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Jeremy
D. GROSS
Victim's family, community views influence prosecutors
By Tim Starks - The Star Press
In 1998, prosecutors in Indianapolis had two
murder cases, each with similar facts.
The defendants, only a year apart in age, were
charged with robbing separate convenience stores and killing someone
inside.
Both slayings were committed in "cold blood,"
caught on videotape for the respective juries to see. Both
defendants had the same attorney, and both were eligible for the
death penalty.
But only one defendant had to face it. Jeremy
Gross did, and Casey Priest did not.
The difference, according to Robert Hill, the
attorney who defended them, was simple: "It was in the attitude of
the victim's families."
Hill doesn't think that's the way it ought to be.
But to prosecutors, the attitudes of a victim's family is a crucial
deciding factor in whether to seek the death penalty.
Community attitudes make a difference in the
decision, too, and they are among the factors that make deciding who
receives the death penalty in Indiana similar to a lottery.
"I don't think justice should be handed out based
on the degree to which a family makes noise or objects to the way
the system does things," Hill said.
"It should be based on the individual's behavior.
Some people are more vocal, and some people have less power to voice
their opinion. Does that mean they're entitled to less justice or a
different brand of justice? I don't think so."
Marion County Prosecutor Scott Newman said he
thought both Gross and Priest deserved to die for their crimes, but
he also weighed the families' wishes. The family of the man Priest
killed - Frito-Lay salesman Gary Hoffman - didn't want to go through
the long, tortuous appeals process that often accompanies the death
penalty.
Priest got life without parole, and after his
sentencing, he flipped the middle finger in the direction of
Hoffman's widow and uttered a profanity.
Newman sought the death penalty for Jeremy Gross,
but he received life without parole instead. Gross apologized to the
victim's family, who wanted him to die for killing clerk Christopher
Beers.
Hill, the attorney for the two men, thinks Priest
had a case that warranted the death penalty more than Gross's.
Newman is no different from most prosecutors for weighing the wishes
of victims' families, not that he or his peers necessarily consider
it the most important factor.
A poll of 90 prosecutors, conducted by a team of
Indiana newspapers, found 64 prosecutors strongly agreed or agreed
with the statement: "In deciding whether to seek the death penalty
in a case, consideration should be given to the victim's family and
its desire." Only six were neutral, and only five disagreed.
So what does a prosecutor do when the victim's
families disagree? Such was the case in Vanderburgh County, where
the families of the three people Matthew Eric Wrinkles killed
assassination-style in 1993 had differing values.
Most family members wanted Wrinkles to die for
killing his estranged wife, Debra Jean Wrinkles, 31; her brother,
Mark Anthony (Tony) Fulkerson, 28; and his wife, Natalie (Chris),
26.
Not Mary Winnecke, mother of Natalie. She gave
two reasons:
"Because vengeance belongs to the Lord," and "because
Natalie gave her life so that another may live," referring to how
Natalie stepped in front of the gun and pushed children out of the
home before she was shot.
Winnecke, a devout Roman Catholic, believed it
would be hypocritical to oppose abortion but not the death penalty.
Vanderburgh County Prosecutor Stan Levco was
inclined to seek the death penalty before he consulted the families
of Wrinkles's victims. But when most of the family members agreed
Wrinkles should be executed, it sealed his decision. Wrinkles now
sits on death row.
"[Victims' families] have a much greater role
when it comes to talking me out of filing, as opposed to talking me
into it," he said.
Those opinions matter, Levco said, because of his
views on the nature of the system.
"To me, one of the things the criminal justice
system can do is offer some small measure of satisfaction to the
victims' families," he said. "It gives them more of a right to say
what the penalty ought to be. They are the people that I'm most
interested in wanting to feel that justice was done."
Sometimes, the social landscape just isn't
friendly ground for seeking the death penalty. In Monroe County,
home of Bloomington and Indiana University, no one can remember the
last time a death penalty sentence was sought.
At a prosecutor's conference a few years ago, the
presenter for an afternoon session on the death penalty advised
Monroe County's prosecutor, Carl Salzmann, to retreat to the
swimming pool, since it was unlikely he would ever get a jury to
vote for a sentence of death. Seeking the death penalty is not
uncommon to the north in Morgan County, or to the south in Lawrence
County. But Monroe County, a harbor of liberalism, is a place where
citizens aren't likely to vote to put a person to death.
"I have to recognize where my jury pool is coming
from," Salzmann said. "The reality is we have a very liberal
community in regards to may different issues, one of them being the
death penalty."
In 1995, Salzmann's first year in office, he
faced some criticism from a victim's family when he chose not to
seek the death penalty in a case against an 18-year-old charged with
killing a cab driver.
