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Danny Keith HOOKS
February 4,
DANNY KEITH HOOKS, Appellant -vs- STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee
As Corrected: March 13, 2001
OPINION
CHAPEL, JUDGE:
[19 P.3d 303]
¶1 Danny Keith Hooks
was tried by jury and convicted of five counts of Murder in the First
Degree in violation of 21 O.S.1991, § 701.7, in the District Court of
Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-97-657. The jury found two aggravating
circumstances for each count: (1) that Hooks had been previously
convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the
person; and (2) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel.
1
In accordance with the jury's recommendation the Honorable Daniel L.
Owens sentenced Hooks to death on each count.
¶2 On May 16, 1992,
the bodies of Phyllis Adams, LaShawn Evans, Sandra Thompson, Carolyn
Watson, and Francill Roberts were found in a small bedroom in a crack
house. Each woman was gagged and had been stabbed several times. The
bodies were nude and Thompson, Watson, and Roberts were bound.
2
The room was in disarray and the victims' purses appeared to have been
searched. There were no drugs or money in the house.
¶3 Although there
were five victims in a confined space, the evidence suggested one
person committed the crimes. The women were killed in the bedroom. A
trail of blood drops led to the front door, and Luminol testing showed
a single set of bloody footprints also leading from the bedroom to the
front door. There was a great deal of the victims' blood in the
bedroom. However, the blood trail to the door, and some other blood
drops found at various places in the bedroom, did not come from any of
the victims. A bloody palm print was on the west wall of the bedroom
closet, and police found a bloody boot print with "Honchos" embossed
on the sole. Despite a thorough investigation police found nobody who
matched either the palm print or the blood drops. In 1995 samples of
the blood drops were submitted for DNA testing, and those results were
distributed nationally in 1996. In 1997, California penal authorities
informed the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI) that they
had a person with that DNA profile. Subsequent tests confirmed that
the blood trail, drops in the bedroom, and bloody palm print all
belonged to Hooks. DNA from semen found in Roberts's mouth was also
consistent with Hooks' DNA.
¶4 Hooks admitted he
was at the house. He testified he went there during the evening of May
15th, and sometime close to or shortly after midnight on
May 16th he was there smoking crack cocaine with all the
victims. Hooks said he only knew the woman who rented the house, and
could not remember any of the victims' names. He said he had "regular"
sex with one woman and oral sex with another. During the night they
ran out of crack and Hooks gave two of the women $30 to go buy more.
After they returned and finished smoking, he ran out of drugs and
money and left. Hooks said he got home - about a mile from the house -
around 2:00 a.m. He decided to go back sometime after 4:00 a.m. On the
way, he cut his left index finger falling off his bicycle while trying
to fix the kick stand. When he got there the house was dark and the
door was ajar. He pushed it open and entered cautiously, closing the
door behind him, went to the bedroom and saw the bodies, and went back
to the front door. He lifted the curtain and looked outside, then
decided to go back in and check on the victims in case anyone was
alive. He returned to the bedroom and determined each victim was dead.
After he checked Evans's body he picked up a shirt and wrapped it
around his cut finger. Hooks looked at the contents of the victims'
purses on the west bed, then knelt and looked under [19 P.3d 304] the
clothes in the closet. He then left the house, dropping the shirt by
the front door, and closed the door. Hooks did not tell anyone what he
had seen because he was afraid the authorities would revoke his
California parole for being in a crack house. Two weeks later he left
the area. In November he was arrested in Holdenville, Oklahoma, on a
domestic complaint and returned to California.
ISSUES RELATING TO
JURY SELECTION
¶5 In Proposition IX
Hooks claims he was denied his right to a jury composed of a fair
cross-section of the community through systematic under-representation
of African-Americans from the jury panel. Out of a jury venire of 65
persons called to hear Hooks's case, four or five appeared to be
African-American. Trial counsel objected to the racial makeup of the
venire, and continued to object to the racial makeup of the panel
throughout the case. Counsel made an oral motion to quash the panel at
the end of the first day of voir dire. This was denied after some
discussion on the record. The trial court noted that it had no control
or influence over the racial makeup of the venire, which was summoned
on a random selection basis using driver's license rolls.
¶6 The State first
argues that Hooks waived this claim by failing to file a written
motion to quash the panel. Oklahoma law requires a venire challenge to
be in writing, specifying the facts which constitute the grounds for
the challenge.
3
Hooks argues counsel substantially complied with the intent behind the
statute, since the trial court was alerted to the exact problem with
the venire and a record was made which enables this Court to review
the error. We agree both that the claim was waived under the law and
that a sufficient record enables us to review Hooks's claim. In
keeping with the heightened level of scrutiny required in capital
cases, we have reviewed the claim and conclude Hooks has not shown
error.
¶7 In order to prove
he was denied a jury composed of a fair cross-section of the community
Hooks must show: (1) the excluded group is distinctive in the
community; (2) the group's representation in the jury pool is not fair
and reasonable in relation to the number of people in the community;
and (3) the under-representation is due to systematic exclusion in the
jury selection process.
4
Hooks presents a meticulous argument, using a variety of statistical
models, to show that African-Americans were woefully under-represented
on his venire. We need not adopt any of these statistical methods to
resolve this issue. Assuming without deciding that Hooks has shown
under-representation, he completely fails to show that this was caused
by systematic exclusion in the selection process. This Court has found
the Oklahoma jury selection method does not per se
systematically exclude African-Americans.
5
To overcome this, Hooks argues first that the degree of
under-representation must indicate a systemic defect in either the
method of selection or the assignment of jurors to individual
courtrooms. We decline this suggestion that we assume systematic bias
rather than requiring evidence of it. Hooks next argues systematic
exclusion is proved by the Oklahoma County Court Clerk's failure to
secure jurors who do not answer the summons to duty. He claims this
ensures large identifiable classes of jurors are excluded, but offers
nothing to suggest either that this is true or that those persons are
African-American. He claims the Oklahoma County practice giving trial
courts control of jury selection in individual cases constitutes a
factor within the State's control giving rise to systematic exclusion.
Again, Hooks offers nothing to prove this actually leads to exclusion
beyond his claim that the statistical [19 P.3d 305] anomaly itself
proves African-Americans must have been systematically excluded. The
United States Supreme Court has found systematic exclusion where
states explicitly excluded particular groups of people from jury
service, or erected a racially non-neutral selection process.
6
Hooks shows nothing similar. We have already upheld Oklahoma's
statutory jury selection method and will not, without some proof, find
it systematically excludes minorities on the strength of statistical
disparity alone. This proposition is denied.
ISSUES RELATING TO
FIRST STAGE PROCEEDINGS
¶8 In Proposition I
Hooks claims the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first
degree murder. The State's case against Hooks was built on strong
circumstantial evidence.
7
Circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis other
than guilt.
8
We will accept all reasonable inferences and credibility choices which
tend to support the jury's verdict.
9
Taken together, the evidence presented at trial meets this standard.
We disagree with Hooks's claim that his story raised a credible
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Circumstantial evidence connecting
Hooks to the murders includes:
Drops of Hooks's
blood in the bedroom. Drops were found near some of the victims,
on clothing and items under the west bed and underneath other
items on that bed, and on the sleeve of a jacket which was
underneath Evans's head when the bodies were discovered.
Hooks's blood
formed a trail of drops leading from the bedroom to the front door.
Several drops were found in front of the door and on the jamb, and
Hooks's blood was smeared on the inside
surface of the
front door's window curtain. These drops paralleled a single
bloody trail of footprints leading from the bedroom out the front
door.
Hooks's palm
print in blood was found in the bedroom closet where Adams was
attacked.
Semen consistent
with Hooks was found in Roberts's mouth.
Evidence
suggested that someone wearing work boots walked through blood in
the bedroom while at least some of the victims were being killed.
Those boots were not found, but witnesses agreed that Hooks
usually wore work boots in April and May of 1992.
Witnesses agreed
Hooks was familiar with the house, had bought crack cocaine there
many times, and knew at least one of the victims.
¶9 Rather than
contest the DNA evidence Hooks chose to admit his presence at the
scene of the crime before and after the murders. However, Hooks's
story was contradicted by evidence that Adams and Watson were with
other people and got to the house sometime between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m.
on May 16th; they could not have been partying with him
between 12:30 and 2:00 a.m. His description of his actions in the
bedroom did not [19 P.3d 306] account for drops of his blood found on
items under the west bed, nor did he explain how his blood could have
soaked into a jacket under Evans's head. Although he described looking
at items identifying the victims on the west bed, many of these were
covered by clothing or other debris when the bodies were found. His
explanation of the bloody palm print appeared somewhat confused. While
portions of Hooks's story are plausible, compared with the physical
evidence it does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than
guilt. This proposition is denied.
