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Virginia
S. CAUDILL
Classification: Murderer
Characteristics:
Robbery -
Arson - Looking
for money to buy "crack" cocaine
CAUDILL, VIRGINIA,
DOB 9-10-60, was sentenced to death March 24, 2000 in Fayette County
for murder, robbery I, burglary I, arson II and tampering with
physical evidence.
On March 15, 1998, Caudill and
accomplice Johnathan Wayne Goforth entered the home of a 73 year old
female, beat her to death and then burglarized her home. They then
placed her body in the trunk of her own vehicle and drove her to a
rural area in Fayette County and set the car on fire.
Corrections.ky.gov
Virginia Caudill
On
March 15, 1998, this killer and accomplice, Jonathon Goforth, entered
the home of a 73 year old female and beat her to death. Her skull was
shattered. After killing her, they burglarized her home. They then
placed her body in the trunk of her own car and drove her to a rural
area in Fayette County and set the car on fire. The victim was burned
so badly that she could not be recognized.
Victim: Lonetta White
Virginia Caudill
Female/White, 39 years old at the time
Victim: Lonetta White
In Fayette County on March 15, 1998,
Virginia Caudill and accomplice Jonathon Goforth entered the
home of a 73-year-old female and beat her to death, shattering her
skull. The victim was the mother of Caudill’s estranged boyfriend and
the two had gone to her home to ask her for money, supposedly to buy
crack cocaine.
Caudill and Goforth then ransacked her home and
stole numerous items of valuable personal property, including guns,
jewelry and a mink coat. They then wrapped her body in a rug and
placed it in the trunk of her own car and drove her to a rural area in
Fayette County and set the car on fire. The victim was burned so
badly that she could not be recognized.
Additional facts about the case:
Aggravating circumstance which made this case
eligible for the Death Penalty: murder which occurred during the
commission of a burglary and robbery.
Length of appeal to date: 10 years.
LexingtonProsecutor.com
Bowling sentence upheld in Laurel murders
ClintonHerald.com
April 24, 2009
FRANKFORT (AP) — The Kentucky Supreme Court upheld
the convictions of three death row inmates on Thursday, including the
state’s only woman sentenced to death.
The court upheld the murder convictions of Virginia
Caudill, Johnathan Wayne Goforth and Robert Foley.
Caudill and Goforth were convicted of killing
73-year-old Lonetta White in 1998 by bludgeoning her to death with a
hammer. White’s body was then put in the trunk of her own car, which
was set ablaze. Foley is a former FBI informant convicted of six
killings in eastern Kentucky. He was sentenced to death in 1993 for
killing Rodney and Lynn Vaughn during a dispute at his home.
Both Caudill and Goforth argued they had
ineffective attorneys during their trial, which resulted in both being
convicted of murder, robbery, burglary, arson and evidence tampering.
Both inmates lost a previous appeal before the state supreme court.
Among other things, Caudill claimed she had an
ineffective trial attorney. Caudill claimed an expert witness should
have been called in on her behalf to rebut the testimony of a Kentucky
State Police forensic examiner who studied blood spatter on her shoes.
The justices ruled there was no evidence in
Caudill’s case that additional expert testimony would have changed the
outcome.
Currently, there are 36 inmates on Kentucky’s death
row. Caudill, 48, is the only woman.
Dennis Burke, one of Caudill’s public defenders,
said he intends to ask the court for a rehearing and ask it to
reconsider the decision.
“We are disappointed,” Burke said.
Goforth had argued, among other things, that his
trial attorney made a mistake by not cross-examining Caudill.
Amy Robinson Staples, who is representing Goforth,
declined to comment on the court’s decision because she had not yet
reviewed it.
Allison Martin, a spokeswoman for Attorney General
Jack Conway, declined to comment on the cases.
Foley had argued his trial attorney did not
properly present his motion to change the venue of his case. The court
disagreed.
Foley is on Kentucky’s death row for more killings
than any other condemned inmate. He was sentenced to death for killing
6 people: brothers Rodney and Lynn Vaughn, Kimberly Bowersock, Lillian
Contino, Jerry McMillen and Calvin Reynolds.
Meanwhile, the court also denied a petition for
rehearing filed by Ronnie Lee Bowling.
The court upheld Bowling’s death sentence last year
despite an FBI analysis that “overstated the significance” of some
evidence presented at his trial. Bowling was convicted partially on
the basis of an FBI bullet analysis that linked him to the murders of
two Laurel County men in 1989.
Sentenced to death December 9, 1992 in Laurel
County for the murder of two gas station attendants in two separate
robberies. Bowling, from Clay County, Kentucky, shot and killed Ronald
Smith, a London, Kentucky service station attendant during the early
morning of January 20, 1989. Again, in the early morning of February
22, 1989 Marvin Hensley, a service station manager in London, Kentucky
was robbed and killed. Bowling was arrested February 25, 1989.
More case info from Court Decision
Following a trial by jury in the Fayette Circuit
Court, Appellants Virginia Susan Caudill and Johnathon Wayne Goforth
were each convicted of murder, robbery in the first degree, burglary
in the first degree, arson in the second degree, and tampering with
physical evidence. Each was sentenced to death for the murder
conviction and to the maximum authorized penalties for the other four
convictions. Both now appeal to this Court as a matter of right, Ky.
Const. § 110(2)(b), KRS 532.075(1), asserting seventy-four claims of
error. For the reasons explained herein, we affirm.
Lonetta White, age 73, was bludgeoned to death in
her home in Lexington, Kentucky, during the early morning hours of
March 15, 1998. Her body was found in the trunk of her burning
automobile in a field several miles away. Her home was ransacked and
numerous items of personal property, including two guns, jewelry, and
a mink coat were stolen. Appellants Caudill and Goforth admitted they
were present at the commission of all of these crimes. Each, however,
accused the other of murdering and robbing the victim and [*3] of
setting fire to the automobile.
Caudill had been living with the victim's son,
Steve White, but had moved out of his house on either March 13 or 14
following an argument concerning Caudill's drug use. Caudill went to a
nearby "crack house," a residence where drug users gathered to buy,
sell, and ingest controlled substances, especially crack cocaine.
There she encountered Goforth, a casual acquaintance whom she had not
seen for about fifteen years. Caudill testified that, on the afternoon
of March 14, Goforth gave her a ride to Mrs. White's residence and
that Caudill induced White to give her twenty or thirty dollars on the
pretext that she needed the money to rent a room for the night.
Instead, she returned to the crack house and used the money to
purchase crack cocaine. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 15, Caudill and
Goforth returned to Mrs. White's residence.
According to Caudill, she went to the door and told
Mrs. White that she needed more money for the room rental. Goforth
remained out of sight near the garage. When Mrs. White turned away to
retrieve the money, Goforth burst through the door and attacked her
without warning. Caudill did not identify the weapon used by Goforth
[*4] but remembered that, during the course of the attack, Mrs. White
pleaded with her to "please help me, Virginia." Goforth then took
Caudill to a bedroom and bound her hands together. After killing
White, Goforth ransacked the residence, loaded the jewelry, guns, and
mink coat into his pickup truck, and wrapped the body in a carpet. He
then prevailed upon Caudill to help him carry the body to the garage
and load it into the trunk of Mrs. White's automobile. The two then
drove both vehicles to a vacant field where Goforth doused Mrs.
White's vehicle with gasoline and set it afire.
According to Goforth, Caudill induced Mrs. White to
admit them into her residence under the pretext that they were having
car trouble and needed to use White's telephone. Once inside, Caudill
demanded that Mrs. White give her some money. When White refused,
Caudill unexpectedly produced a roofer's hammer that she had
surreptitiously removed from Goforth's pickup truck and struck White
in the back of the head with full force. When Goforth asked Caudill
why she had struck Mrs. White, Caudill struck her again. As Caudill
continued to bludgeon the victim with the hammer, Goforth went into
the living room, sat down [*5] on a sofa, and pondered what he should
do next. Caudill ransacked the victim's residence and loaded the
stolen property into Goforth's pickup truck. She wrapped Mrs. White's
body in the carpet. At Caudill's request, Goforth helped carry the
body to the garage and load it into the trunk of White's automobile.
They then drove both vehicles to a vacant field where Caudill doused
White's automobile with gasoline and set it afire.
Cynthia Ellis, a jailhouse informant, testified
that Caudill told her that she had gone to White's residence to obtain
money to buy drugs. When White refused her request for money, Caudill
struck White twice in the head with a clock that she pulled off the
wall. Julia Davis, another jailhouse informant, testified that Caudill
told her that she broke into the victim's home intending to steal
money to buy drugs, but when the victim discovered her presence, she
killed her, stole her guns and jewelry, and set fire to her car. Davis
also testified that Caudill said White had pleaded with her to "help
me, why are you doing this to me?"
Because of her known relationship with the victim's
son, Caudill was questioned by police about the murder on the evening
of March 15, 1998. She [*6] denied any involvement in the crimes and
told the police that she had been with Goforth when the crimes were
committed. The police unsuccessfully attempted to contact Goforth at
his residence and left a message there for Goforth to contact them.
Instead, Goforth and Caudill fled Fayette County. They spent several
days at a cabin near Herrington Lake in Mercer County, then moved to
Ocala, Florida, then to Gulfport, Mississippi. Caudill left Goforth in
Gulfport and moved to New Orleans, Louisiana, where she was
subsequently arrested November 11, 1998. She gave another statement at
that time in which she admitted her presence at the scene of the
crimes but named Goforth as the perpetrator. Goforth was arrested and
questioned in Gulfport, Mississippi, on December 8, 1998. He claimed
Caudill killed Mrs. White with the hammer and, further, that an
unidentified African-American male had assisted Caudill in the
commission of the crimes (an assertion he admitted at trial was a
fabrication). After her extradition to Kentucky, Caudill gave a third
statement to police on December 9, 1998, which was substantially the
same as her second statement.
Kentucky Supreme Court
Caudill v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
Virginia Susan CAUDILL, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
Appellee,
Johnathon Wayne Goforth, Appellant, v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Appellee.
Nos. 2000-SC-0296-MR, 2000-SC-0297-MR.
June 12, 2003
Donna L. Boyce, Appellate Branch Manager,
Department of Public Advocacy, Randall L. Wheeler, Assistant Public
Advocate, Frankfort, Counsel for Appellant Virginia Susan Caudill
(2000-SC-0296-MR).Julie Namkin, Assistant Public Advocate, Shannon
Dupree, Assistant Public Advocate, Department of Public Advocacy,
Frankfort, Counsel for Appellant Johnathon Wayne Goforth
(2000-SC-0297-MR).A.B. Chandler, III, Attorney General, Connie Vance
Malone, Michael G. Wilson, Brian T. Judy, Assistant Attorneys General,
Office of Attorney General, Criminal Appellate Division, Frankfort,
Counsel for Appellee Commonwealth of Kentucky (2000-SC-0296-MR and
2000-SC-0297-MR).
OPINION
AFFIRMING
Following a trial by jury in the Fayette Circuit
Court, Appellants Virginia Susan Caudill and Johnathon Wayne Goforth
were each convicted of murder, robbery in the first degree, burglary
in the first degree, arson in the second degree, and tampering with
physical evidence. Each was sentenced to death for the murder
conviction and to the maximum authorized penalties for the other four
convictions. Both now appeal to this Court as a matter of right, Ky.
Const. § 110(2)(b), KRS 532.075(1), asserting seventy-four claims of
error. For the reasons explained herein, we affirm.
Lonetta White, age 73, was bludgeoned to death in
her home in Lexington, Kentucky, during the early morning hours of
March 15, 1998. Her body was found in the trunk of her burning
automobile in a field several miles away. Her home was ransacked and
numerous items of personal property, including two guns, jewelry, and
a mink coat were stolen. Appellants Caudill and Goforth admitted
they were present at the commission of all of these crimes. Each,
however, accused the other of murdering and robbing the victim and of
setting fire to the automobile.
Caudill had been living with the victim's son,
Steve White, but had moved out of his house on either March 13 or 14
following an argument concerning Caudill's drug use. Caudill went to
a nearby “crack house,” a residence where drug users gathered to buy,
sell, and ingest controlled substances, especially crack cocaine.
There she encountered Goforth, a casual acquaintance whom she had not
seen for about fifteen years. Caudill testified that, on the
afternoon of March 14, Goforth gave her a ride to Mrs. White's
residence and that Caudill induced White to give her twenty or thirty
dollars on the pretext that she needed the money to rent a room for
the night. Instead, she returned to the crack house and used the
money to purchase crack cocaine. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 15,
Caudill and Goforth returned to Mrs. White's residence.
According to Caudill, she went to the door and told
Mrs. White that she needed more money for the room rental. Goforth
remained out of sight near the garage. When Mrs. White turned away
to retrieve the money, Goforth burst through the door and attacked her
without warning. Caudill did not identify the weapon used by Goforth
but remembered that, during the course of the attack, Mrs. White
pleaded with her to “please help me, Virginia.” Goforth then took
Caudill to a bedroom and bound her hands together. After killing
White, Goforth ransacked the residence, loaded the jewelry, guns, and
mink coat into his pickup truck, and wrapped the body in a carpet.
He then prevailed upon Caudill to help him carry the body to the
garage and load it into the trunk of Mrs. White's automobile. The
two then drove both vehicles to a vacant field where Goforth doused
Mrs. White's vehicle with gasoline and set it afire.
According to Goforth, Caudill induced Mrs. White to
admit them into her residence under the pretext that they were having
car trouble and needed to use White's telephone. Once inside,
Caudill demanded that Mrs. White give her some money. When White
refused, Caudill unexpectedly produced a roofer's hammer that she had
surreptitiously removed from Goforth's pickup truck and struck White
in the back of the head with full force. When Goforth asked Caudill
why she had struck Mrs. White, Caudill struck her again. As Caudill
continued to bludgeon the victim with the hammer, Goforth went into
the living room, sat down on a sofa, and pondered what he should do
next. Caudill ransacked the victim's residence and loaded the stolen
property into Goforth's pickup truck. She wrapped Mrs. White's body
in the carpet. At Caudill's request, Goforth helped carry the body
to the garage and load it into the trunk of White's automobile. They
then drove both vehicles to a vacant field where Caudill doused
White's automobile with gasoline and set it afire.
