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Method of murder:
Beating
- Stabbing
with knife
- Strangulation
Location: Wisconsin/Illinois, USA
Status:
Sentenced to life in prison without parole in Illinois on August
1994
Lorenso Fayne, convicted of
killing 5 kids in Illinois, is linked to another murder
Mediatakeout.com
November 09, 2009
A former Milwaukee man convicted in the serial murders of five
children in Illinois during the late 1980s and early 1990s was charged
Tuesday in Milwaukee with killing a 32-year-old mother of three more
than 20 years ago.
Lorenzo Fayne, 38, was charged in a
complaint with the beating death Sept. 15, 1989, of Rita D. Scott, whose
partially clothed body was found in a pool of blood near a loading dock
in the 1500 block of W. Cherry St. Her head had been smashed in with
chunks of concrete, and she had been sexually assaulted. Scott had three
boys, ages 11, 5 and 11 months.
In May, a routine search of a national
DNA databank of convicted felons linked Fayne to Scott's death.
"We've all waited 20 years," said
Scott's mother, Mozella Scott of Milwaukee. "We were very happy and
relieved. Now my daughter can sleep in peace, I'm pretty sure."
Rita Scott's uncle, Mike Mitchell,
said his family never gave up hope that the killer would be found.
"We never gave up, but life went on,"
Mitchell said. "We said God would handle it, and that he did."
A sense of relief has swept over
Scott's family, Mitchell said.
"There's never closure, but there is
peace within the family," he said. "We all know that (Fayne) will never
get out to do this to anyone else."
Fayne grew up in Milwaukee, lived in
the 2400 block of W. Lloyd St., and began drifting between Milwaukee and
his grandmother's home in East St. Louis, Ill., when he turned 18 in
1989.
That was the year he killed his first
known victim, 6-year-old Aree Hunt of Centerville, Ill. Fayne was
convicted of beating the child to death and was sentenced in August 1994
to life in prison without parole.
Fayne is charged with killing Scott
two months after he killed Aree.
In 2001, Fayne was convicted of
stabbing Latondra Dean, 14, in March 1992; of strangling Fallon Flood,
9, in July 1992; of stabbing Glenda Jones, 17, in June 1993; and of
stabbing Faith Davis, 17, in July 1994.
All four girls lived in the East St.
Louis area.
In a 2001 interview with the Journal
Sentinel, Fayne's attorney, John O'Gara, said he doubted Fayne had
committed any homicides in Milwaukee.
"He always denied doing anything" in
Milwaukee, O'Gara said at the time.
In October, Milwaukee investigators
visited Fayne at the Menard Correctional Institution in Chester, Ill.
Fayne, according to the complaint,
told investigators he didn't remember the exact date he killed Scott,
but that he did remember killing her.
He told police he sneaked up to Scott
and bashed her head with a rock with such force that the rock broke in
two.
He then dragged her body through a
gangway between a factory and house, continued to beat her with the
chunk of rock he still had in his hand, then had sex with her once she
was dead.
"He stated he regrets committing this
homicide as well as the other homicides and that he is glad he is locked
up because he would still be doing it if he were not," the complaint
says.
Mitchell said his family is thankful
that Milwaukee police never gave up searching for their daughter's
killer.
"They hung in there," Mitchell said.
"We hear so much bad about the police,
but we need to say something good about the police. This family would
really like to thank the police."
The DNA sample in Scott's murder case
was submitted by the Milwaukee Police Department's Homicide Cold Case
Unit, which has submitted evidence recently in about 70 cold case
homicides to the State Crime Laboratory. The unit is awaiting results on
about 20 of those cases.
Lorenzo Fayne
Sonic.net
East St. Louis, IL -- Aug. 31, 1994
Lorenzo Fayne, 24, who was convicted of sexually
assaulting and then bludgeoning Aree Hunt to death, after luring him
away from a playground and is currently serving a life sentence with no
parole confessed to killing the four girls.
In his confession that he killed Aree he told police
he wanted to hear the sound of a neck breaking.
His defense attorney, John O'Gara, contended that
Fayne was insane, his behavior the result of suffering brutality as a
child while growing up in Milwaukee in a home riddled with abuse of
alcohol and other drugs.
Eleven jurors had wanted Fayne executed, but one
woman would not agree and refused to deliberate further. Illinois law
requires unanimity for a death penalty.
The juror, who spoke on the condition of anonymity,
said the jury had informed the state's attorney that 11 of the 12 jurors
were steadfastly in favor of executing Fayne for the murder.
