KNEPPER, J.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas granting the state's motion for summary judgment, thereby denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief.

On November 6, 1984, following a jury trial, appellant, Joseph Lewis Clark, was found guilty of aggravated murder while committing aggravated robbery, and was found guilty of the aggravating circumstances as charged in the specification of the indictment.

On November 13, 1984, following a mitigation hearing, the jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors and recommended the sentence of death.

On November 28, 1984, the trial court sentenced appellant to be put to death on February 23, 1985. Appellant's sentence of death was stayed pending the outcome of his appeal.

Appellant's conviction and sentence were affirmed by this court, State v. Clark (Dec. 24, 1986), Lucas App. No. L-84-443, unreported, and by the Ohio Supreme Court, State v. Clark (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 527 N.E.2d 844. Certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Clark v. Ohio (1989), 489 U.S. 1071, 109 S.Ct. 1355, 103 L.Ed.2d 823.

On November 1, 1996, appellant filed an amended petition for postconviction relief, pursuant to R.C. 2953.21. In response, the state filed a motion for summary judgment/motion to dismiss on March 11, 1997.

The trial court granted the state's motion for summary judgment on March 31, 1997, finding that appellant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he failed to demonstrate substantive grounds for postconviction relief. Appellant appeals the decision of the trial court and raises the following assignments of error:

“ Assignment of Error 1 “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 2, 5, 9, 10 AND 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, AND OHIO R.CIV .P. 56.

“ Assignment of Error 2 “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA TO APPELLANT'S CLAIMS FOR RELIEF, THUS VIOLATING HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH, NINTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, AND 20 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

“ Assignment of Error 3 “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. (PETITIONER'S FIRST THROUGH SIXTH CLAIMS FOR RELIEF). THE FAILURE BY COUNSEL TO OBTAIN NECESSARY EXPERTS AND PRESENT AVAILABLE MITIGATING EVIDENCE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHTS AS GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH, NINTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 1, 2, 9, 10, 16, AND 20 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

“ Assignment of Error 4 “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT CLARK AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, THUS VIOLATING HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH, NINTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1, 2, 9, 10, 16, AND 20 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

“ Assignment of Error 5 “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING MR. CLARK'S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT ALLOWING DISCOVERY TO SUPPORT THE CLAIMS CONTAINED IN THE PETITION IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH, NINTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1, 2, 9, 10, 16, AND 20 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, AND OHIO R.CIV.P. 26

“ Assignment of Error 6 “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S PETITION TO VACATE OR SET ASIDE SENTENCE BECAUSE EACH OF THE TWENTY CLAIMS FOR RELIEF SET FORTH A CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THUS VIOLATING APPELLANT'S FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH, NINTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1, 2, 9, 10, AND 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

“ Assignment of Error 7 “OHIO DOES NOT PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE CORRECTIVE PROCESS IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS, THE EQUAL PROTECTION, AND THE SUPREMACY CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 2, 10, AND 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

“ Assignment of Error 8 “THE CUMULATIVE ERROR OF APPELLANT'S SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS MERITS REVERSAL OR A REMAND FOR A PROPER POST-CONVICTION PROCESS.”

Appellant's first, second, third, fourth, and sixth assignments of error are related, in that, stated in various ways, he argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to his petition for postconviction relief.

In his first assignment of error, relying on the fact that he presented affidavits and other exhibits in support of his petition, appellant argues that summary judgment was improperly granted as genuine issues of material fact exist.

In his second assignment of error, because he presented evidence in support of his petition, appellant argues that his claims for relief could not have been fully litigated on direct appeal and, therefore, the trial court erred in finding that his claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court incorrectly found that he was not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

In his fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that, because he presented evidence dehors the record that raised sufficient facts to support his claims, the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing on his petition.

And, in his sixth assignment of error, appellant argues that he should have been granted relief on each of his twenty claims for relief.

Initially, we note that constitutional issues cannot be considered in postconviction proceedings where they have already been or could have been fully litigated on direct appeal. State v. Perry (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104, paragraph seven of the syllabus.

As such, “[u]nder the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from that judgment.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at paragraph nine of the syllabus.

