I. INTRODUCTION
Randall Eugene
Cannon appeals from the district court's denial of
his federal habeas corpus petition brought pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. 2254. In his petition, Cannon lodged
numerous challenges to his Oklahoma first degree
murder and arson convictions and to his death
sentence. The district court denied relief as to
each claim but granted Cannon a certificate of
appealability ("COA") to raise five issues on
appeal. See supra section II.B. After conducting a
case management conference, this court granted
Cannon a COA to raise three additional issues. See
supra section II.B.
After a thorough
review of the record and consideration of Cannon's
appellate contentions, this court concludes that
Cannon is not entitled to habeas relief. Accordingly,
this court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 1291 and 2253(c) and affirms the district
court's denial of Cannon's 2254 habeas corpus
petition.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual
Background
Cannon and his co-defendant
Loyd LaFevers were convicted in state court of
murdering eighty-four-year-old Addie Hawley. The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ("OCCA")
recounted the facts of the crime as follows:
On June 24, 1985,
[LaFevers] and . . . Cannon decided to steal a car
after [LaFevers'] car broke down in a northwest
Oklahoma City neighborhood. After selecting a house
in the neighborhood, the two men forced their way
into the home of eighty-four year old Addie Hawley.
They ransacked her
home, taking eight dollars from her purse, along
with the keys to her car and the garage door opener.
The two took her out of the house and into the car.
Cannon, who was driving the car, drove for just over
a mile before pulling over so that they could put
Hawley in the trunk.
The two men drove
to a convenience store where they bought a two liter
bottle of orange soda. After drinking some of the
soda, they poured the rest out and filled the bottle
with gasoline. [LaFevers] directed Cannon to drive
to a secluded area where he removed Hawley from the
trunk of the car.
Although there was
evidence presented at trial that indicated that
Hawley was raped, neither defendant admitted having
committed rape or sodomy. Each man indicated in his
pretrial confession to police and during his
testimony at trial that the other man had committed
the sexual offenses while he remained as a lookout.
After the
completion of the sex acts, one of the two men,
again each blamed the other, poured gasoline from
the orange soda bottle on Hawley and set her on fire.
They drove the car a short distance away and also
set it on fire.
Rescue personnel
were called to the scene soon after the fires were
set. Although Hawley had been burned over sixty
percent of her body, she was still alive. She had
suffered a blunt injury to the forehead and had two
black eyes along with multiple cuts and bruises. She
died a short time after being taken to the hospital.
Lafevers v. State,
819 P.2d 1362, 1364 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (footnote
omitted); see also Cannon v. State, 827 P.2d 1339,
1340-41 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (noting that facts
of Cannon's case were detailed in the OCCA's
original opinion in Lafevers); Cannon v. State, 904
P.2d 89, 100-01 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (Cannon I) (setting
forth in detail contents of Cannon's written
statement to police and taped confession).
B. Procedural
Background
An Oklahoma jury
found Cannon guilty of first degree murder, rape,
forcible sodomy, and arson.
The jury sentenced Cannon to death for the murder
conviction. On direct appeal, the OCCA vacated the
rape and sodomy convictions, concluding they were
not supported by sufficient evidence; it affirmed
the murder and arson convictions and death sentence.
See Cannon I, 904 P.2d at 102, 108.
Cannon then filed
an application for post-conviction relief, along
with a request for an evidentiary hearing, directly
with the OCCA.
The OCCA rejected the request for an evidentiary
hearing and denied Cannon's application for post-conviction
relief. See Cannon v. State, 933 P.2d 926, 930 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1997) (Cannon II).
After the OCCA
denied his request for post-conviction relief,
Cannon filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition in
federal district court. The district court denied
relief as to each of the numerous claims set forth
in the petition. It did, however, grant Cannon a COA,
see 28 U.S.C. 2253(c), to raise the following five
claims on appeal: (1) statements Cannon made after
his arrest were improperly admitted at trial because
the statements were fruits of an illegal arrest and
detention; (2) evidence seized during a warrantless
search of Cannon's home was improperly admitted at
trial; (3) trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective during the guilt phase of the trial; (4)
prosecutors violated Cannon's due process rights
when they failed to disclose, in violation of Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), evidence favorable
to the defense; and (5) trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective during the penalty
phase of the trial.
This court
conducted a case management conference. See In re:
Procedures for the Management of Death Penalty
Matters issued Apr. 8, 1999. At the conclusion of
that conference, Judge Porfilio issued a case
management order granting Cannon a COA as to the
following additional three claims: (1) the trial
court denied Cannon his constitutional right to an
impartial jury when it removed a prospective juror
for cause; (2) the aiding and abetting instructions
given at trial allowed the jury to convict Cannon of
malice aforethought murder without any showing that
he intended to kill the victim; and (3) the death
penalty is invalid because the trial court failed to
instruct the jury, pursuant to Tison v. Arizona, 481
U.S. 137 (1987) and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982), to make findings as to whether Cannon had
the specific intent to kill the victim.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of
Review
Because Cannon
filed his 2254 habeas petition on September 29,
1997, well after the April 24, 1996 effective date
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 ("AEDPA"),
this court reviews Cannon's petition pursuant to the
revised standards of review set out in 28 U.S.C.
2254(d) and (e).
See Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1160-61 (10th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1208 (2000). This
court recently stated as follows regarding the
revised standards of review set forth in 2254(d)(1):
The Supreme Court
. . . elucidated the opaque language of 2254(d)(1)
in Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1518-23
(2000) (opinion of O'Connor, J.). Speaking for a
majority of the Court in her separate concurring
opinion, Justice O'Connor noted the AEDPA allows a
federal court to grant habeas relief under
2254(d)(1) only if the relevant state-court decision
was either "contrary to" or "an unreasonable
application of" established Supreme Court precedent.
See id. at 1519. As for 2254(d)(1)'s "contrary to"
clause, Justice O'Connor noted that a state-court
decision would be contrary to the Court's clearly
established precedent in two circumstances: (1) "the
state court applies a rule that contradicts the
governing law set forth in [the Court's] cases"; or
(2) "the state court confronts a set of facts that
are materially indistinguishable from a decision of
[the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result
different from" the result reached by the Supreme
Court. Id. at 1519, 1519-20.
Under the "unreasonable
application" clause, on the other hand, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ only if "the state
court identifies the correct governing legal
principle from [the] Court's decisions but
unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of
the prisoner's case." Id. at 1523. To be clear, "[u]nder
2254(d)(1)'s 'unreasonable application' clause . . .
, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ
simply because that court concludes in its
independent judgment that the relevant state-court
decision applied clearly established federal law
erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application
must also be unreasonable." Id. at 1522.
Thomas v. Gibson,
218 F.3d 1213, 1219-20 (10th Cir. 2000).
To the extent that
the state court has not addressed the merits of a
claim and "the federal district court made its own
determination in the first instance," this court
reviews "the district court's conclusions of law de
novo and its findings of fact, if any, for clear
error." LaFevers v. Gibson, 182 F.3d 705, 711 (10th
Cir. 1999).
