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Hilma
Marie WITTE
By Ken Kosky - Nwitimes.com
March 24, 2000
VALPARAISO -- The woman convicted of convincing
her teen-age sons to kill her husband and mother-in-law will not
be freed from prison as she had hoped.
Hilma "Marie" Witte, 51, had her petition for
sentence modification denied in both Porter County and LaPorte
County.
Porter Superior Court Judge Thomas Webber noted
that Witte had received favorable reports from the prison system,
where she has earned a bachelor of arts degree. But he placed a
lot of weight on what prosecutors had to say -- that her release
would not be in the best interest of justice.
Webber made his decision this week. Two weeks
earlier, LaPorte Superior Court Senior Judge Donald D. Martin also
denied Witte's request.
Each judge was required to decide because one
of the murders was tried in Porter County and the other in LaPorte
County.
Witte, who has served about 14 years in prison,
will have to continue serving two terms for murder for her roles
in the 1981 shooting death of Paul Witte in Beverly Shores and the
1984 crossbow murder of Elaine Witte near Michigan City.
Elaine Witte's body was dismembered and never
located.
Hilma Witte is not due to be released from
Indiana Women's Prison in Indianapolis for another 29 years.
Dan Berning, who prosecuted Witte in Porter
County, said the murder in LaPorte County was one of the most
gruesome in memory. And the shooting in Porter County was
orchestrated only after her efforts to poison her husband failed.
Berning, who left the Prosecutor's Office to
enter private law practice, called the judges' decision to
deny Witte's sentence modification an "appropriate ruling."
William Herrbach, the LaPorte deputy prosecutor
who tried the case against Witte, said she doesn't deserve to ever
be released because of the murders, and because she ruined her
sons' lives through her ability to manipulate them. Her sons, who
each committed one of the murders, also were imprisoned.
Herrbach called Witte "the coldest lady I could
ever recall during a trial."
Witte's petition for sentence modification
stated, "She has, through therapy, counseling, groups, education,
time and self-introspection overcome the issues in her life which
brought her to prison."
In prison, she has tutored other inmates and
has earned a bachelor of arts degree. She has also taken part in
groups for domestic violence, anger management, incest survivors,
assertiveness and more.
She stated in her petition, "There is no excuse
for resorting to violence regardless of the circumstances" and
that she "deeply regrets those actions."
By Thomas P. Wyman - Associated Press
December 20, 1985
MICHIGAN CITY, IND. MICHIGAN CITY, Ind. (AP) _
A woman was sentenced Friday to 90 years in prison for
masterminding what prosecutors say was a family conspiracy to kill
her stepmother-in-law and then spending months helping to
dismember the body.
Hilma Marie Witte, 38, of Trail Creek, listened
impassively as the LaPorte Superior Court judge ordered
consecutive terms of 60 years for murder and a 30 for conspiracy
to commit murder in the killing of Elaine Witte.
The 74-year-old victim was fatally shot by a
crossbow arrow after she discovered that a family member had been
siphoning money out of her bank account, prosecutors said. After
her death, Hilma Witte continued cashing the woman's Social
Security checks, they said.
Testimony at the trial detailed an effort by
Mrs. Witte, her two sons and her mother to destroy the body, using
a saw, knives, chisel, garbage disposal, trash compactor, a deep
fat fryer and a microwave oven to reduce the body parts for
disposal in garbage bags.
The defendant's 16-year-old son, John, followed
his mother's instructions and fired the arrow that killed his
stepgrandmother in January 1984, authorities said. He pleaded
guilty to voluntary manslaughter in May and was sentenced to 20
years in prison.
Next month, Mrs. Witte, who was convicted Nov.
20, faces sentencing in neighboring Porter County for the 1981
murder of her 45-year-old husband, Paul J. Witte.
Authorities say Mrs. Witte also plotted that
killing, instructing her older son Eric, 19, to carry it out. Eric
shot his father in the head as he lay sleeping in the Beverly
Shores home the family occupied at the time, LaPorte Chief Deputy
Prosecutor William Herrbach said.
Elaine Witte also was shot as she slept in the
home she shared with Mrs. Witte and her children.
''We're talking about a cold, calculating
vicious conjuring of a plan and waiting until this senior citizen
was at her weakest moment, lying in her bed,'' Herrbach told the
judge in his unsuccessful bid for the maximum sentence of 110
years in prison.
''She (Mrs. Witte) has not repented, she has no
remorse, and she has shown no remorse,'' he said.
Defense attorney Scott King said Mrs. Witte
continues to insist she is innocent.
The prosecution has dealt more leniently with
other family members who were equally involved in the crime, King
contended. In addition to the plea bargain with John, the state
has agreed to accept a plea from Eric to a charge of assisting a
criminal for his role in the disposal of the woman's body, King
said.
Mrs. Witte's mother, Margaret O'Donnell, 59, of
Trail Creek, who knew of the plot and allegedly aided in the
disposal effort, also has been charged only with assisting a
criminal, he said.
Charges against Eric and Mrs. O'Donnell in
LaPorte County are pending, Herrbach said. Eric has been charged
with murder in Porter County in his father's death but has not yet
been tried.
