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Samuel
BUSTAMANTE
Robberies
Summary:
Bustamante, then 28; Dedrick Depriest, 20; Arthur Escamilla, 29;
and Walter Escamilla drove to Rosenberg, southwest of Houston.
Before leaving, Bustamante told the others that they were going "shopping"
- their term for finding a "wetback" after the bars closed,
offering him a ride, taking him to a deserted location, beating
him, and stealing his money and jewelry.
Upon arrival. They came upon Rafael Alvarado,
who needed a ride across town and offered to pay the men.
Bustamante noted that Alvarado’s clothes were in good condition
and his watch looked like it was made of “real gold.” Alvarado
climbed into the bed of the pickup, along with Bustamante and two
of the other men. After a few minutes, Bustamante stood up and
stabbed Alvarado ten times with a knife. Alvarado managed to break
free and fell to the ground. When the truck stopped, Bustamante
and the others looked for Alvarado, but were unable to see him
because it was dark, so they left. Upon arrest on unrelated
charges two months later, Bustamante confessed to the murder.
Bustamante's accomplices were each sentenced to
eight years imprisonment for aggravated robbery and since have
been released.
Citations:
Bustamante v. State, 106 S.W.3d 738 (Tex.Crim.App.,2003). (Direct
Appeal) Bustamante v. Quarterman, 284 Fed.Appx. 183 (5th Cir.
2008). (Habeas)
Final/Special Meal:
Four fried chicken legs and thigh quarters, macaroni and cheese,
fried okra, jalapeno peppers, 10 flour tortillas and a six pack of
cola.
Last Words:
None.
Name
TDCJ Number
Date of Birth
Bustamante, Samuel
999380
12/11/1969
Date Received
Age
(when Received)
Education Level
03/16/2001
31
10
Date of Offense
Age
(at the
Offense)
County
01/18/1998
28
Fort
Bend
Race
Gender
Hair Color
Hispanic
Male
Black
Height
Weight
Eye Color
5 ft
7 in
264
Brown
Native County
Native State
Prior Occupation
Wharton
Texas
laborer
Prior Prison
Record
North
Carolina Department of Corrections on a one year sentence for
Forgery, confined 6 months, released on parole; #503412 on a 5
year sentence from Wharton County for one count of Burglary of a
Building, released on parole to Dallas County; returned from
parole with a four year sentence for one count of possession of
a prohibited weapon, released on parole on 2/16/1991.
Summary of
incident
On
1/18/1998, Bustamante gave a 27 year old hispanic male a ride.
Then he stabbed him 10 times with a knife, resulting in the
victim's death. Bustamante dumped the victim's body and took
his jewelry. Bustamante committed the offenses along with three
other co-defendants.
Co-defendants
Diedrick Depriest
Aurthur Escamilla
Walter Escamilla
Race and Gender of
Victim
hispanic male
Bustamante, Samuel
Date of Birth: 12/11/1969
DR#: 999380
Date Received: 3/16/2001
Education: 10 years
Occupation: Laborer
Date of Offense: 1/18/1998
County of Offense: Fort Bend
Native County: Wharton
Race: Hispanic
Gender: Male
Hair Color: Black
Eye Color: Brown
Height: 5' 07"
Weight: 264
Prior Prison Record: North Carolina Department
of Corrections on a one year sentence for Forgery, confined 6
months, released on parole; #503412 on a 5 year sentence from
Wharton County for one count of Burglary of a Building, released
on parole to Dallas County; returned from parole with a four year
sentence for one count of possession of a prohibited weapon,
released on parole on 2/16/1991.
Summary of incident: On 1/18/1998, Bustamante
gave a 27 year old hispanic male a ride. Then he stabbed him 10
times with a knife, resulting in the victim's death. Bustamante
committed the offenses along with three other co-defendants.
Co-Defendants: Diedrick Depriest, Aurthur
Escamilla. Walter Escamilla
Texas Attorney General
Tuesday, April 20, 2010
Media Advisory: Samuel Bustamante scheduled for
execution
AUSTIN – Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott
offers the following information on Samuel Bustamante, who is
scheduled to be executed after 6 p.m. on April 27, 2010.
Bustamante was sentenced to death for the murder and attempted
robbery of Rafael Alvarado in Fort Bend County.
FACTS OF THE CRIME
On the night of January 17, 1998, Bustamante
and three of his friends drove to Rosenberg to find, beat and rob
a man after the bars closed. At first, the group had trouble
finding a victim. But just as they were about to give up, they
came upon Rafael Alvarado. Bustamante noted that Alvarado’s
clothes were in good condition and his watch looked like it was
made of “real gold.”
Alvarado offered to pay the driver of the truck
to give him a ride across town. The men agreed, and Alvarado
climbed into the bed of the pickup, along with Bustamante and two
of the other men. After a few minutes, Bustamante stood up and
stabbed Alvarado ten times with a knife.
Alvarado managed to break free and fell to the
ground. When the truck stopped, Bustamante and the others looked
for Alvarado, but were unable to see him because it was dark, so
they left. One of the men with Bustamante admitted at trial that,
had they found Alvarado, they probably would have robbed him.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Bustamante’s conviction was affirmed on appeal
by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court of Criminal
Appeals denied his state habeas application in a written order on
May 19, 2004. Bustamante’s federal habeas petition was filed on
May 19, 2005. The court granted summary judgment for the State on
December 6, 2006, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the federal district court
on July 8, 2008. Bustamante did not file a petition for writ of
certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.
PRIOR CRIMINAL HISTORY
At the punishment phase of his trial, it was
revealed that Bustamante had confessed to the murder of Lloyd
Harold Turner, whose body was found February 13, 1998, in an area
underneath an overpass on Highway 59 in Wharton County, where
Turner had lived for about a year. Bustamante’s signed, written
confession was read and admitted into evidence.
Man executed for 1998 stabbing
By Mary Rainwater - ItemOnline.com
April 27, 2010
HUNTSVILLE — Texas inmate Samuel Bustamante was
executed Tuesday for the fatal stabbing of an illegal immigrant in
1998, making him the seventh prisoner executed so far this year.