B. Guilt Phase
Issues
1. Confession
Obtained in Violation of the Fourth Amendment
In his habeas
petition, Cannon argued that the Oklahoma state
courts committed constitutional error when they
refused to suppress certain statements he made
shortly after his arrest. In particular, Cannon
argued that his arrest was illegal because the
outstanding warrants for which he was arrested were
invalid. He thus argued the custodial statements
were fruits of an illegal arrest.
The district court
concluded that it was barred from reaching the
merits of Cannon's claim because Cannon received an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of the
claim in state court. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 494 (1976) ("[W]e conclude that where the State
has provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of a Fourth Amendment Claim, a state
prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus
relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at
his trial." (footnote omitted)).
On appeal, Cannon
asserts the district court erred in applying Stone
to bar habeas relief because he never received a
full and fair opportunity to litigate this claim in
state court.
Whether Cannon had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in state court
is a question of law this court reviews de novo. See
Miranda v. Cooper, 967 F.2d 392, 401 (10th Cir.
1992). This court has held that "Stone's 'opportunity
for full and fair consideration' and/or 'litigation'
includes, but is not limited to[,] the procedural
opportunity to raise or otherwise present a Fourth
Amendment claim[] and the full and fair evidentiary
hearing contemplated by Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293 (1963)." Id.
That standard
further "contemplates recognition and at least
colorable application of the correct Fourth
Amendment constitutional standards." Gamble v.
Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1978). Upon
de novo review of the district court order and the
entire state court record, this court agrees that
Cannon had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
this claim in state court.
Prior to trial,
Cannon filed a discovery motion asking that the
trial court order the prosecution to disclose "[c]opies
of any arrest warrants and affidavits obtained or
issued in this case." Although the record does not
disclose whether the trial court acted on this
request, it did hold a hearing regarding the
propriety of Cannon's arrest. Detective Ron Mitchell
of the Oklahoma City Police Department testified
that he arrested Cannon because he "had an
outstanding . . . misdemeanor warrant and then also
a couple of back traffic tickets."
Mitchell testified
he learned of the outstanding warrants by calling
the police department's Crime Information Unit ("CIU");
the CIU then called the issuing entity to verify
that the warrants were still valid. According to
Mitchell, the CIU verified the existence of both the
misdemeanor warrant and traffic warrants. Mitchell
testified that he never personally verified the
existence of the misdemeanor warrant, but that the
traffic warrants "had to be in hand in order to book
somebody on those charges."
Cannon testified
that no outstanding warrants existed on the day he
was arrested and that he had previously paid all
fines related to the misdemeanor and traffic charges.
He requested that the trial court hold its ruling in
abeyance until he could present receipts for payment
of the fines. Cannon also asked that the prosecution
produce the warrants for examination by the trial
court.
In response, the
prosecution argued that it was not necessary to
produce the warrants because the trial court could
rely on the testimony of Mitchell. The trial court
rejected Cannon's request, ruling as follows: "The
Defendant's motion to hold in abeyance the ruling is
overruled, and the motion to suppress the evidence
of the arrest is overruled. All right. The evidence
will be admitted."
When Cannon raised
this claim on direct appeal, the OCCA noted in a
footnote that "[a] copy of the [misdemeanor] warrant
was submitted as a supplemental record on appeal and
accepted as tendered for filing on April 1. 1994."
Cannon I, 904 P.2d at 95 n.7. The OCCA held the
warrant was valid on its face "and any possible
error would be harmless because Cannon has not shown
he was prejudiced." Id at 95. Although there is no
indication the OCCA was provided with copies of the
traffic warrants, that court also held that "the
traffic warrants appear sufficient to uphold the
legality of the arrest." Id.
Like the district
court, we conclude this procedural history
demonstrates that the state court proceedings
sufficed to provide Cannon with an opportunity for
full and fair litigation of this claim. When Cannon
first raised this claim, the trial court conducted a
hearing outside the presence of the jury, at which
time it heard testimony and received all evidence
that was readily available to be presented.
Based upon the
evidence presented during the hearing, the trial
court concluded that Cannon's arrest comported with
the Fourth Amendment and ruled that all evidence
flowing from Cannon's arrest was admissible. When
this claim was raised on direct appeal, the OCCA
allowed the record to be expanded with a copy of the
arrest warrant. See Cannon I, 904 P.2d at 95 n.7.
There is no
indication in the record that Cannon attempted or
requested to have the record expanded with other
materials relating to the outstanding warrants that
he now identifies as relevant in his 2254 habeas
petition. The OCCA reviewed Cannon's claim in light
of the evidence presented to the trial court as well
as the additional material first presented as part
of his direct appeal. Based on that review, the OCCA
rejected Cannon's challenge to the legality of his
arrest. See id. at 95.
Despite this
procedural history, Cannon asserts on appeal that he
did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate
this claim because the prosecution never produced
copies of the relevant warrants prior to or at the
suppression hearing.
This court is not
convinced, under the particular facts of this case,
that the prosecution's failure to produce the
warrants at the suppression hearing deprived Cannon
of his ability to fully and fairly litigate his
illegal-arrest claim. First, the district court
specifically found that all of the documents
relevant to the validity of the misdemeanor warrant
were in the files of the Oklahoma County District
Court and were freely available to Cannon for a
period of several years prior to his trial.
Furthermore, the
opinion of the OCCA in Cannon I makes clear that the
parties were afforded an opportunity to supplement
the direct appeal record with the documentary
material relevant to this claim. See id. at 95 n.7.
Accordingly, Cannon cannot claim that the
prosecution's failure to produce relevant documents
precluded him from obtaining a full and fair
litigation of his illegal-arrest claim.
2. Warrantless
Search of Home
In addition to his
illegal-arrest claim, Cannon also asserted in his
habeas petition that a warrantless search of his
home on the morning following his arrest violated
the Fourth Amendment. In particular, Cannon asserted
that Oklahoma failed to prove that he knowingly and
voluntarily consented to the search. As with
Cannon's illegal-arrest claim, the district court
concluded that a review of the merits of this claim
was barred by Stone. Upon de novo review, see
Miranda, 967 F.2d at 401, this court agrees that
Cannon was afforded a full and fair opportunity to
litigate this claim in state court. See Stone, 428
U.S. at 494.
Cannon's primary
contention on appeal is that he was denied a full
and fair opportunity to litigate this claim because
the state trial court did not make specific, express
findings that Cannon actually consented to the
search or that any such consent was voluntary. A
review of the state trial record clearly
demonstrates, however, that the state trial court
implicitly made the requisite findings after a full
and fair evidentiary hearing on the validity of the
warrantless search.
The state trial
court held an in camera hearing on the validity of
the warrantless search pursuant to Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368 (1964). At both that hearing and later
before the jury, Lieutenant Pacheco of the Oklahoma
City Police Department testified at length regarding
the circumstances surrounding Cannon's consent to
the search.
In summary,
Pacheco testified that Cannon consented to the
search of his home upon the condition that his
parents or brother would be present during the
search. He further testified that Cannon was not
physically impaired at the time he gave consent and
that he was not "hurr[ied]" into providing consent.