Cynthia Ellis, a jailhouse informant, testified
that Caudill told her that she had gone to White's residence to obtain
money to buy drugs. When White refused her request for money,
Caudill struck White twice in the head with a clock that she pulled
off the wall. Julia Davis, another jailhouse informant, testified
that Caudill told her that she broke into the victim's home intending
to steal money to buy drugs, but when the victim discovered her
presence, she killed her, stole her guns and jewelry, and set fire to
her car. Davis also testified that Caudill said White had pleaded
with her to “[h]elp me, why are you doing this to me?”
Because of her known relationship with the victim's
son, Caudill was questioned by police about the murder on the evening
of March 15, 1998. She denied any involvement in the crimes and told
the police that she had been with Goforth when the crimes were
committed. The police unsuccessfully attempted to contact Goforth at
his residence and left a message there for Goforth to contact them.
Instead, Goforth and Caudill fled Fayette County. They spent several
days at a cabin near Herrington Lake in Mercer County, then moved to
Ocala, Florida, then to Gulfport, Mississippi. Caudill left Goforth
in Gulfport and moved to New Orleans, Louisiana, where she was
subsequently arrested November 11, 1998. She gave another statement
at that time in which she admitted her presence at the scene of the
crimes but named Goforth as the perpetrator. Goforth was arrested
and questioned in Gulfport, Mississippi, on December 8, 1998. He
claimed Caudill killed Mrs. White with the hammer and, further, that
an unidentified African-American male had assisted Caudill in the
commission of the crimes (an assertion he admitted at trial was a
fabrication). After her extradition to Kentucky, Caudill gave a
third statement to police on December 9, 1998, which was substantially
the same as her second statement.
I. PRE-TRIAL ISSUES.
1. Indictment.
Counts 1 and 4 of the joint indictment provide:
Count 1: On or about the 15th day of March, 1998,
in Fayette County, Kentucky, the above named Defendants committed the
offense of Capital Murder by causing the death of Lonetta White while
in the course of committing a First Degree Robbery and a First Degree
Burglary.
․
Count 4: On or about the 15th day of March, 1998,
in Fayette County, Kentucky, the above named Defendants committed the
offense of Second Degree Arson by setting fire to an automobile
belonging to Lonetta White.
Both appellants assert that counts 1 and 4 of their
joint indictment charging them with murder and second-degree arson
were invalid because they did not recite a culpable mens rea; and,
thus, the Fayette Circuit Court never acquired subject matter
jurisdiction over those charges. Neither appellant objected to these
alleged defects, RCr 8.18, or sought a bill of particulars, RCr 6.22.
Criminal Rule 6.10(2) provides that an indictment is sufficient if it
contains “a plain, concise and definite statement of the essential
facts constituting the specific offense with which the defendant is
charged.” Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 931 S.W.2d 446 (1996), holds
that RCr 6.10(1) only requires that the indictment provide information
sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge against him/her
and that an indictment is not invalid merely because of factual
incompleteness or lack of specificity. Id. at 449.
In addition to describing the offense, the
indictment also identified the applicable sections of the penal code,
i.e., KRS 507.020 and KRS 513.030. Although arguably incomplete
under RCr 6.10(2), counts 1 and 4 of the indictment provided
sufficient information to serve notice on appellants of the charges
against them. Thus, counts 1 and 4 were not invalid and sufficed to
confer subject matter jurisdiction on the Fayette Circuit Court with
respect to the charged offenses. Thomas, at 449-50.
2. Arraignment.
Both appellants assert that their arraignments by
closed circuit television violated RCr 8.02 (arraignment to be
conducted in open court), RCr 8.28 (defendant shall be present at the
arraignment), and Rule 8 of the Fayette Circuit Court (arraignment to
be in open court), as well as their constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection. All of these arguments except the
equal protection issue were addressed and rejected in Commonwealth v.
Ingram, Ky., 46 S.W.3d 569, 570-72 (2001). The equal protection
issue is premised upon appellants' perceptions that a non-indigent
defendant could have obtained some additional benefit from being in
personal attendance in court at arraignment. However, a review of
the videotapes of the arraignments indicates that each appellant had
counsel physically present at the jail, thus immediately available for
consultation during the arraignment; each appellant could see the
judge on the closed circuit monitor; and each appellant received a
copy of the indictment, was advised of the charges against him/her,
and entered a plea of not guilty. In other words, the procedure was
exactly the same as any other routine arraignment except that the
judge and the defendant viewed each other by closed circuit monitor
instead of face-to-face. We perceive no denial of equal protection
in that respect.
3. Joinder.
Caudill asserts that the trial judge erroneously
denied her motion for a separate trial because she and Goforth had
antagonistic defenses and the Bruton-required redaction of her
pre-trial confessions to delete any reference to Goforth, see Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968),
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176
(1987), and Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140
L.Ed.2d 294 (1998), forced her to give up her right to remain silent
and testify to Goforth's culpability in order to shift the blame from
herself.
Joinder is appropriate if the defendants “are
alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the
same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or
offenses.” RCr 6.20; Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 670 S.W.2d 828,
834 (1984). “Even if the defendants attempt to cast blame on each
other, severance is not required.” Gabow v. Commonwealth, Ky., 34
S.W.3d 63, 71 (2000) (citing United States v. Arthur, 949 F.2d 211,
217-18 (6th Cir.1991)).
[N]either antagonistic defenses nor the fact that
the evidence for or against one defendant incriminates the other
amounts, by itself, to unfair prejudice․ That different defendants
alleged to have been involved in the same transaction have conflicting
versions of what took place, or the extent to which they participated
in it, vel non, is a reason for rather than against a joint trial.
If one is lying it is easier for the truth to be determined if all are
required to be tried together.
Ware v. Commonwealth, Ky., 537 S.W.2d 174, 177
(1976). The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying
Caudill's motion for a separate trial.
4. Absence from pre-trial hearings.
Criminal Rule 8.28(1) provides:
The defendant shall be present at the arraignment,
at every critical stage of the trial including the empaneling of the
jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of the
sentence.
In addition to their claims that they were not
“present” at their closed-circuit television arraignments, an issue
resolved by Commonwealth v. Ingram, supra, at 570-71, both appellants
complain of their absence from a hearing held on January 27, 2000,
eleven days before trial; and Caudill complains of her absence from a
hearing held on February 4, 2000, three days before trial.
(a) January 27, 2000.
The trial judge offered to have both appellants
brought up from the jail to attend the January 27, 2000, hearing.
However, the attorneys for both appellants expressly waived their
respective clients' presence at that hearing. Fugate v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 62 S.W.3d 15, 18-19 (2001). Furthermore, nothing that occurred
at that hearing could be characterized as a “critical stage of the
trial.” Much of the hearing was consumed by the trial judge's review
of juror requests for excusal or postponement of jury service for
health or hardship reasons. While we applaud the trial judge for
allowing counsel to participate in this process, such excusals and
postponements are within the discretion of the trial judge, Admin.
Proc., Part II, § 12(1), KRS 29A.100(1), who is not required to make
those decisions in open court or in the presence of or consultation
with any parties or their counsel. The trial judge is only required
to record the reasons for the excusals or postponements on the juror
qualification forms so they can be reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Admin. Proc., Part II, § 12(2); KRS 29A.100(2); Sanborn v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534, 548-49 (1988). Nothing else was
discussed except scheduling problems related to Caudill's last-minute
notice (exactly twenty days before the trial date of February 7, 2000)
of her intention to introduce evidence of mental illness, KRS
504.070(1), the Commonwealth's failure to complete the
Bruton-redaction of appellants' respective pretrial statements, and
the number of peremptory strikes to be allotted to each side at trial.
Thus, the January 27, 2000, hearing was not a
“critical stage of the trial” and appellants' presence at that hearing
had been validly waived by their respective counsel.
(b) February 4, 2000.
This hearing was held from 4:11 p.m. until 5:16
p.m. on the Friday before trial. Goforth was present. However,
Caudill was absent because she was undergoing a mental health
examination by the prosecutor's expert, Dr. Cooley. KRS 504.070(2).
The matters resolved at the hearing on February 4, 2000, were (1)
Caudill's motion in limine, filed on February 2, 2000, five days
before trial, to suppress eight items of evidence (the prosecutor
conceded six of the issues and the remaining two were resolved solely
by legal argument); (2) Caudill's motion to suppress that portion of
her March 15, 1998, statement that was made after she requested an
attorney (the prosecutor conceded the issue); (3) whether Goforth's
statement should be redacted to exclude his assertion that an
unidentified African-American male had assisted Caudill in the
commission of the crimes (the trial judge ruled, per Bruton, supra,
that the reference should be redacted because it incriminated
Caudill); (4) Goforth's motion to preclude the Commonwealth from
introducing a videotape of Caudill's “walk-through” of the crime scene
with police detectives (the prosecutor agreed not to introduce the
videotape and whether Caudill could introduce it, herself, was not
addressed); (5) Caudill's motion for a separate trial, which had been
filed on the morning of the hearing (the motion was overruled on the
basis of RCr 6.20 and Ware v. Commonwealth, supra ); and (6) whether,
since the offenses were committed prior to July 15, 1998, the jury
should be instructed on the penalty of life without parole in the
event of a conviction of murder. See Commonwealth v. Phon, Ky., 17
S.W.3d 106, 108 (2000). Resolution of that issue was postponed until
trial.
Thus, no evidentiary hearing was held and all of
the issues addressed were resolved by legal argument. A defendant is
not required to be present during the argument of legal issues between
court and counsel. Tamme v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13, 38
(1998); Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 512, 515 (1968);
Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 285 S.W.2d 489, 491 (1955). “A
defendant's absence means little when, as in the present case, the
trial court's communication merely involves a question of law rather
than fact. In such a case, a defendant's presence can be of no help
to the defense.” United States v. Dockter, 58 F.3d 1284, 1287 (8th
Cir.1995).
II. JURY SELECTION ISSUES.
1. Postponement of jury service.
During the January 27, 2000, hearing, the trial
judge informed the attorneys of his intent to postpone jury service
for eight full-time students until the end of the school year because
he felt it would be “difficult,” i.e., a hardship, for such students
to lose the time and money they had invested in their education. The
trial judge then inquired, “Does anybody object to that?” Counsel
for both appellants responded, “No.” The trial judge also postponed
jury service for a college professor who taught two class hours three
days per week. During the February 4, 2000, hearing, the trial judge
informed counsel that he had postponed jury service for another
full-time student, and during voir dire at trial, he postponed jury
service for three more full-time students.
Counsel's decisions with respect to jury selection
are regarded as matters of trial strategy. Hodge v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 17 S.W.3d 824, 837 (2000). Thus, defense counsels' agreement to
the postponement of jury service for full-time students was a matter
of trial strategy. Further, as noted in Part I, issue 4(a), supra,
whether to postpone a prospective juror's service because of hardship
is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. We discern no
abuse of discretion in this regard.
Nor did the trial judge's decision to postpone jury
service for students amount to a “systematic exclusion” in violation
of the appellants' right to a jury drawn from a “fair cross section of
the community.” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531, 95 S.Ct. 692,
698, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). A necessary condition for “systematic
exclusion” is that the group allegedly excluded be a “distinctive
group.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668, 58
L.Ed.2d 579 (1979). A “distinctive group” must comprise a
substantial percentage of the county population, and, absent a showing
of numerosity and lack of community needs, no profession or occupation
is considered a distinctive group. Commonwealth v. McFerron, Ky., 680
S.W.2d 924 (1984), overruling Colvin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 570 S.W.2d
281 (1978) (schoolteachers), and overruling by implication Reid v.
Commonwealth, Ky.App., 659 S.W.2d 217 (1983) (doctors and lawyers).
In fact, we explicitly held in Ford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 665 S.W.2d
304 (1983), that “college students ․ are not distinctive ․ as a
class.” Id. at 308. Nor are “young adults” a distinctive group
whose underrepresentation would deny a defendant the right to a “fair
cross section.” Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 437, 442
(1987); McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 669 S.W.2d 519, 521 (1984);
Ford, supra, at 308.
2. Death qualification question.
During individual voir dire, the trial judge “death
qualified” the jury panel by making the following inquiry of each
prospective juror:
This is a capital murder case. If you find the
defendant guilty of murder, there are five ranges of penalty you'll be
instructed to consider-not less than twenty nor more than fifty years,
life, life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years,
life without the possibility of parole, and death. If you determine
under the facts of this case, and the instructions of the Court,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of murder, can
you consider the entire range of penalties provided by the statutes of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky as I have just outlined them to you?
[Emphasis added.]
Appellants assert that the emphasized language
should have been “guilty of aggravated murder,” not “guilty of
murder,” because death, life without parole, and life without parole
for twenty-five years, are available penalties only if the jury also
finds beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an aggravating
circumstance. KRS 532.025(3). Appellants do not assert that this
fact caused some jurors to disclaim an ability to consider death as a
penalty for “mere” murder and, thus, to be excused for cause as not
“death qualified.” Murder is a capital offense, KRS 507.020(2), and
the range of penalties for a capital offense are those recited in the
trial judge's inquiry. KRS 532.030(1). Rather, Appellants assert
that jurors who would state that they could consider the minimum
penalty for a “mere murder” might not be able to consider that penalty
for an aggravated murder. Either way, no error occurred.
The leading United States Supreme Court cases on
“death qualification,” i.e., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88
S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100
S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,
105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), and Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986), all address the
circumstances under which a potential juror may be excused for cause
because of the juror's bias against imposition of the death penalty.