"Molten lava wasn't as hot as we were" after one
female juror held out for sparing Fayne's life, the juror said in a
telephone interview. The juror refused to identify the lone holdout.
The juror said the holdout had voted against the
death penalty only because her pastor's son suffered from a disease that
made him violent. When a doctor suggested on the witness stand that
Fayne might have the same disease, the holdout decided against execution,
the juror said.
The juror said the woman who held out should have
notified authorities before the trial that her personal experience of
knowing a violent person would have made her a poor candidate to sit on
the jury.
The state's attorney plans to try Fayne separately
for each of the four remaining murders, and to seek the death penalty
for each.
O'Gara, as defense attorney, contends that because
evidence from all five murders was used against Fayne in the first case,
trying him anew violates the Constitution's prohibition against double
jeopardy. So far he has been unable to get a judge or appellate court to
agree.
A psychiatrist who was the trial's final prosecution
witness testified that Fayne's personality was abnormal but that he
suffered no delusions or inability to control his behavior, and could
not be considered mentally ill as defined by Illinois law.
Fayne told police he committed all five murders, and
the psychiatrist, Dr. John Rabun of the Missouri State Hospital, said
Fayne gave a detailed account of each during a five-hour psychiatric
exam.
Rabun said Fayne was typical of serial sex killers -
a sadist and necrophiliac who had sex with his victims after they were
dead.
With the evidence stacked overwhelmingly against him,
Fayne's attorney, John J. O'Gara, opted for insanity as the only
plausible defense.
He told the jury Fayne was a "tortured soul," the
victim of a "twisted, insane mind."
Fayne showed no emotion when pronounced guilty. He
had spent most of the trial staring down at the defense table.
Fayne said before being sentenced for murder that "this
may sound weird, but the things that I did, I deserve to die. I really
do."
Fayne, handcuffed and shackled, twice said he was
sorry for killing Aree but said he could not bring him back to life. "I
still don't understand none of this," he said.
Aree was found beaten to death at the edge of a state
park. His nude body had been sexually assaulted, then thrown down a
ditch bank.
Although he lived in Milwaukee, Fayne often visited
relatives in East St. Louis.
According to Rabun, the psychiatrist, Fayne had been
in and out of legal custody from age 13 for such things as shoplifting,
grabbing at women, stealing cars, breaking into homes and abusing
animals.
According to testimony, both parents were alcoholics, and Fayne's mother
was a drug addict.
Also, Fayne was a witness to and victim of violence at home, and he
abused alcohol and drugs himself.
Latondra's body was found in a bathtub less than a block from where
another victim, Faith Davis was found. Latondra had been stabbed more
than 20 times in the chest.
Police arrested Fayne after a police dog followed a trail of blood to
his grandmother's home from a burning house where firefighters had found
the nude body of Faith Davis. She had been stabbed several times in the
back.
Besides those two murders, Fayne is charged with first-degree in the
deaths of:
Fallon Flood of East St. Louis. Her body was found in
a locker at East St. Louis Senior High School. She had been strangled
with a belt.
Glenda Jones of Centreville...her body was found
behind Martin Luther King Junior High near the boundary between East St.
Louis and Centreville. She had been stabbed to death.
All the victims other then Fallon had been sexually
assaulted.
UPDATE
Nov. 15, 2001 -- A jury recommended Thursday that
confessed child
killer Lorenzo Fayne be put to death for the slayings of four girls.
Fayne, 30, showed no emotion as the verdict was read
by St. Clair County
Circuit Judge James Donovan. The jury reached its decision after about
three hours of deliberations.
Fayne has admitted killing Faith Davis, 17, Glenda
Jones, 17, Fallon Flood, 9, and Latondra Dean, 14. Autopsies determined
Fayne molested the girls
after killing them.
Although Donovan set an execution date for May 15,
the death sentence would
likely not be carried out then because of a moratorium on the death
penalty, imposed by Gov. George
Ryan. The appeals process also would extend that date
by years, St. Clair County State's Attorney Robert Haida said.
Fayne's attorney, John O'Gara said that Fayne will
appeal the death sentence
issued in each of the killings.
Jurors declined to talk to reporters after issuing
their decision.
Haida said he was glad to see the case end.
"The emotions are different than a normal case. It's
so definite and final," Haida said. "We continue to think of the victims
and their survivors. That's
what kept us pursuing this case to its disposition."