Bustamante, 40, made no final statement, only shaking his head
when asked by the warden if he wanted to do so. His death was
witnessed by four friends he invited to attend. No friends or
relatives of the victim were present. He was pronounced dead at
6:22 p.m., just eight minutes after the lethal injection began.
Bustamante was convicted of the slaying of
Rafael Alvarado, 27, a Mexican national in Fort Bend County,
southwest of Houston, who became a target of what Bustamante and
some of his friends called “shopping trips” where they would hunt
illegal immigrants, then beat and rob them.
The punishment came about 90 minutes after the
U.S. Supreme Court rejected a last-ditch appeal from Bustamante's
attorneys. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the state’s
highest criminal court, had refused a similar appeal Monday. The
Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles also declined a clemency
request.
In a taped confession to detectives, Bustamante
said he and three friends — Dedrick Depriest and brothers Walter
and Arthur Escamilla, all from El Campo, about 70 miles southwest
of Houston — spent the day in January 1998 eating and drinking. He
said they decided to go "shopping" in Rosenberg, 40 miles to the
northeast, as bars were closing at 2 a.m. Alvarado, after leaving
a Rosenberg bar, approached the pickup driven by Arthur Escamilla
and offered to pay for a ride home to nearby Richmond. Alvarado
joined Walter Escamilla and Bustamante in the bed of the truck and
they drove off. After a few minutes, Bustamante told officers, he
pulled a knife and began stabbing Alvarado as Escamilla held him
down. Alvarado managed to break free and bail out of the speeding
truck. Police following a trail of blood the next morning found
Alvarado's body in a ditch. He'd been stabbed at least 10 times.
Two months later, with Bustamante jailed on an
unrelated charge in Wharton County, authorities notified Rosenberg
police after receiving a tip he was involved in Alvarado's slaying.
“I don’t need a judge and I don't need a jury to tell me I'm
guilty,” Bustamante, a former oil field worker, told detectives.
Bustamante was listed in prison records as 5-foot-7
and 264 pounds. Known as “Fat Boy,” he had at least three earlier
convictions — one in North Carolina for forgery and two others in
Texas, one in Wharton County for burglary and one in Dallas for
possession of a prohibited weapon while on parole.
Headed to the death chamber after Bustamante is
41-year-old Kevin Varga, on May 12. Varga, a Michigan native who’d
been imprisoned in South Dakota, was condemned for the 1998 fatal
beating of a North Carolina man with a hammer and tree limb. One
of Varga’s accomplices, 41-year-old Billy Galloway, is scheduled
for lethal injection the next day.
Killer in 1998 Rosenberg robbery very quiet
at execution
By Alan Turner - The Houston Chronicle
April 27, 2010
HUNTSVILLE — Samuel Bustamante, sentenced to
die for stabbing a man to death during a 1998 robbery in Rosenberg,
silently went to his death in the state's execution chamber
Tuesday. The lethal drugs were administered at 6:14 p.m. He was
declared dead eight minutes later.
Bustamante made no final statement. Four women,
identified as Bustamante's friends, witnessed the execution. No
victim's witnesses were present.
Bustamante killed Rafael Alvarado early on the
morning of Jan. 18, 1998, after Bustamante and three companions
spotted him walking near a Rosenberg tavern. Bustamante's group
had cruised the neighborhoods surrounding the city's bars in
search of potential robbery victims. After Alvarado, 27, accepted
a ride with the men, Bustamante stabbed him 10 times.
Earlier Tuesday, Bustamante, 40, met with
friends, Walls Unit Warden Charles O'Reilly and a prison chaplain.
“He answered questions with ‘yes' and ‘no'” said prison spokesman
Jason Clark. “He was very quiet.”
For his last meal, Bustamante ordered four
fried chicken legs and thigh quarters, macaroni and cheese, fried
okra, jalapeno peppers, 10 flour tortillas and a six pack of cola.
Bustamante's execution happened about 90
minutes after the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review an earlier
state court decision that the killer failed to qualify as mentally
retarded. Bustamante's Houston lawyers, Philip Hilder and James
Ryttner, argued that their client was mildly mentally retarded,
and therefore covered by the Supreme Court's 2002 ruling that
banned execution of mentally retarded killers. “They make a murder
look very easy,” said Houston anti-capital punishment activist
Gloria Rubac, who was among Bustamante's friends. “They've gotten
very good at it.”
Previously, Bustamante had been convicted of
theft, burglary and possession of a prohibited weapon. Shortly
after his conviction in the Alvarado case, Bustamante pleaded
guilty to murdering a homeless El Campo man.
Bustamante's brother, Bill Bustamante, was an
accomplice in the El Campo killing and is serving a a 40-year
murder setence. Bustamante's accomplices in Alvarado's murder —
Diedrich Depriest, Arthur Escamilla and Walter Escamilla — were
sentenced to eight years for aggravated robbery and since have
been released.
Bustamante was the seventh Texas killer to be
executed this year, and the fourth killer from Fort Bend County to
be put to death since the state resumed executions in 1982.
Samuel Bustamente
ProDeathPenalty.com
On January 17, 1998, Walter Escamilla, Arthur
Escamilla, Dedrick Depriest, and Samuel Bustamante planned a
robbery. Walter suggested that the four of them go to the town of
Rosenberg to go “shopping.” According to Bustamante, “shopping”
entailed finding a “wetback” after the bars closed, offering him a
ride, taking him to a deserted location, beating him, and stealing
his money and jewelry. Bustamante told Solomon Escamilla and
Brandy Riha that he was going "shopping" in Rosenberg with Walter,
Arthur, and Dedrick. Riha was the ex-girlfriend of Bustamante’s
brother, Bill Bustamante. Solomon was apparently aware of the
criminal usage of the word “shopping” while Riha was not.
