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ANDERSON
COUNTY — Troy Alan Burkhart, showing no
remorse and proclaiming he acted in self-defense in
the fatal shootings of three people, was given three
life sentences without parole by Judge J.C. Buddy
Nicholson on Friday.
Burkhart, who killed three people
during an 11-shot shooting spree in the cab of a
pickup truck in 1997, has twice been convicted and
sentenced to death.
The South Carolina Supreme Court
had ruled only the sentencing phase was flawed in
the second trial after testimony described prison
conditions and did not focus solely on the defendant
or the crime.
About a dozen relatives of murder
victims Shane and Stacy Walters and Sonya Cann sat
in the jury box of the fourth floor courtroom in the
Anderson County Courthouse as three sheriff’s
deputies stood around Burkhart and his court-appointed
attorney Andy Potter.
Judge Nicholson, who was on the
bench during the second trial, denied Burkhart’s
motion that the judge step down. The motion argued
that the judge also is hearing a civil case
involving Burkhart’s uncle Ronnie Burkhart, who died
shortly after Troy Burkhart was convicted the first
time in March 2000. Judge Nicholson also denied Troy
Burkhart’s request to be relieved of his attorneys.
Burkhart has said it was his
uncle, known by local and federal authorities as a
drug kingpin, who wanted him killed. Burkhart also
contends his uncle and another person were in the
kudzu field the morning of the killings.
Judge Nicholson told Burkhart
repeatedly that the hearing Friday was for
sentencing only.
“We’re not here to prove
innocence or guilt,” Judge Nicholson said.
Tenth Judicial Circuit Solicitor
Chrissy Adams told the court that Burkhart had been
offered life in prison before the second trial and
turned down the offer. Ms. Adams also said she was
prepared to seek a third death sentence for Burkhart,
but the victims’ families needed closure.
“They simply can not go through a
third trial and be forced to listen to the horrific
details surrounding their loved ones’ deaths,” Ms.
Adams said.
With Juanita Shead, Shane Walters’
mother, standing at her side, Ms. Adams read Ms.
Shead’s statement that called Burkhart a “sorry”
human being who took her son and she now finds
herself crying for hours.
Deborah Byrum, Sonya Cann’s
mother, also stood next to Ms. Adams, said she hopes
when Burkhart closes his eyes at night he will
relive that cold November night again.
Dana Albertson, Shane Walters’
sister, fought back tears as she read her statement.
“He should sit in a small cell
and think about what he did,” Ms. Albertson said.
“He took my brother and uncle. … Why is he even
given a choice? The Bible should be our law, an eye
for an eye. Something’s wrong when the murderer has
more rights than the victim.”
Burkhart’s father, wife and
sister were joined by several other family members
and friends, but no members of the group addressed
the court.
Burkhart can appeal Friday’s
sentencing, but for now he will be sent to a maximum-security
prison, Ms. Adams said.
Troy Burkhart could get off
death row at Friday hearing
Monday, July 23, 2007
Troy Alan Burkhart walked into the Seneca Police
Department nearly ten years ago splattered with
blood after killing three people in an Anderson
County kudzu field.
Twice Burkhart has been convicted
of the gruesome slayings of two Townville brothers
and an Anderson woman and sentenced to death.
On Friday, Burkhart is scheduled
to be back in the Anderson County Courthouse, and
this time he could plead to three life sentences and
get off death row.
Tenth Circuit Solicitor Chrissy
Adams said she would reserve comment until after the
hearing Friday.
The hearing scheduled to start at
10 a.m. before Judge J.C. “Buddy” Nicholson will
give Burkhart the opportunity to be sentenced to
life in prison without parole.
The South Carolina Supreme Court
overturned Burkhart’s first conviction, saying Judge
Donald Beatty did not instruct the jury that the
prosecution had to disprove self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt.
After Burkhart was convicted and
sentenced a second time, the court ruled the
sentencing phase was flawed because prison
conditions were part of the sentencing, which should
have dealt with just the crime.
In a brief phone conversation
with the Anderson Independent-Mail from the Anderson
County Detention Center last week, Burkhart said
there is someone else who was in that kudzu patch on
Nov. 17, 1997, with his uncle Ronnie Burkhart.
“It’s like pulling hair trying to
get them to come forward,” Troy Alan Burkhart said.
“He needs to be contacted. The past four days I’ve
been trying to get an officer here to come down and
tell him everything.”
Burkhart insists that a lot of
things have not come to light in the last 10 years
and that there was a lot of perjury during the two
trials. Death penalty cases include a sentencing
phase after the defendant has been convicted.
In the two trials, prosecutors
described a weekend of drug use and partying after
Shane Walters, 27, and his brother Stacy, 21, helped
Burkhart repair the septic tank at Traditions
nightclub on a Friday.
Burkhart and his wife, Michelle,
operated the nightclub and catering business on
Coneross Creek Road and lived nearby in southern
Oconee County.
