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Robert
Allen BRECHEEN
Robbery
Same day
Location: Carter
County, Oklahoma, USA
Status:
Executed by lethal
injection in Oklahoma on August 11, 1995
BRECHEEN v. STATE
1987 OK CR 17
¶4 Appellant's defense was that some black man had
entered his truck as he left a bar. This man made him go to the
Stubbs' residence and carry the rifle to the door. When Mrs. Stubbs
opened the door, the black man pushed him inside and the gun
accidentally went off and killed her. Mr. Stubbs did not see but one
person at his home the evening of the killing, but did testify that he
was acquainted with appellant who had recently approached him for a
loan.
I
¶5 Appellant first assigns as error the trial
court's refusal to grant him a change of venue for trial. The motion
was primarily based upon the fact that the Stubbs owned a local
clothing store and practically all veniremen knew who the Stubbs were.
The State did not present evidence in opposition to the motion.
¶6 Practically all those who were acquainted with
the Stubbs were so because they had traded in their store. Some knew
policemen and prosecutors. Practically all had read newspaper accounts
of the incident.
¶7 The fact that jurors know the victims of a crime
does not in itself demonstrate the need for a change of venue, just
[732 P.2d 893] as the mere existence of pretrial publicity is
insufficient. It is only when a criminal defendant establishes by
clear and convincing evidence that a fair trial is a virtual
impossibility that such a motion should be granted. Thomsen v. State,
582 P.2d 829 (Okl.Cr. 1978). A defendant is not entitled to a jury
which is unacquainted with the victims or facts of his or her case.
¶8 An exhaustive voir dire was conducted at trial.
Those who served on the jury stated they could fairly and impartially
judge the case on the evidence presented. Those who formed opinions
concerning appellant's guilt or doubted their ability to serve
impartially were excused. We find there was adequate safeguard of the
jury process, Frye v. State, 606 P.2d 599 (Okl.Cr. 1980), and the need
for a change of venue was not established.
II
¶9 A venireman named Price was voir dired
concerning his views of the death penalty. Initially he stated he was
against the death penalty but would "go along with the rest of them"
if appellant was convicted. Upon more penetrating examination, he
stated he could not imagine a case in which he would vote for a
sentence of death, regardless of the facts or the law. Appellant
contends that since Price never retracted his statement that he would
go along with the other jurors, his position concerning the death
penalty was not clear and he should not have been excused for cause.
¶10 A juror's prejudice against the death penalty
need not be demonstrated with "unmistakable clarity" before excusal
for bias is proper. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844,
852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). If a prospective juror's view of the death
penalty would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath,"
he may properly be excused from capital sentencing juries. Id.
Appellant was not denied a trial by an impartial jury because Price
was excused.
III
¶11 Appellant contends there was insufficient
evidence of a "breaking" to sustain the burglary conviction. But we
disagree. It was his testimony at trial that Mrs. Stubbs came to the
front door of her home and with rifle in hand, he and the black man
pushed their way into the house. Photographs introduced at trial show
that there was a glass and screen door as well as a wooden door at the
front of the house on this March evening. Appellant testified that
Mrs. Stubbs just backed away from them and then screamed. He admitted
that they were not invited to come in by the victim.
¶12 The statute defining Burglary in the First
Degree provides that the offense is committed by:
Every person who breaks into and enters the
dwelling house of another, in which there is at the time some human
being, with intent to commit some crime therein, either:
1) By forcibly bursting or breaking the wall, or
an outer door, window, or shutter of a window of such house or the
lock or bolts of such window or shutter; or
2) By breaking in any other manner, being armed
with a dangerous weapon or being assisted or aided by one or more
confederates then actually present. . . . (Emphasis added).
21 O.S. 1981 § 1431 [21-1431]. Appellant's own
testimony provided sufficient circumstantial evidence of a "breaking"
under the statute. Where there is evidence from which the jury can
rationally conclude that a defendant is guilty of the charged offense,
this Court will not interfere with their verdict. Spuehler v. State,
709 P.2d 202 (Okl.Cr. 1985).
¶48 This Court has considered cases of similar
facts to this one and have upheld the finding of this aggravating
circumstance. In both of the following cases, the second person put at
risk was not in the immediate vicinity of the party killed: Ross v.
State, 717 P.2d 117, (Okl.Cr. 1986) and Cartwright v. State, 695 P.2d
548 (Okl.Cr. 1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 3538, 87
L.Ed.2d 661. In Ross, we noted also that the United States Supreme
Court has upheld cases in which the sentence of death was so assessed
under a statute similar to Oklahoma's. 717 P.2d at 123. This
assignment is without merit.
XX
¶49 Appellant requests this Court to compare his
sentence to that imposed in similar cases, claiming it is
disproportionate. Such a comparison is no longer required nor
necessary. He cites us to cases in which the individual did not
receive the death penalty. Appellant fails to take into account that
the juries in those cases may have found the mitigating circumstances
exceeded the aggravating. In such a case, the death penalty may not be
imposed. 21 O.S. 1981 § 701.11 [21-701.11].
¶50 Additionally, the Legislature recently amended
the review this Court is to make in death cases by deleting the
proportionality review. 21 O.S.Supp. 1986 § 701.13 [21-701.13]. [732
P.2d 899] See Foster v. State, 714 P.2d 1031 (Okl.Cr. 1986), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 249, 93 L.Ed.2d 173.
¶51 Appellant next assigns as
error the trial court's failure to give a particular instruction
listing mitigating circumstances. At trial, appellant did not object
to the instructions given nor request and submit any additional ones.
Therefore, potential error was not preserved. Dodson v. State, 674
P.2d 57 (Okl.Cr. 1984).
¶52 The instructions given accurately stated the
applicable law. Johnson v. State, 621 P.2d 1162 (Okl.Cr. 1980). There
was no error.
XXII
¶53 Appellant contends the evidence of mitigating
circumstances outweighed that of the one aggravating circumstance the
jury found to exist.
¶54 The jury was specifically instructed that to be
authorized to assess the death penalty, they must find an aggravating
circumstance to exist beyond a reasonable doubt and that the
aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances. 21
O.S. 1981 § 701.11 [21-701.11]. We find upon our review of the
evidence that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly created a great risk of
death to more than one person and that this circumstance was not
outweighed by mitigating circumstances. Spuehler v. State, 709 P.2d
202 (Okl.Cr. 1985). There is no error.
XXIII
¶55 Appellant contends that Oklahoma's death
penalty statutes in general (21 O.S. 1981, §§ 701.9-701.13
[21-701.9-701.13]) are being applied in an overbroad and, therefore,
unconstitutional manner. We have upheld the application of these
statutes against such charges in a number of cases: Liles v. State,
702 P.2d 1025 (Okl.Cr. 1985), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct.
2291, 90 L.Ed.2d 732 (1986); Banks v. State, 701 P.2d 418 (Okl.Cr.
1985); Nuckols v. State, 690 P.2d 463 (Okl.Cr. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1030, 105 S.Ct. 2050, 85 L.Ed.2d 323 (1985); Boutwell v.
State, 659 P.2d 322 (Okl.Cr. 1983). Appellant has not added any new
light to cause us to change these holdings.
XXIV
¶56 As appellant's final assignment, he charges
that the double jeopardy protections of the federal and the state
constitutions are violated by his being convicted of both Burglary
with Intent to Commit Murder and of Murder from the same transaction.
We have previously held that burglary and other offenses committed
within the structure burgled do not merge, and conviction of both does
not violate double jeopardy protections. Ziegler v. State, 610 P.2d
251 (Okl.Cr. 1980). The burglary is complete upon entry with intent to
commit a crime. 21 O.S. 1981 § 1431 [21-1431]. The offenses committed
after entry are separate and distinct.
XXV
¶57 Our final review is assigned by 21 O.S.Supp.
1986 § 701.13 [21-701.13](C). As previously stated, we find that the
evidence supports the jury's finding of the statutory aggravating
circumstance that the appellant knowingly created a great risk of
death to more than one person; that being Mr. Stubbs and the homicide
victim, Mrs. Stubbs. We do not find the sentence to have been imposed
under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary
factor.
¶58 Finding no error warranting reversal or
modification, judgments and sentences are AFFIRMED.
¶1 Although I concur in the affirmance of the
judgment and sentence of the [732 P.2d 900] appellant, I am compelled
to address several instances of improper conduct on the part of the
District Attorney for Carter County. First, the improper appeals to
societal alarm asserting that, unless the appellant was punished, the
community, county and State would be threatened with "chaos and
anarchy" are clearly improper and unnecessary. See Cobbs v. State, 629
P.2d 368, 369 (Okl.Cr. 1981). See also Henderson v. State, 716 P.2d
691, 693 (Okl.Cr. 1986) (Parks, P.J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). Second, the prosecutor improperly asked the jury to punish
the appellant "as vengeance for the family that is specifically hurt,
vengeance for the community to set an example . . ." See Scott v.
State, 649 P.2d 560, 564 (Okl.Cr. 1982) ("The vindication of community
outrage has been criticized by this Court in Franks v. State, 636 P.2d
361 (1981).").
¶2 It is difficult to understand why the State
would risk reversal or modification by making such clearly improper
and unnecessary comments during closing argument. However, in light of
the strong evidence of guilt, the failure to make timely objections
and requests for admonishments to disregard, and the failure to show
prejudice, it is unnecessary to reverse or modify the conviction. See
Elvaker v. State, 707 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Okl.Cr. 1985); Brodbent v.
State, 700 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Okl.Cr. 1985).
¶3 I also write separately to express my view that
the application of 21 O.S.Supp. 1985 § 701.13 [21-701.13](C), which
became effective July 16, 1985, to cases pending on appeal at the time
the statute was passed renders the enactment an ex post facto law. See
Green v. State, 713 P.2d 1032, 1041 n. 4 (Okl.Cr. 1985). See also
Foster v. State, 714 P.2d 1031, 1042 (Okl.Cr. 1986) (Parks, P.J.,
specially concurring). Nevertheless, I have compared the sentences
imposed herein with those previous cases either affirmed1
On petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins,
dissenting.
This Court has insisted that an accused be tried by
"a public tribunal free of prejudice, passion, excitement, and
tyrannical power." Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-237, 476-477
(1940). We have recognized that failure to ensure the impartiality of
a jury "violates even the minimal standards of due process." Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 1642 (1961). The Oklahoma court's denial of
petitioner's unopposed motion for change of venue raises serious
doubts about whether those minimal standards were met in this case.
These doubts demand that we undertake two separate inquiries. First,
we must consider whether and to what extent our precedents regarding
jury impartiality set constitutional limits on state change of venue
standards. Second, we must address the proper application of those
precedents to the unique setting of capital sentencings.
