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Troy Anthony DAVIS

 
 
 
 
 

 

 

 

 
 
 
Classification: Murderer
Characteristics: To avoid arrest
Number of victims: 1
Date of murder: August 18, 1989
Date of birth: October 6, 1968
Victims profile: Mark Allen MacPhail, 27 (Savannah police officer)
Method of murder: Shooting
Location: Chatham County, Georgia, USA
Status: Sentenced to death on August 30, 1991. Executed by lethal injection in Georgia on September 21, 2011
 
 
 
 
 
 

photo gallery

 
 
 
 
 

Supreme Court of the United States

 

08-1443 order and concurring

08-1443 dissent

 
 
 
 
 

The United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

 

opinion 04-13371

opinion 08-16009

 
 
 
 
 

Supreme Court of Georgia

 

troy anthony davis v. the state (S07A1758)

 
 
 
 
 
 

Summary:

Troy Anthony Davis was at a Burger King restaurant with friends and and struck a homeless man named Larry Young in the head with a pistol when Young refused to give a beer to one of Davis's friends.

Savannah police officer Mark Allen MacPhail, who was working an off-duty security detail at the Greyhound bus terminal next door, heard Young cry out and responded to the disturbance. Davis fled and Officer MacPhail, wearing his full police uniform, ordered him to stop. Davis turned and shot the officer in the right thigh and chest.

Although Officer MacPhail was wearing a bullet-proof vest, his sides were not protected and the bullet entered the left side of his chest. Davis, smiling, walked up to the stricken officer and shot him in the face as he lay dying in the parking lot. No gun was ever found, but prosecutors say shell casings were linked to an earlier shooting for which Davis was convicted. Witnesses placed Davis at the crime scene and identified him as the shooter, but several of them recanted their accounts years later.

Citations:

Davis v. State, 263 Ga. 5, 426 S.E.2d 844 (Ga. 1993). (Direct Appeal)
Davis v. Turpin, 273 Ga. 244, 539 S.E.2d 129 (Ga. 2000). (State Habeas)
Davis v. Terry, 465 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2006). (Federal Habeas)

Final/Special Meal:

Declined.

Final Words:

"I'd like to address the MacPhail family. Let you know, despite the situation you are in, I'm not the one who personally killed your son, your father, your brother. I am innocent. The incident that happened that night is not my fault. I did not have a gun. All I can ask ... is that you look deeper into this case so that you really can finally see the truth. I ask my family and friends to continue to fight this fight. For those about to take my life, God have mercy on your souls. And may God bless your souls."

ClarkProsecutor.org

 
 

Georgia Department of Corrections

Troy Anthony Davis
GDC ID: 657378
YOB: 10/68
RACE: BLACK
GENDER: MALE
EYE COLOR: BROWN
HAIR COLOR: BLACK
HT:
WT:
MAJOR OFFENSE: MURDER

CASE NO: 284361
OFFENSE: POSS OF FIREARM DUR CRIME, OBSTR OF LAW ENF OFFICER, AGGRAV ASSAULT, AGGRAV ASSAULT, MURDER
CONVICTION COUNTY: CHATHAM COUNTY
CRIME COMMIT DATE: 08/19/1989
SENTENCE LENGTH: 05 years, 05 years, 20 years, 20 years, DEATH
INCARCERATION BEGIN: 09/13/91

 
 

Troy Anthony Davis

At midnight on August 18, 1989, Mark Allen MacPhail, a Savannah police officer, reported for work as a security guard at the Greyhound bus station in Savannah, adjacent to a fast-food restaurant.

According to Court records say Troy Anthony Davis shot into a car that was leaving a party on Cloverdale Drive in a Savannah subdivision and struck a man in the head, severely injuring him by a bullet that lodged in his right jaw.

A few hours later, as the Burger King restaurant was closing, a fight broke out in which Davis struck a homeless man in the head with a pistol.

Officer MacPhail, wearing his police uniform -- including badge, shoulder patches, gun belt, .38 revolver and nightstick -- ran to the scene of the disturbance. Davis fled.

When Officer MacPhail ordered him to halt, Davis turned around and shot him. Officer MacPhail fell to the ground. Davis, smiling, walked up to the stricken officer and shot him several more times. The officer's gun was still in his holster.

Mark MacPhail wore a bullet-proof vest, but the vest did not cover his sides and the fatal bullet entered the left side of his chest, penetrated his left lung and aorta, and came to rest at the back of his chest cavity. The officer was also shot in the left cheek and the right leg.

The next afternoon, Davis told a friend that he had been involved in an argument at the restaurant the previous evening and struck someone with a gun. He told the friend that when a police officer ran up, Davis shot him and that he went to the officer and "finished the job" because he knew the officer got a good look at his face when he shot him the first time.

After his arrest, Davis told a cellmate a similar story. A shell casing that was found at the scene of the murder was linked to the Cloverdale Drive shooting. A woman who was staying in a hotel across the street from where Mark MacPhail was murdered identified Troy Davis as the shooter after seeing a photograph of him. She also chose his photo from a 5-person lineup, as well as identified him at his trial. Numerous other eyewitnesses also identified Davis.

 
 

Georgia Attorney General

PRESS ADVISORY

Wednesday, September 7, 2011

Execution Set for Troy Anthony Davis, Convicted of 1989 Murder of Savannah Police Officer Georgia Attorney General Sam Olens offers the following information in the case against Troy Anthony Davis, who is currently scheduled to be executed on September 21, 2011 at 7:00 p.m.

Scheduled Execution

On September 6, 2011, the Superior Court of Chatham County filed an order, setting the seven-day window in which the execution of Troy Anthony Davis may occur to begin at noon on September 21, 2011, and ending seven days later at noon on September 28, 2011. The Commissioner of the Department of Corrections then set the specific date and time for the execution as 7:00 pm on September 21, 2011. Davis has concluded his direct appeal proceedings and his state and federal habeas corpus proceedings.

Davis’ Crimes

At approximately 1:00 a.m. on Saturday, August 19, 1989, officers of the Savannah Police Department responded to a call of “an officer down” at the Greyhound bus station. (T. 759)[1]. Officers found Mark MacPhail, a 27 year-old Savannah police officer, lying face down in the parking lot of the Burger King restaurant next to the bus station. (T. 759). Officer MacPhail’s mouth was filled with blood and bits of his teeth were on the sidewalk. As he began administering CPR to the victim, Officer Owens noticed that the victim’s firearm was still snapped into his holster. (T. 761).

Larry Young, who was present at the scene, told police that between midnight and 1:00 a.m. he had walked from the Burger King parking lot to the convenience store down the block to purchase beer. (T. 797-798). Sylvester “Red” Coles saw Young leave the pool hall next door and began following Young demanding a beer. (T. 798). Coles continued to harass Mr. Young all the way back to the Burger King. (T. 799). When Young arrived at the parking lot, Harriet Murray was sitting on a low wall by the restaurant. Davis and Daryl Collins, who had taken a shortcut to the parking lot, came out from behind the bank and surrounded Mr. Young. (T. 799). Mr. Coles, who was facing Mr. Young, told him not to walk away “cause you don’t know me, I’ll shoot you,” and began digging in his pants. (T. 845). Ms. Murray ran to the back door of the Burger King, which was locked. (T. 799). Davis, who was behind Young and to his right, blind-sided him, striking him on the side of the face with a snub-nosed pistol, inflicting a severe head injury. Mr. Young began to bleed profusely, and he stumbled to a van parked in front of the Burger King drive-in window, asking the occupants for help. (T. 803). When the driver did not respond, he went to the drive-in window, but the manager shut it in his face. (T. 803, 915).

In response to the disturbance in the parking lot, Officer MacPhail, who was working as a security guard at the restaurant, walked rapidly from behind the bus station, with his nightstick in his hand and ordered the three men to halt. (T. 849). Mr. Collins and Davis fled, and Officer MacPhail ran past Sylvester Coles in pursuit of Davis. (T. 851). Davis looked over his shoulder, and when the officer was five to six feet away, shot him. Officer MacPhail fell to the ground, and Davis walked towards him and shot him again while he was on the ground. (T. 850). One eyewitness testified that Davis was smiling at the time. (T. 851). The victim died of gunshot wounds before help arrived. Davis fled to Atlanta the following day and surrendered to authorities on August 23, 1989.

Pursuant to an investigation, police learned that on the night of the killing, Davis had attended a party on Cloverdale Drive in a subdivision near Savannah. (T. 1115-1116). During the party, Davis, annoyed that some girls ignored him, told several of his friends something about “burning them.” (T. 146). Davis then walked around saying, “I feel like doing something, anything.” (T. 1464). When Michael Cooper and his friends were leaving the party, Davis was standing out front. (T. 1120). Michael Cooper was in the front passenger seat, and as the car pulled away, several of the men in the car leaned out the window shouting and throwing things. (T. 1120, 1186). Davis shot at the car from a couple of hundred feet away and the bullet shattered the back windshield and lodged in Michael Cooper’s right jaw. (T. 1186). Cooper was treated at the hospital and released and Cooper’s injury formed the basis for Count IV of Davis’ indictment. The shooting incident took place approximately one hour before Officer MacPhail was shot.

Shortly after Michael Cooper was shot, Eric Ellison and D.D. Collins picked up Davis in Cloverdale and took him to Brown’s Pool Hall in Savannah. Red Coles, wearing a yellow t-shirt, was already at the pool hall.

A ballistics expert testified that the bullet recovered from MacPhail’s body was of the same type and was possibly fired from the same weapon as used in the Cooper shooting. (T. 1292). Four .38 special casings recovered at Cloverdale, where Michael Cooper was wounded, were fired from the same gun as casings found at the scene of Officer MacPhail’s murder. (T. 1292).

At trial, Kevin McQueen, who was at the Chatham City Jail with Davis, testified that Davis told him there had been a party in Cloverdale on the night of the victim’s murder; Davis had argued with some men and there was an exchange of gunfire. (T. 1230-1231). Davis told McQueen he did some of the shooting. (T. 1231). After the party, Davis went to a girlfriend’s house and intended to eat breakfast at Burger King. Davis stated that he was with a friend and they ran into a guy who “owed money to buy dope.” (T. 1231). There was a fight, Officer MacPhail appeared, and Davis shot him in the face. As Officer MacPhail attempted to get up, Davis shot him again, because he was afraid MacPhail had seen him that night at Cloverdale. (T. 1232). Davis also told McQueen that he was on his way out of town to Atlanta. (T. 1232).

Jeffrey Lapp testified that Davis told him he did the shooting at Burger King, but that it was self-defense. (T. 1249-1252). Mr. Lapp noted that Davis’ street name was RAH, standing for “Rough As Hell.” (T. 1257). Red Coles identified Davis as the perpetrator of Officer MacPhail’s murder, as did numerous other eyewitnesses, including Harriet Murray, Dorothy Ferrell, Daryl Collins, Antoine Williams, Steven Sanders and Larry Young.

Davis testified at trial. Davis admitted that he was present at the scene of the shooting on the night in question, but denied that he was involved in the shooting of Cooper or the victim or the assault on Larry Young.

The Trial (1989-1991)

Davis was found Davis guilty of one count of malice murder, one count of obstruction of a law enforcement officer, two counts of aggravated assault and one count of possession of firearm during the commission of a felony. The jury’s recommendation of a death sentence was returned on August 30, 1991. The Georgia Supreme Court unanimously affirmed Davis’ convictions and death sentence on February 26, 1993. Davis v. State, 263 Ga. 5, 426 S.E.2d 844 (1993). The Georgia Supreme Court specifically found that the evidence presented at Davis’ trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, by stating that, “The evidence supports the conviction on all counts.” Davis v. State, 263 Ga. 5, 7 (1993).

State Habeas Corpus Petition (1994-2001)

Davis, represented by the Georgia Resource Center, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Butts County, Georgia on March 15, 1994. An evidentiary hearing was held on December 16, 1996.

On September 9, 1997, the state habeas corpus court denied Davis state habeas corpus relief, including his claim that he was not the shooter. (State habeas corpus order of September 5, 1997, denying relief, page 41). The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of state habeas corpus relief on November 13, 2000. Davis v. Turpin, 273 Ga. 244, 539 S.E.2d 129 (2000).

Davis then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on October 1, 2001. Davis v. Turpin, 534 U.S. 842, 122 S.Ct. 100 (2001).

Federal Habeas Corpus Petition (2001-2004)

Davis, represented by Thomas Dunn, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Savannah Division, on December 14, 2001. On May 13, 2004, the district court denied Davis federal habeas corpus relief. In its order denying relief, the federal habeas corpus court denied Davis a federal evidentiary hearing stating that, “this Court finds that because the submitted affidavits are insufficient to raise doubts as to the constitutionality of the result at trial, there is no danger of a miscarriage of justice in declining to consider the claim.” (Federal habeas corpus order of 5/13/04, p. 25.).

11th Circuit Court of Appeals (2004-2006)

The case was orally argued before the Eleventh Circuit on September 7, 2005. On September 26, 2006, the Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion which affirmed the denial of federal habeas corpus relief to Davis. Davis v. Terry, 465 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2006). In the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, the Court noted, “In this case, Davis does not make a substantive claim of actual innocence. Rather, he argues that his constitutional claims of an unfair trial must be considered, even though they are otherwise procedurally defaulted, because he has made the requisite showing of actual innocence under Schlup.” Davis v. Terry, 465 F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 2006). Reviewing each of Davis’s claims, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas corpus relief by stating the following, “Having very carefully considered this record, we cannot say that the district court erred in concluding that Davis has not borne his burden to establish a viable claim that his trial was constitutionally unfair.” Davis v. Terry, 465 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006). Davis filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court on April 11, 2007, which was denied on June 25, 2007.

Original Execution Date Set (July 17, 2007)

On June 29, 2007, Chief Judge Perry Brannen, Jr. of the Superior Court of Chatham County filed an order setting the execution of Troy Anthony Davis for July 17, 2007. Davis filed a motion for stay of execution and an extraordinary motion for new trial. The trial court granted a stay, and then “exhaustively reviewed” each submitted affidavit “and considered in great detail the relevant trial testimony, if any, corresponding to each.” In denying the extraordinary motion for new trial, the trial court concluded that, “Defendant has failed to carry the burden on each and every submitted affidavit.”

On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court extensively reviewed each category of “affidavit testimony” on which Petitioner’s extraordinary motion relied, including: “recantations by trial witnesses,” “statements recounting alleged admissions of guilt by Coles,” “statements that Coles disposed of a handgun following the murder” and “alleged eyewitness accounts.” Davis v. State, 283 Ga. 438, 441-447, 660 S.E.2d 354 (2008). The Georgia Supreme Court held that, “Upon our careful review of Davis’s extraordinary motion for new trial and the trial record, we find that Davis failed to present such facts in his motion and, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying that motion without a hearing.” Davis v. State, 283 Ga. at 448.

New Execution Date Set (September 23, 2008)

A new execution date was set for Troy Anthony Davis for September 23, 2008. On September 12, 2008, the Board of Pardons and Paroles denied commutation of death sentence and issued the following statement: The Parole Board does not generally comment on death penalty cases it has considered for clemency. However, the Troy Davis case has received such extensive publicity that the Board has decided to make an exception.

Davis’ attorneys have argued that the Board should grant him clemency because a number of witnesses against Davis changed their earlier statements to the police and their testimony at the trial. Moreover, the attorneys have brought forward other people who now claim to have information that raises doubt as to the guilt of Davis. Because of these claims, the Parole Board stopped Davis’ execution last year. The Board has now spent more than a year studying and considering this case.

As a part of its proceedings, the Board gave Davis’ attorneys an opportunity to present every witness they desired to support their allegation that there is doubt as to Davis’ guilt. The Board heard each of these witnesses and questioned them closely. In addition, the Board has studied the voluminous trial transcript, the police investigation report and the initial statements of the witnesses. The Board has also had certain physical evidence retested and Davis interviewed.

After an exhaustive review of all available information regarding the Troy Davis case and after considering all possible reasons for granting clemency, the Board has determined that clemency is not warranted.

On September 23, 2008, the United States Supreme Court entered an order staying the execution pending disposition of Davis’s petition for writ of certiorari that had been previously filed on July 14, 2008. On October 14, 2008, the United States Supreme Court denied Davis’s petition for writ of certiorari, thus terminating the stay of execution. Davis v. Georgia, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 397 (2008).

New Execution Date Set (October 27, 2008)

On October 22, 2008, Davis filed an application for leave to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition. Respondent filed a response in opposition on October 23, 2008. On October 24, 2008, the Eleventh Circuit granted a conditional stay of execution and directed both parties to submit briefs addressing specific issues. Both parties submitted briefs, and an oral argument before the Eleventh Circuit was held on December 9, 2008. On April 16, 2009, the Eleventh Circuit denied Davis’s application for leave to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition. In re: Davis, 565 F.3d 810 (11th Cir. 2009). The Eleventh Circuit held:

In short, we are constrained by the statutory requirements found in § 2244(b)(2)(B) to conclude that Davis has not even come close to making a prima facie showing that his Herrera claim relies on (i) facts that could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence, and that (ii), if proven, would “establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) (2006). He, therefore, cannot file a successive petition.

In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 824.

Davis subsequently filed an original writ in the United States Supreme Court on May 19, 2009. On August 17, 2009, the United States Supreme Court transferred the case to the district court for that court to “receive testimony and make findings of fact as to whether evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of the trial establishes petitioner’s innocence.” In re Davis, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1 (2009).

Following briefing and discovery, a federal evidentiary hearing was conducted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Savannah Division, on June 23-24, 2010. On August 24, 2010, the United States District Court entered an order denying Davis’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In denying relief, the district court held:

Ultimately, while Mr. Davis's new evidence casts some additional, minimal doubt on his conviction, it is largely smoke and mirrors. The vast majority of the evidence at trial remains intact, and the new evidence is largely not credible or lacking in probative value. After careful consideration, the Court finds that Mr. Davis has failed to make a showing of actual innocence that would entitle him to habeas relief in federal court.