Stacy lived with his older
brother on Woolbright Road in Townville, and the two
ran a business that moved and set up mobile homes.
Sonya Cann, 21, of Carole Avenue
in Anderson never had met Burkhart until 5:30 a.m.
Nov. 17, a Monday morning, when the three men showed
up at her house. to go four-wheeling and deer-spotting
in Shane’s extended-cab type Dodge pickup truck.
Testimony indicated Shane had known Ms. Cann from
her work as a waitress.
At some point, with all four in
the truck on that chilly November morning, Burkhart
said the situation became a scene out of the movie
“Deliverance” and some one said, “Make him squeal
like a pig.”
Investigators could only piece
together the horror that followed in the next few
minutes.
The prosecution, led by then-assistant
solicitor Druanne White, showed Burkhart had to
reload his seven-shot .45-caliber Colt Commander
pistol during a shooting spree inside and outside
the truck. Shane Walters was shot six times,
including one wound to the back of the head. Stacy
Walters was shot in the right temple and the right
cheek, and Ms. Cann was shot three times, including
the right temple and through the left eye.
When the shooting started, Shane
Walters was in the driver’s seat, and Ms. Cann was
in the middle between Burkhart and Shane Walters.
Stacy Walters was in the back portion of the cab.
Burkhart pulled the three bodies
out of the truck and shot Ms. Cann while she was on
the ground, authorities testified. He then left the
kudzu field in the pickup truck and drove to his
father’s house near Seneca. His father, Warren
Burkhart, eventually took him to the Seneca Police
Department.
An Anderson Sheriff’s helicopter
later located the three bodies off Old Denver Road
near Pearman Dairy Road.
Ms. Cann had a three-year-old
daughter at the time of her death and Stacy Walters
had two sons ages 3 and 1.
Burkhart is not alone in his
belief that he was fighting for his life.
His sister Lori and his wife also
have proclaimed Burkhart’s innocence based on self-defense.
The two women also say they hurt for the victims’
families.
“I pray their families will have
peace,” Lori said during an interview with the
Independent-Mail.
She has moved back to Seneca and
is caring for her father, Warren, who has cancer.
Burkhart’s wife also has moved
back to Oconee County after looking after a sister
in Charleston.
Michelle Burkhart said her
husband has now been in jail longer they have had
been together. The two still are married.
“We were engaged for one year and
married five years,” she said.
She and Lori have been friends
since their high school days in Seneca. She has
known her husband, now 39, since she was 15 years
old.
“I pray for mercy and grace every
day,” Michelle said. “Troy feels like when he is
sentenced to life he will be killed in jail. Troy
has told the truth from day one.”
Ten years and two trials with
death sentence hearings have been a different kind
of sentence for the victims’ families who said there
was no justice when the second trial was ordered.
Lawrence Walters, the father of
two men, said he could not watch his sons’ killer’s
retrial.
“This trial is no justice,” Mr.
Walters said after the first trial. “I am not going
to sit down there and have them make a mockery of my
two sons laying up there in the ground.”
Deborah Byrum, Ms. Cann’s mother,
also was deeply disturbed by the re-trial.
“We don’t need this,” Ms. Byrum
said. “All we’ve got is going to the graveyard and
grieving for my child and Shane and Stacy. I know
them boys, and they were good boys, and Sonya wasn’t
with them 25 minutes, and she never even met Mr.
Burkhart and now she’s dead. I’ve lived with those
pictures of my daughter’s brains being blown out.”
He said he never met her until that day and only
knew her 25 minutes when he shot her in the face
three times.”
Mr. Walters said he can’t forget
those past events.
“You don’t forget a call to go to
the Anderson hospital and the morgue to identify
your sons and you see that they are that sickening
blue color and blood is running out of their heads
and ears where that idiot shot them,” he said.
Burkhart, who is in custody in
Anderson, said Ronnie Burkhart and another person
were in the kudzu field the night of the killings.
Former Anderson Sheriff Gene
Taylor testified that Ronnie Burkhart was the target
of an extensive local and federal drug investigation,
including ties to area attorneys and Florida lawyers.
However, Ronnie Burkhart died of
cancer in April 2000 shortly after his nephew was
sentenced to death. Also, Ronnie Burkhart never
testified, but defense witnesses said he was someone
to fear.
Shortly after marrying Ronnie
Burkhart, Janice Burkhart was arrested a month after
his death from cancer and she pleaded guilty to
giving false information to a federal agent about a
$390,000 cashier’s check.
The state also targeted $1.3
million that was left in the control of various
attorneys and more than 260 acres in land parcels
throughout Oconee County that were identified as
purchases for drug money laundering.
Some of the property included
lots in such subdivisions as Keowee, Townville Lakes
Plantation, Keowee Inlet, Clemson Forest, Calhoun
Point and Loran Pointe.