Hilma Witte was sentenced in federal court in
California to 10 years in prison for forging Elaine Witte's
signature to cash Social Security checks. Herrbach said Mrs. Witte
will be turned over to federal authorities to serve the sentence
after she has been sentenced in Porter County Jan. 3 in the
shooting of her husband.
A 16-year-old boy, his voice flat and seemingly
without emotion, told an Indiana jury how, at the behest of his
mother, he killed his sleeping grandmother with a crossbow in the
family home near Michigan City on the morning of Jan. 8, 1984.
"My mom said I could strangle her or use my
crossbow," explained John "Butch" Witte, who was 14 at the time.
"It was up to me."
The youth also testified that he saw his
father, Paul Witte, killed in 1981, and that his mother also
arranged that crime.
John's older brother, Eric, who was 15 at the
time, admitted to police that he fatally shot his 43-year-old
father as his father dozed on a living room couch, but he said the
gun went off by accident when he tripped on a carpet.
John Witte's dramatic testimony Tuesday came
during the second week of the trial of the boys' mother, Hilma
Witte, 37, who goes by her middle name of Marie. She is charged
with murder in the crossbow slaying of her mother-in-law, Elaine
Witte, 74, in her home in the Trail Creek retirement community
just south of Michigan City.
Authorities contend that the elderly woman was
killed for her Social Security benefits and life savings of
several thousand dollars. After the killing, they say, her body
was dismembered and parts scattered around the countryside.
Defense attorneys, in opening statements and in
cross-examination of witnesses, are trying to convince the La
Porte County jury that Marie Witte had nothing to do with the
crossbow death. They say the killing was carried out solely by
young John, who was obsessed with the Dungeons & Dragons fantasy
game.
Marie Witte stared unflinchingly at her younger
son as he told of events leading up to Elaine Witte's death,
described how her body was dismembered with knives and a chain saw
and told how family members were tracked down in California last
fall and arrested on charges of forging the dead woman's Social
Security checks.
Under questioning by deputy prosecutor Scott
Duerring, John said he "wanted to help my mom out" when he agreed
to kill his grandmother.
To prepare for the event, he said, he "partied
with myself" the night before, consuming alcohol and smoking
marijuana in the basement of the victim's home.
After the killing, he said, his mother told
him, "Don't worry about killing Elaine."
Asked why the body was dismembered and
discarded, the teenager, his head cocked on his right shoulder,
replied, "So we wouldn't have to go through the same thing my
brother did--a police investigation."
He referred to the death of his father in the
family's former home in Beverly Shores, Ind. Authorities at that
time ruled the death an accident, but they reopened the case when
the killing of Elaine Witte was discovered. They later filed
murder charges against Marie and her son, Eric, now 18.
John Witte, who earlier pleaded guilty to a
reduced charge of voluntary manslaughter in his grandmother's
death, testified as the chief prosecution witness in the trial of
his mother, under a plea agreement in which he was sentenced to 20
years in prison last June.
Eric has pleaded innocent to the charge of
murdering his father. Prosecutors said they will call him as a
witness in his mother's trial.
Within hours of the crossbow killing, John
testified Tuesday, he and his mother took a train to Chicago so
she could appear in court concerning the payment of disability
benefits in her husband's death. That night, back home in Indiana,
he said he and his mother began cutting up the body.
On cross-examination, John Witte conceded that
when he and other family members were arrested in California, he
told an FBI agent that the death of his grandmother was an
accident in which his mother had no part.
By John O'Brien and Ed Baumann, Chicago Tribune
His son Eric, then 15 years old, told
police he tripped on a rug while carrying a gun; the gun
discharged, hitting his father once in the head as he dozed on the
living room sofa in the family home in Beverly Shores in Porter
County.
The death was reinvestigated and
reclassified as murder, however, after the victim's mother, Elaine
Witte, 74, was slain three years later with a medieval-type
crossbow in the hands of another grandson.
After
Elaine Witte was killed in her home in the Trail Creek retirement
community just south of Michigan City, authorities said, she was
dismembered and parts of her body were dumped in California.
The motive for the two slayings was the victims` savings and
Social Security checks, authorities say.
On May
24, John "Butch" Witte, 16, admitted in La Porte County Superior
Court that he killed his grandmother with an arrow from his
crossbow in January, 1984, and that he acted at the urging of his
mother, Hilma Marie Witte, 37, known as Marie.
The youth, originally charged with murder, pleaded guilty to a
reduced charge of voluntary manslaughter and awaits sentencing
June 21.
As part of the plea agreement in the
case, he will testify against his mother and his older brother,
Eric, now 18, in connection with the grandmother's death, said
Chief Deputy Prosecutor William Herrbach.
Shortly before John Witte's courtroom appearance in Michigan City,
prosecuting attorney Daniel Berning in adjoining Porter County
said the shooting death of Paul Witte by his son Eric was no
accident.
On June 3, Marie Witte was arraigned
on charges of murder and attempted murder in her husband's death.
Eric Witte also has been charged with murder; and Marie's mother,
Margaret O'Donnell, 59, of Michigan City, has been charged with
attempted murder.