Solomon testified that one meaning of shopping
was to “roll wetbacks,” that is, to beat and rob them. Riha
testified that she thought it was strange that Bustamante and the
other men would go shopping so late at night. The four men,
traveling in Arthur’s pickup truck, arrived in Rosenberg at about
2:00 a.m., just after the bars had closed. At first the group had
trouble finding a victim. But just as they were about to give up,
they came upon Rafael Alvarado, a Hispanic male. Bustamante noted
that Alvarado’s clothes were in good condition and his watch
looked like it was made of “real gold.” Alvarado offered to pay
the driver of the truck to give him a ride across town. The men
agreed, and Alvarado climbed into the bed of the pickup.
Arthur and Depriest sat in the truck cab while
Bustamante, Walter, and the victim sat in the truck bed. After
about fifteen minutes, Bustamante asked Walter what he was going
to do. Walter told Bustamante to wait but Bustamante stood up and
began stabbing Alvarado with a knife. Bustamante stabbed him ten
times. When Alvarado tried to escape, Walter caught him by the
shirt and made an effort to pull him back in. Bustamante also
tried to pull Alvarado in, but the victim managed to break free
and fall to the ground. Walter yelled at the driver of the truck
to stop, but by the time he did, Bustamante and the others were
unable to see Alvarado because of the darkness. Bustamante told
Depriest that he wanted the victim’s boots. After the men walked
around the area for several minutes without finding the victim,
Bustamante decided that they should leave. Depriest admitted that,
had they found the victim, they probably would have robbed him. As
the truck drove away, the others in the group remarked that
Bustamante was crazy.
The police followed a trail of blood from the
west city limits of Rosenberg to where Alvarado’s body was found,
in a ditch in Fort Bend county. He was wearing a watch, a gold
necklace, and a ring. He also had a hundred dollars in his pockets
and his wallet was undisturbed. His death was caused by stab
wounds to the heart and liver and the attendant loss of blood.
After returning from Rosenberg, Bustamante told
Solomon and Richard Escamilla to wash the truck before daylight.
There was blood in the bed of the truck and a hand-print on the
tailgate. Bustamante told Solomon that things went wrong and that
someone had gotten in the way of what Bustamante does. Bustamante
explained that he had gotten hold of a man the night before and
the man had fallen out of the truck. When Solomon showed
Bustamante a story about the victim in the paper, Bustamante
responded, “That’s what I told you, nobody gets away,” saying that
when he kills somebody, he knows he kills them. Solomon and
Richard joked with Bustamante by telling him not to stab them and
by trying to give him their money.
Samuel Bustamante
Txexecutions.org
Samuel Bustamante, 40, was executed by lethal
injection on 27 April 2010 in Huntsville, Texas for killing a man
in an attempted robbery.
On 18 January 1998, Bustamante, then 28;
Dedrick Depriest, 20; Arthur Escamilla, 29; and Walter Escamilla
drove from El Campo to Rosenberg, southwest of Houston. Before
leaving, Bustamante told Solomon Escamilla and Brandy Riha that he
and the others were going "shopping" - their term for finding a "wetback"
(i.e. an illegal Mexican immigrant) after the bars closed,
offering him a ride, taking him to a deserted location, beating
him, and stealing his money and jewelry.
After some time, they noticed Rafael Alvarado.
Bustamante observed that Alvarado's clothing was in good condition,
and his watch appeared to be made of "real gold". Alvarado offered
to pay the men to give him a ride across town. They agreed, so
Alvarado climbed into the bed of the pickup, with Bustamante and
Walter. Depriest was in the cab of the truck along with Arthur,
who was driving. After about fifteen minutes, Bustamante asked
Walter if he was ready. Walter told him to wait. Nevertheless,
Bustamante then stood up and stabbed Alvarado ten times with a
knife. Alvarado struggled against his attackers and broke free,
falling to the ground from the moving truck. The men stopped the
truck to look for him, but were unable to find him in the darkness,
so they left.
After returning from Rosenberg, Bustamante told
Solomon and Richard Escamilla to wash the truck before daylight.
There was blood in the bed of the truck and a handprint on the
tailgate. Bustamante told Solomon that they had gotten hold of a
man, but he fell out of the truck. Later that day, Bustamante's
brother, Bill, 25, drove them back to the scene to search for the
victim, but they were unable to find him.
Following a trail of blood, Rosenberg police
found Alvarado's body in a ditch in Fort Bend county. His death
was caused by stab wounds to the heart and liver and the attendant
loss of blood. In order to qualify as capital murder, one or more
aggravating factors must be present. Texas' capital murder statute
includes attempted robbery in its list of aggravating factors.
At his trial, Bustamante admitted killing
Alvarado. He also admitted that he and the others went to
Rosenberg to go "shopping", and that was code for picking up
someone from a bar and robbing him. Nonetheless, he claimed that
he did not intend to rob Alvarado. In addition to Bustamante's own
incriminating testimony and the testimonies of Solomon Escamilla
and Brandy Riha, Dedrick Depriest testified that, as they searched
for Alvarado in the darkness for about fifteen minutes, Bustamante
stated that he wanted the victim's boots.
Bustamante had served parts of three different
prison sentences. In December 1988, he began serving a 5-year
sentence for burglary of a building. He was paroled after a year.
While on parole, he received a new conviction for possessing a
prohibited weapon. He served 6 months of a 4-year sentence before
receiving parole again in February 1991. (At the time, early
release was common in Texas due to strict prison population caps
imposed by U.S. District Judge William Wayne Justice.)
After receiving parole, Bustamante moved to
North Carolina. He was quickly in prison again, on a 1-year
sentence for forgery that began in April 1991. He was paroled
after serving 5 months. After that, he racked up convictions for
shooting a gun within city limits, carrying a concealed weapon,
making threatening communications, resisting arrest, and
possessing marijuana. Some time after his last conviction in
December 1992, he returned to Texas.
During the punishment phase of his capital
murder trial, Bustamante confessed to the murder of Lloyd Harold
Turner on 13 February 1998. He said that he and his brother
targeted the homeless man to "work out some aggravation". He
stabbed Turner ten to twenty times while his brother beat him with
a baseball bat. They left his body under an overpass of highway
U.S. 59.
A jury convicted Bustamante of capital murder
in March 2001 and sentenced him to death. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence in June
2003. All of his subsequent appeals in state and federal court
were denied. He was also sentenced to 40 years in prison for
Turner's killing.
