



Fire Lessons Learned

(Submitted by the Oklahoma City Fire Department)

Taken from the minutes of the first Oklahoma City Fire Department critique of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Incident. The critique was held on August 7, 1995 with 32 personnel present.

OVERVIEW

1. The Incident Command System really can be used for any size incident! Early setup of ICS Structure was automatic and made the incident manageable, even to the size of 20,000 plus personnel.
2. Action plan and communication issue.

We need to develop a system. Even with our drills (inter-agency), we have not tapped into how to handle a 17-day event. Whether the shifts should be 8-hour or 12-hour and consistency problems with the command staff. Long-term incidents need to be looked at in these areas.

Lessons Learned:

- One recommendation was to set up a mutual aid check out, including all equipment, donations, and human resources to one single spot. It would be beneficial for the Incident Commander to have a tape recorder so that he can verbalize what he is doing. This would help the documentation of the incident.
- To train other organizations in ICS and have a common system adopted by all Metro or even the state, so that everyone has an idea of what is going on.
- Know what our Command Post looks like and what shape it is in. Label and bin equipment.
- Interfacing of the crime scene and response area.
- MACC Operations — There needs to be a representative from all agencies there at all times inside the MACC.
- We felt like we had too many requests coming in other than from the Incident Commander; that information from EMS, Rescue, Logistics,

etc., should route through Command and route to MACC Command.

- ICS does work, it's just a matter of if it's used properly or not.
- You cannot underestimate the need for people in the liaison area. Utilize them to make things go smoother. Every ICS function needed more runners for dispersing directives, going for equipment, and/or a liaison.
- Company integrity — we tried not to bust up the integrity of companies.
- Need for a Senior Officer as an Advisor — nothing to do but come up with different look of how things would operate.
- Being able to identify early on your experienced people to play vital roles.
- Evacuation System — A signal we could use for all agencies.
- Control of all resources - especially the donations. How all those flooded into many areas.
- Computerized bar code system for I.D. tags — for accountability.
- Establish a call-in procedure for off-duty personnel.

RESCUE COMMAND

Positives:

- Early arrival of command — Due to District Chiefs meeting.
- Equipment needs met — No problems getting anything.
- 8-hour rotations of manpower — Everyone wanted to work.
- Mutual aid cooperation — There were no problems with seniority at all or any other multi-jurisdictional reserves.
- Willingness to work (all personnel).

Negatives:

- Early communications — Everyone trying to use radios at same time.

- Manpower coordination with ops/staging — When the second bomb scare came, we regrouped. Set up a manpower pool. We needed communication between rescue and operations in order to get those
- Coordination with Law Enforcement DEA/ FBI/US MARSHAL
 - On south side of the building there were three entrances and numerous people were entering to remove occupants. Security was needed.
- Mutual aid going directly to scene (no check in) — Had a problem with some of these departments. Instead of coming through the command post, they would show up on the south side, and if they were in FD uniforms, PD would let them through.
- Communications with ops regarding manpower needs — Knowing where people were and when they were needed.
- Crime scene issues — Since it was a crime scene, there were problems such as, what can and can't be done. We were restricted as far as what could be done initially.
- FEMA teams — They worked on 12 hour shifts (8:00-8:00) and there was quite a bit of difference between the two shifts. They approached things from different ways.
- Public officials — There was a problem of public officials visiting the site. There weren't enough people that could be assigned to take these people around to tour the site. Need to have system in disaster plan.

INCIDENT COMMAND

Positives:

- All DC's and apparatus responded at the same time.
- Bomb scare — regroup.
- Mutual aid command post separate.
- Location of logistics and tracking.
- Working with the ICS properly.
- FBI liaison.
- Weather service availability.


Negatives:

- Branch/Command terminology.
- All DCs and apparatus responded at the same time.
- Freelancing (both OKCFD and mutual aid).
- Communications with dispatch and backup plan.
- Crowd control early on.
- IC needs to be isolated.
- Accountability for all agencies.
- Mutual aid (control) — separate.
- Coordination of info between agencies — law enforcement/rescue.
- Shift change sit-stat reports to all work sections.

