 (Ala.Cr.App.1985),
aff'd, 500 So.2d 57 (Ala.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1007, 107 S.Ct.
1634, 95 L.Ed.2d 207 (1987). The jury does not have an ‘unfettered
option’ to recommend a sentence of life without parole unless after
weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances it finds that
life without parole is warranted.”
“ ‘Williams v. State, 601 So.2d 1062, 1081
(Ala.Cr.App.1991). In Alabama, the jury must consider any relevant
aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances, including any
non-statutory mitigating circumstances introduced by the appellant
that are relevant. The weight to be accorded the circumstances is a
matter for the jury and the record indicates that the jury was
properly instructed on how to weigh the circumstances․'
“The jury was instructed that it could consider
anything in mitigation. The jury was also instructed that the
aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances had to be
weighed before considering whether a sentence was appropriate. The
trial court's instructions were consistent with Alabama law.”
In this case, the circuit court's instructions on
mitigating circumstances stated, in part:
“Now, a mitigating circumstance does not have to be
included in the list that I have read to you in order for it to be
considered by you. In addition to the mitigating circumstances
previously specified, mitigating circumstances shall include any
aspect of a defendant's life, character, or record, and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant offers as a basis for
a sentence of life imprisonment without parole instead of death.
“You must consider all evidence that is offered in
mitigation. The weight you give to any particular mitigating
circumstance is a matter for your moral and legal judgment.”
(R. 107-08.) The jury instructions on mitigating
circumstances were accurate and consistent with Alabama law. See
Stallworth.
E.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court erred in
failing to admonish the jury before each time it separated that the
juror should not discuss the case among themselves. Specifically,
she argues that the circuit court failed to comply with Rule 19.3,
Ala.R.Crim.P.
Rule 19.3(b), Ala.R.Crim.P., states:
“(b) Admonitions to Jurors. In all cases, the
court shall admonish the jurors that they are not:
“(1) To discuss among themselves any subject
connected with the trial until the case is submitted to them for
deliberations;
“(2) To converse with anyone else on any subject
connected with the trial, until they are discharged as jurors in the
case;
“(3) To knowingly expose themselves to outside
comments or to news accounts of the proceedings, until they are
discharged as jurors in the case; or
(4) To form or express any opinion on the case
until it is submitted to them for deliberation.
“If the jurors are permitted to separate, they may
also be admonished not to view the place where the offense was
allegedly committed.”
In this case the circuit court did not give
detailed instructions each time that the jury separated; however, it
did give detailed instructions to the jury before trial and at various
intervals during the proceedings. Before trial, the circuit court
gave the following instruction:
“I told you earlier, of course, that I am not going
to sequester this jury. You will be allowed to go to your respective
homes. The only stipulation there is, of course, is you cannot
discuss this case in the evening with your spouses. And of course,
you cannot review any news coverage, watch, read, listen to any media
coverage concerning this case. And, while there has not yet been an
address or location where these events allegedly occurred, there will
be shortly. And, I am instructing that you can not go by there and
make any independent examination of the scene. Because the law says
it would be improper for you to do so. So, keep that in mind as we
recess for lunch and as we recess for the evenings, that you will not
be able to go by there.
“You heard me say repeatedly and you will again;
do not discuss this case among yourselves or allow anyone to discuss
it with you. In fact, if anybody attempts to discuss it with you,
you bring it to my attention immediately.”
(R. 548.) At various other times in the record,
the circuit court gave a similar instruction.
As we held in Smith v. State, 795 So.2d 788, 805
(Ala.Crim.App.2000):
“The trial court did not give similar detailed
instructions at each break in the court proceedings. To require a
court to do so would be unduly burdensome, disruptive, and contrary to
the clear wording of Rule 19.3(d). Indeed, Rule 19.3(d) does not
require that a trial court give the admonitions at each court break.
Indeed, Rule 19.3(d) does not state that these instructions must be
given more than once in the trial. The record clearly reflects that
the jurors were aware of their duties and obligations. There was no
violation of Rule 19.3(d).”
X.
Blackmon argues that the circuit erred in having ex
parte communications with one of the State's expert witnesses. There
was no objection to this alleged ex parte communication; therefore,
we are limited to determining whether plain error exists. See Rule
45A, Ala.R.App.P.
We cannot agree with Blackmon's interpretation of
what occurred. The record shows that during a hearing at which
several motions were discussed, the following occurred:
“(Thereupon, a recess was called and taken by all
parties. Upon completion of said recess, all parties returned to the
presence and hearing of the court room and the following proceedings
were had, to-wit:)
“The Court: On the record, out of the presence of
the jury. Gentlemen, we have just addressed certain documentation
from the Department of Forensic Sciences concerning audit material,
accreditation material. I spoke with the Forensic Scien[tist]-her
name is?
“[Prosecutor]: Phyllis Rollan.
“The Court: Ms. Rollan. She indicated that she
would do everything in her power to get up with the appropriate
parties to get certain documents here. We have addressed that
situation and hopefully we will have that here in the morning at 8:30.
What else is there?”
(R. 702.)
Clearly, the circuit court had no ex parte
communications with Rollan. It appears that the court communicated
with this witness at the behest of Blackmon and the State. There
were no ex parte communications in this case. This claim is not
supported by the record.
XI.