Fayne, who already was serving a life sentence for
the 1989 murder of 6-year-old Aree Hunt, pleaded guilty in October to
the four remaining murder
charges against him in an attempt to avoid multiple
trials and opportunities
for prosecutors to win a death sentence.
Jurors spent a week viewing grisly crime scene photos
and hearing testimony detailing the rape and murders of
the four girls. They also heard
psychologists testify about Fayne's childhood of
rape and abuse at the hands
of his mother and stepfather, and an
adolescence spent in juvenile detention
facilities.
O'Gara had asked the jury to spare Fayne's life,
saying his abusive past
should keep them from condemning Fayne to death. He
argued that Fayne had a
low IQ, and that childhood beatings left him
with severe brain damage.
But Assistant State's Attorney Lisa Porter said Fayne
"chose to kill; he
knew exactly what he was doing every step of the
way."
Dean was raped, stabbed more than 20 times and left
in a bathtub at a
friend's home in East St. Louis in March 1992.
In July of that year, Flood
was lured from a school lunch program, strangled
and hung by a belt in the
locker room at East St. Louis High School.
After her first day of work at Illinois Public Action
in Belleville, Jones
was raped and stabbed behind Martin Luther King
Junior High in June 1993.
A month later, Davis was stabbed and raped in the
kitchen of her family's
East St. Louis home.
SEX:
M RACE: B TYPE: T MOTIVE: Sex.
MO: Rape-strangler of black
children age six to 17.
DISPOSITION: Life term on one
count, 1994.
In the Appellate Court of Illinois Fifth District
NO. 5-96-0333
October 16, 1998
The People of the State of Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee
v. Lorenzo, Fayne, Defendant-Appellant
Circiut Court St. Clair County
JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered
the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Lorenzo Fayne, was charged in the
circuit court of St. Clair County with five separate charges of first-degree
murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a) (now 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)
(West 1996))). In cause No. 93-CF-785, defendant was charged with the
murder of Aree Hunt, age six; in cause No. 93-CF-786, defendant was
charged with the murder of Faith Davis, age 17; in cause No. 93-CF-944,
defendant was charged with the murder of Fallon Flood, age nine; in
cause No. 93-CF-945, defendant was charged with the murder of Glenda
Jones, age 17; and in cause No. 94-CF-66, defendant was charged with the
murder of Latonda Dean, age 14. The first case that proceeded to trial
was No. 93-CF-785. In that case, after a jury trial, defendant was
convicted of first-degree murder in the death of Aree Hunt. At a
separate sentencing hearing, the jury could not agree that there were no
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death
penalty. The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to natural
life in prison. Defendant's conviction and sentence were affirmed by
this court in People v. Fayne, 283 Ill. App. 3d 382, 669 N.E.2d
1172 (1996).
In one of the remaining untried cases, No. 93-CF-786,
defendant filed a motion to dismiss and to bar a death penalty
sentencing hearing on the basis that the decision not to impose the
death penalty after the murder conviction for the death of Aree Hunt
barred any successive capital sentencing hearing. Defendant argued he
would be subjected to double jeopardy since in the Aree Hunt sentencing
hearing the State had already presented evidence of all the murders.
Defendant later filed motions to dismiss in the other remaining cases,
No. 93-CF-944, No. 93-CF-945, and No. 94-CF-66. The trial court denied
the pretrial motions to dismiss, and the cases were consolidated for
appeal. The issue we are asked to address is whether the State is
barred from seeking the death penalty in the remaining four cases
pending against defendant when the question whether defendant should be
put to death was already decided in No. 93-CF-785 and the jury chose to
impose a sentence other than death. We affirm.
FACTS
We recite only those facts necessary for an
understanding of this appeal. On July 24, 1993, defendant was arrested
in conjunction with the murder of Faith Davis, after the East St. Louis
fire department was called to the Davis home to extinguish a fire. An
investigation of the fire determined that Davis had been murdered. A
trail of blood led from Davis's home to the home of defendant's
grandmother, where defendant was residing. After the police talked to
witnesses, defendant was arrested and brought to the East St. Louis
police department for questioning. The East St. Louis police department
contacted the Illinois State Police to assist in the investigation.
Ultimately, defendant confessed not only to the murder of Davis, but
also to the murders of four other victims.