I
On March 23, 1983, Marie Stubbs, wife of Hilton
Stubbs, a prominent storekeeper in Ardmore, Oklahoma, was shot and
killed in her home. The murder and the subsequent arrest of petitioner
Robert Brecheen were the subject of extensive local newspaper and
television coverage. Ardmore, which has a population of approximately
25,000, is located in Carter County, which has a population of
approximately 40,000.
Petitioner's attorney filed a motion, accompanied
by affidavits, for change of venue from Carter County. Although the
motion was unopposed, the trial judge refused to grant it after
conducting voir dire. The jury that was finally empaneled contained
one person who knew the victim, one
who knew the victim's daughter, and three who knew
the victim's husband. All but one of the jurors were customers at the
Stubbs' family store. Three jurors knew the prosecuting attorney and
three knew officers who would testify for the prosecution. All of the
jurors had heard of the case through pretrial publicity. The jury
convicted petitioner of burglary and homicide and sentenced him to
death.
On appeal, petitioner challenged, inter alia, the
trial court's refusal to grant him a change of venue. The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals rejected petitioner's claim, holding that "[i]t
is only when a criminal defendant establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that a fair trial is a virtual impossibility that such a
motion should be granted ." App. to Pet. for Cert. 2.
II
This Court has established that a refusal to grant
a motion for change of venue may constitute a violation of due process.
See Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, supra. A defendant seeking to
establish such a violation must demonstrate either that his trial
resulted in "identifiable prejudice" or that it gave rise to a
presumption of prejudice because it involved "such a probability that
prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due
process." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-543, 1632-1633 (1965). In
deciding whether such a presumption of prejudice is warranted, courts
must examine "any indications in the totality of circumstances that
petitioner's trial was not fundamentally fair." Murphy v. Florida, 421
U.S. 794, 799, 2036 (1975).
We have had little occasion to apply these basic
principles to determine whether particular state standards for change
of venue comport with the requirements of due process. Most of our
precedents regarding due process and jury neutrality consist of
careful examinations of the circumstances surrounding specific trials
to determine whether they give rise to a presumption of prejudice. See,
e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Turner v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 466 (1965). Although we did strike down one state venue
statute which categorically denied change of venue for misdemeanors,
see Groppi v. Wisconsin, supra, we have not considered any other
wholesale restrictions on venue change.
In this vacuum of constitutional precedent, States
have taken divergent paths. Most States have followed the well-trod
course of granting motions for venue change when the totality of the
circumstances establish " 'a reasonable likelihood that in the absence
of such relief, a fair trial cannot be had.' " Martinez v. Superior
Court, 29 Cal.3d 574, 577-578, 174 Cal.Rptr. 701, 702, 629 P.2d 502,
503 (1981) (quoting Maine v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.2d 375, 383, 66
Cal.Rptr. 724, 729, 438 P.2d 372, 377 (1968)). The Martinez court
defined "reasonable likelihood" as a lesser standard of proof than
"more probable than not." 29 Cal.3d at 578, 174 Cal.Rptr. at 702, 629
P.2d at 503. See also People v. Gendron, 41 Ill. 2d 351, 243 N.E.2d
208 (1968) (adopting "reasonable likelihood" standard), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 889 (1969); State v. Cuevas, 288 N.W.2d 525 (Iowa 1980) (same);
State v. Beier, 263 N.W.2d 622 ( Minn.1978) (same). Other States have
decided to grant change of venue motions when the circumstances
establish a substantial likelihood of prejudice. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Cohen, 489 Pa. 167, 413 A.2d 1066, cert. denied, 449
U.S. 840 (1980). The American Bar Association has explicitly endorsed
this latter approach in its Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free
Press 8-3.3(c) (2d ed. 1980 ). Oklahoma, however, diverges sharply
from its sister States in setting a much higher threshold for granting
a change of venue motion, requiring " clear and convincing evidence"
that a fair trial is a "virtual impossibility."
In my view, Oklahoma's strong presumption against
venue change fails to accommodate properly the concerns expressed in
our due process precedents. Those precedents implicitly acknowledge
that the defendant's interest in a fundamentally fair trial outweighs
the State's interest in holding that trial in a particular district.
Oklahoma's standard is out of step with this Court's repeated
recognition that "our system of law has always endeavored to prevent
even the probability of unfairness." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
136, 625 (1955) ( emphasis added), quoted in Sheppard v. Maxwell,
supra, 384 U.S. at 352, 86 S.Ct. at 1517; Estes v. Texas, supra, 381
U.S. at 543, 85 S.Ct. at 1633.
We frequently have invoked the opinion of Chief
Justice Taft 50 years ago, which held that "[e]very procedure which
would offer a possible temptation to the average man . . . to forget
the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might
lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the
State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law." Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, 444 (1927) (emphasis added), cited in Irvin
v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. at 722, 81 S.Ct. at 1642; Estes v. Texas,
supra, 381 U.S. at 543, 85 S.Ct. at 1633. We should
grant certiorari to establish clearly the minimal requirements of the
Due Process Clause for state change of venue standards.
III
Our prior precedents have left a second gap of
perhaps even more importance. We have failed to give any guidance as
to the circumstances that might give rise to a presumption of
prejudice in the sentencing phase of a bifurcated capital trial. Our
cases have dealt exclusively with factors that might influence the
jury in its fact-finding function when it makes determinations of
guilt or innocence. We held, for example, that the pretrial broadcast
of a defendant in the act of confessing to the charged crime
inherently prejudiced the jury's ability to evaluate objectively his
guilt. See Rideau v. Louisiana, supra.
Similarly, we held that when key government
witnesses doubled as official guardians of the jury during
deliberations, the ability of the jury to assess witness credibility
was presumptively prejudiced. See Turner v. Louisiana, supra. But the
influences that might impair the truth-seeking function of the jury in
guilt determinations are not identical to those that impinge on its
responsibility to administer fairly the death penalty.
This case demonstrates that lack of congruence. The
fact that many of the jurors knew the victim or members of the
victim's family might not presumptively establish the fundamental
unfairness of the guilt proceedings. There may be little reason to
doubt the testimony of such jurors at voir dire that they could put
aside their knowledge of the consequences of the crime in order to
establish the facts of its commission. But the jury wears an
altogether different hat when it sits as sentencer. It must make a
moral decision whether a defendant already found guilty deserves to
die for his crime. As we have previously recognized, the function of
the sentencing jury is to "express the conscience of the community on
the ultimate question of life or death." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 519, 1775d 776 (1968).
When a jury is composed, as this petitioner's was,
of people who are personally familiar with the consequences of a
defendant's crime, it cannot perform this function in an impartial
manner. We held as much just last Term, when we declared that the
Eighth Amendment forbids the introduction of a victim impact statement
during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. We concluded that a
description of the effects of the murder on the victim's family and
friends
was too likely to inflame the jury and lead to a
sentence based on caprice or emotion rather than reason. See Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987). Surely empaneling a
jury with personal knowledge of these effects would have much the same
result. The likelihood of such a result should give rise to a
presumption of prejudice during the sentencing phase, just as
extensive news coverage might establish that presumption in the guilt
phase.
IV
This petition raises two important issues that call
for this Court's review. We must establish what the Due Process Clause
requires of state legislatures and courts in formulating general
standards for change of venue. Oklahoma's strong presumption against
granting such motions raises serious concerns about the fundamental
fairness of its criminal proceedings. In addition, we must recognize
and rule on the difference between the guilt and penalty phases of a
capital trial for the purpose of presuming prejudice when jury
impartiality is called into question. This distinction is required not
because death is a qualitatively different penalty from any other (although
it is), but because the jury's function is profoundly altered when it
sits as sentencer.
We consider these claims only because of either an intervening change
in the law or because of some circumstance which occurred that was not
known (or could not have been discovered) at the time of the direct
appeal.
¶4 Petitioner has raised a number of issues
involving the trial court's denial of his request for a change of
venue and how that denial adversely affected his ability to obtain a
fair trial before an impartial jury. Although we discussed the merits
of related propositions raised in the direct appeal, we feel compelled
at this point to note that in actuality, any complaint which
Petitioner may have about the composition of his jury must be
considered waived due to his waiver of preemptory challenges at trial.
¶5 Following the exercise of his seventh of nine
preemptory challenge, Petitioner declined to employ his remaining two
challenges. At that point, the twelve jurors seated in the box were
deemed acceptable and were sworn to try the case. As was the case in
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988),
Petitioner may not complain about the specific composition of his
jury, having dispensed with the opportunity to remedy the situation at
the trial level. His claim then, that he was forced to use one of his
challenges to excuse a potential juror, is totally lacking in
significance, given the fact that he did not utilize all the
challenges allowed by law. Id.
¶6 On another level, Petitioner's complaints
concerning the general makeup of his jury are directed to the fact
that the majority of those called to potentially serve on the jury
were in some way familiar with the victim of this crime or her family.
We will assume that this contention is general to the jury panel,
rather than specific to individual jurors. The concern seems to be not
that any single person on the jury was directly unacceptable in any
articulable way, but that the prevalent familiarity
with the victims, who owned a popular western wear store, coupled with
knowledge of pretrial publicity culminated in a denial of due process.
We find that due to a subsequent change in the standard under which
such a claim must be reviewed, this issue is properly before us at
this time.
¶7 Although several allegations of error were
asserted with respect to the voir dire process as a part of the direct
appeal, Petitioner properly points out that since the decision was
rendered in his case, this Court has substantially changed the
standard of review which is applied to questions of fair venue. At the
time his appeal was considered, this Court utilized a relatively
strict test when considering claims that a different venue should have
been allowed when there has been extensive pretrial publicity in the
county where the crime occurred. In connection with this Court's
affirmation of the trial court's denial of Petitioner's request for a
change of venue, we held that such a change is warranted only "when a
criminal defendant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a
fair trial is a virtual impossibility." Brecheen, 732 P.2d at 893.
¶8 Subsequent to our denial of Petitioner's claims
on appeal, we considered the same issue in Coates v. State, 773 P.2d
1281 (Okl.Cr. 1989). In that case, rather than considering whether
selection of an impartial jury was a "virtual impossibility," we
applied a two step test derived from previous cases by this Court in
conjunction with dictates from the Supreme Court. The first prong of
the analysis requires a finding that "`the influence of the news
media, either in the community at large or in the courtroom itself,
pervaded the proceedings.'" Coates, 773 P.2d at 1286, quoting Murphy
v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798-99, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2035-36, 44 L.Ed.2d
589 (1975). If the media involvement in the case is rampant, prejudice
is presumed.
¶9 The second level of inquiry is more incorporeal
in that it requires an examination of the entire process to determine
whether or not the defendant received a "`fundamentally fair' trial."