During his own testimony at the
Jackson v. Denno hearing, Cannon testified that the
signature on the consent form the prosecution had
attempted to introduce was not his.
He also testified that he did not remember giving
consent to a search of his home. At the request of
his trial counsel, Cannon submitted an exemplar of
his signature to the trial court for comparison with
the signature on the photocopied consent form.
On direct appeal,
the OCCA discussed the evidence presented at the
Jackson v. Denno hearing as well as the evidence
presented by Pacheco in open court. See Cannon I,
904 P.2d at 95-96. The OCCA noted that the "trial
court found Cannon gave knowing and voluntary
consent to search." Id. at 96. The OCCA concluded
that the trial court's finding was well supported by
Pacheco's testimony both during the in camera
hearing and before the jury. See id.
Despite the
litigation of this claim in a Jackson v. Denno
hearing, at trial, and on direct appeal to the OCCA,
Cannon argues that the state courts did not actually
consider this Fourth Amendment claim because the
trial court did not make specific, explicit findings
regarding the existence and voluntariness of his
consent and because the OCCA simply affirmed the
trial court's "non-existent" findings.
Cannon equates the
failure to make specific, explicit findings to a
failure to consider his arguments and cites Reed v.
Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 346 (1994), for the
proposition that the Stone bar should not apply on
collateral review if the state court failed to
consider a petitioner's arguments.
Under the facts of
this case, we cannot conclude that the state trial
court's failure to make specific, explicit findings
constitutes a failure to consider Cannon's arguments
regarding the validity of the warrantless search. As
the procedural history set out above clearly
demonstrates, Cannon's arguments regarding the
validity of the search were extensively litigated
before the trial court. The trial court's decision
to admit the fruits of the search after the in
camera hearing and Pacheco's testimony in open court
certainly constitutes an implicit determination that
Cannon knowingly and voluntarily consented to the
search.
Furthermore, on
direct appeal the OCCA reviewed the merits of this
implicit finding and determined it was well
supported by the record. See Cannon I, 904 P.2d at
96. Like the district court, we conclude that the
record belies Cannon's assertion that the Oklahoma
court did not consider his arguments regarding the
validity of the warrantless search of his home.
Cannon further
argues that he was denied a full and fair
opportunity to litigate his illegal-search claim
because the OCCA improperly denied him the benefit
of the state-law rule announced in Schorr v. State,
499 P.2d 450 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972). Cf. Gamble,
583 F.2d at 1165 (holding that a predicate to the
applicability of the Stone bar is the "recognition
and at least colorable application of the correct
Fourth Amendment constitutional standards" by the
state courts).
A review of the
OCCA's opinion on direct appeal, however, clearly
demonstrates that the OCCA decision constitutes a "colorable"
analysis of the state-law rule announced in Schorr
so as to satisfy the concept announced in Gamble. In
addressing Cannon's claim based on Schorr, the OCCA
held as follows:
Evidence did not
show whether Pacheco repeated the Miranda warnings
before asking Cannon for consent to search. Cannon
claims this Court has held that a valid custodial
consent to search must be preceded by Miranda
warnings. He relies on Schorr v. State, 499 P.2d 450
(Okl. Cr. 1972), overruled on other grounds,
Rowbotham v. State, 542 P.2d 610 (Okl. Cr. 1975),
judgment vacated and remanded, 428 U.S. 907 (1976),
modified to life imprisonment, 554 P.2d 814 (Okl. Cr.
1976).
Although nothing
specifically overrules this portion of Schorr, it is
cited only in dissenting or questioning opinions
subsequent to Rowbotham. Since Rowbotham this Court
has not held Miranda warnings are required before
obtaining consent to search. The record here does
not show whether Pacheco gave Cannon Miranda
warnings when discussing the consent form, but
Cannon received such warnings on the evening of the
25th when he was taken into custody and booked.
Cannon has not
alleged that he requested an attorney or invoked his
right to silence at that time. Testimony showed that
officers did not speak to Cannon between booking and
Pacheco's visit. Cannon does not allege that he did
not understand his rights vis a vis the consent form.
Cannon I, 904 P.2d
at 96 n.13. In light of this analysis, this court
concludes, as did the district court, that Cannon's
arguments regarding Schorr are more akin to an
attack on the merits of the OCCA decision rather
than a charge that the OCCA willfully misapplied
constitutional law.
Finally, Cannon
incorporates his arguments with regard to his
illegal-arrest claim, see supra section III.B.1.,
asserting that because his arrest was illegal, his
consent to the warrantless search obtained while he
was in custody on an illegal arrest is necessarily
invalid as well.
In that regard, he
further asserts that because he was denied the
opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the illegal
arrest claim based on the prosecution's Brady
violation and ineffective assistance of counsel, he
was also necessarily denied the ability to fully and
fairly litigate his illegal-search claim. These
assertions fail for the reasons set out in rejecting
Cannon's Brady claim, see infra section III.B.4.,
and in rejecting Cannon's claim of ineffective
assistance, see supra section III.B.1., at p. 13 n.8
& infra III.B.3.
3. Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
In his habeas
petition, Cannon sought to raise the following three
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel:
(1) counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge
the seizure of a gun taken from Cannon's home at the
time of his arrest; (2) counsel was ineffective in
failing to request a handwriting expert to contest
the prosecution's assertion that the signature on
the "search waiver" was Cannon's; and (3) counsel
was ineffective in not adequately investigating and
presenting Cannon's illegal-arrest claim.
Although it
recognized that Cannon had not raised these claims
in state court and that the claims were therefore
unexhausted, the district court chose to deny relief
on the merits pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(2).
This court,
however, denies Cannon relief as to these claims
under the doctrine of procedural bar. See Medlock v.
Ward, 200 F.3d 1314, 1322 (10th Cir. 2000) (denying
habeas relief on the basis of procedural bar despite
fact that district court had denied relief on the
merits pursuant to 2254(b)(2)).
Except for a few
narrow exceptions, 2254 habeas petitioners must
exhaust available state court remedies before
seeking habeas relief. See id.; Smallwood v. Gibson,
191 F.3d 1257, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999); see also
generally 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1). It is uncontested
that Cannon never raised any of his three federal
habeas claims of ineffective assistance in state
court and has, therefore, failed to exhaust his
state court remedies. See Thomas, 218 F.3d at 1221.
"Nevertheless the Supreme Court has held that if a
petitioner 'failed to exhaust state remedies and the
court to which the petitioner would be required to
present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion
requirement would now find the claims procedurally
barred' the claims are considered exhausted and
procedurally defaulted for purposes of federal
habeas relief." Id. (quoting Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991)). "Oklahoma deems
waived claims that were not raised in an initial
application for post-conviction relief in a death
penalty case." Medlock, 200 F.3d at 1323 (citing
Okla. Stat. tit. 22, 1086, 1089(D)(2)); see also
Thomas, 218 F.3d at 1221 (citing Medlock).