The first of the five murder cases to be
prosecuted was No. 93-CF-785. For a full recitation of the facts in
that case, see People v. Fayne, 283 Ill. App. 3d 382, 669 N.E.2d
1172 (1996). Defendant, who was age 23 at the time of that trial,
asserted an insanity defense, which the jury rejected by returning a
guilty verdict. The State sought the death penalty. A sentencing
hearing was conducted from August 16, 1994, through August 18, 1994. At
the hearing, the State introduced evidence concerning each of the four
remaining murders with which defendant was charged. For example, the
State introduced People's Exhibit 39, which contained five- by seven-inch
color photographs of each of the five victims defendant was accused of
killing, along with each person's age, residence, date of death, manner
of death, and location where the body was found. Graphic pictures of
each of the crime scenes and the victims were introduced into evidence
over defendant's objection. In addition to Aree Hunt, defendant's
victims were identified as Fallon Flood, Glenda Jones, Faith Davis, and
Latonda Dean.
Flood's body was found on the floor of a local
high school in an abandoned locker room with a belt tightened around her
neck and her underwear around her ankles. Defendant's statement
admitting to the murder of Flood was introduced into evidence. In that
statement, defendant admitted that he choked Flood and attempted to rape
her.
Glenda Jones died as a result of stab wounds.
Her body was badly decomposed when it was found. Jones's body was
clothed, but her bra was turned inside out. Defendant's statement, in
which he admitted that he stabbed Jones and had sex with her, was
admitted into evidence. In that statement, defendant stated that he
first approached Jones with a knife but that later she consented to sex
with defendant. According to defendant, Jones even discussed starting a
relationship with him. However, something "snapped" in defendant, and
he ended up stabbing Jones.
Faith Davis's nude body was found face-down
bent over a coffee table with her knees on the floor and her legs spread
apart. She had several stab wounds in her upper chest and back. The
crime scene indicated that she died in one area and then was dragged
over to the coffee table. A large amount of petroleum jelly was spread
on her buttocks, and she had been sexually assaulted. Defendant's
statement admitting to stabbing Davis and then returning to sexually
assault her was introduced into evidence.
Latonda Dean's nude body was found lying in a
bathtub. She died as a result of 24 stab wounds, mainly in her chest
and abdomen. Defendant's statement admitting that he raped and stabbed
Dean was admitted into evidence.
Defendant presented a number of witnesses in
mitigation. The evidence showed that defendant's mother drank heavily
and took drugs throughout her pregnancy with defendant. Defendant's
mother admitted to hitting defendant in the head as a form of punishment.
She believed that this was the way to punish a child. It was not until
after a child care agency intervened and specifically told her that this
was an improper means of disciplining that she realized that anything
was wrong with it. Defendant's mother, a crack cocaine addict and an
alcoholic, beat defendant with anything within reach, including broom
handles and extension cords. Defendant's biological father was found in
a Veterans Administration mental hospital and is a diagnosed
schizophrenic. Defendant has had virtually no contact with him.
Defendant's stepfather was an alcoholic, and he often beat defendant.
On one occasion, he choked defendant until defendant lost consciousness.
Defendant's grandmother and sister testified about the abusive home
environment in which defendant was raised. Defendant's grandmother
explained that defendant was raped by a neighborhood boy when defendant
was seven years old. The boy who raped defendant was approximately four
years older. The police were not called. Instead, defendant's
stepfather beat him after defendant told him that he had been raped.
There was testimony that defendant had been raped on other occasions,
usually when he was serving time in a juvenile facility for one of his
many brushes with the law. Experts testified that defendant has limited
intellectual abilities and a low IQ. Defendant suffered brain damage
from the beatings to which he was subjected. At the conclusion of the
sentencing hearing, the jury could not agree that there were no
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death
penalty. The trial judge then sentenced defendant to natural life in
prison. As previously set forth, we affirmed in People v. Fayne,
283 Ill. App. 3d 382, 669 N.E.2d 1172 (1996).
On March 15, 1996, defendant filed a motion to
dismiss and to bar a death penalty hearing in No. 93-CF-786, on the
basis that defendant would be subjected to double jeopardy because the
State had already presented evidence of all five murders in the first
sentencing hearing. Defendant argued he could not again be exposed to
the death penalty. Defendant later filed the same motion in the
remaining three cases. On April 24, 1996, the trial court denied
defendant's motion in No. 93-CF-786. On June 5, 1996, the trial court
denied defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss in No. 93-CF-944, No. 93-CF-945,
and No. 94-CF-66. The cases were consolidated on appeal. The State
moved to dismiss defendant's appeal on the basis that we lacked
jurisdiction. On June 6, 1998, we denied the State's motion to dismiss.