Blackmon next argues that the State failed to
disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Specifically,
Blackmon argues that the State failed to disclose evidence related to
Dr. Alfredo Parades's qualifications. It asserts in brief: “The
State initially indicated that ‘[a]s far as his release or retirement,
there is none’ and then indicated that it possessed ‘retirement
papers' that were not disclosed to the defense.” (Blackmon's brief at
page 95.)
The following occurred:
“The Court: Are there any pending motions that we
have not already addressed?
“[Defense counsel]: No, sir. We are just waiting
for the information the Court directed about Dr. Parades. But, other
than that, there isn't any.
“[Prosecutor]: As far as his release or
retirement, there is none.
“The Court: I am sorry?
“[Prosecutor]: There is no such information. If
[defense counsel] would like to speak with Dr. Downs, he can confirm
that for himself.
“[Defense counsel]: If Dr. Downs says so, there is
no documentation.
“[Prosecutor]: Unless you want the retirement
papers. He retired.
“The Court: Let me address a couple of items by
way of housekeeping.”
(R. 817.) The State did not withhold any
exculpatory information but made the retirement papers available to
the defense. We find no Brady violation.
XII.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court erred in
failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of
criminally negligent homicide.
The record shows that Blackmon did not request a
jury charge on criminally negligent homicide. Therefore, we apply a
plain-error standard of review. See Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.
Here, the circuit court gave jury instructions on
the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. We have stated that
“ ‘A defendant is entitled to a charge on a lesser
included offense if there is any reasonable theory from the evidence
that would support the position.’ Ex parte Oliver, 518 So.2d 705,
706 (Ala.1987). Section 13A-2-2(4), Code of Alabama 1975, states that
‘[a] person acts with criminal negligence ․ when he fails to perceive
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or
that the circumstance exists.’
“Thus, an instruction on criminally negligent
homicide is correctly given only when reasonable evidence suggests
that the appellant was unaware that he created a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of death to another party. Wiggins v. State, 491
So.2d 1046 (Ala.Cr.App.1986).”
Oddo v. State, 675 So.2d 58, 61-62
(Ala.Crim.App.1995).
The evidence indicated that Blackmon beat a
two-year-old child to death with a pool cue and then stomped on her
chest. There was absolutely no evidence presented indicating that
Blackmon failed to “perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the result will occur or that the circumstance exists.” There was no
rational basis for giving an instruction on criminally negligent
homicide. The circuit court committed no error in failing to sua
sponte instruct the jury on this lesser-included offense.
XIII.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court erred in
allowing evidence of prior bad acts. Specifically, she argues that
it was error to admit evidence about old injuries the victim had
suffered.
There was no objection to the admission of the
evidence; therefore, we are limited to determining whether there is
plain error. See Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.
Several doctors testified concerning the extent of
the victim's injuries. In describing the injuries, the doctors
referenced new and old injuries to clarify those injuries that had
occurred when the victim was beaten to death. Blackmon argues that
the references to old injuries implied that Blackmon had physically
abused the victim before the beating that caused her death.
In this case, the evidence showed that the victim
had been removed from her natural mother's home and placed in
Blackmon's custody approximately nine months before she was killed.
The State never attributed the old injuries to Blackmon. In fact,
after the defense had concluded its case, the following occurred:
“[Prosecutor]: This is one of the things you said
approach about. I expect to call a rebuttal witness, a Ms. Reagan,
who within the time frame he established with the DHR workers, my
proffer would be Ms. Reagan saw Ms. Blackmon striking her child at the
time Dominiqua would have been some eight months younger, while
putting her very close to the time frame he established with DHR where
she was switching her and screaming at her as she tried to get up the
stairs. The lower steps, these were steps a small child would not
have been capable of getting up. She was yelling at her and saying
she was not getting up the stairs quick enough.
“The Court: [Defense counsel].
“[Defense counsel]: Yes, sir. First of all, I
think [the prosecutor] said he proffered this testimony if there was
evidence from us that Ms. Blackmon never switched Dominiqua. Which,
at this time is contrary, your Honor. In Ms. Blackmon's statement,
she admitted to having switched Dominiqua. That has been put in
evidence here. So, we feel first of all, within the confines of the
Court's ruling on the [Rule] 404B[, Ala.R.Evid.,] issue, we feel this
is improper testimony and improper rebuttal.
“The Court: What does it rebut?
“[Prosecutor]: It rebuts testimony of Ms. Daniels
and more recently Ms. Whatley. Everything was peaceful and nice and
there was no problem whatsoever. There was problems and they let the
child stay and yet a month later, she is wailing away on the child
because she didn't get up the stairs quick enough.
“The Court: Well, the Court finds it would not be
proper rebuttal. It is in the nature of prior bad acts.”
(R. 991-92.)
The record shows that there was no evidence
presented that indicated that Blackmon caused any of the victim's
older injuries. Nor was this argued to the jury. Last, the only
prior-bad-act evidence that the State attempted to present was deemed
inadmissible by the circuit court. We find no error in this case.4
XIV.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court erred in
failing to give a residual-doubt instruction. He argues that the
United States Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari on a case
involving the issue whether a defendant has a right to a
residual-doubt instruction in the penalty phase of a capital trial.
He contends that we should hold this case in abeyance until the
Supreme Court resolves this issue.
However, the case referenced by Blackmon has now
been released by the United States Supreme Court. See Oregon v.
Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 126 S.Ct. 1226, 163 L.Ed.2d 1112 (2006). In
Oregon v. Guzek, the Supreme Court considered the validity of an
Oregon Supreme Court decision that held that the United States
Constitution provided a right to introduce alibi evidence at the
penalty phase of a capital trial. In reversing the lower court's
decision, the United States Supreme Court stated:
“[S]ubsequent to Green [v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95
(1979) ], this Court decided Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108
S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (plurality opinion), and that case
makes clear, contrary to the Oregon Supreme Court's understanding,
that this Court's previous cases had not interpreted the Eighth
Amendment as providing a capital defendant the right to introduce at
sentencing evidence designed to cast ‘residual doubt’ on his guilt of
the basic crime of conviction. The Franklin plurality said it was
‘quite doubtful’ that any such right existed. Id., at 173, n. 6, 108
S.Ct. 2320. And two other Members of the Court added that ‘[o]ur
cases' do not support any such ‘right to reconsideration by the
sentencing body of lingering doubts about ․ guilt.’ Id., at 187, 108
S.Ct. 2320 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). See also Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 320, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989)
(characterizing Franklin as a case in which a majority ‘agreed that
“residual doubt” as to Franklin's guilt was not a constitutionally
mandated mitigating factor’ (brackets omitted)).
“Franklin did not resolve whether the Eighth
Amendment affords capital defendants such a right, for the plurality
held that the sentencing scheme at issue was constitutional ‘even if
such a right existed.’ 487 U.S., at 174, 108 S.Ct. 2320. But the
Court's statements on the matter make clear that the Oregon Supreme
Court erred in interpreting Green as providing a capital defendant
with a constitutional right to introduce residual doubt evidence at
sentencing.
“In this case, we once again face a situation where
we need not resolve whether such a right exists, for, even if it does,
it could not extend so far as to provide this defendant with a right
to introduce the evidence at issue. See, e.g., Alabama State
Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461-462, 65 S.Ct. 1384,
89 L.Ed. 1725 (1945). The Eighth Amendment insists upon
‘ “reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case.” ’ Penry, supra, at 328, 109 S.Ct.
2934 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct.
2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion)). The Eighth
Amendment also insists that a sentencing jury be able ‘to consider and
give effect to mitigating evidence’ about the defendant's ‘character
or record or the circumstances of the offense.’ Penry, supra, at
327-328, 109 S.Ct. 2934. But the Eighth Amendment does not deprive
the State of its authority to set reasonable limits upon the evidence
a defendant can submit, and to control the manner in which it is
submitted. Rather, ‘States are free to structure and shape
consideration of mitigating evidence “in an effort to achieve a more
rational and equitable administration of the death penalty.” ’ Boyde
v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316
(1990) (quoting Franklin, supra, at 181, 108 S.Ct. 2320 (plurality
opinion)); see, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 362, 113 S.Ct.
2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 543,
107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987).”
546 U.S. at 525-26, 126 S.Ct. at 1231-32.
Alabama has consistently held that a capital
defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on residual doubt in
the penalty phase. See Benjamin v. State, 940 So.2d 371, 382-83
(Ala.Crim.App.2005), Myers v. State, 699 So.2d 1281, 1283-84
(Ala.Crim.App.1996); Harris v. State, 632 So.2d 503, 535
(Ala.Crim.App.1992). The United States Supreme Court's decision in
Oregon v. Guzek is consistent with our prior decisions. The circuit
court committed no error in denying Blackmon's request for a
residual-doubt instruction in the penalty phase.
XV.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court erroneously
allowed DNA evidence to be introduced when there was no evidence that
it was reliable. Specifically, she argues that the State failed to
comply with the requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469
(1993), and Turner v. State, 746 So.2d 355 (Ala.1998), because the
State failed to prove the reliability of the testing and the
population-frequency statistics.
The Alabama Supreme Court in Turner set out the
guidelines for the admission of DNA evidence. The court stated:
“[I]f the admissibility of DNA evidence is
contested, the trial court must hold a hearing, outside the presence
of the jury, and, pursuant to § 36-18-30[, Ala.Code 1975], determine
whether the proponent of the evidence sufficiently establishes
affirmative answers to these two questions:
“I. Are the theory and the technique (i.e., the
principle and the methodology) on which the proffered DNA forensic
evidence is based ‘reliable’?
“II. Are the theory and the technique (i.e., the
principle and the methodology) on which the proffered DNA evidence is
based ‘relevant’ to understanding the evidence or to determining a
fact in issue?
“Trial courts should use the flexible Daubert [v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993),] analysis in
making the ‘reliability’ (scientific validity) assessment. In making
that assessment, the courts should employ the following factors: (1)
testing; (2) peer review; (3) rate of error; and (4) general
acceptance.
“Trial courts should make the ‘relevance’
assessment by addressing the ‘fit’ between what the scientific theory
and technique are supposed to show and what must be shown to resolve
the factual dispute at trial. Whether otherwise reliable testing
procedures were performed without error in a particular case goes to
the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Only if a party
challenges the performance of a reliable and relevant technique and
shows that the performance was so particularly and critically
deficient that it undermined the reliability of the technique, will
evidence that is otherwise reliable and relevant be deemed
inadmissible.