This court may not
consider issues raised in a habeas petition "that
have been defaulted in state court on an independent
and adequate procedural ground[] unless the
petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice or a
fundamental miscarriage of justice." English v. Cody,
146 F.3d 1257, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998).
Cannon does not
assert that his procedural default is overcome by
cause and prejudice or that application of the
procedural bar will result in a fundamental
miscarriage of justice. Instead, he raises a more
fundamental challenge to the Oklahoma procedural bar
to claims not raised in an initial petition for
post-conviction review: the bar should be
disregarded because it does not adequately protect
the rights of petitioners to litigate ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims in state court.
The problem with
this argument, however, is that it is clearly
foreclosed by a series of recent Tenth Circuit cases
affirming the adequacy of the Oklahoma procedural
bar relating to claims not raised in an initial
state petition for post-conviction review. See
Thomas, 218 F.3d at 1221-22; Medlock, 200 F.3d at
1323; Smallwood, 191 F.3d at 1267-69; Moore v.
Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1097 (10th Cir. 1998). In
particular, this court in Medlock cited to the
relevant provisions of the Oklahoma code, Okla. Stat.
tit. 22, 1086, 1089(D)(2), and held that "[d]espite
the especially vigilant scrutiny we apply in
examining procedural bars to ineffective assistance
claims, we have held that Oklahoma's procedural bar
to claims not raised on initial post-conviction
review is independent and adequate." 200 F.3d at
1323.
Absent some
alteration of the status quo by the OCCA or the
Oklahoma legislature, something not alleged by
Cannon, this panel is bound by the rule announced by
Thomas, Medlock, Smallwood, and Moore. See United
States v. Myers, 200 F.3d 715, 720 (10th Cir. 2000)
("We are bound by the precedent of prior panels
absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding
contrary decision by the Supreme Court." (quotation
omitted)); cf. Strauth v. Nat'l Union Firs Ins. Co.
of Pittsburg, 236 F.3d 1260, 1267 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting
special variant of stare decisis under which "any
panel of this Court [must] follow an earlier panel's
interpretation of state law absent a supervening
declaration to the contrary by the state's courts or
an intervening change in the state law").
Because this court
has definitively and repeatedly held that Oklahoma's
procedural bar of ineffective assistance claims not
raised in an initial state petition for post-conviction
relief is independent and adequate, and because
Cannon does not argue that his default is excused by
cause and prejudice or that the application of the
bar would result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice, this court is precluded from reaching the
merits of these ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims.
4. Brady Violation
In his habeas petition, Cannon
argued that the prosecution violated Brady by
failing to disclose prior to trial the misdemeanor
arrest warrant, the underlying Application to Revoke
Suspended Sentence supporting the warrant, and the
District Court Appearance Docket Sheet for Oklahoma
County.
Cannon argued that these
documents were material and exculpatory and that the
prosecution's failure to disclose the documents
prevented him from adequately litigating his illegal-arrest
and warrantless-search claims. In response, Oklahoma
asserted that Cannons' Brady claim was procedurally
barred because Cannon had never raised the claim on
direct appeal.
In resolving this
claim, the district court agreed that Cannon had
never presented his Brady claim to the state courts
for resolution and that the claim would be
procedurally barred under Oklahoma law if it were
now presented in state court. See Okla. Stat. tit.
22, 1086.
The district court
concluded, however, that the procedural bar was not
adequate to bar federal habeas corpus review because
it had not been applied strictly, regularly, or
evenhandedly to all similar claims. See English, 146
F.3d at 1259 (noting that in order to bar federal
habeas corpus review, a state procedural bar must be
independent and adequate and holding that "[a]s a
general rule, this court has concluded that in order
to be adequate, a state rule of procedural default
must be applied evenhandedly in the vast majority of
cases").
In particular, the
district court identified four Oklahoma cases in
which the OCCA addressed the merits of a Brady claim
in a first or subsequent post-conviction proceeding
even though the claim was not raised on direct
appeal. See Van Woudenberg v. State, 942 P.2d 224,
227 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997); Rojem v. State, 925
P.2d 70, 73-75 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996); Munson v.
State, 886 P.2d 999, 1000 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994);
Castleberry v. State, 590 P.2d 697, 701 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1979).
In contrast, the
district court identified only seven cases during
the same time period in which the OCCA refused to
address the merits of a Brady claim because it was
not raised on direct appeal. See Slaughter v. State,
969 P.2d 990, 994 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998); Richie v.
State, 957 P.2d 1192, 1197 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998);
Johnson v. State, 952 P.2d 1003, 1007 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1998); Scott v. State, 942 P.2d 755, 758-59 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1997); Powell v. State, 935 P.2d 378, 385
(Okla. Crim. App. 1997); Newsted v. State, 908 P.2d
1388, 1391-92 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); Hale v. State,
807 P.2d 264, 269 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). Because,
by its count, the OCCA had failed to apply the
procedural bar in almost forty percent of relevant
cases, the district court concluded that the
procedural bar applicable to Brady claims not raised
on direct appeal was inadequate.
Unfortunately, the
district court did not have the benefit of this
court's decision in Hale v. Gibson, 227 F.3d 1298,
1330 n.15 (10th Cir. 2000) at the time it issued its
decision. In Hale, this court examined the adequacy
of the procedural bar at issue here and "again
conclude[d] that section 1086 is an adequate state
bar to Brady claims raised on post-conviction review
that could have been raised on direct appeal." Id.
In so doing, this
court specifically held that two of the cases relied
on by the district court in the instant case, Rojem
and Castleberry, did not support a conclusion that
the 1086 procedural bar was not applied in an
evenhanded manner. See id. In particular, this court
noted that, in both Rojem and Castleberry, the OCCA
addressed the Brady issue for the first time in a
post-conviction proceeding because the claims fell
within an exception set out in 1086 for claims which
for sufficient reason were not asserted or were
inadequately raised on direct appeal. See id.
Furthermore, Hale
identified two additional cases in which the OCCA
applied the procedural bar to Brady claims raised
for the first time in state petitions for post-conviction
relief. See id. (citing Smith v. State, 878 P.2d
375, 377 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) and Banks v. State,
810 P.2d 1286, 1289 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991)).
Hale thus not only
expanded the universe of cases, beyond those
identified by the district court, in which the OCCA
applied the procedural bar to Brady claims not
raised on direct appeal, it also rejected as
dissimilar two cases relied on by the district court
in determining the procedural bar was not regularly
applied. See id. ("'The test . . . is whether the
state courts' actual application of the particular
procedural default rule to all similar claims has
been evenhanded in the vast majority of cases.'" (quoting
Maes v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 979, 986 (10th Cir. 1995)).
Accordingly, the
question is whether the two remaining cases
identified by the district court in which the OCCA
did not apply the procedural bar to a Brady claim
not raised on direct appeal are sufficient, in light
of this expanded universe of cases, to conclude that
the procedural bar is inadequate.
In considering one
of these two remaining cases, Munson, the district
court erred in concluding that the OCCA decision
supported its view that Oklahoma's procedural bar of
Brady claims was not adequate. Although there is no
discussion of the procedural bar, the Munson opinion
makes clear that the Brady issue could not be
adequately raised on direct appeal because much of
the material forming the basis of the claim became
available only after direct appeal. See 886 P.2d at
1002 ("Despite the district court's order and the
prosecutor's assurances that the State had complied
with [the discovery orders], a significant amount of
evidence, including police reports and photographs,
was not turned over to Munson either before or
during trial.