ANALYSIS
I. JURISDICTION
We first address the State's ongoing contention
that this court has no jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The State
maintains that we have no jurisdiction under Supreme Court Rule 604(f)
(145 Ill. 2d R. 604(f)). However, the State fails to offer any new
reasons for dismissal not previously considered in our January 6, 1998,
order rejecting the State's motion to dismiss. The State merely urges
us to reconsider our order denying its motion to dismiss. As defendant
points out, whether the State is barred from seeking the death penalty
in the four remaining cases in which defendant was charged with separate
murders will affect each trial in numerous ways, including whether
potential jurors can be asked whether they support or oppose the death
penalty (see People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 622 N.E.2d 774
(1993)) and how many peremptory challenges are granted. In a capital
case, 14 peremptory challenges are granted, whereas in cases involving
imprisonment, only 7 are granted. 134 Ill. 2d R. 434(d). We find that
it would not be a prudent use of judicial resources to wait to determine
the double jeopardy issue until sentences are imposed in the remaining
four cases. To wait to decide the issue would promote repetitive
litigation and waste judicial resources. In addition, Supreme Court
Rule 604(f) provides:
"(f) Appeal by Defendant on Grounds of Former
Jeopardy. A defendant may appeal to the Appellate Court the denial of a
motion to dismiss a criminal proceeding on grounds of former jeopardy."
145 Ill. 2d R. 604(f).
We conclude that Supreme Court Rule 604(f)
specifically allows this appeal. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over
this appeal.
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Defendant maintains that the principles of
double jeopardy and collateral estoppel bar the State from seeking the
death penalty in the remaining four cases pending against defendant
because the question whether defendant should be put to death was
already decided in No. 93-CF-785 and the jury chose to impose a sentence
other than death. The earlier proceeding on which defendant relies is
the St. Clair County prosecution for the murder of Aree Hunt. In that
prosecution, during the first phase of the bifurcated sentencing hearing
the jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty, but following
the second phase of the sentencing hearing, during which evidence was
presented in aggravation and mitigation, the jury could not agree that
there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition
of the death penalty. The trial judge then sentenced defendant to
natural life in prison. Defendant points out that all these murders
occurred in the same county, specifically within a one-mile radius of
each other, that "[t]he State referred to defendant as a `serial sexual
offender,'" and that "all of the murders were part of a pattern of
behavior repeated for sexual gratification that defendant achieved in
conjunction with the person's death." Defendant admits that the jury in
the first case that went to trial did not have his convictions in the
remaining murders to consider in aggravation, but he insists that
because it had his confessions, as well as testimony concerning the
circumstances of all five murders, the rejection of the death penalty in
the first case tried precludes the imposition of the death sentence in
any of the remaining four cases. We disagree.
In general, a death penalty acquittal bars the
State from seeking the death penalty again on that conviction.
Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 90 L. Ed. 2d 123, 106 S. Ct. 1749
(1986); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 68 L. Ed. 2d 270,
101 S. Ct. 1852 (1981); People v. Davis, 112 Ill. 2d 78, 491 N.E.2d
1163 (1986). The rationale for such a ruling is that the protections
afforded by the double jeopardy clause are applicable to defendants in
such proceedings because of the trial-type nature of a capital
sentencing hearing. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 68 L.
Ed. 2d 270, 101 S. Ct. 1852 (1981). However, our own supreme court has
determined that an earlier decision not to impose the death penalty for
a capital murder conviction does not bar the imposition of the death
penalty in a later case involving a different murder conviction, even
though the earlier sentencing hearing involves the same aggravating and
mitigating factors presented at the later sentencing hearing. People
v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 614 N.E.2d 1160 (1993) (Page I);
People v. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 258, 620 N.E.2d 339 (1993) (Page II).
Page I and Page II involved the
same defendant, Patrick Page. Page was charged with three separate
murders. His victims were John Goodman, Andrew Devine, and Charles
Howell. In Page I, the defendant was convicted in the circuit
court of Cook County of, inter alia, the murder of John Goodman.
During the first stage of the sentencing hearing, the State presented
evidence of the defendant's conviction in 1988 in Will County for the
murder of Andrew Devine. That murder occurred sometime in 1985.