Burkhart insists that his
knowledge of his uncle’s operations put him in his
uncle’s sights.
“My uncle’s own stepson as well
as another employee testified that they all worked
for my uncle, and that he in fact wanted me killed,”
Burkhart said.
For Burkhart’s sister, it is an
uphill battle to find those who believe her brother.
“Apathy is our biggest hurdle,”
Lori Burkhart said. “It all seems so beyond our
control, and it is so frustrating.”
THE
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
The State,
Respondent,
v.
Troy Alan
Burkhart, Appellant.
Appeal
From Anderson County
Donald W. Beatty, Circuit Court Judge
Opinion No. 25484
Heard December 13, 2001 - Filed June 17,
2002
REVERSED AND REMANDED
CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: Troy
Alan Burkhart ("Appellant") appeals his
convictions on three counts of murder and
three counts of possession of a firearm
during commission of a violent crime for
which he was sentenced to death. We reverse.
Factual/Procedural
Background
On
January 13, 1998, the grand jury for
Anderson County indicted Appellant for the
murders of Shane and Stacy Walters, half-brothers,
and Sonya Cann. In addition to the three
counts of murder, Appellant was indicted on
three counts of possession of a firearm
during the commission of a violent crime.
Although Appellant admitted to shooting and
killing Shane, Stacy, and Sonya, he pled not
guilty, claiming he killed them all in self-defense.
After a two week trial beginning on March 6,
2000, the jury convicted Appellant on all
three counts of murder and all three counts
of possession of a firearm during commission
of a violent crime. The following day, the
jury recommended Appellant be sentenced to
death, citing the murder of two or more
persons pursuant to one scheme or course of
conduct as the statutory aggravator. The
trial judge affirmed their recommendation
and sentenced Appellant to death.
According to the record, Appellant met the
Walters brothers just a few days before they
were killed. It all began when a mutual
friend, Paul Zastrow, introduced Appellant
and the Walters when they met by chance at
Zastrow's house on Friday, November 14,
1997. Appellant did not know the Walters
before that weekend and claims he did not
know Sonya Cann at all. Appellant owned and
managed a bar called Traditions, and the
Walters set up mobile homes for a living.
A
group of Clemson students had rented
Appellant's bar for a private party that
weekend, but Appellant was having trouble
with his septic tank. Zastrow suggested that
the Walters might be able to help fix it.
Appellant accepted the offer and Zastrow and
both Walters arrived at Traditions Friday
evening, November 14, to work on the septic
tank. They built a bonfire and spent the
night working on the septic tank, drinking,
doing drugs (methamphetamine and marijuana),
and talking about deer hunting. An impromptu
party developed as several other friends
showed up and joined them.
The
next day, Saturday, November 15, went much
like the previous evening. Appellant picked
up Shane at Paul Zastrow's house around 9:00
p.m. and they drove to Traditions to work on
the septic tank. Many of the same people
from the night before returned, and the
group drank alcohol and did drugs until the
bar closed, just as they had on Friday
night.
Apparently, Shane and Appellant agreed to go
hunting the following morning. Appellant
dropped Shane off and went home to prepare
to go hunting. Appellant waited on Shane,
but he never showed up. Appellant drove to
Shane's house twice and knocked on the door,
but got no answer. Assuming Shane fell
asleep, Appellant drove to Paul Zastrow's
house for coffee and then drove home to go
to sleep.
That
afternoon, Sunday, November 16, Shane and
his wife Vicky had some friends over to
watch car races on television. Appellant
called Shane several times, and he and Paul
Zastrow went over to the Walters' trailer
around 4:00 p.m. Stacy came in from work a
short time later. At some point, Shane,
Stacy, and Appellant decided to go "four-wheeling"
in Shane's truck. Appellant had his gun with
him in case they went hunting, and Shane had
his rifle. The three men were drinking and
doing drugs at this time.
At
some point after four-wheeling, the
threesome drove over to Tammy Steele's house
where they continued partying. According to
Tammy, Appellant's wife called him on his
mobile phone while he was there and, after
speaking to her, Appellant said he did not
want to go home that night. Tammy also
testified that Appellant mentioned that his
business was not doing well and thanked
Shane and Stacy profusely for helping him
with the septic tank.
Shane, Danielle, and Appellant returned to
Tammy's house until the party disbursed
sometime after 5:00 a.m. Shane, Stacy, and
Appellant left Tammy's house in Shane's
truck. After they left her house, Shane
drove them to Sonya Cann's house to pick her
up. Sonya sat in the front of the truck
between Shane and Appellant and Stacy sat on
the backseat of the truck, behind Appellant
on the passenger side. They drove around for
a little while, eventually going up to an
isolated kudzu field known to everyone in
the truck but Appellant.
From
this point on, Appellant testified that the
atmosphere in the truck changed dramatically.