Additionally, with respect to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated: “Where defendant, represented by new counsel upon direct appeal, fails to raise therein the issue of competent trial counsel and said issue could fairly have been determined without resort to evidence dehors the record, res judicata is a proper basis for dismissing defendant's petition for postconviction relief. ( State v. Hester, 45 Ohio St.2d 71, 341 N.E.2d 304 ***, modified.)” State v. Cole (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 443 N.E.2d 169, syllabus.

In order to be entitled to a hearing on a petition for postconviction relief, which claims ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must submit evidentiary documents containing sufficient operative facts to demonstrate the lack of competent counsel and that the defense was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness. State v. Jackson (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 107, 413 N.E.2d 819, syllabus; State v. Kapper (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 36, 448 N.E.2d 823. See, also, Cole, supra at 114, 443 N.E.2d 169.

(“Where ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged in a petition for postconviction relief, the defendant, in order to secure a hearing on his petition, must proffer evidence which, if believed, would establish not only that his trial counsel had substantially violated at least one of a defense attorney's essential duties to his client but also that said violation was prejudicial to the defendant.”)

With respect to granting a hearing, R.C. 2953.21(C) states in relevant part: “Before granting a hearing, the court shall determine whether there are substantive grounds for relief. In making such a determination, the court shall consider, in addition to the petition and supporting affidavits, all the files and records pertaining to the proceedings against the petitioner, including, but not limited to, the indictment, the court's journal entries, the journalized records of the clerk of the court, and the court reporter's transcript.”

“When determining whether there are substantive grounds for postconviction relief that would warrant a hearing, the affidavits offered in support of the petition should be accepted as true.” State v. Swortcheck (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 770, 772, 656 N.E.2d 732, citing State v. Strutton (1988), 62 Ohio App.3d 248, 252, 575 N.E.2d 466.

Generally, an affidavit containing evidence of the availability of mitigating evidence and the failure of trial counsel to attempt to obtain the mitigating evidence sets forth sufficient operative facts to show substantial grounds for relief. Swortcheck at 772, 656 N.E.2d 732, citing State v. Scott (1989), 63 Ohio App.3d 304, 310-311, 578 N.E.2d 841.

In his first four claims for relief, appellant asserted that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to obtain the assistance of a neuropsychologist, who could have provided at his suppression hearing, trial, and mitigation hearing, testimony regarding appellant's organic brain syndrome, and a pharmacologist, who could have provided testimony concerning appellant's opioid addiction and drug withdrawal.

Appellant attempted suicide by hanging while incarcerated on another matter, and was taken to the hospital for six days. Upon release from the hospital, appellant was taken to the Toledo Police Department and interrogated regarding the robbery-murder in this case.

After waiving his Miranda rights, appellant eventually confessed to the murder. Appellant sought to suppress this statement.

In his petition for postconviction relief, appellant asserts that his trial counsel should have presented testimony from a neuropsychologist and a pharmacologist to show that appellant was incapable of knowingly and voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights.

He argued that, because this evidence was not presented, his statement to the police was allowed at trial; thus, leading to his conviction.

In support of his petition, appellant offered the affidavits of Michael M. Gelbort, Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist, and Charles T. Kandiko, Ph.D., a doctor of pharmacology.

Dr. Gelbort was asked to conduct a neuropsychological evaluation of appellant and consider whether data obtained from that evaluation would have been relevant, had he been available at the time of appellant's trial.

In his report, Dr. Gelbort concluded in relevant part: “The patient exhibits an Organic Brain Syndrome (OBS) at the time of testing.

[T]he condition was present at the time of the offense for which he has been convicted and was made worse as a result of the effects of the suicide attempt.

It is likely that each of these problems contributed to the patient's neuropsychological dysfunction and that all were in effect and had an affect on his behavior at the time of his trial. Furthermore, his impaired cognitive abilities (caused by the OBS) would have caused him to be less able than a normal individual to comprehend the meaning of Miranda rights and be unable to weigh and deliberate his options in a normal fashion. This would have been the case at the time his confession was elicited in this case.

As noted, the patient's deficits are especially prevalent when he under stress, when affected by drug abuse (or withdrawal,) and in complex situations.

This would have been the case at the time when the confession was elicited and would have further caused his confession to be other than freely given in a knowing fashion.

“Finally, the patient's behavior has not only been affected by the Organic Brain Syndrome/cognitive dysfunction from which he suffers, but also from the acute effects of substance abuse and eventual withdrawal.