Witherspoon held that strikes for cause could not be employed to
empanel a jury predisposed to return a verdict of death, 391 U.S. at
521-23, 88 S.Ct. at 1776-77; and that, “[u]nless a venireman states
unambiguously that he would automatically vote against the imposition
of capital punishment no matter what the trial might reveal,” id. at
515 n. 9, 88 S.Ct. at 1773 n. 9, it cannot be assumed that such is
that person's position simply because the juror expressed reservations
or scruples about the death penalty. Id. Although Witherspoon also
states “[t]hat the most that can be demanded of a venireman in this
regard is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided
by state law,” id. at 522 n. 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1777 n. 21 (emphasis in
original), Adams, supra, explained that “Witherspoon is not a ground
for challenging any prospective juror. It is rather a limitation on
the State's power to exclude.” 448 U.S. at 47-48, 100 S.Ct. at 2528.
“[T]he proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be
excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment ․
is whether the juror's views would ‘prevent or substantially impair
the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath.’ ” Witt, supra, at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852,
quoting Adams, supra, at 45, 100 S.Ct. at 2526. If so, the removal
of so-called “ ‘Witherspoon-excludables' serves the State's entirely
proper interest in obtaining a single jury that could impartially
decide all the issues in [a death penalty] case.” McCree, supra, at
180, 106 S.Ct. at 1768.
In Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct.
2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), the Court expanded this principle to
require that a jury be “life qualified” by excluding those jurors who
would automatically impose death upon a finding of guilt.
A juror who will automatically vote for the death
penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions
require him to do. Indeed, because such a juror has already formed
an opinion on the merits, the presence or absence of either
aggravating or mitigating circumstances is entirely irrelevant to such
a juror.
Id. at 729, 112 S.Ct. at 2229.
No jurisdiction other than Kentucky has ever held
that a juror is disqualified simply because he or she cannot consider
imposition of the minimum authorized sentence for conviction of an
offense for which death is an authorized penalty. That proposition
first entered our jurisprudence via obiter dictum in Grooms v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 756 S.W.2d 131, 137 (1988). Grooms anticipated
the holding in Morgan, supra, by holding that it was reversible error
not to excuse for cause a juror who “favors the death penalty to the
exclusion of all other penalties as punishment for intentional
murder.” 756 S.W.2d at 137. However, Grooms went on to say that “a
juror should be excused for cause if he would be unable in any case,
no matter how extenuating the circumstances may be, to consider the
imposition of the minimum penalty prescribed by law.” Id.
Giving corporeality to the Grooms dictum, Morris v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 766 S.W.2d 58 (1989), held that:
[T]he lower court should have informed the jury
there are four penalties for the capital offense of intentional
murder-viz, death, life without parole or probation for 25 years,
life, or a term of not less than 20 years. KRS 532.030. The jury
should be asked the simple question “If you determine under the
instructions of the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty of intentional murder, could you consider the entire range
of penalties provided by statutes of this Commonwealth as outlined to
you?”
Id. at 60. Of course, that is almost verbatim the
question asked by the trial judge in this case, except that the range
of penalties for a capital offense now includes life without parole.
KRS 532.030(1).
Although Morris also held that “[b]oth the
Commonwealth and the defendant are entitled to a panel of jurors who
will consider the entire range of punishment,” id. at 60, Davis v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 795 S.W.2d 942 (1990), explained that while “[i]t
would be a better practice for a trial judge conducting death penalty
voir dire pursuant to RCr 9.38 1
to inquire about a juror's ability to consider the full range of
penalties in capital cases,” the requirement is satisfied if defense
counsel is afforded the opportunity to do so. Id. at 952. That is
in accord with Witt, supra, that “[a]s with any other trial situation
where an adversary wishes to exclude a juror because of bias, then, it
is the adversary seeking exclusion who must demonstrate, through
questioning, that the potential juror lacks impartiality.” 469 U.S.
at 423, 105 S.Ct. at 852.
Here, neither defense counsel was precluded from
questioning any potential juror with respect to that juror's ability
to consider imposition of the minimum penalty for “aggravated murder.”
Indeed, counsel asked the following question of several prospective
jurors:
Assume in this case that we get to the sentencing
phase. That means that you've already found the defendant guilty of
murder and an aggravating circumstance, like a burglary or a robbery
or a rape or something like that. If that's the case, can you give a
serious and honest consideration to a minimum sentence of twenty
years?
(In fact, if a defendant is found guilty of murder
and burglary, robbery or rape, the minimum sentence would be thirty
years, not twenty years (twenty years for murder, KRS 532.030(1), plus
ten years for the class B felony, KRS 532.060(2)(b)). Regardless, the
trial judge's death penalty inquiry did not misstate the law or
mislead the jury. Any perceived deficiency was cured by permitting
defense counsel to further clarify the inquiry).
3. Refusal to excuse two jurors for cause.
Both appellants assert that the trial judge erred
by refusing to excuse Jurors 871 and 884 for cause.
Juror 871 stated that he could consider the full
range of penalties. Appellants complain that when asked whether he
could consider a “minimal sentence” for an aggravated murder, he
responded “I can't tell you now, I would have to hear all the
evidence,” and could not think of a specific case where he could
consider a “minimal sentence” for a conviction of murder accompanied
by an aggravating circumstance. Of course, the appropriate inquiry
under Grooms and Morris is not whether a juror can consider “a minimal
sentence,” but whether he can consider “the minimum sentence.” Juror
871 assured defense counsel that he could consider mitigating
circumstances and that he would not sentence on the basis of “an eye
for an eye” but would need to hear all the facts.
Juror 884 stated that she was “for the death
penalty,” but could consider the full range of penalties and would not
automatically impose or exclude any penalty. Although she stated at
one point that she would not be able to consider the “lower range” for
convictions of both murder and robbery or burglary, she also stated
that she could consider it if, based on all the facts, she thought it
was an appropriate punishment. As stated supra, the minimum sentence
for conviction of both murder and robbery or burglary would be thirty
years, not twenty years. Further, in Mabe v. Commonwealth, Ky., 884
S.W.2d 668, 671 (1994), we substantially diluted the strict excusal
requirement articulated in Grooms and Morris:
Many jurors find it difficult to conceive of
minimum punishment when the facts as given suggest only the most
severe punishment․ A per se disqualification is not required merely
because a juror does not instantly embrace every legal concept
presented during voir dire examination. The test is not whether a
juror agrees with the law when it is presented in the most extreme
manner. The test is whether, after having heard all of the evidence,
the prospective juror can conform his views to the requirements of the
law and render a fair and impartial verdict․
“․ Jurors cannot be expected invariably to express
themselves carefully or even consistently. Every trial judge
understands this, and under our system it is that judge who is best
suited to determine the competency to serve impartially. The trial
judge properly may choose to believe those statements that were the
most fully articulated or that appeared to have been least influenced
by leading.”
884 S.W.2d at 671 (quoting Patton v. Yount, 467
U.S. 1025, 1038-39, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2892-93, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984)).
See also Foley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 876, 882 n. 5 (1996).
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to excuse
Jurors 871 and 884 for cause.
4. Excusal of two jurors for cause.
Both appellants assert that the trial judge erred
in excusing Jurors 872 and 939 for cause.
Juror 872 initially responded “Yes” to the trial
judge's qualification question as to whether she could consider the
full range of penalties. Later, however, she stated three times that
she could not consider the death penalty. Her final statement during
attempted rehabilitation by defense counsel was: “At this point, I
could not consider the death penalty. I could not do that.”
After a long hesitation, Juror 939 also initially
responded “Yes” to the trial judge's qualification question. Later,
however, she indicated that she had not understood (“didn't get”) the
fact that death was a possible penalty and stated that even if the
facts of the case warranted it, she could not impose the death
penalty.
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
excusing Jurors 872 and 939. Hodge, 17 S.W.3d at 838 (“This argument
has been consistently rejected by both the United States Supreme Court
and by this Court.”).
5. Extra peremptory strikes.
Appellants do not claim that the trial judge did
not allot them the number of peremptory strikes required by RCr 9.40
but claim it was an abuse of discretion not to allot them extra
strikes because this is a death penalty case. “Whether to grant
additional peremptories is within the discretion of the trial judge.”
Tamme, 973 S.W.2d at 26. We discern no abuse of that discretion.
6. Batson challenge.
The victim, Lonetta White, was an African-American
woman. Appellants are both Caucasians. The Commonwealth exercised
eight of its nine peremptory strikes against Caucasian men and
Appellants responded with a Batson challenge, claiming that the
peremptories were both racially and gender motivated. J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994); Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
To date, the United States Supreme Court has not
addressed whether Batson applies to race-based peremptory strikes
against Caucasians. However, a number of federal courts of appeals
have decided that it does. E.g., United States v. Allen-Brown, 243
F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir.2001) (trial court properly required
defendant to give race-neutral reasons for striking Caucasian jurors);
United States v. Parsee, 178 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir.1999) (upholding
government's Batson challenge to four of the ten Caucasian jurors
struck by the defendant); United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 606
(5th Cir.1998) (upholding trial court's finding that defendant's
peremptory strikes of Caucasian jurors presented a prima facie case of
racial discrimination); Government of Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865
F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir.1989) (“Batson applies to both whites and
blacks.”); Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 227 (2d Cir.1987)
(Caucasians are a cognizable group for Sixth Amendment purposes and
trial judge properly required race-neutral reasons for prosecution's
exercise of peremptory challenges against Caucasian jurors in trial of
Caucasian defendant).
The prosecutor did not contest whether Batson
applies to peremptory strikes of Caucasian jurors and stated his
reasons for the exercise of all nine of the Commonwealth's peremptory
strikes. Six peremptories were used to excuse potential jurors who
had expressed serious reservations about the death penalty. Another
was used to excuse a potential juror who had only an elementary school
education and did not seem fully cognizant of the nature of the
proceedings. Another was used to excuse a close personal friend of
one of Caudill's attorneys. The last was used to excuse a potential
juror who expressed what the prosecutor perceived to be hostility
toward the police and the judicial system. The trial judge found all
of these reasons to be race-neutral and we are unable to conclude that
his finding in that regard was clearly erroneous. Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352, 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1871, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991);
Commonwealth v. Snodgrass, Ky., 831 S.W.2d 176, 179 (1992).
III. GUILT PHASE EVIDENCE.
1. Redacted statements.
During the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, Detective
Lyons read to the jury the Bruton-redacted versions of Caudill's
pre-trial statements made on March 15, 1998, November 11, 1998, and
December 9, 1998, and Goforth's pre-trial statement made on December
8, 1998. Appellants do not claim that the statements were not
sufficiently redacted in accordance with the requirements of Gray v.
Maryland and Richardson v. Marsh, supra. Instead, they claim that
the redactions (1) rendered the statements disjointed and (2) deleted
appellants' respective defenses (“I didn't do it; he/she did it.”),
essentially forcing them to forego their respective rights to remain
silent by testifying in their own defense.
The argument ignores the Commonwealth's right to
present to the jury, whether at a separate or a joint trial, the
self-inculpatory portions of each defendant's out-of-court statements
so long as those portions do not violate a codefendant's right of
confrontation. The hearsay aspect of the statement is satisfied by the
exception for admissions, KRE 801A(b)(1). However, the rule only
applies to admissions offered against the party that made the
admission. Thus, even absent the Bruton issue, neither KRE
801A(b)(1) nor the “rule of completeness,” KRE 106, would have
automatically authorized either of these defendants to introduce his
or her own out-of-court statement(s) for the purpose of asserting a
defense without subjecting that defendant to cross-examination-even
though the Commonwealth introduced those portions of the statements
that were self-inculpatory. Gabow, 34 S.W.3d at 68 n. 2. Appellants
could have jointly stood on their redacted statements in which each
admitted only his/her presence at the crime scenes and neither
admitted committing the crimes. The fact that both, instead, chose
to testify and affirmatively assert their respective defenses affords
no basis for reversal.
As the appellants complain, the redacted versions
of the statements were necessarily disjointed. For that reason, the
trial judge told the jury prior to the reading of Caudill's November
11, 1998, statement that “only portions of the statement will be read
to you.” We are unable to conclude that the jury must have assumed
from that admonition that the omitted portions inculpated Goforth.
Finally, appellants assert that the trial judge
erred by not admonishing the jury that each statement could be
considered only against the party who made it. No admonition was
requested, Hall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 817 S.W.2d 228, 229 (1991),
overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Ramsey, Ky., 920 S.W.2d
526 (1996), Matthews v. Commonwealth, Ky., 709 S.W.2d 414, 418 (1985),
and appellants are mistaken in their belief that the Constitution
requires it. Prior to Bruton, it was held that the prejudicial
effect of an out-of-court statement by a non-testifying codefendant
that inculpated a defendant could be cured by giving the jury a
limiting admonition that it should not consider the codefendant's
statement in determining the guilt of the defendant. Delli Paoli v.
United States, 352 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 294, 1 L.Ed.2d 278 (1957).
Bruton held that this limiting admonition was insufficient to cure
the prejudice resulting from the defendant's inability to
cross-examine his/her accuser.
Despite the concededly clear instructions to the
jury to disregard Evans' inadmissible hearsay evidence inculpating
petitioner, in the context of a joint trial we cannot accept limiting
instructions as an adequate substitute for petitioner's constitutional
right of cross-examination. The effect is the same as if there had
been no instruction at all.
391 U.S. at 137, 88 S.Ct. at 1628.
By forbidding the use in a joint trial of a
non-testifying codefendant's out-of-court statement that inculpates a
defendant, Bruton eliminated the need for a limiting admonition. In
Richardson, supra, the United States Supreme Court authorized the
admission of a codefendant's confession that was redacted to omit all
references to the defendant or to the fact that anyone other than the
codefendant/declarant had participated in the crime. 481 U.S. at 211,
107 S.Ct. at 1709. In Richardson, a limiting instruction had been
given, id., so the Court was not required to decide whether the
absence of such an instruction, even if not requested, mandated
reversal. We conclude now that it does not. If the non-testifying
codefendant's out-of-court statement is so redacted that it does not
inculpate the defendant in the commission of the crime, the limiting
instruction might well be viewed as calling the jury's attention to
the very fact that the redaction was intended to suppress, i.e., that
the deleted portions of the codefendant's confession would have
implicated the defendant in the commission of the crime. As in Hall,
supra, at 229, we view this as a matter of trial strategy and decline
to treat as automatic reversible error the failure to give an
unrequested limiting admonition.