LOGISTICS

Positives:

- If needed, they got it.
- Coordination with USAR.
- Circumvent normal bureaucracy (emergency purchasing powers) — We were able to purchase things as needed without the bureaucracy.
- Mechanic on site 24 hrs — for the first 12 days. He kept apparatus running and was a runner for the logistics people. Equipment change out was maintained through this person.
- Purchasing — 24hrs — Had three people there at all times.
- Runners available — 24hrs.
- Enthusiasm of “whatever works.”
- Weather — Location was out of the weather.
- Military taking over fuel needs — Fuel truck was on site until the Monday after the incident started.
- Staffing — not enough — Due to documentation needed.
- Fragmentation — The Purchasing occurring from every direction was the biggest problem we had. There was purchasing done from Headquarters, the Shop, the site, and the Red Cross.



- Media control — Along the lines of donations. The media was told by personnel leaving the site — “We need gloves” when all he had to do was walk over to Logistics and there were about 100 cases of them. Immediately, the media put it out on TV “We need Gloves.” That became a problem with gloves, filter masks, rubber gloves, etc. It continued for two weeks afterward.
- Staffing not put on 8-hr rotating shifts — Consistency of operation — We felt like we needed to have two people in control — one on each shift. Or, three people in control — one on each 8-hour shift, to work it through and to keep the same people on the same team. The main body needed to be the same. This was done in other areas of the Command Structure and worked very well.
- Lack of situation-stat reports from other divisions—Big picture of what is happening. There was a need to know what was going on everywhere.
- One clearing house is needed for Purchasing, Receiving, Ordering, etc. That was a big issue. There were three layers of purchasing being done and deliveries being made to multiple locations.
- Lack of documentation — invoices, purchases, loaned, who end user was. We needed a way to mark that stuff. There was a lot of time spent determining how we got it. We had to call the manufacturer many times and ask them if we bought it from them, if they donated it, or if someone else bought it and donated it. The suggestion made was to have a color coding system (Red label listing information - we bought it, Green Label — loaned or donated). Separate the tools, first aid supplies, etc.
- Inadequate list of vendors and alternate sources — We should have been using City vendors who are on contract as much as possible.
- Perimeter control for logistics — Too many people IN/OUT of Logistics Center.

Recommendation:

- Designated commanders throughout incident — They would be on specific shifts to keep the continuity, and they would have the single purchasing authority. Frequently, we ended up with single items from three different sources.
- Single purchase authority.
- Single logistics center with appropriate representation of agencies — Ideal plan would be to have two (one outside perimeter to do all receiving and drop-offs, and one inside perimeter for dispensing).
- Single dispensing/receiving.
- Two location centers inside/outside perimeter.
- Situation-stat reports — There needs to be reports daily to twice daily. It helps with purchasing.
- Media — Limit request to public.
- Have training on FEMA paperwork and on logistics.
- ICS — There would have been a benefit from having a skilled person with a computer (laptop) to input the information. There could have been daily updates stored, etc.
- Train all staff in ICS (secretaries and support personnel).
- Too many supplies offered by vendors.
 - Rotated crews/volunteers through as staff. Did not work.
- Orders were interrupted by other agencies (FEMA).
- Set up control of logistics for all agency operation under ICS.
- Laptop computers with skilled operator.
- Develop list of vendors.
- Internal control issues gone — Need for accountability system when emergency purchasing is being done.
- FEMA reimbursement process.
 - How does it work?
 - Simplify paperwork.
- Design record keeping for speed.
- Operated in a vacuum — Did not have communication/briefings on incident.
- List of alternative sources.
- Communications.
- Need dedicated phone lines.
 - used hard wire systems- lots of runners

- Develop timetables.
 - Agency levels
 - Rescue vs recovery

EMS

Positives:

- Interagency cooperation — There were four or five ambulance companies there the first day.
- Early treatment/triage/transport areas in place.
- EMS command in place early.
- Biohazard and Decon problems recognized early.
- 8-hr rotating shifts — on same shifts as rescue
- Training of personnel — Starting the second day, taught everyone how to use respirators, to look for dangers.
- Early contact with CDC — We were told we could downgrade some of our decontamination procedures.
- Low rescuer injuries — Had site safety officers who determined the risks, etc.

