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Benjamin BREWER
Rape
The New York Times
October 27, 1991
Under an obscure
80-year-old Oklahoma law, Benjamin Brewer, a
prisoner on death row at the state
penitentiary in McAlester, could have been
killed in his cell by a county sheriff next
week.
But a state appeals court
halted the proceedings on Friday and gave
lawyers for all sides two weeks to submit
further legal briefs.
"It's a very odd
situation," said the prisoner's lawyer,
Mitchell A. Lee.
It began two months ago
in Tulsa County, where Mr. Brewer had been
sentenced to death for killing a woman in
1978. On Aug. 27, a district judge there, B.
R. Beasley, ordered Sheriff Stanley Glanz to
execute Mr. Brewer on Oct. 29.
The order was based on
the seldom-used law, which allows a sheriff
to carry out an execution if no legal reason
exists to delay it. David Moss, the Tulsa
County District Attorney, had requested the
order because no action had been taken in
Mr. Brewer's case in 18 months.
But on Oct. 2, a district
judge in Pittsburg County, where the state
penitentiary is situated, ordered
penitentiary officials not to assist Sheriff
Glanz because Mr. Brewer still had several
appeals available. That order, issued by
Judge Robert Layden, meant that the sheriff
would not be allowed to use the prison's
death chamber.
Then, this Tuesday, Judge
Layden refused to issue an order to stop
Sheriff Glanz, saying he had no authority
over a sheriff from Tulsa.
Mr. Lee, the defense
lawyer, said Judge Layden's two orders,
taken together, meant that Sheriff Glanz
would have to "shoot Brewer or strangle him
or whatever he wants to kill him in his
cell."
Sheriff Glanz went to the
prison on Friday to ask Mr. Brewer whom he
wanted to witness his execution. "We felt we
needed to go ahead and make the
arrangements," Sheriff Glanz said later.
"Our main purpose was to visit with Mr.
Brewer and advise him he had the right to
have clergy and up to five witnesses attend
the execution."
But the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals issued its stay about 15
minutes before the sheriff arrived at the
prison.
Sheriff Glanz and Mr.
Moss, the Tulsa County District Attorney,
conceded that they had never expected to be
allowed to execute Mr. Brewer. But the
sheriff insisted that he had been prepared
to do so.
Legislators said the case
illustrated the need to repeal the law. "It
might have worked 80 years ago," said
Representative Gary Maxey, chairman of the
House Criminal Justice Committee. "But with
the changes that have been made in capital
punishment laws, I don't think it would work
today."
Witnesses to an
Execution
The New York Times
April 28, 1996
A
man who raped and
stabbed a
20-year-old
neighbor, then sat
on her sofa and
watched her die, was
executed on Friday
while her family
watched on
closed-circuit
television.
The man, Benjamin
Brewer, 38, had
nothing to say and
kept his eyes shut
as he was put to
death by lethal
injection.
One floor below the
execution chamber at
the Oklahoma State
Penitentiary, five
relatives of his
victim, Karen Joyce
Stapleton, watched
him die. They were
the first members of
a victim's family to
do so under a new
state law that
allows them to watch
on television in an
area separated from
the other witnesses.
"Karen faced him
alone, and she
fought hard to
survive," said her
brother, Mark
Gregory. "We
promised he would
not go unpunished,
and we wanted to be
here to represent
her when justice was
finally carried
out."
The Supreme Court
rejected Mr.
Brewer's final
appeal on Thursday.
*****
*****
1991 OK CR 85
814 P.2d 505
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, PETITIONER, v. BENJAMIN BREWER, RESPONDENT.
Case No. F-83-677.
August 2, 1991
ORDER
DECLINING JURISDICTION
�1 The
Attorney General of the
State of Oklahoma and the
District Attorney for Tulsa
County have jointly filed an
Application For Execution
Date alleging that this
Court affirmed Benjamin
Brewer's death penalty on
April 26, 1986, denied
post-conviction relief on
September 8, 1989, and the
United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari on March
26, 1990. Petitioners
request that this Court set
a new execution date since
all state appeals are
exhausted and federal
appeals were abandoned more
than 60 days prior to the
filing of the application.
�2 We
find that Petitioners have
failed to follow the proper
procedure. 22 O.S. 1981 �
1012 [22-1012] provides:
If, for any reason,
a judgment of death
has not been
executed, and it
remains in force,
the court in which
the conviction was
had, on application
of the district
attorney, must order
the defendant to be
brought before it,
or, if he is at
large, a warrant for
his apprehension may
be issued.
22 O.S.
1981 � 1013 [22-1013] then
provides:
Upon the defendant
being brought before
the court, it must
inquire into the
facts, and if no
legal reason exists
against the
execution of the
judgment, must make
an order that the
sheriff of the
proper county
execute the judgment
at a specified time.
The sheriff must
execute the judgment
accordingly.
It is
clear that the trial court
is the forum for the setting
of a new execution date, and
it is the duty of the
district attorney to seek
the new date in that forum.
The responsibility of the
trial court to set the date
was recognized by this Court
in Armstrong v. State, 2
Okl.Cr. 567, 103 P. 658
(1909).
�3 For
the above reasons, we
decline to assume
jurisdiction to grant the
requested relief.
�4 IT IS
SO ORDERED.
Benjamin BREWER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
Dan REYNOLDS, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 94-5072.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
April 5, 1995.
STEPHEN H. ANDERSON, Circuit
Judge.
In 1983, an Oklahoma jury
convicted Benjamin Brewer of first degree murder and sentenced
him to death. After unsuccessfully pursuing a direct appeal of
his conviction and post-conviction relief in the Oklahoma state
courts, Mr. Brewer filed this, his first federal petition for
writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. In his
petition, Mr. Brewer raised thirty-six claims. The district
court denied the petition, but issued a certificate of probable
cause.
In this appeal, Mr. Brewer's
only challenge is to the district court's denial of two of his
claims. First, he contends the district court erred in ruling
that he received effective assistance from his trial counsel
during the penalty phase of his trial. Specifically, he claims
his counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce mitigation
evidence relating to his mental condition and for failing to
call his mother as a mitigation witness. Second, Mr. Brewer
contends that the district court erred in concluding that he did
not have a constitutional right to the appointment of a mental
health expert to assist in the penalty phase of his trial. We
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 and
affirm.
On August 17, 1978, the
semi-nude body of Karen Joyce Stapleton was discovered in her
Tulsa apartment. She had been stabbed twenty-one times. Mr.
Brewer confessed to the crime and physical evidence introduced
at trial corroborated that confession.
In 1979, Mr. Brewer was tried
in the Tulsa County District Court on a charge of first degree
murder. He raised the defense of insanity, relying on the expert
testimony of Dr. Anthony C. Gagliano, a private osteopath
specializing in psychiatry. Mr. Brewer was represented at trial
by Frank McCarthy of the Tulsa County Public Defender's Office.