The perpetrator's youth, a request from the
victim's family for a speedy resolution to the case and Salzmann's
knowledge of his potential jurors made it clear that seeking the
death penalty was not the best course.
"There are a lot of people out there who are
against the death penalty, and I have to recognize that," he said.
In northern Indiana, it appears that a pocket
with a high incidence of capital cases has galvanized anti-death
penalty activism.
Six northern-tier counties, from Lake County to
Elkhart County, have produced more than one-fifth of Indiana's death
penalty requests since 1990.
Groups already active in the area - and highly
visible outside the state prison in Michigan City during executions
- were the Northern Indiana Coalition Against the Death Penalty and
Murder Victims' Families for Reconciliation.
And when St. Joseph County experienced an
increased case load under a new prosecutor, Chris Toth, it provided
the impetus to bring together members of the Catholic and Mennonite
faiths.
In a geographical area with heavy concentrations
of both faith groups, the St. Joseph-Elkhart County Religious
Coalition Against the Death Penalty was born.
Darrin Belousek, an assistant professor of
philosophy at Goshen College, said it grew out of a "spontaneous
response" at a Mennonite church in South Bend. It reached a zenith
during the 1999 trial of Gregory Dickens, a young black man charged
in the shooting death of a South Bend police officer.
Dickens was convicted of murder, but a jury
recommended against the death sentence, and he was sentenced to life
in prison.
During the penalty phase, the coalition held
vigils outside the county courthouse. The vigils drew as many as 150
people at times.
"The basic value there is the sanctity of life,"
Belousek said. "Human life has value at all of its stages and should
be protected at all of its stages.
"We can't devalue one person in the name of
avenging the death of another," he added.
- Laura Lane of the Bloomington Herald-Times
and Matthew S. Galbraith of the South Bend Tribune contributed to
this report.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF
INDIANA
JEREMY GROSS, Appellant-Defendant,
v.
STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Supreme Court Cause Number 49S00-0009-CR-528
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
CRIMINAL DIVISION, ROOM 4
The Honorable Patricia J. Gifford, Judge
Cause No. 49G04-9808-CF-141115
ON DIRECT APPEAL
June 18, 2002
RUCKER, Justice
Jeremy Gross
was convicted of murder, felony murder, conspiracy to commit robbery,
and robbery as a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him to
life in prison without parole for the murder conviction and to a
term of years for the conspiracy and robbery convictions. No
sentence was imposed for the felony murder conviction.
In this direct appeal, Gross raises two issues
for our review that we rephrase as: (1) did the trial court err in
imposing sentence for robbery as a Class A felony; and (2) is his
life sentence appropriate. We vacate Gross’ conviction for robbery
as a Class A felony and remand for resentencing to impose sentence
for robbery as a Class B felony. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
Facts
In the early morning hours of August 26, 1998, J.J. Thompson was
driving near a convenience store in Indianapolis when he saw a
person later identified as Jeremy Gross raise his arm and fire a
handgun at Christopher Beers, the store clerk. Thompson immediately
drove away and called the police. In the meantime, after taking $650
in cash, disabling the store’s telephone lines, and grabbing the
video recorder that served the surveillance cameras, Gross and his
confederate, Joshua Spears, fled the scene.
When officers of the Marion County Sheriff’s
Department arrived, they found Beers’ body outside the store near a
payphone. He had died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds to the
head, chest, and abdomen. Sheriff’s deputies arrested Gross shortly
thereafter. Gross gave a taped statement admitting that he entered
the store to rob the cashier, and when the cashier refused to
surrender the money, he shot him. Gross also admitted taking the
security video recorder in order to conceal the crime.
The State charged Gross with murder, murder in
the perpetration of a robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and
robbery as a Class A felony.
See footnote
In a separate request for a sentence of death,
the State alleged as an aggravating circumstance that Gross
committed the murder by intentionally killing Beers while committing
a robbery. A jury convicted Gross as charged but after the penalty
phase of trial recommended life without parole.
The trial court accepted the jury’s
recommendation and sentenced Gross accordingly. The trial court also
sentenced Gross to consecutive terms of thirty years for conspiracy
to commit robbery and robbery as a Class A felony. No sentence was
imposed on the felony murder conviction. This direct appeal followed.
Discussion
I. Double Jeopardy
Gross contends that his multiple convictions violate Indiana’s
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Specifically,
Gross contends that he cannot be convicted for both murder and
robbery as a Class A felony because both crimes were enhanced by the
same bodily injury. The State concedes this point. The Indiana
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple convictions if there is “a
reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder
to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have
been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged
offense.” Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 53 (Ind. 1999).