¶10 In Proposition
III Hooks argues the trial court erred in refusing to allow the
defense to present a witness regarding his work boots. The State went
to a great deal of effort to connect Hooks to "Honchos" work boots
matching the bloody footprint. The State admitted as a demonstrative
exhibit a pair of Honcho boots bought by police in 1992 after the
crimes, then suggested to witnesses and argued to the jury that Hooks
owned similar boots. The State also extensively cross-examined Hooks
about his boots. Hooks admitted owning two pairs of boots in 1992 - a
pair of Army boots and lace-up work boots. He denied owning "Honchos"
boots. Hooks said he didn't know what happened to his Army boots, but
he left his work boots with his family when he was returned to
California in November, 1992. After trial began, as the State began
emphasizing this evidence, trial counsel asked Hooks's family to find
his work boots. After seven days of voir dire and evidence, during
Hooks's case in chief, a family member brought Hooks's boots from
Holdenville to the Oklahoma County courthouse. Over Hooks's objection
the trial court refused to allow a witness to sponsor the boots. This
decision was error.
¶11 On appeal the
State first suggests Hooks knew through preliminary hearing testimony
that the bloody bootprint was important evidence. However, there was
no evidence about the bootprint presented at preliminary hearing. The
State then erroneously claims that the trial court's decision was
merely an advisory ruling on a motion in limine, and Hooks has waived
this issue on appeal. The State apparently reaches this conclusion
from a desire to avoid addressing the issue, as it is completely
unsupported by the record. After a long colloquy the trial court
definitively ruled that Hooks would not be allowed to present the
boots or any evidence indicating they had been found. There was
nothing advisory about this decision, and the issue was preserved for
review.
¶12 The trial court
explicitly excluded the evidence because to admit the boots "would
absolutely violate the principles that we all have relating to mutual
and open discovery." The trial court held the issue was not one of
nondisclosure but found admitting the evidence would be extremely
prejudicial to the State's case.
10
This decision is contradicted by well-settled case law holding that
exclusion of defense evidence is a harsh sanction almost never
appropriate in capital cases. We have often held that this sanction is
too severe a remedy for discovery violations where the evidence is
material and the violation is not blatant, willful or calculated.
11
Here the record supports the conclusion that the discovery violation
was at best inadvertent and at worst unavoidable (counsel did not have
the evidence until the day it was presented). As we discuss below, the
evidence was material. Hooks's counsel indicated he would not object
to a continuance for the State to examine the boots and sponsoring
witness. However, the trial court and State apparently did not even
consider this option. As Hooks notes, we routinely require defendants
in these circumstances to request a continuance for adequate time to
prepare.
12We should hold the State to the same
requirement.
[19 P.3d 307]
¶13 The State argues
the boots were not material because Hooks admitted to having two pairs
of boots and presentation of one could not rule out the other as the
crime scene boots. This, like the suggestion that Hooks's family
bought the boots second-hand to help his case, goes to the evidence's
credibility. The State appears to argue: (1) the boots the prosecutor
claimed Hooks owned, which made the bloody footprint, were material;
but (2) boots presented by the defense as Hooks's actual boots were
not material to the case. This makes no sense. Either Hooks's boots
had evidentiary value or they did not. We agree with the State that
the bloody bootprint was material and find Hooks should have been
allowed to present evidence bearing on that issue.
¶14 The trial court
mechanistically applied a discovery rule and prohibited Hooks from
introducing material evidence relevant to guilt or innocence during
his case in chief.
13
We do not approve the unnecessary imposition of this harsh sanction in
this case. However, a thorough review of the record persuades us that
the error neither resulted in a miscarriage of justice nor
substantially violated Hooks's statutory or constitutional rights.
14
Even without connecting Hooks to the bloody bootprint, the prosecution
connected him to the crime through DNA and palmprint evidence. Other
witnesses testified Hooks was familiar with the house and some of the
victims. We conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that this error was
harmless.
15
We also examine the error for its effect on second stage. Although it
is possible that, had Hooks been able to introduce boots without the "Honchos"
soles, jurors might have concluded a second person was also
responsible for the killings and declined to impose the death penalty,
jurors could have reached that conclusion based on the State's failure
to solidly connect Hooks to the "Honchos" boots. We conclude the error
did not affect the jury's second stage verdicts. This proposition is
denied.
¶15 In Proposition V
Hooks claims hearsay testimony concerning a police report improperly
bolstered Billy Ray Johnson's trial testimony. Billy Ray Johnson
testified that he took Hooks to the house to buy crack. Johnson
initially said he wasn't sure which woman Hooks was going with, that
it could have been the youngest one who just had her baby or "that
other one." Johnson remembered telling police that it was the youngest
one and Hooks knew her "real well." To clear up any confusion, the
prosecutor then read Johnson's prior consistent statement to police,
and Johnson agreed with it. Hooks did not cross-examine. Hooks does
not contest the propriety of this exchange on appeal.
¶16 After Johnson
testified prosecutors called Officer Burke to read his report on
Johnson's statement. Hooks's objection was overruled and this issue
was preserved for appeal. Hooks correctly complains that prosecutors
should not have been allowed to bolster Johnson's testimony with this
prior consistent statement, which was both hearsay and extrinsic
evidence. The State appears to misunderstand this claim. Hooks is not
claiming the State had no right to impeach its own witness. Hooks is
claiming the State properly impeached its witness by offering Johnson
the prior consistent statement and allowing him the opportunity to
explain or deny it.
16
Johnson agreed with the statement. There was no need for Officer Burke
to provide hearsay further bolstering Johnson's testimony. Officer
Burke's evidence was offered solely to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, and it does not fall under any exception to the hearsay rule.
This Court has found error before where the same officer gave
substantially similar testimony.
17
However, here we find beyond a [19 P.3d 308] reasonable doubt that the
improperly admitted hearsay did not contribute to Hooks's convictions
and sentences.
18
This proposition is denied.
¶17 In Proposition VI
Hooks alleges the trial court erred by permitting the State to
introduce evidence of other bad acts that were not part of the
transaction resulting in the death of the victims. Over Hooks's
strenuous objections the prosecution repeatedly elicited evidence that
Hooks was interested in group sex. There were some sexual overtones at
trial since the victims were nude women, four had old semen from
various donors present in their bodies, and Hooks admitted having sex
with two victims. No sex crimes were charged. Both parties agree a
defendant should ideally be convicted by evidence showing his guilt of
the offense charged, rather than by evidence of other crimes or bad
acts.
19
Prosecutors admitted this material was not included in a Burks
notice
20
but argued both: (1) Hooks's interest in group sex was not illegal and
thus not subject to Burks, and (2) sex with multiple partners
showed Hooks's proclivity for group sex. This argument is self-contradictory.
Prosecutors used this evidence to argue that Hooks had a deviant,
depraved nature and constituted proof that Hooks murdered the victims.
In second stage, Mr. Macy appeared to argue that sex with multiple
partners was itself evidence of a continuing threat to society.
¶18 On appeal the
State contends this evidence was relevant since Hooks admitted he had
intercourse with two of the victims that night. On the contrary, since
Hooks made this admission (concerning the only sexually-related issue
in the case) whether he enjoyed or fantasized about group sex with
other women was wholly irrelevant. The State also unconvincingly
argues without explanation that Hooks's penchant for group sex was
relevant simply because these victims were nude. There simply is no
credible argument that this evidence was relevant to any issue raised
in the first stage of trial.
21
After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that this error did
not unduly prejudice Hooks. While the jury may have agreed with
prosecutors that Hooks's enjoyment of group sex was repugnant, that
information was ultimately irrelevant to the issue of whether Hooks
stabbed the five victims. The murder charges were well-supported by
relevant evidence. Erroneously admitting this other crimes evidence
neither constituted a miscarriage of justice nor deprived Hooks of a
statutory or constitutional right.
22
This proposition is denied.
ISSUES RELATING TO
SECOND STAGE PROCEEDINGS
¶19 In Proposition
VII Hooks argues that his jury was coerced into returning a death
sentence. After five hours of second-stage deliberations the jury sent
a note indicating they were 11-1 for the death penalty and asking the
trial court to interview the holdout juror and replace her with an
alternate. The trial court answered that the law did not authorize the
court to grant that request and told the jury to continue deliberation.
Within ten minutes the jury returned a note saying "We are unable to
reach any unanimous sentence."
¶20 The trial court
and counsel discussed possible avenues of reply after the first note.
The trial court read aloud the appropriate [19 P.3d 309] capital
sentencing deadlock instruction, OUJI-CR (2d) 4-83. The
State objected to that instruction because the jury had not been out
long enough to justify something like an Allen charge. The
trial court agreed OUJI-CR (2d) 4-83 was similar to an
Allen charge but stated the OUJI comment "does not make a lot of
sense" and said it would not give that instruction. Trial counsel
requested "the Allen charge" "telling them to go back and do
that as opposed to anything else that we could instruct." The trial
court decided not to give any instruction beyond urging the jury to
resume deliberations.
¶21 After the second
note announcing a deadlock, the trial court overruled Hooks's motion
for a mistrial. The trial court announced it did not believe jurors
had been out long enough to declare a mistrial and stated it would
give an Allen23
charge, OUJI-CR (2d) 10-11. Trial counsel objected, saying,
"We think that the Allen charge and instruction given is not an
appropriate instruction to be given to a jury in the stage two
deliberation since there is such an overlap of moral and legal issues."