In re: Davis, Case No. CV409-130.

Thereafter, Davis filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court on January 21, 2011, which was denied on March 28, 2011.

 
 

Watching an execution: AJC reporter was inside the death chamber

By Rhonda Cook - AJC.com

September 22, 2011

Just after 10:30 Wednesday night two words stopped the conversation among reporters instantly. “Y’all ready?” a correctional officer asked. We were moments away from witnessing an execution. Media witnesses are as much a part of the execution process as the officers who escort the inmate to the death chamber or the officers who strap the condemned to a gurney.

Wednesday, we were there as unbiased witnesses, sitting on the back row. Our seats were behind those there on behalf of the condemned and those who prosecuted or arrested Troy Davis for the 1989 murder of Savannah police officer Mark Allen MacPhail. The dead officer’s son and namesake, Mark MacPhail Jr., and his brother, William MacPhail, were there for the family. We spoke little from that moment on, the five reporters selected to witness the execution.

As the officer called our names, we lined up and left the room where we had waited for so long, oblivious to the last-ditch effort to spare Davis and the police presence and protests beyond the prison's walls. In the death chamber, we took our seats on the last of three pews.

Warden Carl Humphrey began the process by reading the execution order signed by Chatham County Judge Penny Haas Freesmann. "The court having sentenced defendant Troy Anthony Davis on the third day of September, 1991, to be executed….” Then he asked Davis if he has any final words. Yes, the condemned man said and he raised his head so he could look at Mark MacPhail Jr., who was an infant when his father was murdered, and William MacPhail, the dead officer’s brother. “I’m sorry for your loss,” Davis said.

Mark MacPhail, who was leaning forward, and his uncle did not move. They stared at the man who killed their loved one. “I did not personally kill your son, father and brother,” Davis said. “I am innocent. “ He asked his family and friends to continue to search for the truth. And to the prison officials he said “may God have mercy on your souls. May God bless your souls.” He then lowered his head. He turned down an offer for a prayer.

Within minutes, Troy Anthony Davis slipped out of consciousness and in 14 minutes he was dead. A three-drug cocktail ended his life. First pentobarbital put Davis in a drug-induced coma. The paralytic pancuronium bromide was second. Potassium chloride stopped Davis’ heart. “The court ordered execution of Troy Anthony Davis was carried out in accordance with the laws of the state of Georgia,” the warden announced. Curtains in the death chamber were closed and we were quickly ushered out.

Waiting for us at the media staging area was a line of correctional officers, deputy sheriffs and state troopers blocking protesters from crossing Georgia Highway 36 onto prison property and hoards of local, national and international reporters waiting for the reporters who witnessed the execution to describe what happened. He went peacefully, one of the reporters said.

*****

Davis' last day: A goodbye to family

By Rhonda Cook

September 21, 2011

Troy Anthony Davis is preparing to die for the fourth time today. Davis' day will run according to a schedule the Department of Corrections follows in the hours leading up to an execution -- a final goodbye to family, a last meal, the chance for Davis to make a final statement. Then, at 7 p.m., he is scheduled to die by lethal injection for the 1989 shooting death of off-duty police officer Mark MacPhail.

Three previous times Davis has been scheduled to die. In 2007 his execution was called off the day before. . In 2008 he came within 2 1/2 hours of dying when the U.S. Supreme Court stopped it. And again in 2008 the federal court of appeals stopped the execution three days before he was to die. This time, however, he has exhausted all his appeals.

"We’ve been here before. We’re just hoping it will go all the way through this time,” said Mark MacPhail Jr., who was an infant in 1989 when his father and namesake was shot to death in a Savannah Burger King parking lot.

For the most part, activity today at the Diagnostic and Classification Prison, the home for all Georgia executions, will be as it has been for 28 previous executions. According to prison policies, Davis was put on "death watch" days ago, with an officer assigned to watch him at all times to ensure he does not try to take his own life. Anonymous members of the prison's execution team have rehearsed their respective roles. Today, officers -- even those not directly assigned to the execution -- will remove any badges or patches that identify them. .

Davis and his family will have six hours together -- 9 a.m. until 3 p.m. -- in a special visitation room before they say "good-bye." After his family leaves the prison for the last time, that is when officials begin the final preparations for his death.

Davis will get a physical and clean clothes at 3 p.m., and an hour later his final meal. Davis has asked to have the same thing for dinner that the rest of the 2,100 inmates will have Wednesday – a cheeseburger, potatoes, baked beans, slaw, cookies and a grape drink. At 5 p.m. Davis can make a recorded final statement, one that is longer than the one he can make once he is strapped to the gurney in the death chamber.

He will be allowed to pass the time listening to music, reading, watching television and talking on the telephone. And all the while a prison guard will take meticulous notes of everything he does, how much he eats or doesn't eat and his mood. An hour before he is scheduled to die, Davis will be offered a sedative to calm him.

That also is the time when five reporters will be loaded into a van and driven to the prison where they will wait, down the hall from other witnesses, until they are taken to the death chamber behind the massive prison. One by one, they will be led into the view area – first the witnesses for the state, then Davis’ witness and finally the media witnesses.

Mark MacPhail Jr. and his uncle, William MacPhail, will be in the death chamber to represent the family. Mark MacPhail said his older sister's emotions wouldn't let her witness the execution and his mother and grandmother didn't want to watch. "I was the only family member willing to," said the 22-year-old. Once the witnesses are seated, Davis will be placed in view with IVs in both arms. The warden will read the death warrant and Davis will be offered a chance for final words. The lethal injection process will begin, injecting a cocktail of drugs in Davis that will kill him within minutes.

*****

Davis appeals fail; executed for ‘89 murder

By Bill Rankin and Rhonda Cook

September 21, 2011

Troy Anthony Davis, who maintained his innocence until the end, was executed late Wednesday night after the nation’s highest court rejected his final appeal. Davis, 42, was declared dead at 11:08 p.m., but his execution did not put to rest widespread doubts about whether he committed the crime for which he was punished – the 1989 murder of off-duty Savannah Police Officer Mark Allen MacPhail, a father of two young children and a former Army Ranger. His death-penalty case was one of the most bitterly contested and controversial in Georgia history.

Strapped to the lethal-injection gurney, Davis lifted his head and looked at the MacPhail family, and said, "The incident that night was not my fault, I did not have a gun. ... I did not personally kill your son, father and brother. I am innocent." He then said for "those about to take my life, may God have mercy on your souls, may God bless your souls." When Davis addressed members of the MacPhail family who witnessed the execution, they said nothing, but did not look away.

MacPhail’s family and the prosecutors who put Davis on death row steadfastly stood behind Davis’ conviction as his innocence claims attracted worldwide attention and the calls from dignitaries and celebrities for Davis to be spared. But while Davis may have made thousands wonder if he was a true cop killer, he could not convince the justice system to halt his execution. "I'm not joyous," MacPhail's mother, Anneliese MacPhail, said. "I'm feeling a little bit relieved. It has been a long, long battle. I'd like to close the book."

Brian Kammer, one of Davis' lawyers, said the state may have executed an innocent man. "I think Georgia has shamed itself in a very profound way by failing to err on the side of life when there is meaningful, significant doubt," he said. This was the fourth time Davis faced execution. On the three prior occasions, he received stays. But a succession of court decisions issued Wednesday denied Davis' final bids.

The Georgia Supreme Court unanimously declined to stop the execution about two hours before it was to be carried out. Davis' scheduled 7 p.m. execution was put on hold for more than three hours as the U.S. Supreme Court considered his final bid.

The scene outside the state prison in Jackson was unlike any other in past executions. Television satellite trucks and media cars parked bumper to bumper. A crowd of death-penalty opponents swelling into the hundreds -- but dwindled at the evening wore on -- rallied outside and held vigils in an area set aside for them. A news conference organized by Amnesty International and the NAACP at a nearby church resembled a tent-revival meeting.

As the high court deliberated past the scheduled execution time, a dozen Georgia state troopers in riot gear raised tensions when they marched in military formation between protesters and other officers in paramilitary gear stationed just outside the prison. The troopers were met by choruses of “Shame on you” from the protesters.

Benjamin Jealous, head of the NAACP, predicted Davis’ case would be a “game-changer for the death-penalty debate” and make jurors more reluctant to send killers to death row for fear they might be making a mistake.

As the day wore on and Davis’ execution neared, he met with family members and friends. He declined the opportunity offered all condemned inmates to give a final, recorded statement. He was given a tray with a cheeseburger, potatoes, baked beans, coleslaw and cookies but did not eat a last meal, a prison spokeswoman said.

This week, Davis’ legal team mounted an aggressive effort to try and stop the execution. It first asked the state Board of Pardons and Paroles to grant Davis clemency, a request that was denied Tuesday. The lawyers, joined by U.S. congressmen, former Department of Corrections officials and the Innocence Project, asked the parole board to reconsider. The board denied that as well.

Davis’ lawyers next asked the Department of Corrections to let Davis take a polygraph test, but they were rebuffed at the prison gate on Wednesday morning. “We came here to try and prove Mr. Davis is innocent and unfortunately we were denied that opportunity by the Department of Corrections,” said Stephen Marsh, one of Davis’ lawyers, after he was turned away from the prison in Jackson, about 50 miles south of Atlanta.

Davis’ supporters even called for President Barack Obama to stop the execution, though only the state parole board or a court could do so. At a Monday news conference, White House spokesman Jay Carney, when asked about Davis’ case, declined to weigh in. “Well, as you know, the president has written that he believes the death penalty does little to deter crime but that some crimes merit the ultimate punishment,” Carney said. He referred questions about the pending Davis execution to the U.S. Justice Department.

The case was one of the most popular topics throughout Wednesday on the social media Twitter site.

MacPhail, 27, was moonlighting on a security detail shortly after midnight on Aug. 19, 1989, when he rushed to help a homeless man who had cried out while he was pistol-whipped in a Burger King parking lot. MacPhail was shot three times before he could draw his gun. One witness said the killer wore a “smirky-like smile” and stood over the fallen officer, firing again and again, including once in MacPhail’s face.

Sylvester “Redd” Coles, who accompanied Davis to the scene, was the first to implicate Davis to police. Other witnesses said they either saw Davis fire the fatal shots or identified Davis as the killer by the clothes he wore. Davis was tried, convicted and sentenced to death during a 1991 trial.

In ensuing years, however, several key prosecution witnesses renounced or backed off their trial testimony, while others issued sworn statements that said Coles had told them he was the actual trigger man. Coles, once asked by The Atlanta Journal-Constitution about the accusations, declined to comment. At trial, he testified that he left the immediate crime scene before he heard shots fired.

The new testimony and evidence gained notoriety because the murder weapon was never found, and no DNA, fingerprint or blood evidence tied Davis to the killing. At least three jurors who sentenced Davis to death recently signed sworn statements that said they now had doubts about their verdicts and asked that Davis be spared execution.

People arrived outside the prison in buses, including some who accompanied Al Sharpton and his National Action Network from Atlanta. A.C. Dumas traveled to Jackson from Flint, Mich., to rally support for Davis. “I think you have to correct the mistake — that is why you have erasures,” Dumas said. “This is a threat of injustice and needs to be corrected.”

Organized by Amnesty International and the NAACP, a news conference held at Towaligia County Line Baptist Church near the jail better resembled a tent revival meeting. Among the speakers were Big Boi of the musical group Outkast and Martina Correia, Davis’ eldest sibling, who has been the most outspoken champion of his cause.

The wheelchair-bound Correia, who is battling breast cancer, said she deeply believed in her brother’s innocence and contended his case should be reason for abolishing the death penalty. “Troy said this movement did not begin with him and will not end with him,” she said. “I’m not here to say who is innocent or who is guilty, but, if you’re going to execute a man, you need to make sure he is 100-percent guilty,” said Big Boi, whose legal name is Antwan Patton and who was raised in Savannah. “There is too much doubt.”

About 400 Troy Davis supporters gathered in front of the state Capitol Wednesday night in a vigil calling for a stay of execution. Some carried “I Am Troy Davis” banners, held candles, sang and prayed.

*****

A mother's vigil

By Craig Schneider and Victoria Loe Hicks

September 21, 2011

COLUMBUS -- "It might be over this time." Those six words from Anneliese MacPhail, scribbled by a friend and left lying on the kitchen table, held 22 years of grief and anger. "I'm a nervous wreck," MacPhail announced at 6:35 p.m., as the clock ticked down toward the scheduled execution of the man convicted of killing her youngest son.

As 7 p.m. came and went with no execution, the mother, long a widow, waited a wait she had endured three times before. At 77, she waited with a steel-spined determination to see justice -- justice by her own lights -- done no matter how long the wait. Surrounded by family, friends and dozens of framed family photos, she smoked, in her own words, "like a steam engine" and sat by the phone. It rang incessantly, but not with the news she wanted, the news from the prison that would put the waiting behind her.

Instead, some of the calls were from people who wanted to berate her for being party to the killing of Troy Davis, a man they believed to have been wrongly convicted. She didn't shrink from answering them back. Let them tell her she had blood on her hands, she said defiantly. Let them challenge her any way at all. "I know what I'm doing," she said. "They're trying to intimidate me. I don't go that route."

The phone was her umbilical cord to the outside world, her only source of news. The TV was off; the local station was not covering the execution vigil live. Earlier in the evening, when the protests over Davis' impending execution dominated the national news, she had watched and talked right back at the talking heads. "That's what you think," she barked at the Rev. Al Sharpton when he proclaimed that killing Davis would be a miscarriage of justice.

All around her, the house spoke tales of a family devoted to military and police service. In a bedroom was a blanket emblazoned with the words: "Freedom is not free." In the living room, amidst the photos -- Mark graduating from high school, Mark in his Army Ranger uniform -- sat a shadowbox containing a gold police shield, a gift from an admirer. Mark's real shield she carries in her purse: Savannah Police Department, Officer 212.

Outside, TV camera crews camped on the front lawn. In the living room, MacPhail fingered the photos of Mark as her 11-month-old great-grandson, Grayson, crawled about on the rug. His mother, Mandy Winningham, was 7 when her uncle Mark was killed. After all these years of struggle and controversy, it's hard she said, to remember the good times.

In the kitchen, 82-year-old Helen Edwards sat knitting dish towels. Edwards, who also lost a son to murder, met MacPhail through a support group for crime victims. She has little use for Davis' supporters, she said, even the Pope or former President Jimmy Carter. If she met them on the street, she said, "I would make a face."

As Edwards knitted, MacPhail went outside to stand stoically in the front yard with a crew from CNN. Sheltered by an umbrella from the pouring rain, she waited for Anderson Cooper to be ready to do a remote interview. "Dear," she called him, when the interview finally commenced. Off camera, as the clock ticked past 8, past 8:30, past 9, she waited. "I don't hate him," she said of Davis. "The hate is gone. He disgusts me."

9:30 ... 9:45 ... 10:00 ... the wait stretched on. But soldiers know how to wait. "I want my justice," she said. "I just want it done." 10:19, the phone rang. "Thank you," MacPhail said to the voice on the other end.

Turning to Edwards and Winningham, she thrust her fists into the air. "It's going ahead," she said. 11:08, the phone rang again. She picked it up and listened. Putting it down, she said slowly and with emphasis: "It is over."

 
 

Troy Davis: The time line

SavannahNow.com

September 22, 2011

1989

Aug. 19: Officer Mark Allen MacPhail is shot twice while trying to break up a fight.
Aug. 20: Police conduct two raids searching for the suspect, Troy Anthony Davis.
Aug. 22: Even as MacPhail’s funeral is held, officers continue to work the case.
Aug. 23: Davis surrenders after negotiations between police and Davis’ family. Davis had fled to Atlanta.
Nov. 15: Davis is indicted on murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm.

1990

Jan. 16: The formal request for the death penalty triggers the state’s uniform procedures.
April 30: Davis’ lawyers enter a plea of not guilty. They also request a change of venue.
July 30: Trial is set for October.
Oct. 12: The trial is postponed to December. Davis’ lawyers request a psychological evaluation.
Nov. 9: Judge James W. Head bans evidence seized during a search of the home of Davis’ mother.
Nov. 15: Prosecutors ask to delay Davis’ trial while they appeal the banning of evidence. Granted.

1991

May: Georgia Supreme Court upholds the ban on evidence seized by officers during the raid.
May 31: Judge Head sets Davis’ trial for Aug. 19.
July: Davis’ lawyers request that cameras be banned from the trial. Aug. 22: Opening statements are made.
Aug. 23: Harriette Murray identifies Davis as the shooter and says he smiled as he shot MacPhail.
Aug. 26: Kevin McQueen testifies that Davis admitted the shooting to him.
Aug. 27: Davis takes the stand and denies shooting MacPhail. He says he fled the scene before.
Aug. 28: Closing statements are made. The jury takes about two hours to convict Davis.
Aug. 29: Davis asks the jury to spare his life in the sentencing phase of the trial.
Aug. 30: After seven hours, the jury sentences Davis to death.
Oct. 1: Lawyers file a motion for a new trial.

1992

Feb. 18: Lawyers present their arguments for a new trial.
March 20: Judge Head upholds the conviction, sending further appeals to the Georgia Supreme Court.

1993

Feb. 26: The Georgia Supreme Court upholds the conviction and sentence of Davis.
Nov. 1: The U.S. Supreme Court refuses to hear Davis case without comment.

1994

March 3: Judge Head signs the first order for execution. It ends Davis’ rounds of direct appeals to his conviction. Assistant District Attorney David Lock, who assisted in the prosecution of Davis, states that Davis has another 10 years of “habeas corpus” petitions left before a meaningful execution date.