The jury found Mr. Brewer guilty of first degree murder and, in
the bifurcated penalty phase, recommended the death penalty.
Finding prosecutorial misconduct during the trial, the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction. Brewer v.
State, 650 P.2d 54 (Okla.Crim.App.1982).
Mr. Brewer was retried in
1983, again raising the defense of insanity. In the second
trial, he was represented by Mr. McCarthy with the assistance of
Thomas Burns, another attorney in the Tulsa County Public
Defender's Office.
In support of his insanity
defense, Mr. Brewer again introduced the expert testimony of Dr.
Gagliano. Dr. Gagliano did not conduct any psychological testing
on Mr. Brewer. Rather, he based his findings on his review of
Mr. Brewer's mental health records, a discussion with one of the
mental health experts who previously had examined Mr. Brewer, an
interview with Mr. Brewer's mother and written materials
received from her, and interviews with Mr. Brewer.
Dr. Gagliano testified that,
although Mr. Brewer was not psychotic, he suffered from a
personality disorder. R.Supp.Vol. III at 921. Dr. Gagliano
further testified that he found no insanity or thought disorder
either prior to or after the homicide, but that the "bizarreness
and insaneness of the crime" represented a thought disorder at
the time of the act. R.Supp.Vol. III at 920; R.Vol. I, Doc. 52
at 5.
As to the legal defense of
insanity, Dr. Gagliano testified that at the time he committed
the murder Mr. Brewer was insane; that is, he neither knew the
difference between right and wrong, nor could he appreciate the
consequences of his actions. R.Supp.Vol. III at 925.1
The jury rejected Mr. Brewer's
insanity defense and returned a guilty verdict on the first
degree murder charge. In the penalty phase of the trial,2
the State alleged the following aggravating factors: (1) that
Mr. Brewer previously had been convicted of a felony involving
the use or threat of violence to the person;3
and (2) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel.4
The State introduced by motion
the guilt/innocence phase prosecution evidence. Additionally, in
support of the prior violent felony aggravator, the State
introduced the judgment and sentence of the 1977 rape conviction
and Mr. Brewer's stipulation that the crime involved the use or
threat of violence to the person. R.Supp.Vol. III at 1065-67.
The State called no witnesses during the penalty phase.
Mr. Brewer instructed his
attorneys not to call any witnesses during the penalty phase. At
the federal habeas corpus hearing, Mr. McCarthy testified5
that he and Mr. Burns discussed whether or not they should
override Mr. Brewer's direction and present mitigation
witnesses. R.Vol. VIII at 18. Mr. McCarthy further testified
that, at the time of trial, he did not believe Mr. Brewer was
competent to make the decision to forego presentation of
mitigating evidence; that, as far as Mr. McCarthy knew, Mr.
Brewer had no reason for directing his counsel not to put on
mitigating evidence; and that defense counsel's decision to
forego presentation of mitigating evidence was not a "tactical
decision." Id. at 18, 22, 31.
Thus, although defense counsel
believed that the testimony of Mr. Brewer's mother, Shirley
Brewer Botkin, would have been helpful, they nonetheless acceded
to the wishes of their client and called no mitigation
witnesses. Id. at 18, 30-31. Defense counsel did, however,
introduce by motion the defense evidence presented during the
guilt/innocence phase. Thus, Dr. Gagliano's testimony, presented
during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, was again before
the jury in the penalty phase.
The jury found the two
statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and
returned a recommendation that the death penalty be imposed. On
October 27, 1983, the court sentenced Mr. Brewer to death.
On direct appeal, the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence,
Brewer v. State, 718 P.2d 354 (Okla.Crim.App.1986), and the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, Brewer v.
Oklahoma, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S.Ct. 245, 93 L.Ed.2d 169 (1986).
Mr. Brewer thereafter sought post-conviction relief in the
Oklahoma state courts. The district court denied post-conviction
relief on September 19, 1988. See Brewer v. State, No.
CRF-78-2137 (Tulsa County Dist.Ct. Sept. 21, 1988). That
decision was affirmed in an unpublished opinion by the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals on September 8, 1989. See Brewer v.
State, No. PC-88-868 (Okla.Crim.App. Sept. 8, 1989).
On June 12, 1992, Mr. Brewer
filed this federal habeas corpus petition. The district court
held an evidentiary hearing on December 23, 1993, and
subsequently entered an order denying the petition. The court
did, however, grant a certificate of probable cause and Mr.
Brewer filed a timely notice of appeal with this court. A stay
of execution order, entered by the district court on June 12,
1992, remains in effect. See R.Vol. I, Doc. 11.
As to each of the claims
presented in this appeal, Mr. Brewer has exhausted the available
state-court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b). Mr. Brewer
first presented the ineffective assistance of counsel claim to
the Oklahoma district court in his application for
post-conviction relief. Brewer v. State, No. CRF-78-2137 (Tulsa
County Dist.Ct. Sept. 19, 1988).
The court concluded that
because ineffective assistance of counsel is a claim which may
be raised on direct appeal, Mr. Brewer could not raise it for
the first time on collateral review. Id. at 3-4 (citing Jones v.
State, 704 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Okla.Crim.App.1985). The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Brewer v. State, No.
PC-88-868 (Okla.Crim.App. Sept. 8, 1989). However, in Brecheen
v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir.1994), we recently held that
the failure to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel on direct review will not preclude federal review of
that claim. Id. at 1363-64. Thus, Mr. Brewer's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is not procedurally barred.6
Mr. Brewer's second claim,
that he was denied the appointment of a mental health expert in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, was raised on direct
appeal and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals disposed of
the claim on the merits. See Brewer v. State, 718 P.2d 354, 363
(Okla.Crim.App.1986).
DISCUSSION
In reviewing the district
court's denial of Mr. Brewer's habeas corpus petition, we accept
the court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous and we
review the court's conclusions of law de novo. Thomas v. Kerby,
44 F.3d 884, 886-87 (10th Cir.1995); Kell v. United States
Parole Comm'n, 26 F.3d 1016, 1019 (10th Cir.1994); Hill v.
Reynolds, 942 F.2d 1494, 1495 (10th Cir.1991).
I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
DURING THE PENALTY PHASE
Mr. Brewer's first claim is
that his trial counsel was ineffective in not introducing the
following evidence during the penalty phase of his trial:
psychological evidence relating to his lifelong mental and
emotional disturbance; and the testimony of his mother, Shirley
Brewer Botkin. Noting that Mr. Brewer had instructed his
attorneys not to present mitigating evidence, the federal
district court stated its refusal to "establish a rule whereby
an attorney must disregard the explicit instructions of his
client, who has been found competent, or risk being found
ineffective as counsel," R.Vol. I, Doc. 53 at 14, and denied
habeas corpus relief on this ground.
A claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact
which we review de novo. Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343,
1365-66 (10th Cir.1994); United States v. Whalen, 976 F.2d 1346,
1347 (10th Cir.1992). We accept the factual findings of the
district court unless they are clearly erroneous. United States
v. Haddock, 12 F.3d 950, 955 (10th Cir.1993).
First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064;
Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1562 (10th Cir.1994); see
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586,
91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462,
1472 (10th Cir.1990).
"The Supreme Court has
observed that often it may be easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim for lack of prejudice than to determine
whether the alleged errors were legally deficient." Haddock, 12
F.3d at 955; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at
2069-70; United States v. Smith, 10 F.3d 724, 728 (10th
Cir.1993); Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1233 (10th
Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909, 107 S.Ct. 2491, 96
L.Ed.2d 383 (1987). This is a case in which we may heed the
Supreme Court's suggestion and turn immediately to Strickland's
prejudice component.7
In order to establish the
prejudice component of the Strickland analysis, Mr. Brewer must
show there exists "a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's purported unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; see
Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 626 (10th Cir.1988); see
also Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 381, 106 S.Ct. at 2586; Andrews v.
Deland, 943 F.2d 1162, 1193 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1213, 117 L.Ed.2d 451 (1992); Tapia v.
Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1564 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
835, 112 S.Ct. 115, 116 L.Ed.2d 84 (1991); Rivera, 900 F.2d at
1472.
In the context of a challenge
to counsel's effectiveness at the penalty phase of a capital
trial, prejudice is established if the petitioner demonstrates
"a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer--including
an appellate court, to the extent that it independently reweighs
the evidence--would have concluded that the balance of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Osborn, 861 F.2d
at 626 n. 12.
In reviewing a claim of
prejudice, we must "keep in mind the strength of the
government's case and the aggravating factors the jury found as
well as the mitigating factors that might have been presented"
if the petitioner had been provided effective assistance of
counsel. Stafford, 34 F.3d at 1564; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at
696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069.A.
Mr. Brewer first claims that
the sentencing jury should have heard evidence regarding "the
severe mental and emotional impairments suffered by Benjamin
Brewer throughout his life that mitigated the degree of his
culpability." Petr's Br. at 27. In support of this argument, Mr.
Brewer introduced the testimony of two psychologists at the
federal habeas corpus hearing: Dr. Patricia Fleming, a clinical
psychologist, and Sally Church, a licensed professional
counselor.8
Dr. Fleming conducted her
evaluation of Mr. Brewer in 1993, fifteen years after the crime.
She and her associate conducted a battery of psychological tests
which included the Minnesota Multiphastic Personality Inventory
("MMPI"), the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, the Wechsler
Memory Scale, and various other tests of sensory and perceptual
functioning. Mr. Brewer tested within the average or normal
range on most of these tests. Dr. Fleming noted that Mr.
Brewer's I.Q. of 120 was slightly above average.
Dr. Fleming reviewed Mr.
Brewer's previous mental health records which included two
competency evaluations performed at the Eastern State Hospital
(one in 1976, prior to his trial for rape; the second in 1979,
prior to his first trial on the first-degree murder charge); the
report of Dr. Paul Aleksic, a psychologist who examined Mr.
Brewer when he was sixteen years old; and the testimony of Dr.
Gagliano. Dr. Fleming also communicated with Mr. Brewer's family
members and conducted approximately nine hours of interviews
with Mr. Brewer.
Dr. Fleming testified that Mr.
Brewer suffers from a "schizoid personality disorder";9
that he exhibits a "high level of paranoia, alienation, social
alienation, suspiciousness"; and that, in her examination of Mr.
Brewer, he "showed some antisocial behavior things on [the MMPI
and Beck Depression Scale tests], some psychotic thinking."
R.Vol. VIII at 59. She noted in her evaluation that Mr. Brewer
"has a number of traits typical of the aggressive man with
little regard for others, poor interpersonal relationships, and
social isolation." R.Vol. III, Doc. 13 at 12.
Mr. Brewer contends that, had
the jury heard this psychological evidence, it would have viewed
him in a different light, and he concludes that there is a
reasonable probability the jury would not have rendered a
recommendation of death. The State, on the other hand, contends
that a good deal of the psychological testimony Mr. Brewer now
claims should have been introduced during the penalty phase was
adequately placed before the jury by way of Dr. Gagliano's
testimony, given during the guilt/innocence phase and introduced
t 12.
Mr. Brewer contends that, had
the jury heard this psychological evidence, it would have viewed
him in a different light, and he concludes that there is a
reasonable probability the jury would not have rendered a
recommendation of death. The State, on the other hand, contends
that a good deal of the psychological testimony Mr. Brewer now
claims should have been introduced during the penalty phase was
adequately placed before the jury by way of Dr. Gagliano's
testimony, given during the guilt/innocence phase and introduced
by motion into the penalty phase. We disagree.
The major requirement of the
penalty phase of a capital trial is that the sentence be
individualized by focusing on the particularized characteristics
of the defendant. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112,
102 S.Ct. 869, 875, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944
(1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199, 96 S.Ct. 2909,
2937, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). And, as the Supreme Court has
observed, "[e]vidence of ... emotional disturbance is typically
introduced by defendants in mitigation." Eddings, 455 U.S. at
115, 102 S.Ct. at 877; see Hill v. Lockhart, 28 F.3d 832, 844
(8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 778, 130
L.Ed.2d 673 (1995); Schlup v. Armontrout, 941 F.2d 631, 643 (8th
Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 909, 112 S.Ct. 1273, 117
L.Ed.2d 499 (1992); see also Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for
Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 299, 300-03 (1983). Clearly, such mitigating
evidence is not limited to evidence of guilt or innocence, nor
does it necessarily relate solely to the circumstances of the
offense. See Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545, 1554-55 (10th
Cir.1988), rev'd sub nom. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 110
S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990).
In this case, Dr. Gagliano's
testimony was given at a point in the proceedings when the jury
was focused on guilt or innocence rather than the sentence to be
imposed. Furthermore, the testimony centered on Mr. Brewer's
sanity at the time he committed the offense, and only
tangentially touched upon the more chronic mental health
problems to which Dr. Fleming testified at the federal habeas
corpus hearing.10
Thus, while Dr. Gagliano's
guilt/innocence phase testimony clearly was relevant to the
first of the five mitigating instructions given by the court at
sentencing,11
its relevance with respect to the remaining instructions would
have been less obvious to the jury. Unfortunately, counsel did
nothing to clarify this obfuscation. Counsel waived opening
statement and directed his closing argument toward his
disagreement with the jury's verdict of guilt and his
generalized opposition to the death penalty. See R.Supp.Vol. III
at 1070-71, 1080-91.