He related the ensuing events as follows:
When we got to the top, we parked and I
believe there was some beer opened and
Sonya handed Stacy some, what I believed
to have been some more methamphetamine.
. . . Stacy was, was fixing it . . . on
a CD case. And I said to Shane, I said,
"Are there any deer here, where are the
deer?" He didn't answer, but Sonya said,
"There ain't no deer here, this is a
scattering field.". . . I didn't know
what to think of that. I guess I just
let it go and didn't think much more
about it. And I . . . started a
conversation about the restaurant. Shane
and I had talked about him knowing
someone that could help me that wasn't a
bank. And I asked him a little more
about that. And he told me that he had
that worked out and that I didn't have
to worry about that. . . .That's when
Stacy handed Shane a cassette case with
some what I thought to be
methamphetamine on it. . . . He held it
for a moment and passed it to me. When I
got it, it still had four lines or four
piles of powder on it. . . . [O]n
occasion when we had done drugs before,
when I got it, there was only one line
left on it. I thought it was strange
that there were four and it had been
passed through the other three. . . . As
he passed it to me, he asked me if I had
ever wronged anyone. And I said, "No,
what do you mean by that?" Then he said,
"Have you ever wronged your Uncle Ronnie?"
[Shane] said that he and Ronnie had this
thing worked out, that he had gotten
money from drugs in Florida. . . . [Shane]
said all he had to do was take care of
me . . . . Then [Shane] said, "it's time
to get this over with." Then he pulled
out the gun and told me to get the hell
out of the truck. . . . Stacy had had
[sic] me around the neck and had a knife
in his hand and said, "we're going to
make you squeal like a pig, boy." . . .
Sonya said, "Yeah, baby, make him squeal
like a pig." . . . I lunged for the gun
and then the gun went off. . . . I was
able to get the gun and I just shot. I
just shot. . . . I couldn't say which
direction. . . . I shot until it
wouldn't shoot. . . . I opened the
driver's door and . . . I pushed Shane
and Sonya out of the truck. . . . I
heard what sounded like another door
slamming. . . . I looked on the seat and
saw the other clip for the gun was
there, and I put the other clip in the
gun. . . . I couldn't get it to work. I
couldn't get the bullet to go in. And I
remember trying to get it to work and
bullets coming out, and I remember it
going off. Then I got out of the truck
to see what it was that I may have
heard, and I couldn't see anything. I
went around and I pulled Stacy out of
the truck. . . . I got in the truck and
got the hell out of there. . . . I
thought I was going to be raped and
killed.
Shane Walters was shot six times, including
one fatal wound to the back of the head.
Stacy Walters was shot in the right temple
and right cheek, either of which would have
been fatal. Sonya Cann was shot three times,
including fatal wounds to the right temple
and through the left eye.
The
State contended, contrary to Appellant's
account, that the shots that killed Shane
and Sonya were fired after they were already
incapacitated, lying on the ground outside
the truck, and that Appellant had stomped
Sonya and Stacy with his boot after he shot
them. Still, the State's pathologist who
advanced these theories could not rule out
self-defense, particularly in view of the
amount of drugs and alcohol consumed. A
defense pathologist testified that the
shootings could have occurred exactly as
Appellant described.
On
cross-examination, Appellant unequivocally
denied the State's accusations. He testified,
"I did not stomp anyone and I did not shoot
anyone on the ground." Appellant described
the episode as a five-second fight for his
life against Stacy, Shane, and Sonya.
According to Appellant, he had no choice but
to kill them all in self-defense.
Appellant claims to have told the police the
same story he told at trial when he led them
to the bodies later that morning, including
the Deliverance "squeal like a pig"
threat of homosexual rape. This is
significant because Stacy Walters' autopsy
later revealed he was wearing a condom at
the time he was killed which Appellant could
not have known when he took the police to
the scene. The State speculated it was the
same condom Stacy wore when he had sex with
Tammy Steele earlier in the evening, but the
defense argued this was highly unlikely as
hours had passed since he had sex with Tammy,
and that this fact corroborated Appellant's
self-defense claim.
At
trial, the judge instructed the jury on
murder, voluntary manslaughter and self-defense.
Defense counsel submitted a number of
written requests for the judge to charge
concerning self-defense, two of which would
have charged the jury that the State must
prove the defendant did not act in self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead,
in addition to the basic four element self-defense
instruction from State v. Davis,
282 S.C. 45, 317 S.E.2d 452 (1984), the
judge charged, "[t]he defendant, ladies and
gentlemen, is not required to prove the
defense of self-defense. All burdens of
proof in this case are on the State and
remain with the State."
The
judge did not charge the reasonable doubt
instruction submitted by the defense.
Defense counsel objected that the charge
given did not comport with State v.