This formulation of what has come to be known as
the Richardson actual evidence test has generated some amount of
confusion. Indeed, this Court has previously determined that under
Richardson “a robbery conviction cannot be elevated by the same
serious bodily injury (death) that formed the basis of [a] murder
conviction.” Chapman v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. 1999).
See footnote
However, as we have recently clarified: “under
the
Richardson actual evidence test, the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause
is not violated when the evidentiary facts establishing the
essential elements of one offense also establish only one or even
several, but not all, of the essential elements of a second offense.”
Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 833 (Ind. 2002).
To convict Gross of murder, the State was
required to prove that he knowingly or intentionally killed another
human being. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. As charged, in order to convict
Gross of robbery as a Class A felony, the State was required to
prove that he: (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) took property from
another person or from the presence of another person (3) by using
or threatening the use of force on any person (4) that resulted in
serious bodily injury. I.C. § 35-42-5-1.
The facts establishing the essential elements of
murder may have also established some of the essential elements of
robbery as a Class A felony, namely: serious bodily injury—death—of
the victim and use of force. However, such facts did not establish
the elements of knowingly or intentionally taking property from
another person. As such, there would be no Indiana double jeopardy
violation. Spivey, 761 N.E.2d at 834.
On the other hand, we find a reasonable
possibility that the jury may have used evidentiary facts
establishing all the essential elements of robbery as a Class A
felony to establish also all the essential elements of murder. We
refer specifically to evidence that Gross fired a handgun directly
at the store clerk, then took $650 in cash, and the store clerk died
from the gunshot wounds. This violates the Indiana Double Jeopardy
Clause.
Moreover, as we recently pointed out, “we have
long adhered to a series of rules of statutory construction and
common law that are often described as double jeopardy, but are not
governed by the constitutional test set forth in Richardson.” Pierce
v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind. 2002). Among these is the
doctrine that where a single act forms the basis of both a Class A
felony robbery conviction and also the act element of the murder
conviction, the two cannot stand. Kingery v. State, 659 N.E.2d 490,
495-96 (Ind. 1995). Accordingly, the robbery conviction as a Class A
felony must be reduced.
The robbery statute provides:
A person who knowingly or intentionally takes property from another
person or from the presence of another person:
by using or threatening the use of force on any person; or
by
putting any person in fear;
commits robbery, a Class C felony. However, the
offense is a Class B felony if it is committed while armed with a
deadly weapon or results in bodily injury to any person other than a
defendant, and a Class A felony if it results in serious bodily
injury to any person other than a defendant.
I.C. § 35-42-5-1 (emphasis added). The same doctrine and double
jeopardy concerns that prohibit the use of Beers’ death to support
both the murder conviction and the elevation of robbery to a Class A
felony apply equally to the bodily injury variety of Class B felony
robbery.
However, the charging information in this case
reads in pertinent part:
JEREMY D. GROSS and JOSHUA E. SPEARS, on or about
AUGUST 26, 1988, did knowingly, while armed with a deadly weapon,
that is: A HANDGUN, take from the person or presence of CHRISTOPHER
BEERS property, that is: UNITED STATES CURRENCY, by putting
CHRISTOPHER BEERS in fear or by using or threatening the use of
force on CHRISTOPHER BEERS, which resulted in serious bodily injury,
that is: DEATH to CHRISTOPHER BEERS[.]
R. at 55 (emphasis added). In essence, the State
charged Gross with both the bodily injury variety of Class B felony
robbery as well as the armed with a deadly weapon variety of the
offense. Also, the record shows the jury was instructed on the
elements of both varieties of robbery as a Class B felony. R. at
483-84; compare Spears, 735 N.E.2d at 1165 n.2 (finding it
appropriate to reduce defendant’s Class A robbery conviction to
Class C robbery where “[t]here was no jury instruction on the use of
a deadly weapon . . . .”). Accordingly, we vacate Gross’ sentence
for robbery as a Class A felony and remand to the trial court for a
new sentencing order that imposes sentence for robbery as a Class B
felony.
II. Sentencing
Gross challenges his sentence contending the trial court did not
give adequate weight to certain mitigating factors.
See footnote To obtain a
sentence of death or life without parole, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one or more aggravating
circumstances listed in Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9(b).
Logan, 729 N.E.2d at 136. To support its death sentence request in
this case, the State relied on the felony murder aggravator: “The
defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim
while committing or attempting to commit . . . Robbery.” I.C. §
35-50-2-9(b)(1)(G).