Court documents filed in the
Paul Witte slaying allege that he was killed with a handgun only
after unsuccessful attempts were made by the two women to kill him
by lacing his meals with drugs and rat poison.
Marie and Eric Witte, accompanied by federal marshals, were
returned to Indiana last month from California, where they were
convicted of forging and cashing Elaine Witte's Social Security
checks. The mother and son were extradited to stand trial in
Michigan City, La Porte County, in connection with the slaying of
Elaine Witte.
On April 8, a federal judge in San
Diego sentenced Marie Witte to 10 years in prison and fined her
$10,000 for forging and cashing $1,135 in Social Security checks
stolen from her mother-in-law.
On her return to
Indiana, Marie Witte was charged with murder and conspiracy in the
death of Elaine Witte in her La Porte County home--a home Marie
Witte and her two sons were sharing at the time. Herrbach said the
charges were based largely on her younger son's statements to
police.
Eric Witte was charged with conspiracy
to commit murder. Authorities believe Eric, then a Navy seaman,
helped his mother dismember his´grandmother's
body and then disposed of parts of the body in a landfill in San
Diego, Herrbach said.
Marie and Eric Witte are
to be tried separately in Michigan City in the crossbow case.
Herrbach and Berning said they hope to decide soon which of Marie
Witte's murder trials will be heard first.
The
charges filed in Porter County last month resulted from the
reopening of the investigation into Paul Witte's death after that
of his mother, Berning said.
He said that the
charges were based on statements given by John Witte and his
maternal grandmother.
By
John O'Brien and Ed Baumann, Chicago Tribune
The initial slaying--the fatal
shooting of Beverly Shores volunteer firefighter Paul Witte, 43,
on Sept. 1, 1981--was ruled accidental at the time.
His son Eric, then 15 years old, told police he accidentally
tripped on a rug while carrying the gun and shot his father once
in the head as he dozed on the living room sofa.
The death has been reinvestigated and reclassified as murder,
however, after the victim's mother, Elaine Witte, 74, was slain
three years later with a medieval-type crossbow in the hands of
another grandson.
In both cases, authorities now
say, the motive was thousands of dollars in bank savings and
Social Security checks belonging to the victims.
Earlier, authorities disclosed that after Elaine Witte was slain
in her home in the Trail Creek retirement community just south of
Michigan City, she was dismembered and parts of her body were
flushed down a drain or disposed of by family members in
California.
On May 24, John "Butch" Witte, now
16, admitted in La Porte County Superior Court that he killed his
grandmother with an arrow from his crossbow in January, 1984, and
that he acted at the urging of his mother, Hilma Marie Witte, 37,
known as Marie.
The youth, originally charged
with murder, pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of voluntary
manslaughter and awaits sentencing June 21.
As
part of a plea agreement in the case, however, he will testify
against his mother and his older brother, Eric, now 18, in
connection with the grandmother's slaying, according to Chief
Deputy Prosecutor William Herrbach. John Witte's courtroom
appearance in Michigan City came amid these developments:
-- In adjoining Porter County, prosecuting attorney Daniel Berning
said the shooting death of Paul Witte by his son Eric was, in
fact, murder. Marie Witte and Eric have been charged in that case,
along with Marie's mother, Margaret O'Donnell, 59, of Michigan
City. She is accused of poisoning the food of Paul Witte.
-- Court documents filed in the Paul Witte slaying allege that he
was killed with a handgun only after unsuccessful attempts were
made by both women to kill him by lacing his meals with drugs and
rat poison.
-- Marie Witte and Eric, accompanied
by federal marshals, were returned to Indiana from California,
where they were convicted this spring of forging and cashing
Elaine Witte's Social Security checks.
Marie
Witte and Eric were extradited to stand trial in Michigan City in
connection with the slaying of Elaine Witte as she slept in the
home she shared with Marie Witte and her two sons.
Marie Witte is identified in court documents as having plotted not
only the murder of Elaine Witte but also the shooting death of her
husband as he slept at the then family home in Beverly Shores,
Porter County.
Last week, she was named in new
charges of murder and conspiracy for the murder of Elaine Witte in
La Porte County. Herrbach said these charges are based largely on
her younger son's statements to police.
Eric, a
Navy seaman at the time of his grandmother's death, also was
charged last week with conspiracy to commit murder. Authorities
believe he helped his mother dismember his grandmother and then
disposed of parts of her body in a landfill in San Diego, Herrbach
said.
Marie Witte and Eric are to be tried
separately in Michigan City in the crossbow case. Herrbach and
Berning said they hope to reach a decision soon as to which murder
Marie Witte will be tried for first.
The charges
filed in Porter County on May 21 resulted from the reopening of
the investigation into Paul Witte's death after that of his
mother, Berning said.
He explained that the
charges are based in part on statements given by John Witte and
his maternal grandmother, Margaret O'Donnell, as well as ballistic
findings and circumstantial evidence submitted by Indiana state
troopers.
In the case of Paul Witte, Berning
said, Marie Witte is charged with murder and Mrs. O'Donnell is
charged with attempted murder.