In fact, some of
this evidence was not turned over to defense counsel
until the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, which
was held more than eight years after the original
trial."). Accordingly, we conclude that Munson is
not similar to the case at hand and, therefore, not
relevant to the question of whether the Oklahoma
procedural bar is adequate.
We agree with the
district court that the OCCA's failure to apply the
procedural bar in Van Woudenberg cannot be explained
by reference to the exception in 1086 for claims
that could not be adequately presented on direct
appeal. See 942 P.2d at 227 (noting that supposedly
suppressed exculpatory statements were discussed on
the record at trial); id. at 229 (Lumpkin, J.,
concurring in the result) ("The proposition raised
in the present case could have been raised and
addressed in both the direct appeal and the prior
post-conviction application. In fact, as the opinion
relates it is revealed in the transcript of the
trial. Therefore the issue has been waived."). As
the above discussion indicates, however, the OCCA's
failure to apply the procedural bar in Van
Woudenberg is an aberration.
In Andrews v.
Deland, this court held that the test of a
procedural bar's adequacy is whether the state
court's "actual application of the particular
procedural default to all similar claims has been
evenhanded in the vast majority of cases." 943 F.2d
1162, 1190 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotations omitted).
Furthermore, the fact that a state court has
overlooked the procedural bar as an "occasional act
of grace" is insufficient to conclude that the
procedural bar is inadequate. Id. (quotation omitted).
With this in mind,
we conclude that the decision in Van Woudenberg,
standing alone as it does, is insufficient to
demonstrate that Oklahoma's procedural bar to Brady
claims not raised on direct appeal is inadequate.
Accordingly, as we did recently in Hale, this court
reaffirms that 1086 is an adequate state bar to
Brady claims which could have been, but were not,
raised on direct appeal. See Hale, 227 F.3d at 1330
n.15.
Furthermore, even
though Cannon did not exhaust his Brady claim in
state court, we are convinced the OCCA would not
dispense "grace" to Cannon as it did in Van
Woudenberg. Given that Cannon raised on direct
appeal the alleged illegality of his arrest based on
the misdemeanor and traffic warrants, albeit in the
Fourth Amendment context, we have no doubt the OCCA
would apply its procedural bar to a Brady claim
based on the same arguments.
This court may not
consider issues raised in a 2254 habeas petition "that
have been defaulted in state court on an independent
and adequate procedural ground, unless the
petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice or a
fundamental miscarriage of justice." English, 146
F.3d at 1259. Because Cannon does not assert that a
fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if
this court does not address his claim, we examine
only whether he has established cause and prejudice
for the procedural default.
As cause for his
procedural default, Cannon asserts that he was not
able to bring the claim on direct appeal because the
prosecutor failed to turn over the relevant
documents prior to the completion of the direct
appeal process. In other words, Cannon argues that
the prosecutor's violation of Brady itself serves as
cause for the failure to raise the Brady claim on
direct appeal.
Although this
court does not doubt that a prosecutor's failure to
disclose exculpatory materials may in certain
circumstances serve as cause for the failure to
raise a Brady claim in the appropriate state
proceeding, see, e.g., Parkus v. Delo, 33 F.3d 933,
940 (8th Cir. 1994), this is not one of those cases.
As set out above in discussing Cannon's Fourth
Amendment claims, the documents at issue here were
included in a discovery request filed by Cannon
prior to trial.
At the suppression
hearing held on Cannon's illegal arrest claim,
Cannon specifically informed the state trial court
that the prosecution had not produced the documents
and once again asked that the documents be produced.
In response, the prosecution argued that the trial
court could decide the validity of the arrest based
solely on the testimony of the arresting officer.
The trial court
agreed and ruled that the arrest comported with the
Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, it was absolutely
clear early in the trial process that the
prosecution had not produced the documents.
Furthermore, as noted by the district court, all
three documents were available in an open state
court file since 1985, approximately eight years
before Cannon's trial. Finally, a copy of the arrest
warrant was submitted by the state as a supplemental
record on direct appeal and accepted as tendered by
the OCCA. See Cannon I, 904 P.2d at 95 n.7.
Under these
circumstances, Cannon's assertion that he could not
have discovered the basis of his Brady claim prior
to the bringing of his direct appeal lacks merit.
Because Cannon has not demonstrated cause for his
procedural default, this court may not consider the
Brady issue on the merits. See Hale, 227 F.3d at
1330-31.
5. Jury
Instructions
At trial, the
prosecution offered the jury alternative theories
upon which it could convict Cannon of malice
aforethought murder: (1) Cannon directly committed
the murder; or (2) Cannon aided and abetted LaFevers
in committing the murder.
In his 2254 habeas
petition, Cannon alleged that the aiding and
abetting instructions given at trial impermissibly
allowed the jury to convict him of malice
aforethought murder without any showing he intended
that Ms. Hawley be killed. Because Oklahoma law
requires proof of specific intent for a malice
murder conviction,
Cannon asserts that the alleged instructional error
denied him his Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process of law.
On direct appeal,
the OCCA rejected Cannon's claim that the aiding and
abetting instructions given at trial permitted the
jury to convict Cannon of malice murder without
finding that he had the specific intent to kill Ms.
Hawley. In so doing, the OCCA held as follows:
Nobody contests
the fact that, under the aiding and abetting theory,
the jury had to find that Cannon was a principal to
the crime. Instructions 36 and 37 correctly defined
"principal" and aiding and abetting. The remaining
instructions clearly set forth the defense of
abandonment, the burden of proof, and the definition
of criminal intent.
Cannon claims that
the malice murder instructions told the jury that
Cannon must have caused the victim's death and that
the aiding and abetting instructions told them
Cannon could be guilty if he did not actually commit
the acts. He says "it is not a giant leap" to
conclude that an aiding and abetting conviction for
malice murder required only general intent. On the
contrary, this is a leap of epic proportions.
The aiding and
abetting instructions cannot be read in a vacuum;
they explicitly refer to the underlying charged
crime and indicate that the elements of the charged
offense must be proved. Read as a whole, the
instructions clearly required the jury to find that
Cannon's conduct caused Hawley's death and that he
intended to take her life, or that he aided and
abetted LaFevers' acts knowing of and sharing in
LaFevers' intent to take Hawley's life. These
instructions were not erroneous.
Cannon I, 904 P.2d
at 99.
In this case, the
state trial court defined aiding and abetting in
Instruction 37 as follows:
One who does not
actively commit the offense, but who aids, promotes,
or encourages its commission, either by act or
counsel or both, is not deemed to be a principal to
the crime unless he did what he did knowingly and
with criminal intent. To aid or abet another in the
commission of a crime implies a consciousness of
guilt in instigating, encouraging, promoting, or
aiding in the commission of that criminal offense.
(emphasis added).