Simply stated, defense counsel
did nothing more with Dr. Gagliano's guilt/innocence phase
testimony than to properly move for its introduction at
sentencing. As a result, although the jury instructions provided
"standards to guide" the jury in its deliberation of the
sentence, we harbor serious doubt that "the sentencing authority
[was] apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of
the sentence." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195, 96 S.Ct. at 2935. The
jurors simply were left with no guidance as to how they might
consider Dr. Gagliano's testimony in light of the mitigating
instructions given by the court. See Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d
642, 654-55 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 872, 109 S.Ct.
189, 102 L.Ed.2d 158 (1988); see also Blanco v. Singletary, 943
F.2d 1477, 1503 & n. 124 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S.
943, 112 S.Ct. 2282, 119 L.Ed.2d 207 (1992); Armstrong v. Dugger,
833 F.2d 1430, 1433 (11th Cir.1987). Accordingly, we must
consider the evidence offered by Mr. Brewer at the federal
hearing as well as the impact that evidence would have had on
the jury had it been presented at sentencing.
In reviewing Dr. Fleming's
testimony, and the thirteen-page psychological evaluation of Mr.
Brewer that she prepared, we note the conclusory nature of her
diagnosis of Mr. Brewer as a man "who suffers significant mental
illness." R.Vol. VIII at 69. We also note the absence in Mr.
Brewer's mental health history of any diagnoses which
corroborate Dr. Fleming's conclusion. There is nothing in the
record which suggests Mr. Brewer suffers from significant mental
health problems, nothing to suggest an organic brain disorder,
nothing suggesting brain damage. He is not mentally retarded; he
has an I.Q. of 120. He has never been hospitalized for treatment
of any form of mental disease or condition, nor has he ever been
on medication to control any mental disorder.
On the standardized
psychological tests administered by Dr. Fleming, Mr. Brewer
tested within the normal range. When he was evaluated in 1974 by
Dr. Paul Aleksic, he was diagnosed as having "pronounced
schizoid features," but there was no indication at that time of
"serious emotional deterioration." R.Vol. III, Doc. 10 at 7.
Indeed, Dr. Aleksic found only "some schizophrenic traits
evident in that he is socially and emotionally detached but
there is no evidence of disorder thought or dissociation from
reality." Id.
Mr. Brewer was evaluated at
the Eastern State Hospital for his competency to stand trial on
two occasions, in 1976 and again in 1978. While the foci of
these evaluations were on Mr. Brewer's competency, we cannot
overlook the fact that qualified physicians12
at this state institution, on two separate occasions, found that
Mr. Brewer had "no mental disorder." R.Vol. III, Docs. 11, 12.
Although Dr. Fleming had some
reservations regarding the Eastern State Hospital reports, her
evaluation stated only that, had the examining physician
"addressed the issue of behavioral stability and the schizoid
and depressive characteristics the report would have noted
dynamics that indicated the need for treatment for this young
man." Petr's Br., App. 1, at 7. Thus, Dr. Fleming did not
dispute the hospital's conclusion regarding the absence of a
mental disorder, it was simply her opinion that Mr. Brewer
needed some form of unspecified "treatment." And finally, Dr.
Gagliano testified that Mr. Brewer is not psychotic, nor did he
suffer from any mental disorder or thought disorder prior to, or
following, the homicide. R.Supp.Vol. III at 921.
We find nothing in Dr.
Fleming's written evaluation of Mr. Brewer or her habeas hearing
testimony which directly refutes, or even calls into question,
the diagnoses of the several other mental health professionals
who found no mental illness or thought disorder in Mr. Brewer.13
She simply arrived at a different conclusion, which is not
surprising given that psychiatry is not "an exact science, and
psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes
mental illness, on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to a
given behavior and symptoms, [and] on cure and treatment." Ake
v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1095, 84 L.Ed.2d
53 (1985); see Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1517 (9th
Cir.1990), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 910, 112 S.Ct. 1275, 117
L.Ed.2d 501 (1992); Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1013 (7th
Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1110, 111 S.Ct. 1024, 112
L.Ed.2d 1106 (1991).
In light of the rather
speculative nature of Dr. Fleming's conclusions and the
conflicting diagnoses regarding Mr. Brewer's mental condition,
we believe the jury would have viewed Mr. Brewer as, at most, a
paranoid, antisocial man, suffering from a personality disorder
evinced by violent and inappropriate behavior. Psychological
testimony of the sort proffered at the federal hearing would not
have been afforded considerable weight by the jury. Thus, we are
doubtful that the jury would have found such evidence
sufficiently mitigating to change the sentence rendered.
B.
Mr. Brewer next claims that
the jury should have heard testimony from his mother, Shirley
Brewer Botkin. Ms. Botkin did not testify at the federal
hearing. The only evidence proffered as to what her testimony
would have been is an eighteen-page letter, prepared by Ms.
Botkin, wherein she details her son's life history. R.Vol. III,
Doc. 16.14
The substance of this letter
suggests that Ms. Botkin would have testified regarding her
son's difficult childhood; her own inability to spend time with
her son due to the demands of her employment; his father's
disaffection and abuse, unspecified as to type, time, manner,
degree, or duration; the family's instability, frequent moves,
and financial hardships; Mr. Brewer's inability to make friends
or form lasting relationships; his failed attempts at suicide;
the fact that her son had been diagnosed with "schizophrenia
brought on by pressures from his peers"; and Mr. Brewer's failed
marriage.
Mr. Brewer argues that this
evidence would have cast him as the unfortunate victim of a
violent and turbulent upbringing. In considering Mr. Brewer's
ineffectiveness claim, however, we "must consider the totality
of the evidence before the judge or jury," Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, not merely that part of the testimony
which may have been helpful to Mr. Brewer's case.
Thus, we believe it is just as
probable that the jury may have concluded, not that Mr. Brewer
was a victim of his environment, but that his crime was the
culmination of his own, self-directed, violent, and
irresponsible life. The jury would have heard testimony
regarding Mr. Brewer's problems in school and the fact that he
eventually dropped out of school; his drug and alcohol abuse,
and the fact that he had left home to take up residence with
other drug users; his increasing alienation of his family; his
inability to hold down a job; and his numerous parole
violations.
The jury undoubtedly would
have been struck, as we are, by Mr. Brewer's escalating
criminality: he had run away from home and been adjudged an
ungovernable youth in 1973; he had been charged with third
degree burglary for theft and placed on parole in 1975; he was
convicted of first degree rape in 1977; and finally, he
committed the instant crime in 1978. See R.Vol. III, Doc. 16. In
short, while testimony from a family member may generally be
beneficial to a capital defendant at sentencing, we believe
that, in this case, the totality of Ms. Botkin's revelations
could have been devastating.