In particular, it is noted form the records that he was interrogated while withdrawing from psychoactive substances. Withdrawal is an emotionally and cognitively draining and debilitating experience during which cognitive abilities are further clouded or impaired from their operant state.

Patient's who are in withdrawal will often say or do whatever they are asked to end a situation (questioning or interrogation) which is most often found to be exhausting, confusing, and may be experienced as physically nauseating.

Information obtained from individuals in this state cannot be viewed as being as valid and accurate as that obtained form someone who is not under such duress and who may not acquiesce simply to end the interrogation.

“While the hypoxia occurred after the criminal act, the data show that there were significant cognitive deficits which would have been caused by other etiologies and which would have been present at the time of the criminal act.

It should also be noted that the patient's presentation is one where the lay person, and even a psychologist not trained in neuropsychology (or one who does not have the benefit of test data) could and likely would overlook the deficits.

Despite the neuropsychological deficits not having an overt, outwardly observable physical manifestation, they are real, readily observable in the test data, and the patient's history is clearly indicative of their presence.

Review of the patient's history obviously signal (and did signal at the time of the original trial) the presence of impaired functioning and should have lead to neuropsychological testing and investigation at that time.”

In Dr. Kandiko's affidavit, he stated that he was asked to conduct a neuropharmacological evaluation pertaining to appellant and consider whether data obtained from that evaluation would have been relevant at the time of appellant's trial in 1984.

Dr. Kandiko stated that he addressed two specific areas: the opioid withdrawal syndrome which affected appellant at the time of his arrest on capital charges and his mental status during his interrogation by police.

After discussing the various substance addictions suffered by appellant, Dr. Kandiko gave the following analysis and conclusion: “*** patients in opioid withdrawal have a tendency to be highly responsive to suggestion, and placebo effects are formidable. ***

“9. Mr. Clark, given his past history of opioid abuse (hydromorphone), was in my opinion suffering from opioid withdrawal at the time of his police interrogation. He had been in the hospital 6 days, but as the literature states a person in opioid withdrawal from a short-acting opioid will remain in severe withdrawal for as long as 10 days ***.

In addition, opioid abusers also experience prolonged withdrawal for as long as 6 months post detoxification ***. Mr. Clark was interrogated without having any detoxification treatment.

He would have been subject to all of the above physiological conditions with added anxiety and depression. A standard treatment for opioid abusers is to initially administer 20 mg methadone and adjust dosage as required ***.

Mr. Clark was never given the opportunity to undergo opioid treatment and detoxification. ***

“10. A person suffering form opioid withdrawal is known to experience severe anxiety, restlessness, depression and discomfort ***. [This is known as dysphoria.]

“11. Since Mr. Clark was never treated medically for his opioid addiction, he was most probably in a state of opioid withdrawal at the time of his interrogation by police. This opioid withdrawal would include the mental dysphoria state, as well as the other stated physiological symptoms that are known to occur, when medical treatment is absent ***.

Therefore, it is my opinion, from a scientific viewpoint, that Mr. Clark was suffering from opioid withdrawal with the concomitant dysphoria during the police interrogation of him on January 23, 1984. This dysphoric state most probably had an adverse effect on Mr. Clark's ability to reason, adapt to changing topics, and in general tolerate a three hour interrogation.”

Appellant argues that because a personal examination was not done of him, the trial court denied his motion to suppress his statements to the police.

Appellant cited this passage from the trial court's judgment entry: “The Court has carefully examined the testimony of both Dr. Mareska and Dr. Tanay. Although Dr. Mareska would not give a psychiatric opinion, his testimony did illuminate discrepancies in some of the significant items upon which Dr. Tanay based his conclusion.

The Court notes further that none of the hospital records relied upon contained any evaluations or progress reports of the defendant's mental or emotional condition.

This Court is hesitant to rely solely upon a psychiatric opinion based upon reconstruction of records without any personal examination of the defendant.” (Emphasis added.)

Appellant argues that he suffered prejudice by his counsel's failure to present such evidence during the hearing on the motion to suppress and during mitigation.

In essence, had the evidence been presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court may have found that appellant did not voluntarily and knowingly waive his Miranda rights.