Wiggins, 330 S.C. 538, 500 S.E.2d 489
(1998)(requiring the State to disprove self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt). The judge
refused to add to the charge, finding the
charge he had given to be sufficient in
light of present law relating to burden of
proof and self-defense. After the jury found
Appellant guilty, defense counsel moved for
a new trial, based once again on the judge's
failure to "to charge that the state has the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
the absence of the elements of self-defense,"
citing Wiggins for support. The
judge denied defense counsel's motion,
relying on his earlier ruling.
As
discussed, Appellant was convicted on all
three counts of murder and possession of a
firearm during commission of a violent crime
at trial and sentenced to death. On appeal,
Appellant raises the following issue:
Did the trial judge commit reversible
error in refusing to charge the jury
that the State bore the burden of
disproving self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt?
Law/Analysis
Appellant argues the trial court committed
reversible error when it refused to charge
the jury that the State bore the burden of
disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable
doubt. We agree.
If
there is any evidence in the record to
support self-defense, the issue should be
submitted to the jury. State v. Hill,
315 S.C. 260, 433 S.E.2d 848 (1993). In
general, the trial judge is required to
charge only the current and correct law of
South Carolina. Cohens v. Atkins,
333 S.C. 345, 509 S.E.2d 286 (Ct. App.
1998). A jury charge is correct if it
contains the correct definition of the law
when read as a whole. Keaton v.
Greenville Hosp. Sys., 334 S.C. 345,
514 S.E.2d 570 (1990).
The
substance of the law must be charged to the
jury, not particular verbiage. Keaton.
"Current law requires the State to disprove
self-defense, once raised by the defendant,
beyond a reasonable doubt." Wiggins,
330 S.C. at 544, 500 S.E.2d at 493. Finally,
to warrant reversal, a trial judge's refusal
to give a requested charge must be both
erroneous and prejudicial. Ellison v.
Parts Distributors, Inc., 302 S.C. 299,
395 S.E.2d 740 (Ct. App. 1990).
This
Court recently clarified the State's burden
when a defendant raises self-defense:
In
this case, the trial judge charged the jury
on the four elements of self-defense
pursuant to State v. Davis and,
additionally, charged that the defendant did
not have to prove self-defense and that the
burden remained on the State at all times.
The State argues that this charge, coupled
with the other charges given by the judge,
complied with Wiggins by conveying
to the jury that all of the evidence,
including evidence of self-defense, must be
considered in the jury's calculation of
reasonable doubt.
We
disagree with the State. We do not believe
the trial judge's self-defense charge
adequately conveyed that the State has the
burden of disproving self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt as
required under Wiggins. It is the
substance of the law and not the "particular
verbiage" of a charge that determine whether
the charge is adequate, and, in this case,
the trial judge's charge did not accurately
communicate the "substance of the law" as
pronounced in Wiggins. Keaton.
In
State v. Fuller, this Court made
clear that it did not intend Davis
to be the exclusive self-defense
charge. 297 S.C. 440, 377 S.E.2d 328 (1989).
This Court removed the burden of proving
self-defense from the defendant and placed
it instead on the State in Davis.
In Wiggins, this Court eliminated
any confusion lingering since Davis
by enunciating the State's precise burden
clearly: "current law requires the State to
disprove self-defense, once raised by the
defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt." 330
S.C. at 544, 500 S.E.2d at 492.
Under Wiggins and now Addison,
when self-defense is properly submitted to
the jury, the defendant is entitled to a
charge, if requested, that the State has the
burden of disproving self-defense by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Addison;
Wiggins. The instruction regarding
burden of proof in this case did not
reference the beyond reasonable doubt
standard, required arguably since Davis,
and without a doubt since Wiggins.
Further, the instruction did not include any
language indicating that the State must
disprove Appellant's self-defense claim
or, conversely, that the State must prove
Appellant did not act in self-defense.
As
noted, to warrant reversal, a trial judge's
refusal to give a requested jury charge must
be both erroneous and prejudicial to the
defendant. Keaton; State v. Hughey,
339 S.C. 439, 529 S.E.2d 721 (2000). The
jury charge is to be read as a whole in
considering whether it adequately covers the
law. Hughey. Failure to give
requested jury instructions is not
prejudicial error where the instructions
given afford the proper test for determining
the issues. Orders Distributing Co.,
Inc. v. Newsome Carpets & Wallcovering,
308 S.C. 429, 418 S.E.2d 550 (1992).
Although the trial judge did charge that the
burden was on the State and remains on the
State, we do not believe that charge was
adequate. Similarly, the fact that defense
counsel enunciated the proper burden in his
closing argument, telling the jury, "you
must find the defendant not guilty unless
the State proves to you beyond a reasonable
doubt that each of the elements of
self-defense do not exist in this case" does
not adequately convey the State's burden.
Clearly, the judge's instruction carries far
more weight with the jury than defense
counsel's word in his closing argument. We
cannot assume the jury was able to connect
the State's general burden to prove
Appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
to the trial judge's charge regarding
self-defense when the judge failed to
mention the reasonable doubt standard at all
and only said the defendant did not have to
prove self-defense. The trial judge's charge
only implicitly placed the burden on the
State, and that is not sufficient under
Wiggins and Addison.