“Of course, once a particular theory or technique
has satisfied § 36-18-30, a court may take judicial notice of that
theory or technique's reliability. See [Ex parte] Perry, 586 So.2d
[242] at 251 [ (Ala.1991) ]; [United States v.] Beasley, 102 F.3d
[1440] at 1448 [ (8th Cir.1996) ] (holding that reliability of the
polymerase chain reaction (‘PCR’) method of DNA typing would be
subject to judicial notice in future cases); [United States v.]
Martinez, 3 F.3d [1191] at 1197 [ (8th Cir.1993) ] (holding that the
reliability of the restriction fragment length polymorphism (‘RFLP’)
procedure was subject to judicial notice). We recognize that the
state of scientific theories and the techniques for producing DNA
evidence is not static, and that the scientific community undoubtedly
will produce new theories and techniques regarding DNA. Each new
theory and technique will be subject to the test set out above until
its reliability warrants judicial notice.”
746 So.2d at 361-62 (footnotes omitted).
In this case, the circuit court held a hearing
outside the presence of the jury on the admission of the DNA evidence.
Phyllis T. Rollan, a forensic biologist at the Alabama Department of
Forensic Sciences, testified concerning the DNA tests conducted in
this case. Rollan testified that the laboratory uses the polymerase
chain-reaction (“PCR”) method of DNA testing. She testified that the
procedure is generally accepted in the scientific community, that it
is reliable, and that quality controls are in place to ensure the
test's accuracy. She testified that Alabama had established a
database for population-frequency statistics and it was consistent
with other established databases throughout the county. The
calculations are done using a computer and then two scientists review
the DNA profile. Rollan also stated that the statistical information
is generally accepted in the scientific community. Rollan last
testified that she followed all of the procedures that are generally
accepted in the scientific community in this case and that the
controls did not indicate that any error had occurred.
Here, it is clear that the State complied with the
Daubert requirements. The circuit court committed no error in
admitting the DNA evidence.
XVI.
Blackmon argues that the State's experts were
improperly permitted to testify based on evidence not introduced at
trial. Specifically, she asserts that Dr. James Downs was allowed to
give his expert opinion on the victim's injuries and her death, but he
never viewed the victim's body; moreover, he relied exclusively on
photographs, diagrams, and observations made by Dr. Alfredo Paredes.
Rule 703, Ala.R.Evid., provides: “The facts or
data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing.” The Advisory Committee's Notes to this Rule
also provide: “This includes data presented to the expert by means
other than personal perception, such as through the opinions, records,
or reports of others.”
As the Alabama Supreme Court has stated: “It is
well settled that any challenge to the facts upon which an expert
bases his opinion goes to the weight, rather than the admissibility,
of the evidence. Dyer v. Traeger, 357 So.2d 328, 330 (Ala.1978).”
Baker v. Edgar, 472 So.2d 968, 970 (Ala.1985). The circuit court
committed no error in allowing the experts to testify.
XVII.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court erred in
admitting cumulative evidence concerning the victim's injuries.
Initially, we note that there was no objection to
this testimony; therefore, we review the issue for plain error. See
Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.
Even if we were to conclude that the circuit court
erred, we would find no reason to reverse this case. We have
frequently stated that: “The erroneous admission of evidence that is
merely cumulative is harmless error.” Dawson v. State, 675 So.2d 897,
900 (Ala.Crim.App.1995). See also Yeomans v. State, 641 So.2d 1269
(Ala.Crim.App.1993); McFarley v. State, 608 So.2d 430
(Ala.Crim.App.1992).
Moreover, it was Blackmon's contention that the
injuries were caused by improperly performed attempts to revive the
victim. Thus, the extent and cause of the victim's injuries was a
highly contested issue. The circuit court committed no error in
allowing cumulative testimony concerning the victim's injuries.
XVIII.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court erred in
admitting hearsay evidence during Dr. Alfredo Paredes's testimony.
Specifically, she argues that the court erred in allowing Dr. Paredes
to read from a report he had prepared. Blackmon argues in brief:
“Because Ms. Blackmon did not have an opportunity to confront these
out-of-court statements offered for their truth, their introduction
was highly prejudicial and corrupted the fairness of the trial
process.” (Blackmon's rehearing brief at page 114.)
There was no objection to Dr. Parades's testimony;
therefore, we review this issue for plain error. See Rule 45A,
Ala.R.App.P.
The following occurred during Dr. Parades's
testimony:
“Q [Prosecutor]: In your final anatomical
diagnosis near the front of the report-
“A [Dr. Paredes]: Uh-huh. (Affirmative response.)
“Q: What I would like to do is go through that list
and explain what each thing means.
“A: Okay.
“Q: Start with capital letter A and tell the ladies
and gentlemen what the finding was.
“A: Let me read what I describe as being under
capital letter A. Multiple punctate, meaning like pinpoint, linear,
like a line, well healed hypo-pigmented, hypo meaning less
pigmentation than normal, scars over the face, the front part of the
neck, upper abdomen, left forearm, dorsum of the right arm, means the
fat of the right arm, arm and forearm, the front part of the right
thigh, the left lower leg and the back of the left lower leg. These
were, again, multiple scars which I considered to be associated with
previous injuries. They were multiple, they were pinpoint, they were
linear. The scars are not associated, in my opinion, with accidental
injuries because of the particular locations, particularly the back of
the leg, the front part of the neck.”
(R. 862-63.)