Negatives:

- Accountability.
- Set lines of authority.
 - Who reports to who
 - Division leader (not the person) other agencies not knowing ICS.
- Lack of operational meetings.
- Staffing needs were not met at times.
- Uncoordination of different logistics (could not find supplies ordered).

Recommendations:

- Perimeter control.
- Better communications — not necessarily radio, but ICS communications.
- Lines of authority established early and adhered to — All division heads need to be aware of our operational meetings.
- Situation/stat reports to all personnel.
 - regular operational meetings (daily)
 - all division leaders present
 - forecasting of personnel needs

OKLAHOMA CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT
MURRAH BOMBING RESPONSE
RED SHIFT FIRST-IN COMPANIES
"9:02 a.m. - 10:30 a.m., April 19, 1995"

Station & Company Assignments

Fire Companies which self-dispatched after the 9:02 a.m. explosion:

**Fire Station 1
820 NW 5 Street**

Truck 1 (1990 E-One Hurricane equipped with a 135' aluminum ladder, a 1,500 GPM pumping unit, and 1,500' of 4" hose.)

Truck 1 went east on NW 5. The truck officer had to leave the cab near the Regency Tower Apartments and clear debris from the street so the truck could proceed. They saw large numbers of wounded and directed them to NW 5 & Hudson where there were two Police Traffic Service Technicians. They gave the truck's jump kit to an off-duty firefighter who went to assist the wounded. Truck 1 was positioned on Harvey, just north of the Water Resources Building. They attempted to raise the aerial ladder to the building, but the 135' ladder was too long to position to the 2nd and 3rd floors. An officer and a firefighter entered the building and began a primary search. They found an injured man, place him in a chair and carried him down the north stairs. They returned to the search and assisted another person from the building. After attempting to raise the ladder, the driver entered the building with Major Woodward. They located one woman trapped under debris and extricated and removed her. The company was searching the Water Resources Building at 10:30 a.m.

Engine 1 (1989 Quality Spartan equipped with a 1,250 GPM pumping unit, and a 1,000 GPM deck gun.)

Engine 1 went east on NW 5. The driver was instructed to back in to Harvey from the Regency Tower Apartments area. They met large numbers of wounded and directed them to NW 5 and Hudson. They first worked to treat wounded at NW 5 and Harvey. They provided first aid supplies to Truck 5's crew. Then Chief Conner directed them to lay a line and attack the car fires in the parking lot east of the Athenian Building. The crew hand laid a supply line to the hydrant at NW 5 and Harvey and advanced an attack line to fight the car fires. They were ordered to leave one firefighter with the line and the rest of crew was directed to join in the search of the Water Resources Building. They joined the crew from Truck 1 and found one woman who was in critical condition. They extricated her from debris on 2nd floor, removed her via the stairs, and passed her into the care of an EMSA crew. Engine 1's crew worked in the Water Resources Building until 10:30 a.m.

Rescue Squad 1 (1990 E-One Protector.)

Squad 1 went east on NW 5, then north on Walker and east on NW 6 to park at NW 6 and Harvey. The crew walked to NW 5 and Harvey and was divided into two groups, one to search the partially collapsed Athenian Building and the other the Water Resources Building. Two members entered the Athenian Building and assisted in the rescue of one man and then joined a District Chief's driver and other workers to extricate a man trapped under the fallen roof of the Journal Record Building. The man was then placed on a backboard and taken to an EMSA site. Two members entered the Water Resources Building and helped Engine 51's crew extricate and remove one person and then assisted Truck 1's crew in carrying another person down the stairs. They continued search efforts in both buildings. At 10:30 a.m., the two crew members searching the collapsed Athenian Building had to jump from the second floor to the first floor in order to evacuate the building.