Id. quoting Brown v. State, 743 P.2d 133, 136 (Okl.Cr. 1987). This
determination must go farther than a simple consideration of whether
or not each juror has promised to "set aside his opinion and consider
only the evidence presented at trial." Id.
¶10 In the present case, we need not reconsider the
issue of venue in any great detail. Although it is quite true that
almost all of the seated jurors had some knowledge of the victim in
this case due to her store ownership, and had some media exposure to
the facts underlying the charges, there is no indication that the
influence of the media "pervaded the process" or that the jury
selected was "inherently unfair." None of the jurors actually seated
were acquaintances of the victim, but had merely been customers in a
store bearing her name. Likewise, though most recalled reading about
the crime, none recalled specific details and all related that the
reports would not influence their decision making or fact finding
processes.
¶11 Although we have changed the standard of review
to some extent, we have not changed the ultimate fact that a fair jury
does not necessarily require totally uninformed jurors. We held in
Petitioner's direct appeal, that "a defendant is not entitled to a
jury which is unacquainted with the victims or the facts of his or her
case." Brecheen, 732 P.2d at 893. See also McBrain v. State, 764 P.2d
905 (Okl.Cr. 1988); Wilkett v. State, 753 P.2d 383 (Okl.Cr. 1988).
Having applied the doctrines of Coates, we conclude that while the
jury was not totally ignorant of the facts and circumstances behind
this case, the trial court's decision to retain venue in Carter County
was correct and no relief is warranted on this ground.
¶13 Petitioner claims that additional bullet holes
were found in the house, the existence of which was not disclosed to
the defense, and that his investigator has discovered a witness who
heard a police dispatch that a black man was in the area near the
shooting. The evidence of additional bullet holes, presented by
affidavit to the trial court, was disputed by several witnesses
including the victim's husband. The trial court found, after careful
consideration of the evidence presented that:
[t]his claim is disputed by the affidavit of the
person allegedly discovering this evidence. Additionally, even if
the evidence did exist, the response filed by the District Attorney
reveals it was not known to the prosecutor and would have been
equally discoverable by the defense with the exercise of diligence.
For these reasons this allegation is meritless.
O.R. 458.
¶14 Petitioner claims that the trial court erred by
making this decision without benefit of an evidentiary hearing on the
issue. In Johnson, 823 P.2d at 373, we held that "[t]he statutory
section in question, 22 O.S. 1981 § 1084 [22-1084], provides that an
evidentiary hearing will only be required `if the application cannot
be disposed of on the pleadings and record, or there exists a material
issue of fact.'" As was true in Johnson, there is no indication by the
trial court that any issues were presented which demanded an
evidentiary hearing. The record demonstrates that the trial court
considered all the evidence presented in reaching its decision. There
is no allegation of additional evidence which should have been or
would have been presented had an evidentiary hearing been undertaken.
We find no reason presented sufficient to overcome the trial court's
findings that this issue should be considered barred for failure to
raise it in a timely manner.
¶15 We come to the same conclusion with respect to
the allegations concerning the witness who claims to have heard a
police dispatch about a black man in the area of the shooting. No
reason is given why due diligence would not have discovered this
witness prior to trial. Additionally, we find that the evidence (which
is presented to us as hearsay on hearsay) would have been merely
cumulative to the substantial evidence presented by Petitioner in
connection with his defensive claim that he was forced into the
Stubbs' home by an unidentified black man. The trial court also held
that this claim was barred and we support that finding.
¶16 We have thoroughly reviewed the claims made by
Petitioner in this Application for Post-Conviction Relief. We find
that the bulk of the assertions are barred because of the failure to
raise them in any earlier forum. Accordingly, we find no reason to
deviate from the trial court's denial of relief. We further find that
Appellant has exhausted his state remedies, having pursued both a
direct appeal and post-conviction relief.
LUMPKIN, V.P.J., and BRETT and PARKS, JJ., concur.
Proposition II, concerning the assistance of
counsel during the second stage of the trial was not raised during the
direct appeal, notwithstanding similar allegations with respect to the
first stage proceedings. No compelling explanation for the late
raising is offered.
Proposition III is merely an attempt to obtain
review of comments made by the prosecutor. Relief on this ground was
rejected on direct appeal. 732 P.2d at 898.
Proposition V concerns the so called
"anti-sympathy" instruction. No claim was made in this regard on
appeal.
Proposition VI and VII concern the appropriateness
of the death sentence in a case where only one aggravating factor is
alleged. The claim was rejected on direct appeal. 732 P.2d at 898.
Proposition VIII challenges the constitutionality
of the aggravating circumstance found by the jury. The argument was
previously considered and rejected by this Court. 732 P.2d at 898.
Proposition IX alleges that additional instructions
should have been given to the jury in the second stage. This should
have been brought up on direct appeal and is therefore waived.
Proposition XI concerns misconduct by a juror which
was the subject of an evidentiary hearing ordered by this Court prior
to the decision in the direct appeal. The issue was raised by
supplemental brief and considered in the original opinion rendered in
the case. Any additional arguments in this regard should have been
raised at that time.
Mr. Brecheen thereafter filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. In an order dated June 30,
1994 (No. CIV 94-318-S), the Chief Judge of the district denied Mr.
Brecheen's petition and his motion for a stay of execution, which had
been set for July 6, 1994. On July 1, 1994, we granted Mr. Brecheen's
emergency application for a temporary stay of execution to allow for
the appointment of counsel, along with expedited appeal and oral
argument. See Coleman v. Brown, 753 F.2d 832, 833 (10th Cir.1985).
On appeal to this court, Mr.
Brecheen reasserts the six arguments offered in his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court: (1) denial of
fair trial based on the trial court's denial of his motion for a
change of venue; (2) denial of a fair trial due to prosecutorial
misconduct; (3) violation of due process during sentencing for failure
to offer a "presumption of life" instruction; (4) violation of the
Eighth Amendment during sentencing for overbroad use of a statutory
aggravating circumstance; (5) ineffective assistance of counsel during
the sentencing phase; and (6) cumulative error. We address these
claims seriatim.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Brecheen initially claims that
the state trial court erred in denying his motion for a change of
venue. He claims that under the facts of this case, the actions of the
state trial court amounted to a denial of his right to a fair trial by
impartial jurors under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. He further
alleges that the standard applied by the appellate court in reviewing
the state trial courts' change of venue decisions is similarly
unconstitutional as a violation of due process.
Brecheen I, 732 P.2d at 893 (citation
omitted). During state postconviction proceedings, the Oklahoma Court
of Appeals again affirmed. "[W]hile the jury was not totally ignorant
of the facts and the circumstances behind this case, the trial court's
decision to retain venue in Carter County was correct and no relief is
warranted on this ground." Brecheen II, 835 P.2d at 120. The federal
district court rejected this argument as well, concluding that under
applicable Supreme Court precedent, Mr. Brecheen's right to due
process was not violated by the denial of his motion to change venue.
We agree.
The murder ... is a crime against, and a threat to
every other member of that community, county and state, and unless it
is punished, unless it is carried out, then we have no government,
then we have no law, then we have chaos and anarchy.... The average
person can take a hundred locks and put on their doors, have all of
their guns and be prepared to fend off any attack, anybody that wants
to come in, any strong man that wants to take over, anybody that wants
to take over can do it, unless the law works, and the law works here.
It works with twelve people.
Mr. Brecheen's allegation that the
trial court erred by failing to give a "presumption of life"
instruction was not raised on direct appeal. For reasons discussed
earlier, we recognize Oklahoma's procedural bar to claims that were
waived on direct appeal as an adequate and independent state ground
for not reaching the merits of the claim. See Steele, 11 F.3d at 1522
& n. 5.
Therefore, unless Mr. Brecheen can
show that one of the narrow, recognized exceptions to the procedural
bar rule is applicable, we will not, out of respect for the Oklahoma
courts' procedural rules, adjudicate the merits of this claim. See
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. at 2564-65. Mr. Brecheen does not
argue that he has shown cause and prejudice to override his procedural
default; instead, he relies on the "fundamental miscarriage of justice"
exception. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495, 106 S.Ct. 2639,
2649, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986), quoted in Harris, 489 U.S. at 262, 109
S.Ct. at 1042-43; see also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50, 111 S.Ct. at
2564-65.
The Supreme Court recently expounded
on the narrow scope of this exception and indicated it is equivalent
to a showing of "actual innocence." See Herrera v. Collins, --- U.S.
----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 853, 862, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993); Sawyer v.
Whitley, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2518-19, 120 L.Ed.2d 269
(1992) (discussing Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S.Ct.
2616, 2627, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) (plurality opinion)). "The
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is available 'only where
the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable
showing of factual innocence.' " Herrera, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct.
at 862 (emphasis in original) (quoting Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454, 106
S.Ct. at 2627 (plurality opinion)). This rule is "grounded in the 'equitable
discretion' of habeas courts to see that federal constitutional errors
do not result in the incarceration of innocent persons," Herrera, ---
U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 862 (citing McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494, 111
S.Ct. at 1470), and these standards apply with full force in capital
cases. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9, 109 S.Ct. 2765,
2769-70, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (plurality opinion), quoted in Herrera,
--- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 863.
As the name suggests, the
appropriate inquiry concerns actual or factual innocence, as compared
to legal innocence. See Steele, 11 F.3d at 1522 n. 8. " '[D]emonstrating
that an error is by its nature the kind of error that might have
affected the accuracy of a death sentence is far from demonstrating
that an individual defendant probably is "actually innocent" of the
sentence he or she received.' " Sawyer, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at
2519 (quoting Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 412 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 1211,
1218 n. 6, 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989)); Steele, 11 F.3d at 1522 & n. 8.
Oklahoma's rule preventing
relitigation in state postconviction proceedings of claims raised and
decided on direct appeal does not constitute a procedural bar to
federal habeas review. In Ylst, 501 U.S. 797, 111 S.Ct. 2590, the
Supreme Court considered the effect of unexplained state court orders
on an earlier reasoned state court order for purposes of federal
habeas review.
The Court noted that because a state
court's subsequent unexplained order is "not meant to convey anything
as to the reason for the decision," id. at 803, 111 S.Ct. at 2594 (emphasis
in original), a "look through" rule that gives the later unexplained
decision "no effect" most nearly reflects the role that such decisions
are intended to play. Id. at 804, 111 S.Ct. at 2595 (emphasis in
original) (footnote omitted).