As we stated in Williams v. State, 627 So.2d 985,
990 (Ala.Crim.App.1991):
“ ‘The defendant's Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation ․ limits the prosecution's use of statements of persons
who do not testify at trial and therefore cannot be cross-examined.
Such statements, when offered for their truth, ordinarily constitute
hearsay․ The crucial question under the confrontation clause is not
compliance with common law hearsay rules, but fulfillment of the
“mission of the confrontation clause to advance the accuracy of the
truth determining process ․ by assuring that the trier of fact has a
satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of a prior statement.” ’
“LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 23.3(d) (1984).
(Emphasis added [in Williams ].) ․ [T]he crucial ingredient
necessary to activate the confrontation clause when hearsay is
involved is the presence of a ‘statement made by a person who does not
testify at trial.’ See LaFave, supra.”
The Confrontation Clause was not implicated in this
case because Dr. Paredes, the author of the report, was in court and
subject to cross-examination. Blackmon was not denied her right to
confront Dr. Paredes.
XIX.
Blackmon argues that her sentence of death is
grossly disproportionate to the crime. Specifically, she argues:
“Nothing about the way in which the victim died, the scene of the
crime, or the facts surrounding Ms. Blackmon's activities that day
suggests that Ms. Blackmon intentionally killed her child.”
(Blackmon's rehearing brief at page 116.) Blackmon further argues
that each year there are 300 homicides involving parents who kill
their children and only a small percentage of those parents are
sentenced to death. She further argues that the death penalty is
disproportionately used against women in domestic-violence cases.
In our previous opinion we found that Blackmon's
death sentence was not disproportionate. We have been cited no
reason to revisit our holding.
XX.
Blackmon argues that her right to a speedy trial
was violated because of the 35-month delay between her arrest and her
trial.
In this case, Dominiqua was murdered on May 29,
1999. Blackmon was arrested on June 1, 1999. Blackmon was indicted
in August 1999 for capital murder. In June 2000, the State informed
the court that it was awaiting test results from the Department of
Forensic Sciences and was not ready to proceed with trial. In May
2001, Blackmon moved for a speedy trial. In August 2001, the circuit
court directed the Department of Forensic Sciences to complete the
blood tests and have the results for a January 2002 trial date. On
January 2, 2002, Blackmon requested a continuance. On January 10,
2002, the case was continued by agreement of both parties. On
January 16, 2002, Blackmon requested another continuance. Blackmon
then moved that the case be stayed pending the United States Supreme
Court's ruling in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153
L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). That motion was denied. In February 2002, the
circuit court ex mero motu moved the trial date from March 2002 to
April 2002. Blackmon's trial started on April 18, 2002.
As the Alabama Supreme Court stated in Ex parte
Walker, 928 So.2d 259, 263 (Ala.2005):
“An accused's right to a speedy trial is guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Art.
I, § 6, of the Alabama Constitution, 1901. As noted, an evaluation
of an accused's speedy-trial claim requires us to balance the four
factors the United States Supreme Court set forth in Barker [v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972) ]: ‘[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay,
the defendant's assertion of [her] right, and prejudice to the
defendant.’ 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (footnote omitted). See
also Ex parte Carrell, 565 So.2d [104] at 105 [ (Ala.1990) ]. ‘A
single factor is not necessarily determinative, because this is a
“balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defense are weighed.” ’ Ex parte Clopton, 656 So.2d [1243] at 1245
[ (Ala. 1995) ] (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182). We
examine each factor in turn.”
(Footnotes omitted.)
Length of delay. When examining the length of the
delay we apply the law as set out by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex
parte Walker:
“In Doggett v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court explained that the first factor-length of delay-‘is
actually a double enquiry.’ 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120
L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). The first inquiry under this factor is whether
the length of the delay is ‘ “presumptively prejudicial.” ’ 505 U.S.
at 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct.
2182). A finding that the length of delay is presumptively
prejudicial ‘triggers' an examination of the remaining three Barker
factors. 505 U.S. at 652 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (‘[A]s the term is used
in this threshold context, “presumptive prejudice” does not
necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it
simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable
enough to trigger the Barker enquiry.’). See also Roberson v. State,
864 So.2d 379, 394 (Ala.Crim.App.2002).
“In Alabama, ‘[t]he length of delay is measured
from the date of the indictment or the date of the issuance of an
arrest warrant-whichever is earlier-to the date of the trial.’
Roberson, 864 So.2d at 394. Cf. § 15-3-7, Ala.Code 1975 (‘A
prosecution may be commenced within the meaning of this chapter by
finding an indictment, the issuing of a warrant or by binding over the
offender.’); Rule 2.1, Ala. R.Crim. P. (‘All criminal proceedings
shall be commenced either by indictment or by complaint.’). The
length of the delay in this case was approximately 50 months: Walker
was indicted on January 14, 2000, and she pleaded guilty on March 25,
2004. See Carrell, 565 So.2d at 107 (calculating the length of delay
from defendant's indictment until his plea of guilty). The State
concedes (and both the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals
held) that the 50-month delay in Walker's case was presumptively
prejudicial.”
928 So.2d at 263-64 (footnotes omitted). Here,
there is no question that the delay was presumptively prejudicial.
Thus, we must examine the remaining factors discussed in Barker v.
Wingo.