We have taken due account of
the impact that the errors Mr. Brewer claims were committed by
his counsel would have had on the sentencing jury. This is not a
case, however, in which the sentence rendered is "only weakly
supported by the record." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct.
at 2068. Given the State's overwhelming case against him, the
number and gravity of the aggravating circumstances found by the
jury, and the nature of the crime itself, we do not believe that
the speculative, conclusory, and possibly damaging mitigating
evidence offered now, seventeen years after the crime, would
have resulted in the imposition of a sentence other than death.
Even assuming deficient performance by counsel, Mr. Brewer has
failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome
of his sentencing would have been different. Thus, our
confidence in the outcome has not been undermined, id., and we
affirm the district court's denial of habeas relief on Mr.
Brewer's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
II. AKE CLAIM
Prior to trial, Mr. Brewer
filed a motion requesting appointment of "a private medical
expert" in order to "determine whether there exists a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society as
is alleged in the bill of particulars filed by the state of
Oklahoma in this case." R.Vol. III, Doc. 4 at 1.15
The trial court denied the motion.16
Mr. Brewer contends that the trial court's failure to appoint a
mental health expert to assist in the penalty phase of his trial
was a denial of due process.17
The Court in Ake observed that
"under certain circumstances, due process also entitles a
criminal defendant to court-appointed psychiatric assistance
during the sentencing phase of a capital proceeding." Liles v.
Saffle, 945 F.2d 333, 335 (10th Cir.1991) (citing Ake, 470 U.S.
at 83-84, 105 S.Ct. at 1096-97), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1066,
112 S.Ct. 956, 117 L.Ed.2d 123 (1992); see Clisby v. Jones, 960
F.2d 925, 928-29 (11th Cir.1992); Thompson v. Wainwright, 787
F.2d 1447, 1458-59 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied sub nom.
Thompson v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 1042, 107 S.Ct. 1986, 95 L.Ed.2d
825 (1987).18
Finding that the state trial
court had deprived the petitioner of due process during the
sentencing phase of his trial by denying him court-appointed
psychiatric assistance "to rebut the State's evidence of his
future dangerousness," Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 105 S.Ct. at 1096
(emphasis added), the Court held that due process entitles a
defendant to the appointment of a mental health expert "when the
State presents psychiatric evidence of the defendant's future
dangerousness." Id.
We have rejected a narrow
construction of Ake. In Liles v. Saffle, 945 F.2d 333 (10th
Cir.1991), we held that due process requires the appointment of
a mental health expert to assist the defendant in the penalty
phase when the State presents evidence, psychiatric or
otherwise, concerning the defendant's future dangerousness, and
the defendant establishes the likelihood that his mental
condition could have been a significant mitigating factor. Id.
at 341.
In denying Mr. Brewer's habeas
corpus petition, the district court observed that, in this case,
the State had not alleged the continuing threat aggravating
circumstance in the sentencing phase of Mr. Brewer's trial, nor
had the State presented evidence regarding Mr. Brewer's future
dangerousness. Thus, according to the court, Ake and Liles did
not dictate appointment of a mental health expert. See R.Vol. I,
Doc. 53 at 12-13. While we agree with the district court, we
arrive at our conclusion via a slightly different analysis.
At the time Mr. Brewer made
his motion for the appointment of a mental health expert, the
State had not dropped the continuing threat aggravating
circumstance from its bill of particulars. Thus, although the
trial court had before it a bill of particulars alleging the
continuing threat aggravator, it nevertheless denied the defense
motion for the appointment of a mental health expert. Under
Liles, this was error. See Liles, 945 F.2d at 341; see also
Clisby, 960 F.2d at 930; Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 710 (11th
Cir.) ("[W]e must assess the reasonableness of the trial judge's
action at the time he took it."), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054,
107 S.Ct. 2192, 95 L.Ed.2d 847 (1987). We therefore must
consider whether Mr. Brewer suffered any harm resultant from the
error.
The Eighth Circuit recently
held that the denial of a psychiatric expert in violation of Ake
is "trial error," and thus, subject to harmless-error analysis.
Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1291-92 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Norris v. Starr, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 499,
130 L.Ed.2d 409 (1994). We agree with the court's conclusion
that "a right to which a defendant is not entitled absent some
threshold showing [cannot] fairly be defined as basic to the
structure of a constitutional trial." Starr, 23 F.3d at 1291.
Thus, harmless error review is appropriate. See Rose v. Clark,
478 U.S. 570, 577, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3105-06, 92 L.Ed.2d 460
(1986) ("[I]f the defendant had counsel and was tried by an
impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any
other errors that may have occurred are subject to
harmless-error analysis."); United States v. Crozier, 987 F.2d
893, 891-92 (2d Cir.1993); cf. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 307-10, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1263-65, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)
(holding that certain constitutional errors, such as the
deprivation of the right to counsel, are so fundamental that
their existence abrogates the basic structure of a
constitutional trial and are not, therefore, subject to
harmlessness review).
We disagree with the Eighth
Circuit, however, as to which harmless-error analysis is
applicable. While the court in Starr applied the standard of
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17
L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (appropriate harmless error standard is
whether federal constitutional error is "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt"), Starr, 23 F.3d at 1292, the Supreme Court,
in Brecht v. Abrahamson, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1710,
1722, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993), directed the federal courts, on
habeas corpus review, to apply the standard set forth in
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed.
1557 (1946), and determine whether the error "had substantial
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
verdict." Id. at 776, 66 S.Ct. at 1253. The Court in Brecht held
that "the Kotteakos harmless-error standard, rather than the
Chapman standard, applies in determining whether habeas relief
must be granted because of constitutional error of the trial
type." Brecht, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1722. Accordingly,
we apply the Kotteakos harmless-error standard in our review of
Mr. Brewer's Ake claim.
It is clear that the trial
court's denial of Mr. Brewer's motion, though erroneous, was
nonetheless harmless. Mr. Brewer's motion requesting appointment
of the mental health expert was framed exclusively for the
purpose of rebutting the State's allegation that he posed a
continuing threat to society. Therefore, when the State did not
pursue the continuing threat aggravator at sentencing, the sole
basis for Mr. Brewer's request disappeared. Simply stated, there
was nothing for a defense psychiatric expert to rebut.19
The error committed by the court in denying Mr. Brewer's motion,
therefore, could not have had a substantial and injurious
effect, nor could it have had any influence on the jury's
recommendation of death. Brecht, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at
1722. Thus, in this case, we harbor no "grave doubt" that the
error was harmless. See O'Neal v. McAninch, --- U.S. ---- -
----, 115 S.Ct. 992, 994-95, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995).