Mrs. O'Donnell,
who was taken into custody on May 21, is being held in the Porter
County Jail in Valparaiso in lieu of $25,000 bond.
On April 8 a federal judge in San Diego sentenced Marie Witte to
10 years in prison and fined her $10,000 for forging and cashing
$1,135 in Social Security checks stolen from her mother-in-law.
No. 46S00-8810-CR-887.
550 N.E.2d 68 (1990)
Hilma Marie WITTE,
Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
February 12,
1990.
Lawrence W. Arness, Michigan City, for
appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Mary
Dreyer, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
GIVAN, Justice.
A jury trial resulted in the
conviction of appellant of Murder and Conspiracy to Commit Murder.
She received a sentence of sixty (60) years on the murder count
and thirty (30) years on the conspiracy count, the sentences to
run consecutively.
The facts are: Appellant and
her two teenage sons, John and Eric Witte, had an extensive
history of family problems which included an abusive father, drugs
and alcohol abuse, and financial problems. In 1981, appellant
conspired with her two sons to kill her husband, Paul Witte.
Appellant ordered her son Eric, who was sixteen years of age at
the time, to shoot Paul Witte while he slept on a sofa. (Appellant
was convicted of this crime and that conviction was affirmed by
this Court in the case of Witte v. State (1987), Ind., 516 N.E.2d
2.)
In 1982, appellant and her two sons moved in
with her elderly mother-in-law Elaine Witte. Shortly thereafter,
appellant discussed with her sons various ways in which they might
kill the elderly Mrs. Witte. During this period of time, appellant
often forged Mrs. Witte's signature on her social security checks
and cashed them. She and her sons discussed poisoning, strangling,
pushing the victim out of a window, and shooting her. On several
occasions, appellant put poison in food and drink for Mrs. Witte.
However, there was no apparent effect upon her.
On the morning of January 8, 1984, appellant awakened her youngest
son John, who was fifteen years old at the time, and ordered him
to kill Mrs. Witte. John complied by shooting his grandmother in
the rib cage with a crossbow. During the next four months,
appellant and her sons sought the aid of friends in disposing of
Mrs. Witte's body. The body was cut up with knives and a chain
saw. A trash compactor and a garbage disposal were used to destroy
some of the parts of the body. Acid also was used to dissolve some
of the bones. The remains were stored in garbage bags in a
freezer. Finally, with help elicited from friends of the sons, the
remains were discarded in Indiana, Illinois, and California.
Appellant claims the trial court erred in allowing evidence of an
unrelated offense, i.e., the shooting of appellant's husband, Paul
Witte, in 1981. Such evidence was admitted over appellant's
objection on the theory that it tended to prove a common scheme
and plan and thus was an exception to the general rule that
evidence of independent crimes is inadmissible. Both the rule and
its exception are discussed in Taylor v. State (1987), Ind., 506
N.E.2d 468.
Appellant argues that the two crimes
were so separated in time and modus operandi that the evidence of
the killing of appellant's husband does not come within the
exception to the general rule. However, an examination of the
record in this case discloses many more similarities than
differences in the two crimes. In both instances, appellant
conspired with her two sons to kill a member of their family for
what was perceived by her to be a bettering of her situation, both
emotionally and financially. In both instances, she first
attempted to poison the victims and then ordered her sons to shoot
the victims. The fact, as argued by appellant, that the cases are
dissimilar because she did not order the same son to commit both
crimes, and because a gun was used to kill the husband and a
crossbow used to kill the mother-in-law does not constitute a
sufficient difference to defeat the State's theory of common
scheme and plan.
The trial court did not err in
permitting evidence of the killing of appellant's former husband.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in permitting the
testimony of Doug Menkel, claiming it was highly prejudicial,
gruesome, and not relevant to the charges against appellant. Doug
Menkel testified that he was a friend of appellant's son Eric and
that he assisted Eric in disposing of Elaine Witte's body. He
testified that he helped transport the remains in an ice chest
from Indiana to California. He stated that the ice chest contained
various black garbage bags. The prosecutor then asked him if he
noticed anything unusual about the bags, to which Menkel replied,
"Yes, it had a lot of white worms on it and some small flying
black bugs."
Appellant takes the position that
this testimony was wholly unnecessary and elicited by the State
for the sole purpose of prejudicing the jury against her. A trial
judge has wide latitude to determine the probative value of
evidence in light of its prejudicial impact. Relevant evidence
which logically tends to prove a material fact may be admitted
although it is gruesome or cumulative in nature. Whitehead v.
State (1987), Ind., 511 N.E.2d 284; Chittenden v. State (1982),
Ind., 436 N.E.2d 86.
In the case at bar,
Menkel's testimony was admissible to show the macabre way in which
appellant and her two sons disposed of Elaine Witte's body and
their indifference toward her gruesome death. The submission of
this evidence was well within the trial court's discretion.