Dedrick Deshone Depriest, Walter Escamilla, and
Arthur Escamilla pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and received
8-year sentences, which they have completed. Bill Bustamante is
still serving a 40-year sentence for Turner's murder.
Samuel Bustamante granted a reporter's request
for an interview prior to his execution, but he failed to keep the
appointment. On an anti-death-penalty web site, Bustamante stated,
"I did do wrong, yet there is a lot more good in me than bad. We
are all human and make mistakes. Yet, do we not deserve the
benefit of the doubt?"
Bustamante's execution was attended by four
women he invited. No one attended on behalf of the victims. The
condemned man made no last statement before the lethal injection
was given. He was pronounced dead at 6:22 p.m.
No. 74,079
Samuel Bustamante, Appellant v.
The State of Texas
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
A. Background
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence at
trial shows the following: On January 17, 1998, Walter Escamilla,
Arthur Escamilla, Dedrick Depriest, and appellant planned a
robbery. Walter suggested that the four of them go to the town of
Rosenberg to go "shopping." According to appellant,
(3) "shopping"
entailed finding a "wetback"
(4) after the
bars closed, offering him a ride, taking him to a deserted
location, beating him, and stealing his money and jewelry.
Appellant told Solomon Escamilla
(5) and Brandy
Riha
(6) that he was
going shopping in Rosenberg with Walter, Arthur, and Dedrick.
(7) The four men,
traveling in Arthur's pickup truck, arrived in Rosenberg at about
2:00 a.m., just after the bars had closed. At first the group had
trouble finding a victim. But just as they were about to give up,
they came upon Rafael Alvarado, a hispanic male. Appellant noted
that Alvarado's clothes were in good condition and his watch
looked like it was made of "real gold."
Alvarado offered to pay the driver of the truck to give him a ride
across town. The men agreed, and Alvarado climbed into the bed of
the pickup. Arthur and Depriest sat in the truck cab while
appellant, Walter, and the victim sat in the truck bed. After
about fifteen minutes, appellant asked Walter what he was going to
do. Walter told appellant to wait but appellant stood up and began
stabbing Alvarado with a knife. Appellant stabbed him ten times.
When Alvarado tried to escape, Walter caught him by the shirt and
made an effort to pull him back in. Appellant also tried to pull
Alvarado in, but the victim managed to break free and fall to the
ground. Walter yelled at the driver of the truck to stop, but by
the time he did, appellant and the others were unable to see
Alvarado because of the darkness.
(8) Appellant
told Depriest that he wanted the victim's boots. After the men
walked around the area for several minutes
(9) without
finding the victim, appellant decided that they should leave.
Depriest admitted that, had they found the victim, they probably
would have robbed him. As the truck drove away, the others in the
group remarked that appellant was crazy.
The police
followed a trail of blood from the west city limits of Rosenberg
to where Alvarado's body was found, in a ditch in Fort Bend county.
He was wearing a watch, a gold necklace, and a ring. He also had a
hundred dollars in his pockets and his wallet was undisturbed. His
death was caused by stab wounds to the heart and liver and the
attendant loss of blood.
After
returning from Rosenberg, appellant told Solomon and Richard
Escamilla to wash the truck before daylight. There was blood in
the bed of the truck and a hand-print on the tailgate. Appellant
told Solomon that things went wrong and that someone had gotten in
the way of what appellant does. Appellant explained that he had
gotten hold of a man the night before and the man had fallen out
of the truck. When Solomon showed appellant a story about the
victim in the paper, appellant responded, "That's what I told you,
nobody gets away," saying that when he kills somebody, he knows he
kills them. Solomon and Richard joked with appellant by telling
him not to stab them and by trying to give him their money.
Viewing the
record in a neutral light reveals the following evidence favorable
to appellant. Depriest claimed that the group had not formulated a
robbery plot but traveled to Rosenberg to "have fun and party." He
further stated that he assumed the group was going to drop
Alvarado off at his desired destination.
B. Analysis
In points of
error one and two, appellant contends that the evidence is legally
and factually insufficient to show that he committed the
underlying offense of robbery or attempted robbery. In his brief,
he concedes that his confessions "indicate that the group had
originally planned to go to Rosenberg to rob illegal aliens," but
he argues that the murder was not connected to that plan. In
support of his argument that the murder was not connected to the
prior plan to rob someone, appellant points out that no money or
property was taken from the deceased and that no one in the group
had demanded money from the deceased. Appellant also points to
testimony of Depriest that they did not intend to rob anyone but
went to Rosenberg to party and that the group actually intended to
fulfill the agreement to give Alvarado a ride home for money.
Finally, appellant contends that the murder "shocked the other
participants, who seemed to have been taken aback by appellant's
actions."
Evidence is legally insufficient if, viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, no rational jury could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
(10) Evidence is
factually insufficient if, viewed without the prism of "the light
most favorable to the verdict," the evidence supporting the
verdict is so weak or so against the overwhelming weight of
contrary evidence as to render the verdict clearly wrong and
manifestly unjust.
(11)
Likewise, we
find the evidence to be factually sufficient. Even looking at the
evidence in a neutral light and considering Depriest's exculpatory
statements, the evidence is sufficient to show a robbery or
attempted robbery. The jury was well within its discretion to
believe Depriest's and appellant's prior incriminating statements
and to disbelieve the self-serving statements made by Depriest on
the witness stand. Moreover, even if the jury fully believed
Depriest's statements, the evidence would nevertheless support a
conclusion that appellant intended to rob the victim at the time
of the murder, even if the others did not. The evidence supporting
appellant's guilt is not so weak or so against the overwhelming
weight of the contrary evidence so as to render the jury's verdict
clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Points of error one and two
are overruled.