In practice, the look-through rule
tells a federal habeas court to ignore the unexplained order and focus
upon the last reasoned state court decision. Id. at 803, 111 S.Ct. at
2594; Church, 942 F.2d at 1507. In so doing, the federal habeas court
places itself in a position to determine if the reasoning used in that
state court opinion " 'fairly appear[s] to rest primarily upon federal
law,' " Ylst, 501 U.S. at 802, 111 S.Ct. at 2594 (quoting Coleman, 501
U.S. at 737, 111 S.Ct. at 2558), such that habeas review is proper, or
if the state court decision rested on an adequate and independent
state ground, i.e., a procedural bar. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 802, 111 S.Ct.
at 2594.
The presumption that subsequent
unexplained orders should be given no effect is a relatively accurate
barometer in most cases. Id. at 804, 111 S.Ct. at 2595 ("The maxim is
that silence implies consent ... and courts generally behave
accordingly, affirming without further discussion when they agree, not
when they disagree, with the reasons given below."). As the Court
noted in a footnote, however, the only recurring circumstance where
this presumption is unrealistic is the situation presently before us,
where
the later state decision rests upon a prohibition
against further [emphasis in original] state review--for example, an
unexplained denial of state habeas resting in fact upon a rule ...
preventing the relitigation on state habeas of claims raised on direct
appeal. In that circumstance, even though the presumption does not
posit the real reason for the later denial, it does produce a result
('looking through' to the last reasoned decision) that is the correct
one for federal habeas courts. Since a later state decision based upon
ineligibility for further state review [does not] rest[ ] upon [a]
procedural default ... its effect upon the availability of federal
habeas is nil--which is precisely the effect accorded by the 'look-through'
presumption.
Id. at 804 n. 3, 111 S.Ct. at 2595
n. 3 (emphasis added).
Thus, under the Ylst footnote, if a
state court addresses the merits of a particular federal claim on
direct appeal, as it did here with respect to Mr. Brecheen's Eighth
Amendment claim, then its subsequent refusal to grant "further" state
review in an application for postconviction relief should be given no
effect and does not constitute a procedural bar for purposes of
federal habeas corpus review. Id. at 803-04 & n. 3, 111 S.Ct. at
2594-95 & n. 3.
Therefore, we are free to examine
the merits of this aspect of Mr. Brecheen's Eighth Amendment challenge,
which posits that the "great risk of death to others" aggravating
circumstance is unconstitutional because it does not provide the
sentencer with a rationally reviewable standard. Because we conclude
that this aggravating circumstance is consistent with the dictates of
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, we reject
this claim of error.
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), the various opinions of the
Supreme Court established the principle that the Eighth Amendment
imposes some limitations on the ability of the States to impose the
punishment of death. This core tenet was adhered to in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), where a
plurality of the Court stated that "where discretion is afforded a
sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a
human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action." Id. at 189, 96 S.Ct. at 2932 (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S.
764, 774, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 3098-99, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990) (majority
opinion). In Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d
398 (1980), Justice Stewart's plurality opinion reiterated that "if a
State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional
responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the
arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty." Id. at 428,
100 S.Ct. at 1764 (plurality opinion); Lewis, 497 U.S. at 774, 110
S.Ct. at 3098-99; Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874, 103 S.Ct. 2733,
2741, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189, 96 S.Ct.
at 2932-33).
To provide the necessary guidance to
a capital sentencing jury, and thereby reduce the concerns relating to
the potential for arbitrary application of the death penalty, those
states that allow the imposition of this "qualitatively different"
punishment have enacted comprehensive statutory schemes to regulate
the circumstances under which it may be administered. Cartwright v.
Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1483 (10th Cir.1987) (en banc) (Cartwright II
), aff'd, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988).
In some states, aggravating
circumstances are simply a device for "narrow[ing] the class of first
degree murderers that are eligible for the death penalty." Id. at 1480
(citing cases decided under Georgia, Utah, and Louisiana law where the
courts use aggravating circumstances to determine which first degree
murders are capital offenses). In other states, including Oklahoma,
aggravating circumstances serve a "decidedly different" function. Id.
As we stated in Cartwright II:
An aggravating circumstance under the Oklahoma
scheme does not establish a threshold that distinguishes capital
murders from other first degree murders. In Oklahoma any first degree
murder is punishable by life imprisonment or death. Okla.Stat.Ann. tit.
21, Sec. 701.9 (West.1983).... Oklahoma uses an aggravating
circumstance to guide the discretion of the sentencer in determining
whether the death penalty should be imposed for a particular murder.
Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 21, Sec. 701.10 (West 1983).
Reviewing Oklahoma case
law prior to 1986, we found the construction of the "great
risk" factor by Oklahoma courts provided consistent
guidance to the jury so as to limit its discretion and
thereby withstand an Eighth Amendment challenge. See
Cartwright I, 802 F.2d at 1222. We find no deviation from
this conclusion since that time. See, e.g., Snow v. State,
876 P.2d 291 (Okla.Crim.App.1994); Ellis v. State, 867
P.2d 1289 (Okla.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S.
----, 115 S.Ct. 178, 130 L.Ed.2d 113 (1994); Trice v.
State, 853 P.2d 203 (Okla.Crim.App.), cert. denied, ---
U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 638, 126 L.Ed.2d 597 (1993); Nguyen
v. State, 769 P.2d 167 (Okla.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied,
492 U.S. 925, 109 S.Ct. 3264, 106 L.Ed.2d 609 (1989).
The construction given
to this circumstance by the Oklahoma courts does not
require the death of more than one person. It only
requires an act or acts by the defendant that create the
risk of death to another who is in close proximity to the
killing itself in terms of time, location, and intent.
Snow, 876 P.2d at 297.
In this case, the jury
found Mr. Brecheen killed Mrs. Stubbs, fired a gun several
times into the empty bed of Mr. Stubbs, and then returned
fire into the Stubbses' residence as he fled. The
sentencer's ultimate conclusion that this conduct
constitutes a "great risk of danger to more than one
person" is entirely consistent with both the facts of this
case and the Oklahoma courts' construction of this factor.
Because "our vagueness review is quite deferential,"
Tuilaepa, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2635, and because
this factor "has some 'common-sense core of meaning ...
that criminal juries should be capable of understanding,'
" Tuilaepa, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2636 (quoting
with approval Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279, 96 S.Ct.
2950, 2959-60, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring in judgment)), we find that this aggravating
factor is not unconstitutionally vague.13IV.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Mr. Brecheen's final
assignment of error is a claim he received ineffective
assistance of trial counsel at the sentencing phase of his
trial. The procedural posture of this claim requires some
elaboration.
In reviewing Mr.
Brecheen's federal habeas petition, the district court
found the ineffective assistance claim procedurally
barred, but, out of an "overabundance of caution," that
court considered and dismissed the issue on the merits.
No. CIV-94-318-S, slip op. at 12-18. On appeal, Mr.
Brecheen argues the federal district court erred in
failing to grant him a separate evidentiary hearing on
this issue, in finding this claim procedurally barred and
in dismissing it on the merits. We address these claims in
turn.
We agree with the
district court that Mr. Brecheen was not entitled to an
additional evidentiary hearing in federal court because he
received a full and fair hearing in state court. See
Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir.1993),
cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1294 (1994).
In Parks v. Brown, 840
F.2d 1496 (10th Cir.1987), we stated there is no absolute
right to an evidentiary hearing "in every case involving a
claim of ineffectiveness of counsel." Id. at 1509. Rather,
the determination of whether an evidentiary hearing is
mandated involves application of a two-pronged test.
First, the petitioner bears the burden of "alleg[ing]
facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief."
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312, 83 S.Ct. 745, 757, 9
L.Ed.2d 770 (1963);14
Lucero v. Kerby, 7 F.3d 1520, 1522 (10th Cir.1993).
If the petitioner
carries this burden, then an evidentiary hearing is
required " 'if the habeas applicant did not receive a full
and fair evidentiary hearing in the state court, either at
the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding.' "
Church, 942 F.2d at 1510 (emphasis added) (quoting
Townsend, 372 U.S. at 312, 83 S.Ct. at 756-57); see also
Keeney, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1720. The "full and
fair" hearing exception is especially applicable if "a
state court has made findings as to those very facts."
Meeks v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 316, 319 (11th Cir.1992),
cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1362, 122 L.Ed.2d
741 (1993). Because Mr. Brecheen has not alleged any
specific facts that would entitle him to relief other than
the facts adduced at the state court hearing, and because
we believe the hearing afforded Mr. Brecheen a full and
fair hearing at the state level, we agree with the
district court's conclusion not to grant an evidentiary
hearing.
During the state court
evidentiary hearing, current counsel for Mr. Brecheen
presented testimony of the attorney who handled the trial
in this case, along with the testimony of several
potential mitigating witnesses and the investigator hired
by current counsel to locate mitigating affiants. Mr.
Brecheen testified as well in his own behalf. Furthermore,
the state court admitted the deposition testimony of an
expert witness who evaluated trial counsel's performance
and admitted the affidavits of several persons who
supported Mr. Brecheen.
Under these
circumstances, and accounting for the fact that a state
court's findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of
correctness,15
and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we
believe Mr. Brecheen received a full and fair
postconviction evidentiary hearing on the question of
ineffective assistance of counsel in state district court.
Therefore, the district court's conclusion that another
evidentiary hearing was not necessary was correct.
Mr. Brecheen next claims
the district court erred in finding this claim
procedurally barred. The district court concluded that the
Court of Criminal Appeals' decision rejecting Mr.
Brecheen's postconviction appeal of this claim rested on
his failure to raise it on direct appeal, which the
district court viewed as an adequate and independent state
ground to support the decision. Although we conclude the
Court of Criminal Appeals' decision rested on a state law
ground "independent" of federal law (i.e., waiver), we do
not believe in this case Oklahoma's application of this
procedural rule was an "adequate" state ground. Therefore,
we agree with Mr. Brecheen that his claim is not
procedurally barred.
The general rule is the
failure to raise a claim at trial or on direct appeal will
preclude federal habeas corpus review of the merits of the
claim absent a showing of either cause and prejudice or a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Andrews, 943 F.2d
at 1188; Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 622 (10th
Cir.1988). When, however, the underlying claim is
ineffective assistance of counsel, then our cases indicate
the "general" rule must give way because of countervailing
concerns unique to ineffective assistance claims. In
Osborn, we quoted the following passage from Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305
(1986):
"Because collateral review will
frequently be the only means through which an accused can
effectuate the right to counsel, restricting the
litigation of some Sixth Amendment [ineffective assistance
of counsel] claims to trial and direct review would
seriously interfere with an accused's right to effective
representation."
Osborn, 861 F.2d at 622
(quoting Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 378, 106 S.Ct. at
2584-85). This need to give a meaningful opportunity to
assess and develop a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, coupled with the fact that such claims may
require an opportunity to develop additional facts,16
compel the conclusion that "ineffective assistance claims
may be brought for the first time collaterally." Osborn,
861 F.2d at 622; accord Andrews, 943 F.2d at 1192-93.
Osborn indicates that this result is dictated by the
interplay of two factors: the need for additional
fact-finding, along with the need to permit the petitioner
to consult with separate counsel on appeal in order to
obtain an objective assessment as to trial counsel's
performance. Osborn, 861 F.2d at 623.