2. Photographs of reconstructed skull.
The Commonwealth's forensic anthropologist
partially reconstructed the victim's skull from bones found on or
inside her body to assist in estimating the number and nature of the
blows inflicted upon her. The Commonwealth did not introduce the
skull, itself, but only three photographs that were used to explain
the testimony of the witness. Even bones and bone fragments from the
victim's body are admissible if relevant. Tamme, 973 S.W.2d at 36;
Tackett v. Commonwealth, 245 Ky. 98, 53 S.W.2d 218 (1932); Robey v.
Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 407, 48 S.W.2d 822 (1932). Likewise, “even
gruesome photographs are admissible if they have probative value.”
Tamme, at 36; Epperson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 809 S.W.2d 835, 843
(1990). The number and nature of the blows inflicted upon the victim
were relevant to prove the corpus delicti and to refute a potential
claim that the person who inflicted the blows lacked the intent to
kill the victim. KRS 507.030(1)(a).
3. Character evidence.
The following colloquy occurred during the
prosecutor's direct examination of the victim's sister, Alma Gross:
Q. Was [the victim] a careful person about who she
would let into her house?
A. Very cautious.
Q. Tell me about that.
A. Every time she would talk to me she would say,
“Be sure to lock your doors; don't open your door after dark; don't
let nobody in.” She was very cautious.
Mrs. Gross explained later in her testimony that
her sister “didn't like the part of town that I lived in and that was
why she always stressed to me to be cautious.” That explanation
cured any possible error with respect to Gross's response to the
prosecutor's second question because it clarified that the victim was
advising Gross to be cautious, not that the victim, herself, was a
cautious person. However, it did not cure the error with respect to
the first question which elicited that the victim was “very cautious”
about who she let into her house. KRE 404(a) provides:
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except [exceptions not
applicable].
The evidence of the victim's character for being
“very cautious” about who she let into her house was admitted to prove
action in conformity therewith, i.e., that she did not invite the
appellants into her home on the night she was killed, thus, they
committed burglary when they “unlawfully” entered her residence with
the intent to commit a crime. KRS 511.020(1); Robey v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 943 S.W.2d 616, 620 (1997). The admission of this evidence was
erroneous.
However, the erroneous admission of evidence is
subject to harmless error analysis even in a case where the death
penalty has been imposed. Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249,
257-58, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 1798, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988); Stanford v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 781, 787 (1987). The inquiry is
whether the “error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” Stanford
at 787, or, said another way, “whether the circumstances in totality
are persuasive that, minus the error, the defendant may not have been
found guilty of a capital crime, or the death penalty may not have
been imposed.” Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 801 S.W.2d 665, 668
(1990).
The erroneously admitted character evidence
amounted only to circumstantial evidence creating an inference that
appellants did not enter the victim's home with her permission.
Caudill admitted in her testimony that she and Goforth did not have
permission to enter the residence but that Goforth burst into the
residence and attacked the victim as she was walking away from the
door. Goforth testified that Caudill obtained admission into the
victim's home under the pretext that they needed to use her telephone
because of “car trouble.” Goforth admittedly knew that there was no
“car trouble” and that they were at the victim's home for the purpose
of acquiring the victim's money.
All of our burglary and trespass statutes,
including KRS 511.020, require as an element of the offense that the
defendant “knowingly enter[ed] or remain [ed] unlawfully” in the
victim's building. In that respect, our statute differs from Section
221.1 of the Model Penal Code and, instead, corresponds with Section
140.30 of the New York Penal Law. See KRS 511.020 (1974 commentary).
New York courts have consistently held that entry by deception,
trickery, or misrepresentation satisfies the “unlawful entry” element
of the offense. E.g., People v. Mitchell, 254 A.D.2d 830, 679
N.Y.S.2d 761, 761-62 (N.Y.App.Div.1998); People v. Johnson, 190
A.D.2d 503, 593 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (N.Y.App.Div.1993); People v.
Harrison, 151 A.D.2d 778, 543 N.Y.S.2d 108, 110 (N.Y.App.Div.1989).
We find that reasoning to be sound and are satisfied that no
reasonable juror would conclude that “entry by deception, trickery, or
misrepresentation” equates with “entry by invitation.” Since both
appellants admitted at trial that they “unlawfully entered” the
victim's home, the erroneously admitted circumstantial evidence of
their unlawful entry was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
4. Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
a. Caudill asserts that evidence that she was
interviewed in a New Orleans jail on November 11, 1998, violated KRE
404(b)'s proscription against admission of evidence of other crimes to
prove her bad character. Since it was not shown that Caudill was
jailed on charges other than those related to these offenses, any
perceived error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
b. Caudill also asserts that Jeanette Holden's
testimony that Caudill told her that she knew where they could get
$3,000.00 and asked whether Holden was willing to hurt somebody
violated KRE 404(b)'s proscription against admission of evidence of
other wrongs or acts to prove action in conformity therewith.
However, at a suppression hearing on the issue, Holden testified that
the incident occurred after Caudill's former boyfriend, Thomas
Garrett, committed suicide and while Caudill was looking for a place
to stay. Caudill testified that she learned of Garrett's death on
Thursday, March 12, 1998, and that she moved out of Steve White's
house on either Friday night, March 13, 1998, or Saturday afternoon,
March 14, 1998. Lonetta White was killed and robbed at approximately
3:30 a.m. on March 15, 1998. Caudill's statement to Holden was
sufficiently proximate to the murder and robbery of White for the jury
to properly conclude that the statement manifested an “intent” and
“plan” to harm and rob White and, thus, was within the exceptions set
forth in KRE 404(b)(1).
c. Goforth asserts that KRE 404(b) was violated by
Veronica Jones's testimony that Goforth ingested cocaine both orally
and intravenously for up to thirty days before the crimes, Caudill's
testimony that he ingested cocaine intravenously while at Lake
Herrington after the crimes, and the testimony of Penny Hunter,
Goforth's domestic companion, that she had to make the house payments
because Goforth spent all of his money on crack cocaine. This
evidence was relevant to show motive. “Evidence of a drug habit,
along with evidence of insufficient funds to support that habit, is
relevant to show a motive to commit a crime in order to gain money to
buy drugs.” Adkins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 96 S.W.3d 779, 793 (2003).
5. Impeachment of Jeanette Holden.
Caudill complains that she was precluded from
impeaching the credibility of Jeanette Holden and thereby prevented
from exercising her constitutional right of confrontation. U.S.
Const. amend. VI; Ky. Const. § 11. In fact, Caudill was permitted
to elicit from Holden the facts that Holden was a convicted felon,
that she was serving a ten-year sentence, and that she would like for
the parole board to know that she had cooperated with the prosecution
of this case. When asked if she had helped Detective Lyons with any
other cases, Holden replied that she had not. Defense counsel then
inquired whether Holden had helped any police detective with any other
case, specifically a case involving Christina Halvorsen. Upon the
prosecutor's objection, the trial judge questioned defense counsel as
to whether he had information that Holden had received or been
promised any benefit for her cooperation in that case. When defense
counsel replied that he did not, the objection was sustained. Thus,
Holden did not answer the question and what answer she might have made
was not preserved by an avowal. KRE 103(a)(2).
Limitations on cross-examination, including
cross-examination to expose bias or prejudice, Parsley v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 306 S.W.2d 284, 285 (1957), involve a fundamental
constitutional right and should be cautiously applied. Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1112, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974).
Nevertheless, “[s]o long as a reasonably complete picture of the
witness' veracity, bias and motivation is developed, the judge enjoys
power and discretion to set appropriate boundaries.” Commonwealth v.
Maddox, Ky., 955 S.W.2d 718, 721 (1997) (quoting United States v.
Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 254 (1st Cir.1990)).
[A] connection must be established between the
cross-examination proposed to be undertaken and the facts in evidence.
A defendant is not at liberty to present unsupported theories in the
guise of cross-examination and invite the jury to speculate as to some
cause other than one supported by the evidence.
Maddox, at 721.
Caudill was able to show that Holden was a
convicted felon, was serving a prison term, and hoped the parole board
would give consideration to her cooperation in this case. The trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in sustaining the prosecutor's
objection to defense counsel's attempted inquiry as to whether Holden
had cooperated with the police in another case absent a good faith
belief that she had benefitted from that cooperation. The mere fact
that a witness helped the police in an unrelated case is not evidence
of bias in this case and is not an adverse reflection on the witness's
credibility in general.
Finally, absent an avowal, we have no way of
knowing what Holden's response would have been or whether it would
have been beneficial to Caudill. Commonwealth v. Ferrell, Ky., 17
S.W.3d 520, 525 (2000).
6. Evidence evoking sympathy for victim.
Much of appellants' complaints relate to claimed
irrelevancy of evidence that “humanized” the victim and described the
horrific nature of her fatal injuries. We have stated many times
that evidence that a murder victim was not a mere statistic but an
individual human being with a personality and activities does not
unduly prejudice the defendant or inflame the jury. Stopher v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 57 S.W.3d 787, 802-03 (2001); Hodge, 17 S.W.3d at
847; Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 293, 302-03 (1997);
McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 669 S.W.2d 519, 523 (1984). Appellants
cite no authority for the proposition that the nature and extent of a
murder victim's injuries is irrelevant and we are aware of none.
7. Goforth's cross-examination of Caudill.
During cross-examination of Caudill by Goforth's
attorney, Caudill was asked (a) whether Edna Sharp was mistaken when
she testified that she knew Johnathon Goforth? (to which Caudill
replied that Sharp was mistaken); (b) whether Steve White was
mistaken when he testified that Lonetta White wore a fur coat on the
day she visited an attorney (whereas Caudill had said that Lonetta
White was wearing a black leather coat)? (to which Caudill replied
that she did not know if she or Steve White was mistaken); (c)
whether Penny Hunter was mistaken when she testified that she was with
Goforth all day in Paris, Kentucky, on the Saturday before the crimes
(whereas Caudill had said that Goforth was at a crack house in
Lexington that day)? (to which Caudill replied that one of them could
be mistaken); (d) whether Cynthia Ellis had lied when she testified
that Caudill told her that Caudill had hit Lonetta White with a clock?
(to which Caudill replied that Ellis had lied); (e) whether Cynthia
Ellis and Julia Davis had lied in their testimonies? (to which Caudill
replied that some of the things they said were not true).
In Moss v. Commonwealth, Ky., 949 S.W.2d 579
(1997), we held that a witness should not be required to characterize
the testimony of another witness as a lie. Id. at 583; see also
Tamme, 973 S.W.2d at 28. As in Moss and Tamme, Caudill did not
object to any of these questions. As in Moss and Tamme (a death
penalty case), we conclude that the totality of the circumstances are
persuasive that exclusion of the improper inquiries would not have
resulted in different verdicts in this case. Sanders, 801 S.W.2d at
668 (unpreserved error in death penalty case will not result in
reversal unless the “circumstances in totality are persuasive that,
minus the error, the defendant may not have been found guilty of a
capital crime, or the death penalty may not have been imposed.”);
Cosby v. Commonwealth, Ky., 776 S.W.2d 367, 369 (1989), overruled on
other grounds by St. Clair v. Roark, Ky., 10 S.W.3d 482, 487 (1999).
8. “America's Most Wanted.”
From March until November 1998, the police were
searching for Caudill and Goforth and arranged to have the two and
their crimes against Lonetta White featured on the popular television
series, “America's Most Wanted.” The trial judge made a pretrial
ruling that this fact was irrelevant and should not be made known to
the jury. Nevertheless, when asked when he had last seen Caudill,
Steve White responded that he had last seen her on “America's Most
Wanted.” The trial judge overruled Caudill's motion for a mistrial but
offered to give the jury a curative admonition to disregard the
remark. Caudill declined the offered admonition. This same issue
arose in Bray v. Commonwealth, Ky., 68 S.W.3d 375 (2002), except that
the evidence there was much more detailed than the isolated remark
made here. Id. at 383. As in Bray, we conclude that admission of
this evidence did not create a manifest necessity for a mistrial.
9. Caudill's racial slur.
During her March 15, 1998, statement, Detective
Lyons told Caudill that he was only repeating what other people had
told him. Caudill then remarked:
You were talking to the junkies down the street,
the crackheads, who were telling you something you wanted to hear,
maybe for something that they had done, laying it on me. I know who
you talked to out on the street. I know who you talked to.
Jeanette and that other chick and and I know you talked to that n
[racial slur] up the street. They're all sagers [phonetic], I know
that.
Caudill asserts that the failure to delete the
racial slur from her statement was reversible error. We disagree.
The word came from her own mouth. She is a Caucasian accused of
brutally murdering an African-American. Although it is obvious from
the context that the slur did not refer to the victim, it is at least
somewhat probative of an animus against African-Americans. The trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that its probative
value was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. KRE
403; Commonwealth v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (1999).
10. Caudill's demeanor.
Caudill asserts it was error to permit Julia Davis
to testify that when Caudill told her that Lonetta White had said,
“Help me, why are you doing this to me?” Caudill was laughing and
using a mocking tone of voice. We disagree. A lay witness may
express an opinion as to another's demeanor. KRE 701; McKinney v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 60 S.W.3d 499, 503-04 (2001). The trial judge did
not abuse his discretion in determining that the probative value of
this evidence was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect. KRE 403; English, at 945.
11. Cross-examination of Goforth.
After Goforth testified that he fled Kentucky
because he did not have $5,000.00 to pay an attorney, the prosecutor
inquired about Goforth's knowledge of the legal system, specifically
whether he had taken a paralegal course before these crimes were
committed. Goforth claims that this was prejudicial error because he
was in prison when he worked as a paralegal. However, the
Commonwealth only established when, not where, the paralegal training
occurred for the purpose of establishing his legal knowledge at the
time he fled Kentucky.