Engine 51 (1991 E-One Cyclone equipped with a teleboom, a 1,250 GPM pumping unit and 1,200' of 4" hose.)

Engine 51 went east on NW 5 to Walker, north on Walker to NW 7, east on NW 7 and then south on Harvey to NW 6. The crew assisted Rescue Squad 1 in removing a person from the Water Resources Building. Then Chief Conner assigned them to rescue operations in the Murrah Building. They entered the Murrah Building from the north by climbing over the debris pile. They participated in several rescues before being joined by other OCFD crews. They reported seeing many non-firefighters already working in the building. The crew worked in the Pit area. They found the injured by listening for cries. The injured were extricated and given to non-firefighters who carried them from the building. The crew was working to extricate a person at time of the 10:30 evacuation.

Fire Station 4
100 SW 4 Street

(Brush Pumper 41994 Chevrolet One-ton Pickup Truck modified in the Fire Maintenance Shop to carry a 300 gallon water tank and 200' of 3/4" hose.)

Brush Pumper 4 was at Station 5 at NW 22 and Broadway. BP4 went south on Broadway to NW 5 and backed into NW 5 from Broadway, to a location by the YMCA.

Engine 4 (1995 Boardman Spartan equipped with a 1,250 GPM pumper, a 1,000 GPM deck gun and 1,500' of 4" hose.)

Engine 4 was putting out a small fire at SE 2 and Compress. E4 self-dispatched after hearing the first radio report of major damage. E4 went west on Reno, north on E.K. Gaylord and Broadway to NW 5. and backed into NW 5 to a location by the YMCA.

The E4 and BP 4 crews operated together. Two firefighters cared for a critically wounded woman who had been removed from the 1st floor of the Murrah Building and then remained outside to care for other wounded. Shortly after arriving at the site, the rest of the two crews entered the Murrah Building east extension through the door on Robinson and made their way into the first floor of the building. They encountered rising water from damaged sprinkler and water lines. Live electrical lines were hanging and some lines had fallen into the water. The crews located a non-critical person and removed her to an area where other crews were working. They reentered the building and found a woman trapped at her desk. They removed debris, extricated the woman and, using a table top as a back-board, evacuated her to the east side of the building. By this time, EMSA and additional OCFD crews had arrived. BP4's crew remained outside to help treat the wounded. The E4 crews re-entered the building and located a third person on the southeast side of the basement near the collapse area. Debris was still falling and the area was dangerous to work in. One firefighter lifted the woman to his shoulders. The crew looked for a way out of the building. They saw a ladder placed from the 1st floor collapse area to the 2nd floor. They used this ladder to exit the building onto the Plaza area. The crews then re-entered the building from the south entrance and assisted with debris removal on the 2nd floor. Four members of the crew went to the north side of the building and got a 39' ladder from Truck 5. They carried this ladder over a wall and to the south side of the building and raised it in an attempt to rescue people trapped on the upper floor at the south-east end of the building. The wide overhang of the building at this point prevented the ladder from reaching the people. The crew made radio contact with Truck 5, which was operating an aerial ladder on the north side. The people were removed by Truck 5's ladder. The crew was working in the Pit at 10:30 a.m.

Fire Station 5
NW 22 and Broadway

Truck 5 (1990 E-One Hurricane equipped with a 135' aluminum ladder, a 1,500 GPM" pumping unit, and 1,200' of 4" hose.)

Truck 5 went south on Broadway to NW 13, east on NW 13 to Robinson and south on Robinson. They stopped at NW 8 to check on injured people. They found them not to be critical and proceeded south to NW 6 where EMSA had established a triage site. T5 was initially assigned to assist at triage. Then Chief Vernon directed them to go to the Murrah Building where they treated the wounded removed from the building. They were directed to bring Truck 5 to the building. Other emergency vehicles had to be moved so they could move the truck. The truck was maneuvered east on NW 6 to Broadway, west on NW 5 to Robinson and around several vehicles to the Murrah Building. The truck was placed on NW 5 about 20' to 30' feet from the bomb crater and the ladder was raised to reach the northeast part

of the building. The ladder was used to rescue three people trapped on the 6th floor. These rescues were just completed at 10:30 a.m. The truck was left in position and the crew moved to a staging area.