II. JURY DELIBERATIONS
A. Background
During the
course of their investigation, police officers interviewed
appellant's brother, Bill Bustamante, and procured from him a
signed, written statement. During the guilt/innocence phase of
trial, the State called Bill to testify, but he declined. Upon the
State's request, the trial court granted Bill immunity for any
testimony given at the trial and ordered him to testify. Bill
Bustamante persisted in his refusal to testify and the trial court
held him in contempt. His written statement, which had been marked
State's Exhibit 107, was never admitted into evidence. Another
item, a chart or graph, was later marked as Exhibit 107 and
admitted into evidence.
Both items
marked "Exhibit 107" were included with the exhibits in the jury
room. During jury deliberations on guilt, one of the jurors read
the Bill Bustamante statement aloud while others listened with
varying degrees of attentiveness. After the statement was read,
the jurors became concerned about whether it was properly before
them. As a result, the jury foreman sent a note to the trial judge
asking, "Judge, can we use exhibit 107 in making our decision?"
The trial judge subsequently discovered that Bill Bustamante's
written statement was in the jury room and had it removed.
From
questioning the foreman, the trial judge ascertained that the
jurors were indeed inquiring about the Bill Bustamante statement.
The trial judge proceeded to question each juror individually
about the statement, how much of it they had read or heard,
whether it presented anything new, whether it had influenced them,
and whether they could follow an instruction to disregard the
exhibit. Nine jurors said that they had not read the statement but
had heard some or all of it being read. Three jurors said they had
read the statement or parts of it, aloud or to themselves. Of the
twelve jurors, five said that they learned nothing new from the
statement, three said that they learned that appellant had "gone
shopping" before, and four said they learned about an incident at
a truck stop, after the murder, in which appellant apparently
started to break into another vehicle occupied by a sleeping
person. One juror said she also learned that appellant had told
his brother before leaving for Rosenberg that he intended to rob
someone. Before being asked whether they could follow an
instruction to disregard, eight jurors said that the evidence
would not influence their decision. The other four were not asked
that question. One juror told the court that a round of voting had
already occurred before the statement was read, and three jurors
volunteered they had already made up their minds before the
statement was read. Several said that they were not paying much
attention to the statement when it was read. Finally, all twelve
jurors said that they could completely disregard the exhibit if
instructed to do so.
After
questioning all the jurors, the trial court brought them into the
courtroom as a group and issued an instruction to disregard the
Bill Bustamante statement:
Members of
the jury, now that I've had an opportunity to talk to each one of
you 12 jurors individually, I need to give you an additional
admonition; and that admonition is as follows: Because of the
factors that we discussed here individually a few minutes ago,
specifically that there were two State's exhibit number 107 marked
in this case. Only the first State's exhibit 107 was actually
admitted by me into evidence. That State's exhibit number 107 is
this plat which is down here on the floor. That may be considered
by you, and I'm answering your question now. That exhibit number
107 may be used in making your decision in this case. The second
State's exhibit number 107 was mismarked. That purports to be a
statement by Mr. Bill Bustamante. That State's exhibit number 107
was never put into evidence, and you are not to consider it as
evidence of any kind for any purpose at any stage of this trial.
You are to make a decision in this case based only on the law and
the evidence, specifically the evidence which has been admitted
before you for your consideration, which would be the physical
pieces of evidence that are admitted and the testimony that you've
heard from the witness stand in here. In short, you're not to use
anything that you may have read or heard from the purported Bill
Bustamonte statement for any purpose whatsoever. That's an
additional admonition that you are charged to follow.
After the
jury was sent back to the jury room to deliberate, appellant moved
for a mistrial on the basis that the jury had received other
evidence during deliberations. After hearing arguments on the
matter, the trial court denied the motion. The jury later came
back with a guilty verdict for the offense of capital murder.
Appellant also complained about this matter in a motion for new
trial, which was denied.
B. Analysis
In points of error three and four, appellant contends that the
trial court should have granted a mistrial or a new trial because
the jury's examination of the Bill Bustamante statement
constituted the receipt of evidence that was not admitted at trial.
The pertinent rule regarding a new trial is Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 21.3(f), which requires, in relevant part,
that a new trial be granted "when, after retiring to deliberate,
the jury has received other evidence." Before the rules of
appellate procedure were adopted, this rule was codified, in
virtually identical language, at Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
40.03(7).
(14) We shall
construe Rule 21.3(f) in the same manner as we construed its
predecessor statute.
(15)
Under caselaw from this Court construing the predecessor statute,
a two-prong test must be satisfied for the defendant to obtain a
new trial: (1) the evidence must have been received by the jury,
and (2) the evidence must be detrimental or adverse to the
defendant.
(16) In
determining whether evidence was "received" by the jury, a court
may consider how extensively the evidence was examined by the jury
and whether the jury was given an instruction to disregard.
(17) In
Eckert v. State, we observed that an instruction to disregard
at the deliberations stage is "similar to the corrective action of
an instruction to disregard evidence improperly introduced at
trial."
(18) If the trial
court gives an instruction to disregard and that instruction is
found to be effective, then under our law, it is as though the
evidence was never "received" by the jury.
(19)
Caselaw is not clear on whether the same standards apply to
mistrials - where the issue is manifested before the jury has
reached a verdict. Several cases involving unauthorized
communications, covered in the same new trial rule as the receipt
of other evidence, have not distinguished between new trial and
mistrial situations.
(20) In Brown
v. State, the receipt of other evidence and a mistrial were
at issue, but we did not address whether raising the issue before
or after trial made a difference.
(21) Instead, we
simply observed that we were confronting a different case because
the events at issue occurred before deliberations had begun.
(22) Nevertheless,
we analogized to other situations, including the new trial rule,
and determined that a mistrial was not required if an instruction
to disregard would have cured the error.
(23) This holding
is in line with Eckert, a new trial case, holding that an
instruction to disregard during deliberations was comparable in
effect to an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence.
(24) At least
with respect to whether an instruction to disregard can cure the
error, then, the standards are the same.
In this
case, the jurors recognized that there was a potential problem
with the Bill Bustamante statement and queried the trial judge for
instructions. The trial judge then carefully examined all of the
jurors regarding the matter. In response to the trial judge's
questioning, all the jurors stated that they could follow an
instruction to disregard the statement. The trial judge
subsequently issued an instruction to disregard. Under the
circumstances presented here, we find that the Bill Bustamante
statement was not "received" by the jury and any error associated
with that statement was cured by instruction. Points of error
three and four are overruled.