Goforth also complains that the prosecutor
repeatedly pointed out that he had lied in the statement he gave to
the police in Gulfport, Mississippi. “[W]hen [a defendant] assumes
the role of a witness, the rules that generally apply to other
witnesses-rules that serve the truth-seeking function of the trial-are
generally applicable to him as well.” Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S.
61, 69, 120 S.Ct. 1119, 1125, 146 L.Ed.2d 47 (2000) (quoting Perry v.
Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 282, 109 S.Ct. 594, 600-01, 102 L.Ed.2d 624
(1989)). A defendant's “credibility may be impeached and his
testimony assailed like that of any other witness.” Id. (quoting
Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154, 78 S.Ct. 622, 626, 2
L.Ed.2d 589 (1958)). “It is essential ․ to the proper functioning of
the adversary system that when a defendant takes the stand, the
government be permitted proper and effective cross-examination in an
attempt to elicit the truth.” United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620,
626-27, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 1916, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980).
12. Alleged violation of KRE 609.
During the direct examinations of Steve White, Edna
Sharp, Cynthia Ellis, and Julia Davis, the prosecutor asked the
witnesses whether they had been convicted of felonies and, upon
receiving affirmative answers, the nature of the felonies committed
which were, respectively, DUI-fourth offense, trafficking in cocaine,
theft by deception of $300 or more, and forgery. Neither appellants
nor any of the witnesses in question objected to these inquiries.
Goforth now asserts that eliciting the nature of the convictions
amounted to improper impeachment in violation of KRE 609(a) and that
he was prejudiced thereby because the witnesses all inculpated
Caudill, thus were favorable to him.
In fact, the inquiries had the effect of casting
the witnesses in a more favorable light. The only purpose for
inquiring whether a party's own witness has been convicted of a felony
is to defuse anticipated impeachment by the opposing party; and the
obvious purpose for inquiring as to the nature of each offense was
anticipatory rehabilitation, i.e., to show that the witnesses had, at
least, not been convicted of a crime of violence. Furthermore, KRE
609(a) only provides that “[t]he identity of the crime upon which the
conviction was based may not be disclosed upon cross-examination ․”
(emphasis added), and these disclosures were elicited upon direct
examination.
13. Hearsay.
Goforth raises six hearsay issues with respect to
the testimonies of Caudill, Cynthia Ellis, and Julia Davis. Ellis
and Davis were jailhouse informants who testified as witnesses for the
Commonwealth against Caudill. Neither indicated any acquaintanceship
with Goforth. Both had been cautioned prior to trial and pursuant to
Gray v. Maryland and Richardson v. Marsh, both supra, not to testify
as to any statements by Caudill indicating that anyone else was
present when the crimes were committed. For the most part, both
complied with this directive.
a. Goforth's first claim relates to Ellis's
testimony that Caudill told her “that she had gathered some black, she
did say black plastic bags, and that they had, that she had wrapped
the woman in this.” (Emphasis added.) In the first place, Ellis
immediately corrected herself by changing the identifying pronoun from
plural to singular. Secondly, Goforth admitted he was present when
the victim's body was wrapped in a carpet and that he assisted in
carrying it to the garage and loading it into the trunk of the
victim's automobile. There was no objection to Ellis's slip and the
totality of the circumstances are persuasive that it did not change
the result in this case. Sanders, supra, at 668; Cosby, supra, at
369.
b. When the prosecutor asked Davis what Caudill
had told her about what she had done, Davis replied: “I can't say the
other person's name ․” Technically, this statement was not hearsay
because it was not offered to prove the truth of any relevant fact.
At worst, it was a Bruton violation and was rendered harmless when (1)
Caudill subsequently testified and subjected herself to
cross-examination and (2) Goforth subsequently testified and admitted
that he was present when the crimes were committed.
c. On cross-examination by Caudill's attorney,
Davis responded to an inquiry about her alleged inconsistent
statements to Detective Lyons by saying, “[i]t was all in the process
of them murdering her, so, you know, it was as if she was being
killed.” (Emphasis added.) There was no objection to Davis's slip
and, because Caudill subsequently testified that Goforth killed White
and was subjected to extensive cross-examination on the subject, we
are unpersuaded that, absent this isolated slip, the result would have
been different. Sanders; Cosby.
d. Caudill admitted on cross-examination by the
prosecutor that the victim had pleaded with her to “please help me.”
The statement was not introduced to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, KRE 801(c), but to prove that the victim was still alive
when the statement was made. Because it had a relevancy without
regard to the truth of the assertion, the statement was admissible.
Osborne v. Commonwealth, Ky., 43 S.W.3d 234, 242 (2001); Robert G.
Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 8.05, at 367-68 (3d ed.
Michie 1993).
e. Caudill testified that when she and Goforth
returned to Lexington after burning Mrs. White's automobile, they
encountered Sonny Price who asked Goforth, “Now where did you get,
where did all the blood come from?” To the extent that Price's
inquiry can be characterized as hearsay, it falls within the exception
for a present sense impression, i.e., “a statement describing or
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was
perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.” KRE
803(1); Bray v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d at 381. Regardless, Goforth
admitted that he assisted in carrying the victim's body to the garage
and that the victim's blood had spilled through the carpet during that
process, thus explaining the presence of the blood.
f. After her arrest, Caudill accompanied the
police on a walk-through of the crime scene, explaining how Goforth
killed Mrs. White. As noted earlier in Part I, issue 4(b), the
videotape was not introduced. KRE 801A(a)(2); Fields v.
Commonwealth, Ky.,12 S.W.3d 275, 280-81 (2000). Goforth complains,
however, that Caudill testified at trial that, after her arrest, she
“did a walk-through reenactment with the detectives.” That
testimony, of course, was not hearsay. Goforth then complains that
Detective Lyons testified that he “took Caudill out to the location on
Bryanwood Park” (Mrs. White's residence). That, testimony, of
course, also was not hearsay. Finally, Goforth complains that
Detective Lyons testified that Caudill showed him “where Goforth's
truck had been parked in the shopping center parking lot” (supporting
Caudill's version that she did not want White to know she was with
another person), whereas Goforth subsequently testified that his truck
was parked directly in front of White's residence (supporting
Goforth's version that Caudill told White they were having car
trouble). Although Caudill may or may not have said to Lyons that
“we parked the truck here so that White would not know that another
person was with me,” Lyons's testimony was arguably hearsay by implied
assertion. See Lawson, supra, § 8.05 III(1), at 369. However,
Goforth did not object to the testimony and we are unpersuaded that
the result in this case would have been different absent the admission
of the implied assertion. Sanders, supra, at 668; Cosby, supra, at
369. That is especially true since Caudill subsequently testified to
the same fact under oath and subject to cross-examination.
14. Effects of cocaine.
Goforth complains of the fact that, during
cross-examination of Steve White, Caudill's attorney elicited
information that using cocaine caused White to “become paranoid.”
Presumably, Caudill was hoping by the inquiry to establish an
intoxication defense. Goforth did not object to this testimony and
does not articulate any rational reason how this testimony prejudiced
him. He only speculates that the jury may have viewed this evidence
as giving credence to Dr. Schilling's penalty phase testimony that
Caudill was a submissive person. Dr. Schilling did not testify that
Caudill was paranoid or that paranoia is in any way related to
submissiveness.
IV. GUILT PHASE INSTRUCTIONS.
Appellants complain only of the guilt phase
instructions on homicide. The jury was not instructed on any lesser
included homicide offenses.
1. Principal or Accomplice.
The murder instructions permitted the jury to find
each appellant guilty of (1) murder under Instruction No. 2, which
fully set out the elements of that offense, including the element of
intent, (2) complicity to murder under Instruction No. 3, which fully
set out the elements of that offense, including that the accomplice
intended that the victim would be killed, or, (3) if the jury could
not determine who was the principal and who was the accomplice,
“murder-principal or accomplice” under Instruction No. 4. The last
instruction read as follows:
MURDER-PRINCIPAL OR ACCOMPLICE
If you believe from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of either murder under
Instruction No. 2 or complicity to murder under Instruction No. 3, but
are unable to determine from the evidence whether the defendant
committed this crime as principal under Instruction No. 2 or
accomplice under Instruction No. 3, then you will find the defendant
guilty of murder, principal or accomplice, under this Instruction and
so state in your verdict.
Both appellants were convicted of “murder-principal
or accomplice,” under Instruction No. 4. Both assert that their
convictions are invalid because (1) the instruction did not set out
the elements of the offenses of murder and complicity to murder; (2)
the instruction authorized a non-unanimous verdict; (3) the
instruction negated their right to an impartial jury; and (4) the
instruction denied them individualized sentencing. We previously
addressed and rejected the first two contentions in Halvorsen v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 730 S.W.2d 921 (1986), and specifically approved an
instruction identical to the one given in this case. Id. at 925. As
noted in Halvorsen, there was no need to repeat the elements of murder
and complicity to murder because they were fully set forth in
Instructions Nos. 2 and 3. Id. The “combination” instruction
specifically referred to those instructions and incorporated them by
reference. Id. The unanimity requirement was not violated because
both theories were supported by the evidence. Id.; see Ice v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 667 S.W.2d 671, 677 (1984); Wells v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 561 S.W.2d 85, 88 (1978).
While we, of course, agree that the appellants were
entitled to a trial by an impartial jury, they do not explain how the
“combination” instruction denied them that right. The cases they
cite to support that proposition, viz: Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404, 92 S.Ct. 1628, 32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972), Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970), and Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), are all
inapposite. In fact, Apodaca specifically holds that the Sixth
Amendment does not require a unanimous verdict in a state criminal
trial. 406 U.S. at 407, 92 S.Ct. at 1630.
Nor did the finding of guilt under the
“combination” instruction deny either appellant the right to
individualized sentencing. An accomplice to a murder committed by
another in the course of the commission of a violent felony can be
sentenced to death if the accomplice was a major participant in the
commission of the felony and possessed a mens rea of at least reckless
disregard for human life. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58, 107
S.Ct. 1676, 1688, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987). Here, the accomplice
instruction (and, hence, also the “combination” instruction) required
the accomplice to actually intend that Mrs. White be killed. Despite
that, each set of penalty phase instructions permitted the jury to
consider as a possible mitigating circumstance that “[t]he Defendant
was an accomplice in an offense committed by another person and
[his][her] participation in the offense was relatively minor.” KRS
532.025(2)(b)(5).
Tison, supra, by necessity, also resolves adversely
to appellants their claims that they were not eligible for the death
penalty because the jury did not specifically determine whether each
was a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the offense.
2. Murder-absence of EED.
Caudill asserts that, because KRS 507.020(1)(a)
contains the proviso that “a person shall not be guilty under this
subsection if he acted under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance ․,” it was error not to include the absence of extreme
emotional disturbance (EED) as an element of the offense in the murder
instruction. However, we have long held that “[a]n instruction on
murder need not require the jury to find that the defendant was not
acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance unless
there is something in the evidence to suggest that he was, thereby
affording room for reasonable doubt in that respect.” Gall v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 607 S.W.2d 97, 109 (1980), overruled on other
grounds by Payne v. Commonwealth, Ky., 623 S.W.2d 867, 870 (1981).
As will be discussed more fully infra, there was no evidence
whatsoever that Caudill was acting under extreme emotional disturbance
at the time Lonetta White was killed.
3. First-degree manslaughter-EED.
Caudill asserts error in the trial judge's failure
to instruct the jury on manslaughter in the first degree under KRS
507.030(1)(b), i. e., intentional homicide committed under the
influence of EED, as a lesser included offense. She points to three
“triggering events” as evidence of EED: (1) she was informed of the
recent suicide of a former boyfriend, Thomas Garrett, on Thursday,
March 12, 1998; (2) she argued with her present boyfriend, Steve
White, about her resumption of drug use on either Friday, March 13, or
Saturday, March 14; and (3) Lonetta White refused her demand for
money immediately before the murder. Caudill has placed the cart
before the horse. First, there must be evidence of the existence of
an EED at the time the homicide was committed. It is only upon such
proof that the requirement arises for proof that the EED was the
result of adequate provocation, i.e., a “triggering event,” and that
the EED remained uninterrupted from the provocation until the killing.
Fields v. Commonwealth, Ky., 44 S.W.3d 355, 359 (2001).
We start with the definition of “extreme emotional
disturbance,” formulated in McClellan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 715 S.W.2d
464 (1986):
Extreme emotional disturbance is a temporary state
of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one's
judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the impelling
force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or
malicious purposes. It is not a mental disease in itself, and an
enraged, inflamed or disturbed emotional state does not constitute an
extreme emotional disturbance unless there is a reasonable explanation
or excuse therefor, the reasonableness of which is to be determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under
circumstances as [the] defendant believed them to be.
Id. at 468-69 (emphasis added.)
Caudill did not claim that she went to Mrs. White's
residence under the influence of EED. She claimed she went there to
induce White, under false pretenses, to give her money with which to
satisfy her drug dependency. However, a drug dependency or the
effects of substance abuse, standing alone, does not authorize
instructions on EED and first-degree manslaughter. Stopher, 57
S.W.3d at 803; Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 175, 179
(1993); Stanford, 793 S.W.2d at 115. Nor does Caudill claim that
she killed White because she was emotionally disturbed about the death
of her former boyfriend, or even about her argument with her
then-present boyfriend, Mrs. White's son. A closer factual question
is created by her claim that she became extremely emotionally
disturbed when White refused her demand for money. However, even
viewing the circumstances from Caudill's drug dependent point of view,
White's mere resistance to her demand for money was not “a reasonable
explanation or excuse” for Caudill to become so enraged, inflamed or
disturbed as to be entitled to the defense of EED. Hodge, 17 S.W.3d at
850 (“Mere resistance by the victim ․ does not ․ constitute a
reasonable explanation or excuse for an emotional state so enraged,
inflamed or disturbed as to cause the perpetrator to kill the
victim.”).