Furthermore, the jury instructions defined criminal
intent as the "[d]esign to commit a crime or to
commit acts the probable consequences of which are
criminal." (emphasis added). Taken together, Cannon
asserts that these instructions allowed the jury to
convict him of malice murder without finding that he
had the specific intent to take Ms. Hawley's life.
Like the district
court, this court concludes that the decision of the
OCCA rejecting Cannon's claim of instructional error
is neither "contrary to" nor an "unreasonable
application of" Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
(1977) and Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1).
Although Cannon
would have this court focus very narrowly on a
limited number of instructions in determining
whether the jury was properly instructed, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that
instructions must be evaluated not in isolation but,
instead, in the context of the entire panoply of
instructions.
In that regard,
this court notes that in addition to the two
instructions quoted above, the jury was instructed
that "malice aforethought" means "a deliberate
intention to take away the life of a human being";
that malice aforethought was an element of murder in
the first degree;
that the State had to prove each element of the
charged crime, including the specific intent to kill,
beyond a reasonable doubt;
and, finally, that "[t]he external circumstances
surrounding the commission of a homicidal act may be
considered in finding whether or not deliberate
intent existed in the mind of the defendant to take
a human life."
Reading these
instructions in conjunction with the instructions
cited by Cannon, the OCCA concluded that, in order
to convict Cannon, the jury was required to "find
that Cannon's conduct caused Hawley's death and that
he intended to take her life, or that he aided and
abetted LaFevers' acts knowing of and sharing in
LaFevers' intent to take Hawley's life." Cannon I,
904 P.2d at 99. Upon our independent review of all
fifty-nine instructions given to the jury in this
case, this court concludes that the decision of the
OCCA is neither "contrary to" nor "an unreasonable
application of" Patterson and Jackson. 28 U.S.C.
2254(d)(1).
C. Penalty Phase
Issues
1. Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
Cannon argued in
his habeas petition before the district court and
reasserts on appeal that he was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
when his trial counsel failed to develop and
introduce additional mitigation evidence during the
penalty phase of the trial.
In particular,
Cannon identifies the following three areas of
mitigation evidence not developed by counsel at
trial: (1) evidence of possible organic brain damage;
(2) a social history investigation which would have
examined Cannon's childhood and early adult life;
and (3) DNA testing of blood stains on Cannon's
pants.
The district court
reviewed these claims on the merits and concluded
that, even assuming counsel had rendered substandard
performance, Cannon had not carried his burden under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) of
demonstrating prejudice. Because the OCCA did not
address this claim and the district court made its
own determination on the merits,
this court reviews the district court's resolution
of Cannon's ineffective assistance claims de novo.
See Smith v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 454, 461 (10th Cir.
1999) (holding that ineffective assistance claims
present mixed questions of law and fact which are
reviewed de novo); see also LaFevers, 182 F.3d at
711 (holding that, post-AEDPA, when state court did
not review case on merits and "federal district
court made its own determination in the first
instance," this court will review the district
court's conclusions of law de novo).
"To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must
prove that counsel's performance was
constitutionally deficient and that counsel's
deficient performance prejudiced the defense." See
Wallace v. Ward, 191 F.3d 1235, 1247 (10th Cir.
1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687), cert.
denied, 530 U.S. 1216 (2000). To carry his burden
under Strickland's performance prong, Cannon must "demonstrate
his counsel committed serious errors in light of
prevailing professional norms such that his legal
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." Cooks v. Ward, 165 F.3d 1283, 1292
(10th Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted).
In so doing,
Cannon "must overcome the presumption that counsel's
conduct was not constitutionally defective." Wallace,
191 F.3d at 1247 (citation omitted). Because this
claim of ineffective assistance relates to the
validity of his death sentence, Cannon must
demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, absent
the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded
that the balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances did not warrant death" in order to
carry his burden under Strickland's prejudice prong.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
Taken together,
Strickland's performance and prejudice inquiries
provide the following benchmark for judging a claim
of ineffective assistance: "whether counsel's
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied
on as having produced a just result." Id. at 686. "Courts
may address the performance and prejudice components
in any order and need not address both if a [petitioner]
fails to make a sufficient showing of one." Hale,
227 F.3d at 1314.
a. Failure to
Obtain DNA Testing
Cannon argues that
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
have DNA testing performed on a pair of pants
admitted at his trial. At trial, the prosecution
presented to the jury two pairs of blood-stained
pants and asserted that one pair was worn by Cannon
("Exhibit 84) and the other by LaFevers ("Exhibit
83") on the night of the murder.
In that regard,
Joyce Gilchrist, a forensic chemist employed by the
Oklahoma City Police Department ("OCPD"), testified
that eight blood stains on Exhibit 84, the pants
associated with Cannon, were analyzed for blood type.
That analysis
revealed four stains of type O blood around the
cuffs and back of the pants, three type A stains in
various locations on the pants, and one stain that
was inconclusive as to type on the inside of the
lower leg. Gilchrist further testified that both
Cannon and the victim had type O blood and that
LaFevers had type A blood. Finally, Gilchrist
testified that Exhibit 83, the pants associated with
LaFevers, had four type O blood stains and four type
B stains.
Following
Gilchrist's testimony, the prosecution adduced the
testimony of Tom Bevill, an employee of the OCPD
with an expertise in "geometric blood stain analysis."
As to Exhibit 84, Bevill testified that the majority
of the blood on the pants constituted transfer blood,
i.e., blood that did not drip or splatter from the
blood source but instead came from rubbing against a
bloody object or body part, and that there were "very
few instances" of medium velocity splatters.
Bevill testified
that medium velocity blood stains were indicative of
force being applied to a bloody surface, such as a
physical blow to an already bloodied body part. He
further testified that the "majority of the activity
as far as medium velocity is going to be very low
toward the cuff and primarily to the back side of
the pair of jeans."
Bevill testified
that Exhibit 83 was more heavily stained with blood,
including a much larger number of medium velocity
blood stains. Based on the testimony of Gilchrist
and Bevill, the prosecutor asked the jury to infer
that Cannon had directly participated in the beating
of the victim before she was set on fire.
In his habeas
petition, Cannon argued as follows:
The blood splatter
evidence was the foundation of the state's case to
make Randy Cannon an active participant in the
murder rather than a person who was merely present
as argued by defense counsel at trial. From
conversations with defendant, there is no question
the blood on the trousers is not the victim's blood
. . . . DNA testing would have negat[ed] this
portion of the state's case to prove Randy Cannon
beat Ms. Hawley numerous times causing blood to
splatter on his clothing.
The district court
rejected this claim, concluding that Cannon had
failed to demonstrate any prejudice flowing from
counsel's failure to request DNA testing.
In support of this
conclusion, the district court noted as follows: (1)
evidence Cannon participated in beating Ms. Hawley
formed only a small part of the prosecution's case;
(2) trial counsel's cross-examination of Bevill was
effective in demonstrating that LaFevers was, based
upon the amount and location of the blood on the
clothing introduced into evidence, more involved in
the beating of the victim than was Cannon; and (3)
the blood-splatter evidence was not unduly stressed
during closing arguments.