Appellant claims the prosecutor's inflammatory comments in the
presence of the jury prejudiced her right to a fair trial. When
appellant made her motion for mistrial during the testimony of
Douglas Menkel, the prosecutor made the remark, "Well, we're not
interested in prejudicing any more guilty persons than we are any
other guilty person." Defense counsel again moved for a mistrial
because of the remark of the prosecutor. However, the trial court
denied the motion for a new trial but admonished the jury to
disregard the prosecutor's remark. When counsel is deemed to have
made improper remarks, the court is required to determine whether
there was probable persuasive effect upon the jury by the
misconduct. Hill v. State (1986), Ind., 497 N.E.2d 1061.
Ordinarily admonishment of the jury to disregard an improper
remark is sufficient to remove any prejudice. Shackelford v. State
(1986), Ind., 498 N.E.2d 382. In the case at bar, we cannot see
how the admonishment of the jury would not cure any possible
prejudice. In fact, it is difficult to see how prejudice would
have occurred in that a prosecutor could logically be expected to
believe that a person on trial for a crime was guilty. Such is the
substance of his presentation to the jury. The incident was
properly handled by the trial court. We see no error.
Appellant claims the verdict is not supported by sufficient
evidence as to the cause of death as alleged in the charging
information. An examination of the record in this case discloses
that the evidence is overwhelming as to the cause of death.
Appellant's mother and two teenage sons testified that the
shooting resulted from several months of planning by appellant and
other members of her family, including her youngest son, John, who
did the actual shooting.
Appellant bases her
argument on her claim that the testimony of the other witnesses is
tainted by the fact that John had entered into a favorable
agreement with the State in return for his testimony against his
mother. All of this was presented to the jury for their
evaluation. This Court will not invade the province of the jury in
weighing the evidence. Alfaro v. State (1985), Ind., 478 N.E.2d
670. The evidence in this case is sufficient to sustain the
verdict of the jury.
Appellant contends the
trial court erred in permitting the State to amend its information
charging conspiracy after the commencement of trial. An
information may be amended on a motion by the prosecutor at any
time, if the amendment is necessary because of an immaterial
defect, as long as the defendant is accorded an adequate
opportunity to address the changes. See Hegg v. State (1987),
Ind., 514 N.E.2d 1061; Morris v. State (1980), 273 Ind. 614, 406
N.E.2d 1187.
In the case at bar, the original
information alleged that the conspiracy occurred from September of
1984 to January of 1985. When it became apparent that each date
was one year off when compared with the actual commission of the
crime, the State was permitted to amend the charge to show the
dates to be September of 1983 to January 10, 1984. There is
nothing in this record to show, nor does appellant allege, that
she was misled by the original dates nor was she in any manner
prevented from making her defense by reason of the amendment of
the charging information. When an amendment is made, such as in
the case at bar, with no showing of prejudice to the defendant, no
reversible error is shown. Henderson v. State (1980), 273 Ind.
334, 403 N.E.2d 1088. The trial court did not err in permitting
the amendment.
Appellant claims the trial court
erred in allowing testimony concerning events which occurred
beyond the date of the alleged conspiracy. Eric Witte was
permitted to testify concerning conversations the family had in
regard to the disposal of the victim's property after the family
had journeyed to California long after the victim's death. It is
proper to show events occurring after the commission of a crime if
such evidence tends to show a consciousness of guilt or if there
is a substantial showing that the activity was relevant to the
crime charged. See Mason v. State (1984), Ind., 467 N.E.2d 737;
Allen v. State (1982), Ind., 431 N.E.2d 478. In the case at bar,
evidence of the disposal of the victim's property by the
perpetrators of the crime was evidence to substantiate the State's
theory that the victim had been killed for profit. The trial court
did not err in permitting the testimony of Eric Witte.
Appellant contends the trial court placed her in double jeopardy
by refusing to dismiss one of the two informations. Appellant
takes the position that the State's theory of liability is
identical in both the charge of murder and in the charge of
conspiracy. To support her position, she cites Elmore v. State
(1978), 269 Ind. 532, 382 N.E.2d 893 for the proposition that when
the same transaction constitutes two distinct crimes, the test to
be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one
offense is whether each provision requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not. This Court has consistently taken a
position that a person in fact may be charged with murder and with
conspiracy to commit that murder. See Chinn v. State (1987), Ind.,
511 N.E.2d 1000; Smith v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1105. We
find no double jeopardy in charging and convicting appellant of
both offenses.
Appellant claims the trial court
erred in imposing consecutive sentences in that the trial court
considered inappropriate factors to support such enhancement. The
record discloses that the trial judge gave as aggravating
circumstances: 1) that defendant caused the death of a person over
the age of sixty-five; 2) that the defendant stole money from the
victim while she was alive and after she was killed; and 3) that
the primary circumstance was that the defendant forced her
youngest son to commit the actual killing and destroyed her own
child. The trial court thus complied with the requirements set
forth in Whitehead, supra in that he set out the reasons to
support any aggravating circumstances. The trial court did not err
in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to sequester
the jury during the trial as requested by appellant. The record in
this case shows that although appellant was originally charged
with murder, subjecting her to the death penalty, later the State
amended the information to charge her with murder with no death
penalty allegation. Prior to the legislative session of 1981, the
statutory law in this State, then Ind. Code § 35-1-37-2, required
that upon the request of a defendant in a death penalty case, the
court was required to sequester the jury.