Reasons for the delay. It appears that a good
portion of the delays were based on motions filed by Blackmon. The
delay attributable to the State was the delay concerning the results
of the forensic tests. “Justified delay-which includes such
occurrences as missing witnesses or delay for which the defendant is
primarily responsible-is not weighted against the State. Barker, 407
U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182.” Walker, 928 So.2d at 265.
Assertion of right to speedy trial. Blackmon did
not file a motion for a speedy trial until May 2001-11 months before
she was tried.
“An accused does not waive the right to a speedy
trial simply by failing to assert it. Barker, 407 U.S. at 528, 92
S.Ct. 2182. Even so, courts applying the Barker factors are to
consider in the weighing process whether and when the accused asserts
the right to a speedy trial, 407 U.S. at 528-29, 92 S.Ct. 2182, and
not every assertion of the right to a speedy trial is weighted
equally. Compare Kelley v. State, 568 So.2d 405, 410
(Ala.Crim.App.1990) (‘Repeated requests for a speedy trial weigh
heavily in favor of an accused.’), with Clancy v. State, 886 So.2d
166, 172 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (weighting third factor against an
accused who asserted his right to a speedy trial two weeks before
trial, and stating: ‘ “The fact that the appellant did not assert his
right to a speedy trial sooner ‘tends to suggest that he either
acquiesced in the delays or suffered only minimal prejudice prior to
that date.’ ” ') (quoting Benefield v. State, 726 So.2d 286, 291
(Ala.Crim.App.1997), additional citations omitted), and Brown v.
State, 392 So.2d 1248, 1254 (Ala.Crim.App.1980) (no speedy-trial
violation where defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial three
days before trial).”
Ex parte Walker, 928 So.2d at 265-66.
Prejudice to the defendant. Blackmon does not
assert in brief nor did she assert at trial how she was specifically
prejudiced by the delay in her trial. “Walker ․ has neither alleged
nor proved how the delay actually impaired her defense, and both the
trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Walker's
speedy-trial claim because of her failure to establish actual
prejudice.” Ex parte Walker, 928 So.2d at 259.
After reviewing the Barker v. Wingo factors, we
find no evidence that Blackmon was denied her constitutional right to
a speedy trial.
XXI.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court erred in
denying her motion for a change of venue. This issue was extensively
addressed in our original opinion and we found that the circuit court
did not err in denying Blackmon's motion for a change of venue. We
see no reason to revisit that issue on rehearing.
XXII.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court erred in
denying her motion for a judgment of acquittal. We addressed this
issue in our original opinion and found that the evidence was more
than sufficient to present to the jury for its determination. There
is no reason to change that holding on rehearing.
XXIII.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court erred in
denying her motion for a new trial. This issue was thoroughly
addressed in our original opinion. We held that the circuit court
did not err. We have been cited nothing that would give us reason to
revisit that holding on rehearing.
XXIV.
Blackmon argues the circuit court erred in
admitting photographs of the victim's body and her injuries because
they were inflammatory, repetitive, and prejudicial.
There was no objection at trial; therefore, we
review this issue for plain error. See Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.
“Alabama courts have held on many occasions that
photographs of the crime scene and the victims are admissible, even
though they might be gruesome and cumulative, if they shed light on an
issue being tried. E.g., Baird v. State, 849 So.2d 223, 246
(Ala.Crim.App.2002).” McGahee v. State, 885 So.2d 191, 214
(Ala.Crim.App.2003). The photographs were correctly received into
evidence.
XXV.
Blackmon argues that her statements were
involuntary and should not have been admitted into evidence.
This claim was not presented to the circuit court;
therefore, we review this issue for plain error. See Rule 45A,
Ala.R.App.P.
When reviewing the voluntariness of a confession we
apply the standard articulated by the Alabama Supreme Court in McLeod
v. State, 718 So.2d 727 (Ala.1998):
“For a confession, or an inculpatory statement, to
be admissible, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that it was voluntary. Ex parte Singleton, 465 So.2d 443, 445
(Ala.1985). The initial determination is made by the trial court.
Singleton, 465 So.2d at 445. The trial court's determination will
not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the great weight of the
evidence or is manifestly wrong. Marschke v. State, 450 So.2d 177
(Ala.Crim.App.1984)․
“The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States provides in pertinent part: ‘No person ․ shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself․’
Similarly, § 6 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 provides that ‘in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused ․ shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself.’ These constitutional guarantees
ensure that no involuntary confession, or other inculpatory statement,
is admissible to convict the accused of a criminal offense. Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961);
Hubbard v. State, 283 Ala. 183, 215 So.2d 261 (1968).
“It has long been held that a confession, or any
inculpatory statement, is involuntary if it is either coerced through
force or induced through an express or implied promise of leniency.
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568
(1897). In Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602, 81 S.Ct. at 1879, the Supreme
Court of the United States explained that for a confession to be
voluntary, the defendant must have the capacity to exercise his own
free will in choosing to confess. If his capacity has been impaired,
that is, ‘if his will has been overborne ’ by coercion or inducement,
then the confession is involuntary and cannot be admitted into
evidence. Id. (emphasis added).
“The Supreme Court has stated that when a court is
determining whether a confession was given voluntarily it must
consider the ‘totality of the circumstances.’ Boulden v. Holman, 394
U.S. 478, 480, 89 S.Ct. 1138, 1139-40, 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969);
Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 521, 88 S.Ct. 1152, 1154, 20
L.Ed.2d 77 (1968); see Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 38, 88 S.Ct.