Engine 5 (1991 E-One Cyclone equipped with a 1,250 GPM pumping unit, a 1,000 GPM deck gun, and 1,500' of 3" hose.)

Engine 5 went south on Broadway to NW 5 and east on NW 5 to park in front of the YMCA. The crew was assigned to provide triage and first aid at the YMCA. They provided support to EMSA until 10:30 a.m.

HAZ MAT 5 (1990 Hush that carried hazardous materials instruments.)

HAZ MAT 5 went south on Broadway to NW 5. They encountered broken glass and building damage as far north as NW 13. HM5 parked in front of the YMCA and reported to Chief Vernon. They were assigned to evacuate and treat the children from the YMCA day care center. Several members of the crew continued to support the triage work while the rest were ordered to the first floor of the Murrah Building. After removing one victim, Captain Fields and a firefighter met a police officer carrying a child. Captain Fields took the child and carried her to an EMSA unit on Robinson just south of the Murrah Building. The crew retrieved additional equipment from the HAZ MAT 5 truck and then reentered the 1st floor and determined that electrical power and water lines to the area had been shut off. The crew was directed by radio to go to the outside of the building, on the south side, to assist with rescue work. They reported there and assisted in extricating two people trapped in a collapse area just inside the building. They were extricated and placed on backboards and given to others who formed a human chain. The 10:30 a.m. evacuation came just after these rescues.

Fire Station 6
620 NE 8 Street

Engine 6 (1987 Quality Spartan equipped with a 1,250 GPM pumping unit, a 1,000 GPM deck gun, and 1,500' of 3" hose.)

Engine 6 went west on NE 8 to Harrison, south on Harrison to NE 6, west on 6th Street to NW 6 and Robinson adjacent to the parking lot across NW 5 from the Murrah Building. They reported to Chief Marrs and were assigned to attack the car fires. They laid a supply line from the hydrant at NW 6 and Robinson and placed two attack lines into service to extinguish about 25 burning cars. They continue the car fire suppression work until the 10:30 a.m. evacuation.

Truck 6 (1983 Spartan Snorkle equipped with a 65' articulating boom.)

Truck 6 went west on NE 8 to Harrison, south on Harrison to NE 6, and west on 6th to the east side of the NW 6 and Robinson intersection. They were assigned to make a primary search of Journal Record Building. When this was completed, they responded to a request from a police officer to search the building on the east side of Robinson, across from the Journal Record Building. They searched that building but did not find any one. They used their radio to request another assignment and were directed to report to the south side of the Murrah Building to assist with search and rescue operations. They entered the building from the south and worked near Rescue Squad 1 to search for victims. They located a number of dead and at least one injured person. They had been in the building for about 45 minutes when they were ordered to evacuate at 10:30 a.m.

Fire Companies dispatched at 9:20 a.m. by the Fourth and Fifth Alarms:

Fire Station 7
218 SW 23 Street

Engine 7 (1985 Quality Spartan equipped with a 1,250 GPM pumping unit, a 1,000 GPM deck gun, and 1,500' of 3" hose.)



Engine 7 went east on SW 23, north on Shields to Gaylord/ Broadway and north on Broadway to NW 5 to stage at Fire Station 1. They were ordered by Major Young to search the Journal Record Building. They drove to the NW corner of NW 6 and Harvey and walked to the building. They took the stairs to the second floor and were met by Captain Beck of Inspection and Captain Aduddell and were told all floors had been checked except for the first floor and the basement. They searched those areas but did not find anyone. The crew was searching a restaurant at the east end of the Journal Record Building when ordered to evacuate at 10:30 a.m.

Truck 7 (1990 E-One Hurricane equipped with a 95' platform, a 1,500 GPM pumping unit, and 1,200' of 4" hose.)