The trial
court's judgment is affirmed.
KELLER,
Presiding Judge
Date
delivered: June 4, 2003
Publish
*****
1. TEX. PEN. CODE §19.03(a);
Art. 37.071 §2(g). Unless otherwise indicated all references to
Articles refer to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
3. Appellant made two
confessions - an electronically-recorded oral confession and a
written confession - in which he related the events of the crime.
4. A "wetback" appears to
refer to an illegal alien of Hispanic origin.
5. Solomon was Walter and
Arthur's brother. They had another brother named Richard. Solomon
was also appellant's brother-in-law (married to appellant's sister).
6. Riha was the ex-girlfriend
of appellant's brother, Bill Bustamante.
7. Solomon was apparently
aware of the criminal usage of the word "shopping" while Riha was
not. Solomon testified that one meaning of shopping was to "roll
wetbacks," that is, to beat and rob them. Riha testified that she
thought it was strange that appellant and the other men would go
shopping so late at night.
8. Apparently the victim was
still able to walk and eluded his captors.
9. According to appellant,
they looked for the victim for less than fifteen minutes.
10. Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
11. Johnson v. State,
23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Bustamante v. Quarterman, 284
Fed.Appx. 183 (5th Cir. 2008). (Habeas)
Background: Following affirmance of capital
murder conviction, 106 S.W.3d 738, petition for writ of habeas
corpus was filed. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, Gray H. Miller, J., 2006 WL 3541565,
denied the petition. Petitioner appealed.
Holding: The Court of Appeals held that defense
counsel's failure to inspect trial exhibits before they were given
to jury did not prejudice defendant. Affirmed.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner Samuel Bustamante (“Bustamante”),
convicted of capital murder in Texas and sentenced to death,
appeals the denial of federal habeas relief. Bustamante contends
that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial in
violation of the Sixth Amendment. On September 20, 2007, this
Court granted a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) with respect
to this claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
Bustamante has not shown that the state court's
decision-no reasonable probability that but for counsel's
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different-is objectively unreasonable. We therefore affirm the
district court's denial of federal habeas relief.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 17, 1998, Bustamante, Walter
Escamilla (“Walter”), Arthur Escamilla (“Arthur”), and Dedrick
Depriest (“Depriest”) planned a robbery. Walter suggested that the
four of them drive to Rosenberg, Texas, to go “shopping.”
“Shopping” entailed offering a ride to an apparently illegal alien,
taking him to a deserted location, beating him and stealing his
money and jewelry. Arthur drove the group in his pickup truck, and
they arrived in Rosenberg at 2:00 a.m., the time the bars closed.
The group spotted Rafael Alvarado (“Alvarado” or “victim”), and
Bustamante noted that Alvarado was “dressed real decent” and his
watch appeared to be “real” and looked expensive, “like a yellow
gold.”
Alvarado offered to pay for a ride across town,
and they “told him to get in.” Arthur and Depriest sat in the
truck cab and Bustamante and Walter rode in the truck bed with
Alvarado. After about fifteen minutes, Bustamante asked Walter a
question, and Walter said Bustamante should wait. Bustamante stood
up and stabbed Alvarado ten times with a knife. Alvarado managed
to break free and fall out of the truck to the ground. Walter
shouted at the driver to stop, but by the time the truck stopped,
they were unable to find Alvarado after searching for several
minutes in the darkness. As they drove away, the other men called
Bustamante crazy. Later that day, Bustamante's brother, Bill
Bustamante (“Bill”), drove them back to the scene to search for
the body. Their search was unsuccessful.
Subsequently, the police discovered Alvarado's
body in a ditch. He was wearing a watch, a gold necklace, and a
ring. His wallet contained one hundred dollars. The cause of death
was stab wounds to the heart and liver and the attendant loss of
blood.
A grand jury indicted Bustamante on the charge
of capital murder. He was tried before a jury on the charge of
capital murder in Fort Bend County, Texas. During the guilt phase
of the trial, Bustamante's brother, Bill, was called to the stand
and refused to testify. Thus, Bill's written statement was not
admitted into evidence. The statement contained information about
the murder as related by Bustamante to Bill. In addition to the
facts of the instant offense, it provided that Bill had gone
“shopping” with Bustamante one time. Additionally, the statement
provided that after the murder the four men stopped at a truck
stop. Walter, Arthur, and Depriest went inside and when “they came
out they found [Bustamante] trying to get into a car that had the
windows cracked a little bit, trying to get a person who was
asleep in the car. They told [Bustamante] that was enough.”
At the conclusion of the guilt phase of the
trial, Bill's written statement was inadvertently submitted to the
jury with the properly admitted exhibits. The statement was
labeled exhibit 107 and another properly admitted exhibit was
given the same number.FN1 Realizing that the exhibit might have
been erroneously provided to them, the jurors notified the trial
judge, who questioned the jurors. This questioning revealed that
three jurors had read the statement or portions of it either
silently or aloud. Bustamante v. State, 106 S.W.3d 738, 742 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).
Nine jurors had not read it themselves but had heard some or all
of it read aloud. Id. Five jurors said that “they learned nothing
new from the statement, three said that they learned that
[Bustamante] had ‘gone shopping’ before, and four said they
learned about an incident at a truck stop, after the murder, in
which [Bustamante] apparently started to break into another
vehicle occupied by a sleeping person.” Id. Additionally, “[o]ne
juror said she also learned that [Bustamante] had told his brother
before leaving for Rosenberg that he intended to rob someone.” Id.
FN1. The record reveals that the district
attorney's office had mistakenly labeled two of its exhibits with
the number 107.
The judge overruled Bustamante's motion for
mistrial and instructed the jurors not to consider that statement
“as evidence of any kind for any purpose at any stage of this
trial.” The jury found Bustamante guilty as charged. After the
sentencing phase, the jury answered the special issues, and the
judge imposed a death sentence.