189, 191, 19 L.Ed.2d 35 (1967). Alabama courts have also held that a
court must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine if
the defendant's will was overborne by coercion or inducement. See Ex
parte Matthews, 601 So.2d 52, 54 (Ala.) (stating that a court must
analyze a confession by looking at the totality of the circumstances),
cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206, 112 S.Ct. 2996, 120 L.Ed.2d 872 (1992);
Jackson v. State, 562 So.2d 1373, 1380 (Ala.Crim.App.1990) (stating
that, to admit a confession, a court must determine that the
defendant's will was not overborne by pressures and circumstances
swirling around him); Eakes v. State, 387 So.2d 855, 859
(Ala.Crim.App.1978) (stating that the true test to be employed is
‘whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed’)
(emphasis added).”
718 So.2d at 729 (footnote omitted).
The uncontested evidence showed that Sgt. Doug
Johnson read Blackmon her Miranda rights and that she signed a waiver
of rights form. She also indicated on the form that she was not
pressured or promised anything in order to secure her statements.
There was absolutely no evidence presented indicating that Blackmon's
statements were not voluntarily given. The circuit court committed
no error in admitting her statements into evidence.
XXVI.
Blackmon argues that the circuit court improperly
denied her motion in limine to prevent the State from impeaching a
defense witness with an uncharged accusation of child neglect.
When this issue was raised before the defense's
case-in-chief the circuit court stated the following:
“The State is instructed not to go into that until
it approaches the Court out of the presence of the jury and to bring
it up at that time. I tend to agree with [defense counsel] that it
would not generally be admissible. However, I could foresee
situations where it might rise to that level of admissibility, if you
were to open the door on it somehow․ So, you know, I don't want to
foreclose possibilities where it might be admissible and just give an
ironclad ruling presently.
“But again, the State is instructed not to go into
it unless and until such time that it becomes an issue. Until such
time as it arguably could be admissible and then the State would have
to approach the bench out of the presence of the jury and bring it up
at that time.”
(R. 963.) Clearly, there was no adverse ruling.
The circuit court agreed with the defense and this issue was not
brought up again during this witness's testimony. Blackmon's
assertion is not supported by the record.
XXVII.
Blackmon argues, in one paragraph in her rehearing
brief, that she was denied a full appeal because the record of the
proceedings in circuit court was not fully transcribed. She asserts
that parts of discovery, bench conferences, witness testimony, and
jury questionnaires were omitted from the record.
This claim is raised for the first time on appeal
and will be reviewed for plain error. See Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.
Initially we note that juror questionnaires are to
be omitted from the record unless we specifically direct that they be
forwarded to this Court. See Rule 10(a)(6), Ala.R.App.P. This
Court requested that the circuit clerk forward those questionnaires to
this Court.
Furthermore, as we stated in Wynn v. State, 804
So.2d 1122, 1143-44 (Ala.Crim.App.2000):
“[I]t should have been apparent to the defense
during the trial that the court reporter was not recording certain
sidebars․ Defense counsel could have easily reminded the trial court
that it had granted his motion for full recordation of the proceedings
and remedied the omissions at that time. Therefore, this error was
invited by the appellant.”
Moreover, one of Blackmon's appellate attorneys was
also one of Blackmon's trial attorneys. When an appellant has the
same lawyer on appeal and at trial, the appellant must show that the
failure to transcribe the complete record resulted in prejudice to
him-there is no per se prejudice rule. See Ingram v. State, 779
So.2d 1225 (Ala.Crim.App.1999).
Blackmon has made no argument as to how she was
prejudiced by the omission of what appears to be minor portions of the
record. It is apparent, after reviewing the pages cited by Blackmon,
that the omissions related to scheduling concerns. There is no
reversible error here.
XXVIII.
Blackmon argues that “death qualifying” the jury
produced a conviction-prone jury and, she argues, denied her of her
right to an impartial jury.
This claim was not raised at trial; therefore, we
review this issue only for plain error. See Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.
The United States Supreme Court in Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986), held that
the United States Constitution does not forbid a capital defendant's
potential jury from being “death qualified” and that to do so does not
deprive a defendant of his constitutional right to an impartial jury.
476 U.S. at 173, 106 S.Ct. 1758. Alabama has followed the holding
in Lockhart v. McCree. See Johnson v. State, 823 So.2d 1
(Ala.Crim.App.2001); Clemons v. State, 720 So.2d 961
(Ala.Crim.App.1996).
XXIX.
Blackmon last argues that the circuit court erred
in not allowing discovery of the grand-jury materials. We addressed
this issue in our original opinion and held that there was no error.
We have been cited no reason to reevaluate our holding on rehearing.
In our original opinion we reviewed the propriety
of Blackmon's death sentence and found no violation of § 13A-5-53,
Ala.Code 1975; nor did we find any plain error. See Rule 45A,
Ala.R.App.P.
For the foregoing reasons, Blackmon's application
for rehearing is due to be, and is hereby, overruled.
APPLICATION OVERRULED.