The trial court overruled this objection and refused counsel's request
to ask jurors whether further deliberation would be helpful before
giving the Allen instruction. The trial court then called the
jury in. The court told jurors the case had taken approximately 57
hours of trial time, and they had only deliberated for six and a half
hours. The court then gave OUJI-CR (2d) 10-11, including
the following language:
This does not
mean that those favoring any particular position should
surrender their honest convictions as to the weight or affect
[sic] of any evidence solely because of the opinion of other
jurors or because of the importance of arriving at a decision.
No juror should ever agree to a verdict that is contrary to the
law and the Court's instruction nor find a fact or concur in a
verdict which in good conscience he or she believes to be untrue.
If at all possible, you
should resolve any differences and come to a common conclusion
so this case may be completed.
¶22 Sometime before 7:30 p.m.,
deliberations recessed while two jurors moved their cars. During this
time the jury sent a note asking for its evening break. The trial
court sent the jury to dinner while the court and counsel discussed
the note. Everyone realized that the jurors expected to go home, as
they had during first stage deliberations. Both Hooks and the State
objected to breaking sequestration during second stage deliberations.
The trial court reserved a motel in case jurors wanted to break for
the evening and proposed telling jurors that before they resumed
deliberations. The court denied trial counsel's request to first ask
jurors whether further deliberation would be helpful. Trial counsel
confirmed that the court would not declare the jurors at an impasse,
then announced no objection to the motel procedure.
¶23 After the jurors finished
dinner, at approximately 8:20 p.m., the trial court called them in "to
discuss some logistical issues." Emphasizing that the jury should
deliberate at its own pace, the court explained motel rooms were
reserved should the jurors care to break for the evening and resume
deliberations the next day. The court said jurors were free to
continue deliberations into the night, but needed to decide whether to
use the motel rooms by 10:30 p.m. If so, family members could bring
overnight items to the courthouse for jurors to use. The court stated
it needed an answer from jurors "shortly" so it could proceed with as
little inconvenience as possible, and noted, "But for the course of
this proceeding I cannot release you to go to your respective
dwellings." The court then released jurors to continue deliberations.
Forty-five minutes later the jury returned with verdicts of death on
all counts.
¶24 Hooks claims the trial
court erred in several ways during this sequence of events, and that
under the peculiar circumstances of this case the errors resulted in a
coerced verdict. We agree the trial court failed to give the correct
deadlock instruction and should have repeated the Allen
language cited above in his final instruction to the jury. However,
for reasons discussed below, we do [19 P.3d 310] not believe these
errors coerced the verdict, and they do not require relief. The
State's brief cites no law and discusses only one case cited by Hooks.
¶25 Hooks first claims the
trial court should not have told jurors they could not return to their
homes until the close of the proceedings. This is an accurate
statement of law - the jury was sequestered and jurors could not be
separated until they either reached a verdict or an impasse was
declared. Hooks argues that it is nonetheless error because, in
context, it suggested jurors could not leave until they had a
unanimous verdict. The trial court knew that, several hours earlier,
the jury had announced an 11-1 deadlock. Hooks claims that under these
circumstances the trial court's announcement put unbearable pressure
on the holdout juror. He argues that the quick return of a verdict
after this instruction suggests coercion.
24
We are mindful of that inference but cannot agree that the trial
court's accurate statement of law was either explicitly or inherently
coercive.
¶26 Hooks correctly complains
that, when releasing the jury for further deliberation after dinner,
the trial court should have admonished jurors not to abandon their
honestly held beliefs. Well-settled law indicates that this
exhortation is necessary whenever a deadlocked jury is returned to
deliberations.
25
In a similar case this Court recently found this omission to be
reversible error.
26
According to the last substantive communication from Hooks's jury, it
was deadlocked 11-1 in favor of death. Under those circumstances the
trial court had a duty to ensure each juror understood his or her
obligation to hold fast to firm convictions, and not to concur in a
finding or verdict simply to reach a unanimous decision. The trial
court should have included this admonition to Hooks's jury when
releasing it for evening deliberations.
¶27 Under the circumstances of
this case we do not find this error requires reversal. We distinguish
Mooney. There, in addition to the failure to properly admonish
the jurors there was an unauthorized communication with the bailiff
which caused the whole proceeding to go off on a tangent. The trial
judge concentrated on which juror should initiate and sign notes to
the court, vested the foreman with too much authority, did not answer
the jury's question, and did not appropriately instruct the apparently
deadlocked jury. Here there is no claim of improper communication or
confusion engendered by the trial court's other after-dinner
instructions. Hooks's jury had received a proper Allen
instruction, including the admonition at issue, within the preceding
two or three hours. There were no intervening substantive
communications or instructions between the Allen instruction
and the after-dinner exchange.
¶28 Hooks claims the trial
court erred in refusing to give the capital deadlock instruction,
OUJI-CR (2d) 4-83. Hooks is right. This instruction repeats
the relevant statutory language:27
If on further
deliberation you are unable to agree unanimously as to
punishment, I shall discharge you and impose a sentence of
imprisonment for life without the [19 P.3d 311] possibility of
parole or imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole.
¶29 The State argues that
Hooks waived this claim when trial counsel asked for "the Allen
instruction." The State claims counsel referred to OUJI-CR (2d)
10-11, which was given. While the discussion is confusing, when read
as a whole the record shows trial counsel was referring to OUJI-CR (2d)
4-83. Initially the trial court read OUJI-CR (2d) 4-83. The
prosecutor said that was "similar to the Allen charge" and said
the jury had not been out long enough to justify an Allen
charge. Trial counsel responded, "I think the Allen charge
should be given now frankly telling them to go back and do that as
opposed to anything else that we could construct." Counsel later
objected to the Allen instruction given, stating: "We think
that the Allen charge and instruction given is not an
appropriate instruction to be given to a jury in the stage two
deliberation since there is such an overlap of both moral and legal
issues." These statements can only be reconciled if the first is taken
to refer to OUJI-CR (2d) 4-83. Given this ambiguity and the
importance of the issue, we do not apply waiver and review the
subproposition on its merits.
¶30 OUJI-CR (2d)
4-83 became effective, with the rest of the revised criminal jury
instructions, on August 1, 1996. Its advent recognized the change in
law brought about by § 701.11, and altered the trial court's
appropriate response to a deadlocked capital jury. Unfortunately
neither the OUJI Comment nor this Court's subsequent case law has
discussed or reflected that change. In several earlier cases
appellants raised this issue in the abstract, claiming error where
trial courts refused to initially instruct jurors that, if they could
not reach a unanimous sentencing verdict, the trial court would impose
sentence. In those cases this Court quite reasonably held such an
instruction would distract the jury from its duty to assess a
sentence.28
None of those cases raised the issue in the context of a capital jury
deadlocked in the second stage. However, the OUJI Comment relied on
those cases when comparing the § 701.11 language with our previous
holdings that the instruction was improper. This creates nothing but
confusion and the trial court here understandably concluded that the
Comment "does not make a lot of sense." Although the Comment is
confusing, the language of the instruction itself is clear and readily
understandable. We recommend that the language in the Comment be
rewritten to reflect the current state of the law.
¶31 Gilbert v. State29
posed the question: is it error to give an Allen charge to a
deadlocked second-stage capital jury? In that case, the Petition in
Error was filed in this Court June 24, 1996, and OUJI-CR (2d)
4-83 was not in effect at the time of trial.30
We found in Gilbert that an Allen charge was not per se
coercive,31
and we confirm that conclusion now. However, Gilbert used the
cases cited in Note 28, supra, to determine that an instruction
on the sentencing provisions of § 701.11 would "distract" even a
deadlocked capital sentencing jury.32
As these cases did not consider the question, their authority on this
issue is dubious at best. In addition, that trial court had no
alternative but the Allen charge. The Gilbert Court was
not faced with the choice [19 P.3d 312] between OUJI-CR (2d)
4-83 and OUJI-CR (2d) 10-11. Our conclusion is compelled by
common sense, fairness, and the clear intent of the Legislature as
expressed in § 701.11. Where a capital jury is deadlocked on the issue
of punishment, the trial court should give OUJI-CR (2d)
4-83. Any previous holdings to the contrary are overruled.
¶32 We are left with the issue
of whether the error in this case - the trial court's refusal to give
4-83 - requires relief. We continue to hold that an Allen
instruction, while no longer the appropriate instruction under these
circumstances, is not per se error in the second stage of a capital
case. The trial court gave the correct Allen instruction. We
have already determined that the trial court's actions were not
inherently or explicitly coercive. Given these facts we decline to
grant relief for this error in instruction.33
This proposition is denied.