Self-defense was the most significant issue
for the jury to decide. Appellant admitted
to the killings on the stand at trial. His
credibility and the relative burdens of
proof surrounding self-defense were central
to this case. In light of that conclusion,
we find the trial judge's error was
prejudicial to Appellant and constituted
reversible error.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing reasons, we
REVERSE and REMAND
this case for a new trial on each of
Appellant's convictions.
MOORE and WALLER, JJ., concur.
PLEICONES, J., concurring in result in a
separate opinionin which
BURNETT, J., concurs.
JUSTICE PLEICONES: I concur
with the result reached by the majority. At
the time Burkhart was tried, he was entitled
to the charge he requested: That the State
has the burden of disproving, beyond a
reasonable doubt, his self-defense claim.
Upon further reflection, however, I am
convinced that this charge is confusing and
imposes an impossible burden on the State.
In
every criminal trial the burden is on the
State to prove every element of the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
Instructions should focus the jury's
attention on this fundamental principle. The
charge mandated by Addison and
Wiggins, in essence, requires the State
prove, not an element of the offense, but
rather a negative.
I
agree with the following statement of the
law taken from State v. Davis, 282
S.C. 45, 46, 317 S.E.2d 452, 453 (1984): If,
after considering all the evidence presented
including the evidence of self-defense, the
jury has a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt, then the jury must find
the defendant not guilty. On the other hand,
if, after considering all the evidence
including the evidence of self-defense, the
jury has no reasonable doubt of the
defendant's guilt, then it must find the
defendant guilty.
In
my view, this statement properly informs the
jury of the State's burden to prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
I
therefore concur in the result, and would
prospectively overrule State v. Addison,
343 S.C. 290, 540 S.E.2d 449 (2000), and
State v. Wiggins, 330 S.C. 538, 500 S.E.2d
489 (1998).
BURNETT, J., concurs.
*****
1. Appellant purchased a
Colt .45 automatic - the gun he shot Shane,
Stacy, and Sonya with - at a pawn shop a few
years before this episode.
2. This testimony is
relevant because Stacy's autopsy revealed he
was wearing a condom at the time of his
death which Appellant claims corroborates
his story that Stacy threatened him with
homosexual rape. The State refuted this
evidence by arguing the condom was the same
one he used with Tammy earlier in the night.
3. Ronnie Burkhart and
his brother, Appellant's father, Warren
Burkhart, hated each other so much,
according to an attorney with first-hand
knowledge of their relationship, that they
could not be left alone in a courtroom
together without getting into a fist fight.
Ronnie seemed determined to ruin his brother
financially and there were several lawsuits
between the two brothers. Appellant's
relatives referred to Ronnie as "very
vicious" and as an "evil person."
4. James Dickey,
Deliverance, Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1970. Dickey's best-selling novel,
Deliverance, set on a white water river
in the Georgia wilderness, has become famous,
not only for its masterful prose, but for
its vivid account of a sexual assault of a
man by a group of rough and brutal men he
and his three friends encountered while
canoeing the river.
5. Nearly all state
courts considering the prosecution's burden
of proof have held the defendant is entitled
to such a charge. See, e.g., Williams v.
State, 538 S.E.2d 544 (Ga. 2000);
Miller v.State,720 N.E.2d 696 (Ind.
1999); State v. Osborne, 775 So. 2d
607 (La. App. (4th Cir.) 2000);
Commonwealth v. Beauchamp, 732 N.E.2d
311 (Mass. 2000); State v. Plante,
623 A.2d 166 (Me. 1993); State v. Cooper,
561 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1997); State v.
Santamaria, 756 A.2d 589 (N.H. 2000);
State v. Garcia,18 P.3d 1123 (Utah
App. 2001); State v. Walden, 932
P.2d 1237 (Wash. 1997).
6. Because Addison
was decided shortly after Appellant's trial,
we do not rely on it alone in this case.
Wiggins, by itself, is sufficient to
support our analysis and ultimate decision
in this case. Addison does, however,
clarify what this Court stated in
Wiggins and provides an instructive
description of the Wiggins decision.
The only change Addison makes is to
place a limitation on when the charge must
be given. After Addison, the charge
set out in Wiggins is required only
if requested. Presumably then,
before Addison, the Wiggins
charge must have been given whenever a self-defense
charge was merited.
7. In the concurring
opinion, it is argued that the Wiggins
and Addison cases impose an
impossible burden on the State and,
therefore, should be reversed. As we
observed in Addison, however,
nearly all courts that have considered the
state's burden of proof have held that when
the defendant presents evidence of self-defense
he is entitled to a charge that the state
bears the burden of disproving self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Supra n. 5 (providing citations of
several state court opinions enunciating
this rule); 43 A.L.R.3d 221 § 5(b) (Supp.