However, in 1981, the legislature amended the statute on
sequestration and the present law provides that in all cases "the
jurors may separate when court is adjourned for the day, unless
the court finds that the jurors shall be sequestered in order to
assure a fair trial." Ind. Code § 35-37-2-4. Even under the prior
law requiring sequestration in a death penalty case, appellant
would not have been entitled to sequestration as a matter of right
because she did not stand trial under jeopardy of the death
penalty. Therefore, no reversible error would result in a failure
to sequester. Thompson v. State (1986), Ind., 492 N.E.2d 264.
Appellant also argues that the trial judge did not comply with
Ind. Code § 35-37-2-4 in that he did not properly admonish the
jury before allowing them to separate during the course of the
trial. Appellant takes the position that the only admonition the
trial judge gave was at the close of each day. She sets out the
admonition given at that time, which is sufficient. However,
appellant states that such admonition should have been given at
the beginning of each day and before each recess during the day.
Appellant makes no showing that the jurors were actually exposed
to trial publicity or that they violated the admonition given them
at the close of each day. Under the circumstances, we see no
presentation of reversible error in the manner in which the jurors
were admonished. See Schweitzer v. State (1989), Ind., 531 N.E.2d
1386; Harris v. State (1985), Ind., 480 N.E.2d 932; Corder v.
State (1984), Ind., 467 N.E.2d 409; Drollinger v. State (1980),
274 Ind. 5, 408 N.E.2d 1228.
The trial court is
affirmed.
PIVARNIK and DICKSON, JJ., concur.
DeBRULER, J., dissents with separate opinion in which SHEPARD, C.J.,
concurs.
DeBRULER, Justice, dissenting.
The evidence of the killing of the husband was not admissible in
this prosecution of appellant for the killing of her
mother-in-law. It was irrelevant. It was not admissible on the
issue of identity, as the perpetrator of the killing testified and
admitted the act. It was not admissible under the common scheme or
plan exception because the two killings were so separated in time,
manner and space as to be separate and distinct in the legal
sense. It was not admissible to prove motive in the killing of the
mother-in-law. According to the State the motive provided by three
witnesses was that the husband, Paul, was to be killed because he
was abusive to appellant and their two sons. According to the
State's witnesses, the mother-in-law was killed so that appellant
and her two sons could use the old woman's life savings to solve
their financial problems.
I am unable to
conclude that the erroneous admission of this evidence was
harmless. The jury concluded that appellant was guilty of the
murder of her mother-in-law on a theory of vicarious liability,
that is, because she aided and abetted her son in the crime. It
also concluded that appellant was guilty of a conspiracy to murder
her mother-in-law, that is, that she made an agreement with that
son to carry out that same crime. It is therefore highly probable
that appellant's convictions for both murder on a vicarious
liability theory and conspiracy, as well as the consecutive
sentences for both murder and conspiracy, are the product of the
erroneous admission of evidence of appellant's prior crime. In
light of this assessment of injury, and in order to grant relief
for it, I would remand with instructions to grant a new trial on
both charges, or in the alternative to set aside the conviction
and the sentence for conspiracy.
SHEPARD, C.J.,
concurs.
No. 64S00-8605-CR547.
516 N.E.2d 2 (1987)
Hilma Marie WITTE,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
December 8, 1987.
Dale Allen, Deputy Public
Defender, Porter County, Valparaiso, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., John D. Shuman, Deputy Atty. Gen.,
Indianapolis, for appellee.
PIVARNIK, Justice.
Defendant-Appellant Hilma Marie Witte was found guilty by a jury
of murder and attempted murder and was sentenced to concurrent
terms of fifty (50) years. She raises five (5) issues for our
consideration in this direct appeal:
1.
restricting cross-examination of State's witnesses; 2. alleged
giving of additional instructions to the jury during
deliberations; 3. refusal to give Appellant's tendered instruction
No. 1; 4. sentencing; and 5. sufficiency of the evidence.
The evidence showed that Appellant was married to the victim, Paul
Witte. They had two sons, Eric and John (Butch) Witte. For
approximately two years prior to September 1, 1981, Appellant made
comments to her family concerning her desire to be free of Paul.
During the summer of 1981 Appellant resolved Paul should be
killed. He had been physically abusive to her and to their two
sons and she thought the property settlement she could expect from
a divorce would be inadequate. Financial problems arose which
added to the contention. Appellant and Paul had taken out a loan
to buy some furniture, but Appellant had used the money for other
purposes. Paul was, with increasing anger, demanding to know when
the furniture would be delivered.
Appellant then
began lacing Paul's food with rat poison and Valium, to which she
thought he was allergic. Appellant talked to her son Eric about
him killing Paul, suggesting that Eric either shoot Paul or
bludgeon him with a hammer. Appellant wanted Eric to perform the
murder because as a juvenile, if caught, he would be subject to a
lesser penalty than would Appellant as an adult. Eric continued to
decline.