4. First-degree manslaughter-intent to injure.
Both Caudill and Goforth claim they were entitled
to an instruction on manslaughter in the first degree under KRS
507.030(1)(a), i.e., unintentional homicide committed with the intent
to cause serious physical injury but not death. However, an
instruction on a lesser included offense is required only if,
considering the totality of the evidence, the jury might have a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt of the greater offense,
and yet believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty
of the lesser offense. Parker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 952 S.W.2d 209,
211 (1997). The postmortem examination of Mrs. White's body revealed
that she suffered at least fifteen blows to the head with a
hammer-like object. The blows ranged from those that caused
lacerations to those that fractured the skull causing fragments of
bone to be driven into the brain. This undisputed evidence precludes
any reasonable doubt that whoever attacked Mrs. White intended to
kill, as opposed to merely injure, her.
5. Second-degree manslaughter-“felony murder.”
Caudill asserts that she was entitled to an
instruction on manslaughter in the second degree because the jury
could have believed that her complicity in the plan to rob White
amounted only to wantonness, i.e., awareness and conscious disregard
of a substantial risk that Goforth would kill White during the course
of the robbery. KRS 507.040(1); KRS 501.020(3).
Formerly, an accomplice to a dangerous felony could
be convicted of an intentional murder committed by another participant
in the felony on the theory that the intent to commit the dangerous
felony provided the element of intent necessary to convict of murder.
This “felony murder” concept was abandoned in Kentucky with the
adoption of the penal code. However, participation in a dangerous
felony, e.g., armed robbery, may supply the element of aggravated
wantonness, i.e., extreme indifference to human life, necessary to
convict of wanton murder. KRS 507.020(1)(b). See Graves v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 858, 862-63 (2000); Bennett v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 322, 327 (1998); Kruse v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 704 S.W.2d 192, 193-95 (1985). In that scenario, second-degree
manslaughter becomes a lesser included offense of wanton murder if the
jury could believe that the defendant's participation in the dangerous
felony amounted to wantonness but not extreme indifference to human
life. Kruse, at 194 (quoting the Commentary to KRS 507.020).
“Although a trial judge has a duty to prepare and
give instructions on the whole law of the case, including any lesser
included offenses which are supported by the evidence, ․ that duty
does not require an instruction on a theory with no evidentiary
foundation.” Gabow, 34 S.W.3d at 72 (quoting Houston v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 975 S.W.2d 925, 929 (1998)); see also Thompkins v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 54 S.W.3d 147, 151 (2001). Caudill's version of the events was
that she went to White's residence to ask for money and that White was
in the process of complying with her request when Goforth unexpectedly
attacked and killed her. Goforth's version was that Caudill killed
White when White refused her request for money. Julia Davis
testified that Caudill told her that she (Caudill) killed White.
Cynthia Ellis testified that Caudill told her that she was the first
to attack White by hitting her twice in the head with a clock. None
of these versions support a theory that Caudill intended to rob White
and that, during the course of the robbery, Goforth unexpectedly
killed her. An inference can be drawn from Jeanette Holden's
testimony that Caudill was looking for an accomplice who was willing
to rob and “hurt” White. However, evidence that Caudill expected
White to be “hurt” during the robbery would have warranted, at best,
an instruction on aggravated wantonness, i.e., wanton murder, which
was not requested, not an instruction on mere wantonness, i.e.,
second-degree manslaughter.
6. Second-degree manslaughter-intoxication.
Both appellants assert they were entitled to an
instruction on manslaughter in the second degree because the jury
could have believed that they were so intoxicated that they could not
form the requisite intent necessary for a conviction of murder. The
defense of voluntary intoxication does not warrant an acquittal but
reduces the offense from murder to second-degree manslaughter. Slaven
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 845, 856-57 (1997). However, “[i]n
order to justify an instruction on [voluntary] intoxication, there
must be evidence not only that the defendant was drunk, but that she
was so drunk that she did not know what she was doing.” Springer v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 439, 451 (1999); see also Stanford, 793
S.W.2d at 117-18. No evidence was introduced at trial to support a
defense of intoxication. Goforth specifically testified that he was
not claiming that he was intoxicated by drugs or alcohol and did not
request an instruction on intoxication. Caudill testified that she
and Goforth parked Goforth's truck in a shopping center parking lot so
that White would not suspect there was another person with her.
Goforth testified that Caudill gained entry into White's residence
under the pretext that she needed to use the telephone because they
were having car trouble. These are not the actions of a person who
was so intoxicated that she did not know what she was doing.
7. Criminal facilitation.
Both appellants assert they were entitled to an
instruction on criminal facilitation of murder. KRS 506.080 provides:
A person is guilty of criminal facilitation when,
acting with knowledge that another person is committing or intends to
commit a crime, he engages in conduct which knowingly provides such
person with the means or opportunity for the commission of the crime
and which in fact aids such person to commit the crime. [Emphasis
added.]
Both appellants affirmatively asserted at trial
that they had no knowledge that the other intended to murder Mrs.
White. Without knowledge, there can be no facilitation. However,
as noted in Chumbler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 905 S.W.2d 488 (1995),
without knowledge there also could be no complicity. Id. at 498-99.
Nevertheless, “[f]acilitation reflects the mental state of one who is
‘wholly indifferent’ to the actual completion of the crime,” Perdue v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 916 S.W.2d 148, 160 (1995), as opposed to one who
intends that the crime be committed. Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 50
S.W.3d 148, 165 (2001).
Caudill does not articulate how she “facilitated”
Goforth's murder of White. But if the basis for her claim is that
she induced White to unlock her door knowing that Goforth intended to
kill her, no reasonable jury could believe she was “wholly
indifferent” to the actual completion of the murder. Goforth claims
he only “facilitated” Caudill's murder of White by furnishing Caudill
with transportation to White's residence. Webb v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
904 S.W.2d 226, 228-29 (1995). He would have a better argument if he
had left Caudill at White's residence and returned to the crack house
without her, or, perhaps, if he had waited in the pickup truck while
Caudill entered the residence and committed the murder. However, no
reasonable juror could believe that Goforth was “wholly indifferent”
to the completion of the murder after he admitted that he accompanied
Caudill to White's door, participated in the “car trouble” ruse that
induced White to permit Caudill to enter her residence, and entered
the residence with Caudill, all the while knowing that Caudill
intended to enter the residence for the purpose of killing White.
V. PENALTY PHASE ISSUES.
1. Severance.
Goforth asserts that the trial judge should have,
sua sponte, severed his penalty phase from Caudill's penalty phase
because Caudill introduced evidence in mitigation of capital
punishment that she had a submissive personality. The jury was
ultimately instructed to consider on Caudill's behalf the statutory
mitigating circumstance, if believed to be true, that she “acted under
duress or under the domination of another person even though the
duress or domination of another person [was] not sufficient to
constitute a defense to the crime.” KRS 532.025(2)(b)(6). Goforth
relies on Foster v. Commonwealth, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 670 (1992), for the
proposition that the evidence and instruction were prejudicial to him
because they portrayed him as the more culpable of the two. Id. at
679-83.
In Foster, the codefendant Powell introduced in
support of her mitigation claim of duress and domination numerous
witnesses who testified to specific acts of prior misconduct by
Foster, including Foster's threats against Powell and her statements
that she had to kill one of the victims because Powell was a “weak
bitch” and “not capable of finishing the work.” Id. at 681. Powell
and Foster had a long-term lesbian relationship and Powell, herself,
testified that she had been beaten by Foster and that Foster had
perpetrated other acts of violence against members of her own family.
Id. Powell also introduced expert testimony that she suffered from the
equivalent of “battered spouse syndrome” because she had “learned
helplessness” toward Foster. Id. at 683. The upshot was that the
jury fixed Foster's penalty at death and Powell's at life without
parole for twenty-five years. Id. at 672. On appeal, the cumulation
of Powell's mitigation evidence was held to have been so prejudicial
to Foster as to require reversal of Foster's sentences for a new
sentencing hearing. Id. at 683.
Here, Caudill did not testify in the penalty phase
and offered no evidence of any prior misconduct by Goforth. When she
testified in the guilt phase, Caudill did not claim that she was
dominated by Goforth (a person she barely knew) or that Goforth
induced her by threats or otherwise to participate in the murder of
White. Remember, her version of the murder was that Goforth acted
unexpectedly and unilaterally and bound her hands while he murdered
White and ransacked her residence. In support of the duress and
domination mitigator, Caudill offered witnesses who testified that she
had been physically abused by her father and several husbands and that
her lifestyle included drug addiction and prostitution. She also
offered the expert testimony of Dr. Peter Schilling, a psychologist,
that her history indicated possible brain damage from a prior head
injury, and that her history and MMPI-2 test results reflected a
submissive personality, “particularly with respect to men.” To rebut
Dr. Schilling's testimony, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of
Dr. Andrew Cooley, a psychiatrist, who testified that he had examined
and tested Caudill on the Friday and Saturday before trial and found
no evidence of either brain damage or a dependent personality
disorder.
At a bench conference prior to Dr. Schilling's
testimony, Goforth's attorney made a motion to prohibit Schilling from
testifying that Caudill was a person who would be unable to act as a
principal in the commission of a murder, indicating that counsel was
aware of the nature of Dr. Schilling's expected testimony. The
motion was granted. Goforth's attorney did not request a severance
of the penalty phase either before or after Dr. Schilling's testimony.
He did not cross-examine either Dr. Schilling or Dr. Cooley. Nor
did he request a recess in order to prepare a possible
cross-examination. The enduring impression of this entire issue is
that Goforth's attorney did not believe Dr. Schilling's testimony was
sufficiently prejudicial to his client to warrant a severance or even
cross-examination. We agree and hold that the trial judge did not
err in failing to grant an unrequested severance. We also note in
passing that, unlike the codefendants in Foster, both Caudill and
Goforth received identical penalties for every offense.
2. Psychological/psychiatric reports.
On June 4, 1999, a discovery order was entered
requiring the Commonwealth to furnish Goforth with “all results or
reports of mental and physical examinations ․ including, but not
limited to, ․ any psychological/psychiatric tests of Johnathon Wayne
Goforth or Virginia Caudill in the possession of the Commonwealth.”
Goforth's appellate counsel claims that his trial counsel never
received Dr. Schilling's report and that the Commonwealth's failure to
furnish that report after receiving it from Caudill's attorney
impaired Goforth's trial counsel's right of cross-examination. This,
however, is a claim Goforth's trial counsel never made. During the
lengthy discussion at the pretrial hearing held on January 27, 2000,
concerning time frames for obtaining mental health examinations and
furnishing reports of experts, Goforth's counsel indicated that he was
not interested in reports of mental health examinations of Caudill.
Nevertheless, his motion to limit Dr. Schilling's testimony indicates
that he had advance notice of the nature of Dr. Schilling's proposed
testimony.
KRS 504.070(1) requires a defendant to give the
prosecution twenty days notice of an intention to introduce mental
health evidence at trial, and KRS 504.070(2) gives the prosecution the
right to have the defendant examined by an independent mental health
expert. However, KRS 504.070(4) requires the prosecution to file any
“reports prepared by its witnesses” ten days prior to trial. Dr.
Schilling testified that he examined and tested Caudill four times
over the period November 4, 1999, through January 13, 2000. On
January 18, 2000, exactly twenty days before trial, Caudill filed her
notice of intent to introduce evidence of “mental illness, retardation
or deficiency.” The Commonwealth was unable to schedule Caudill's
examination by Dr. Cooley until February 4-5, 2000, the Friday and
Saturday before the trial began on February 7, 2000. Both appellants
complain that they never received a final report of Dr. Cooley's
examination. In fact, it appears that Dr. Cooley never prepared a
final report. Caudill's counsel admitted receiving Dr. Cooley's
“preliminary report” prior to Dr. Cooley's testimony. Goforth's
trial counsel did not raise the issue at all, no doubt because Dr.
Cooley's testimony did not prejudice Goforth in any respect.
Finally, since neither doctor's report is in the record, we are unable
to determine whether either appellant was prejudiced by the failure,
if any, to timely receive it. Garrett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 48 S.W.3d
6, 15 (2001) (affirming where disputed document not introduced by
avowal); Commonwealth v. Ferrell, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 520 (2000).
3. Exclusion of allegedly mitigating evidence.
Appellants claim it was error for the trial court
to refuse their proffer, as mitigation evidence, of the fact that a
defendant in another case who had been convicted of multiple murders
had been sentenced by agreement to life without parole. However, the
requirement of individualized sentencing requires an assessment of the
particular defendant's background and character and the nature of the
crime for which he or she has been convicted. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2947, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), abrogated
on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242,
153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). As a corollary to that rule, evidence not
bearing on the defendant's character, background, or the circumstances
of the offense for which he/she has been convicted may be excluded.
Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 845 S.W.2d 534, 539 (1993) (quoting
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 n. 12, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2965 n. 12,
57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)). Specifically, evidence of a sentence imposed
upon someone else, whether pursuant to plea agreement or jury verdict,
is not a factor to be considered by the jury or the sentencing judge
in determining the appropriate penalty for this defendant.
Commonwealth v. Bass, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 233, 234 (1989); McClellan,
715 S.W.2d at 472.
4. Goforth's prior criminal convictions.
KRS 532.025(1)(a) provides, inter alia:
In such hearing, the judge shall hear additional
evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment,
including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of
guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant, or the absence of
any prior conviction and pleas; provided, however, that only such
evidence in aggravation as the state has made known to the defendant
prior to his trial shall be admissible.
KRS 532.025(1)(b), which provides for capital
sentencing by a jury, incorporates this provision by reference.
During the penalty phase of this trial, the
prosecutor introduced evidence of two prior criminal convictions of
Goforth: (1) a conviction of trafficking in a controlled substance in
the third degree, and (2) a conviction of three counts of criminal
facilitation of robbery in the first degree. Goforth's appellate
counsel asserts entitlement to a new penalty phase because there is no
proof in the record that the Commonwealth gave Goforth's trial counsel
pretrial notice of an intent to introduce these two prior convictions.