Although Mr. Brecheen
was represented by separate counsel on his direct appeal,
a fact distinguishing this case from Osborn, he
nonetheless did not have an opportunity to develop any
additional facts relating to trial counsel's performance
in the direct review process since evidentiary hearings
are unavailable at the appellate level. He was, however,
given this opportunity when he filed his postconviction
petition, and his claim was ultimately denied on the
merits after a hearing. Yet on appeal, the Court of
Criminal Appeals refused to review this claim on the
merits, even after a hearing had taken place, because it
concluded the claim was waived for not having been raised
on direct appeal. See Brecheen II, 835 P.2d at 119 n. 1.
While this determination
provides an "independent" state law ground for rejecting
this claim, we do not believe it is an adequate basis. The
practical effect of this ruling is to force Mr. Brecheen
either to raise this claim on direct appeal, with new
counsel but without the benefit of additional
fact-finding, or have the claim forfeited under state law.
This Hobson's choice cannot constitute an adequate state
ground under the controlling case law because it deprives
Mr. Brecheen of any meaningful review of his ineffective
assistance claim. What Osborn and its progeny give Mr.
Brecheen--the opportunity to raise this claim on
collateral review--the Court of Criminal Appeals
effectively takes away by finding the claim waived.
Therefore, we do not find this claim procedurally barred,
and accordingly, we turn to the merits to determine
whether trial counsel was ineffective.
The primary thrust of
Mr. Brecheen's ineffectiveness argument is that defense
counsel failed to present additional mitigating evidence
during the sentencing phase of his trial. Trial counsel's
ineffectiveness purportedly stemmed from his lack of
investigation and preparation as to the available
mitigating evidence. To demonstrate this lack of
investigation, Mr. Brecheen, in his attempt to obtain
postconviction relief, filed numerous affidavits from
family, friends, and coworkers who contend they would have
appeared to testify on his behalf had they been called.
After the state district court held an evidentiary hearing
on this issue, it concluded that:
Time and hindsight aid the defendant
and current counsel in scrutinizing the conduct of trial
counsel. However, when viewed in the context of the then
existing circumstances, the Court is not convinced that
conduct falls below the standard set by Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 104 S.Ct. [2052] 2053, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
In so deciding as the trier of fact at
the evidentiary hearing, the Court finds the defendant
discussed with his attorney his option regarding
mitigating evidence and made a voluntary decision to
forego the opportunity to call witnesses. However, this is
but one of the factors which causes the Court to determine
the defendant was adequately represented.
Order of Feb. 10, 1989,
No. CRF-83-127, slip op. at 1-2 (20th Judicial District,
Oklahoma).
The district court
agreed with the state court's conclusion. The district
court first concluded that Mr. Brecheen introduced some
mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase, namely,
the guilt phase mitigating evidence that was incorporated
into the sentencing phase. The district court then found
that trial counsel's decision to limit the amount of
mitigating evidence to be introduced at the sentencing
phase was a reasonable tactical decision, especially in
light of Mr. Brecheen's request that counsel forego the
introduction of additional mitigating evidence. We address
the district court's conclusion after first enunciating
the legal standards that govern our review of this issue.
The Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI. "The Supreme Court has
long 'recognized that "the right to counsel is the right
to effective assistance of counsel" ' under the Sixth
Amendment." Osborn, 861 F.2d at 624 (emphasis added)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at
2063-64); accord Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 597 (10th
Cir.1987). This right extends to a capital sentencing
hearing. Harris v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 756, 762 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1011, 110 S.Ct. 573, 107 L.Ed.2d
568 (1989)
To prevail on a Sixth
Amendment claim of actual17
ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment, Mr. Brecheen must first show that counsel
"committed serious errors in light of 'prevailing
professional norms' " in that the representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65;
Haddock, 12 F.3d 950, 955 (10th Cir.1993).
In so doing, the
petitioner must overcome the "strong presumption" that
counsel's conduct falls within the "wide range of
reasonable professional assistance" that " 'might be
considered sound trial strategy,' " Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana,
350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 164, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955));
he must, in other words, overcome the presumption that
counsel's conduct was constitutionally effective. Haddock,
12 F.3d at 955. A claim of ineffective assistance "must be
reviewed from the perspective of counsel at the time,"
Porter v. Singletary, 14 F.3d 554, 558 (11th Cir.1994),
cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 532, 130 L.Ed.2d
435 (1994), and therefore may not be predicated on " 'the
distorting effects of hindsight.' " Parks, 840 F.2d at
1510 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at
2065). Finally, in reviewing ineffective assistance
claims, we "address not what is prudent or appropriate,
but only what is constitutionally compelled." Cronic, 466
U.S. at 665 n. 38, 104 S.Ct. at 2050 n. 38, cited with
approval in Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794, 107 S.Ct.
3114, 3125-26, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987).
If constitutionally
deficient performance is shown, then Mr. Brecheen must
demonstrate that "there is a 'reasonable probability' that
the outcome would have been different had those errors not
occurred." Haddock, 12 F.3d at 955 (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65, 2068; Lockhart v.
Fretwell, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842-43, 122
L.Ed.2d 180 (1993)).
In the specific context
of a challenge to a death sentence, the prejudice
component of Strickland focuses on whether "the sentencer
... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, quoted in
Stevens v. Zant, 968 F.2d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir.1992),
cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1306, 122 L.Ed.2d
695 (1993).
The petitioner carries
the burden of establishing both that the purported
deficiencies unreasonably fell beneath prevailing norms of
professional conduct and that the deficient performance
prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104
S.Ct. at 2063-64; Yarrington, 992 F.2d at 1079. In
essence, "[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104
S.Ct. at 2064.
"[T]he performance and
prejudice prongs under Strickland involve mixed questions
of law and fact which we review de novo." United States v.
Owens, 882 F.2d 1493, 1501-02 n. 16 (10th Cir.1989),
quoted in United States v. Whalen, 976 F.2d 1346, 1347
(10th Cir.1992); see also Haddock, 12 F.3d at 955; United
States v. Miller, 907 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir.1990);
Porter, 14 F.3d at 558.
Accordingly, "in a
federal habeas challenge to a state criminal judgment, a
state court conclusion that counsel rendered effective
assistance is not a finding of fact binding on the federal
court to the extent stated by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d)."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2070, quoted in
Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1558 n. 12 (11th
Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 589, 130
L.Ed.2d 502 (1994); Miller, 907 F.2d at 997 (quoting
Wycoff v. Nix, 869 F.2d 1111, 1117 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 863, 110 S.Ct. 179, 107 L.Ed.2d 135
(1989)). The state court's findings of historical fact,
however, are entitled to the presumption of correctness.
Miller, 907 F.2d at 997; Bolender, 16 F.3d at 1558 n. 12.
The federal district court's findings of fact are subject
to review only for clear error. See Haddock, 12 F.3d at
955; Miller, 907 F.2d at 996; cf. Whalen, 976 F.2d at 1347
(clear error standard applies to district court's findings
of fact in a Sec. 2255 action).
a.
The gravamen of Mr.
Brecheen's argument on the merits is that trial counsel's
performance during the sentencing phase was ineffective
due to his lack of preparation and inadequate
investigation of possible mitigating circumstances.18
In the context of the
sentencing phase of a capital case, we agree with our
sister circuits and emphasize that "[a]n attorney has a
duty to conduct a reasonable investigation, including an
investigation of the defendant's background, for possible
mitigating evidence." Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491,
493 (11th Cir.1988) (emphasis added) (citing Thompson v.
Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1451 (11th Cir.1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1042, 107 S.Ct. 1986, 95 L.Ed.2d 825
(1987)); accord Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456
(9th Cir.1994); Porter, 14 F.3d at 557; Lightbourne v.
Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1025 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 934, 109 S.Ct. 329, 102 L.Ed.2d 346 (1988).
Because of the existence
of this duty, we also agree that "[t]he failure to conduct
a reasonable investigation into possible mitigating
circumstances" may "fall outside the scope of reasonable
professional assistance," Bolender, 16 F.3d at 1557;
Lightbourne, 829 F.2d at 1025; see also Sanders, 21 F.3d
at 1456, and thereby amount to deficient representation
under the first prong of Strickland.19
In stating that an
attorney has an affirmative duty to conduct an
investigation into the existence of potential mitigating
evidence, we do not imply that this duty is boundless. To
the contrary, an attorney "is not required to investigate
all leads" as long as the decision not to pursue a
particular lead, or to pursue a particular lead only so
far, is reasonable under the circumstances. See Bolender,
16 F.3d at 1557 & n. 11 (citing cases); Harris, 874 F.2d
at 763 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at
2066-67).
In this case, we are
unpersuaded by Mr. Brecheen's argument that his trial
counsel inadequately prepared and investigated for the
sentencing phase of trial. Our review of the evidentiary
hearing and the entire record in this case supports the
findings of the district court that trial counsel did in
fact prepare and present some mitigating evidence at the
sentencing phase. Mr. Brecheen's trial counsel, as part of
general preparation for the trial, directed an
investigation of Mr. Brecheen and his family. Counsel was
aware of Mr. Brecheen's background, which he shared with
the jury during the guilt phase and which was necessarily
incorporated into the sentencing phase. That evidence
included testimony that Mr. Brecheen had moved back home
to assist his family when his father became ill; that he
was a high school graduate with two years of training as a
carpenter; that he was one of nine children in a large,
church-going family; and that he had held a supervisory
position in an oil field job.
There was also evidence
presented from his mother that he was a polite individual,
and evidence from his fiancee that she still intended to
marry Mr. Brecheen regardless of what happened. During his
closing argument at the sentencing phase, trial counsel
reiterated most, if not all, of this evidence along with
additional mitigating circumstances. Moreover, review of
the affidavits submitted by Mr. Brecheen's current counsel
show trial counsel talked with other family members about
testifying as character witnesses, but that he chose not
to pursue that course of action for fear of risking a
stronger response from the government.20
We do not believe that
trial counsel's preparatory action in this case
constituted inadequate investigatory work under
Strickland. Leads were discovered and reasonably followed
by counsel, and mitigating evidence was both presented and
prepared to be presented. Tactical considerations, such as
the effect of cross-examination on the credibility of the
proposed witnesses, were also taken into account. Although
others may choose to do differently, that is not the
standard of our review. Moreover, recognizing the
fact-specific nature of this inquiry, we believe our
conclusion that trial counsel was not ineffective here is
entirely consistent with our precedents holding that trial
counsel was inadequate based on his or her complete lack
of investigative efforts. See Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d
1557 (10th Cir.1994) (finding that counsel's failure to
conduct any investigation for possible mitigating evidence
amounted to deficient conduct); Osborn, 861 F.2d at 626-27
(finding counsel's lack of preparation constituted
deficient conduct); see also Sanders, 21 F.3d at 1456-57
(citing Ninth Circuit cases); Bolender, 16 F.3d at 1558 &
1559-60 n. 16 (citing Eleventh Circuit decisions); Brewer
v. Aiken, 935 F.2d 850, 857-59 (7th Cir.1991). See
generally Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 533 (11th Cir.)