As such, his confession would have been suppressed and the jury would not have heard it. If the jury had not heard his confession, then he may not have been convicted. In any event, the absence of this evidence during mitigation may have kept him from receiving a lessor sentence.

In ruling upon appellant's petition for postconviction relief, the trial court held that “*** the uncontroverted facts firmly establish that a lawyer, untrained in neuropsychology, could not reasonably have been expected to have obtained neurological testing of petitioner.”

In making this finding, the trial court relied on the report of Dr. Gelbort, wherein he stated, “It should *** be noted that the patient's presentation is one where the lay person, and even a psychologist not trained in neuropsychology *** could and likely would overlook the deficits.”

The trial court denied appellant's claims stating that there was “no evidence from which to infer that trial counsels' decision not to hire a neuropsychologist fell below the standard of reasonableness ***.”

The trial court also noted that appellant failed to make a sufficient showing of prejudice and stated, “Focusing first upon the trial court's decision denying suppression of petitioner's confession, it is clear that the decision was made independent of any psychological testimony, evidence, or rebuttal; rather, the trial court determined that petitioner's confession was voluntarily based on petitioner's experience with criminal proceedings and his being repeatedly informed of his Miranda rights in the instant case.”

The standard for evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim was enunciated by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraphs two and three of the syllabus, as follows:

“2. Counsel's performance will not be deemed ineffective unless and until counsel's performance is proved to have fallen below an objective standard of reasonable representation and, in addition, prejudice arises from counsel's performance. ( State v. Lytle [1976], 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 358 N.E.2d 623 ***; Strickland v. Washington [1984], 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, followed.) “3. To show that a defendant has been prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different.”

Petitioners bear the burden to plead both elements in order to adequately state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Jackson, 64 Ohio St.2d 107, 413 N.E.2d 819.

If the petition, affidavits, and/or supporting materials do not establish one of those elements, the petitioner has not stated a proper claim and the court may summarily dismiss the petition without a hearing. State v. Clark (April 17, 1998), Portage App. Nos. 96-P-0257 and 96-P-0258, unreported. There is “ ‘a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance ***.’ “ Bradley, supra at 142, 538 N.E.2d 373, quoting Strickland, supra at 689.

Ohio presumes a licensed attorney is competent. Vaughn v. Maxwell (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 299, 301, 209 N.E.2d 164. Counsel will not be deemed ineffective merely because a defendant is convicted and not acquitted. State v. Hunt (1984), 20 Ohio App.3d 310, 311, 486 N.E.2d 108.

In Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, the Supreme Court determined the standard to be applied to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial court cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id., at 686.

Appellant did present evidence dehors the record that defense counsel could have presented during the suppression hearing; however, the evidence is insufficient to establish that counsel's performance was deficient or that the defense was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness. See Bradley, supra.

Although defense counsel did not present an expert who had personally examined appellant, this fact alone does not demonstrate that counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation. Counsel did engage a psychiatrist to testify in appellant's behalf concerning his mental condition at the time of his confession.

Moreover, appellant's own neuropsychologist, Dr. Gelbort, stated that it would have been difficult for a lay person to recognize appellant's deficits: “It should *** be noted that the patient's presentation is one where the lay person, and even a psychologist not trained in neuropsychology *** could and likely would overlook the deficits.” Additionally, appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice as a result of counsel's failure to call Dr. Gelbort.

The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that evidence of police coercion or overreaching is necessary for a finding of involuntariness, and that simply evidence of a low mental aptitude on the part of the interrogee is not sufficient. State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 318, 595 N.E.2d 884.

Additionally, we note that, at the suppression hearing, the trial court heard testimony from a psychiatrist concerning appellant's diminished mental capabilities. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that appellant's statements to the police were voluntarily made.

The trial court described the psychiatrist's testimony as follows: “Dr. Tanay testified that the defendant's state of mind at the time of his statements would have interfered with his ability to make choices in an informed, reasonable fashion.

This conclusion was based upon the hospital records of St. Vincent, the court-ordered psychiatric evaluation of the defendant conducted by the Court Diagnostic and Treatment Center, the defendant's juvenile records, various police documents, and the taped confession statements of the defendant.