However, there is also no proof that the Commonwealth did not give
such notice. In fact, prior to the commencement of the penalty
phase, Goforth's trial counsel inquired as to the procedure the
prosecutor intended to use to introduce Goforth's prior convictions.
After the prosecutor recited verbatim what he intended to tell the
jury, Goforth's counsel stated he had no objection. At no time did
he complain that he had not been given pretrial notice of the
Commonwealth's intent to introduce those convictions.
5. Instruction issues.
a. EED mitigator.
The trial judge instructed the jury with respect to
Caudill to consider, if believed to be true, the mitigating
circumstance set forth in KRS 532.025(2)(b)(2), viz: “The capital
offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance even though the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance is not sufficient to
constitute a defense to the crime.” At trial, the prosecutor
requested that the instruction be accompanied by the definition of EED
set forth in McClellan, 715 S.W.2d at 468-69, quoted verbatim in Part
IV, issue 3, supra. Caudill's trial counsel did not join in that
request, no doubt because the McClellan definition serves to narrow,
not broaden, the scope of EED. Dean v. Commonwealth, Ky., 777 S.W.2d
900, 910-11 (1989) (Leibson, J., concurring); McClellan, supra, at
473-74 (Leibson, J., dissenting). Caudill's appellate counsel,
however, asserts that it was reversible error to omit the McClellan
definition from the penalty phase instructions, relying on the
plurality opinion in Dean, supra, at 909.
Upon further reflection, we conclude that the
McClellan definition of EED applies only to EED as a defense under KRS
507.020(1)(a) and not to EED as a mitigating circumstance under KRS
532.025(2)(b)(2). The language in the latter statute differs
somewhat from the former, primarily in that the murder statute
requires that there be a reasonable explanation or excuse for the EED,
whereas the mitigation statute does not contain that qualification.
Yet, the qualification is included in the McClellan definition.
McClellan, supra, at 468-69. If the McClellan definition applied to
both statutes, evidence justifying an instruction on EED as a
mitigator would have to be equally as strong as evidence justifying an
instruction on EED as a defense. If so, the omission of the
McClellan definition from Caudill's penalty phase instructions would
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because, if the evidence was
insufficient to entitle Caudill to an EED guilt phase instruction, it
was equally insufficient to entitle her to an EED mitigation
instruction. However, the phrase, “even though the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance is not sufficient to
constitute a defense to the crime,” in KRS 532.025(2)(b)(2) clearly
anticipates that a broader form of emotional disturbance is available
as mitigation of punishment than as a defense to the crime. Thus,
even though, as here, the evidence is insufficient to warrant an
instruction on EED as a defense to the crime, it could still be
sufficient to warrant an instruction on EED as a mitigating
circumstance.2
Therefore, the McClellan definition does not apply to EED as a
mitigating circumstance and the trial judge properly denied the
prosecutor's motion to include the definition in the penalty phase
instructions. To the extent that Dean holds otherwise, it is
overruled.3
b. Accomplice mitigator.
The trial judge instructed the jury with respect to
both appellants to consider, if believed to be true, the mitigating
circumstance described in KRS 532.025(2)(b)(5), viz: “The defendant
was an accomplice in a capital offense committed by another person and
[his][her] participation in the capital offense was relatively minor.”
Both appellants assert error in the trial judge's refusal to delete
the language, “and [his][her] participation in the capital offense was
relatively minor.” We disagree. To delete the language in question
would completely change the meaning and intent of this statutory
mitigating circumstance. Obviously, major participation by an
accomplice in a capital offense is not a mitigating circumstance.
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. at 157-58, 107 S.Ct. at 1688.
c. Other instruction issues.
There is no requirement that a capital penalty jury
be instructed that its findings on mitigation need not be unanimous.
Mills v. Commonwealth, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 473, 492 (1999); Tamme, 973
S.W.2d at 37; Bowling, 873 S.W.2d at 180. There was no need to
instruct the jury that it could impose a life sentence even if it
found an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. Bussell v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 882 S.W.2d 111, 113 (1994). Instruction No. 19,
“Authorized Sentences,” read together with the verdict forms and as
further explained during closing arguments, adequately apprised the
jury of the available range of penalties and the role of the
aggravator in the sentencing scheme. “An instruction may not be
judged in artificial isolation but must be considered in the context
of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 482, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991)
(internal quotations omitted). Finally, as we have stated many
times, while we prefer the specimen verdict forms at 1 Cooper,
Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal) § 12.10A (4th ed.
Anderson 1999), over the specimen forms at § 12.10 of that treatise,
we do not deem the use of the latter forms to be reversible error.
E.g., Hodge, 17 S.W.3d at 854. We note that when the prosecutor
suggested that the § 12.10A forms be used, the attorneys representing
Caudill and Goforth advised they had no objection to the § 12.10 forms
prepared by the trial judge.
VI. ALLEGED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.
Appellants cite numerous instances of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct to which no objection was made at trial.
All are without merit.
Any consideration on appeal of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct must center on the overall fairness of the
trial. In order to justify reversal, the misconduct of the
prosecutor must be so serious as to render the entire trial
fundamentally unfair.
Stopher, 57 S.W.3d at 805 (citations omitted).
Informing prospective jurors during voir dire that
the court was looking for “neutral” jurors equated to a desire for
“impartial” jurors and did not dilute the presumption of innocence or
shift the burden of proof. The prosecutor did not excessively
“humanize” the victim or over-emphasize the brutality of the crime.
Hodge, 17 S.W.3d at 852. Contrary to appellants' assertion, the
prosecutor did not tell the jury during guilt phase closing argument
that this was the worst crime he had ever seen. He told them, “As
many times as I have stood here before jurors and in murder cases and
I don't have the words.” That statement did not interject
extrajudicial information into the trial. In Tamme, supra, we held
that the prosecutor's characterization of the case as the “worst
imaginable crime” was but a statement of opinion of the prosecutor's
view of the evidence. 973 S.W.2d at 39.
The prosecutor's guilt phase argument did not
invoke the “golden rule.” The allegedly offensive remarks were:
What must she have been thinking that night, this
seventy-three-year-old woman, by herself, basically afraid anyway?
What panic she must have felt confronted by this woman and this
stranger at three o'clock in the morning.
A “golden rule” argument is one in which the
prosecutor asks the jurors to imagine themselves or someone they care
about in the position of the crime victim. Black's Law Dictionary
700 (7th ed. West 1999). E.g., “Suppose you run a store and somebody
comes in on you and does that to you. What's it worth?” Lycans v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 562 S.W.2d 303, 305-06 (1978). See also Lucas v.
State, 335 So.2d 566, 567 (Fla.Ct.App.1976) (“Think how you ladies
would feel if that happened to you.”).
The prosecutor's statement that “just because there
is a question or some unanswered part of the case, that there is
automatically reasonable doubt” did not impermissibly define
“reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Callahan, Ky., 675 S.W.2d 391,
393 (1984). Callahan also contains the disclaimer that “[w]e do not
intend by this holding that counsel cannot point out to the jury which
evidence, or lack thereof, creates reasonable doubt.” Id. at 393.
In Sanders v. Commonwealth, supra, we declined to reverse where the
prosecutor told the jury that “beyond a reasonable doubt” does not
mean “beyond all doubt or a shadow of a doubt.” 801 S.W.2d at 671.
As in Sanders, “we are wholly unconvinced, considering the
circumstances, that absent this putative error the [appellants] may
not have been found guilty of a capital crime, or the death penalty
may not have been imposed.” Id.
The prosecutor's guilt phase argument that neither
defendant did, showed, or demonstrated anything “that says they're not
guilty of this offense” was fair comment on the quality of the
evidence for the defense. Tamme, 973 S.W.2d at 38; Bowling, 873
S.W.2d at 178; Haynes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 657 S.W.2d 948, 952-53
(1983).
The prosecutor's penalty phase argument that “you
have already found the aggravating circumstances” was fair comment on
the jury's guilt phase verdicts. The two aggravating circumstances
were that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery in
the first degree and/or a burglary in the first degree and the jury
had, indeed, found appellants guilty of those offenses. The factual
issue remaining with respect to the finding of an aggravating
circumstance was whether the murder was committed while appellants
were engaged in the commission of either of those offenses. KRS
532.025(2)(a). The prosecutor argued that it was; defense counsel
argued that it was not.
Caudill claims the prosecutor misstated the law
with respect to the mitigating factor of intoxication. Voluntary
intoxication is a defense to a criminal charge if it “[n]egatives the
existence of an element of the offense.” KRS 501.080(1). Our cases
interpret that provision to mean that the defendant must have been so
intoxicated as not to know what he or she was doing. See Part IV,
issue 6, supra. However, voluntary intoxication is a mitigating
circumstance with respect to capital punishment if it equates with the
same standard established for the defenses of involuntary
intoxication, mental illness or retardation, and insanity, i.e., if it
impairs the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of
his/her conduct or to conform his/her conduct to the requirements of
law. KRS 501.080(2); KRS 504.060(5); KRS 504.120(3); KRS
532.025(2)(b)(7).4
In his argument, the prosecutor stated:
That at the time of the offense the capacity of
either defendant to conform their [sic] conduct to the requirements of
the law was impaired as a result of intoxication. You listened to
the evidence. They knew exactly what they were doing when they were
there. Were they under the influence to the extent that they didn't
know what they were doing?
Thus, the prosecutor first stated the correct test,
then referred to an incorrect standard in a rhetorical question. The
trial judge's instruction contained the correct test and there was no
objection to the rhetorical question. We are unpersuaded,
considering the totality of the circumstances, that, absent this
isolated reference, the death penalty may not have been imposed upon
either Caudill or Goforth. Sanders, supra, at 668; Cosby, supra, at
369. Compare Mattingly v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 878 S.W.2d 797, 800
(1993) (when the prosecutor twice misstated the test for insanity,
viz: “The test is can she discriminate between right and wrong ․ The
question is whether or not she had the ability to discern right from
wrong,” the error, properly preserved by contemporaneous objections,
was not harmless).
During his penalty phase argument, the prosecutor
attributed to the late Justice Potter Stewart the remark that “if
those who break the law do not receive the punishment that the public
believes they deserve, therein are sown the seeds of anarchy.” Even
though Justice Stewart was misquoted,5
we perceive no fundamental unfairness from this particular dramatic
flourish. Nor did the remark diminish the jury's sentencing
responsibility or shift that responsibility from the jury to Justice
Stewart (which seems to be the gist of this aspect of the argument).
Contrary to appellants' assertion, the reversal in Clark v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 793 (1992), was not due to the same
prosecutor's identical remark. In Clark, the prosecutor more
seriously misquoted Justice Stewart as saying that “ ‘the seeds of
anarchy’ are sown unless capital punishment is meted in deserving
cases.” Id. at 795. Nevertheless, the primary reason for reversal
in Clark was that the prosecutor diminished the jury's sentencing
responsibility by stating twenty-five times in his closing argument
that the jury's verdict would be only a “recommendation.” Id. at 796.
Finally, we perceive no fundamental unfairness in
that portion of the prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument that
evoked sympathy for the victim and members of her family. Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2608, 115 L.Ed.2d 720
(1991); Hodge, 17 S.W.3d at 852-53; Bowling, 942 S.W.2d at 303.
VII. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES.
1. Sufficiency of the evidence.
The evidence was sufficient to support appellants'
convictions of each offense. Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d
186, 187 (1991). There was ample evidence that appellants unlawfully
entered Mrs. White's residence, see Part III, issue 3, supra, for the
purpose of committing a crime, that Mrs. White was murdered while
appellants were in the building, and that appellants were armed with
deadly weapons while in immediate flight therefrom. KRS 511.020(1);
Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 670 S.W.2d 828, 830 (1984) (one who
steals a deadly weapon during the course of a burglary is “armed”
within the meaning of the statute). It is immaterial to the robbery
convictions that the theft may have occurred after the murder so long
as the theft and murder were part of the same criminal episode.
Bowling, 942 S.W.2d at 307. The evidence afforded a reasonable
inference that appellants went to Mrs. White's residence for the
purpose of committing robbery and that the murder was committed in
facilitation of the robbery. Appellants admitted to tampering with
physical evidence by attempting to destroy the victim's body and each
testified that the other committed both the murder and arson.
2. Double jeopardy.
Convictions of both robbery and burglary do not
violate the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy since
each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not.
Jordan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 703 S.W.2d 870, 873 (1985); see
Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 805, 809-11 (1997). Nor is it
double jeopardy to convict a defendant of robbery or burglary and then
use the same offense as an aggravating circumstance authorizing
capital punishment. Bowling, 942 S.W.2d at 308; Wilson v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 836 S.W.2d 872, 891 (1992), overruled on other
grounds by St. Clair v. Roark, 10 S.W.3d at 487; Sanders, 801 S.W.2d
at 682.
3. Trial judge's report.
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the
trial judge informed the attorneys that he had completed a preliminary
draft of the report required by KRS 532.075(1) and that he would
complete it in final form later that day and furnish copies to counsel
for appropriate objections. The report was filed in the record later
that same day. Appellants assert that because the report was at
least partially prepared before the sentences were imposed, the trial
judge must have prejudged the sentence. We disagree. As required
by the statute, the report is in the form of a questionnaire. The
only question that directly pertains to the imposition of the death
penalty is question 12 of section E which requests “general comments
of the trial judge concerning the appropriateness of the sentence
imposed in this case.” All of the other questions pertain to the
facts of the case, the conduct of the trial, and the background(s) of
the defendant(s). These are factors which a trial judge should
consider before passing final sentence and the process of preparing
the answers to those questions should assist a trial judge in reaching
the ultimate decision. We have reviewed the videotape of the
sentencing hearing, which consisted solely of legal arguments and
pleas for mercy by counsel and apologies and statements of remorse by
the appellants, and find no indication that the trial judge had
predetermined the sentence before hearing these arguments, pleas,
apologies, and statements of remorse.