Mr. Brewer does not dispute
that once the State dropped the continuing threat aggravating
factor, any right which he may have had to the appointment of an
expert to rebut that aggravator also became a nullity. He
contends, however, that he nonetheless was entitled to
appointment of a psychiatric expert. He argues that the mere
fact that a capital defendant may offer affirmative psychiatric
evidence in mitigation sufficiently calls the defendant's mental
condition into question under Ake as to warrant appointment of
an expert. We disagree.
Under Mr. Brewer's analysis,
every capital defendant desiring such would be entitled to a
court-appointed psychiatric expert at sentencing, regardless of
whether he makes the requisite threshold showing of need. The
Supreme Court, however, has rejected such a proposition: "A
defendant's mental condition is not necessarily at issue in
every criminal proceeding ... and it is unlikely that
psychiatric assistance of the kind we have described would be of
probable value in cases where it is not." Ake, 470 U.S. at 82,
105 S.Ct. at 1096.
Ake does not stand for the
proposition that every capital defendant has a fundamental right
to the appointment of a psychiatric expert to assist in the
sentencing phase of trial. Rather, Ake ensures that when the
resources of the State are brought to bear upon an indigent
individual in the sentencing stage of the proceeding, he is
provided with the "basic tools of an adequate defense" necessary
to rebut the State's challenge. Id. at 77, 80, 105 S.Ct. at
1093, 1094-95; Liles, 945 F.2d at 341; Kordenbrock v. Scroggy,
919 F.2d 1091, 1105 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 970,
111 S.Ct. 1608, 113 L.Ed.2d 669 (1991); Little v. Armontrout,
835 F.2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1210, 108 S.Ct. 2857, 101 L.Ed.2d 894 (1988); see also
Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1162-63 (9th Cir.1990); Davis
v. Maynard, 869 F.2d 1401, 1407 (10th Cir.1989), vacated sub
nom. Saffle v. Davis, 494 U.S. 1050, 110 S.Ct. 1516, 108 L.Ed.2d
756, aff'd, 911 F.2d 415 (10th Cir.1991); Cartwright v. Maynard,
802 F.2d 1203, 1214 (10th Cir.1986), point aff'd on reh'g, 822
F.2d 1477 (10th Cir.1987), aff'd, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853,
100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447,
1458-59 (11th Cir.1986); Bowden v. Kemp, 767 F.2d 761, 763-64
(11th Cir.1985); cf. United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 929
(10th Cir.1985); Gore v. Dugger, 763 F.Supp. 1110, 1120-21
(M.D.Fla.1989), aff'd, 933 F.2d 904 (11th Cir.1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1066, 112 S.Ct. 956, 117 L.Ed.2d 123 (1992).
See generally Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92
S.Ct. 431, 433, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963) (state must
insure meaningful chance to present defense); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956) (state
must provide indigent defendant trial transcripts). In this
case, the State did not pursue the continuing threat aggravating
factor at sentencing and there was, therefore, nothing for a
defense psychiatrist to rebut. Thus, with respect to future
dangerousness, Mr. Brewer's mental condition was not at issue
during the penalty phase.
Mr. Brewer argues, however,
that the State did place his mental condition at issue in the
penalty phase by alleging that the crime was committed in an
especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel manner. We disagree.20
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals has narrowed the heinous, atrocious, and cruel
aggravating factor to encompass only those crimes in which
"torture or serious physical abuse" precede the death of the
victim. See Stouffer v. State, 742 P.2d 562, 563
(Okla.Crim.App.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036, 108 S.Ct.
763, 98 L.Ed.2d 779 (1988). As noted previously, the jury
instruction which was read to the jury in this case reflected
that narrowing construction. See supra note 4. The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals has construed the heinous, atrocious,
and cruel aggravator in such a manner such that it does not
implicate a defendant's mental condition. Compare Stouffer, 742
P.2d at 563, with State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 769 P.2d 1017,
1032-34 (1989) (construing "Especially heinous, cruel or
depraved" aggravating circumstance to implicate mental state),
aff'd, Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111
L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), it has not done so; see also Cartwright v.
Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1482 (10th Cir.1987) (determination of
what narrowing construction of the "Especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance would satisfy
constitutional requirements left to state to decide in the first
instance), aff'd, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372
(1988). Accordingly, we reject Mr. Brewer's argument that the
State's allegation of the heinous, atrocious, and cruel
aggravator sufficiently placed his mental condition at issue as
to trigger the right to a court-appointed psychiatric expert.
In sum, the State of Oklahoma
alleged two aggravating factors in the penalty phase of Mr.
Brewer's trial. Neither of these factors, however, placed his
mental condition at issue. Accordingly, we hold that the trial
court did not deprive Mr. Brewer of due process by denying his
request for a psychiatric expert to assist in the penalty phase
of trial, and the district court did not err in denying habeas
corpus relief on Mr. Brewer's Ake claim.
III. CONCLUSION
We have exhaustively reviewed
the record in this case and carefully considered each of Mr.
Brewer's claims properly before this court. For the foregoing
reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's order denying Mr.
Brewer's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Oklahoma follows the M'Naughten test of
legal insanity. See Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 21, Sec. 152 (West
1983); Manous v. State, 745 P.2d 742, 744
(Okla.Crim.App.1987)
Under the Oklahoma capital sentencing
scheme, a separate penalty phase of the trial is held.
Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 21, Sec. 701.10 (West 1983). Before the
jury may recommend the sentence of death, it must
unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, at least one of
the enumerated aggravating circumstances, and it must
determine that the aggravating circumstance(s) outweigh the
mitigating factors. Id. Secs. 701.11-.12
Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 21, Sec. 701.12(4)
(West 1983). Following our decision in Cartwright v.
Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1482 (10th Cir.1987), aff'd, 486
U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988), the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals restricted the
application of this circumstance to murders preceded by
torture or serious physical abuse. Stouffer v. State, 742
P.2d 562, 563 (Okla.Crim.App.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1036, 108 S.Ct. 763, 98 L.Ed.2d 779 (1988). Uniform Jury
Instruction OUJI-CR 436, which the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals held in Stouffer sufficiently directed and
limited the jury's discretion to impose the death penalty,
was read in Mr. Brewer's case:
As used in this instruction, the term
"Heinous" means extremely wicked or shockingly evil;
"Atrocious" means outrageously wicked or vile; "Cruel" means
pitiless, or designed to inflict a high degree of pain, with
utter indifference to, or enjoyment of, the sufferings of
others.
The phrase "Especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" is directed to those crimes where the
death of the victim was preceded by torture of the victim or
serious physical abuse.