After exhausting his direct appeal and state
habeas remedies, Bustamante filed the instant federal habeas
petition. The district court denied relief and a COA. This Court
granted Bustamante's request to issue a COA with respect to
whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt
phase of the trial.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Bustamante filed his § 2254 petition for a writ
of habeas corpus after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The petition, therefore, is
subject to AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct.
2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). Pursuant to the federal habeas
statute, as amended by AEDPA, we defer to a state court's
adjudication of a petitioner's claims on the merits unless the
state court's decision was: (1) “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2)
“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court's
decision is deemed contrary to clearly established federal law if
it reaches a legal conclusion in direct conflict with a prior
decision of the Supreme Court or if it reaches a different
conclusion than the Supreme Court based on materially
indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08,
120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A state court's decision
constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law if it is “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409, 120
S.Ct. 1495.
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel,
Bustamante must show (1) defense counsel's performance was
deficient and (2) this deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We must find that trial counsel “made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed ... by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. The Supreme
Court instructs courts to look at the “norms of practice as
reflected in the American Bar Association standards” and to
consider “all the circumstances” of a case. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct.
2052. While “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be
highly deferential,” Bustamante can demonstrate deficient
performance if he shows “that counsel's representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct.
2052. However, “[t]here is a ‘strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.’ ” United States v. Webster, 392 F.3d 787, 793 (5th
Cir.2004) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052).
Strickland's “prejudice” prong requires a reasonable probability
that, but for the deficient performance of his trial counsel, the
outcome of his capital murder trial would have been different.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” Id.
Bustamante contends that counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to inspect the trial exhibits
before they were given to the jury, thus allowing an exhibit that
had not been admitted to be considered by the jury. Although
Bustamante cites various cases from our sister circuits and state
courts that indicate it is counsel's responsibility to ensure that
only admitted exhibits are provided to the jury, there is no case
cited (and we are aware of none) which holds that failure to do so
constitutes deficient performance under Strickland. We will assume
for purposes of this appeal that such an omission by counsel
satisfies the first prong of Strickland.FN2
FN2. “If it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be
followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
With respect to the prejudice prong of
Strickland, the crux of Bustamante's argument is that but for his
brother's statement, there is a reasonable probability that at
least one juror would have found that he did not intend to rob the
victim. Under that scenario, Bustamante would not be guilty of
capital murder.FN3 In other words, Bustamante apparently concedes
that based on all the incriminating evidence against him, the jury
would have found that he killed the victim. Nevertheless, he
insists that the evidence of his intent to rob was weak and thus
his brother's statement providing that Bustamante told Bill that
they “were going to Rosenberg shopping” demonstrates prejudice.
Bustamante also points to the portions of the statement providing
that: (1) Bustamante and Bill had gone “shopping” on one other
occasion; and (2) Bustamante apparently tried to rob a person
sleeping in a car after the murder. To determine whether
Bustamante has shown prejudice, we start by reviewing the strength
of the government's evidence that was properly admitted before the
jury.
FN3. Tex. Pen.Code § 19.03(a)(2)(“A person
commits an offense if the person commits murder as defined under
Section 19.02(b)(1) and ... the person intentionally commits the
murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit ...
robbery....”).
Bustamante's Confession
In Bustamante's confession to the police, he
stated that on the day of the murder he had been “[b]arbecuing and
drinking” with Walter, Arthur and “Dee” (Depriest). It had been
Walter's idea to drive to Rosenberg to go “shopping.” He explained
that “shopping” meant “they pick up-they call them wetbacks. They
pick them up, act like they're going to give them a ride or
something, they catch him leaving the bars at closing.” “And they
catch them or they catch them walking down the street.” “And they
beat the heck out of them.” Bustamante further confessed “[t]hey
do it for money.” More specifically, they “[b]eat them and take it.”
“They'd been doing that for years.”
On the night of the murder, they started
driving to Rosenberg with the intention of arriving before the
bars closed at 2:00 am. Arthur drove his pickup truck, with
Depriest as a passenger in the cab and Walter and Bustamante
sitting in the bed of the truck. They drove by “Mexican bars” for
over two hours. Then “[w]e found this one. He asked us to give him
a ride.” Alvarado, the soon-to-be victim, said he would pay for
the ride. “So naturally we all told him to get in.” Bustamante
described the victim as “dressed real decent” with two or three
gold chains and a watch that looked “real,” “like a yellow gold,”
and expensive. Alvarado rode in the bed of the pickup with
Bustamante and Walter. The plan was to drive the victim to
“someplace, Rabbit Road,” FN4 and “everybody was going to have a
piece of him, be involved.” But Bustamante “didn't let him make it
that far.” Although the other three men told Bustamante to “wait,”
he nonetheless began stabbing the victim with a knife. Bustamante
further explained that Walter tried to restrain the victim, who
struggled while Bustamante stabbed him about ten times. During the
struggle, the victim fell out of the truck bed.
FN4. Bustamante didn't know “where that is, or
if there even is a Rabbit Road.” According to other evidence at
trial, there is a Jackrabbit Road in the Rosenberg area.
After alerting the driver of the truck, they
made a U-turn and went back to find the body. After searching for
a while, Bustamante and the other men could not find him in the
dark and drove home. Later that day, they drove back to the scene
to search for the body. Bustamante wanted to “comb the area more
carefully and thoroughly to find him.” However, they failed to
discover him because they did not realize the victim would have
been able to walk that far.
Other testimony
Solomon Escamilla (“Solomon”) testified that he
is married to Bustamante's sister Nancy. Walter and Arthur are
Solomon's brothers. On the night of the murder, Solomon was
drinking and “hanging out” with his wife, Bustamante, Bill, Bill's
girlfriend Brandy Riha (“Riha”) and Riha's mother. Later that
evening, Walter, Arthur and Depriest arrived in a pickup truck.
The three men informed Solomon they were going “shopping.” When
the three men departed, Bustamante jumped in the bed of the pickup
and left with them.