Items of significance to Dr. Tanay included the following: the defendant's condition upon arrival at St. Vincent's wherein his pupils were nonreactive, he had no blood pressure, and an abnormal EEG; the Court Diagnostic and Treatment Center report of Dr. Archambeau wherein the defendant stated that he couldn't remember making the statements and that he (the defendant) had been unconscious for three or four days; the juvenile records of Clark which indicated an IQ of 75; and the police records which indicated that Clark had also confessed to something he didn't do.

Essentially, Dr. Tanay concluded that there was a reasonable medical certainty that Clark suffered both acute and chronic brain damage and that it was likely that Clark was still depressed, which, when taken together, would make a person more susceptible to others. ***”

Notwithstanding this testimony, the trial court held that appellant voluntarily waived his rights, finding that appellant was no stranger to the criminal justice system and that he had a psychiatric examination that indicated he displayed an exemplary knowledge of the workings of the criminal system.

The court also stated that it was “not dealing with a young, inexperienced individual who might be easily intimidated by the interrogation process; but, rather with someone who is fairly sophisticated concerning the criminal process.”

The trial court also found that there was no evidence of “physical deprivation, mistreatment, threats, or inducement.” Finally, the trial court considered the testimony of the interrogating officers.

The trial court noted that Detective James Lagger testified that appellant “was very lucid, alert, and responded properly to all questions asked,” that appellant responded that he was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol or other mind-altering substance, and that appellant read aloud his rights, pronounced the words, had no difficulty concerning any of the words or terminology, and indicated that he understood what he had read.

With respect to Dr. Kandiko's testimony, the trial court also denied appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call a pharmacologist at the suppression hearing.

The trial court quoted Dr. Kandiko's opinion that “This dysphoric state most probably had an adverse effect on Mr. Clark's ability to reason, adapt to changing topics, and in general tolerate a three hour interrogation.”

The trial court then stated: “Such a showing simply does not allow reasonably for the conclusion that trial counsel, by failing to present such evidence, so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial court would not have reliably produced a just result.”

We agree with the trial court. Appellant made no showing that defense counsel was incompetent in failing to call a pharmacologist.

However, even assuming that defense counsel should have called a pharmacologist to discuss the effects of withdrawal, appellant has not demonstrated that this additional testimony would have changed the outcome of the suppression hearing, or the trial overall.

Regardless of the testimony from Dr. Kandiko, who did not examine appellant at the time of the confession, there was testimony that appellant was lucid, seemed relaxed, and stated that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the confession.

With respect to counsel's failure to offer testimony from a neuropsychologist and pharmacologist during trial and mitigation, we find that appellant failed to establish that counsel was deficient in not presenting such evidence. We further find that appellant failed to demonstrate any resultant prejudice.

Appellant offered in mitigation, testimony regarding his mental state, drug addiction, and family history. Dr. Gelbort's and Dr. Kandiko's testimony regarding appellant's mental deficiencies and drug abuse would have been cumulative at best.

Hence, even accepting Dr. Gelbort's and Dr. Kandiko's affidavits as true, appellant failed to demonstrate that defense counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation or that appellant's defense was prejudiced from counsel's actions. See Bradley, supra.

In addition, appellant has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had the testimony been presented at any stage of the proceedings. See Strickland, supra. As such, appellant has failed to set forth sufficient operative facts to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying appellant's first, second, third, and fourth claims for relief without a hearing. In his fifth claim for relief, appellant argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by counsel's failure to properly investigate and present mitigating evidence which was available at the time of appellant's trial, including neuropsychological, psychological, pharmacological, and family information. The Ohio Supreme Court summarized appellant's mitigation testimony as follows:

“At the mitigation hearing, appellant called the Lucas County jail chaplain to testify to the morality of capital punishment, and a sociologist to testify to its lack of deterrent effect.

He called his mother to testify to the events of his life from his birth to his father's death in 1963 and from approximately 1983 to the time of his arrest.

Appellant also called Dr. Kisin, a psychologist, to testify about his discussions with appellant concerning the same period. Dr. Kisin also gave his opinion about appellant's state of mind during and after the murder and his prospects for rehabilitation. Appellant's two children testified that they did not want their father to be executed.

Additionally, appellant made an unsworn statement on his own behalf. For its part, the state called Sgt. Przeslawski, who testified that appellant told him he attempted suicide because he did not want to return to prison. “There is evidence in the record that the victim, David Manning, attempted to resist the robbery, and it could be argued that resistance to a robbery attempt constitutes inducing or facilitating the offense.