I concur with the majority's decision to overrule
Blackmon's application for rehearing. I write specially with regard
to this Court's decision to allow Blackmon to raise new issues in her
application for rehearing. As a general rule neither this Court nor
any other Alabama appellate court allows a party to raise new issues
in its application for rehearing. See, e.g., Finley v. Patterson,
705 So.2d 834, 836 (Ala.1997) (See, J., concurring specially and
noting that the Alabama Supreme Court will not ordinarily address
issues that are raised for the first time on rehearing); Ex parte
Jordan, 486 So.2d 485, 488 (Ala.1986) (noting that the Alabama Supreme
Court does not normally consider issues that are raised for the first
time on rehearing, but making an exception because the new argument
was an extension of an argument that had been raised and addressed on
original submission). See also Ex parte Hulsey, 536 So.2d 75, 78
(Ala.Civ.App.1988) (noting that, “ ‘[w]hen an appellate court has
rendered an opinion and an application for a rehearing has been filed,
new issues which were not argued upon the original submission of the
appeal generally will not be considered. Stover v. Alabama Farm
Bureau Insurance Co., 467 So.2d 251 (Ala.1985).’ Holsonback v.
Holsonback, 518 So.2d 146, 148 (Ala.Civ.App.1987).”). But see
Williams v. State, 627 So.2d 994, 995 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) (opinion on
application for rehearing), aff'd, 627 So.2d 999 (Ala.1993) (noting
that the court did not find plain error on initial review, but
nevertheless addressing issues that were raised by new counsel on
rehearing “because we realize that other appellate courts will review
this death penalty case”).
Even though this case involves imposition of the
ultimate punishment-the death penalty-just as was the case in Williams
v. State, I question whether it was necessary to allow Blackmon's
counsel to present new issues on rehearing, given that this Court
searched the record for plain error during our initial review of
Blackmon's appeal. See Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P. Thus, had there been
merit to any of these issues, this Court would have been required,
pursuant to Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P., to have noticed the errors. But
for our previous holding in Williams v. State-together with the highly
unusual facts of this case, namely, the fact that Blackmon's original
appellate counsel had been suspended from the practice of law at the
time our decision was released, leaving Blackmon without any legal
representation-I would have dissented from the majority's decision to
review the merits of the new issues raised by Blackmon on rehearing.
Therefore, my vote in this case should not be taken as an indication
that under normal circumstances I would allow an appellant to raise
new issues in an application for rehearing. Indeed, if this Court
allowed parties to continue to raise entirely new issues on rehearing
and then addressed those new issues, parties could conceivably file
second and successive rehearing briefs raising new issues, and there
would be no finality of judgments by this Court. However, given the
unique facts of this case, I believe that prohibiting Blackmon's newly
appointed appellate counsel from raising new issues in her application
for rehearing would serve no purpose but to delay a final resolution
of this case. Accordingly, I agree with the majority's decision to
make an exception to our general rule prohibiting an appellant from
raising new issues on rehearing.
FOOTNOTES
1. The
imprint on the victim's chest was so distinct that a photograph of the
victim's chest introduced into evidence clearly showed the tread of
the sole of a shoe.
2. Numbers
alone are not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. The circuit court could have properly denied
Blackmon's Batson motion without hearing the State's reasons for
removing the black prospective jurors. Sharrief v. Gerlach, 798 So.2d
646 (Ala.2001).
3. The
State gave its reasons for removing six prospective black jurors.
Apparently the State's last strike, an alternate, was also a black
individual. “As provided in Rule 18.4(g)(3), [Ala.]R.Crim.P., ‘The
last person or persons struck shall be the alternate or alternates․'
Thus, the trial court should view the alternate jurors as having been
struck for purposes of Batson and this court must ‘evaluate the
State's explanation for striking [the alternate].’ Ex parte Bankhead,
625 So.2d 1146, 1147 (Ala.1993).” Ashley v. State, 651 So.2d 1096,
1099 (Ala.Crim.App.1994).
4. The
holding in Ring applies to this case because this case was pending on
direct appeal when that decision was released. See Griffith v.
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987).
5. Blackmon
was tried before the Alabama Supreme Court released its decision in
McGriff.
FOOTNOTE. Note from the reporter of decisions: The slip opinion
issued by the Court of Criminal Appeals on August 5, 2005, was 41
pages.
1. The
Alabama Supreme Court has long stated that new issues may not be
raised for the first time in an application for rehearing:“We cannot
sanction the practice of bringing up new questions for the first time
in application for rehearing. Robinson v. Allison, 97 Ala. 596, 604,
12 So. 382, 604 [ (1893) ].“An application for rehearing on ground not
argued or suggested until after our judgment was rendered cannot be
now considered.”Kirkland v. Kirkland, 281 Ala. 42, 49, 198 So.2d 771,
777 (1967).
2. In the
original brief, Blackmon argued only that the reasons given for
striking six black prospective jurors were not race neutral. We
found that all of the reasons were race neutral and did not violate
Batson. Blackmon raises a new argument on rehearing.
3. “A
trial judge has a duty to be thorough, courteous, patient, punctual,
just and impartial. Yet he is not required to be a ‘Great Stone
Face’ which shows no reaction to anything that happens in his
courtroom. Allen v. State, 290 Ala. 339, 276 So.2d 583 (1973).”
Gwin v. State, 425 So.2d 500, 506-07 (Ala.Crim.App.1982).
4. Blackmon
specifically cites the admission of State's exhibit 40-a confidential
report from the DHR. However, this exhibit was not admitted into
evidence.