Truck 7 went east on SW 23, north on Shields to Gaylord/ Broadway and north on Broadway to stage at NW 8 and Harvey. They reported by radio to Chief Conner and were instructed to bring Truck 7 to the northwest side of the Murrah Building. The brought the truck to building and had to remove debris in order to back the truck into position. The crew used the platform, or bucket, to reach the 3rd floor and conducted primary searches of the 3rd, 4th and 5th floors. No rescues were made. The crew worked on the 2nd floor and was then assigned to survey the west side of the building for structural stability. The crew was in the truck's bucket, surveying the 7th floor, when 10:30 a.m. evacuation was ordered. The crew evacuated on foot.

Fire Station 8

1934 W. Exchange Ave.

Engine 8 (1988 Quality Spartan equipped with a 1,250 GPM pumping unit, a 1,000 GPM deck gun, and 1,500' of 4" hose.)

Engine 8 and Truck 8 were at the Fairgrounds near NW 10 and May where they were preparing to test Engine 8's hose. When they heard the explosion, they self-dispatched to downtown. They proceeded east on Reno to Lee and turned north on Lee to NW 4, and then went east to Walker, where they were stopped by several walking wounded including a citizen complaining of chest pains. They left the citizens in the care of an off-duty firefighter and proceeded to NW 6 and Harvey. The Engine 8 crew was immediately assigned to the east side of the Murrah Building. They left Engine 8 at NW 6 and Harvey, took their hand tools and reported to Chief Vernon. They were assigned to turn off some utilities. After completing that assignment, they were assigned to the south side of the building. A firefighter was sent for a ladder which they erected and used to rescue several people from the 2nd and 3rd floors. The ladder was left in place and Police Officers and Sheriffs continued to use it to assist people from the building. The crew reported to the Pit area and began to search for victims. Major Hill found one victim with only a hand exposed. A firefighter was sent for heavier equipment. Engine 8's crew worked with other firefighters and Major M. Hanson to free the victim. As they were working, Major Hill discovered another victim just to the east of where they were working. This victim was about 10 feet deep in the broken pillars and rebar. Major Hill had ordered some assistance for this victim when the 10:30 evacuation was called. Corporal Roberts, who had been carrying in some tools, carried out a Police Officer who had fallen down the stairs and broken her leg. The crew met outside at a predetermined location and reported to staging.

Truck 8 (1978 Ward La France equipped with a 100' Maxim ladder.)

Truck 8 responded with Engine 8. After arriving, they were directed to ladder the Murrah Building. They positioned Truck 8 on the north side of the building just west of the bomb crater. The ladder was raised to the top of the debris pile at the 3rd floor. Crew members climbed the ladder to assist Chief Shannon in disentangling the legs of a person trapped in the rubble. They placed the injured man in a stokes basket, brought him down the ladder, and passed him into the care of those standing by. They climbed the ladder again to reach a woman trapped near the man they had rescued. They had to lay an attic ladder across a crevice and climb across it to reach her. After bringing her down the ladder to safety, they entered the building and assisted Fire Chaplain Wilson and a group who were working to free a woman trapped in the debris. They tried to use a mini-amkus to free her, but the slab of concrete flooring was too heavy for the tool. Squad 18 arrived with a porta-power tool. The 10:30 a.m. evacuation was called at this time. Truck 8's crew exited the building. Squad 18's crew freed the survivor and carried her from the building.

Fire Station 9

1415 SW 89th Street

Engine 9 (1995 Boardman Spartan equipped with a 1,250 GPM pumping unit, a 1,000 GPM deck gun, and 1,500' of 3" hose.)

Engine 9 was dispatched to stage at Fire Station 1. They stayed there for about an hour and then were told to report to the parking lot of the First Baptist Church at NW 11 and Harvey. They were in that staging area at the time of the 10:30 a.m. evacuation.

Fire Station 10

2039 NW 16 Street

Engine 10 (1991 E-One Cyclone equipped with a 1,250 GPM pumping unit, a 1,000 GPM deck gun, and 1,500' of 3" hose.)