4. Constitutionality of death penalty.
“[A]rguments that the death penalty is
discriminatory and arbitrary, and that our statutory scheme does not
provide constitutionally adequate guidance to capital sentencing
juries, have been raised, considered and rejected by this Court on
numerous occasions.” Hodge, 17 S.W.3d at 854. “Our views with
respect to those arguments remain unchanged.” Id.
5. Constitutionality of proportionality review.
There is no constitutional right to a
proportionality review. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44, 104 S.Ct.
871, 876, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984). Our review is governed solely by the
provisions of KRS 532.075.
6. KRS 532.075(6) data.
Failure to provide access to data compiled pursuant
to KRS 532.075(6) does not implicate the Due Process Clause. Mills,
996 S.W.2d at 495; Sanders, 801 S.W.2d at 683; Harper v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 665, 671 (1985).
7. Constitutionality of death qualification of
jurors.
Death qualification of jurors is not
unconstitutional. Hodge, 17 S.W.3d at 838.
8. Trial judge's role in sentencing.
Appellants cite a statement in Matthews v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 709 S.W.2d 414 (1985), that “the statutory scheme
not only permits, but anticipates, that the trial court will play a
separate and different role in sentencing in capital cases after the
jury's verdict has been received.” Id. at 423. From this statement
they conclude that our capital sentencing scheme is fatally flawed
because it does not articulate what that “separate and different” role
might be. Of course, the quotation from Matthews is out of context.
What we said in Matthews was that a trial judge, in sentencing a
defendant convicted by a jury that has also fixed a sentence, is not
limited, as was the jury, to consideration of statutory aggravating
and mitigating circumstances when exercising his/her discretion as to
whether to accept the jury verdict or to impose a lesser sentence.
The information elicited in the trial judge's report, KRS 532.075(1),
can be a partial guide to assist the trial judge in making that
decision.
9. Residual doubt.
Once again, we are cited to Lockhart v. McCree,
476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986), for the
proposition that the death penalty should be set aside because of the
existence of a “residual doubt.” Lockhart does not so hold and we
specifically addressed and rejected that argument in Tamme, 973 S.W.2d
at 40.
10. Video record.
“The Court's use of videotaped records pursuant to
CR 98 instead of stenographic transcripts did not prejudice [the
appellants'] right to appeal.” Hodge, 17 S.W.3d at 854-55 (citing
Foster v. Kassulke, 898 F.2d 1144, 1147-48 (6th Cir.1990)).
11. Cumulative error.
No cumulative error occurred that requires reversal
of this case. Compare Funk v. Commonwealth, Ky., 842 S.W.2d 476, 483
(1992).
VIII. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW.
Pursuant to KRS 532.075(3), we have reviewed the
record and determined that the sentence of death was not imposed under
the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.
There was ample evidence to support the jury's finding of statutory
aggravating circumstances. We have also reviewed all cases decided
since 1970 in which the death penalty was imposed. We have
particularly considered those cases in which the defendant was
convicted of a single murder committed during the course of a burglary
or robbery, or both, and sentenced to death, viz: Mills v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 473 (1999) (burglary and robbery);
Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 293 (1997) (burglary and
robbery); Bussell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 882 S.W.2d 111 (1994)
(robbery); Epperson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 809 S.W.2d 835 (1990)
(burglary and robbery); Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 771 S.W.2d 34
(1988) (robbery); Slaughter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 744 S.W.2d 407
(1987) (robbery); Marlowe v. Commonwealth, Ky., 709 S.W.2d 424 (1986)
(robbery); Kordenbrock v. Commonwealth, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 384 (1985)
(robbery); McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 669 S.W.2d 519 (1984)
(robbery); Self v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 509 (1977)
(robbery); Meadows v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 511 (1977)
(burglary); Caine v. Commonwealth, Ky., 491 S.W.2d 824 (1973)
(robbery); Galbreath v. Commonwealth, Ky., 492 S.W.2d 882 (1973)
(robbery); Leigh v. Commonwealth, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 75 (1972)
(robbery). (The death sentences in Self, Meadows, Caine, Galbreath,
andLeigh were all vacated pursuant to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).) Considering the facts of this
case and comparing them to similar cases in which the death penalty
was imposed, we conclude that the sentences of death imposed in this
case are neither excessive nor disproportionate.
Accordingly, the judgments of conviction and
sentences imposed by the Fayette Circuit Court are affirmed.
I concur in the result reached by the majority and
I would affirm the Fayette Circuit Court's judgments of conviction and
sentence in these cases. I write separately, however, because I
disagree with certain aspects with the majority's analysis,
specifically: (1) Part II(2) (“Death Qualification Question”), in
which the majority's dicta calls into question long-standing Kentucky
precedent holding that a fair and impartial juror must be able to
consider the full range of penalties provided for an offense; (2)
Part II(6) ( “Batson challenge”), in which the majority
mischaracterizes Appellants' objection to the Commonwealth's exercise
of peremptory challenges; (3) Part III(3) (“Character evidence”), in
which today's majority becomes the first Kentucky court to hold in a
published opinion that a person “unlawfully enters” another's
residence if he or she gains entry to the residence through
subterfuge; and (4) Part V(5)(a) (“EED mitigator”), in which the
majority dismisses this Court's previous, more-than-reasonable
conclusion that “[w]hether extreme emotional disturbance is used as an
element of the murder, manslaughter, or mitigating circumstance
instructions, the jury should be instructed as to its definition.” 1
Although I do not intend to dwell upon any of these topics at great
length, I hope to clarify my views as to each of them.
As to Part II(2), I agree with the majority's
conclusion that the trial court's “death penalty qualification”
question did not deprive Appellants of their right to a meaningful
voir dire examination because the trial court permitted Appellants'
trial counsel to question jurors regarding their ability to consider
the full range of penalties.2
I take issue, however, with the “full court press” that the majority
employs upon Grooms v. Commonwealth,3
wherein this Court stated that “a juror should be excused for cause if
he would be unable in any case, no matter how extenuating the
circumstances may be, to consider the imposition of the minimum
penalty prescribed by law.” 4
Today's majority characterizes the Grooms court's conclusion as
anomalous and mere dictum. Less than two years ago, however, this
Court again stated “[w]e remain convinced that, in all criminal cases,
the right to a fair and impartial jury requires the jury to possess
the ability to consider the full range of penalties [.]” 5
Although the majority states, without citation of authority, that the
Commonwealth of Kentucky stands alone in requiring the
disqualification of a juror who cannot consider the minimum authorized
sentence in a capital case, this contention, if true, is not a valid
criticism of this Court's past attempts to ensure that such cases are
tried before fair and impartial jurors, and it is certainly not a
valid reason to abandon long-standing policy. If today's majority
opinion is an indication that the Court intends to retreat from
precedent that supports the commonsense notion that a fair and
impartial juror must “be able to consider any permissible punishment” 6
-including both the maximum and the minimum sentences authorized by
law-the Court will do so over my dissent.7
As to Part II(6), the majority misstates
Appellants' objection. Appellants questioned the Commonwealth's use
of eight of its nine peremptory challenges against male members of the
jury panel-i.e., an objection premised on only the jurors' gender, not
their race. Thus, regardless of the races of these eight jurors
removed from the jury panel, Appellants made a prima facie case for
discrimination on the basis of gender.8
In any event, the trial court found that the Commonwealth elected to
challenge the jurors for non-discriminatory reasons, and I agree with
the majority that the trial court's finding in that regard is
supported by substantial evidence.
In Part III(3), the majority concludes that the
erroneous introduction of character evidence regarding the victim's
careful nature was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because “both
appellants admitted at trial that they ‘unlawfully entered’ the
victim's home.” 9
Because the evidence at trial largely compelled the conclusion that
Appellants were guilty of First-Degree Burglary under one or more
theories, I agree with the majority's ultimate conclusion that this
evidence did not prejudice Appellants. However, I cannot agree with
the majority's holding that Appellant Goforth's version of the
events-in which he and Appellant Caudill obtained admission into the
victim's home by falsely representing to the victim that they needed
to use her telephone-constituted “unlawful entry” as defined in
Chapter 511 of the Kentucky Penal Code. KRS 511.090(1) provides that
“[a] person ‘enters or remains unlawfully’ in or upon premises when he
is not privileged or licensed to do so.” 10
And, the Commentary to KRS 511.020 explains that Kentucky's burglary
crimes' “knowingly enter or remain unlawfully” requirement “is
intended to ․ emphasize[ ] the unlawfulness of the intrusion․ Burglary
is not committed by ․ invited guests who enter buildings under
privilege even though they have intention to commit a crime while
there.” 11
In fact, in Tribbett v. Commonwealth,12
where the appellant obtained entry into the victim's home ostensibly
in order to make use of the victim's firing range,13
but actually to rob and murder the victim, the Court made no mention
of today's majority opinion's “subterfuge” theory and, in fact, held
that “Tribbett and his two companions were invited by [the victim]
into his home. As such, they were mere licensees.” 14
Today's majority opinion thus unnecessarily embraces a new theory of
“unlawful entry” burglary that appears inconsistent with both the
commentary to KRS 511.020 and our case law interpreting it.
As to Part V(5)(a), I agree with the Dean plurality
that EED as a mitigating circumstance is conceptually the same as EED
as a defense, and that the McClellan v. Commonwealth 15
definition applies in either case. The “even though the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance is not sufficient to
constitute a defense to the crime” language in KRS 532.025(2)(b)(2)
advises the jurors that the existence of EED that: (1) lacks a
reasonable explanation or excuse, or (2) is of lesser degree-i.e., one
that does not cause a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or
disturbed as to overcome one's judgment and cause one to act
uncontrollably-can nevertheless be considered in mitigation of
penalty. Accordingly, I believe that, in cases where the evidence
supports an instruction on the KRS 532.025(2)(b)(2) mitigating
circumstance, the instructions should define EED so that the jury can
make a meaningful determination as to whether that mitigating
circumstance is present. Here, however, I agree with the result
reached by the majority because there was no evidence to warrant a
finding of EED, as defined by McClellan, in either phase of the trial.
And, thus, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because
Caudill could not have been prejudiced by the fact that the trial
court's instructions omitted the McClellan definition.
FOOTNOTES
1. Actually,
RCr 9.38 specifically does not require the trial judge to ask any voir
dire questions during the empaneling of a jury in a capital case.
2. The
“even though” phrase in the statute pertains to the availability of
the mitigator, i.e., the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant an
instruction, and should not be included in the jury instruction,
itself.
3. In
fact, since only a plurality of the Court agreed with Dean 's holding
on this issue, it never acquired precedential status. Fugate v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 62 S.W.3d 15, 19 (2001). Furthermore, while a
change in judicial construction of a statute can implicate the Ex Post
Facto Clause, U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, Ky. Const. § 19(1), Bouie
v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354-55, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 1703, 12
L.Ed.2d 894 (1964), because the McClellan definition narrows the scope
of EED, today's holding that the definition does not apply to EED as a
mitigator is an ameliorative, as opposed to a more onerous,
interpretation than in Dean. Thus, our decision has no ex post facto
ramifications. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290,
2299, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (“It is axiomatic that for a law to be ex
post facto it must be more onerous than the prior law.”); Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798) (No law “that
mollifies the rigor of the criminal law” is within the meaning of the
Ex Post Facto Clause.); cf. Martin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 96 S.W.3d
38, 58-59 (2003) (judicial interpretation that narrows the scope of a
criminal statute is ameliorative).
4. In
fact, the applicable language in KRS 532.025(2)(b)(7) is “the capacity
of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct to the
requirements of law was impaired.” This language makes no sense and
is an obvious typographical error that has existed in this statute
since its enactment. 1976 Ky. Acts (ex. sess.), ch. 15, § 2(7).
The trial judge's instructions conformed to the obviously intended
meaning of the statute.
5. What
Justice Stewart, in fact, wrote was: “When people begin to believe
that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal
offenders the punishment they ‘deserve,’ then there are sown the seeds
of anarchy of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.” Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2761, 33 L.Ed.2d 346
(1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
1. Dean v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 900, 909 (1989) (emphasis added).
2. I would
observe, however, that the majority opinion erroneously suggests that
the minimum sentence for a defendant convicted of both Murder and
First-Degree Robbery, First-Degree Burglary, or First-Degree Rape is
thirty (30) years. The majority's arithmetic ignores not only the
context of counsel's question-i.e., what sentence the juror could
consider for the Murder-but also the fact that the trial court could
order sentences to run concurrently. KRS 532.110(1).
6. Shields
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 812 S.W.2d 152, 153 (1991) (emphasis added),
overruled on other grounds by Lawson v. Commonwealth, supra note 5.
See also Woodall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 104, 119 (2002) (
“[A] juror is disqualified if he or she cannot consider the minimum
penalty ․”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 835, 123 S.Ct. 145, 154 L.Ed.2d 54
(2002); Hodge v. Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 824, 837 (1999), cert.
denied 531 U.S. 1018, 121 S.Ct. 581, 148 L.Ed.2d 498 (2000).
7. See
Furnish v. Commonwealth, Ky., 95 S.W.3d 34, 54-57 (2003) (Keller, J.,
dissenting); Stopher v. Commonwealth, Ky., 57 S.W.3d 787, 808-812
(2001) (Keller, J., dissenting), cert. denied 535 U.S. 1059, 122 S.Ct.
1921, 152 L.Ed.2d 829 (2002).
8. J.E.B.
v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994)
(holding that peremptory challenges cannot be exercised on the basis
of gender). Cf. Wiley v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 978 S.W.2d 333
(1998) (holding that the defendant could not exercise his peremptory
challenges on the basis of gender).
LAMBERT, C.J.; COOPER, GRAVES, JOHNSTONE, and
WINTERSHEIMER, J.J., concur.KELLER, J., concurs in the result by
separate opinion, which STUMBO, J., joins.STUMBO, J., joins this
concurring opinion.