¶33 In Proposition VIII Hooks
claims the trial court erred in failing to provide guidance to the
jury in response to a question which indicated a clear
misunderstanding of the law. During second-stage deliberations the
jury sent out a note complaining that the holdout juror, refusing to
change her vote, "refers on grounds not related to the law."34
Hooks claims this phrase indicates the jury misunderstood Oklahoma law
by believing that the law might require a death sentence, and argues
the trial court erred in failing to correct this misunderstanding.
Hooks suggests the trial court should have emphasized that the law
never requires a jury to impose the death penalty. The State cites no
relevant authority to support its response, and does not discuss
Hooks's cited cases.
¶34 A trial court has a duty
of special care to evaluate jurors' understanding of the law and clear
away any explicit difficulties.35
This Court is troubled by the suggestion that the jury believed
Oklahoma law required imposition of the death penalty. However, such
an interpretation is pure speculation. The jury was accurately
instructed that it was authorized to impose the death penalty if it
unanimously found one or more aggravating circumstances, and then
found that circumstance outweighed any mitigating evidence. Nothing in
the instructions suggested the jury was required to impose a death
sentence if it found at least one aggravating circumstance.
Instruction 11 told the jury it could impose a sentence of life or
life without parole even after finding aggravating circumstances
outweighed mitigating circumstances. As the record does not support
Hooks's assertion that the jury misunderstood the law, we find no
error in the trial court's response.36
This proposition is denied.
¶35 In Proposition X Hooks
alleges his death sentence must be vacated because the use of victim
impact evidence violated his rights. A family member gave victim
impact testimony for each victim in question-and-answer format. Hooks
neither cross-examined these witnesses nor objected to victim impact
testimony, and has waived all but plain error. Victim impact testimony
[19 P.3d 313] must conform to specific guidelines; the trial court
must find that evidence of at least one aggravating circumstance is
present before admitting the evidence; and the jury must be properly
instructed on victim impact evidence.37
The trial court made no formal finding that evidence of one or more
aggravating circumstance was present in the record. However, before
victim impact evidence began trial counsel stated he expected
prosecutors to abide by this Court's guidelines and the statutory
requirements for this evidence. The trial court agreed. All parties
reviewed the victim impact instruction and agreed on the parameters of
the evidence. The appropriate victim impact instruction was given.
Sufficient evidence supported more than one aggravating circumstance.
There is no plain error in the trial court's failure to explicitly
find evidence of at least one aggravating circumstance before
admitting victim impact evidence.
¶36 Hooks complains that Ms.
Lewis should not have been allowed to give victim impact testimony
regarding Evans. Lewis, Evans's aunt, testified about the effects of
Evans's death on herself, Evans's daughter and father, and the
extended family. Victim impact evidence is limited to the effect on a
victim's immediate family, defined as "the spouse, a child by birth or
adoption, a stepchild, a parent, or a sibling of each victim."38
Victim impact testimony may be given by an immediate family member or
person designated by the family to represent them at trial for this
purpose.39
We will not presume, in the face of a silent record, that Lewis was in
fact the family's designated representative. However, her testimony
emphasized the effect of Evans's death on her child and parent.
Lewis's remarks regarding her own reactions to Evans's death may have
been improper under the statute. However, this was a small portion of
her testimony. Had Lewis been formally designated as the family's
representative her testimony would have been proper. We find no plain
error.
¶37 Hooks also complains that
Lewis and other victim impact witnesses gave hearsay testimony
regarding other family members. Victim impact evidence is intended to
give a "quick glimpse" of a victim by focusing on the financial,
emotional, psychological, and physical effect of the crime itself and
some personal characteristics of the victim.40
We have held the rules of evidence, including the prohibition against
hearsay, apply to victim impact testimony.41
However, the statute clearly allows one person to speak for an entire
family and describe the effect of a victim's death on individual
family members.42
We reconcile this apparent conflict by finding no error where a family
member or representative gives victim impact testimony on behalf of
several immediate family members, as long as that testimony is
otherwise admissible. Here, the five victim impact witnesses did not
dwell unduly on the emotional effect of the victims' deaths. We do not
agree with Hooks's claim that most of this evidence was irrelevant.
Lewis's statement that Evans's father said he would never see justice
for his child, then died six months after her death, was not within
the bounds of appropriate victim impact testimony. We cannot say this
isolated statement caused the verdict to be the result of an
unreasoned emotional response.43
¶38 We have repeatedly found
that victim impact evidence does not operate as a "superaggravator".44
We decline Hooks's invitation to revisit those decisions. Any [19
P.3d 314] isolated error in victim impact evidence did not divert
the jury from its duty to make a decision through a reasoned moral
response.45
This proposition is denied.
¶39 In Proposition XI Hooks
claims the "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating
circumstance is unconstitutional. He argues this aggravating
circumstance is standardless and serves no narrowing function. He
acknowledges we have consistently rejected this claim,46
but urges us to reconsider. Hooks's reliance on Robinson v. State47
is misplaced. In Robinson the Court found the victim was
conscious and suffered physical anguish.48
Where, as here, there is proof of conscious physical suffering or
extreme mental cruelty, this Court will continue to uphold this
aggravating circumstance. This proposition is denied.
ISSUES RELATING TO FIRST AND
SECOND STAGE PROCEEDINGS
¶40 In Proposition II Hooks
argues he was deprived of a fair trial and fair sentencing hearing by
prosecutorial misconduct in first stage during both argument and
presentation of evidence, and during second stage argument. He failed
to object to any instances of misconduct and we review for plain error
only. We recognize the State's wide latitude to discuss the evidence
and reasonable inferences from evidence in closing argument, and will
only grant relief where grossly improper and unwarranted argument
affects a defendant's rights.49
Prosecutors misused evidence in the first stage of trial and engaged
in egregiously improper argument which we have often condemned. These
missteps are particularly unnecessary here, where the evidence amply
supported the State's case and the jury verdicts. This Court has in
the past warned prosecutors against misconduct that can endanger a
case.50
However, we do not find these errors entitle Hooks to relief. This
proposition is denied.51
¶41 Hooks first complains
about misleading and prejudicial evidence in first stage.
Prosecutors tried to connect Hooks to the "Honchos" boots which left
the bloody [19 P.3d 315] print in the bedroom. Prosecutors asked
four witnesses what kind of footgear Hooks usually wore in 1992, and
all agreed he wore work boots. Prosecutors did not show these
witnesses the demonstrative "Honchos" work boots during their
testimony. However, contrary to Hooks's claim, evidence suggests
some of the witnesses had seen those boots during interviews with
police. Prosecutors may, as Hooks suggests, have feared witnesses
would disagree and deliberately avoided using the demonstrative
boots during their testimony. We will not hold that this strategic
decision, which could certainly be argued to the jury, constitutes
misconduct.
¶42 Prosecutors did present
misleading evidence in questioning Hooks's former girlfriend, Ms.
McClain. McClain was initially confused but testified Hooks wore
lace-up work boots similar to ones the officers showed her. The
prosecutor was apparently not satisfied and asked whether McClain
hadn't testified that way in the preliminary hearing and if she had
lied to that judge. McClain responded that she had so testified and
had not lied. In fact, McClain did not testify about Hooks's boots
during the preliminary hearing. The questioning prosecutor was present
at preliminary hearing and we must assume he was aware of this. This
question led the witness into perjury and may have bolstered her
testimony in jurors' minds. Nonetheless we find this error did not
affect the verdict and does not require relief.
¶43 Hooks next complains the
prosecutor should not have argued in closing that Hooks's presence at
trial allowed him to hear the State's evidence and then create a story
to fit it. The United States Supreme Court recently found this
argument was not an impermissible comment on a defendant's right to
testify, or an infringement on his right to confront witnesses or on
the requirement he be present at trial.52
Given this precedent we decline to find error.
¶44 Hooks claims prosecutors
erred in several comments during second stage closing argument. Most
of the statements are borderline at best. Each claim is set forth
below.53
¶45 Hooks claims the
prosecutor misstated the law when he argued the victims were people
and their families were their lives. In context, the prosecutor was
urging the jury not to think of the victims as merely objects in the
medical examiners' pictures and drawings, but to look at the victim
impact evidence to understand who they were. The suggestion the
victim impact evidence should be used as substantive evidence comes
close to error. However, the comment is a reasonable attempt to
humanize the victims based on the evidence.
¶46 Hooks claims the
prosecutor misstated the law when he urged jurors to apply this
standard to the heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance:
"[W]hat would you call it if someone did it to you. Or worse, your
sister, your mother, your daughter, your aunt, your niece? Is that
torture? Is that serious abuse?" This, of course, misstates the
"heinous, atrocious, or cruel" test, which requires serious
physical abuse. More importantly, it directs jurors to find this
aggravating circumstance based on their own sympathies for the victim,
by inserting jurors' emotions into the victims' place, rather than
analyzing whether the victims' actual situation fit within the legal
restrictions on this aggravating circumstance. This combination of
misstated law and encouraging sympathy for the victims is error.
¶47 Hooks claims the
prosecutors argued facts not in evidence by stating the victims were
kidnapped. These comments (Hooks complains of one instance, but Mr.