2006

September: The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals rejects arguments and affirms death sentence.

2007

April 12: Lawyers for Davis file a final appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court.
June 25: The U.S. Supreme Court refuses to review the conviction and sentence.
July 9: Lawyers file an extraordinary motion for a new trial that another man shot and killed MacPhail.
July 10: The Georgia Board of Pardons receives letters from human rights activists and supporters for Davis. Tonya Johnson, a witness in the case, states she saw another man dump the guns after the shooting. She said she didn’t come forward earlier because she fears the man she believed to be the actual shooter.

July 12: Prosecutors argue the “new” evidence is old.
July 13: Judge Penny Haas Freesemann rejects Davis’ appeal and refuses to stay his execution.
July 16: The Board of Pardons and Paroles suspend Davis’ execution for 90 days. As the month wears on, letters continue to pour in to the board asking for clemency or setting aside the death penalty to life in prison. Meanwhile, challenges to the lethal injection method may further delay any executions.

Aug. 3: The Georgia Supreme Court agrees to hear an appeal for a new trial.
Aug. 6: A second clemency hearing is suspended as the lawyers seek a new trial.
Nov. 13: The Georgia Supreme Court hears Davis’ request for a new trial.

2008

Mar. 17: The Georgia Supreme Court rejects Davis’ contention that witness recantations should allow a new trial. They reject his request a second time in April.

Sept. 3: Davis’ execution is set for Sept. 23.
Sept. 12: The Board of Pardons and Paroles rejects a clemency request.
Sept. 23: An eleventh-hour move by the U.S. Supreme Court grants Davis a stay.
Oct. 11: The U.S. Supreme Court again rejects a request to review the case.
Oct. 12: An Oct. 27 execution date is set.
Oct. 24: The 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals grants a stay.
Dec. 9: The Circuit Court hears Davis’ bid for a new trial.

2009

April: The 11th U.S. Circuit Court rejects Davis’ appeal.
June: The NAACP appeals to Chatham County District Attorney Larry Chisholm to reopen the case. Various groups urge that the case be reopened. Meanwhile, the U.S. Supreme Court delays ruling on the case until its next term.

Aug. 17: The U.S. Supreme Court rules the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia must hear evidence in the case.
Aug. 19: The 20th anniversary of the shooting of MacPhail is marked.

2010

January: Davis’ lawyers seek police files in the case saying they hold evidence not presented.
February: State attorneys suggest defense attorneys improperly obtained witness recantations.
June: Evidence that prosecutors earlier were barred from using will be allowed in the latest hearing.
July: Final arguments filed. Judges are also asked to weigh rejected evidence.
August: Judge Moore rejects attempts to reopen evidence not presented in the original trial. Further, the judge says Davis is still guilty. He failed to prove his innocence during the hearing. The next appeal must be to the U.S. Supreme Court.

2011

March 28: The U.S. Supreme Court rejects Davis’ two-pronged appeal.
Sept. 6: A new execution order is signed by Superior Court Judge Penny Haas Freesemann. for between Sept. 21 and 28. The Georgia Department of Correction sets the date for Sept. 21.

Sept. 15: 600,000 petitions are delivered to the Board of Pardons and Paroles.
Sept. 20: The Board of Pardons and Paroles denies Davis clemency.
Sept. 21: Davis supporters deliver 240,000 signatures to Chatham County District Attorney Larry Chisolm’s door asking him to vacate the order authorizing the execution of Davis. Davis was executed at 11:08 p.m.

 
 

Troy Davis supporters seek next step after execution

By Greg Bluestein - SavannahNow.com

September 22, 2011

ATLANTA (AP) — Minutes before he was put to death, Troy Davis asked his supporters to "continue to fight this fight" — but will they, and how?

The Georgia inmate's case outraged hundreds of thousands of people around the world who found the evidence against him weak, and opponents of the death penalty hope their anger provokes a backlash against capital punishment. Some activists say a fitting legacy of the case would be laws that bar death sentences for those, like Davis, whose convictions are based on eyewitness testimony.

With Davis gone, however, the loose coalition of groups who pushed for his freedom may simply crumble. Much may depend not on the death penalty's most strident opponents, but on less politically active people who were drawn into the debate by Davis' two-decade struggle.

That includes Melvin Middleton, who believes capital punishment can be appropriate. After learning more details about Davis' case, he decided to show up at a downtown Atlanta rally opposing the execution. "If you're going to take someone's life, you better be damn sure you are making the right decision," he said. "I don't know if he's guilty or not, but he's not proven guilty."

Davis was executed late Wednesday for the 1989 murder of off-duty Savannah police officer Mark MacPhail. Defense attorneys said several key witnesses disputed their testimony and other people claimed that another man confessed to the crime, but state and federal courts repeatedly upheld the conviction.

Davis maintained his innocence even as he was strapped to a gurney in the death chamber, where he told the MacPhail family to "look deeper into this case so that you really can finally see the truth." Prosecutors and MacPhail's relatives say they have no doubt that justice was done, but among Davis' supporters, frustration runs deep. "We did not want to lose Troy Davis as a casualty of this war, but I do think that his execution in a real sense will only add momentum to the movement of those of us who understand that the state really cannot be trusted with the ultimate punishment," said the Rev. Raphael Warnock, who spoke on Davis' behalf at a pardons board hearing this week.

Already, there are calls for lasting changes to the capital punishment system from Davis' advocates. Former President Jimmy Carter said he hopes "this tragedy will spur us as a nation toward the total rejection of capital punishment." Filmmaker Michael Moore posted a statement on his website calling for a boycott of Georgia. The Rev. Al Sharpton, who visited Davis on death row, said he will push for a national ban on capital punishment in cases that rely on eyewitness testimony. Maryland passed such a law in 2009. "We must not only mourn what happened to Troy Davis but take strong measures so that it does not happen again," Sharpton said.

The Davis execution comes at a time when death penalty decisions are under increased scrutiny. The number of executions has dropped by half over the last decade, from 98 in 1999 to 46 in 2010. Illinois abolished capital punishment in March and several other states, including California and Connecticut, are expected to consider similar proposals next year. More than 3,200 U.S. inmates were on death row at the beginning of 2011, according to the Death Penalty Information Center.

Public support for capital punishment remains strong, according to several polls. This month, a CBS/NY Times poll found that 60 percent of those surveyed supported the death penalty for people convicted of murder, with 27 percent opposed and 13 percent unsure. Gallup polls over the past two decades have shown slightly higher support, though Gallup found Americans to be closely divided when asked to choose between the death penalty and life imprisonment with no chance of parole.

Laura Moye of Amnesty International said she expects the Davis execution to be used to rally repeal movements across the country. She plans to meet with activists in Georgia over the next few days to plot out an attempt to banish capital punishment there. "I'm meeting people who didn't really ever speak about the death penalty and now they are. They're hungry about the information and now they know," she said.

It's far from clear, however, whether the thousands who rallied and the hundreds of thousands who signed petitions on Davis' behalf will become any kind of political force. Organizers have announced few concrete steps, and legislative proposals have yet to take shape. "The emotion of the moment passes and unfortunately so does the urgency to address these issues," said Bruce Barket, a New York criminal defense attorney who specializes in investigating wrongful convictions.

Spencer Lawton, the Savannah prosecutor who helped convict avis, said the case shouldn't morph into a broader debate about capital punishment. "Whether you are for or against the death penalty case is irrelevant in this case," he said. "You shouldn't be making Troy Davis into a vehicle for you to distort the truth, and that's what I think is going to happen. Whether you are for or against the death penalty, this has been a clear and fair and honest proceeding throughout. If you don't like the result, don't attack the proceeding falsely."

 
 

Hundreds march in Georgia to oppose Troy Davis execution

By David Beasley - Reuters.com

September 16, 2011

ATLANTA (Reuters) - More than 2,000 activists chanting and toting banners joined a march and rally on Friday to oppose the execution of Georgia death row inmate Troy Davis, convicted of the 1989 murder of a Savannah police officer.

Georgia's Board of Pardons and Paroles is slated to meet Monday to consider whether to stop Davis' execution by lethal injection, which is scheduled for next Wednesday. "I pray that this rally will have an impact on Pardons and Paroles," said marcher Solana Plaines, from Savannah. "I hope they will do the right thing."

Davis' supporters say there is no physical evidence linking him to the crime and that key witnesses in his trial have since recanted their testimony. "You just can't give up hope," said Ellen Kubica, who traveled from her home in Germany to attend Friday's event, which featured banners reading: "Too much doubt to execute.

Davis' supporters marched from downtown Atlanta to Ebenezer Baptist Church on Auburn Avenue for a rally. Martin Luther King III, son of the late civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr., joined the march. His father and grandfather were pastors at Ebenezer. Ben Jealous, president of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the Rev. Al Sharpton, a civil rights activist and television show host, also attended. "The only thing left to decide is whether you have the courage to do the right thing," Sharpton said, referring to the Georgia parole board. "It is blatantly clear that there is no reason for this man to be sitting on death row," he added.

In a rare move, the U.S. Supreme Court in August 2009 ordered a new hearing for Davis to assess what he said was new evidence showing his innocence. The justices transferred the case to a U.S. District Court in Georgia for a hearing and determination of his claims that new witnesses will clearly establish his innocence. A year later, the judge, William T. Moore Jr., rejected Davis' claims of innocence.

On Thursday, supporters of the condemned man delivered petitions bearing more than 600,000 names to the parole board. In an opinion column published on Thursday in the Atlanta Journal Constitution newspaper, former FBI Director William Sessions called for Davis' sentence to be commuted to life in prison, saying the case was "permeated in doubt."

In an opposing column written in late 2008 and republished on Thursday, Spencer Lawton, the district attorney who prosecuted Davis, said the condemned man had a fair trial. The claim that seven witnesses at the trial had subsequently recanted their testimony was "not believable," Lawton wrote. Lawton said the witnesses were all cross-examined by defense attorneys during Davis' trial and denied that they had been coerced by police.

 
 

Troy Davis executed for killing off-duty police officer

The Augusta Chronicle

Sept. 21, 2011

JACKSON, Ga. — Georgia executed Troy Davis on Wednesday night for the murder of an off-duty police officer, a crime he denied committing right to the end as supporters around the world mourned and declared that an innocent man was put to death. Defiant to the end, he told relatives of Mark MacPhail that his 1989 slaying was not his fault. “I did not have a gun,” he insisted.

“For those about to take my life,” he told prison officials, “may God have mercy on your souls. May God bless your souls.” Davis was declared dead at 11:08. The lethal injection began about 15 minutes earlier, after the Supreme Court rejected an 11th-hour request for a stay.

The court did not comment on its order, which came about four hours after it received the request and more than three hours after the planned execution time. Though Davis’ attorneys said seven of nine key witnesses against him disputed all or parts of their testimony, state and federal judges repeatedly ruled against granting him a new trial. As the court losses piled up Wednesday, his offer to take a polygraph test was rejected and the pardons board refused to give him one more hearing.

Davis’ supporters staged vigils in the U.S. and Europe, declaring “I am Troy Davis” on signs, T-shirts and the Internet. Some tried increasingly frenzied measures, urging prison workers to stay home and even posting a judge’s phone number online, hoping people will press him to put a stop to the lethal injection. President Obama deflected calls for him to get involved. “They say death row; we say hell no!” protesters shouted outside the Jackson prison where Davis was to be executed. In Washington, a crowd outside the Supreme Court yelled the same chant.

As many as 700 demonstrators gathered outside the prison as a few dozen riot police stood watch, but the crowd thinned as the night wore on and the outcome became clear. The scene turned eerily quiet as word of the high court’s decision spread, with demonstrators hugging, crying, praying, holding candles and gathering around Davis’ family. Laura Moye of Amnesty International said the execution would be “the best argument for abolishing the death penalty.” “The state of Georgia is about to demonstrate why government can’t be trusted with the power over life and death,” she said.

About 10 counterdemonstrators also were outside the prison, showing support for the death penalty and the family of Mark MacPhail, the man Davis was convicted of killing in 1989. MacPhail’s son and brother attended the execution. “He had all the chances in the world,” his mother, Anneliese MacPhail, said of Davis in a telephone interview. “It has got to come to an end.”

At a Paris rally, many of the roughly 150 demonstrators carried signs emblazoned with Davis’ face. “Everyone who looks a little bit at the case knows that there is too much doubt to execute him,” Nicolas Krameyer of Amnesty International said at the protest. Davis’ execution has been stopped three times since 2007, but on Wednesday the 42-year-old ran out of legal options.

As his last hours ticked away, an upbeat and prayerful Davis turned down an offer for a special last meal as he met with friends, family and supporters. “Troy Davis has impacted the world,” his sister Martina Correia said at a news conference. “They say, ‘I am Troy Davis,’ in languages he can’t speak.”

His attorney Stephen Marsh said Davis would have spent part of Wednesday taking a polygraph test if pardons officials had taken his offer seriously. “He doesn’t want to spend three hours away from his family on what could be the last day of his life if it won’t make any difference,” Marsh said.

Amnesty International says nearly 1 million people have signed a petition on Davis’ behalf. His supporters include former President Jimmy Carter, Pope Benedict XVI, a former FBI director, the NAACP, several conservative figures and many celebrities, including hip-hop star Sean “P. Diddy” Combs. “I’m trying to bring the word to the young people: There is too much doubt,” rapper Big Boi, of the Atlanta-based group Outkast, said at a church near the prison.

The U.S. Supreme Court gave Davis an unusual opportunity to prove his innocence in a lower court last year, though the high court itself did not hear the merits of the case. He was convicted in 1991 of killing MacPhail, who was working as a security guard at the time. MacPhail rushed to the aid of a homeless man who prosecutors said Davis was bashing with a handgun after asking him for a beer. Prosecutors said Davis had a smirk on his face as he shot the officer to death in a Burger King parking lot in Savannah.

No gun was ever found, but prosecutors say shell casings were linked to an earlier shooting for which Davis was convicted. Witnesses placed Davis at the crime scene and identified him as the shooter, but several of them have recanted their accounts and some jurors have said they’ve changed their minds about his guilt. Others have claimed a man who was with Davis that night has told people he actually shot the officer. “Such incredibly flawed eyewitness testimony should never be the basis for an execution,” Marsh said. “To execute someone under these circumstances would be unconscionable.”

State and federal courts, however, have repeatedly upheld Davis’ conviction. One federal judge dismissed the evidence advanced by Davis’ lawyers as “largely smoke and mirrors.” “He has had ample time to prove his innocence,” said MacPhail’s widow, Joan MacPhail-Harris. “And he is not innocent.”

The last motion filed by Davis’ attorneys in Butts County Court challenged testimony from two witnesses and disputed testimony from the expert who linked the shell casings to the earlier shooting involving Davis. Superior Court Judge Thomas Wilson and the Georgia Supreme Court rejected the appeal, and prosecutors said the filing was just a delay tactic.

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, which helped lead the charge to stop the execution, said it considered asking Obama to intervene, even though he cannot grant Davis clemency for a state conviction. Press secretary Jay Carney issued a statement saying that although Obama “has worked to ensure accuracy and fairness in the criminal justice system,” it was not appropriate for him “to weigh in on specific cases like this one, which is a state prosecution.” Dozens of protesters outside the White House called on the president to step in, and about 12 were arrested for disobeying police orders.

Davis was not the only U.S. inmate put to death Wednesday evening. In Texas, white supremacist gang member Lawrence Russell Brewer was put to death for the 1998 dragging death of a black man, James Byrd Jr., one of the most notorious hate crime murders in recent U.S. history.

Davis’ best chance may have come last year, in a hearing ordered by the U.S. Supreme Court. It was the first time in 50 years that justices had considered a request to grant a new trial for a death row inmate. The high court set a tough standard for Davis to exonerate himself, ruling that his attorneys must “clearly establish” Davis’ innocence – a higher bar to meet than prosecutors having to prove guilt. After the hearing judge ruled in prosecutors’ favor, the justices didn’t take up the case.

The execution drew widespread criticism in Europe, where politicians and activists made last-minute pleas for a stay.

Spencer Lawton, the district attorney who secured Davis’ conviction in 1991, said he was embarrassed for the judicial system – not because of the execution, but because it took so long to carry out. “What we have had is a manufactured appearance of doubt which has taken on the quality of legitimate doubt itself. And all of it is exquisitely unfair,” said Lawton, who retired as Chatham County’s head prosecutor in 2008. “The good news is we live in a civilized society where questions like this are decided based on fact in open and transparent courts of law, and not on street corners.”

 
 

Troy Anthony Davis

ProDeathPenalty.com

Troy Anthony Davis was sentenced to death for the murder of Savannah police officer Mark Allen MacPhail in 1989. On August 19, 1989, Troy Anthony Davis was at a Burger King restaurant with friends and and struck a homeless man named Larry Young in the head with a pistol when Young refused to give a beer to one of Davis's friends. Officer MacPhail, who was working an off-duty security detail at the Greyhound bus terminal next door, heard Young cry out and responded to the disturbance.

Davis fled and, when Officer MacPhail, wearing his full police uniform, ordered him to stop, Davis turned and shot the officer in the right thigh and chest. Although Mark MacPhail was wearing a bullet-proof vest, his sides were not protected and the bullet entered the left side of his chest, penetrating his left lung and his aorta, stopping at the back of his chest cavity. Davis, smiling, walked up to the stricken officer and shot him in the face as he lay dying in the parking lot. The officer's gun was still strapped in his holster and his baton was still on his belt.

Davis fled to Atlanta and a massive manhunt ensued. The next afternoon, Davis told a friend that he had been involved in an argument at the restaurant the previous evening and struck someone with a gun. He told the friend that when a police officer ran up, Davis shot him and that he went to the officer and "finished the job" because he knew the officer got a good look at his face when he shot him the first time.