At sentencing, the trial court found this
aggravator proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the record supports
the trial court’s finding. In its sentencing order, the trial court
weighed as mitigating circumstances Gross’s unstable childhood
characterized by a pattern of parental abuse and neglect, his
attainment of a high school diploma, his satisfactory adjustment
while incarcerated at a youth center and at Boy’s School, and his
volunteering to tutor other inmates while incarcerated at the Marion
County Jail awaiting trial. Finding that the mitigating
circumstances were outweighed by the aggravating circumstance, the
trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Gross
to life imprisonment.
“The trial court’s determination of the proper
weight to be given aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the
appropriateness of the sentence as a whole is entitled to great
deference and will be set aside only upon a showing of a manifest
abuse of discretion.” Dunlop v. State, 724 N.E.2d 592, 597 (Ind.
2000), reh’g denied. The trial court is not obligated to accept the
defendant’s contentions as to what constitutes a mitigating factor.
McCann v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1116, 1121 (Ind. 2001). Nor is the court
required to give the same weight to proffered mitigating factors as
the defendant does. Bonds v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1238, 1243 (Ind.
1999). Here, the record of the sentencing proceeding does not
demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in
considering and weighing the mitigating factors against the sole
aggravating factor.
Upon independent review, we find evidence of
Gross’ difficult childhood, his age of eighteen at the time of the
crime, his graduation from high school, his conduct at Boy’s School
and at a youth center, his tutoring of other inmates while
incarcerated at the Marion County Jail, and his expression of
remorse. The mitigating weight warranted for each of these
considerations is in the low range, individually and cumulatively.
See footnote
Although there is only a single aggravating
factor here, it is a “substantial and serious” one.
Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 959 (Ind. 1994) (affirming
defendant’s death sentence after weighing the mitigating factors of
alcoholism and troubled adolescence against the aggravating factor
of an intentional killing in the course of a robbery). We find that
the mitigating circumstances in this case are outweighed by the
aggravating factor of an intentional murder during a robbery. Having
also given due consideration to the jury’s recommendation, we
determine that the proper and appropriate sentence for Jeremy Gross
is life without parole.
Conclusion
We vacate Gross’ sentence for robbery as a Class A felony and remand
to the trial court for a new sentencing order that imposes sentence
for robbery as a Class B felony. In all other respects, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and BOEHM,
JJ., concur.
*****
Footnote:
Spears was charged and tried separately for the same offenses.
See Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161 (Ind. 2000), reh’g denied.
*****
Footnote:
Accord Francis v. State, 758 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ind. 2001); Burnett v.
State, 736 N.E.2d 259, 263 (Ind. 2000); Grace v. State, 731 N.E.2d
442, 446 (Ind. 2000), reh’g denied; Logan v. State, 729 N.E.2d 125,
136 (Ind. 2000); Hampton v. State, 719 N.E.2d 803, 809 (Ind. 1999).
*****
Footnote:
Gross phrases this issue as “[t]he sentence of life without
parole is manifestly unreasonable and inappropriate for Jeremy
because the one aggravating factor does not outweigh the several
mitigating factors.” Br. of Appellant at 7. Although this Court has
the constitutional authority to review and revise sentences, Ind.
Const. art. VII, § 4, it will not do so unless the sentence is
“manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and
the character of the offender,” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). In this
case, although phrasing the issue in terms of “manifestly
unreasonable,” Gross does not cite the standard for such a claim nor
explain how the facts of this case are applicable to the claim.
Rather, his argument focuses on the trial court’s failure to ascribe
appropriate mitigating weight to certain factors and this Court’s
special appellate scrutiny in cases where the sentence is death or
life without parole.
*****
Footnote:
Gross seems to suggest that his age is automatically a
significant mitigating factor. That is not the case. It is true that
a defendant’s youth may be a mitigating factor in some circumstances.
See Brown v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1157, 1159 (Ind. 1999) (instructing
the trial court to impose concurrent, rather than consecutive, terms
on defendant who was sixteen at time of murder and under the
influence of a man twice his age); see also Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d
835, 843 (Ind. 1999) (finding the fourteen-year-old defendant’s
sixty-year murder sentence manifestly unreasonable). However, age is
not a per se mitigating factor. See Sensback v. State, 720 N.E.2d
1160, 1164 (Ind. 1999) (“Unfortunately, murders committed by
eighteen-year-olds are more common than they used to be.”). As we
observed in Ellis v. State, 736 N.E.2d 731, 736 (Ind. 2000),
chronological age for people in their teens and early twenties is
not the sole measure of culpability. “There are both relatively old
offenders who seem clueless and relatively young ones who appear
hardened and purposeful.” Id. In this case, Gross has not
demonstrated that his age and culpability are linked in any way.