Miller and Mr. Macy each argued it) were apparently references to the
fact that each woman was gagged and some were bound. The references,
although based on evidence, were inflammatory considering that
kidnapping was not charged. This erroneous argument dangerously skirts
the border of impropriety.
[19 P.3d 316]
¶48 Hooks claims correctly
that the prosecutors misstated the law and diminished the jury's
individual sense of morality and mercy. Both prosecutors vigorously
argued against the prospect of a hung jury. Mr. Miller began by
thanking the jurors for their work first stage and commenting that the
system would grind to a halt if jurors did not deliberate and come to
a disposition in cases so justice could be done. Mr. Miller also told
jurors to enforce the law and operate within the law. Mr. Miller later
anticipated trial counsel's reminder that it took only one juror to
avoid the death sentence, by labeling this "jury nullification".
Miller read a dictionary definition and told jurors this would impede
or attempt to prevent enforcement of the law. He said one or two
people could cripple the system, cut it up and eviscerate it. He urged
all jurors to work through the sentencing decision with vigor, as "The
12 of you must resolve this case." Mr. Macy argued that legally, any
one juror could control the trial but there were twelve chairs there
so the defendant could be tried by his peers (emphasizing the plural).
He then remarked, "There's been far too much work go into this case.
It's far too important in this case for someone to play martyr and
trying to hang it up."
¶49 This Court is concerned
about these misstatements of law. First, all twelve jurors do not have
to unanimously agree in capital sentencing proceedings. Second, the
failure to agree does not amount to jury nullification. Oklahoma law
specifically provides that the jury may not reach a unanimous verdict.54
As the law provides for this result, failure to agree cannot be said
to impede or obstruct it. Third, deadlocked juries are instructed not
to abandon their honestly held convictions or concur in a verdict
which they cannot in good conscience accept (as this jury was, see
Proposition VII) while attempting to resolve their differences. The
closing arguments complained of here suggest jurors should in fact
abandon their honestly held beliefs if those beliefs will result in a
less than unanimous verdict. These misstatements of law could have
deprived Hooks of his right to a properly instructed capital jury, and
come close to requiring relief even if the other comments did not
render the proceedings as a whole fundamentally unfair. We note,
however, that despite these erroneous arguments the jury was
deadlocked for several hours. We must conclude that the jurors in this
case were not misled. Capital cases will not always present such a
clear indication of the jury's understanding. We thus strongly caution
prosecutors against using this argument during the second stage of a
capital trial.
¶50 Hooks claims prosecutors
erred in arguing both that lots of people do drugs but don't kill, and
that Hooks could get drugs in prison. There was no evidence introduced
regarding access to drugs in prison, and the prosecutor should not
have suggested it. In context, this remark does not excite societal
alarm. The prosecutor also noted that if drugs were the only factor
most of the State's witnesses would be killers and even people who got
drugs in prison weren't mass murderers. The misstatement of fact does
not warrant relief.
¶51 Hooks claims Mr. Miller
gave his personal opinion regarding the death penalty. He argued the
district attorneys struggled when determining to seek the death
penalty and did not celebrate when a death verdict was received, and
"I wouldn't be involved if there was." He also referred to capital
cases as "the most grueling part of my job." While this may be an
improper and irrelevant comment on the prosecutor's state of mind, it
is not a personal opinion regarding the justification for the death
penalty in this case.
¶52 Hooks finally complains of
two arguments - the infamous "three hots and a cot" and the
exhortation to the jury to "pray if you want to." This Court has
repeatedly condemned both these arguments and warned these same
prosecutors to stop using them.55
The Court even recently [19 P.3d 317] reversed a case partially on the
strength of this improper argument.56
The Oklahoma County District Attorney office is ignoring this Court's
direction. Although we cannot condone this practice and once again
direct prosecutors to refrain from this type of argument, we conclude
that the error here does not require relief.57
¶53 In summary, prosecutors
skirted the border of impropriety or engaged in outright improper
argument in both first and second stage. However, after a thorough
review of the entire record we conclude the prosecutorial misconduct
did not affect Hooks's rights, and does not require relief.
Proposition II is denied.
¶54 In Proposition IV Hooks
argues he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. To
prevail, Hooks must show counsel's performance was so deficient that
he did not have counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and that
the deficient performance created errors so serious as to deprive
Hooks of a fair trial with reliable results.58
In capital cases, there must be a reasonable probability that, absent
errors, the jury would have concluded the balance of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances did not support a death sentence.59
A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome of the case.60
We presume counsel's conduct was professional and equaled sound trial
strategy.61
We consider the challenged conduct on the facts of the case as viewed
at the time and ask if it was professionally unreasonable, then
consider whether the error affected the jury's judgment.62
To determine whether counsel's acts or omissions were outside the wide
range of professionally competent assistance, we consider whether
counsel fulfilled the function of making the adversarial testing
process work.63
We need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient if
we find no prejudice.64
Using this standard of review counsel was not ineffective and this
proposition should be denied.65
We cannot agree, however, with the State's argument that the record
shows counsel was a zealous advocate. For example, contrary to the
State's assertion, counsel did not file "a substantial number" of
pretrial motions. Counsel filed two - a general discovery motion and a
request to withdraw from the case for Hooks's failure to pay for
services.
¶55 Hooks first complains
counsel failed to properly marshal the evidence rebutting the State's
case in closing argument. He admits counsel did argue that the State's
evidence did not prove his guilt, and did set forth an alternate
theory based on Hooks's testimony. While counsel's closing argument
slightly misstated both the State's evidence and Hooks's story, these
[19 P.3d 318] misstatements were to Hooks's benefit. We will not find
counsel's performance deficient where counsel used the evidence to
argue that the State had not proved Hooks guilty.
¶56 Hooks next complains
counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain his work boots from his
family before trial began. As we have determined that the verdicts
were not affected by the trial court's error in refusing to admit the
boots, Hooks cannot show he was prejudiced by this omission.
¶57 Hooks claims counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to erroneous and inappropriate
prosecutorial remarks and tactics. We found in Proposition II that the
State (a) overstepped the bounds of proper argument and (b) erred in
its presentation of evidence tending to connect Hooks with the
"Honchos" boots. However, those errors did not affect the verdicts. As
Hooks was not prejudiced by the State's misconduct, counsel cannot
have been ineffective for failing to object to it.
¶58 When Hooks took the stand
counsel made sure the jury knew Hooks had prior convictions for rape
and assault with intent to commit bodily harm. Hooks now complains
this trial strategy was unreasonable. He suggests counsel should first
have moved the trial court to rule these prior convictions unavailable
for impeachment purposes. Prior convictions may be used to impeach a
witness.66
In ruling on their admissibility the court must consider (1) their
impeachment value; (2) the time of the convictions and the defendant's
subsequent history; (3) the similarity between the prior and charged
crimes; (4) the importance of the defendant's testimony; and (5)
whether credibility is central to the trial.67
We disagree with Hooks's claim that the prior offenses were so similar
to the charged crime of murder as to automatically prejudice the jury
against him. Hooks's prior convictions were relevant for impeachment
purposes and admissible, and their probative value for impeachment was
not outweighed by the danger of prejudice. As the prior convictions
were admissible and would have been used for impeachment, counsel was
not ineffective for omitting to ask the trial court to prohibit the
State from using Hooks's priors.
¶59 Hooks finally claims
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper victim
impact evidence. The trial court held a brief hearing before admitting
the evidence and correctly instructed the jury on its use. We reviewed
the victim impact evidence in Proposition X and concluded that any
isolated errors did not affect the verdict. As Hooks cannot show
prejudice, we will not find counsel ineffective.
¶60 Finally, in Proposition
XII Hooks claims the accumulation of error in his case deprived him of
due process and a reliable sentencing proceeding. We have found error
in Propositions II, III, V, VI, VII and VIII. The evidentiary errors
in Propositions III, V and VI had no effect on the verdicts. Taken
cumulatively, their effect is no greater. The errors in instruction in
Proposition VII were magnified by the prosecutors' egregious
misstatements of law in Proposition II and may have led to a
misunderstanding of law detailed in Proposition VIII. However, we find
the combination of errors did not infect the trial or sentencing
proceeding with unfairness, and does not require relief.68
This proposition is denied.
MANDATORY SENTENCE REVIEW
¶61 In accordance with 21
O.S.1991, § 701.13(C), we must determine (1) whether the sentence of
death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any
other arbitrary factor, and (2) whether the evidence supports the
jury's finding of aggravating circumstances. Upon review of the
record, we cannot say the sentence of death was imposed because the
jury was influenced by passion, prejudice, or any other [19 P.3d 319]
arbitrary factor contrary to 21 O.S.1991, § 701.13(C).
¶62 The jury was instructed on
and found the existence of two aggravating circumstances: (1) that
Hooks had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use of
threat of violence to the person, and (2) that the murders were
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. The jury was instructed on
seventeen mitigating factors.69
Upon our review of the record, we find the sentence of death to be
factually substantiated and appropriate.70
¶63 Finding no error
warranting modification, the judgment and sentence of the District
Court of Oklahoma County is AFFIRMED.
AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT
COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY
THE HONORABLE DANIEL L. OWENS, DISTRICT JUDGE
Danny Keith Hooks was
convicted of five counts of First Degree Murder in Case No. CF-97-657,
in the District Court of Oklahoma County, sentenced to death on all
five counts, and appeals. The Judgments and Sentences for First Degree
Murder are AFFIRMED.
OPINION BY: CHAPEL, J.
STRUBHAR, P.J.: CONCUR
LUMPKIN, V.P.J.: CONCUR IN RESULTS
JOHNSON, J.: CONCUR
LILE, J.: CONCUR IN RESULTS
FOOTNOTES
1
21 O.S.1991, § 701.12. The Bill of Particulars also alleged that
Hooks knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one
person, that the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding
arrest or prosecution, and the existence of a probability that Hooks
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society. The jury did not find these
aggravating circumstances.
2
Adams was partially clothed but her brassiere and shirt were pulled
up, exposing her chest area. Evans and Adams were not bound, but
evidence suggested at one time Adams's hands had been tied.
3
22 O.S.1991, § 634; Lauhoff v. State, 1973 OK CR 127, 508
P.2d 285, 286-87 (failure to file written motion waives challenge).
4Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668, 58
L.Ed.2d 579 (1979).
5Alverson v. State, 1999 OK CR 21, 983 P.2d 498, 517, cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 820, 145 L.Ed.2d 690 (2000);
Trice v. State, 1993 OK CR 19, 853 P.2d 203, 207-08, cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1025, 114 S.Ct. 638, 126 L.Ed.2d 597; Fox v.
State, 1989 OK CR 51, 779 P.2d 562, 566, cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1060, 110 S.Ct. 1538, 108 L.Ed.2d 777 (1990).
6Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 51 L.Ed.2d
498 (1977) (non-neutral "key-man" selection system excluded
Mexican-Americans); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96
S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (analogy to jury selection,
systematic exclusion shown where no African-Americans on venire and
jury commissioners not told of eligible jurors, or showing of
racially non-neutral selection process); Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975) (State conceded
systematic exclusion where women were not summoned for jury service
unless they had previously filed a written declaration of wish to
serve).
7
The State suggests that Hooks was convicted by direct evidence.
Despite some anomalous cases suggesting otherwise, a defendant's
testimony does not provide direct evidence unless he includes actual
direct evidence of the crime. See Hooper v. State, 1997 OK CR
64, 947 P.2d 1090, 1103, cert. denied, 524 U.S. 943, 118
S.Ct. 2353, 141 L.Ed.2d 722 (1998); Mollett v. State, 1997 OK
CR 28, 939 P.2d 1, 9, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1079, 118 S.Ct.
859, 139 L.Ed.2d 758 (1998); Hill v. State, 1995 OK CR 28,
898 P.2d 155, 156.
8Miller v. State, 1998 OK CR 59, 977 P.2d 1099, 1107, cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 228, 145 L.Ed.2d 192 (1999);
Hooper, 947 P.2d at 1103; Mollett, 939 P.2d at 9.
9Hooper, 947 P.2d at 1103; Bryan v. State, 1997 OK CR
15, 935 P.2d 338, 358, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 957, 118 S.Ct.
383, 139 L.Ed.2d. 299 (1997).
10
This conclusion is not supported by the evidence. The State could
have argued to the jury, as it did to the trial court, that it was
unlikely these boots were actually the boots Hooks wore in 1992.
11White v. State, 1998 OK CR 69, 973 P.2d 306, 310-311;
Allen v. State, 1997 OK CR 44, 944 P.2d 934, 937; Wisdom v.
State, 1996 OK CR 22, 918 P.2d 384, 396, cert. denied,
528 U.S. 1020, 120 S.Ct. 529, 145 L.Ed.2d 410 (1999); Morgan v.
District Court of Woodward County, 1992 OK CR 29, 831 P.2d 1001,
1005.
12Moss v. State, 1994 OK CR 80, 888 P.2d 509, 515; Thomas v.
State, 1991 OK CR 58, 811 P.2d 1337, 1342, cert. denied,
502 U.S. 1041, 112 S.Ct. 895, 116 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992).
13Fitzgerald v. State, 1998 OK CR 68, 972 P.2d 1157, 1171;
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049,
35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97, 99
S.Ct. 2150, 2151-52, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979).
19Burks v. State, 1979 OK CR 10, 594 P.2d 771, 774,
overruled in part on other groundsbyJones v. State,
1989 OK CR 7, 772 P.2d 922.
20
The State admits this on appeal but suggests Hooks was "put on
notice" that the evidence would be used. In the statement of
evidence to be used to support the Bill of Particulars the State
listed evidence of violent sex as well as sex with multiple
partners. We cannot agree that this document, giving notice of
second stage evidence offered to prove a single aggravating
circumstance, was sufficient notice that Hooks would have to defend
against this evidence of bad acts during the guilt/innocence phase
of trial.
21
During the second stage the State offered evidence of multiple
partners as well as violent intercourse to prove Hooks was a
continuing threat. As the jury did not find that aggravating
circumstance, we need not determine the admissibility of this
evidence.
23Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed.
528 (1896) (encouraging deadlocked juries to continue deliberations
and reach a verdict).
24Lowenfeld v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 240, 108 S.Ct. 546, 552,
98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988); United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
438 U.S. 422, 462, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2885-86, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978).
See alsoBollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 66
S.Ct. 402, 406, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946) (error in instruction not
harmless where jurors were hung for seven hours but returned with
guilty verdict five minutes after erroneous instruction).
25Mooney v. State, 1999 OK CR 34, 990 P.2d 875, 893; Drew v.
State, 1989 OK CR 1, 771 P.2d 224, 229; Brogie v. State,
1985 OK CR 2, 695 P.2d 538, 545; Miles v. State, 1979 OK CR
116, 602 P.2d 227, 228. See alsoKamees v. State, 1991
OK CR 91, 815 P.2d 1204, 1207 (instruction admonishing deadlocked
jury not to surrender honest convictions proper); Lowenfeld,
484 U.S. at 241, 108 S.Ct. at 552 (no coercion where deadlocked jury
instructed (a) not to surrender honestly held beliefs and (b) if
jury could not reach a unanimous sentencing verdict trial court
would impose life without parole).
26Mooney, 990 P.2d at 893 (where last Allen charge was
two hours previous to instruction at issue, trial court erred in
failing to admonish jury to hold to conscientiously held
convictions).
28Malone v. State, 1994 OK CR 43, 876 P.2d 707, 713; Ellis v
State, 1992 OK CR 45, 867 P.2d 1289, 1300-01, cert. denied,
513 U.S. 863, 115 S.Ct. 178, 130 L.Ed.2d 113 (1994); Sellers v.
State, 1991 OK CR 41, 809 P.2d 676, 691, cert. denied,
502 U.S. 912, 112 S.Ct. 310, 116 L.Ed.2d 252 (1991); Boltz v.
State, 1991 OK CR 1, 806 P.2d 1117, 1124-25, cert. denied,
502 U.S. 846, 112 S.Ct. 143, 116 L.Ed.2d 109; Fox, 779 P.2d
at 573; Hale v. State, 1988 OK CR 24, 750 P.2d 130, 139-40,
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 878, 109 S.Ct. 195, 102 L.Ed.2d 164;
Johnson v. State, 1987 OK CR 8, 731 P.2d 993, 1005, cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 878, 108 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed.2d 383 (1987). In
McCarty v. State, 1995 OK CR 48, 904 P.2d 110, 125, we found
the Allen instruction, coupled with a colloquy between trial
court and foreman, was not coercive in the second stage; however,
OUJI-CR (2d) 4-83 had not been promulgated and there was no other
instruction option available to the trial court.
29
1997 OK CR 71, 951 P.2d 98, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 890, 119
S.Ct. 207, 142 L.Ed.2d 170 (1999).
33
However, I note the errors in instruction were exacerbated by the
egregious errors in argument discussed in Proposition II. I believe
this dangerous combination warrants relief.
34
Hooks also refers to a subsequent news article in which one juror
said the holdout agreed to impose the death penalty given the
confines of the law. This statement could not be used to challenge
the verdict but we consider it to clarify our understanding of the
jury's note.
35See, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 120
S.Ct. 727, 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000); Bollenbach v. United States,
326 U.S. 607, 66 S.Ct. 402, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946); McDowell v.
Calderon, 130 F.3d 833, 936-47 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
523 U.S. 1103, 118 S.Ct. 1575, 140 L.Ed.2d 807 (1998).
36
Hooks's claim is supported by the prosecutors' flagrant
misstatements of law in argument designed to convince jurors they
must reach a sentencing verdict and that a hung jury was somehow
illegal. Notwithstanding the fact that correct instructions were
initially given, I would conclude the misstatements of law in
closing argument, plus the subsequent errors in instructing the
deadlocked jury, may have encouraged and perpetuated any jurors'
misunderstanding of the law. In my judgment, in combination with the
errors in Propositions II and VII, this proposition requires relief.