The poisoning did not have the desired
result and finally on December 1, 1981, Appellant decided this was
the day Paul must die. She demanded that Eric shoot Paul. When
Eric declined, Appellant threatened to commit suicide if Eric did
not shoot Paul. Appellant announced she was leaving the house and
would not return until Eric had killed Paul. Appellant left and
later telephoned Eric, demanding to know whether he had shot Paul
yet. When Eric responded he could not do it, Appellant threatened
not to return home unless Paul was dead. Eric then took a pistol
and killed Paul by shooting him in the head while he was sleeping
on the living room sofa.
After the shooting,
Eric gave a statement to the Indiana State Police indicating he
had tripped or stumbled while carrying the gun and accidentally
shot Paul. The investigation was closed at that time but was
reopened on November 14, 1984, as a result of an investigation
into the death of Elaine Witte, Paul's mother, in LaPorte County,
Indiana. John then made a statement to the police concerning
Paul's death. Also, Margaret O'Donnell, Appellant's mother, made a
new statement and Eric admitted his involvement in Paul's death.
John, Margaret O'Donnell, and Eric each stated Eric shot Paul
while Appellant was absent from the home. The only foreign
substance found in Paul's body was acetaminophen, commonly known
as Tylenol.
I
Appellant
claims the trial court erred by unduly restricting her
cross-examination of State's witnesses John Witte, Eric Witte, and
Margaret O'Donnell. A pre-trial motion in limine was granted,
which ordered defense counsel not to refer to certain matters
concerning the three State witnesses and ordered Appellant's
witnesses to refrain from mentioning the matters. The ruling in
effect prohibited Appellant from presenting evidence on or
questioning the three witnesses regarding prior mental and/or
emotional afflictions; treatments rendered and diagnoses of such
afflictions; prior commitments to mental hospitals; alcohol and
drug abuse; and expert testimony regarding the effect of such
conditions and/or activities on the credibility of the witnesses.
The trial court indicated he would not relax his order as he felt
all of those matters were irrelevant.
Subsequently, defense counsel indicated he would make offers to
prove at the appropriate times during trial. On several occasions
defense counsel made offers to prove, outside the hearing of the
jury, concerning the matters that were restricted by the motion in
limine. The offers to prove did not detail the evidence that would
have been brought forth. Rather, the offers to prove referred to
specifications in the motion in limine and informed the court of
counsel's intention to ask the witness questions on those
specifications. The offers were refused by the trial court. No
questions were asked of the witnesses regarding these subjects.
Although Appellant's attempts to preserve error were not as
complete as they might have been, the parties consider the
attempts adequate to preserve this issue for review on appeal,
because the trial court's order in limine was overly broad.
In support of her contention that she was unduly restricted in
cross-examination of these witnesses, Appellant cites McIntyre v.
State (1984), Ind. App., 460 N.E.2d 162, trans. denied, and
Higginbotham v. State (1981), Ind. App., 427 N.E.2d 896, overruled
on other grounds in Micinski v. State (1986) Ind., 487 N.E.2d 150,
154. In McIntyre, where the victim testified only after the trial
court threatened punishment for contempt of court, it was
reversible error for the trial court to refuse to permit defense
counsel to cross-examine her, within reasonable limitations, to
show her reluctance to testify and the coercive action of the
trial court. In Higginbotham, reversible error occurred when
defense counsel was not allowed to cross-examine a police officer
about conduct by the defendant which may have indicated the police
officer's belief as to the defendant's state of intoxication at
the time of the events leading to a charge of driving under the
influence and causing death. In both McIntyre and Higginbotham,
the proposed cross-examination would have directly affected the
credibility of the witnesses' testimony, and thus, those cases are
distinguishable from the instant situation.
Here, there is no showing that cross-examination of the witnesses
on the subjects of their mental and social problems would have put
any of their testimony into question. Appellant did not claim
during trial nor does she claim on appeal that any of the
witnesses were under the influence of drugs or alcohol or a mental
disability at the time of the incidents so that their ability to
recall the facts they were testifying about might be questionable.
Nor does Appellant claim that while the witnesses were testifying
they were under any such disability that would affect their
credibility. Rather, Appellant contends these areas of inquiry
were proper on cross-examination to impugn the character and
impeach the credibility of the witnesses. Appellant does not point
to any testimony that would have been affected by reference to any
of this background information regarding the mental and social
problems of the witnesses. The information was directed only to a
general assessment of the credibility and character of the
witnesses. Witnesses may be impeached as to character only by
means of evidence of community reputation, or by proof of
conviction of specified crimes. Randall v. State (1983), Ind., 455
N.E.2d 916, 928. Since Appellant tried to impeach the character of
the witnesses impermissibly by raising matters of character,
neither by reputation nor by proof of conviction of specified
crimes, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting
the cross-examination to the extent that it did. Id.
II
Appellant alleges the trial court
improperly gave additional pattern instructions to the jury during
deliberations. Appellant claims the jury dispatched a question to
the trial judge and the trial judge called the jury into the
courtroom. Appellant alleges the trial judge then re-read the
instructions, adding some additional pattern instructions and
perhaps some State tendered instructions. Nothing in the record
supports this contention.