Accordingly, the
district court concluded that even if the DNA
testing conclusively established that the blood on
Exhibit 84 was Cannon's and not the victim's, there
was no reasonable probability that the jury would
have rendered a different verdict.
On appeal, Cannon
simply reasserts the arguments he made before the
district court and argues that if DNA evidence were
admitted during the second stage of his trial at
least one juror would have voted for life. Upon de
novo review, this court agrees with the district
court that Cannon has not carried his burden of
demonstrating prejudice flowing from trial counsel's
failure to obtain DNA testing of Exhibit 84.
This court has
closely reviewed the testimony of both Gilchrist and
Bevill and concludes, like the district court, that
the testimony had no impact on the jury's imposition
of the death penalty.
We begin by noting
that trial counsel was exceedingly effective during
cross-examination in eliciting testimony regarding
two key defense points: (1) it was a matter of pure
speculation whether the type O blood on exhibit 84
was the blood of the victim; and (2) assuming the
pants adduced by the prosecution were worn by
LaFevers and Cannon on the night of the murder, and
further assuming that the blood on Exhibit 84 came
from the victim, the blood splatter evidence
demonstrated that LaFevers was far more involved in
the beating of the victim.
In that regard,
this court notes that Gilchrist testified on cross-examination
that despite the availability of DNA testing well
before trial and the efficacy of such testing on old
samples of dried blood, the prosecution had not
undertaken to conduct DNA testing on the pants.
Bevill's testimony
regarding the blood on the pants is best described
as equivocal. For instance, he testified that the
pants appeared to be work pants, that he could not
say when the blood stains were deposited on the
pants, and that he could not link up the small
number of medium velocity blood splatters on the
pants with the murder of Ms. Hawley. He also
testified that the pants and other clothing
associated with LaFevers were far more likely to
have been near a violent scene.
As to Exhibit 84,
Bevill testified that the person wearing those pants
"would be at more of a distance [from the victim
during the beating] than the person wearing [Exhibit
83]" and that, based on the pattern of the medium
velocity blood splatters, might have had his back
turned to the scene. Based upon this testimony, the
jury was specifically instructed during the penalty
phase that Cannon had presented evidence "as to the
following mitigating circumstances: 1. Randall
Cannon played a lesser role in the death of Addie
Hawkins."
In addition to the
equivocal nature of the testimony of Gilchrist and
Bevill, we note that, considered in context of all
of the evidence presented at trial, the blood
splatter evidence did not play a particularly
significant part in the proceedings. Although the
prosecution did ask the jury to infer from the
presence of the medium velocity blood splatters on
the cuffs and back of Exhibit 84 that Cannon had
participated in beating the victim, that evidence
was not unduly emphasized during its closing
arguments.
Furthermore, in
considering the likely impact of the prosecutor's
closing arguments, this court will not disconnect
those comments from the actual evidence presented at
trial, evidence that was, as noted above, equivocal.
In that regard, we note that the jurors were
specifically instructed that it was their
responsibility "to determine the facts from the
evidence" and that "[n]o statement or argument of
the attorneys is evidence."
Considered in
context of all of the evidence presented at trial,
we conclude that Cannon has not carried his burden
of demonstrating a reasonable possibility that the
result of the penalty phase would have been
different if his counsel had DNA tests conducted on
Exhibit 84 and those test revealed the blood did not
come from the victim.
Our conclusion in
this regard is bolstered by the fact that the
prosecution presented evidence of Cannon's
participation in the other key aspects of the
criminal episode leading up to the death, including
the dousing of Ms. Hawley with gasoline and setting
her on fire. See Cannon I, 904 P.2d at 100-02 (setting
forth evidence).
This court has
previously described the facts surrounding the
murder of Ms. Hawley as "particularly vile."
LaFevers v. Gibson, 238 F.3d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir.
2001). Furthermore, the prosecution's case during
the penalty phase was exceedingly strong and the
jury found the existence of all three aggravating
circumstances presented to it.
We simply do not
think, upon review of the entire record in this
case, that removing Exhibit 84 from the equation
alters the balance struck by the jury between the
aggravating and mitigating evidence, even
considering the additional mitigation evidence
discussed below which Cannon claims counsel was
ineffective for failing to present at trial. See
Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1515 (2000)
(holding that in evaluating a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel premised on alleged failure to
adduce mitigation evidence courts must "evaluate the
totality of the available mitigation evidence--both
that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in
the habeas proceeding--in reweighing it against the
evidence in aggravation"); see also Walker v. Gibson,
228 F.3d 1217, 1234 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that
in determining whether petitioner was prejudiced by
counsel's failure to present additional mitigation
evidence, this court considers the strength of the
state's case, the aggravating circumstances the jury
found, the mitigation evidence defense counsel did
present, and the additional mitigation evidence
defense counsel might have presented).
b. Failure to develop
additional mitigation evidence relating to brain
damage and social history
Cannon argued in
his habeas petition that his trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to develop the following two
strands of mitigation evidence at trial: (1) Cannon
suffered from brain damage and a resulting mental
disorder which "prevented him from using appropriate
judgment in the incident which caused the victim's
death"; and (2) a developmental social history
demonstrating links between that history and
Cannon's conduct at the time of the offense.
The district court
denied relief, finding that, without regard to
whether trial counsel had rendered constitutionally
deficient performance, Cannon had failed to
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by trial
counsel's failure to adduce these additional strands
of mitigation evidence. In so concluding, the
district court noted that in an affidavit submitted
by Cannon, the expert had opined that the result of
the penalty phase would have likely been different
if the additional evidence had been presented to the
jury.
The district court
held, however, that this opinion was not supported
by objective facts. Instead, after a thorough review
of the entire trial transcript and the exhibits
submitted by Cannon, the district court concluded
that there was no reasonable probability that the
jury would have returned a verdict less than death
had the additional mitigation evidence been
introduced. In particular, the district court
identified the brutal nature of the murder and the
strength of the other evidence supporting the
aggravating factors found by the jury.
This court reviews
de novo the district court's conclusion that Cannon
was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to
adduce evidence relating to the two additional
strands of mitigation evidence. See Smith, 197 F.3d
at 461.
In assessing the
question of prejudice, we evaluate the totality of
the available mitigation evidence, both that
presented at trial and that identified on habeas
review, and weigh it against the strength of the
state's case and the aggravating circumstances found
by the jury. See Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1515;
Walker, 228 F.3d at 1234.
We begin by noting
that trial counsel presented substantial mitigation
evidence at trial relating to Cannon's exemplary
work history; lengthy history of acts of kindness to
the elderly, disabled, and destitute; strong,
continuing attachment to his young daughter, despite
the fact of his continued incarceration; lack of a
criminal record before the murder; relatively less
culpable role in the murder; and exemplary behavior
as a prisoner over the previous eight years. Read
holistically, trial counsel's mitigation evidence
painted Cannon as a kind, compliant, and responsible
individual whose involvement in the murder was an
aberration.