2001) (listing cases in support of rule that
once self-defense is properly raised, the
state has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not
act in self-defense).
8. Some courts find
proper self-defense charges to be so
important that prejudice is presumed if
error is identified. "'A jury instruction
misstating the law of self-defense amounts
to an error of constitutional magnitude and
is presumed prejudicial.'" State v.
Walden, 932 P.2d 1237, 1239 (Wash.
1997) (quoting State v. LeFaber,
913 P.2d 369 (Wash. 1996)).
ISSUES
1. Was the exclusion
of evidence in the guilt phase prejudicial?
2. Was the admission
of evidence regarding prison conditions in
the sentencing phase reversible error?
DISCUSSION
1. Exclusion of evidence in guilt phase
Appellant claimed self-defense.
He testified that he killed the victims because
he believed the brothers had been hired to kill
him by his uncle, Ronnie Burkhart, an infamous
drug-dealer with whom appellant was on bad terms.
Appellant testified that when
they arrived at the kudzu field, Shane was
holding appellant’s gun because appellant had
given it to him to shoot at a deer earlier.
While they were sitting in the truck, Shane
asked appellant if he had ever wronged “Uncle
Ronnie.” Because appellant had been threatened
by Ronnie and was surprised that Shane knew
Ronnie, he immediately became anxious. Shane
then pointed the gun at appellant and ordered
him out of the truck. Stacy said, “We’re going
to make you squeal like a pig, boy,” which
appellant took to mean they were going to rape
him.
Appellant grabbed the gun
from Shane and began shooting. When it was over,
he pushed the bodies out of the truck and put
the second magazine in the gun because he
thought someone else may have been out in the
field. A shot went off outside the truck.
Finally, appellant drove off in Shane’s truck.
He went to pick up his wife and his father
because he was afraid Ronnie would hurt them.
After parking Shane’s truck at his father’s
house, appellant went to the police.
Sheriff Taylor was called as
a defense witness. He testified that Ronnie,
who was now deceased, was at one time an
international drug smuggler in cocaine and
marijuana with connections to violent drug lords.
On cross-examination, Sheriff Taylor stated that
Ronnie was very careful in his dealings. The
solicitor then asked, “Did you ever uncover
anything that showed that Shane and Stacy were
on (sic) any of this inside circle that
Ronnie Burkhart would have trusted them?”
Sheriff Taylor answered “no.”
In reply, the defense sought
to elicit Sheriff Taylor’s testimony that Shane
had been arrested for buying a sixteenth of an
ounce of methamphetamine from an undercover
agent in December 1995, two years before the
killings. The solicitor objected on the ground
of relevance and the trial judge excluded the
evidence. Appellant claims the exclusion of
this evidence prejudiced him because it
indicated a relationship between the brothers
and Ronnie that would substantiate his claim of
self-defense. We disagree.
Sheriff Taylor testified
Ronnie Burkhart was out of the drug business by
1991, Ronnie did not deal in methamphetamine,
and he knew of no connection between Shane’s
1995 drug transaction and Ronnie. In the
absence of any evidence linking Shane’s drug
transaction to Ronnie, the excluded evidence did
not tend to make more or less probable
appellant’s claim that Shane would have worked
for Ronnie as a hit man. See Rule 401,
SCRE (evidence is relevant if it tends to make
the existence of any fact at issue more or less
probable). We find the exclusion of this
evidence could not reasonably have affected the
outcome of the trial. SeeState v.
Johnson, 363 S.C. 53, 609 S.E.2d 520 (2005)
(exclusion of evidence is not reversible error
if it could not reasonably have affected outcome
of trial).
2. Admission of evidence in sentencing
phase
During the sentencing phase
of trial, appellant objected to testimony by
State’s witness James Sligh, Director of Inmate
Classification for the Department of Corrections,
regarding the privileges available to an inmate
who receives a sentence of life without parole.
These privileges include access to the yard,
work, education, meals, canteen, phone, library,
recreation, mail, television, and outside
visitors. On cross-examination, Sligh
acknowledged that prison life is “very
regimented” and “is not a country club.”
Further, appellant presented evidence through
his own witness that prison is a harsh
environment with violent predators where one’s
freedom is severely curtailed.
We have long held that
evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital
trial must be relevant to the character of the
defendant or the circumstances of the crime.
State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d
63 (1982). The jury’s sole function is to make
a sentencing determination based on these
factors and not to legislate a plan of
punishment. State v. Johnson, 293 S.C.
321, 360 S.E.2d 317 (1987). “Such
determinations as the time, place, manner, and
conditions of execution or incarceration
. . . are reserved . . . to agencies other than
the jury.” State v. Plath (Plath II),
281 S.C. 1, 15, 313 S.E.2d 619, 627 (1984) (emphasis
added). Based on this reasoning, we have
disallowed defense evidence regarding the
process of electrocution, State v. Plath (Plath
I), 277 S.C. 126, 284 S.E.2d 221 (1981), and
expert testimony regarding the deterrent effect
of capital punishment. State v. George,
323 S.C. 496, 476 S.E.2d 903 (1996).
Recently, in State v.