However, this would be an illogical reading of the statute. In our view, one has the right to use reasonable force to resist the commission of a crime.

Whatever ‘inducing or facilitating the crime’ may mean, it cannot mean a robbery victim, using no weapon, making an attempt to grab an armed robber.

Assuming that Manning's action did induce the offense, it would be entitled to little weight as a mitigating factor for the same reason. “Additionally, there is no evidence in the record of duress, coercion, or strong provocation, or that appellant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform to the law was impaired by any mental disease or defect.

Appellant was thirty-five at the time of the offense, well past his majority, and no evidence suggests that his age is relevant to the crime or sentence. State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 394-395, 513 N.E.2d 754, 768.

He has five prior felony convictions, and was the principal and only offender. Thus, the mitigating factors of R.C. 2929.04(B)(2) through (6) do not apply.

“The nature and circumstances of this crime are entitled to no great weight in mitigation. Appellant was a drug addict. His wife, who had been supporting his habit with her earnings as a prostitute, was in jail, and the appellant needed money.

Appellant stated that he robbed the service station to get money for drugs. This does not weigh heavily, if at all, in mitigation. Appellant's need for drugs may have led him to rob, but it certainly did not require him to kill in the course of the robbery. “Appellant was, however, disadvantaged by his history and background. His father died when he was fifteen, and he lacked significant parental discipline after that. His intelligence was described as dull normal at best, borderline retarded at worst.

Yet appellant has a high school equivalency degree and is literate. His low intelligence is entitled to some weight in mitigation. Cf. State v. Stumpf (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 106, 512 N.E.2d 598, 609.

Appellant's daughter testified that she loved him and both she and her brother did not want him to die. Such testimony has never been afforded great weight as a mitigating factor. “The evidence concerning appellant's family life is mixed. According to his daughter, Cheryl, appellant had made efforts to be a good father.

On the other hand, he let his wife prostitute herself to pay for his drug addiction. While a strong family background is entitled to some weight, Stumpf, supra, the circumstances here suggest that this factor should be given little weight.

“Appellant has stated that he feels remorse for his crime, and Dr. Kisin believed that his attempt at suicide demonstrated that. On the other hand, when Sgt. Przeslawski interrogated appellant, appellant originally denied what he had done. It is our belief that this denial does not indicate genuine remorse.

Additionally, appellant told Przeslawski that he attempted suicide because he could not face prison. Still, because appellant's professions of remorse are backed by some evidence, they should be assigned at least some slight weight. “Despite the existence of some mitigating factors, the aggravating circumstance outweighs them beyond a reasonable doubt; therefore, we find that the death sentence rendered herein is appropriate.

Appellant's remorse, his disadvantaged background, and his attempts to help his daughter cannot outweigh his killing Manning during an armed robbery. As the trial court observed, appellant “balanced [Manning's] life against a crass selfish motive .” State v. Clark (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 263-264, 527 N.E.2d 844.

Upon a review of the affidavits attached in support of appellant's petition, we find that none of the proposed witnesses would add any information to that which had been provided to the jury.

Therefore, even assuming that counsel should have attempted to obtain this additional evidence, because it was merely cumulative, appellant failed to demonstrate any resultant prejudice. See Bradley, supra.

Accordingly, the affidavits do not contain sufficient operative facts to demonstrate that appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel during mitigation. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in denying appellant's fifth claim for relief without a hearing.

In his sixth claim for relief, appellant argued that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to do the following: determine during voir dire each juror's opinion regarding capital punishment; object to statements to the jurors during voir dire and mitigation that a death verdict was a recommendation which the trial court could reject; object to the notion of diminished responsibility which accompanies the term “recommendation”; request that all side bar conferences be recorded; request that references to appellant's Lucasville GED be deleted; object to the trial court's definition of reasonable doubt; and conduct a thorough investigation into appellant's background and develop the testimony in this regard.

In support of this claim for relief, appellant submits the affidavit testimony of Attorney Cimerman who states that each of these alleged failures demonstrates an ineffective assistance of counsel.

Although Mr. Cimerman's affidavit is outside the record, his testimony adds no evidence for consideration that could not have been gathered from the record. As such, all the alleged errors raised by appellant could have been determined and fully litigated on appeal based upon the record before the court.