After his arrest, Davis told a cellmate a similar story. He was arrested after surrendering a few days after the murder. Trial began exactly two years to the day of Officer MacPhail's murder. This resulted in Davis' conviction for murder after less than two hours of deliberation by the jury, and in the imposition of a death sentence after seven hours of deliberation. He was also convicted of obstruction of a law enforcement officer, aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

One of the two counts of aggravated assault arose from an incident where Davis shot into a car that was leaving a party an hour before the murder of Officer MacPhail. Michael Cooper was struck in the head by a bullet, severely injuring him and leaving the bullet lodged in his jaw. Ballistics tests matched the shells from the murder of the police officer to shells found at a party earlier in the evening where Michael Cooper had been shot. Cooper identified Davis as the shooter.

Even though the US Supreme Court rejected his final appeal without dissent in June of 2007, Davis received a 90-day stay from the state pardons and parole board just one day before his July 17, 2007 execution date. The stay was granted to examine claims by witnesses that they had given erroneous testimony or were no longer certain about their identification of Davis.

Mark MacPhail's son, 18-year-old Mark Allen MacPhail Jr. spoke against the 2007 stay to members of the Board of Pardons and Parole. "I told them how it felt having him ripped away from me at such an early age. Picture having Father's Day and having no one to give anything to," MacPhail said he told the board. Anneliese MacPhail, mother of the slain officer, commented to a reporter after learning that Davis's request for a new trial was denied in March 2008. "I wonder, what do all those witnesses remember after 18 years? There is no new evidence. No mother should go through what I have been through." Mark's wife Joan MacPhail said she has lost her best friend, the father of her two children and now her peace of mind as appeals for Davis have drawn on for almost two decades. "It's like another punch in the stomach," she said. "You have to relive that night over and over. That's so wrong. Why shouldn't we have peace in our lives?"

About the changing witnesses, the Georgia Supreme Court stated that most of the witnesses who recanted "have merely stated they now do not feel able to identify the shooter." The majority could not ignore the trial testimony, "and, in fact, we favor that original testimony over the new."

The son of a U.S. Army Ranger, Mark MacPhail was a graduate of Columbus High School in Georgia. His mother, Anne, still lives in Columbus, Georgia. Davis received another stay of execution before his September 23, 2008 execution date.

 
 

Will Georgia Kill an Innocent Man?

By Brendan Lowe - Time.com

Friday, Jul. 13, 2007

The pending execution of Troy Anthony Davis, scheduled to take place on July 17, is raising serious questions about his guilt — and about the Newt Gingrich-era federal law that has limited his appeals options and prevented him, say his supporters, from getting a fair shake.

Davis, 38, a former coach in the Savannah Police Athletic League who had signed up for the Marines, was convicted in the 1989 murder of Mark Allen MacPhail, a Savannah, Ga., police officer. MacPhail was off-duty when he was shot dead in a Savannah parking lot while responding to an assault. Davis was at the scene of the crime, and an acquaintance who was there with him accused Davis of being the shooter.

Since his conviction in 1991, Davis has seen each of his state and federal appeals fail. But in the court of public opinion, Davis presents a compelling argument. Seven of the nine main witnesses whose testimony led to his conviction have since recanted. The murder weapon has never been found, and there is no physical evidence linking the crime to Davis, who has asserted his innocence throughout.

Earlier this month, two of the jurors who sentenced Davis to death signed sworn affidavits saying that based on the recanted testimony, he should not be executed. "In light of this new evidence," wrote one juror, "I have genuine concerns about the fairness of Mr. Davis' death sentence."

One of Davis' major obstacles has been the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), legislation championed by former House Speaker Newt Gingrich as part of his Contract with America and signed by former President Bill Clinton.

The act was passed in 1996 as a way of reforming what Gingrich called "the current interminable, frivolous appeals process." Its major provisions reduced new trials for convicted criminals and sped up their sentences by restricting a federal court's ability to judge whether a state court had correctly interpreted the U.S. Constitution.

Facing political pressure one year after the Oklahoma City bombing and seven months before the presidential election, Clinton signed the bill, but inserted a somewhat incongruous signing statement that called for the federal courts to continue their oversight role.

That was wishful thinking, say many legal experts. "President Clinton was trying to have his cake and eat it, too," said George Kendall, senior counsel at Holland and Knight and a board member of the Death Penalty Information Center.

The reality since 1996, legal analysts say, has been a U.S. Supreme Court that has narrowly interpreted the act, further restraining the ability of federal courts to grant new trials (on June 25, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to give Davis one last hearing). "The bottom line," said Dale Baich, an assistant federal public defender in Arizona, "is that the AEDPA is very harsh and unforgiving."

So now there are serious questions whether, as Gingrich famously said, justice delayed is justice denied. The system of appeals can still stretch out over decades, but in Davis' case, many of those appeals are now being denied for procedural reasons.

In his 2004 petition to the federal district court in Savannah, Davis presented recanted testimony, most of which involves witnesses who say police coercion caused them to wrongly implicate Davis. He also presented nine individuals' affidavits that suggested that the real murderer was actually the former acquaintance who first accused Davis of the crime.

The federal judge rejected the petition since, under the current law, the evidence must first be presented in state court. But Tom Dunn, the executive director of the Georgia Resource Center, which helped represent Davis, says that funding trouble prevented the center from presenting the evidence in state court in the first place.

Tracking down witnesses costs money, but in 1995, just as Dunn's colleagues had been preparing Davis' appeal, Congress eliminated $20 million in funding to post-conviction defender organizations like the Georgia center, which lost 70% of its budget. Six of the center's eight lawyers left, as well as three of its four investigators, and Davis' case became one of about 80 that Beth Wells, then executive director, had to handle with her co-director.

"The work conducted on Mr. Davis' case was akin to triage," Wells wrote in an affidavit, "where we were simply trying to avert total disaster rather than provide any kind of active or effective representation... There were numerous witnesses that we knew should have been interviewed, but lacked the resources to do so."

Georgia officials insist that Davis' failed 2004 federal court hearing is proof he has had his opportunity in court with the new evidence. "They've had a chance to challenge the conviction," said David Lock, chief assistant district attorney in Chatham County, where Savannah is located.

Davis' attorney has been filing a flurry of requests for a stay of execution until a new trial can be held. Meanwhile Davis' sister, Martina Correia, has helped assemble an diverse group of advocates — from Dead Man Walking author Sister Helen Prejean to South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu to former FBI director William S. Sessions (a death penalty supporter) — to petition the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles to commute Davis' sentence to life in prison when it meets on July 16, the day before he's scheduled to die by lethal injection.

Correia has watched her brother spend half his life in prison. This case is not only about him, she says, but it's also about a law that short-changes the convicted. "If for any reason [the last-minute appeal] doesn't go the right way, Georgia is going to be so shamed," she said. "I just don't want my brother to have to be executed to be the catalyst for change."

TIME.com

 
 

Supreme Court OK’s hearing for inmate

Has spent 18 years in Ga. death row

By Jesse J. Holland - The Boston Globe

August 18, 2009

WASHINGTON - The Supreme Court yesterday ordered a new hearing for death row inmate Troy Davis, who supporters say is innocent and should be spared from execution in the killing of an off-duty police officer almost 20 years ago.

Davis has spent 18 years on death row for the 1989 slaying of Savannah, Ga., police officer Mark MacPhail. Davis’s attorneys insist that he is innocent and deserves a new trial because several witnesses at his trial have recanted.

The high court ordered a federal judge in Georgia to determine whether there is evidence “that could not have been obtained at the time of trial [that] clearly establishes petitioner’s innocence.’’

Defense lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court after a federal court denied a new trial request in April.

“The substantial risk of putting an innocent man to death clearly provides an adequate justification for holding an evidentiary hearing,’’ said Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the court. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer concurred with Stevens.

MacPhail was slain while working off-duty as a security guard at a bus station. He had rushed to help a homeless man who had been pistol-whipped at a nearby parking lot and was shot twice when he approached Davis and two other men. Witnesses identified Davis as the shooter at his 1991 trial.

But Davis’s lawyers say new evidence proves he was a victim of mistaken identity. They say three people who did not testify at Davis’s trial have said another man confessed to the killing.

Davis’s attorneys have delayed his execution three times by raising doubts about those witnesses. But state and federal courts have denied Davis’s request for a new trial, and Georgia officials have repeatedly rejected calls for clemency.

The case has attracted global attention, with calls to stop Davis’s execution from the former president Jimmy Carter, Pope Benedict XVI, and Nobel Peace Prize-winner Desmond Tutu.

Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented from the decision to order an evidentiary hearing, with Scalia saying “every judicial and executive body that has examined petitioner’s claim has been unpersuaded.’’

Davis’s “claim is a sure loser,’’ Scalia said. “Transferring his petition to the District Court is a confusing exercise that can serve no purpose except to delay the state’s execution of its lawful criminal judgment.’’

Scalia said the Supreme Court was sending the District Court for the Southern District of Georgia “on a fool’s errand.’’

“That court is directed to consider evidence of actual innocence which has been reviewed and rejected at least three times,’’ he said.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who was just confirmed as a new justice earlier this month, did not take part in the consideration of Davis’ s motion, the court said.

Davis’ s family said the ruling gives them hope that he could be exonerated.

“I’m always optimistic,’’ said his sister Martina Correia, who has traveled around the world advocating for his case. “This means he gets another chance. And we’re going to keep fighting for that chance.’’

State officials welcomed the ruling.

 
 

The Troy Davis case concerns the case of Troy Anthony Davis, a former sports coach from the U.S. state of Georgia, who was convicted and sentenced to death in 1991 for the August 19, 1989 murder of off-duty Savannah, Georgia police officer Mark MacPhail.

Throughout the trial and subsequent appeals, Davis maintained his innocence, claiming he was wrongfully convicted of the crime as a result of false identification.

After the trial and first set of appeals, seven of the nine prosecution eyewitnesses who had linked Davis to the killing recanted or contradicted their original trial testimony, claiming police coercion and questionable interrogation tactics.

The witness who first implicated Davis and has remained consistent, Sylvester "Redd" Coles, was initially a suspect in the crime. Coles was seen acting suspiciously the night of MacPhail's murder and has been heard boasting that he killed an off-duty police officer.

There is only one witness who did not recant his testimony and is not himself a suspect in the murder, but he made an in-court identification of Davis two years after the crime.

Davis opponents say Coles came back to the scene of the shooting with a female after police arrived. Davis changed clothes (even asking Coles for a shirt later) and fled to Atlanta with his sister.

Davis has repeatedly asked the courts to examine the new exculpatory evidence, but so far has not been successful in persuading a majority of judges to grant him a new trial or conduct a hearing in which the recanting eyewitnesses could be cross-examined to determine the credibility of Davis’ innocence claims.

In October 2008, Davis filed a second Habeas petition in the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals on the grounds that it was the first time Davis was presenting a free-standing innocence claim and that no court has yet held an evidentiary hearing on the exculpatory evidence of recanted testimony.

On 16 April 2009 the three-judge panel denied Davis' petition on procedural grounds by a 2-1 majority.

Amnesty International has strongly condemned the refusal of U.S. courts to examine the innocence evidence, and has organized rallies and letter-writing campaigns to persuade the Georgia and Federal courts to grant Davis a new trial or an evidentiary hearing. Many prominent politicians and leaders, including President Jimmy Carter, Pope Benedict XVI, Nobel laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Presidential candidate Bob Barr, and former FBI Director and judge William S. Sessions have called upon the courts to grant Davis a new trial or evidentiary hearing.

On 17 August 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court, over the dissenting votes of two justices, ordered a federal district court in Georgia to consider and rule on whether new evidence "that could not have been obtained at the time of trial clearly establishes [Davis'] innocence."

The shooting of Officer MacPhail

On August 19, 1989, Mark MacPhail, an off-duty policeman, was working as a security guard at a Burger King restaurant in Savannah, Georgia. The incident started when Sylvester “Redd” Coles began harassing a homeless man, Larry Young, for a beer while Troy Davis and others watched quietly from a distance.

Coles verbally harassed and chased the homeless man to a nearby parking lot where MacPhail was working. Coles threatened the retreating homeless man by exclaiming: “You don’t know me. Don’t walk away from me. I’ll shoot you.” Davis and others silently followed the scuffle.

The homeless man yelled for help and MacPhail responded and was shot dead with a .38 caliber weapon. The parking lot was dark and the scene was chaotic. After the dust settled, the police took the statements of several onlookers but had no suspects. Redd Coles and Troy Davis were both African-American males of similar age, height and weight.

Coles came back to the scene of the shooting with a female after police arrived. Davis changed clothes (even asking Coles for a shirt later) and fled to Atlanta with his sister.

The day after the shooting, a spent shell from a .38 caliber revolver was discovered near the scene of the murder. The shell was similar to shell casings recovered near a shooting that occurred earlier that evening at a pool party—not far from where MacPhail was killed. In that shooting, a man named Michael Cooper was shot. The host of the pool party confirms that Coles was at the party. Davis was also at the party, but he was not with Coles.

The pool party shooting occurred when four boys—two of whom were Coles’ neighbors—were shot at as they drove away from the party. One of the car’s passengers was shot in the face.

Later that evening, as Coles’ sister testified at trial, Coles got into a heated argument with Joseph Blige, one of the teenagers riding in the car. Although excluded from trial as hearsay, Coles’ sister’s police statements show that Blige exclaimed to Coles: “I know y’all tried to kill me.”

None of the boys riding in the car knew Davis or identified him as the pool party shooter, and the police searched Davis' house less than 24 hours after the shooting and did not find a gun.

Coles initially lied about carrying the .38 caliber revolver, but later admitted to carrying it with him on the night of the murder. He claimed that it was lost when the police attempted to recover the gun for testing.

After the police swarmed his neighborhood looking for suspects, Redd Coles and his attorney approached the police to exonerate Coles and implicate Troy Davis. Before the police discovered Coles' lies, however, the police had issued an arrest warrant for Davis without corroborating any part of Coles’ story.

After the warrant was issued, Davis’ picture was plastered on wanted posters and in the local Savannah media. Davis who, unlike Coles, had fled to Atlanta surrendered to authorities there on August 23. He admitted to being present at the Burger King parking lot, but denied shooting MacPhail. Davis stated that Coles had shot MacPhail.

The police never searched Coles’ house for the murder weapon, never included Coles’ picture in witness photo spreads, and paraded Coles in front of four State witnesses as a mere bystander in a crime scene “reenactment."

The trial and conviction

Davis asserted his innocence and a jury trial was held. Davis testified at trial and denied that he was involved in the shooting of Cooper or MacPhail. A ballistics expert testified at the trial that the .38 calibre bullet that killed McPhail could possibly have been fired from the same gun that wounded Michael Cooper in the pool party.

At trial, Kevin McQueen, who was at the Chatham City jail with Davis, testified that Davis told him there had been a party in Cloverdale on the night prior to the victim’s murder; Davis had argued with some boys and there was an exchange of gunfire. (T. 1230-1231)

Davis told McQueen he did some of the shooting. (T. 1231). After the party, Davis went to a girlfriend’s house and intended to eat breakfast at Burger King. Davis stated that he was with a friend and they ran into a guy who “owed money to buy dope.” (T. 1231). There was a fight, Officer McPhail appeared, and Davis shot him in the face. As Officer McPhail attempted to get up, Davis shot him again, because he was afraid McPhail had seen him that night at Cloverdale. (T. 1232).

On August 28, 1991, based upon the testimony of eyewitnesses who had linked Davis to the shooting of MacPhail, the jury -including seven blacks and five whites- found Davis guilty on one count of murder and other offenses.

In the sentencing phase of the trial, Davis' family members and close friends were not allowed to testify, preventing the jurors from hearing sympathetic facts, leaving them to rely only on the prosecutor's characterizations of Davis and his life. On August 30, 1991, the jury sentenced Troy Davis to death.

First set of appeals decided without knowledge of exculpatory evidence

Georgia Supreme Court's First Denial of Appeal

The first set of appeals focused almost exclusively on jury selection issues. The jury in the trial was composed of seven blacks and five whites. The racial bias claim raised by Davis' lawyers was dismissed because the county in which the trial took place was about two-thirds white (and the jury pool was about 57% white) while the seated jury was 58% black. His conviction and death sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia in 1993. The study showed a disproportionate representation of blacks made up his jury.

Denial of state habeas petitions

Davis, like many indigent death row inmates, was represented during his state habeas proceedings by the Georgia Resource Center. Just as the Resource Center's lawyers were preparing Davis' appeal, Congress eliminated $20 million in funding to post-conviction defender organizations like the Georgia center, which lost 70% of its budget. Six of the center's eight lawyers left, as well as three of its four investigators, and Davis' case became one of about 80 that Beth Wells, then executive director, had to handle.

"The work conducted on Mr. Davis' case was akin to triage," Wells wrote in an affidavit, "where we were simply trying to avert total disaster rather than provide any kind of active or effective representation... There were numerous witnesses that we knew should have been interviewed, but lacked the resources to do so."

As a direct result, the vast majority of the recantations and other new evidence of Davis’ innocence went undiscovered and unheard as Davis’ appeals proceeded through state courts. In addition, Davis encountered restrictions on the scope of his ability to attack the conviction, due to limitations introduced by the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.

Consequently, on September 9, 1997, the state court denied Davis' state habeas corpus relief. Following briefing and oral argument, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of state habeas corpus relief on November 13, 2000.

Recantation of witnesses and new exculpatory evidence

In 2001, Davis submitted twenty-one exculpatory affidavits to a federal court in Georgia. These affidavits contained recantations from all but two of the prosecution eyewitnesses, the testimony of another previously undiscovered eyewitness and others with information bearing on the crime—all strong evidence suggesting Davis was not the gunman and is, in fact, innocent of the crimes for which he was sentenced to death. All the witnesses stated in their affidavits that their earlier statements implicating him had been coerced by strongarm police tactics.

