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Henry Earl DUNN
Jr.
Gay-bashing murder -
Robbery
3 days after
Final Meal:
Cheeseburger with extra cheese, pickles, onion, lettuce and salad
dressing, tray of french fries, ketchup, 25 fried shrimp, 4 cans of
pineapple juice, 2 banana splits with a bottle of Hershey's syrup
and one jar of apple butter jam.
Final Words:
"To all my family and friends, I want you to know that I love you
very much. I appreciate all the good and bad times together. I'll
always remember you, and love you forever. And to the West family, I
hope you can find it in your heart to find forgiveness and strength,
to move on and find peace."
ClarkProsecutor.org
HenryEarlDunn,
Petitioner-appellant, v.
Janie Cockrell, Director, Texas Department of Criminal
Justice,
Institutional Division, Respondent-appellee
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
August 15, 2002
Appeal from the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES and
STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner,
HenryEarlDunn, appeals the
district court's denial of his Rule 60(b)
motion. Because we find that the district
court correctly denied
Dunn's motion, filed solely to allow
Dunn a second
chance to file a timely appeal, we affirm.
I.
Dunn was convicted
of capital murder and sentenced to death by
the State of Texas in September 1995. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in
September 1997, Dunn
v. State, 951 S.W.2d 478 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).
In September 1999, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals denied his timely filed
application for post-conviction writ of
habeas corpus.
Dunn filed a
federal petition for writ of habeas corpus
on January 27, 2000. On June 27, 2001, the
United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas granted defendant
Cockrell's Motion for Summary Judgment,
denied habeas relief and dismissed the
petition. Thirty-four days later, on July
31, 2001, Dunn's
federal habeas counsel filed an untimely
notice of appeal. On September 4, 2001,
Dunn filed an
untimely Motion for Leave to File Out of
Time Notice of Appeal. The district court
denied this motion as untimely on September
24, 2001. On November 20, 2001, we dismissed
Dunn's appeal for
lack of jurisdiction.
Dunn's habeas
counsel was replaced at his request. On
January 14, 2002, Dunn,
through his new habeas counsel, filed a
Motion under Rule 60(b) for Relief of
Judgment seeking to vacate the original
habeas judgment. The sole basis for the
motion was to vacate and re-enter the
judgment to allow Dunn
to file a timely notice of appeal which was
not done initially because of the negligence
of his attorneys. The district court denied
relief on February 13, 2001.
Dunn timely
appealed and seeks a certificate of
appealability.
II.
Dunn filed both a
timely notice of appeal and a motion for
certificate of appealability. As this case
presents only Dunn's
appeal from the denial of his 60(b) motion,
and not an appeal from the merits of his
habeas petition, no certificate of
appealability is required at this time.1
A district court's ruling on a Rule 60(b)
motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
III.
Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), a
district court may reopen judgments for
reasons of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect." The sole basis for
Dunn's Motion for
Relief of Judgment under Rule 60(b) was to
vacate and re-enter the judgment to allow
Dunn to file a
timely notice of appeal which was not done
initially because of the negligence of his
attorneys. This court has long held that a
Rule 60(b) motion is not a substitute for a
timely appeal. United States v. O'Neil,
709 F.2d 361, 372 (5th Cir.1983) and cases
cited therein, see also In re Air Crash
at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 852 F.2d
842, 844 (5th Cir.1988); Pryor v. U.S.
Postal Service, 769 F.2d 281, 286 (5th
Cir.1985); Latham v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 987 F.2d 1199, 1203 (5th
Cir.1993).
This is
particularly the case when, as here, the
rules provide a party specific limited
relief from the requirement to timely file a
notice of appeal. Under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5), a court may
extend the time for filing the notice of
appeal for up to 30 additional days if the
appellant establishes either "good cause" or
"excusable neglect." But, as we made clear
in O'Neil, a motion under this rule
must be filed "no later than 30 days after
the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a)
expires." Rule 60(b) cannot be used to
circumvent the limited relief available
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
4(a)(5), which advances the principle of
protecting the finality of judgments. Id.
This is
particularly so where, as here, the
Rule 60(b) motion is made after time for
appeal has expired, and the movant neither
complains of any denial of a full and fair
hearing before the district court nor seeks
by the ruling to have the district court
alter its ruling, but rather asks only that
the order be vacated and reentered. In such
a case, the Rule 60(b) motion is avowedly
being used only to extend the time for
appeal. It hence squarely collides with Rule
4(a)(5).
Id.
(citations omitted). As the sole purpose of
Dunn's 60(b) motion
is to achieve an extension of the time in
which to file a notice of appeal, it must
fail. See also, Wilson v. The Atwood
Group, 725 F.2d 255 (5th Cir.1984) (en
banc); Latham v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
987 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir.1993).
IV.
Dunn contends that
the district court applied the wrong
standard in determining whether the neglect
of his counsel was excusable under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). He suggests
that the Supreme Court's decision in
Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs.
Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 113 S.Ct.
1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993), requires the
district court to consider whether the facts
surrounding habeas counsel's tardy filing
constitute an extraordinary circumstance to
justify Rule 60(b)(1) relief. In Pioneer,
the Supreme Court addressed whether an
attorney's inadvertent failure to file a
proof of claim within the deadline
established by the court can constitute
"excusable neglect" justifying late filing
within the meaning of Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 9006(b)(1). It
defined "excusable neglect" in this context
as follows:
Because
Congress has provided no other guideposts
for determining what sorts of neglect will
be considered "excusable," we conclude that
the determination is at bottom an equitable
one, taking account all of the relevant
circumstances surrounding the party's
omission. These include ... the danger of
prejudice to the [non-moving party], the
length of the delay and its potential impact
on judicial proceedings, the reason for the
delay, including whether it was within the
reasonable control of the movant, and
whether the movant acted in good faith.
Id.
at 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489.
Dunn's reliance on Pioneer is
misplaced.
If
Dunn was entitled
to Rule 60(b) relief upon establishing his
counsel's "excusable neglect," Pioneer
might be helpful to him. But
Dunn did not seek
relief under Rule 60(b) in the district
court based on an error by his counsel that
caused the district court to erroneously
enter judgment against him. Rather,
Dunn invoked Rule
60(b) solely for the purpose of having the
district court reenter the adverse judgment
so he could file a timely notice of appeal.
By defining excusable neglect, the
Pioneer Court did not purport to
consider whether Rule 60(b) can be used
solely to extend the time for appeal, when
there is no assertion of a need to correct
an error committed in the district court as
a result of a litigant's excusable neglect.
V.
Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) gives a
litigant 30 days to apply for relief from
the strict jurisdictional time requirement
for filing a notice of appeal due to a
party's excusable neglect. Our cases
sensibly refuse to allow a litigant to
circumvent this specific rule by invoking
Rule 60(b) solely for the purpose of
extending the time for appeal. For the
foregoing reasons, we find that the district
court correctly denied
Dunn's Motion for Relief of Judgment
under Rule 60(b). Accordingly, the judgment
of the district court is AFFIRMED. We also
vacate the stay of execution previously
entered.
In our view, this case
does not present a situation in which the
petitioner is using Rule 60(b) to amend or
alter the judgment of a first habeas
proceeding, in which case the Rule 60(b)
motion should be treated as a successive
habeas petition Hess v. Cockrell, 281
F.3d 212, 214 (5th Cir.2002), citing
Fierro v. Johnson, 197 F.3d 147, 151
(5th Cir.1999). See also Kutzner v.
Cockrell, 303 F.3d 333 (5th Cir.2002).