Moreover, appellant fails to establish that the outcome of the trial would have been different if not for counsel's alleged failures. Accordingly, appellant's sixth claim for relief is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Cole, supra.

In his seventh claim for relief, appellant argued that his conviction and sentence were void or voidable because he was denied the assistance of counsel after he was released from the hospital and in the custody of the police. Appellant does not offer any evidence dehors the record in support of this argument.

Accordingly, this claim was properly dismissed as appellant failed to provide sufficient operative facts to establish a constitutional violation. See Jackson, supra.

Appellant argued in his eighth claim for relief that his conviction and sentence were void or voidable due to the state's withholding of exculpatory or favorable evidence, as discovered on October 8, 1984 at the suppression hearing. Appellant, however, offers no evidence dehors the record in support of this argument.

Accordingly, as this matter could have been fully litigated on direct appeal, this claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Perry, supra.

Appellant argued in his ninth claim for relief that his conviction and sentence were void or voidable because he was tried in a forum that was unduly influenced by media coverage of his case, resulting in outrage by the community and creating political pressure to produce a death penalty verdict in this case.

In support of this claim, appellant provided a number of newspaper clippings evidencing the media coverage of appellant's trial.

The articles alone do not contain sufficient operative facts to demonstrate that appellant was denied a fair and impartial trial. As stated by the Ohio Supreme Court, “ ‘a careful and searching voir dire provides the best test of whether prejudicial pretrial publicity has prevented obtaining a fair and impartial jury from the locality.’ “ State v. Davis (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 107, 111, 666 N.E.2d 1099, citing, State v.. Bayless (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 73, 98, 357 N.E.2d 1035.

Accordingly, the trial court was correct in not conducting an evidentiary hearing and in granting the state's motion for summary judgment on this claim. See Perry, supra.

Appellant argued in his tenth claim for relief that he was denied the opportunity to examine prospective jurors during individual sequestered voir dire regarding pre-trial publicity, rather than during general voir dire as ordered by the trial court.

Although appellant again relies on the newspaper articles concerning his trial, the articles alone do not contain sufficient operative facts to demonstrate that appellant was denied a fair and impartial trial. This claim for relief could have been fully litigated on appeal based upon the record.

According, appellant's claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Perry, supra. Appellant argued in his eleventh claim for relief that he was deprived of a fair and impartial jury because of a potential juror being excused.

Appellant offers no evidence dehors the record regarding this claim. As such, this claim could have been fully litigated on appeal based upon the record in this case. Accordingly, appellant's claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Perry, supra.

Appellant argued in his twelfth claim for relief that he was prejudiced by the testimony of the victim's wife at trial.

Appellant offers no evidence dehors the record regarding this claim. As such, this claim could have been fully litigated on appeal based upon the record in this case. Accordingly, appellant's claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Perry, supra.

Appellant argued in his thirteenth claim for relief that he was prejudiced because the firearm allegedly used by appellant was rendered inoperable by agents of the state prior to appellant having an opportunity to have the firearm scientifically tested. This issue was fully litigated and considered on direct appeal and, therefore, is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Perry, supra.

Appellant argued in his fourteenth claim for relief that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because appellant's firearms expert lacked the requisite credibility needed to be imparted to the jury.

Appellant offers no evidence dehors the record regarding this claim. Moreover, this claim could have been fully litigated on appeal based upon the record in this case. Accordingly, appellant's claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Cole, supra.

Appellant argued in his fifteenth claim for relief that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court allowed only four days for preparation for penalty phase proceedings.

This matter clearly could have been fully litigated on direct appeal and, therefore, is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Perry, supra, and Cole, supra.

Appellant argued in his sixteenth claim for relief that the trial court gave improper instructions and committed error during the mitigation phase of the proceedings. All of appellant's claimed errors could have been raised on direct appeal and fully litigated.

In fact, appellant's claim that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury that its findings as to the sentence was a recommendation, and his claim that it was error for the state to inquire into appellant's past criminal history, were directly dealt with on appeal. Accordingly, appellant's sixteenth claim for relief is res judicata. See Perry, supra.

Appellant argued in his seventeenth claim for relief that the sentence of death is per se excessive and disproportionate to the penalty imposed in appellant's trial for aggravated murder.