One of the key prosecution witnesses, Dorothy Ferrel, recanted her testimony, stating in her affidavit that she was on parole when she testified, and was afraid that she'd be sent back to prison if she didn't agree to finger Davis. In her affidavit, she wrote:

"I told the detective that Troy Davis was the shooter, even though the truth was that I didn't know who shot the officer."

Another witness, Darrell Collins, a teenager at the time of the murder, said in a sworn affidavit that the police had scared him into falsely testifying by threatening to charge him as an accessory to the crime:

"[The police] were telling me that I was an accessory to murder and that I would ... go to jail for a long time and I would be lucky if I ever got out, especially because a police officer got killed ... I was only 16 and was so scared of going to jail."

At least three witnesses who testified against Davis have since said that Sylvester "Redd" Coles admitted that he was the one who had killed the officer. Additionally, five new witnesses implicated Coles, not Davis, in the murder of MacPhail.

The only eyewitness, aside from Coles, who did not recant his testimony is Steve Sanders, whose in-court identification occurred two years after the crime. Sanders’ police statement on the night of the shooting stated that he would not “recognize the shooter.” This directly contradicts his in-court testimony two years later when he identified Davis for the first time at trial.

As of July 2008, Davis' lawyers have been unable to interview Sanders to investigate the glaring contradiction between his police statements - which stated it was impossible for him to identify the shooter - and his in-court testimony two years later which identified Davis as the shooter.

In response to Davis' petition, prosecutors Spencer Lawton and David Lock argued that under Georgia law it was too late to present the recantations as evidence in an extraordinary motion for new trial, and, in addition, claimed that the "submitted affidavits are insufficient to raise doubts as to the constitutionality of the result at trial."

Brenda Forrest, who was a juror at the trial has said:

If I knew then what I know now, Troy Davis would not be on Death Row. The verdict would be "not guilty."

11th Circuit's denial of Habeas petition

Citing procedural bars, the federal district court declined to consider any evidence of Davis’ actual innocence and rejected the habeas petition.

Davis appealed to the 11th Circuit Court which heard oral argument in the case on September 7, 2005. Davis argued that since seven of the nine eyewitnesses recanted their testimony and voluntarily filed sworn affidavits stating they lied in the original trial, he is entitled to a retrial based on his actual innocence claim. Davis' lead lawyer, Kathleen Behan, also argued that there were multiple constitutional violations in the original trial, including failure to disclose Giglio materials (referring to State promises made to Dorothy Ferrell, a key witness for the State, in exchange for her testimony) and a Brady violation (referring to the State's failure to give Davis' lawyers exculpatory evidence).

On September 26, 2006, the 11th Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas corpus relief, claiming that all his innocence claims are "procedurally defaulted." Judges Dubina, Barkett and Marcus ruled that Davis had not borne his burden to establish a viable claim that his trial was constitutionally unfair. According to legal experts, a major obstacle to granting Davis a new trial was the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 whose major provisions reduced new trials for convicted criminals and sped up their sentences by restricting a federal court's ability to judge whether a state court had correctly interpreted the U.S. Constitution. Legal authorities have criticized the restricting effect of the 1996 Act on the ability of wrongfully convicted persons to prove their innocence.

On June 25, 2007, Davis' first Certiorari petition to the US Supreme Court was denied.

Former FBI Director's call for a new trial

In July 2007, William S. Sessions, former FBI Director and federal judge, published an opinion piece in the Atlanta Journal Constitution calling on authorities to halt the execution process until Davis is given a new trial, or alternatively, grant him clemency. Sessions wrote:

"There is no more serious violent crime than the murder of an off-duty police officer who was putting his life on the line to protect innocent bystanders. That being said, we must be convinced that the right person has been convicted. Serious questions have been raised about Davis' guilt...It would be intolerable to execute an innocent man."

Judge Sessions identified himself as a supporter of the death penalty. But, he argued, the judicial system is fallible, and the procedural rules can be too restrictive and can prevent the courts from dispensing justice. They can stop the courts from hearing even claims of innocence, such as in Davis' case. He condemned the kinds of procedural barriers that prevented the courts from addressing the merits of Davis' case, and recommended that they be eliminated. He added that it is intolerable that as a result of these procedural obstacles, no court has examined the claims Davis' current legal team has raised.

Board of Pardons' stay of execution

Despite Judge Sessions' call for a new trial and similar pleas by Amnesty International, Davis' execution was scheduled for July 17, 2007.

On July 16, however, the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles granted a ninety-day stay of execution. On July 16, however, the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles granted a ninety-day stay of execution.

The Georgia Supreme Court's 4-3 decision denying Davis' appeal

On August 3, 2007, the Georgia Supreme Court granted Davis’ application for discretionary appeal from the denial of his Extraordinary Motion for a New Trial. It was the first time Davis' case reached the Georgia Supreme Court since the recantation of witnesses and the discovery of new exculpatory evidence. On March 17, 2008, the Georgia Supreme Court denied the appeal by a slim 4-3 majority. The four-justice majority wrote that "These affidavits lack the type of materiality required to support an extraordinary motion for new trial, as they do not show the witnesses’ trial testimony to have been the “purest fabrication.""

However, a three-justice minority led by Chief Justice Leah Ward Sears strongly dissented, and concluded that the new evidence pointing to "actual innocence" justifies a new hearing. Chief Justice Ward wrote:

"In this case, nearly every witness who identified Davis as the shooter at trial has now disclaimed his or her ability to do so reliably. Three persons have stated that Sylvester Coles confessed to being the shooter. Two witnesses have stated that Sylvester Coles, contrary to his trial testimony, possessed a handgun immediately after the murder. Another witness has provided a description of the crimes that might indicate that Sylvester Coles was the shooter...If recantation testimony, either alone or supported by other evidence, shows convincingly that prior trial testimony was false, it simply defies all logic and morality to hold that it must be disregarded categorically."

Accordingly, the three-justice minority held that the new, exculpatory evidence is sufficient to justify, at the very least, an order to the trial court to conduct a hearing and weigh the credibility of Davis’ new evidence. This procedure would have given the trial court the opportunity to exercise its discretion in determining if the new evidence creates the probability of a different outcome if a new trial were held.

Certiorari Petition to US Supreme Court

On July 14, 2008, Davis' lawyers filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the US Supreme Court, appealing from the Georgia Supreme Court's 4-3 decision, asking the Court to overrule the Georgia Supreme Court's majority decision and determine that the Eighth Amendment creates a substantive right of the innocent not to be executed. If such a right exists, the lawyers argued, then the Georgia Supreme Court's failure to grant an evidentiary hearing to review the cumulative substance and credibility of Davis’ new innocence evidence violates the Constitution - both the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.

The Innocence Project's arguments for a new trial

The Innocence Project, a non-profit organization dedicated to exonerating wrongfully convicted people, filed an amicus curiae brief, strongly condemning the Georgia Supreme Court's majority opinion and supporting Davis' request for a new trial.

The Cardozo Law School-affiliated non-profit argued that constitutional principles and fundamental standards of criminal law require the courts to grant Davis a new trial or, at the very least, an evidentiary hearing to weigh the new exculpatory evidence.

The Innocence Project made the following arguments:

  • A sharply-divided Georgia Supreme Court created a rule of law authorizing categorical denial of due process for innocent Georgians convicted on the word of perjurers.

  • The impossible high "Purest Fabrication" standard set by the four-justice majority would have failed to protect at least three known innocent death row inmates who were convicted based on perjured testimony.

  • The majority’s blind adherence to this new standard and its failure to apply today’s science to the undisputed facts is further proof of the standard's failure.

  • The four-justice majority ignored recent scientific studies establishing that the undisputed viewing conditions and circumstances of this crime precluded a genuine basis for subsequent recognition.

  • The majority did not consider the scientifically supported probability that witnesses selected the police suspect during a suggestive identification process, which created an ideal situation for memory source error and false identifications.

Supreme Court's denial of Certiorari

The US Supreme Court was scheduled to discuss in an internal conference on September 29 whether to take up the case of Troy Davis.

Nevertheless, Georgia's state attorneys scheduled an execution date for September 23, 2008 at 7 pm, intending to carry out the execution before the United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to take up Davis' case the following week. Ignoring calls from organizations, leaders and journalists to halt the execution until the Supreme Court made a decision, Chatham County District Attorney Spencer Lawton ordered that Davis be taken to the death chamber and executed, despite his pending appeal. Only a last-minute emergency stay, issued by the Supreme Court less than two hours before he was scheduled to be put to death, prevented the execution.

Georgia Attorney General Thurbert Baker and Deputy Attorney General Susan Boleyn filed a brief with the Supreme Court asking the Supreme Court not to take the case for review, and objecting to the grant of Certiorari.

On October 14, 2008, the Supreme Court issued a one-line decision declining to hear Davis's petition, meaning the requisite four votes needed to grant certiorari did not exist. Emboldened by the Supreme Court's rejection of Davis's petition, District Attorney Lawton set a new execution date for October 27, 2008.

Pleas for New Trial or Clemency by International Leaders, Congressmen, NGOs

European Parliament's resolution

Representatives from the Council of Europe and European Parliament spoke out on Davis' case, asking U.S. authorities to halt the planned execution and calling for a new trial.

In a resolution adopted on July 10, 2008, the European Parliament appealed to the State of Georgia and the relevant U.S. courts to grant Davis a retrial. Referencing the relevant UN General Assembly resolutions, the resolution stated:

The European Parliament...

1. Calls upon those countries where the death penalty is imposed to take the necessary steps towards its abolition;

2. Asks that Troy Davis' death sentence be commuted and, in view of the abundant evidence which might lead to such commutation, for the relevant courts to grant him a retrial;

3. Appeals urgently to the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles to commute Troy Davis' death sentence;

4. Calls on the Presidency of the Council and the Delegation of the Commission to the United States to raise the issue as a matter of urgency with the US authorities;

5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Government of the United States, the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, and the Attorney General of Georgia

Calls for new trial by Archbishop Tutu, Pope Benedict, U.S. Congressmen

Amnesty International published a report about Davis' case characterizing it as a miscarriage of justice and a "catastrophic flaw in the U.S. death penalty machine." Amnesty initiated a letter-writing campaign and organized rallies worldwide. More than 4,000 people sent letters to the Board of Pardons and Paroles asking to grant clemency to Troy Davis. Nobel Peace Prize winner Archbishop Desmond Tutu urged the Board to demonstrate their commitment to fairness and justice, stating "It is shocking that in over 12 years of appeals, no court has agreed to hear evidence of police coercion, or consider the recanted testimony."

The Vatican's nuncio to the U.S., Monsignor Martin Krebs, sent a letter on behalf of Pope Benedict XVI to Governor of Georgia Sonny Perdue urging him to spare Davis' life. Perdue claimed he passed all the letters to the Board, since Georgia is one of three U.S. states where the governor has no power to grant clemency, and the power to pardon rests solely with the State Board of Pardons and Paroles (though the governor retains political influence by virtue of his authority to appoint the Board members).

Several Congressmen also spoke out on behalf of Davis, requesting the courts grant Davis a new trial. On July 16, U.S. Congressman John Lewis spoke to the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, suggesting that Coles—one of the two eyewitnesses who had not recanted—was the real killer.

In addition, U.S Representatives Jesse Jackson, Jr. and Sheila Jackson Lee, actor Mike Farrell, former Texas District Attorney Sam D. Millsap, Jr., and the organization Murder Victims Families for Reconciliation led a worldwide call for clemency to Davis.

Harry Belafonte implored the Board to use their power to grant clemency to ensure that "Troy has one final chance of a fair hearing in federal court, one that will properly review all evidence, both old and new, and properly question the reliability of the witness testimony used against him at trial." Another supporter of clemency was Sister Helen Prejean, author of Dead Man Walking, who issued a similarly-worded plea to halt the execution and grant Davis a new trial.

In addition, former Republican Congressman and presidential candidate Bob Barr wrote the Georgia Board saying that he is "a strong believer in the death penalty as an appropriate and just punishment," but that the proper level of fairness and accuracy required for the ultimate punishment has not been met in Davis' case. Subsequently, Reverend Al Sharpton also called for clemency after he met and prayed with Davis on death row.

On September 22, 2008, attorney Carol Gray, who assisted the Troy Davis defense team, issued a press release calling on authorities to halt the execution until information can be obtained from a clerk at the motel across from the murder scene. Gray said that the clerk was heard screaming after shots were fired, but the clerk has so far not been identified or interviewed by either side. According to Gray, such identification could be made through existing tax records.

Board of Pardons and Paroles' denial of clemency bid

Despite the outpouring of support and the international attention to the case, on September 12, 2008, the State Board of Pardons and Paroles rejected Davis' clemency request. Board members Milton Nix, Garland Hunt, Gale Buckner, Robert Keller and Garfield Hammonds did not provide any reason for their decision.

Pleas by Amnesty, President Carter and National Lawyers Guild

In response to the State Board's unexplained rejection of the clemency request, Amnesty International condemned "in the strongest possible terms" the decision to deny clemency, and called it "a baffling and unbelievable perversion of justice." Larry Cox, executive director for Amnesty International USA, added: "The U.S. Supreme Court must intervene immediately and unequivocally to prevent this perversion of justice."

President Jimmy Carter released a public letter urging the State Board to reverse its decision. In his letter, Carter stated:

"This case illustrates the deep flaws in the application of the death penalty in this country. Executing Troy Davis without a real examination of potentially exonerating evidence risks taking the life of an innocent man and would be a grave miscarriage of justice."

In addition, the National Lawyers Guild joined the call to halt the execution process until Davis is given a hearing to weigh the exonerating evidence.

Davis' second habeas petition

On October 23, 2008, Davis' lawyers launched a second habeas petition, based on the new exculpatory affidavits that hitherto had not been examined in a court of law. In their court filing, attorneys argued that the new exculpatory evidence proves Davis is innocent, and therefore his execution would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution. Davis' lawyers added:

"Mr. Davis’ execution in light of new evidence concerning his innocence is constitutionally intolerable. Society recoils at state execution of an innocent person."

Davis' lawyers requested an emergency stay of the pending execution, and on October 24, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals issued a stay of execution to consider the newly-filed federal habeas petition. "Upon our thorough review of the record, we conclude that Davis has met the burden for a stay of execution," the court said in an order issued by Judges.

On November 19, 2008, the 11th Circuit ordered the parties to submit briefs. Chatham County prosecutors filed objections to Davis' federal habeas petition, asking the 11th Circuit to deny Davis' petition, and prevent Davis from having an evidentiary hearing to weigh the new, potentially exonerating evidence.

On December 9, in an overfilled courtroom in Atlanta, the three-judge panel who will determine Davis' fate (Judges Joel Fredrick Dubina, Rosemary Barkett, and Stanley Marcus) heard oral arguments in the Habeas petition. Davis' lawyers - Arnold & Porter lawyer Jason Ewart and attorney Tom Dunn - argued that it is constitutionally forbidden to authorize the execution of Davis without a proper judicial examination of the innocence evidence. Attorney Susan Boleyn from the Georgia Attorney General's office argued against granting Davis a new evidentiary hearing.

During oral arguments, Judge Barkett criticized the prosecution for objecting to a hearing that can determine the credibility of the new exculpatory evidence, saying: "As bad as it would be to execute an innocent man, it’s also possible the real guilty person who shot Officer MacPhail is not being prosecuted." The judges will render their decision at a later date.

11th Circuit's 2-1 decision denying second Habeas petition

On 16 April 2009 the three-judge panel denied Davis's "Application for Leave to File a Second or Successive Habeas Corpus Petition" by a 2-1 majority. Judges Joel Dubina and Stanley Marcus wrote that they were rejecting the petition based on Davis' claims having been exhaustively reviewed by Georgia courts and the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles, who have all rejected them. “Davis has not presented us with a showing of innocence so compelling that we would be obligated to act today,” they wrote. They also cited procedural rules. The two judges focused on two procedural requirements contained in 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(2)(A)–(B) (2006), also known as AEDPA, which must be met in order to consider his innocence claim. According to the court's interpretation, Davis failed to meet either of these procedural requirements. Based on these "gatekeeping requirements," the judges rejected the petition, thus denying Davis the opportunity to bring his innocence claim to a court of law.

Judge Rosemary Barkett, the dissenting judge, responded to the majority's procedural concerns, writing, "The majority takes the position that we cannot permit Davis to bring his evidence before the district court because our discretion to do so is constrained by AEDPA. But AEDPA cannot possibly be applied when to do so would offend the Constitution and the fundamental concept of justice that an innocent man should not be executed.

The 11th Circuit issued an order extending the stay of execution for 30 days to allow Davis the opportunity to file a habeas corpus petition with the U.S. Supreme Court. Davis filed a petition for habeas corpus with the U.S. Supreme Court on May 19, 2009. On June 29, 2009, the Court broke for the summer without disposing of the Davis petition. Its next opportunity to take action on the petition when it returns for an adjourned session in September.

U.S. Supreme Court Order

On August 17, 2009, the Supreme Court, over two Justices’ dissents, ordered a federal district court in Georgia to consider and rule on Davis' claim of innocence. The Court order directed the District Court to “receive testimony and make findings of fact as to whether evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of trial clearly establishes [Davis'] innocence." (The case was "In re Davis", 08-1443.) This was a highly unusual action, because original writs of habeas corpus filed in the Supreme Court are very rarely granted; the Court had not granted one of these in "nearly 50 years."

The vote of the Supreme Court was not published, but some justices released opinions: Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Thomas, and Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion in response, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. Justice Sotomayor did not take part in the consideration of the case.