Engine 10's company had been responding to an 8:55 a.m. emergency medical services call. When they completed that call, they began traveling toward Fire Station 1. While enroute, they responded to the alarm and proceeded east on NW 5 from Classen Blvd. and then went to NW 6 and Harvey where Engine 10 was placed in a lot on the northwest corner of the intersection. The crew was told to report to Chief Conner at NW 5 and Harvey. They were ordered into the Murrah Building where they worked with members of Squad 21 and located and extricated several people from the debris. At the time of the evacuation, the crew was working to extricate a person. They completed that work and removed the injured person from the building.

Fire Station 15

2817 NW 122 Street

Engine 15 (1990 E-One Cyclone equipped with a 50' teleboom, and 1,250 GPM pumping unit, and 1,200' of 4" hose.)

Truck 15 1990 E-One Hurricane equipped with a 95' platform, a 1,500 GPM pumping unit, and 1,200' of 4" hose.

Brush Pumper 15 (1992 Ford F350 modified in the Fire Maintenance Shop to carry a 300 gallon tank and 200' of 3/4" hose.)

Engine 15, Truck 15 and Brush Pumper 15 were dispatched to stage at Fire Station 1. They responded south on I-44, east on I-40 to Western, and then north to NW 5 Street. Engine 15 was dispatched to pick up medical supplies from Fire Stations 4 and 6 and take them to the Command Post. Engine 15 went to those stations, but found that Squad 16 had already picked up the supplies. Engine 15 returned to staging. All Station 15 rigs were in staging at the time of the 10:30 a.m. evacuation.

Fire Station 17

2716 NW 50th Street

Rescue Squad 17 (1991 E-One Protector.)

Just before 9:00 a.m., Squad 17 and Engine 17 were dispatched to NW 39 and May Avenue to a vehicle accident with injury. While at that location, the crew heard and felt the 9:02 a.m. explosion and observed the large plume of smoke over downtown. Squad 17 proceeded to downtown and reported to the FS 1 staging area. They were then ordered to go to NW 5 and Robinson. The officer was assigned to be a Public Information Officer. The other members of the Squad went to the Water Resources Building to assist with search and rescue. The Squad was then assigned to go to the south side of the Murrah Building to assist with search and rescue in that area. They were then assigned to monitor the structural integrity of the building. They were ordered to evacuate at 10:30 a.m.

Fire Station 18

4016 N. Prospect

Rescue Squad 18 (1991 E-One Protector.)

Squad 18 was dispatched to report to staging at Fire Station 1. While enroute they were directed to report to Incident Command. They drove to NW 6 and Hudson and walked to the Command Post where they reported to Chief Davis, the OCFD Emergency Medical Services Commander. He assigned them to assist in the triage area at the southwest corner

of the Murrah Building. When they arrived there, they found that there was enough help in the area. They heard a report that a chief needed help in the building and took their jump kit and went to the 3rd floor where they reported to Chief Shannon and several firefighters who were working to free a woman trapped in the debris. Crews from Squad 18 and Truck 8 worked for 30 minutes to free the woman. They used their portable hydraulic spreader to lift a large piece of debris from the woman's legs. They completed this extrication just before 10:30 a.m. One of the Squad members lifted the woman and carried her from the building.

Fire Station 21
3240 SW 29 Street

Rescue Squad 21 (1990 E-One Protector.)

Rescue Squad 21 self-dispatched after hearing the explosion and seeing the television report. They received their dispatch while enroute. Squad 21 went north on I-44 and east on I-40 to the Sheridan-Walker exit, then Sheridan east to Hudson, and north on Hudson to NW 5 Street in front of the Regency Tower Apartments. They attempted to contact Incident Command by radio, but could not do so. They entered the Murrah Building from the north side, west end. One firefighter was left outside the building with first aid supplies. The rest of the crew assisted a group of non-fire personnel in removing one woman. They reentered the building and moved to the east. They found a woman trapped between two floors by office equipment and a concrete slab. They extricated the woman and placed her on a backboard for removal by a group of sheriffs and security guards. They assisted the crew from Truck 5 in extricating a woman trapped above them in the pile. They worked from above while the Station 5 crew worked from below. They began working with other companies on difficult extrications. They were joined by Chief Shannon just before the 10:30 a.m. evacuation.