("It should be beyond cavil that an attorney who fails
altogether to make any preparations for the penalty phase
of a capital murder trial deprives his client of
reasonably effective assistance of counsel by any
objective standard of reasonableness."), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 998, 106 S.Ct. 374, 88 L.Ed.2d 367 (1985).
We therefore conclude
the district court's findings of adequate investigation
and preparation are adequately supported by the state
court record. Therefore, Mr. Brecheen's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on this point must fail.
b.
Mr. Brecheen next
asserts that even if trial counsel discharged his duty to
investigate, he was still ineffective for failing to
introduce this additional mitigating evidence,
notwithstanding Mr. Brecheen's request that counsel forego
the introduction of that mitigating evidence. Because we
conclude the decision not to introduce additional
mitigating evidence was a reasonable tactical choice on
the part of Mr. Brecheen's trial counsel, we reject this
claim of error.
We agree with the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits that " '[c]ounsel has no absolute
duty to present mitigating character evidence' at all."
Bolender, 16 F.3d at 1557 (citing Mitchell v. Kemp, 762
F.2d 886, 889 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1026, 107 S.Ct. 3248, 97 L.Ed.2d 774 (1987)); Devier, 3
F.3d at 1453. From this, it follows a fortiori that the
failure to present available mitigating evidence is not
per se ineffective assistance of counsel. Bolender, 16
F.3d at 1557; King v. Puckett, 1 F.3d 280, 284 (5th
Cir.1993).
If counsel has
mitigating evidence available but elects not to present
that evidence, then the inquiry must focus on the reason
or reasons for the decision not to introduce that
evidence. If counsel had "a reasonable basis for his
strategic decision that an explanation of petitioner's
history would not have minimized the risk of the death
penalty," Burger, 483 U.S. at 795, 107 S.Ct. at 3126,
quoted in Devier, 3 F.3d at 1453, then that decision must
be given "a strong presumption of correctness" and "the
inquiry is generally at an end." Porter, 14 F.3d at 557;
see also Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1385 (8th
Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040, 109
S.Ct. 1944, 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989). If, however, the
decision is not tactical, and counsel's performance is
therefore deficient, then the first prong of Strickland is
satisfied. The court must then engage in a "harmlessness
review," Middleton, 849 F.2d at 493, to determine whether
petitioner carried his burden of demonstrating that he was
prejudiced by the deficient performance. Porter, 14 F.3d
at 557; Middleton, 849 F.2d at 493.
We digress momentarily
to explain why we believe Mr. Brecheen's argument that his
purported waiver of his right to present mitigating
evidence was not made knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily is misdirected. The "knowing, intelligent and
voluntary" standard for a waiver, which is traceable to
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed.
1461 (1938), applies to a defined and limited class of
issues that, because of their stature as "fundamental"
decisions, are waivable only by the defendant. See United
States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 127, 121
L.Ed.2d 82 (1992). In Teague, the Eleventh Circuit noted
the dichotomy between "fundamental" rights, such as the
right to plead guilty, see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969),21
the right to a jury trial, see Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268
(1942), the right to pursue an appeal, see Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963), and
other trial rights that "primarily involve trial strategy
and tactics," including the decision as to "what evidence
should be introduced." Teague, 953 F.2d at 1531. Having
thus established this dichotomy, the Eleventh Circuit
stated that fundamental rights are waivable only by the
defendant because of the personal nature and importance of
the right. Id. In contrast, however, the court expressly
found that nonfundamental trial rights, including
evidentiary matters, "are waivable by defense counsel on
the defendant's behalf." Id.
As we have stated, then,
the relevant inquiry is whether trial counsel's decision
was an informed tactical decision that was reasonable
under the circumstances of the case. Having delineated the
appropriate legal framework, "it is important to note that
'the mere incantation of "strategy" does not insulate
attorney behavior from review; an attorney must have
chosen not to present mitigating evidence after having
investigated the defendant's background, and that choice
must have been reasonable under the circumstances.' "
Bolender, 16 F.3d at 1558 (quoting Stevens, 968 F.2d at
1083) (emphasis in original).
Applying these
principles to the case at bar, we find counsel's actions
were in fact based on reasonable investigative efforts and
that the decision constituted a reasonable tactical choice
under the circumstances. The sequence of events relating
to the sentencing proceedings is as follows. After the
jury returned its verdict of guilty at the first phase of
the trial, the sentencing proceedings were to begin in the
evening after a long day of testimony in which the jury
had heard from Mr. Brecheen and his mother. As the jury
returned its guilty verdict, trial counsel observed
several jurors were extremely upset and agitated. Rather
than seek to postpone sentencing deliberations into the
next days, trial counsel believed those jurors who did not
feel strongly about the guilty verdict might refuse to
vote unanimously for the death penalty if asked to
deliberate as soon as possible. Trial counsel also
testified that, at that time, his strategy was to first
present the defendant, then the defendant's sisters
followed by his fiancee. Because some contradictory
testimony had been elicited earlier among Mr. Brecheen,
his mother, and his fiancee, trial counsel was concerned
about further impeachment of the potential witnesses.
Just prior to the
sentencing phase, defense counsel told the trial judge
that Mr. Brecheen, having been informed of his right to
present mitigating testimony, did not wish to delay the
proceeding by putting on additional evidence. The trial
court instructed the jury, in Mr. Brecheen's presence, to
consider evidence relative to mitigation that was
presented on the defendant's behalf during the guilt phase
of trial because the defendant did not wish to present any
further evidence.
While it might have been
preferable for the state trial court to interview Mr.
Brecheen prior to the sentencing phase, as was suggested
by trial counsel, the evidence adduced during the state
postconviction evidentiary hearing shows both trial
counsel and Mr. Brecheen were given full opportunity to
explain this sequence of events. The postconviction trial
court, as trier of fact, found "the defendant discussed
with his attorney his option regarding mitigating evidence
and made a voluntary decision to forego the opportunity to
call witnesses." Although this finding is not entitled to
a presumption of correctness, we find that it is
nonetheless correct on its merits and that it supports a
conclusion that the decision not to present additional
mitigating evidence was within the realm of reasonable
tactical decisions.
In sum, counsel
incorporated the mitigating evidence adduced at the guilt
phase of trial into the sentencing phase. In addition,
counsel was prepared to present mitigating evidence and
had assembled witnesses in the courtroom in anticipation
of offering their testimony. In light of Mr. Brecheen's
request to forego introducing additional evidence,
however, counsel weighed several factors, including
tactical considerations, and in the exercise of his
professional judgment, agreed with the request. As the
Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he reasonableness of
counsel's actions may be determined or substantially
influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Counsel
then drew the jury's attention to relevant testimony they
had heard that day and to other mitigating factors in an
attempt to persuade the jury to spare Mr. Brecheen from
the sentence that it ultimately imposed. Under these
circumstances, we cannot conclude Mr. Brecheen was
deprived of his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel.23
CONCLUSION
Review of a death
sentence is among the most serious examinations any court
of law ever undertakes. We have given exhaustive and
serious consideration to Mr. Brecheen's claims, as have
each of the state and federal courts preceding us, in
recognition of the fact that "[o]ur duty to search for
constitutional error with painstaking care is never more
exacting than it is in a capital case." Burger, 483 U.S.
at 785, 107 S.Ct. at 3121. Mr. Brecheen was tried before
an impartial jury with the assistance of competent counsel
in a proceeding unaffected by constitutional error.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM
the decision of the federal district court denying Mr.
Brecheen's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. His
request for a stay of execution, see McFarland v. Scott,
--- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 2573-74, 129 L.Ed.2d
666 (1994), shall be extended pending the timely filing of
a petition for a stay, or for a writ of certiorari, or
both, with the United States Supreme Court and during the
pendency of any proceedings before that Court.
*****
EBEL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
This is a difficult case
and my decision to dissent is a close one. I agree with
much of what the majority opinion says. Indeed, my only
quarrel is with the majority's conclusion that Brecheen
failed to establish that he had ineffective trial counsel
during the sentencing phase of the trial.
The sentencing phase of
a capital case is a vitally important proceeding and it
requires careful preparation, advanced consultation with
the client, and vigorous advocacy. It is not a stepchild
to the guilt phase of the trial, but itself deserves to
share center stage with the guilt phase. "[F]ailure to
present significant mitigating evidence creates a
one-sided, non-adversarial sentencing hearing. Such a
sentencing hearing undermines the proper functioning of
the adversarial process and erodes confidence in the
outcome of the case." Ronnie Seidel, Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing: Frey v.
Fulcomer, 66 Tem.L.Rev. 1107, 1118 (1993). See Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602-06, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2963-65, 57
L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, Guideline
11.4.1(A) & (C) (1989) (As soon as counsel begins a
capital case he or she "should conduct independent
investigations relating to the guilt/innocence phase and
to the penalty phase.... The investigation ... should be
conducted regardless of any initial assertion by the
client that mitigation is not to be offered."). It is at
the sentencing phase of the trial that the jury is asked
to turn its attention away from whether the defendant is
guilty or innocent and to focus on the defendant as an
individual. The lawyer's job is to assist the jury in its
assessment of who the defendant is and why he or she
committed the crime.
Brecheen claims that his
counsel, Mr. Sleeper, was ineffective because he failed to
discover and present mitigating evidence that raises a
reasonable probability that the jury would have declined
to vote for the death penalty if such evidence had been
before it. We have to decide if Sleeper's representation
fell below the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and, if
so, whether Brecheen was thereby prejudiced.
To prove that counsel's
performance was deficient, Brecheen bears the burden of
meeting the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In
Strickland, the Court held that a defendant must show: (1)
"that counsel's performance was deficient" with reference
to prevailing professional norms, and (2) "that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687,
104 S.Ct. at 2064; United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462,
1472 (10th Cir.1990). Prejudice is shown by demonstrating
that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1472.
The majority found that
Brecheen's counsel did not perform below the Strickland
standard and, therefore, the majority did not need to
address the prejudice prong of Strickland. The majority
offers essentially three explanations for finding
Brecheen's counsel not ineffective: (1) Brecheen did not
want his attorney to present any mitigating evidence at
the sentencing phase; (2) Sleeper adequately investigated
Brecheen's background; and (3) it was a legitimate trial
strategy not to put on separate mitigating evidence. I
will address each of these in turn.