My colleagues, however, unanimously disagree with me as to this
matter and I yield to their collective wisdom.
37Cargle v. State, 1995 OK CR 77, 909 P.2d 806, 828-29,
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 831, 117 S.Ct. 100, 136 L.Ed.2d 54
(1996).
50Martinez v. State, 1999 OK CR 33, 984 P.2d 813, 830, cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1840, 148 L.Ed.2d 782 (2000).
51
I believe prosecutorial misconduct in the second stage infected the
sentencing proceeding with unfairness and deprived Hooks of a fair
sentencing hearing. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181,
106 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). The second stage
argument was especially egregious, as the misstatements of law,
combined with errors in instruction (see Proposition VII), suggested
that a hung jury was somehow illegal. This may have led to a
misconception among the majority of Hooks's jurors (see Proposition
VIII). We have repeatedly condemned the Oklahoma County District
Attorney's reliance on improper argument (see cases cited in Note
55). In addition to our warnings, federal reviewing courts have also
repeatedly condemned Mr. Macy and prosecutors from his office for
their habitual misconduct in argument. Fowler v. Ward, 200
F.3d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 2000); Paxton v. Ward, 199 F.3d
1197 (10th Cir. 1999); Trice v. Ward, 196 F.3d 1151, 1167-68
(10th Cir. 1999); Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir.
1999); Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1172-73 (10th Cir.
1998). This Court has let this flagrant disregard of our rulings
pass too long. The second stage argument here contained several
comments the prosecutors knew to be error, included for the purpose
of inflaming the jury's passions and encouraging a sentencing
verdict based on passion or prejudice rather than the evidence. The
errors in argument, combined with the errors in instructing the
deadlocked jury, prejudiced Hooks's ability to receive a fair
sentencing hearing. I believe the misstatements of law regarding
jury nullification deprived Hooks of his right to a properly
instructed capital jury, and ought to result in relief even if the
other comments did not render the proceedings as a whole
fundamentally unfair. Paxton, 199 F.3d at 1216-17;
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868,
1871, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974). While I would remand the case for
resentencing as a sanction for deliberate prosecutorial misconduct,
my colleagues disagree. I yield to them on this issue.
52Portuando v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 120 S.Ct. 1119, 146 L.Ed.2d
47 (2000).
53
In Subproposition B(6) Hooks cites an argument against mitigating
evidence that does not appear in the transcripts in any argument.
Accordingly the claim is not reviewed.
55Powell v. State, 2000 OK CR 5, 995 P.2d 510, 539;
Washington v. State, 1999 OK CR 22, 989 P.2d 960, 978, 979 n.
18; Short v. State, 1999 OK CR 15, 980 P.2d 1081, 1105,
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 811, 145 L.Ed.2d 683
(1999); Torres v. State, 1998 OK CR 40, 962 P.2d 3, 18,
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1082, 119 S.Ct. 826, 142 L.Ed.2d 683
(1999); Ochoa v. State, 1998 OK CR 41, 963 P.2d 583, 601,
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1023, 119 S.Ct. 1263, 143 L.Ed.2d 358
(1999); Le, 947 P.2d at 554; Duckett v. State , 1995
OK CR 61, 919 P.2d 7, 19, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117
S.Ct. 991, 136 L.Ed.2d 872 (1997); Robinson, 900 P.2d at 400;
Mitchell v. State, 1994 OK CR 70, 884 P.2d 1186, 1202,
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 827, 116 S.Ct. 95, 133 L.Ed.2d 50 (1995);
Jones v. State, 1987 OK CR 103, 738 P.2d 525, 529, 531.
See alsoPowell,995 P.2d at 542-43 (Chapel, J.,
dissenting) (noting prosecutors apparently chose to ignore Court's
explicit warning, states "I believe we should no longer let this
error pass.")
57
I recognize the majority of the Court finds this blatant disregard
of our decisions not itself reversible. As stated above, but for my
colleagues' votes, I would grant relief as a sanction for these
deliberate violations of law.
58Alverson, 983 P.2d at 510; Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984).
59Ullery v. State, 1999 OK CR 36, 988 P.2d 332, 351; Hooper,
947 P.2d at 1111.
60Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d
435 (2000).
67Gilbert v. State, 1988 OK CR 289, 766 P.2d 361, 363;
Robinson v. State, 1987 OK CR 195, 743 P.2d 1088, 1091.
68Skelly v. State, 1994 OK CR 55, 880 P.2d 401, 407. As I
indicated above, I believe the combination of errors in Propositions
II, VII and VIII made the sentencing proceeding fundamentally
unfair.
69
Instruction 10 stated Hooks: (1) was a good son to his mother, never
caused trouble at home, aided her financially and helped with farm
chores; (2) was gainfully employed all his life; (3) worked in the
community and volunteered labor for the elderly and poor; (4)
volunteered help with gardens and cut firewood for others; (5)
assisted neighbors and family members with money and labor; (6) was
a good son to his father, was trustworthy and always there if
needed; (7) cared for the family farm animals and neighbors'
animals; (8) was a good brother to his eight siblings and would
volunteer help for them; (9) was someone his siblings could always
count on; (10) was a good brother-in-law to Linda Hooks, would
houseclean and prepare her children's evening meal; (11) served his
country for five years in the National Guard; (12) helped his
brother, Earl, financially and with chores; (13) was one family
member the family said they could always count on; (14) was loving,
caring and kind until he became addicted to drugs; (15) volunteered
many hours repairing and rebuilding the Holdenville Greater Shiloh
Baptist church, and volunteered his time to repair the pastor's home
and car; (16) started the integration process at Moss School without
any problems and was always polite to teachers and staff; (17)
helped a dying elderly neighbor by cutting his wood for the winter
and feeding his livestock without pay.
70
This Court did not have available to it certain documentary exhibits
during the pendency of this appeal. These documentary exhibits,
including the DNA printouts and reproductions of the "Honchos"
bootprint, were thoroughly described and discussed in several
witnesses' testimony. Examination of this physical evidence was not
necessary to determine the resolution of the issues raised on
appeal.
*****
LUMPKIN, VICE-PRESIDING JUDGE:
CONCUR IN RESULT
¶1 I agree that Appellant's
convictions and sentences should be affirmed. I write separately
because I disagree with the analysis on several points.
¶2 In Proposition I, Appellant
claims the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first degree
murder. The opinion correctly notes that circumstantial evidence was a
strong component of the State's case. However, direct evidence was
also presented as to the charge of murder. The most that can be said
regarding the evidence is that it was composed of both direct and
circumstantial evidence. Due to that fact, the proper standard is that
this Court will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State and determine if any rational trier of fact would have found
essential elements of crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Drew v.
State, 771 P.2d 224, 227 (Okl.Cr.1989); Spuehler v. State,
707 P.2d 202, 203-204 (Okl.Cr.1985). This parsing of the evidence is
one of the reasons I have previously stated my belief this Court
should adopt a unified Spuehler-type approach to evaluate
sufficiency of the evidence in all cases, whether they contain both
direct and circumstantial evidence, or whether they contain entirely
circumstantial evidence. See White v. State, 900 P.2d 982, 993
(Okl.Cr.1995)(Lumpkin, J., specially concurring). I continue to urge
my colleagues to review the flawed premise upon which this Court has
continued to apply a reasonable hypothesis test in the review of
evidence. The application of the reasonable hypothesis in this case
presents a prime example why a unified approach would be clearer and
more concise.
¶3 I also disagree with the
Court's analysis in Proposition VII where Appellant argues his jury
was coerced into returning a death sentence. A review of the
transcript in this case makes it clear the judge and [19 P.3d 320]
attorneys clearly knew the distinction between an Allen
Instruction, as set out in OUJI-CR (2d) 10-11, and the Death Penalty
Proceedings-Deadlocked Jury Instruction contained in OUJI-CR (2d)
4-83. Initially, we should remember the giving of further instruction
in a criminal case is a matter left to the discretion of the trial
judge. Historically, our cases have provided for the additional
deadlocked jury instruction if a jury is unable to reach a verdict
within a reasonable time. Determination of what is reasonable is best
left to the judge who has tried the case. In this particular case, the
judge and attorneys were particularly aware of the amount of time the
trial had taken and the amount of time taken in deliberation in the
first stage and second stage of trial. When the issue was first raised
regarding an Allen charge, the jury had only been in
deliberations for about four (4) hours. (Tr. 2068) At the time the
Allen charge, OUJI-CR (2d) 10-11, was given, the Court advised the
jury, "this case has taken approximately 57 hours of trial time. You
have deliberated for approximately six and one half hours." (Tr.2072)
As the Court reflected later, the jury had deliberated 12 or 13 hours
in the guilt stage. (Tr. 2080)
¶4 When the issue of the
Allen Instruction was first raised, it was in response to the
trial court's inquiry of counsel as to their desired response to the
request of the jury to replace a juror with an alternate. (Tr. 2067)
To that question, the Assistant District Attorney responded, "what
does the deadlock instruction say?", to which defense counsel added,
"it's one that you give every time." It was the trial court that
raised the question of OUJI-CR (2d) 4-83. As the court was speaking
about that Instruction, defense counsel interrupted the court and
stated, "I have had that given - - I'm sorry. Excuse me. It appears it
has to be after an extended period of time." (Tr. 2067-2068) Following
the State's objection to that charge, defense counsel responded, "I
think the Allen charge should be given now frankly telling them
to go back and do that as opposed to anything else that we could
instruct." (Tr. 2068) The final resolution of that discussion was that
the Allen charge would not be given because it was too soon in
their deliberations for an Allen charge. The agreed response
was going to be that the law did not authorize the court to grant the
request and that the jury should continue their deliberations.