The hearing will now proceed in the Federal District Court.

Family statements

Davis' sister, Martina Correia, has been actively campaigning on his behalf. She has attended all of Davis' court hearings, often sitting in the same room with relatives of MacPhail. After the December 9, 2008 hearing in the 11th Circuit Court, she addressed the concerns of the MacPhail family:

"This is not family against family. We have no ill will against the MacPhail family. When justice is found for Troy, there will be justice for Officer MacPhail."

In an interview with Savannah TV station WTOC-TV, Mark McPhail Jr. says of his father, "He gave his life for the community and now I'm trying to help out his name and help him in some way." Of the appeals process, he says, "The past two years we've had countless appeals and it just keeps on getting drug out." Of Davis, McPhail says, "He decided to break the law. And our law says, you kill an officer of the law, who tries to uphold it, you must be punished."

MacPhail's widow, Joan, has remarked about the successive appeals of Davis:

"It's like another punch in the stomach. You have to relive that night over and over. That's so wrong. Why shouldn't we have peace in our lives?"

District Attorney Statement

From the Savannah Morning News, former Chatham County District Attorney Spencer Lawton, who prosecuted the Davis case, explains "why he's not concerned that an innocent man may be put to death".

"Many people are concerned that an innocent man is about to be put to death. I know this, and I understand it. I am not likewise concerned, however, and I want to explain why.

The only information the public has had in the 17 years since Troy Davis' conviction has been generated by people ideologically opposed to the death penalty, regardless of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

While they have shouted, we have been silent. The canons of legal ethics prohibit a lawyer - prosecutor and defense counsel alike - from commenting publicly, or engineering public comments, on the issue of guilt or innocence in a pending criminal case.

Now that the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled, the case is over, and I can try to tell our side.

First, Davis' advocates have insisted that there was no physical evidence in the case. This is not true.

Crime lab tests proved that the shell casings recovered from the shooting of Michael Cooper at a party earlier in the evening were fired from the same weapon as the casings recovered from the scene of Officer Mark MacPhail's murder. Davis was convicted of shooting Cooper.

And, while it isn't physical evidence, consider the "testimony" of Officer MacPhail himself: When he comes to the rescue of a homeless man being harassed and pistol-whipped, the officer ran past Sylvester Coles on his way to catch Davis. This makes Davis the only one of those two with a motive to shoot Officer MacPhail. Yet Davis' lawyers argue to condemn Coles for shooting MacPhail. Why would he?

In fact, Davis' advocates are eager to condemn Coles based on evidence far weaker than their characterization of the evidence against Davis. Where is their sense of fairness? This is the same Sylvester Coles who promptly presented himself to police, and who was advised by counsel to tell all that he knew - with his lawyer not even present. Which he did. No lawyer who even faintly suspects a client of criminal conduct would let him talk to the police without counsel.

Second, they claim that seven of nine witnesses have recanted their trial testimony. This is not believable.

To be sure, they've produced affidavits; a few handwritten and apparently voluntarily and spontaneous, except for concluding with "further the affiant sayeth not." Who wrote that stuff? The lawyers, perhaps?

The law is understandably skeptical of post-trial "newly-discovered evidence."

Such evidence as these affidavits might, for example, be paid for, or coerced, or the product of fading memory.

If every verdict could be set aside by the casual acceptance of a witness's changing his mind or suggesting uncertainty, decades after the event, it is easy to see how many cases would have to be tried at least twice (perhaps ad infinitum).

Thus the law sets strict standards for such "newly discovered" evidence.

For example, it cannot be for a lack of diligence that the new evidence was not discovered sooner, and the defendant is expected to present that evidence at the earliest possible time.

Yet these affidavits were not offered in a motion for new trial until eight days before the first scheduled execution in 2008 seventeen years after Davis' conviction. If this affidavit evidence was so compelling, why didn't they rush to seek a new trial in 2003 when they had most of the affidavits they now rely upon? Or collect those affidavits earlier?

Each of the now-"recanting" witnesses was closely questioned at trial by lawyers representing Davis, specifically on the question whether they were in any way pressured or coerced by police in giving their statements or testimony. All denied it.

And while an 80 percent recantation rate - the first in the history of the world ? - may seem to some as overwhelmingly persuasive, to others of us it invites a suggestion of uncanny coincidence, making it very difficult to believe.

Third, they claim that their "newly discovered evidence" (i.e., the recantations) hasn't been adequately considered by the courts. This is not true.

The affidavits, in various combinations, had already been reviewed by 29 judges in seven different types of review, over the course of 17 years, before Tuesday's ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court.

The state Parole Board halted the execution in 2007, saying they wouldn't allow a possibly innocent man to be executed. Then, after more than a year of reviewing all of the evidence on both sides, and hearing from every witness Davis' lawyers presented - including Davis - they refused to grant clemency.

The trial was fair. Davis was represented by superbly skilled criminal defense lawyers. He was convicted by a fair jury (seven black and five white). The post conviction stridency we've seen has been much about the death penalty and little about Troy Davis.

The jury found that Davis, after shooting another man earlier in the evening, murdered a police officer who came to the rescue of a homeless man Davis had beaten. Mark MacPhail had never even drawn his weapon."

Wikipedia.or

 
 

DAVIS v. THE STATE (two cases).

S92P1186.

S92P1187.

(263 Ga. 5)
(426 SE2d 844)
(1993)

HUNT, Presiding Justice.

Murder. Chatham Superior Court. Before Judge Head.

Troy Anthony Davis was convicted by a jury in Chatham County of murder, obstruction of a law enforcement officer, two counts of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to death for the murder. He appeals. We affirm. 1

1. At midnight on August 18, 1989, the victim, a police officer, reported for work as a security guard at the Greyhound bus station in Savannah, adjacent to a fast-food restaurant. As the restaurant was closing, a fight broke out in which Davis struck a man with a pistol. The victim, wearing his police uniform -- including badge, shoulder patches, gun belt, .38 revolver and nightstick -- ran to the scene of the disturbance. Davis fled. When the victim ordered him to halt, Davis turned around and shot the victim. The victim fell to the ground. Davis, smiling, walked up to the stricken officer and shot him several more times. The officer's gun was still in his holster.

The victim wore a bullet-proof vest, but the vest did not cover his sides and the fatal bullet entered the left side of his chest, penetrated his left lung and aorta, and came to rest at the back of his chest cavity. The officer was also shot in the left cheek and the right leg.

The next afternoon, Davis told a friend that he had been involved in an argument at the restaurant the previous evening and struck someone with a gun. He told the friend that when a police officer ran up, Davis shot him and that he went to the officer and "finished the job" because he knew the officer got a good look at his face when he shot him the first time.

After his arrest, Davis told a cellmate a similar story.

2. There is no merit to the defendant's contention that he was not guilty of the felony offense of obstructing a law-enforcement officer "in the lawful discharge of his official duties" (OCGA 16-10-24 (b)) because the officer was "moonlighting" as a security guard when he was shot. Loumakis v. State, 179 Ga. App. 294 (3) (346 SE2d 373) (1986); Carr v. State, 176 Ga. App. 113 (1) (335 SE2d 622) (1985).

3. The defendant contends it was error to deny his motion to sever the two aggravated assault counts -- one based upon the defendant's attack upon a customer at the restaurant which led to the victim's intervention and death, and the other based on a shooting less than two hours earlier in which the defendant, using the same gun involved in the murder and the other aggravated assault, shot another person with whom he was angry.

A denial of severance is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Booker v. State, 231 Ga. 598 (203 SE2d 194) (1974). Offenses may be tried together when they are based on the same conduct or constitute a series of acts connected together (or when they constitute part of a single scheme or plan). Dingler v. State, 233 Ga. 462 (211 SE2d 752) (1975).

4. The evidence supports the conviction on all counts. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

5. Only 20 percent of the prospective jurors were excused for bias or prejudice arising from their knowledge of the case or of people involved in the case. The defendant has shown neither actual prejudice in the jury selection process nor the kind of extensive and inflammatory publicity that mandated a change of venue in our recent case of Tyree v. State, 262 Ga. 395 (418 SE2d 16) (1992). 2 There was no error in the denial of the defendant's motion for change of venue.

6. Death-penalty qualification of prospective jurors is not unconstitutional. Ford v. State, 257 Ga. 461 (3) (360 SE2d 258) (1987).

7. The trial court did not err by restricting voir dire examination about parole. Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 732 (24) (386 SE2d 316) (1989).

8. As we held in Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195, 202 (345 SE2d 831) (1986): "Any error regarding a prospective juror qualified 43rd or later on the panel is harmless, unless it becomes necessary to use an alternate juror." Any issue as to the refusal to disqualify prospective juror Daniel is therefore moot.

9. The trial court's determination that jurors Smith and Truitt were qualified to serve as jurors is within the deference due the trial court's findings. Jefferson v. State, 256 Ga. 821, 824 (353 SE2d 468) (1987).

In this case, the prosecutor offered the kind of "concrete, tangible, race-neutral and neutrally-applied reasons" that are sufficient to rebut a prima facie case under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). Ford v. State, 262 Ga. 558, 560 (423 SE2d 245) (1992).

The prosecutor explained that he struck five of the eight because of their clear reluctance to impose a death sentence. As we have held:

A prospective juror's conscientious aversion to the imposition of the death sentence is an adequate reason to justify a peremptory strike in a death-penalty case. [Cit.]

Tharpe v. State, 262 Ga. 110, 112 (6) (416 SE2d 78) (1992).

Of course, a prosecutor would not be justified in assuming a sentencing bias from the race of a juror any more than the prosecutor could assume a bias against the prosecution generally. Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U. S. at 97. However, the answers of these five prospective jurors amply support the prosecutor's suspicions about their willingness to impose a death sentence. 4

Another juror was struck because he testified the defendant "lived out in the area where some of my relatives live" and because he referred to the defendant by his first name even though he denied knowing him personally. As we said in Hall v. State, 261 Ga. 778, 780 (2) (a) (415 SE2d 158) (1991):

A reasonable suspicion about a prospective juror's impartiality that falls short of justifying an excusal for cause might well justify the exercise of a peremptory strike.

The trial court was authorized to conclude that such is the case here. That the juror, whose relatives lived in the same area as the defendant, referred to the defendant by his first name might mean nothing, but the prosecutor's suspicions were not unreasonable.

A seventh juror was struck because he testified he used to work with the defendant's mother and aunt, and he admitted that knowing them would affect his "ability to reach a fair decision in the case." The last juror was struck because the police came to her house to

sufficient rebuttal to rely on the composition of the jury as selected. The prosecutor must sufficiently justify his own strikes on neutral grounds, not imply that the defendant's strikes have been non-neutral.

arrest her son for burglary and because her daughter "got into a rash of shoplifting" and was receiving psychiatric treatment for her problem. The prosecutor had legitimate, neutral and non-racial reasons to strike these two jurors. Ibid.

The record supports the trial court's determination that the state successfully rebutted the prima facie case.

11. The state is under a duty to reveal any understanding or agreement with a witness concerning criminal charges pending against that witness. Patillo v. State, 258 Ga. 255 (4) (368 SE2d 493) (1988); Jolley v. State, 254 Ga. 624 (5) (331 SE2d 516) (1985). In this case, there was "no suppression of any understanding or agreement for prosecutorial leniency," Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga., supra at 729 (17) and no grounds for reversal.

12. There was no error in the admission of photographs of the victim. Love v. State, 259 Ga. 468 (2) (383 SE2d 897) (1989); Scott v. State, 250 Ga. 195 (2) (297 SE2d 18) (1982).

13. Our death penalty laws are not unconstitutional for any reason alleged.

14. There was no error in requiring defense mitigation witnesses to testify subject to cross-examination and not allowing the defense merely to introduce in evidence written letters from family members and neighbors. Green v. Georgia, 442 U. S. 95 (99 SC 2150, 60 LE2d 738) (1979), does not, as the defendant contends, hold that hearsay evidence must be admitted at the sentencing phase of a death-penalty case. Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga., supra at 737 (37).

15. Although at one point in its charge the court referred to finding statutory aggravating circumstances "beyond a reasonable doubt" without mentioning the additional requirement of unanimity, the court's charge contained numerous references to the unanimity requirement. The jury could not have been misled. 5

16. The jury found two statutory aggravating circumstances:

(1) The offense of murder was committed against a peace officer while engaged in the performance of his official duties and (2) the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved aggravated battery to the victim prior to the death of the victim.

Record, p. 2717. See OCGA 17-10-30 (b) (7) and (b) (8). The evidence shows that the victim, wearing his official uniform, in the course of his official duties, ordered the defendant to halt as the latter fled after committing an aggravated assault. Instead of halting, the defendant shot the victim in the face, seriously disfiguring it. He then walked up to the victim as he lay on the ground and inflicted the fatal wound to the chest. The evidence supports the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury. OCGA 17-10-35 (c) (2); see OCGA 16-5-24 (a); Davis v. State, 255 Ga. 588, 593 (3) (c) (340 SE2d 862) (1986).

17. Davis contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to certain evidence and charges, for not requesting certain jury charges, and for not recalling a witness for additional cross-examination. The record supports the trial court's determination that Davis has shown neither deficient attorney performance nor actual prejudice and, therefore, has failed to show he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Ferrell v. State, 261 Ga. 115 (3) (401 SE2d 741) (1991).

18. We do not find that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factor. OCGA 17-10-35 (c) (1). The death sentence in this case is neither excessive nor disproportionate to penalties imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. OCGA 17-10-35 (c) (3). The similar cases listed in the Appendix support the imposition of a death sentence in this case.

APPENDIX.

Hill v. State, 250 Ga. 277 (295 SE2d 518) (1982); Stevens v. State, 247 Ga. 698 (278 SE2d 398) (1981); McClesky v. State, 245 Ga. 108 (263 SE2d 146) (1980); Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553 (261 SE2d 364) (1979); Willis v. State, 243 Ga. 185 (253 SE2d 70) (1979); Ross v. State, 233 Ga. 361 (211 SE2d 356) (1974).

Falligant & Toporek, Robert E. Falligant, Jr., Robert E. Barker, for appellant.

Notes

1  The crime occurred on August 19, 1989. The trial began August 19, 1991 and ended August 30. Davis filed a motion for new trial. Soon thereafter, Davis' trial attorneys were appointed to represent him on appeal, while a new attorney was appointed to review the record for effective assistance of counsel. On March 16, 1992, the trial court denied the motion for new trial on all grounds, including the ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised by the new attorney. In Case No. S92P1187, Davis, represented by the new attorney, appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial as to the ineffectiveness claims. In Case No. S92P1186, Davis, represented by trial counsel, appeals from the denial of the motion for new trial on all other grounds. Since the two cases are essentially one appeal from the judgment below, they were consolidated for oral argument on October 13, 1992, and for decision.

2  A significant factor in our disposition of the Tyree case was that the district attorney and various law enforcement officers were largely responsible for much of the inflammatory publicity. This case does not involve the "fanning of flames" by persons who ought to know better.

3  Especially since the U. S. Supreme Court made it clear in Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U. S. ---- (112 SC 2348, 120 LE2d 33) (1992), that defendants have no more right to discriminate racially in the exercise of their peremptory challenges than prosecutors, it is clear that the prosecutor would not be justified in striking disproportionately against one race to counter disproportionate strikes by the defendant against another race. The remedy against defense discrimination would be a Batson challenge by the state against the defendant, not race-based peremptories by the prosecutor. It follows, then, that where a prosecutor has disproportionately struck members of one race in the exercise of his peremptories, it is not

4  One initially stated she would automatically vote for life. Although she withdrew from that position, she remained adamant that she preferred life and was "not really in favor of" the death penalty. Another testified that "as a Christian" he did not believe he could "choose" a death sentence. The remaining three gave similar answers.We note that these five jurors represent a relatively small percentage of the total number of black prospective jurors.

5  The state argues that the poll of the jury shows that its verdict was unanimous. We do not decide whether the results of the jury poll could substitute adequately for an omission to charge the unanimity requirement.

DECIDED FEBRUARY 26, 1993 -- RECONSIDERATION DENIED MARCH 23, 1993.

 
 

Davis v. Turpin, 273 Ga. 244, 539 S.E.2d 129 (Ga. 2000). (State Habeas)

Habeas petitioner was convicted in the Superior Court, Chatham County, James W. Head, J., of murder, obstruction of law enforcement officer, aggravated assault, and possession of firearm during commission of felony. Petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court, Hunt, P.J., 263 Ga. 5, 426 S.E.2d 844, affirmed. Petitioner sought habeas corpus relief. The Superior Court, Butts County, John M. Ott, J., denied the petition. Petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court, Hunstein, J., held that: (1) it was irrelevant to proportionality review that some death sentences used for comparison ultimately resulted in reversal and re-sentencing to life imprisonment; (2) newly appointed attorney did not operate under a conflict of interest by having a friendly acquaintance with trial counsel whose effectiveness was being challenged; (3) the trial counsel did not operate under a conflict of interest while the newly appointed attorney was challenging his effectiveness; and (4) failure to raise constitutional claims on direct appeal barred them. Affirmed. Benham, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Fletcher, P.J., and Sears, J., joined.

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

Troy Anthony Davis was tried, convicted and sentenced to death in August 1991 for the killing of a law enforcement officer and other crimes. He appealed in 1992; this Court affirmed his conviction and sentence in Davis v. State, 263 Ga. 5, 426 S.E.2d 844 (1993). Davis filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Butts County in March 1994. The habeas court conducted an evidentiary hearing in December 1996 and denied Davis's amended petition in an order filed on September 9, 1997. This Court granted Davis's application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal on February 24, 2000, and ordered the parties to address four issues. We affirm.