Id. In this case, the state district
court on collateral review found, and Mr. Brewer has not
challenged, the following facts in support of this
aggravating circumstance: the victim was awake and aware of
what was happening to her as evinced by the presence of
"defensive wounds"; the victim had been stabbed twenty-one
times; she bled to death as a result of the severing of the
carotid artery, as evinced by the great amount of blood
around her body; she had numerous defensive wounds on her
arms, hands, and sides indicating that she was attempting to
defend herself from the petitioner; the petitioner stated
that he knew the victim was dead or dying because "she was
... drowning in her own blood"; and finally, the petitioner
stated that after stabbing the victim he "sat down on the
couch and watched Karen Stapleton thrash in her own blood."
Brewer v. State, No. CRF-78-2137, at 8-9 (Tulsa County
Dist.Ct. Sept. 21, 1988).
Although the briefs in this case were
filed prior to our decision in Brecheen, at oral argument,
the State conceded that, under Brecheen, Mr. Brewer's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not procedurally
barred
Ms. Church testified regarding Mr.
Brewer's competence to assist his counsel at trial and on
the importance of placing mitigating psychological testimony
before a sentencing jury. In all other respects, her
testimony essentially paralleled that of Dr. Fleming. See
R.Vol. VIII at 92-104
In this appeal, Mr. Brewer's claims
relate only to the sentencing phase of his trial.
Furthermore, regarding Mr. Brewer's competence during the
penalty phase, at oral argument counsel for Mr. Brewer
conceded, "Mr. Brewer was competent, I believe, from a legal
standpoint." Thus, Mr. Brewer's competence to assist counsel
during the penalty phase is not at issue in this case, and
any question regarding his competence to stand trial for the
substantive criminal offense is not properly before us.
The district court concluded that this
diagnosis was essentially the same as that of Dr. Gagliano.
R.Vol. I, Doc. 53 at 13. In his trial testimony, Dr.
Gagliano characterized Mr. Brewer as having a "personality
disorder." R.Supp.Vol. III at 921
Dr. Gagliano testified that reviewing
material from Mr. Brewer's mother and an interview with Mr.
Brewer gave him
a firm hold on Ben as a child, the manner
in which he related, the multiple school changes, the never
having had a stable relationship, his never forming good
interpersonal or friendship relations which immediately was
the seed for an antisocial personality or dissocial. He has
never been a social person.
R.Supp.Vol. III at 924. Dr. Gagliano
further testified that
Ben is not a thought disorder or
psychotic individual. Ben is a personality disorder.
...
.. I think this report in 1976 [referring
to the report from Eastern State Hospital] sums it up
beautifully like what I just said. "Thus, he has many
attitudes in common with antisocial personalities, such as
the negative viewing of his environment," and this important
point, "a propensity to do things on the spur of the moment
with little reflection and a good deal of
self-centeredness.... And it was predicted in 1976, and it
was predicted in 1974 when Dr. Alexis also stated almost
verbatim that he is not likely to act in a violent manner
unless provoked and when provoked, even Dr. Alexis predicted
that it would be in some form of a violent fashion, whether
it would be homicide or stealing cars, but it would be
something antisocial.
The court five mitigation instructions
given by the court were as follows:
(1) Mental disease or defect impaired Mr.
Brewer's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law;
(2) Mr. Brewer committed the crime while
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance;
(3) Mr. Brewer's childhood and
environment and the manner in which he was raised had an
adverse effect on his personality and contributed to the
cause of the homicide;
(4) Mr. Brewer's age at the time of the
crime;
(5) Mr. Brewer's criminal record
consisted of only one prior conviction. Petr's Br. at 40 n.
14.
Mr. Brewer argues that the competency
evaluations performed at the Eastern State Hospital are
unreliable because the attending physician, Dr. R.D. Garcia,
suffered from an untreated manic-depressive illness during
the time he evaluated Mr. Brewer. Petr's Br. at 4 n. 1. The
district court found Mr. Brewer's evidence on this issue
unpersuasive and we discern no error in that finding
Dr. Fleming also noted that Mr. Brewer's
relationships with women have been dysfunctional, especially
in his sexuality. Yet, Dr. Fleming's own evaluation states
that Mr. Brewer's wife reported their "marriage had been
good" until Mr. Brewer began to associate with two other
men, whom Ms. Brewer believed were drug users, and it was at
that time that Mr. Brewer became abusive and violent. Petr's
Br., App. 1 at 5. We are therefore left to speculate whether
this dysfunctionality was the product of mental illness, as
Dr. Fleming suggests, or attributable to some other factor
such as Mr. Brewer's drug use
We are unable to locate where this letter
was made part of the record. It is not in the form of an
affidavit, it is undated, and while it is represented on
appeal as being written "for her son's federal habeas
appeal," Petr's Br. at 27, the text of the letter makes
clear that it was prepared prior to Mr. Brewer's trial. The
letter was included in an appendix to Mr. Brewer's original
petition for habeas corpus. See R.Vol. III, Doc. 16. While
we retain reservations as to the reliability of this
document, because it is the only evidence proffered in the
district court relating to Ms. Botkin's possible testimony,
we consider it in this appeal
The State of Oklahoma's bill of
particulars alleged the following aggravating circumstances:
(1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel;
(2) there existed of a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society; and (3) Mr. Brewer previously
had been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat
of violence. R.Vol. III, Doc. 21; see Okla.Stat.Ann. tit.
21, Sec. 701.12 (West 1983). At trial, only the heinous,
atrocious, or cruel aggravator and the continuing threat
aggravator were alleged
It is unclear at what point in the
proceedings the State of Oklahoma determined not to pursue
the continuing threat aggravating circumstance. For purposes
of our review, however, we assume that on the date Mr.
Brewer filed his motion seeking appointment of a mental
health expert, January 18, 1983, the State was continuing to
allege the continuing threat aggravator.
On direct review, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals noted that the only psychiatric expert to
testify during the trial was the defense expert, Dr.
Gagliano. The court then went on to hold that because the
State had not introduced psychiatric testimony, it "did not
have a strategic advantage over Brewer that would create a
risk of error in the proceeding absent a defense witness to
counter-balance the State's expert testimony." Brewer v.
State, 718 P.2d 354, 363 (Okla.Crim.App.1986)
Mr. Brewer's argument on appeal suggests
that he is challenging the court's denial of appointment of
an expert for both the guilt/innocence phase and the penalty
phase of his trial. Provision of psychological assistance
during the guilt/innocence phase of his trial, however, was
not an issue presented to the habeas court below and,
consequently, it is not properly before this court now. See
Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 720 (10th
Cir.1993). We therefore limit our review of Mr. Brewer's Ake
claim to the penalty phase
The nonretroactivity rule of Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989),
is not implicated in this case. Ake was decided on February
26, 1985 and Mr. Brewer's direct appeal did not become final
until October 6, 1986, when the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari. Brewer v. Oklahoma, 479 U.S. 871, 107
S.Ct. 245, 93 L.Ed.2d 169 (1986)
In cases such as this, in which the trial
court denied the defendant's motion for appointment of a
mental health expert prior to the Court's decision in Ake,
but to which the holding of Ake is applicable, "the question
presented is whether, 'upon review of the entire record,
[petitioner] could have made a threshold showing under Ake
that "his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a
significant factor at trial...." ' " Liles, 945 F.2d at 336
(quoting Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203, 1212 (10th
Cir.1986)) (alteration in original).