Page I, 155 Ill. 2d at 242, 614 N.E.2d at 1164. The jury determined
that the defendant was eligible for the death penalty. 155 Ill. 2d at
243, 614 N.E.2d at 1164. During the second stage of the sentencing
hearing, the State introduced additional evidence of the defendant's
criminal history, including the defendant's confession to the 1985
murder of Charles Howell in Cook County. Howell was murdered in an
attempt to cover up the Devine murder. 155 Ill. 2d at 243, 614 N.E.2d
at 1164. The defendant argued that the principles of double jeopardy
and collateral estoppel barred the imposition of the death penalty in
the Goodman murder. The defendant relied on the 1988 Will County
prosecution in which he was convicted of the murder of Andrew Devine.
155 Ill. 2d at 270, 614 N.E.2d at 1177. In that prosecution, during the
first stage of the sentencing hearing, the same jury that convicted the
defendant of Devine's murder found the defendant eligible for the death
penalty. The defendant waived the jury for the second stage of the
hearing, and the trial court refused to impose the death penalty,
imposing instead a sentence of 60 years in the Department of Corrections.
People v. Page, 196 Ill. App. 3d 285, 553 N.E.2d 753 (1990).
In Page I, the defendant argued that the
decision not to impose the death penalty in the defendant's first
conviction in Will County for the death of Devine precluded the
imposition of the death penalty. Our supreme court disagreed: "[A]
sentencer's rejection of the death penalty in one case *** [does not]
establish[][,] even on virtually the same record of aggravation and
mitigation, the general inappropriateness of that penalty for other
murders committed by the same defendant. The issue resolved in a
capital sentencing hearing is not whether the defendant, in general, is
deserving of the death penalty, but whether the defendant may, and
should, be sentenced to death for a particular offense of murder."
Page I, 155 Ill. 2d at 272-73, 614 N.E.2d at 1178. The court in
Page I went on to hold:
"That the same evidence in aggravation and mitigation
might be admitted at a subsequent sentencing hearing does not alter our
view of the matter.
*** We conclude that the favorable decision
rendered in the earlier case does not collaterally estop the State from
seeking, and obtaining, the death penalty here." 155 Ill. 2d at 273-74,
614 N.E.2d at 1178.
Likewise, in Page II, our supreme court held
that even where a previous court declined to impose the death penalty
based on almost identical evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the
principles of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel did not bar the
imposition of the death penalty in a subsequent murder trial. Page
II, 156 Ill. 2d at 285-86, 620 N.E.2d at 1154.
Page II involved the prosecution of the
defendant for the murder of Charles Howell. After finding the defendant
guilty, the jury found that there were insufficient mitigating factors
to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. The defendant was
sentenced to death, but the death sentence was stayed pending direct
appeal. 156 Ill. 2d at 262, 620 N.E.2d at 343. The court in Page II
pointed out that there was a difference in the first case, the Will
County case, because even though the sentencing body heard about the
other two murders in which the defendant was involved, it found that the
defendant did not have a significant criminal history because the
defendant had not yet been convicted of the other two murders. The
Page II court stated, "[W]here the sentencing body in the instant
case considered, in addition to defendant's confessions to the other two
murders he had committed, defendant's convictions for those murders, the
aggravating evidence was substantially greater than that considered by
the Will County court." 156 Ill. 2d at 286, 620 N.E.2d at 354. The
same situation is presented in the instant case.
Here, defendant was prosecuted first for the
murder of Aree Hunt. During sentencing, defendant's confessions to the
four other murders were introduced, and evidence concerning each of the
other four murders was presented, but defendant had not been
convicted of any other murder. Furthermore, the characteristics of
the five victims--gender, age, and background--varied from victim to
victim. While it is true that they were all murdered within a one-mile
radius of each other, the set of facts surrounding each murder was
different. Accordingly, the only question decided in the first
prosecution was whether defendant should be sentenced to death for the
murder of Aree Hunt. The question whether defendant should be sentenced
to death for any other of the four murders remains to be decided.
Defendant attempts to distinguish Page I
and Page II on the basis that the murders there occurred and were
prosecuted in different counties. The Devine murder occurred in Will
County (Page I, 155 Ill. 2d at 242, 614 N.E.2d at 1164), and the
Goodman and Howell murders occurred in Cook County (see Page I,
155 Ill. 2d at 238, 614 N.E.2d at 1160; Page II, 156 Ill. 2d at
262, 620 N.E.2d at 343). We are unpersuaded that this fact in any way
makes a difference which would make Page I and Page II
inapplicable in the instant case. Relying on Page I and Page
II, we find that the earlier proceeding in which defendant was found
guilty of the death of Aree Hunt but was not sentenced to death does not
estop the State from seeking and obtaining the death penalty in the
remaining four cases.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
circuit court of St. Clair County is affirmed.