Solomon testified that “shopping” meant to
“roll wetbacks.” When pressed for more description, Solomon
explained as follows: “Get ahold of them, beat them down, do what
you've got to do to take their money.” Solomon saw Bustamante
after the murder and Bustamante told him that “things went wrong.”
Bustamante told him that “they had gotten ahold of a man last
night; and he got out [of] the truck, well, fell out of the truck.”
Solomon testified that Bustamante was upset about the man escaping.
Solomon's testimony indicates that Bustamante was upset because
they were unable to rob the victim once he escaped from the truck.
Bustamante's codefendant Depriest, who had been
seated in the cab of the truck, testified that he had pleaded
guilty to the robbery of the victim in the case at bar. Depriest
testified that the reason they turned the truck around was to “go
back ... [f]or the man.” When asked what they were intending to do
if they found him, Depriest responded they “[p]robably would have
robbed him.” He further testified that Bustamante got out of the
truck to look for the victim. Bustamante said that he wanted the
boots that the victim was wearing. Depriest's testimony
demonstrates Bustamante's intent to rob the victim.
Brandy Riha, erstwhile girlfriend of Bill,
testified that on the night of the murder, Bustamante told her
they were driving to Rosenberg to go shopping. She thought it was
strange to go shopping so late at night. Riha's testimony also
provides evidence of Bustamante's intent to rob the victim.
Although Bustamante concedes there is
overwhelming evidence that he murdered Alvarado, he asserts that
the evidence that he killed the victim during the course of a
robbery was largely circumstantial. He argues that his brother's
statement was prejudicial because it was direct evidence of his
intent to rob.
We understand Bustamante's argument to be that
his brother's statement prejudiced him because the properly
admitted evidence of his intent to rob was weak. We disagree. As
outlined above, Bustamante's own confession provided damning
evidence of his intent to rob. In his confession, Bustamante
described the plan to find an apparently illegal alien who was
leaving a bar and, under the ruse of giving him a ride, take him
to a remote vicinity and all four men would beat the victim.
Bustamante's confession shows that he had taken notice of the
victim's gold chains and apparently expensive watch. In addition
to Bustamante's confession, Depriest testified that, as they were
searching for the victim, Bustamante stated that he wanted the
victim's boots. Riha testified that on the night of the murder
Bustamante told her he was leaving to go “shopping”; however, she
did not understand what Bustamante meant at the time. Further,
Solomon testified that Bustamante appeared upset when he told
Solomon that the victim had escaped.
Contrary to Bustamante's assertion, we conclude
that, aside from his brother's statement, there is overwhelming
evidence of Bustamante's intent to rob the victim. Bustamante
correctly asserts that the Strickland prejudice test is not simply
whether there was sufficient evidence to convict him of capital
murder without his brother's statement. Nonetheless, the strength
of the incriminating evidence informs the determination of
prejudice. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398, 120 S.Ct.
1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that in making the
prejudice determination under Strickland the court “correctly
emphasized the strength of the prosecution evidence”).
In Miller v. Dretke, the petitioner moved for a
COA, alleging that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to object to admission of evidence of an extra-judicial
confession of a codefendant that implicated the petitioner. 404
F.3d 908, 918 (5th Cir.2005). This Court found that, “in light of
the other overwhelming evidence against” the petitioner, there was
not a reasonable probability that he would be found not guilty. Id.
Among other things, a witness testified that the petitioner had
admitted shooting the victims. Id. at 919.
Here, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found
no reasonable probability that but for Bustamante's brother's
statement, the jury would have acquitted him of capital murder. In
other words, it found no reasonable probability that, but for the
brother's statement, the jury would not have found that the
killing occurred during the course of a robbery. As previously set
forth, we are constrained under AEDPA to determine whether the
state court's conclusion is “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” §
2254(d).
Bustamante has failed to “show a ‘reasonable
probability’ that the jury would have otherwise harbored a
reasonable doubt concerning guilt.” Emery v. Johnson, 139 F.3d
191, 196 (5th Cir.1997) (citation omitted). Most of Bill's
statement was duplicative of other testimony at trial. To the
extent Bill's statement was duplicative, it fails to demonstrate
prejudice. See id. at 197 (explaining that “testimony about the
confession was duplicative of [other] testimony” and thus the
petitioner “cannot demonstrate that a third source of the same
confession would have sufficed to change the result of his trial”).
There are, however, two pieces of information
in Bill's statement that were not duplicative or cumulative of the
evidence admitted at trial. Bill's statement provided that “I have
gone one time with [Bustamante] to roll wetbacks.” It further
provided that during the drive home after the instant murder, the
four men stopped at a truck stop and Bustamante attempted “to get
to a person who was asleep in the car.” The other three men
persuaded him to stop. This evidence is incriminating and should
not have been considered by the jury. Nonetheless, it pales in
comparison to the overwhelming evidence demonstrating this brutal,
unprovoked stabbing death that occurred during the course of an
attempted robbery. Cf. Henderson v. Cockrell, 333 F.3d 592, 603
(5th Cir.2003) (holding that in view of the “brutal and senseless
nature of the crime” and the overwhelming evidence of guilt,
including petitioner's confession to a cellmate, there was not a
reasonable probability that the evidence of petitioner's gang
affiliation affected the guilty verdict).
Simply put, in light of the strength of the
prosecution's evidence that Bustamante intended to rob the victim
during the course of the murder, Bustamante has not shown there is
a reasonable probability of a different verdict. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Thus, we must conclude that the state
court's conclusion is not objectively unreasonable. FN5
FN5. Bustamante challenges the state court's
findings and conclusions and its analysis. This Court has
“conclude[d] that our focus on the ‘unreasonable application’ test
under Section 2254(d) should be on the ultimate legal conclusion
that the state court reached.” Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246
(5th Cir.2002) (en banc). “[T]he only question for a federal
habeas court is whether the state court's determination is
objectively unreasonable.” Id. Here, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals cited Strickland and opined, inter alia, that in light of
the overwhelming evidence against Bustamante, there was no
reasonable probability that but for counsel's performance the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different. As set forth
above, we find that the state court's conclusion is not
objectively unreasonable.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the district court's
judgment is AFFIRMED.