1. Davis argued in his habeas petition that execution by electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment. Although he raised other arguments on direct appeal in support of his contention that Georgia's death penalty laws constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the argument that the use of electrocution renders those laws unconstitutional was raised for the first time in his habeas petition. We agree with the habeas court that this issue was procedurally barred by not being raised and litigated at the first available opportunity. Black v. Hardin, 255 Ga. 239, 336 S.E.2d 754 (1985). The procedural bar to claims that are raised for the first time in a habeas proceeding exists to prevent litigants from reserving meritorious issues on direct appeal in an effort to interpose needless delay to the complete resolution of their cases. Id., 255 Ga. at 239-240(3), and (4). Accordingly, Georgia law directs habeas courts to “consider whether [a petitioner has] ... complied with Georgia procedural rules at trial and on appeal” and further provides that “absent a showing of cause for noncompliance with such requirement, and of actual prejudice, habeas corpus relief shall not be granted.” OCGA § 9-14-48(d), see Turpin v. Mobley, 269 Ga. 635, 637(2), 502 S.E.2d 458 (1998). We agree with the habeas court that Davis has not made the required showing of cause necessary to overcome the procedural bar to defaulted claims.

2. This Court reviewed Davis's death sentence on direct appeal and found that it was “neither excessive nor disproportionate to penalties imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” Davis, supra, 263 Ga. at 10(18), 426 S.E.2d 844. We decline Davis's invitation to re-examine the proportionality of his sentence. Contrary to Davis's argument, the method by which this Court conducts its proportionality review satisfies Georgia statutory requirements and is not unconstitutional. Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704(16), 532 S.E.2d 677 (2000).

Davis also contends that this Court should reevaluate his death sentence in light of the fact that some of the death sentences to which his sentence was compared by this Court on direct appeal have ultimately resulted in reversal and re-sentencing to life imprisonment. We have said the following about our proportionality review of death sentences:

It is the reaction of the sentencer to the evidence before it which concerns this court and which defines the limits which sentencers in past cases have tolerated, whether before or after [ Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972)]. When a reaction is substantially out of line with reactions of prior sentencers, then this court must set aside the death penalty as excessive. Ross v. State, 233 Ga. 361, 366-367(2), 211 S.E.2d 356 (1974). Because it is a jury's reaction to the evidence before it that concerns this Court in its proportionality review, it is irrelevant if the sentences in the cases used for comparison were already at the time, or later are, reversed for reasons unrelated to the juries' reactions to the evidence.

Finally, Davis contends that other defendants have received sentences less than death for crimes of similar gravity. In light of the severely aggravated nature of Davis's crime, we find no merit in his contention that the death penalty would be unlawfully disproportionate in his case, even if a new proportionality analysis were undertaken. See Gissendaner v. State, supra, 272 Ga. at 716(19)(a), 532 S.E.2d 677.

3. After Davis was convicted and sentenced to death, the trial court appointed additional counsel to represent Davis during the motion for a new trial and direct appeal regarding any claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Davis's original trial counsel remained responsible for all other issues during that time. Davis argues that his new counsel and his trial counsel operated under a conflict of interest and that habeas corpus relief is required, even absent a showing of actual prejudice.

(a) Whether a conflict of interest served to deny Davis his right to effective counsel during his motion for new trial and direct appeal is a mixed question of law and fact, and we review the questions of law involved de novo. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Turpin v. Lipham, 270 Ga. 208(3), 510 S.E.2d 32 (1998).

A conflict of interest would warrant reversal if it rendered counsel's assistance ineffective under constitutional standards. See Cuyler, supra, 446 U.S. at 335(IV), 100 S.Ct. 1708; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As with any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, there must be a showing of constitutionally deficient performance by counsel and of resulting prejudice. However, Cuyler recognized that sufficient prejudice may be presumed in a post-conviction proceeding in certain limited circumstances, namely, where the defendant demonstrates that counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Id., 446 U.S. at 348(IV), (B, C), 100 S.Ct. 1708. While this more lenient standard of proof has traditionally been applied to cases where one attorney represented more than one defendant, Davis argues that this standard should also apply to his case where the alleged conflict of interest arose between Davis and his counsel. See United States v. Moree, 220 F.3d 65, 69 (2nd Cir.2000); Riggs v.. United States, 209 F.3d 828(II)(B) (6th Cir.2000); but see Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258(II) (5th Cir.1995).

We need not directly decide this disputed question at this time, however, because we find that Davis's claims fail even assuming, as we do below, the applicability of the more lenient Cuyler standard. Generally, “the possibility of a conflict [of interest] is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction.” Cuyler, supra, 446 U.S. at 350(IV)(C), 100 S.Ct. 1708. While certain circumstances might so strongly suggest the likelihood of an actual conflict of interest that a trial court would be expected to conduct an inquiry sua sponte, we do not find that such circumstances existed in Davis's case. See id., 446 U.S. at 347, 100 S.Ct. 1708 (“[u]nless the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the trial court need not initiate an inquiry”); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding that “the possibility of a conflict of interest was sufficiently apparent at the time ... to impose upon the court a duty to inquire further”); Dawan v. Lockhart, 31 F.3d 718(II) (8th Cir.1994); United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146(I)(A)(3) (2nd Cir.1994); Wilson v. Morris, 724 F.2d 591(II), (III) (7th Cir.1984) (“[t]he record in this case is devoid of special circumstances requiring a judicial inquiry,” id. at 595(III)). Furthermore, Davis raised no objections before the trial court suggesting his attorneys' loyalties were potentially divided, which, had they been raised, might arguably affect his present burden to show an actual conflict of interest. Compare Wilson, supra, 724 F.2d at 593 (“[a] constitutional violation occurs, and proof of an actual conflict is not required, when a defendant's attorney objects to joint representation and the trial court overrules the objection without exploring the basis of the objection or the adequacy of the representation in the face of a potential conflict of interest”); see Cabello v. United States, 188 F.3d 871, 875(II) (7th Cir.1999) (“[t]he extent to which the defendant must demonstrate prejudice depends on whether and to what extent the conflict was brought to the attention of the trial judge”). Thus, Davis bears the burden to show that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his attorneys' performance. See Smith v. Anderson, 689 F.2d 59, 65(III) (6th Cir.1982) (“[w]hen the defendant, individually or through his legal representative, fails to raise his concern for a conflict in a timely fashion, an ‘actual conflict of interest adversely affect(ing) his lawyer's performance’ must be established”).

(b) We first address Davis's contention that the new attorney appointed to raise claims of ineffective assistance during his motion for a new trial and direct appeal operated under a conflict of interest. The habeas court found that Davis's new counsel “zealously and competently represented Davis's interests in challenging the effectiveness of the primary defense team's assistance at trial” and that there was “no support” for the allegation that Davis's new counsel failed in his professional duties as a result of the friendly acquaintance he had with Davis's trial counsel. This mixed finding of law and fact is supported by the record. In context, counsel's statement that there was no “adversarial relationship” between himself and Davis's trial counsel shows merely that the two attorneys related to one another in a congenial and professional manner, not that ineffective assistance claims were not zealously prosecuted. Counsel prosecuting an ineffective assistance claim must be free to operate independently of the attorney whose performance is in question. See Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661, 662, 409 S.E.2d 507 (1991); see also Kennebrew v. State, 267 Ga. 400, 401-402(2), 480 S.E.2d 1 (1996). In this case, the record supports the habeas court's finding that Davis's new counsel operated with appropriate independence and took adequate steps to examine trial counsel's performance by reviewing the record, by investigating matters outside the record, and by interviewing Davis both inside and outside the presence of his trial counsel.

Because nothing in the trial court or habeas court records suggests that Davis's supplemental appellate counsel had divided loyalties or allowed his actions to be in any way negatively affected by the simultaneous representation, we conclude that the habeas court did not err in finding that Davis's new counsel was not operating under an actual conflict of interest.

(c) Davis also contends that his original trial counsel began operating under a conflict of interest once new counsel was appointed to pursue ineffective assistance claims. Again, we conclude that he has failed to show that an actual conflict of interest existed. Davis's original counsel was responsible for raising alleged trial court error during Davis's motion for new trial and direct appeal. Davis suggests that counsel's loyalties were divided between his duty to argue zealously meritorious issues on Davis's behalf and his own interest in defending himself against claims that he had rendered ineffective assistance during Davis's trial. However, nothing in the record suggests that Davis's original counsel withheld his best efforts or was distracted because his professional reputation was subjected to scrutiny. The record shows that Davis's original counsel encouraged Davis to speak freely and confidentially with his new counsel about any concerns Davis might have had concerning his representation at trial and even suggested several possible areas for examination to Davis's new counsel. Accordingly, we accept the habeas court's factual finding that Davis's original counsel continued to serve Davis's interests and took active steps to facilitate the efforts of Davis's new counsel to do the same. See Carter v. Armontrout, 929 F.2d 1294, 1300 (8th Cir.1991) (applying Cuyler and accepting state court's credibility and factual finding that attorney who was being sued by her client during criminal proceeding had not compromised her loyalty to her client); Iowa v. Thompson, 597 N.W.2d 779(II)(B)(2) (Iowa 1999) (finding no evidence that attorney's potential criminal charges against his client for assaulting him in court had created an actual conflict of interest).

As found by a Federal court of appeals in another case of alleged conflict of interest, we find that “any conflict that might have stemmed from [counsel's] interest in protecting his professional standing evaporated” when he took active, professionally-responsible steps to facilitate the litigation of Davis's claims of ineffective assistance. Fields v. Attorney General of State of Md., 956 F.2d 1290, 1298-1299(III) (4th Cir.1992). Accordingly, we conclude that the habeas court did not err in finding that Davis's original counsel did not operate under an actual conflict of interest during Davis's motion for new trial and direct appeal.

[12] 4. Davis claimed in the habeas court that his constitutional rights were denied by his alleged absence during critical stages of his trial proceedings. Davis also claimed that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to raise the issue of his alleged absence on direct appeal. We hold that the habeas court correctly determined that this claim was procedurally defaulted because it was not raised on direct appeal and find that the procedural bar erected by the failure to raise this claim on direct appeal has not here been overcome by a showing of sufficient cause and prejudice. Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820(2)(a), 493 S.E.2d 900 (1997).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except BENHAM, C.J., FLETCHER, P.J., and SEARS, J., who dissent.

BENHAM, Chief Justice, dissenting.

I respectfully disagree with the majority's decision to affirm the habeas court's ruling that Davis is procedurally barred from pursuing his habeas claim that electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment under the Georgia and United States constitutions. For the reasons that follow, I would vacate that portion of the habeas court's order denying Davis's petition for a writ of habeas corpus insofar as the order concluded that Davis was procedurally barred from pursuing his claim that execution by electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment, and remand the case for further proceedings.

It is in Davis's habeas petition that he raised for the first time the argument that the use of electrocution as the means of execution is cruel and unusual punishment. As the majority notes, the habeas court did not address the merits of Davis's contention because the court concluded that the failure to raise the “evolving standards of decency” argument at trial constituted a waiver under Black v. Hardin, 255 Ga. 239, 336 S.E.2d 754 (1985). I disagree with the imposition of the procedural bar without reference to whether Davis had or could have made a showing that the factual or legal basis of the claim was not available to Davis's counsel on direct appeal. See Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 825, 493 S.E.2d 900 (1997).

The procedural bar to claims that are raised for the first time in a habeas proceeding exists to prevent litigants from reserving meritorious issues on direct appeal in an effort to interpose needless delay to the complete resolution of their cases. See Black v. Hardin, 255 Ga. at 239-240(3) and (4), 336 S.E.2d 754 (holding that an available claim that is not raised on direct appeal is “waived” and that “there then exists a procedural bar to its consideration in habeas corpus proceedings”). Accordingly, Georgia law directs habeas courts to “consider whether [a petitioner has] ... complied with Georgia procedural rules at trial and on appeal” and further provides that “absent a showing of cause for noncompliance with such requirement, and of actual prejudice, habeas corpus relief shall not be granted.” OCGA § 9-14-48(d); see Turpin v. Mobley, 269 Ga. 635, 637(2), 502 S.E.2d 458 (1998).

The required showing of cause necessary to overcome the procedural bar to defaulted claims is not easily made. This Court has recognized ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as one of the few causes that can, in certain circumstances, satisfy the requirement. Turpin v. Todd, supra, 268 Ga. 820(2)(a), 493 S.E.2d 900 (“The procedural bar, however, may be overcome if the petitioner shows, first, an adequate cause for failing to raise the issue earlier and, second, actual prejudice resulting from the alleged error or errors.”). Our reasoning in Todd relied, in part, on persuasive holdings under federal law. Id. at 825, 493 S.E.2d 900. We also noted in Todd another showing of cause recognized under federal law, “a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel.” (Citations and puncuation omitted.) Id. (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991)). I would now hold explicitly that the procedural bar to a claim that was not raised on direct appeal should be set aside upon a showing that the factual or legal basis for the claim was not reasonably available to counsel and that there is actual prejudice to the petitioner's constitutional rights. Indeed, this class of exceptions to the limitation of the review of defaulted claims is nothing more than a necessary, logical extension of the “cause and prejudice test” set forth in Black v. Hardin. Black, 255 Ga. at 240(4), 336 S.E.2d 754 (authorizing consideration of defaulted claims upon a “showing of adequate cause for failure to object or to pursue on appeal and a showing of actual prejudice to the accused.”); see Turpin v. Lipham, 270 Ga. 208, 209-210(2), 510 S.E.2d 32 (1998); Cherry v. Abbott, 258 Ga. 517, 517-518, 371 S.E.2d 852 (1988).

Turning to the question of whether the habeas court correctly rejected Davis's claim as procedurally barred because of Davis's failure to raise it at trial and on direct appeal, I note that at the evidentiary hearing, Davis proffered numerous affidavits in support of his contention that electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment. These affidavits purported to show that executions by electrocution have been plagued by shocking and grotesque errors,FN1 that there is a substantial risk that many if not all executions by electrocution result in the unnecessary infliction of pain and disfigurement,FN2 that societal mores surrounding execution by electrocution have undergone meaningful evolution since Davis's sentence was imposed at trial, and that legislative developments across the nation evidence a national abandonment of electrocution as a means of execution.FN3 Davis's post-hearing brief argued vigorously that electrocution has been steadily abandoned as an acceptable means of execution and that recent scientific inquiries into electrocution FN4 have cast serious doubt on its humaneness.

FN1. See Affidavit of Deborah W. Denno, December 5, 1996, ¶ 18 (outlining “botched” electrocutions, including two, one of which was in Georgia, since Davis's direct appeal).

FN2. Affidavit of Clive A. Stafford Smith, December 5, 1996 (describing a 1996 electrocution in Georgia); Affidavit of Paula B. Hutchinson, December 5, 1996 (describing a 1994 electrocution in Nebraska); Affidavit of Dale A. Baich, December 4, 1996 (describing a 1996 electrocution in Nebraska); Affidavit of John Charles Boger, December 5, 1996 (describing a September 1991 (shortly after Davis's trial) electrocution in Georgia).

FN3. See Affidavit of Deborah W. Denno, December 5, 1996, ¶ 12 (“Altogether, 20 states have switched from electrocution to another method of execution. Moreover, five of these states have switched in the last three years.”); Affidavit of Richard C. Dieter, December 5, 1996 (outlining national legislative abandonment of electrocution, including decrease in use of electrocution from 1991 to date of affidavit); see also La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 15:569 (abolishing electrocution as of September 15, 1991); 1990 Pa. Laws 145 (abolishing electrocution, codified as 61 Pa.Code § 2121.1 until repealed by 61 Pa.Code § 3004 which also specifies lethal injection as method of execution); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2949.22 (allowing lethal injection as an alternative to electrocution as of July 1, 1996); Va.Code Ann. § 53.1-234 (allowing lethal injection as an alternative to electrocution as of January 1, 1995); Conn.Gen.Stat. § 54-100 (abolishing electrocution as of October 1, 1995); Ind.Code § 35-38-6-1 (abolishing electrocution as of July 1, 1995); N.Y. Correct. Law § 658 (abolishing electrocution for crimes committed on or after September 1, 1995); S.C.Code Ann. § 24-3-540 (allowing lethal injection as an alternative to electrocution as of June 7, 1995); Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 431.220 (abolishing electrocution where sentence is imposed after March 31, 1998, and providing lethal injection as an alternative for death sentences imposed before that date); Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-23-114 (abolishing electrocution for crimes committed on or after January 1, 1999, and providing lethal injection as an alternative for crimes committed before that date); Fla.Stat.Ann. § 922.105 (adopting lethal injection except in cases where electrocution is affirmatively elected, effective January 14, 2000); OCGA § 17-10-38 (providing for execution by lethal injection for crimes committed on or after May 1, 2000); 1999 Ga. Laws 734 (preserving execution by electrocution for persons sentenced to death for crimes committed before May 1, 2000).

FN4. See Affidavit of John G. Webster, Ph.D., December 4, 1996 (describing expert review of apparatus for electrocution in Louisiana and opining that a determination of the degree of pain inflicted by Georgia's apparatus would require similar expert review); Affidavit of Harold Hillman, Ph.D. (opining that electrocution is extremely painful, that a low percentage of electricity applied to the scalp penetrates the skull to reach the brain, and that death from electrocution is slow); Affidavit of Orrin Devinsky, M.D., December 5, 1996 (opining based, in part, on review of an execution in 1995 that “[e]lectrocution can be intensely painful” and that it is impossible to conclude that death is instantaneous); Affidavit of Donald D. Price, Ph.D., December 5, 1996 (outlining his ongoing research and opining that electrocution might induce extreme sensations of pain and “horror” by stimulation of certain portions of the brain).