The first issue is the
effect to be given to Brecheen's request that no
mitigating evidence be put on at the sentencing stage of
the trial. Although there is a dispute in the record, the
district court in the state habeas proceeding concluded
that Brecheen said he did not want mitigating evidence
presented, and I am required to accept the state court's
factual finding in that regard.
I agree with the
majority that this should be evaluated not as a question
of a client's waiver of an essential constitutional right,
but rather as a question of whether his counsel performed
up to the standards required by the Constitution in
consulting with the client and in making the decision not
to put on further evidence. That is, it is the counsel's
conduct that is being scrutinized in this ineffective
counsel claim. The majority finds support for counsel's
decision not to put on further evidence from the fact that
Brecheen asked that no further mitigating evidence be
advanced. However, as the majority observed, the approach
to be taken at the mitigation stage of a capital trial
involves many technical and complicated considerations
beyond the understanding and experience of most clients.
The weight to be given a client's wishes either to put on
evidence or to refrain from putting on evidence will
depend on how well informed the client is and on the
adequacy of the lawyer's advice to the client in this
regard. Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1502 (11th
Cir.1991) ("lawyers may not blindly follow" clients'
commands to forego presenting mitigating evidence because
"the lawyer first must evaluate potential avenues and
advise the client of those offering potential merit")
(quoting Thompson v. Wainright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1451 (11th
Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1042, 107 S.Ct. 1986, 95
L.Ed.2d 825 (1987)); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180,
1198 (9th Cir.1993) (counsel's acquiescence in Jeffries'
informed and knowing decision to forego mitigating
evidence was not an ineffective assistance of counsel),
cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1294, 127 L.Ed.2d
647 (1994).
In order to give much
weight to a client's preferences as to how to present a
defense, the client must have been adequately informed by
his attorney about the legal ramifications of the decision
and the factual evidence that could be presented and its
potential significance. Most clients do not have the
wherewithal to make such an important decision without
their attorney's advice and guidance.
Here, the record before
us establishes that Sleeper did not provide Brecheen with
such information. The testimony of Brecheen and others,1
including Sleeper, indicates that Brecheen was not so
advised, nor was Sleeper in a position to give Brecheen
the needed advice because Sleeper had not marshalled the
evidence that could have been presented on Brecheen's
behalf. Not only was a summary of the testimony that could
have been presented not relayed to Brecheen, he was not
made aware of the legal consequences of foregoing the
presentation of separate mitigation evidence.
Additionally, Brecheen was not given enough time to
consider adequately the minimal information that his
counsel provided to him after the jury returned its guilty
verdict because the sentencing phase of the trial began
almost immediately thereafter. Thus, I would give
relatively little weight here to Brecheen's reactive and
ill-informed desire essentially to give up and not to put
on any separate mitigation defense.
Turning to the second
issue of the adequacy of Sleeper's investigation, the
record shows that Sleeper did not invest any significant
effort in checking Brecheen's character or background for
the sentencing phase of the trial.2
Sleeper did investigate the crime; however, as the
affidavits show, he did a wholly inadequate job of
developing mitigating evidence of Brecheen's background
and character. Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 533 (11th
Cir.) ("It should be beyond cavil that an attorney who
fails altogether to make any preparations for the penalty
phase of a capital murder trial deprives his client of
reasonably effective assistance of counsel by any
objective standard of reasonableness."), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 998, 106 S.Ct. 374, 88 L.Ed.2d 367 (1985); Brewer v.
Aiken, 935 F.2d 850, 858 (7th Cir.1991) (In the light of
"attorney's failure to make a reasonable investigation to
discover ... readily available evidence regarding
[defendant's] low I.Q., susceptibility to the influence of
friends and disadvantaged background, we hold that
'counsel's representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness.' ") (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65). The record reveals to me a
wholly inadequate effort by Sleeper to develop and marshal
mitigating evidence. He made very little effort to develop
sympathetic evidence about Brecheen's background, and no
effort to contact most of the townsfolk who would have
testified so favorably to him.
Finally, I address the
claim that Sleeper's decision not to put on mitigating
evidence can be justified as trial strategy. The majority
characterized Sleeper's decision as a legitimate trial
strategy to get the jury back into deliberations quickly
because the jurors appeared agitated. However, a trial
decision based on an inadequate investigation, resulting
in insufficient information, cannot be a legitimate trial
strategy. When the storm hits, it is hardly strategic to
choose one's course without first knowing from where the
winds blow. Because Sleeper had not investigated what kind
of mitigating evidence could be developed for Brecheen, he
can hardly have made a defensible trial strategy at the
last minute to forego the mitigation phase of the trial.
In any event, Sleeper's
"trial strategy" was to get the jury back into
deliberations quickly because some jurors seemed agitated.
However, there was no explanation offered why a brief
presentation of mitigating evidence would do anything
other than increase whatever doubts the jurors may already
have had. This is not a case where the record reveals that
the state would have put on further damaging evidence if
mitigation evidence were introduced. Nor is it a case
where this evidence would significantly have delayed
deliberations if it had effectively been marshalled in
advance. Instead, no trial strategy is offered to explain
why brief, highly favorable background evidence along the
lines contained in the attached affidavits of potential
witnesses would have been harmful to Brecheen.
In conclusion, there was
simply no adequate effort to present "aspect[s] of
[Brecheen's] character" that the jury could use as a basis
for determining that, notwithstanding the terrible crime
for which he was convicted, he should not be given the
death penalty. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at
2964-65. When I consider the critical role that effective
presentation of mitigating evidence plays in a death
penalty case, I conclude that Sleeper's assistance fell
below the prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.
I next evaluate whether
Sleeper's ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced
Brecheen. Applying the Strickland standard in Osborn v.
Shillinger, we said that because
the Court intended the prejudice
standard to be flexible, it emphasized that "a defendant
need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely
than not altered the outcome in the case." Instead, the
defendant bears the burden of showing "that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome."
861 F.2d at 626 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2067-68)
(internal citations omitted). When the ineffective
assistance claim relates to the sentencing phase of the
trial, the standard is whether there is "a reasonable
probability that, absent the errors, the
sentencer--including an appellate court, to the extent it
independently reweighs the evidence--would have concluded
that the balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances did not warrant death." Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. This is the test I have to
apply. Do I harbor a significant doubt that this evidence
would have caused at least one juror to choose life rather
than death? Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1352 (10th
Cir.1984). The jury found as an aggravating factor that
Brecheen put more than one person at risk of death or
great bodily injury. Against that aggravating factor and
the facts of the murder, which the majority detailed, I
have to decide whether the mitigating evidence that could
have been presented on Brecheen's behalf raises a
significant doubt about the jury's decision. See id. 466
U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.
I am apologetic about
burdening the Federal Reporter with additional material;
however, I think the mitigating evidence in this case
cannot be fully appreciated without reading directly the
affidavits sworn to on Brecheen's behalf. Considering the
affidavits, one gets a sense of who Brecheen is through
the eyes of those who know him and who thought his life
was worthwhile and should be spared. When his conviction
is considered in the context of his other life
experiences, one is left with the distinct impression that
his conduct the night of the murder was aberrational. Had
the jurors heard this mitigating evidence, I must conclude
there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror
would have decided that Brecheen's life should be
spared--particularly considering the fact testified to by
Sleeper that several jurors seemed genuinely shaken by the
verdict of guilt that they had just returned.
Sleeper's failure to
present this evidence to the jury deprived Brecheen of the
chance to have the jury focus on him as an individual and
on his humanity. The Supreme Court has stressed the
importance of an individualized sentence determination in
death penalty cases. See, e.g., Lockett, 438 U.S. at
602-06, 98 S.Ct. at 2963-65 (capital sentencing scheme
must provide for an individualized assessment of the
appropriateness of the death penalty). Brecheen did not
receive that individualized consideration.
CONCLUSION
I am left with the firm
belief that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the jury would have
concluded that the balance of the one aggravating factor
and the mitigating evidence did not warrant death.
Therefore, I must respectfully DISSENT.
The facts described in this section are
taken from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion
affirming Mr. Brecheen's conviction on direct appeal.
Brecheen v. State, 732 P.2d 889, 892 (Okla.Crim.App.1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 909, 108 S.Ct. 1085, 99 L.Ed.2d 244
(1988) (Brecheen I )
Written determinations of historical
fact by state courts are presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 2254(d); see Steele v. Young, 11 F.3d 1518, 1520 n. 2
(10th Cir.1993). Considering the assertions made in Mr.
Brecheen's petition, we believe that the presumption of
correctness is appropriate. Id.
The Court of Criminal Appeals is vested
with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction" over all criminal
appellate actions. See Okla. Const., art. 7, Sec. 4;
Okla.Stat. tit. 20 Sec. 40. In the words of that court, it
is "the court of last resort in criminal cases." State v.
Blevins, 825 P.2d 270, 271 (Okla.Crim.App.1992) (emphasis
omitted)
Mr. Brecheen's counsel asserted
twenty-four errors on direct appeal: (1) lack of fair
trial for denial of change of venue; (2) improper for
cause excusal of venireman; (3) insufficient evidence of
"breaking" element of burglary; (4)-(5) improper
instructions concerning the "breaking" element; (6) juror
misconduct; (7) improper denial of access to victim's
house; (8) improper rebuttal evidence of film from
television news broadcast; (9) improper rebuttal testimony
on issue of collateral importance; (10) improper rebuttal
testimony from potentially biased expert; (11)
prosecutorial misconduct; (12) improper admission of
comments made by Mr. Brecheen in hospital in
"semi-conscious" state; (13) improper admission of
comments made under psychological police pressure; (14)
improper jury instruction regarding the voluntariness of
statements; (15) failure to instruct regarding exculpatory
statement made in Mr. Brecheen's confession; (16)
cumulative error; (17) failure to instruct against the use
of impeachment evidence in guilt-innocence phase; (18)
ineffective assistance of counsel during guilt-innocence
phase; (19) unconstitutional application of state
aggravating factors; (20) disproportionate sentence; (21)
improper instructions regarding mitigating factors; (22)
improper balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors;
(23) unconstitutionality of state death penalty statutes
in general; and (24) double jeopardy. See Brecheen I, 732
P.2d at 892-99
The claims that were not reviewed
included: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel during
sentencing phase; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; (3)
failure to give "anti-sympathy" instruction; (4)-(5)
insufficient foundation for jury's decision to assess
death penalty; (6) unconstitutional aggravating factor;
(7) inadequate instructions during the sentencing phase;
and (8) juror misconduct. See Brecheen II, 835 P.2d at
118-19 & n. 1. The only claims that the court reviewed
were two change of venue issues and one matter relating to
the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. Id. at 119-21
In his argument before this court, Mr.