This claim was raised before the Ohio Supreme Court in his twelfth proposition of law and fully considered. Accordingly, appellant's seventeenth claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Perry, supra. Appellant argued in his eighteenth claim for relief that he has been denied a meaningful proportionality review by the Ohio courts.

This matter could have been raised and fully litigated on direct appeal. As such, appellant's eighteenth claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Perry, supra. Appellant's nineteenth claim for relief, that death by electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment, could have been raised and fully litigated on direct appeal.

Accordingly, appellant's claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Perry, supra.

Appellant argued in his twentieth claim for relief that the cumulative effect of errors occurring during the pre-trial, guilt, and mitigation phases of his trial made his sentence of death unreliable and inappropriate.

Because this court finds no error in the trial court's granting of the state's motion for summary judgment and the denial of appellant's petition, without a hearing, we find that this claim was properly denied.

As there were no substantive grounds for relief, the trial court was correct in denying appellant's petition on all claims without a hearing.

Accordingly, we find appellant's first, second, third, fourth, and sixth assignments of error not well-taken. We affirm the trial court's granting of summary judgment as to all of appellant's claims in his petition for postconviction relief.

In appellant's fifth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for postconviction relief without allowing discovery to support the claims contained in the petition.

Appellant served five duces tecum subpoenas, as follows: (1) Records Custodian, Lucas County Prosecutor's Office, requesting that the custodian bring any and all documents that were in his or her possession, custody, or control pertaining to this case and another of appellant's cases involving a different murder; (2) James Lagger, Toledo Police Department, requesting any and all records or notes pertaining to the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of appellant in this case; (3) David McCorvey, requesting any and all records or notes pertaining to the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of appellant in this case; (4) John C. Mareska, M.D., requesting any and all medical records and notes pertaining to the treatment given to appellant from January 17, 1984 to January 23, 1984 at St. Vincent's Hospital and any and all materials relating to testimony given at the pretrial suppression hearing on October 8, 1984; and (5) Records Custodian, Lucas County Prosecutor's Office, this time requesting any and all documents that are in his or her possession, custody, or control pertaining to an extensive list of cases.

A number of appellate districts have found that a trial court is not required to grant discovery during the initial stages of a postconviction proceeding. See, e.g., State v. Hill (Nov. 21, 1997), Hamilton App. No. C-961052, unreported; State v. Waddy, (June 10, 1997), Franklin App. No. 96APA07-863, unreported; State v. Campbell (Jan. 8, 1997), Hamilton App. No. C-950746, unreported; State v. Hawkins, (June 26, 1996), Hamilton App. No. C-950130, unreported; State v. Dennis (Nov. 19, 1997), Summit App. No. 18410, unreported; and State v. Benner, (August 27, 1997), Summit App. No. 18904, unreported.

We also have found that R.C. 2953.21 does not require the trial court to grant discovery during the initial stages of a post-conviction proceeding. State v.. Fox (May 16, 1997), Wood App. No. WD-96-031, unreported. If a trial court does not find substantive grounds for relief within the petition, it need not grant discovery. Hill, supra.

Here, the trial court did not rule on the state's motion to quash appellant's subpoenas; however, the trial court's denial of the postconviction petition implicitly denied appellant's discovery requests. See Hill, supra.

Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not err in denying appellant's discovery requests. Accordingly, appellant's fifth assignment of error is found not well-taken.

In his seventh assignment of error, appellant argues that the remedy provided in R.C. 2953.21, the post-conviction statute, is inadequate. Appellant reasons that the remedy must be inadequate given the fact relief is rarely, if ever, granted. This assignment of error lacks merit and is therefore not well-taken. See State v. Fox (May 16, 1997), Wood App. No. WD-96-031, unreported.

In his eighth assignment of error, appellant asserts that the cumulative error of his substantive claims merits reversal or a remand for a proper postconviction process.

This court has thoroughly considered appellant's arguments and claims for relief. Having found no error in the trial court's denial of his petition, we find this assignment of error to be without merit.

Accordingly, appellant's eighth assignment of error is found not well-taken. The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Court costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See, also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4, amended 1/1/98. PETER M. HANDWORK, P.J., JAMES R. SHERCK and RICHARD W. KNEPPER, JJ., concur.