Fire Station 24
1500 N. Meridian

"Hose Tender 24 (1973 La France equipped with a 1,500 GPM pumping unit and carrying one mile of 5" hose.)

Hose Tender 24 was dispatched to stage at Fire Station 1 and remained there until recalled to Station 24 at 6:00 p.m.

Engine 24 (1985 Quality/Spartan equipped with a 1,000 GPM pumping unit, a 1,000 GPM deck gun, and 1,000' of 3" hose.)

Engine 24 was dispatched to stage at Fire Station 1 and from there was dispatched to stage near NW 12th Street.

Fire Station 34
8617 N. Council

Squad 34 (1991 E-One Protector.)

Personnel at this Fire Station in far-northwest Oklahoma City thought the explosion might have come from a plane crash at Wiley Post Airport. Rescue Squad 34 self-dispatched toward that airport and received the 4th Alarm while enroute. Squad 34 proceeded downtown and reported to the staging area at Fire Station 1. At 10:30 a.m., Squad 34 was assigned to provide support to the Field Hospital at NE 5 and Harrison.

Standard Equipment for OKC Fire rigs

Every Fire Station is equipped with a defibrillator. The defibrillator is carried on whichever piece of equipment is agreed to by the District Chief and officers. Most stations have a hydraulic rescue or "jaws of life" tool which is carried on one piece of equipment. Every Rescue Squad vehicle carries a defibrillator, a hydraulic rescue or "jaws of life" tool, generators, and first aid supplies.

Senior Fire Officers who self-dispatched from Fire Station 1 after the 9:02 a.m. explosion:

Dispatch Designation (Name, Title, and Initial Station or Assignment)

600 Fire Chief Gary Marrs. Was en route to downtown meeting. Drove immediately to NW 5 and Robinson.

601 Major Cornelius Young. Acting District Chief. Went to NW 5 and Harvey, assumed initial command.

602 District Commander Mike Vernon. Went to NW 5 and Harvey, assigned command of Side 2 of the Murrah site.

603 District Commander Jim Conner. Went to NW 5 and Harvey, assigned to Rescue Command at the Murrah Building.

604 District Chief Mike Moad. Assisted Operations on Side 3 - south side of Murrah site.

605 Major Steve Taylor, Acting District Chief. Assigned to Side 3.

606 District Commander Van Hottle. Reported to Dispatch. Was assigned to operate in a planning capacity and coordinated manpower and equipment.

607 Assistant Fire Chief Howard Adams. Responded to Incident Command area at NW 6 and Harvey.

608 Assistant Fire Chief Kenneth Bunch. Responded to Incident Command area at NW 6 and Harvey.

609 Assistant Fire Chief Jon Hansen. Responded to the Murrah site and assisted with caring for the injured before reporting to Command Post area.

611 Fire Marshal Gary Curtis. Made a cursory inspection of Fire Station 1 to determine that it was safe for personnel to return. Responded to the Murrah site and assisted with caring for the injured before reporting to Command Post area.

614 District Chief Gary Davis, Emergency Medical Services Coordinator. Reported to incident command area and assumed control of Fire Emergency Medical Services and coordination with EMSA.

615 District Chief Mike Shannon, Special Teams Coordinator. Entered Murrah Building from the northwest area. Conducted structural survey and damage assessment until 10:30 a.m.

620 District Commander Bob McMahon, Acting Deputy Chief - Shift Commander. Drove to NW 6 and Harvey and assumed duties as Incident Commander.

623 Deputy Chief Charles Gaines. Responded to NW 4 and Harvey and began to direct rescue and first aid operations.

Business Manager Cathy Ginter. Was with Chief Marrs. Returned to FS 1 at 10:00 a.m. to set up financial structure for a long-term incident.