Brecheen contends the federal district court improperly
found a waiver of issues regarding the composition of the
jury because defense counsel did not use two peremptory
challenges. The federal district court did not hold
petitioner's change of venue argument was waived, but only
that any residual issues relating to jury composition were
waived. Brecheen v. Reynolds, No. CIV-94-318-S, slip op.
at 19 n. 4 (citing Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108
S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988)). Since we divine no
additional issues relating to jury composition raised by
the petitioner, we do not treat the federal district
court's conclusion as error
Mr. Brecheen does not assert that the
Oklahoma courts have denied him an opportunity to file a
motion for a change of venue, an opportunity that is
required by the due process clause. See Groppi v.
Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 511, 91 S.Ct. 490, 493-94, 27
L.Ed.2d 571 (1971) (finding a Wisconsin statute that
categorically denied individuals accused of misdemeanors
with an "opportunity" to show "that a change of venue is
required in his case" constitutionally infirm) (emphasis
in original). Instead, he challenges the substantive
standard of review
"It is only when a criminal defendant
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a fair
trial is a virtual impossibility that such a motion should
be granted." Brecheen I, 732 P.2d at 893 (emphasis added)
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
has recently abandoned its standard of review for denials
of motions to change venue. See Brown v. State, 871 P.2d
56, 61-62 (Okla.Crim.App.) (expressly overruling the
"virtual impossibility" standard in favor of a requirement
that defendant show a fair and impartial trial is
"improbable"), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 517,
130 L.Ed.2d 423 (1994). In addition, although the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed Mr. Brecheen's argument
on this point in his application for postconviction relief
under a standard that was less stringent than the virtual
impossibility standard applied on direct appeal, see
Brecheen II, 835 P.2d at 120 (following a two-step test
used in Coates v. State, 773 P.2d 1281, 1286
(Okla.Crim.App.1989)), we must examine the standard in
place at the time of Mr. Brecheen's direct appeal in order
to determine whether it comported with federal due process
requirements
On direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals reviews claims not preserved at trial for
"fundamental error." This fundamental error exception to
claims that would otherwise be barred is limited to the
direct review setting and does not apply to claims raised
for the first time in state post-conviction proceedings.
See Steele, 11 F.3d at 1522 n. 5
Section 701.12(2) of the Oklahoma
statutes provides that the phrase "aggravating
circumstances" includes a finding that the "defendant
knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one
person."
En banc review, and ultimately
certiorari, were granted in Cartwright II to decide
whether a separate aggravating circumstance not implicated
in this case, Sec. 701.12(4), which allowed the imposition
of a death sentence for a crime found to be "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel," was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Our unanimous en banc decision finding this aggravating
factor unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court's
subsequent affirmance, did not address the aggravating
factor at issue in this case, which implicates Sec.
701.12(2). See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 360,
108 S.Ct. 1853, 1857, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988), aff'g, 822
F.2d 1477, 1492 (10th Cir.1987), rev'g on other grounds,
Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d at 1219-21
Although Mr. Brecheen does not assert a
claim regarding the constitutionality of the selection
decision, we find that because there is some degree of
overlap between this type of claim and his claim that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing,
it is appropriate to address this issue
The Supreme Court has held that the
selection decision, which requires an individualized
sentencing determination, "is met when the jury can
consider relevant mitigating evidence of the character and
record of the defendant and the circumstances of the
crime." Tuilaepa, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2635
(citing Blystone, 494 U.S. at 307, 110 S.Ct. at 1083-84);
see also Johnson v. Texas, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at
2669. Although Mr. Brecheen asserts he received
ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the sentencing
phase, based on counsel's failure to introduce additional
mitigating evidence, the record is clear that the
mitigating evidence adduced during the guilt phase was
incorporated into the sentencing phase. Therefore, the
sentencing jury was in fact allowed to "consider relevant
mitigating evidence."
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1,
106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Green v.
Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979)
(per curiam); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct.
2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (plurality opinion); Roberts
v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974
(1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality
opinion); and Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870, 108 S.Ct. 197, 98
L.Ed.2d 149 (1987), are not to the contrary. Those cases
all involved situations where the sentencer was, for a
variety of reasons, prevented or precluded from
considering relevant mitigating evidence. For example,
Woodson and Roberts involved state statutes that excluded
all mitigating evidence from the sentencer's
consideration; Lockett and Green involved state statutes
that limited the type of mitigating evidence that could be
introduced; Eddings involved a trial judge's erroneous
interpretation of existing precedent which he believed
prohibited him from considering certain types of
mitigating evidence; and Skipper and Dutton involved a
trial court's affirmative act of excluding relevant
mitigating evidence that the defendant wished to offer. In
the present case, however, there is no evidence in the
record that state law or the trial court "excluded"
evidence that the defendant wished to offer from the
sentencer's consideration, in contravention of the cases
described above; rather, the evidence supports a finding
that Mr. Brecheen and his trial counsel made a tactical
decision to forego the introduction of additional
mitigating evidence. Because Lockett and its progeny stand
only for the proposition that a State may not, by statute
or judicial act, "cut off in an absolute manner the
presentation of mitigating evidence," McKoy v. North
Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 456, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 1240, 108
L.Ed.2d 369 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring), quoted in
Johnson, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2666 (majority
opinion), we find that entire line of authority inapposite
to the case before us.
Therefore, while we conclude there was
no Eighth Amendment violation in regard to the selection
decision, we discuss below whether there was a Sixth
Amendment violation of the right to effective assistance
of counsel at sentencing in regard to the decision not to
introduce additional mitigating evidence.
We note that Townsend v. Sain is still
valid precedent except to the extent it applies the
"deliberate bypass" or "knowing waiver" standard, as
opposed to the cause and prejudice and fundamental
miscarriage of justice standards, to establish an excuse
for a habeas petitioner's failure to develop a material
fact in state court proceedings. See Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719,
118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992) (overruling in part Townsend, 372
U.S. at 317, 83 S.Ct. at 759)
"Explicit and implicit findings by
state trial and appellate courts 'shall be presumed to be
correct,' 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d), unless one of seven
factors listed in section 2254(d) are present, or the
federal court concludes that the state court findings are
not fairly supported by the record." Case v. Mondragon,
887 F.2d 1388, 1392 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1035, 110 S.Ct. 1490, 108 L.Ed.2d 626 (1990)
(citations omitted); see also Marshall v. Lonberger, 459
U.S. 422, 431-32, 103 S.Ct. 843, 849-50, 74 L.Ed.2d 646
(1983)
See, e.g., Osborn, 861 F.2d at 623;
Beaulieu v. United States, 930 F.2d 805, 807 (10th
Cir.1991) (noting the need when the record is insufficient
for additional fact-finding on ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in the context of Sec. 2255 claim)
Mr. Brecheen's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim does not allege "presumed"
ineffectiveness of counsel, which exists in such contexts
as an actual conflict of interest, see Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1178, 55
L.Ed.2d 426 (1978), or the total absence of counsel during
a critical stage of the proceedings, see United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n. 25, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2047 n.
25, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). For clarity, we therefore refer
to his claim as one alleging "actual" ineffective
assistance of counsel
Mr. Brecheen also asserts in his
supplemental brief that his alleged waiver of the right to
present additional mitigating evidence was invalid because
it was not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.
For reasons enunciated below, we do not believe that this
subissue relating to the validity vel non of the purported
waiver is appropriate to our analysis
Bolender states that the failure to
conduct a reasonable investigation may render counsel's
assistance "ineffective." Bolender, 16 F.3d at 1557.
Bolender, however, relies on Lightbourne, an earlier
Eleventh Circuit decision, for this proposition. In fact,
Lightbourne states that the failure to investigate may
constitute deficient representation (i.e., the first prong
of Strickland ) and not necessarily proof of
ineffectiveness (i.e., the first and second prongs of
Strickland )
In our view, the statement from
Lightbourne appears more consonant with Strickland in that
inadequate investigation, inadequate preparation, or both,
should not, ipso facto, mean that counsel was
"ineffective" absent a showing of prejudice. Therefore, we
believe, as in Lightbourne, that under such circumstances,
petitioner still retains the burden of establishing that
he was prejudiced as a result of counsel's failure to
conduct a reasonable investigation. See Sanders, 21 F.3d
at 1457 ("the failure to conduct a reasonable
investigation constitutes deficient performance.").
Current counsel has diligently sought
to show, through sheer volume of affidavits, the extent of
mitigating witnesses undiscovered by trial counsel. We
believe the affiants are well-intentioned in their support
of Mr. Brecheen's moral character, but we find the great
percentage of the affidavits to be cumulative and
therefore offer little indication of trial counsel's
ineffectiveness. See Devier v. Zant, 3 F.3d 1445, 1452
(11th Cir.1993) (failure to call for cumulative mitigating
testimony during sentencing phase is no evidence of
inadequate preparation); Mathenia v. Delo, 975 F.2d 444,
448 (8th Cir.1992) (same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----,
113 S.Ct. 1609, 123 L.Ed.2d 170 (1993)
In Singleton v. Lockhart, 962 F.2d 1315
(8th Cir.1992), the Eighth Circuit seemingly endorsed the
application of the heightened waiver standard under
similar circumstances. 962 F.2d at 1321. To the extent
that our conclusion is inconsistent with the Eighth
Circuit's decision in Singleton, we respectfully disagree
with its conclusion. In spite of the obvious importance of
this issue, it is still, at its core, an evidentiary
question that is inherently tactical in nature and
therefore vested in the discretion of trial counsel
Because we find no constitutional error
in any of Mr. Brecheen's claims, we must also reject his
final claim of cumulative error. See United States v.
Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1471 (10th Cir.1990) ("[A]
cumulative-error analysis should evaluate only the effect
of matters determined to be error, not the cumulative
effect [of non-errors].")
Robert A. BRECHEEN, Petitioner, v.
Ron J. WARD, Warden of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary Respondent.
This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res
judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors
the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of the
court's General Order filed November 29, 1993. 151 F.R.D. 470
This panel has closely monitored this petition
since it was initially filed in the United States District Court,
and considerable effort has been expended on the issues raised.
This panel has had the benefit of the pleadings filed in both
state and federal courts with attached appendices, plus the
transcript of the August 1, 1995 hearing. We have received the
petition for writ of habeas corpus with supporting authorities,
the state's response, and Petitioner's reply, filed in federal
district court and accept them as filed in this court.
Accordingly, the panel has determined unanimously that oral
argument would not be useful, that no further briefing is
necessary in this court, and that further delay in this appeal is
not warranted. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9