Defense counsel Scott
L. King attached his affidavit to the Motion to Correct Error. The
affidavit stated he was trial counsel for Appellant in this cause,
that he was within the call of the court throughout the jury's
deliberations and had, in fact, been summoned to the court when
the jury had a question during deliberations. The affidavit
further stated that attorney King was not advised the jury had
requested reinstruction and that after the verdict was returned he
learned "... through discussions with the trial prosecutor, the
trial judge and certain newspaper reporters that certain pattern
were submitted to the jury during their deliberations." Further,
the affidavit states, "Had affiant known that the trial court
intended to submit `pattern instructions' and `State's tendered
instructions' to the jury during deliberation, he would have
objected due to the fact said instructions contained extraneous
writings and markings and discussed irrelevant and inapplicable
points of law."
Appellant does not submit the
particular instructions allegedly given to the jury nor any facts
to indicate the incident occurred at all except his allegation he
learned about it through discussions with the trial judge, trial
prosecutor and certain unidentified newspaper reporters. Nothing
in the record indicates the jury was brought into the courtroom in
the absence of the defense, nor that they were reinstructed and
given additional instructions by the court. Ind.R.App.P. 7.2(C)
provides a specific procedure to bring into the record facts that
are not contained therein but which are necessary for
determination of an issue on appeal. Since this was not done here,
this Court has no factual basis on which to review the issue.
III
Appellant contends the trial court
erred in refusing to give her tendered instruction on the
definition of self defense and the defense of others. In reviewing
an issue concerning the refusal of an instruction, this Court
considers whether the tendered instruction is a correct statement
of the law, whether there is evidence to support the giving of the
instruction, and whether the substance of the tendered instruction
is covered by other instructions given. Smith v. State (1984),
Ind., 468 N.E.2d 512, 517, reh. denied; Richey v. State (1981),
Ind., 426 N.E.2d 389, 395. Here, all witnesses testified that the
victim was shot to death while he was asleep on a sofa at the
request of Appellant and that Appellant was absent from the house
at the time. Therefore, the trial court was justified in refusing
to instruct on the use of reasonable force against another person
to protect himself or a third person from what he reasonably
believes to be the eminent use of unlawful force.
IV
Appellant claims the trial court
committed error in not supporting the statutory requirements of
consecutive sentences. After giving his finding of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, the trial court enhanced the presumptive
sentence of forty (40) years to a term of fifty (50) years and
directed the sentence be served consecutively with any and all
sentences Appellant is presently under from LaPorte County. The
trial court's recitation of aggravating circumstances included a
criminal record in the presentence report, the nature of the
particular crime and the nature and circumstances as brought out
in the evidence that the plan involved Appellant's use of other
family members in carrying out a scheme of murdering the victim.
The trial court found mitigating circumstances to be there was
evidence the victim was cruel and abusive toward his wife and
children which may have contributed to Appellant's being upset.
The trial court found, however, the mitigating circumstances were
far outweighed by the aggravating circumstances. These were
sufficient reasons for the sentence enhancement and were supported
by the evidence. Miles v. State (1984), Ind., 468 N.E.2d 1040,
1041-42.
Appellant claims the trial court did
not properly support the determination that the sentence should be
served consecutive to two sentences imposed in LaPorte. When
consecutive sentences are imposed, the court must state specific
and individualized reasons for so doing. While enhancement of the
presumptive sentence and imposition of consecutive sentences are
both dependent on the same statutory aggravating circumstances,
sentence enhancement is a separate decision from the imposition of
consecutive sentences. Lindsey v. State (1985), Ind., 485 N.E.2d
102, 108. We are not able to discern whether or not the court felt
he was required to make the sentence consecutive to those in
LaPorte under the mandatory consecutive sentence provision of Ind.
Code § 35-50-1-2. Appellant claims this statute did not apply to
her since the crimes for which she still faced serving the
sentence in LaPorte County were committed after the instant crime
for which she was being tried and sentenced. We have no way of
determining from the record whether this contention is true, and
thus, we agree with Appellant the trial court has not furnished us
information sufficient to review this issue. Since the court has
given us no reasons for imposing consecutive sentences, we remand
this cause to the trial court to place in the record his reasons
for imposing consecutive sentences or, in the alternative, strike
that provision of his order.
V
Finally, Appellant claims there was insufficient evidence to
support the verdict of the jury. As a court of review, we do not
judge the credibility of witnesses nor reweigh the evidence.
Rather, we look only to that evidence most favorable to the State
and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. If there is
substantial evidence of probative value to support the conclusion
of the trier of fact the verdict will not be overturned. Loyd v.
State (1980), 272 Ind. 404, 398 N.E.2d 1260, 1264, cert. denied
449 U.S. 881, 101 S.Ct. 231, 66 L.Ed.2d 105. The undisputed
evidence from several witnesses showed the victim was asleep on a
sofa when he was shot. The shooting resulted from several months
of planning by Appellant and members of her family, including the
sixteen year old son who did the actual shooting. There was
sufficient evidence before the trier of fact to support the
verdict.
This cause is remanded to the trial
court with instructions to correct the sentencing. The trial court
is in all other respects affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J.,
and DeBRULER, GIVAN and DICKSON, JJ., concur.