Davis contended that his proffered evidence of progressively-emerging changes in society's views toward electrocution were indicative of “evolving standards of decency” sufficient to invoke the protections against cruel and unusual punishments embodied in the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and in Article I, Section I, Paragraph VII of the Georgia Constitution and sufficient to overcome the procedural bar to his claim. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (“While a national consensus against execution of the mentally retarded may someday emerge reflecting the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,’ there is insufficient evidence of such a consensus today.”); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989); Fleming v. Zant, 259 Ga. 687, 689-690(3), 386 S.E.2d 339 (1989) (applying evolving standards of decency to the Georgia Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment). Davis's argument suggests that, at the time of his direct appeal, the factual basis for an effective claim that electrocution was cruel and unusual punishment did not exist, or at least did not exist to the extent that it does now.

A federal district court was recently confronted with a similar situation, and I find that court's resolution of this issue to be persuasive. In McNair v. Haley, 97 F.Supp.2d 1270 (M.D.Ala.2000), a federal district court considered the application of the federal procedural default doctrine to the petitioner's claim that evolving standards of decency barred his execution by electrocution under the federal constitution. The federal magistrate court which first considered the petitioner's federal habeas corpus petition had found that evidence of changing societal mores, of legislative developments, and of recent malfunctioning of the electric chair were merely additional evidence tending to support a previously existing claim and, therefore, that the exception where “the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel” did not apply. Id. at 1276. The federal district court disagreed, stating, “T[he] evidence does not simply support an eighth-amendment claim that electrocution offends evolving social standards of decency; instead, it is the very basis for the claim itself.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 1277. The court reiterated its holding by characterizing the evidence of evolving societal standards as “the necessary preconditions for the very claim itself.” Id. The court then concluded as follows: “Because these new facts are the basis for a claim that was not reasonably available during the petitioner's state proceedings, this court finds cause to excuse the procedural default.” Id. at 1277-78. Although this Court applies Georgia procedural law, I believe Davis's situation to be quite similar and the district court's resolution of the question to be persuasive. By its very nature, it is quite possible that Davis's argument that “evolving standards of decency” demonstrate that electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment could not have been raised in the same manner in 1992 when his direct appeal was heard as it could have been raised in December 1996 when his evidentiary hearing was held. The very basis of Davis's claim is that societal standards have changed.

Because the habeas court disposed of Davis's claim that “evolving standards of decency” demonstrate a viable claim of cruel and unusual punishment under the State and federal constitutions without reference to whether Davis had or could have made a showing that “the factual or legal basis for [that] claim was not reasonably available to counsel” on Davis's direct appeal, I would vacate that aspect of the habeas court's order and remand the case for further consideration. On remand, the habeas court should determine whether Davis has made a proffer of evidence unavailable to him during his direct appeal that is sufficient to warrant consideration of his claim that electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment in light of evolving standards of decency. If the habeas court should find that Davis has made a sufficient proffer, the proffered evidence should be admitted, and a resolution of the claim on its merits should be made. In the interest of judicial economy, the habeas court should also consider any supplemental proffer Davis might make purporting to show further evolution of relevant “standards of decency” since the time of his evidentiary hearing.

I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice FLETCHER and Justice SEARS join this dissent.

 
 

Davis v. Terry, 465 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2006). (Federal Habeas)

Background: Defendant was convicted of murder, obstruction of law enforcement officer, aggravated assault and possession of firearm during commission of felony. The Supreme Court of Georgia, Hunt, P.J., 263 Ga. 5, 426 S.E.2d 844, affirmed conviction and death sentence. After denial of his state habeas petition was affirmed, 273 Ga. 244, 539 S.E.2d 129, defendant filed federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, No. 01-00290-CV-4, John F. Nangle, J., denied petition. Petitioner appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals held that: (1) affidavits of other witnesses were insufficient to support Giglio claim; (2) there was no Brady violation from state's failure to disclose that witness who testified against defendant at trial had contacted district attorney's office regarding possibility of favorable disposition in impending criminal action against her in exchange for her testimony in defendant's case; and (3) even if trial counsel's performance was deficient, petitioner was not deprived of a fair trial. Affirmed.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. Before DUBINA, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Troy Anthony Davis appeals the denial of his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus. Davis was convicted and sentenced to death for crimes that occurred in two separate incidents on the same night. First, Davis was convicted of shooting into a car on Cloverdale Drive in a subdivision of Savannah, Georgia. Michael Cooper, who was sitting in the front passenger seat of the car, was severely injured by a bullet that lodged in his right jaw. Davis was also convicted of striking Larry Young in the head with a gun later that night in a Savannah parking lot, and of fatally shooting police officer Mark Allen McPhail as McPhail responded to the altercation.

Davis' convictions and death sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Davis v. State, 263 Ga. 5, 426 S.E.2d 844 (1993). His state habeas court petition for relief was denied in 1997, Davis v. Turpin, Civ. Action No. 94-V-162, Order of Sept. 5, 1997 (entered Sept. 9, 1997), and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed. Davis v. Turpin, 273 Ga. 244, 539 S.E.2d 129 (2000). Davis then filed his federal habeas petition, whose denial by the district court is the subject of this appeal.

Davis' petition for habeas corpus is based essentially on his claim that newly discovered evidence indicates both that he did not receive a fair trial and that, under the standard set forth in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995), he is actually innocent of murdering Officer McPhail. In Schlup, the Supreme Court described two types of claims pertaining to actual innocence that might be made after trial. First, the Court addressed the substantive claim of actual innocence, as asserted in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), that execution of an innocent person violates the Eighth Amendment even if a conviction was the product of a fair trial.FN1 Second, the Court recognized the procedural claim, asserted by Schlup, that conviction of an innocent person is constitutionally impermissible when the conviction was the product of an unfair trial. The Court held that when a death-sentenced prisoner makes a successful showing of actual innocence, procedural default alone cannot bar consideration of his constitutional claims of an unfair trial.

FN1. The viability of this claim remains an open question as the Court did not reach it, finding that Herrera had failed to make a “truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence.’ ” Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417, 113 S.Ct. 853.

In this case, Davis does not make a substantive claim of actual innocence. Rather, he argues that his constitutional claims of an unfair trial must be considered, even though they are otherwise procedurally defaulted, because he has made the requisite showing of actual innocence under Schlup.FN2 Specifically, Davis argues that:

FN2. To pass through the Schlup “gateway,” a petitioner's new evidence must “establish sufficient doubt about his guilt to justify the conclusion that his execution would be a miscarriage of justice unless his conviction was the product of a fair trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316, 115 S.Ct. 851 (emphasis in original). Establishing sufficient doubt of guilt does not, under Schlup, refer to the strict “clear and convincing” standard of Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992), but rather the lesser standard of Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986), which only requires a petitioner to “show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 326-27, 115 S.Ct. 851. The Supreme Court painstakingly explained the terms of the Carrier/ Schlup standard. First, a habeas court cannot reject a petitioner's claim “solely because” there remains “sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.” Id. at 331, 115 S.Ct. 851. Instead, the court must “consider what reasonable triers of fact are likely to do.” Id. at 330, 115 S.Ct. 851. The Court described a “reasonable” juror as one who fairly considers all of the evidence presented and conscientiously obeys the instructions of the trial court requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 331, 115 S.Ct. 851. After articulating the appropriate standard, the Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine “the probative force” and reliability “of the newly presented evidence in connection with the evidence of guilt adduced at trial.” Id. at 332, 115 S.Ct. 851.

(1) The district court erred as a matter of law in declining to address Davis' claim of actual innocence by: (a) refusing to examine all of the evidence of his actual innocence; (b) reaching Davis' constitutional claims before considering the gateway issue of his actual innocence; (c) applying the standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) to deny Davis an evidentiary hearing on the question of his actual innocence; and (d) failing to recognize that Davis has made a colorable showing of actual innocence. (2) The State violated Davis' due process and fair trial rights by its knowing use of material false evidence and by withholding material exculpatory evidence. (3) Trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to conduct adequate pretrial investigation and for ineffectively representing Davis at trial. (4) Davis' trial was fraught with procedural and substantive errors, including Confrontation Clause violations, which in combination deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial as guaranteed under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.FN3

FN3. We note at the outset that Davis provides no particular factual support for this claim other than a very brief assertion of a Confrontation Clause violation. Specifically, he challenges a single statement within Officer Lorenzo Brown's testimony regarding a shell casing that linked the murder of Officer McPhail to the Cloverdale shooting. Brown testified that he was given the casing by a homeless man who claimed to have found it “on the lawn of the trust company bank.” On appeal, Davis complains that he did not have the opportunity to confront the homeless man, but he did not raise this argument in his habeas petition. The argument was not considered by the district court and will not be considered here. See Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 800 (11th Cir.2004) (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring) (“[A]ppellant's failure to press the argument before the district court foreclosed its right to present it on appeal.” (quoting First Ala. Bank of Montgomery, N.A. v. First State Ins. Co., 899 F.2d 1045, 1060 n. 8 (11th Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks omitted))).

DISCUSSION

Certainly, the threshold question in this case is whether Davis is entitled to consideration of his claims of an unfair trial when, as he concedes, those claims are procedurally defaulted for failure to present them to the state court.FN4 Davis recognizes that, notwithstanding the procedural bar, the district court did consider the merits of his constitutional claims and rejected them as a matter of law. He nonetheless argues that the district court erred in declining to consider evidence of his actual innocence and instead reached the merits of his constitutional claims. Davis cannot prevail on this issue. As noted above, the procedural claim of actual innocence under Schlup is permitted in order to assure consideration of constitutional claims of an unfair trial where those claims have been procedurally defaulted. Davis received precisely such substantive consideration. He cannot be heard to complain that the test for achieving a desired result was not applied, or not applied correctly, when the desired result was, in fact, obtained. Accordingly, we now turn to the true gravamen of this appeal: the question of whether the district court erred in concluding that Davis' constitutional claims of an unfair trial, as he asserts them in this case, must be rejected as a matter of law.

FN4. None of Davis' current claims of an unconstitutional trial were raised in the direct appeal of his conviction. Thus, the state habeas court ruled that they were waived and procedurally barred pursuant to Black v. Hardin, 255 Ga. 239, 336 S.E.2d 754, 754-55 (1985). Because a federal habeas court “will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment,” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), this Court is likewise precluded from considering these constitutional claims. A petitioner may surmount this procedural bar in one of two ways. First, the petitioner's defaulted claims can be reviewed if he can show cause excusing the default and prejudice arising therefrom. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392-93, 124 S.Ct. 1847, 158 L.Ed.2d 659 (2004). Second, because “[t]he cause and prejudice standard is not a perfect safeguard against fundamental miscarriages of justice[,]” id. at 393, 124 S.Ct. 1847, a petitioner may still obtain review of his constitutional claims, even if he cannot show cause and prejudice, only if his case “implicat[es] a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314-15, 115 S.Ct. 851 (1995) (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991)); Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1136 (11th Cir.2000). It would be considered a fundamental miscarriage of justice if “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Davis first argues that his constitutional right to a fair trial was violated because the State knowingly presented false testimony which had been coerced by the police to obtain his conviction. Specifically, Davis argues that the State violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by offering material evidence that state agents knew to be coerced and false in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Davis also argues that the State failed to provide him with exculpatory impeachment evidence of the coercive investigative tactics used to obtain the false testimony in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Additionally, Davis argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, citing trial counsel's failure to investigate possible police coercion of witnesses, to interview critical eyewitnesses prior to trial, and to properly prepare for trial. We address each claim in turn.

I. Giglio Claim

Giglio error, a species of Brady error, occurs when “the undisclosed evidence demonstrates that the prosecution's case included perjured testimony and that the prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury.” Ventura v. Att'y Gen., Fla., 419 F.3d 1269, 1276-77 (11th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)). In order to prevail under Giglio, Davis must establish that: (1) the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony or failed to correct what he subsequently learned was false testimony; and (2) such use was material-i.e., that there is “any reasonable likelihood” that the false testimony “could ... have affected the judgment.” Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763; see also Tompkins v. Moore, 193 F.3d 1327, 1339 (11th Cir.1999). Davis fails to meet this standard.

The only Giglio argument actually asserted in Davis' federal habeas petition (as opposed to his appeal brief) is that the prosecution knowingly presented the false testimony of Kevin McQueen and vouched for this allegedly false testimony. But Davis fails to make any specific allegations tending to show that the government knew McQueen's statement to be false. At trial, the State introduced McQueen's sworn statement that, when the two were inmates together, Davis confessed to the killing. In his present affidavit McQueen asserts that he “made up the story about the confession” in order “to get even with” Davis after an argument.

But as the district court correctly stated: A showing of state misconduct requires, at a minimum, an allegation that the State presented McQueen's testimony while knowing it was false. McQueen's affidavit, accepted as truthful for the sake of argument, shows only that McQueen, on his own and prompted by no one else, sought to take out his anger against Petitioner by lying to a jail warden, by making a false statement to a police officer, and by lying to the court and the jury when he testified that Petitioner confessed to shooting Officer McPhail. McQueen did not present the affidavit recanting his testimony until well after the trial had ended, and no evidence has been presented to indicate that the State knew that his trial testimony was false.

Based on this sole allegation regarding Kevin McQueen, Davis cannot support a Giglio claim as a matter of law.

Although not referenced in his habeas petition, Davis did attach to his petition the affidavits of other witnesses, which he now argues in his brief additionally support his Giglio claim. We have carefully reviewed these affidavits and conclude that, as a matter of law, they are insufficient to support a Giglio claim, either because the assertions contained therein do not rise to the level of coercive police conduct,FN5 or because there is no reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury's judgment.FN6 See United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103, 1110 (11th Cir.1995).

FN5. For example, the “coercion” alleged in some affidavits goes no further than being “told” by the police to sign a statement. In those affidavits, the affiant claims he did not read the statement at the time he signed it but now claims that its contents were false. FN6. For example, the allegation that D.D. Collins' interrogation was coercive was raised at trial and obviously did not impact the jury's finding of guilt.

II. Brady Claim

To prevail on his Brady claim, Davis would have to prove that: (1) the government possessed evidence favorable to him; (2) the defendant did not possess the evidence and could not have obtained it with reasonable diligence; (3) the government suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) the evidence was material. LeCroy v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 421 F.3d 1237, 1268 (11th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.1989)). Davis alleges that the State violated Brady by failing to disclose material exculpatory evidence concerning Dorothy Ferrell-namely, that Ferrell, who testified against Davis at trial, had contacted the district attorney's office regarding the possibility of a favorable disposition in an impending criminal action against her in exchange for her testimony in Davis' case. Davis says this omission was material because Ferrell's testimony was important in securing a guilty verdict against him.

At trial, Ferrell, who was staying in a hotel across the street from the murder scene, testified on behalf of the State. She identified Davis as the shooter after her memory was triggered by a picture of Davis on the seat of a police car. She then picked Davis out of a five-person photographic line up and identified Davis at trial.FN7 After Ferrell testified, defense counsel's wife received a phone call from a person purporting to be Dorothy Ferrell saying that someone in the state attorney's office had told Ferrell they would help her if she testified in Davis' case, and that Ferrell's testimony at Davis' trial had been completely false. When defense counsel informed the state attorney of the phone call, the state attorney revealed Ferrell's written request for assistance in a criminal case in which she was a defendant. Her letter stated that if the prosecutor would help, “I promise you, you will not be making a mistake.” Recalled by the judge to explain, Ferrell denied making the phone call. Though she admitted to writing the letter, she denied that the prosecutor helped her. The judge then offered, and defense counsel declined, to recall Ferrell to the stand.

FN7. Ferrell now claims that the police did not present her with a photographic line-up, but simply showed her one photograph of Davis. However, as noted above, it was Ferrell herself who initially and voluntarily identified Davis as the shooter.

Because it is clear that the defense was aware at trial of Ferrell's contact with the state attorney's office, there was no Brady violation. Moreover, this claim was presented to the state habeas court, which found that “there was ‘no suppression of any understanding or agreement for prosecutorial leniency and no grounds for reversal.’ ” Because there was no clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the district court accepted the state habeas court's finding of fact that there was no suppression of any understanding or agreement. Although the prosecution had an obligation to advise defense counsel of Ferrell's call, the state habeas court found that the omission was not material, citing the defense team's reason for not calling Ferrell back to testify once it found out about the call: “We weren't going to get very far with this witness, simply because we had fairly impeached her on the issue of shoplifting.”

III. Ineffective assistance of counsel

Likewise, Davis cannot establish a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Davis essentially argues that his counsel was ineffective because: 1. Counsel failed to contact Joseph Blige, who allegedly could have furnished evidence that Davis had no fight with anyone at the Cloverdale party. 2. Counsel failed to ask defense witness Joseph Washington about the shirt that Red Coles was wearing, information that would have been exculpatory in light of other evidence presented to the jury. 3. Counsel failed to interview April Hester, who hosted the Cloverdale party and saw Red Coles acting “nervous and upset” soon after McPhail's shooting. 4. Counsel failed to effectively impeach Larry Young, Harriet Murray, Red Coles, and Stephen Sanders.

A successful claim under Strickland has “two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Davis fails, as a matter of law, to meet this standard. His counsel's alleged instances of misconduct, even if true, do not add up to a performance so deficient that it deprived Davis of a fair trial. A review of the trial transcript reveals that Davis' counsel were fully prepared for trial and presented a viable defense: a case of mistaken identity. Counsel extensively cross-examined the State's witnesses to show that they were not trustworthy and to raise doubt about the witnesses' alleged observations of the shooting. Counsel also presented significant testimony that Red Coles was the person who had committed the murder. Most importantly, none of the testimony which Davis asserts counsel should have obtained would overcome the prejudice requirement of Strickland in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial.

Having very carefully considered this record, we cannot say that the district court erred in concluding that Davis has not borne his burden to establish a viable claim that his trial was constitutionally unfair. AFFIRMED.

 

 

 
 
 
 
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