We note that although Mr. Brewer has
challenged various facets of his trial counsel's
effectiveness in this appeal, he has not raised the claim
that counsel was ineffective in failing to frame the motion
seeking appointment of a mental health expert more broadly
At oral argument, Mr. Brewer's counsel
also suggested that the prior violent felony aggravating
circumstance, Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 21, Sec. 701.12(1) (West
1983), places the defendant's mental condition at issue.
Again, we disagree. Especially in a case such as this, where
the defendant stipulated that he had been convicted of a
prior felony involving the use or threat of violence to the
person, this aggravating circumstance relates simply to the
fact of a prior violent felony conviction
83 F.3d 431
United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit
Benjamin BREWER,
Petitioner--Appellant, v.
Ron WARD, Warden of the Oklahoma State
Penitentiary,
Respondent--Appellee.
April 22, 1996
Before
ANDERSON, TACHA, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
Benjamin
Brewer appeals from an order of the district
court denying his Motion to Reconsider
Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b), and denying his application
for a stay of execution. The district
court's order was entered on April 9, 1996.
We received Mr. Brewer's notice of appeal,
request for a stay, and brief on Friday
afternoon, April 19. We ordered the state to
file its response brief by noon today,
Monday, April 22. Mr. Brewer is scheduled to
be executed in the early morning hours of
Friday, April 26, 1996.1
Mr. Brewer
raises a single issue in this appeal:
whether the district court properly held
that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order and Judgment entered by
district court Judge Thomas Brett on
February 10, 1994, dismissing Mr. Brewer's
habeas petition, need not be vacated for
violation of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). He also
seeks a stay of execution and transfer of
his case to a different judge for the
purpose of instituting new proceedings on
the issues raised in his amended habeas
corpus petition.
Several
courts have determined that a Fed.R.Civ.P.
60(b)(6) motion raising new claims may be
treated as the functional equivalent of a
successive habeas petition, implicating
abuse of the writ, procedural bar and
exhaustion principles. Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d
1327, 1339 (4th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 116
S.Ct. 724 (1996); Guinan v. Delo, 5 F.3d
313, 316 (8th Cir.1993); Clark v. Lewis, 1
F.3d 814, 825 (9th Cir.1993) (but deciding
the Rule 60(b) claim also on the merits in
the alternative; Williams v. Whitley, 994
F.2d 226, 230 n. 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 608 (1993); Bolder v. Armentrout,
983 F.2d 98, 99 (8th Cir.1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1088 (1993); Blair v.
Armentrout, 976 F.2d 1130, 1134 (8th
Cir.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 916
(1993); Landano v. Rafferty, 897 F.2d 661,
668 (3d Cir.) (applying exhaustion
requirement to Rule 60(b)(6) motion but
otherwise not deciding the issue), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990); Lindsey v.
Thigpen, 875 F.2d 1509, 1511-12 (11th
Cir.1989). Other courts including our own,
without addressing the issue, have evaluated
the denial of Rule 60(b) relief in the
habeas context for an abuse of discretion.
See Resnover v. Pearson, 9 F.3d 113, 1993 WL
430159 (7th Cir.1993) (unpublished order);
Robison v. Maynard, 958 F.2d 1013, 1018
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 929
(1992); May v. Collins, 961 F.2d 74 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied. 504 U.S. 901 (1992). We
need not decide the issue because even under
the abuse of discretion standard for the
denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief, we conclude
that the district court acted well within
its discretion.2
Mr.
Brewer's argument is that the district court
misapplied the harmless error standard of
Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition
Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988), in determining
that the February 10 order need not be
vacated. In particular, he claims that the
court erroneously focused on harm or error
in the context of the merits of Mr. Brewer's
own case, and he suggests, without citation
of supporting authority, that the court
should have looked at systemic harm. While
we agree that systemic harm is a
consideration, we disagree that it is the
only consideration. Any error resulting from
the violation of § 455(a) must also be
analyzed and determined as it relates to Mr.
Brewer and his own case.
Mr. Brewer
does not argue that he is actually innocent
of the crime,3
nor does he claim any constitutional error
occurred at his trial, nor does he claim any
actual bias resulting from the involvement
of Judge Thomas Brett, the judge who
erroneously failed to recuse himself from
Mr. Brewer's habeas proceeding, in which an
evidentiary hearing was held. In recently
determining that a conviction occurring in a
case in which § 455(a) was violated because
the trial judge erred in failing to recuse
herself, the Fifth Circuit made just such a
case-specific inquiry:
After a
thorough review of the trial record, we are
convinced that the conviction should stand.
First, Appellant does not contend that Judge
Melinda Harmon was actually biased during
the trial phase, nor does she allege an
explicit nexus between the alleged errors
and the appearance of bias. Second,
Appellant never contends that she suffered
any harm during trial because of any alleged
bias or prejudice. Third, we find neither an
indication of bias in the trial record nor
any error requiring reversal.
United
States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 158 (5th
Cir.1995); see also Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 38 F.3d 1404,
1412-13 (5th Cir.1994).
In holding
that Judge Brett's order need not be
vacated, the district court relied in part
on Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d
1510 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1066 (1989), which Mr. Brewer claims is
wrong. In Parker, in considering the third
prong of the Liljeberg harmless error
standard, "the risk of undermining the
public's confidence in the judicial
process," Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864, the
court observed that a determination that §
455(a) had been violated would itself
"instill greater confidence in our
judiciary," Parker, 855 F.2d at 1527,
without the necessity of also vacating the
judgment. Indeed, on this latter point the
Parker court said, "[i]n fact, if we reverse
and vacate a decision that we have already
determined to be proper, the public will
lose faith in our system of justice because
the case will be overturned without regard
to the merits of the [underlying] claims."
Id. We have cited this analysis with
approval in applying the harmless error
standard. See Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d at
1572.
We have
carefully reviewed all filings in this case
and the record before us in this appeal. In
our previous opinion affirming the district
court order Mr. Brewer would have us now
vacate, we explained that we had
"exhaustively reviewed" the record in the
case. We AFFIRM the denial of Mr. Brewer's
Motion, for substantially the reasons set
forth in the district court's order. We DENY
his request for a stay of execution. The
mandate shall issue forthwith.