Bowman, 366 S.C. 485, 623 S.E.2d 378 (2005),
the defendant challenged on appeal the admission
of evidence regarding general prison conditions.
Although we found the issue was not preserved
for review, we cautioned the State and the
defense bar that such evidence is not relevant
to the question of whether a defendant should be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment. 366
S.C. at 498-99, 623 S.E.2d at 387.
This case was tried before
our decision in Bowman; however, we apply
that reasoning here because it is consistent
with our long-standing rule that evidence in the
sentencing phase of a capital trial must be
relevant to the character of the defendant or
the circumstances of the crime. We are aware of
the tension between evidence regarding the
defendant’s adaptability to prison life, which
is clearly admissible,
Here, unlike Bowman,
appellant objected to the State’s evidence
regarding general prison conditions. Although
appellant attempted to counter the testimony of
the State’s witness with evidence regarding the
harshness of prison life, this entire subject
matter injected an arbitrary factor into the
jury’s sentencing considerations. A capital
jury may not impose a death sentence under the
influence of any arbitrary factor. S.C. Code
Ann. § 16-3-25(C)(1) (2003). When the jury is
invited to speculate about irrelevant matters
upon which a death sentence may be based, §
16-3-25(C)(1) is violated. State v. Sloan,
278 S.C. 435, 298 S.E.2d 92 (1982). Accordingly,
we reverse appellant’s death sentence and remand
for resentencing.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED
IN PART; REMANDED.
WALLER, J, concurs.
PLEICONES, J., concurring in a separate opinion.
TOAL, C.J., dissenting in a separate opinion in
which BURNETT, J., concurs.
*****
JUSTICE PLEICONES: I
concur in the majority’s conclusion that
appellant is entitled to a new sentencing
proceeding. I write separately because I
believe a violation of S.C. Code Ann. §
16-3-25(C)(1) (2003) is not subject to a
harmless error analysis.
I agree with the majority
that the prison conditions testimony by Mr.
Sligh violated our rule that evidence in the
sentencing phase of a capital trial must be
relevant to the character of the defendant or
the circumstances of the crime. More
importantly, this inadmissible evidence infused
an arbitrary factor into the jury’s decision to
return a death sentence. Once an arbitrary
matter has been presented to the jury, this
Court cannot uphold the death sentence if we are
to fulfill our statutory duty under S.C. Code
Ann. § 16-3-25(C)(1). State v. Shaw, 273
S.C. 194, 209-210, 255 S.E.2d 799, 807 (1979),
overruled on other grounds by State v.
Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315
(1991).
The dissent argues that the
statute’s prohibition against imposing a death
sentence obtained under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor merely
recites the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.
As a result, although not finding the evidence
in this case to introduce an arbitrary subject
to the jury, the dissent would subject
violations of § 16-3-25(C)(1) to a harmless
error analysis.
Turning to the
questions of federal law, the Eighth Amendment
is violated when the decision to impose the
death penalty is made in an arbitrary manner, or
“out of a whim, passion, prejudice, or
mistake.” Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472
U.S. 320, 329-30 (1985); State v. Copeland,
278 S.C. 572, 587, 300 S.E.2d 63, 72 (1982).
Violations of the Fourteenth Amendment occur
when something “so infects the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a
denial of due process.” See Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986).
Furthermore, an appellate court’s inquiry does
not end upon finding that a constitutional
violation occurred. Very recently, the United
States Supreme Court reminded us that harmless
error analysis is a constitutionally sufficient
rubric by which an appellate court may judge
whether most constitutional violations require
reversal in a criminal case. Washington v.
Recuenco, 548 U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 2546,
2551 (2006).
In this case, I
would not reach the question of whether the
trial court’s error in admitting the above
described evidence was harmless because I would
find no constitutional violations occurred. As
a first matter, Appellant did not raise any
constitutional objections in the trial court,
and it is not clear that he raises these issues
here.
In my view, the
majority’s resolution of this issue is
controlled by a theme found largely in dicta
beginning in State v. Woomer. In that
case, this Court stated “[w]hen a solicitor’s
personal opinion is explicitly injected into the
jury’s deliberations as though it were in itself
evidence justifying a sentence of death, the
resulting death sentence may not be free from
the influence of any arbitrary factor as
required by S.C. Code § 16-3-25(C)(1), and by
the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.” 277 S.C. at 175, 284 S.E.2d at
359.
I believe this
Court has mistakenly seized upon the latter part
of that statement and proceeded to treat §
16-3-25(C) as providing a separate standard by
which this Court should judge the conduct of
capital sentencing proceedings.