The omitted
mitigation evidence identified in Cannon's petition
comes in the form of affidavits from a clinical
psychologist, a Licensed Clinical Social Worker, and
a professor of neurology and pharmacology. Taken
together, these affidavits indicate that Cannon
suffers from serious brain damage and resulting
psychiatric disorders which "distort his perceptions
and impair his judgment."
The psychiatric
disorders flow from organic damage, head trauma, and
prolonged alcoholism and drug abuse. The head trauma
originated from an incident in which Cannon was hit
in the head with a police officer's flashlight.
Cannon asserts on
appeal that absent the omitted mitigation evidence
an incomplete picture was provided to the jury
resulting in its decision to impose the death
sentence. In particular, Cannon asserts that the
neuropsychological evidence and the social history
background could have "explained to the jury how [Cannon]
came to participate in this crime and why they
should spare his life."
This court's
review of the omitted evidence, however, leads us to
conclude that the evidence is far less beneficial
than asserted by Cannon. In particular, the omitted
evidence tends to depict Cannon as an unstable
individual with very little impulse control.
This evidence
would have negated much of the mitigation evidence
actually adduced by trial counsel and could have
strengthened the prosecution's argument that Cannon
represented a continuing threat to society. See
Davis v. Executive Dir. of Dept. of Corr., 100 F.3d
750, 762 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that court must
carefully review omitted mitigation evidence to
determine if it is truly mitigating or, instead, has
the possibility of being a "two-edged sword" (quotation
omitted)).
Furthermore, like
the district court, we conclude that the state
presented a strong case during the penalty phase as
to each of the three aggravating circumstances
submitted to the jury and that the murder was
particularly brutal. In light of the prosecution's
strong case and our conclusion that the omitted
mitigation evidence would have displaced rather than
supplemented the mitigation evidence actually
adduced at trial, we conclude that Cannon has failed
to carry his burden of demonstrating prejudice under
Strickland.
2. Imposition
of Death Penalty in Violation of Enmund and Tison
Cannon asserts
that he was sentenced to death without the jury
making the individualized culpability findings
necessary to render that sentence constitutional
under Enmund and Tison.
The viability of
this claim is entirely dependent upon Cannon's
assertion that the jury instructions given in this
case permitted the jury to convict him of malice
aforethought murder without finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that he intended the victim die.
Because this court
has already rejected Cannon's claim that the jury
was not properly instructed during the guilt phase
of the trial, see supra section III.B.5., Cannon's
claim based on Enmund and Tison necessarily fails.
3. Removal of
Prospective Juror for Cause
The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury,
operating together, prohibit the imposition of the
death penalty "if the jury that imposed or
recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for
cause simply because they voiced general objections
to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or
religious scruples against its infliction."
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-22
(1968).
Instead, "a
prospective juror may be excluded for cause because
of his or her views on capital punishment" only if
those views "would prevent or substantially impair
the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instructions and oath."
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quotation
omitted).
Cannon asserted in
his 2254 habeas petition that he was denied the
impartial jury mandated by Witherspoon and
Wainwright when the state trial judge excluded
prospective juror Jack Vann for cause.
In particular, Cannon argues that Vann's responses
during voir dire indicated that he would consider
imposing the death penalty in an appropriate case
despite his personal reservations about the death
penalty generally.
The OCCA
considered and rejected this claim on the merits on
direct appeal, holding as follows:
Cannon . . .
argues that prospective juror Vann was improperly
excused for cause. Cannon's right to an impartial
jury prohibits the exclusion of venire members who
voice general objections to the death penalty or
express scruples against its imposition. The
relevant question is whether the juror's views could
prevent or substantially impair the performance of
his duties as a juror in accordance with the
instructions and his oath. . . .
Cannon argues that
Vann was improperly excused because he said he was
not opposed to the death penalty and in the right
case would consider imposing it. A thorough reading
of the transcript shows that Vann did not understand
what was being asked. Initially he said he was not
personally opposed to the death penalty but could
not consider imposing it as a juror.
Later he agreed he
would have preconceived notions of appropriate
punishment but admitted he did not know what that
phrase meant; that he could consider all punishments
but his mind was closed; and that he didn't believe
in the death penalty. . . . The record clearly
reflects that Vann did not believe in and would not
impose the death penalty, and his excusal for cause
was not an abuse of discretion.
Cannon I, 904 P.2d
at 96-97 (footnotes omitted).
The Supreme Court
has made clear that the Witherspoon/Wainwright "standard
. . . does not require that a juror's bias be proved
with 'unmistakable clarity.'" Id. Instead, in
situations where the printed record lacks clarity, "deference
must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears
the jurors" as "there will be situations where the
trial judge is left with the definite impression
that a prospective juror would be unable to
faithfully and impartially apply the law." Id. at
425-26.
The trial judge's
finding as to whether a potential juror is biased is
a finding of fact
which is presumed correct unless rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1).
After conducting a
lengthy voir dire, wherein the prosecution, defense
counsel, and trial court all questioned Vann, the
trial court dismissed Vann for cause. In so doing,
the trial court concluded as follows: "The Court is
convinced that Mr. Vann cannot properly serve on
this jury."
In both his habeas
petition before the district court and brief before
this court on appeal, Cannon cites primarily to
responses Vann provided to defense counsel during
voir dire and asserts that those responses "clearly
and unequivocally" demonstrate that Vann would
consider imposing the death penalty in an
appropriate case. Like the district court, however,
this court concludes that the transcript of voir
dire, considered as a whole, supports the trial
court's decision to exclude Vann for cause.
During initial
questioning by the prosecution, Vann unequivocally
indicated that although he was not opposed to the
death penalty per se, he could not personally vote
to impose that ultimate penalty. Defense counsel
attempted to rehabilitate Vann as a potential juror
during his portion of voir dire. As accurately noted
by Cannon, Vann does appear to have retreated,
during defense counsel's voir dire, from his earlier
unequivocal statements regarding his unwillingness
to impose the death penalty.
In light of this
apparent change of heart, the trial court conducted
its own voir dire of Vann. The initial part of the
exchange between Vann and the trial court is best
characterized as confused. Although Vann did state
at various times during the initial part of the
trial court's voir dire that he could consider the
death penalty as a possible punishment, it is clear
that the trial court thought Vann's responses were
hesitant and unclear.
Apparently feeling
that Vann was embarrassed by the personal nature of
these questions, the trial court called Vann to the
bench and asked him a series of questions outside of
the hearing of the other potential jurors. At this
time, Vann once again unequivocally expressed that
he could not personally sentence a person to death.
The trial court's
finding that Vann could not properly serve on the
jury is well-supported by the record as a whole. See
28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). Furthermore, in
reviewing Cannon's Witherspoon claim on direct
appeal, the OCCA applied the controlling Supreme
Court precedent (i.e., Witherspoon and Wainwright)
and concluded that Cannon was not entitled to relief.
See id. 2254(d)(1).
Because Cannon has
failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that the trial court's factual finding was
incorrect, and because the decision of the OCCA is
not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court
precedent, Cannon is not entitled to habeas relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons
set out above, the order of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
denying Cannon's 2254 habeas petition is hereby
AFFIRMED.
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