¶5 During the above
discussion, an additional note was received from the jury which
advised the court the jury was not able to reach a unanimous sentence.
At that juncture, the decision was made to give the Allen
charge as set out in OUJI-CR (2d) 10-11. To that decision, defense
counsel made the following objection:
"We object to that, Your
Honor. - - - and we think that the Allen charge and
instruction given is not an appropriate instruction to be given
to a jury in the stage two deliberation since there is such an
overlap of both moral and legal issues and therefore we object.
We also request that the
Court ask the jury - - since they say that they're deadlocked,
ask if any further deliberations would be beneficial to this
jury before even considering the Allen charge.
And then as I said on
the record, we object to the Allen charge in the second
stage of this trial as not sufficient in verbiage to fully
explain the sentencing phase of a death penalty case."
Thereafter the court did
administer the Allen charge as Jury Instruction No. 15.
¶6 The instruction given is a
correct statement of law and is a correct instruction to allow the
jurors to further deliberate with the admonition that jurors should
not surrender their honest convictions in arriving at a decision. This
instruction was correct and appropriate under the facts of this case.
¶7 The Court's opinion in this
case seems to infer "recent" changes to 21 O.S.1991, § 701.11, which
necessitate this Court's ruling regarding the requirement to give
OUJI-CR (2d) 4-83. The history of this statute and our jury
instructions does not support this analysis. The provisions of our
current Section 701.11 have been in effect since 1987. This is not a
new statute. While OUJI-CR (2d) 4-83 is a relatively recent addition
to the Uniform Jury Instructions, it is not a new instruction as to
its concept. The original Oklahoma Uniform Jury [19 P.3d 321]
Instructions-Criminal were adopted in 1981. OUJI-CR (1st)
442 was the uniform instruction for Death Penalty Proceedings-Closing
Charge. As of the date of that original publication, OUJI-CR (1st)
442 had as a final paragraph with its preparatory instruction the
following:
[IF JURY HAS NOT RETURNED
A VERDICT WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME RETURN JURY TO COURT AND GIVE
THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTION:]
HAVE YOU REACHED A
UNANIMOUS VERDICT? [NOTE: IF ANSWER IS 'NO' GIVE THE
FOLLOWING: IF ON FURTHER DELIBERATION YOU ARE UNABLE TO AGREE
UNANIMOUSLY AS TO PUNISHMENT, I SHALL DISCHARGE YOU AND IMPOSE A
SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE.
¶8 The fact that this type of
instruction has been a part of the Uniform Jury Instructions since
their inception indicates that more weight should be given to our
prior case law relating to this type of jury instruction. More to the
point, it is readily apparent the OUJI-CR Committee merely removed the
last paragraph from OUJI-CR 442 and created a separate instruction for
that paragraph in OUJI-CR (2d) 4-83.
¶9 In Johnson v. State,
731 P.2d 993, 1005 (Okl.Cr.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 878, 108
S.Ct. 35, 98 L.Ed.2d 167 (1987), the Court addressed the provisions of
21 O.S.1981, § 701.11, which stated that "if the jury cannot within a
reasonable time agree to punishment, the judge shall dismiss the jury
and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life". The Court further
stated:
. . . such a statutory
injunction is "an instruction for the trial court, not for the
jury." Coulter v. State, 438 S.2d 336, 346
(Ala.Cr.App.1982). It would amount to an invitation to the jury to
avoid the difficult duty of passing sentence upon the life of the
accused. (internal cites omitted)
¶10 In Fox v. State,
779 P.2d 562, 574 (Okl.Cr.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1060,
110 S.Ct. 1538, 108 L.Ed.2d 777, (1990) the Court was requested to
reconsider its prior holding that the jury does not need to be
instructed concerning Section 701.11. In response to that request, the
Court stated, "[w]e remain convinced that the jury should not be
concerned with the trial court's supervisory role. Such an instruction
could improperly distract the jury from performing its duty of
assessing the sentence." Id.See also, Boltz v. State,
806 P.2d 1117, 1124-25 (Okl.Cr.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 846,
112 S.Ct. 143, 116 L.Ed.2d 109 (1991).
¶11 In Ellis v. State,
867 P.2d 1289, 1300 (Okl.Cr.1992), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 863,
115 S.Ct. 178, 130 L.Ed.2d 113 (1994) the Court addressed the issue of
the application of OUJI-CR (1st) 442. The Ellis
opinion reflects that on five occasions during the jury's
deliberations, defense counsel requested the trial court give the
final portion of OUJI-CR (1st) 442. Ellis, 867 P.2d
at 1300-1301. Each request was refused and the jury was permitted to
deliberate for over seventeen hours before reaching a verdict. This
Court found the length of the jury's deliberations were not
unreasonable under the circumstances of the case and that the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to give the requested
instruction or to take the case from the jury. Id.
¶12 More recently, in
Malone v. State, 876 P.2d 707, 713 (Okl.Cr.1994), we reiterated
the principle that this Court's jurisprudence has consistently held an
instruction pursuant to 21 O.S.1981, § 701.11 was improper because it
invites the jury to avoid its difficult duty to pass sentence on the
life of an accused.
¶13 While this Court has
consistently held that an instruction based on Section 701.11 would
improperly distract the jury from performing its duty of assessing the
sentence, it has also stated that if a trial judge gives that
instruction, it is not an abuse of discretion. See Darks v. State,
954 P.2d 152, 166 (Okl.Cr.1998); Hayes v. State, 738 P.2d 533,
541 (Okl.Cr.1987).
¶14 Based on the historical
perspective of our jury instructions and case law, I believe the
opinion is in error when it infers the Uniform Jury Instruction
Committee has overlooked or missed any changes in the law. The Notes
on Use to OUJI-CR (2d) 4-83 in fact state what this Court has said in
its cases. The Uniform Jury Instruction [19 P.3d 322] Committee has
been extremely diligent and professional in ensuring it provides to us
through the jury instructions, committee comments, and notes on use
only the law as it has been adjudicated and determined by this Court.
It does not seek to say what the law should be; it merely reflects
what we have held the law is. That the type of instruction at issue
here has been with us since the inception of the Uniform Jury
Instructions-Criminal indicates that our case law has been based upon
an informed and intentional interpretation of the statute. I agree
with that case law.
¶15 The jury should be given
every reasonable opportunity to arrive at a decision through its
deliberative process. If there are difficulties in arriving at a
unanimous decision after a reasonable time, it is appropriate to give
an Allen charge as set out in OUJI-CR (2d) 10-11. That charge
reminds the jury of the importance of their duties, it reemphasizes
the importance of each individual decision and encourages those jurors
who may have honest beliefs as to the weight and effect of the
evidence that has been presented to them not to abandon those beliefs.
At the same time, it requires them to realize the importance of the
role they play in our judicial system. I do not believe OUJI-CR (2d)
4-83 should ever be given in isolation, but only at the trial judge's
discretion after the initial Allen charge and after the jury
has had an opportunity to further deliberate pursuant to that Allen
charge. As counsel recognized in the record in this case, OUJI-CR (2d)
4-83 should only be given after an extended period of deliberations
when the impasse of the jury is such it is unlikely they will be able
to resolve their differences to arrive at a unanimous verdict.
¶16 I also disagree with a
reference to a newspaper article identified in footnote 34. This
matter is not a part of the record before this Court and should not be
considered by the Court for any purpose.
¶17 I have also reviewed the
transcripts relating to the claim of prosecutorial misconduct as to
closing arguments. I agree that failure of a prosecutor to adhere to
rulings of this Court in the scope and type of closing argument as has
been discussed and ruled upon in the opinions of this Court is a
breach of professional conduct. If this Court, or members of the
Court, believe a "egregious" breach of duty has been performed by an
attorney then it is incumbent on us to refer the matter for proper bar
discipline. While I find some of the argument inappropriate and
unwarranted, I cannot find any error which would require relief in
this case.
¶18 I continue to believe this
Court should fully articulate the reasons for denying applications for
evidentiary hearings pursuant to Rule 3.11, Rules of the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (1998). However
upon review of the application in its entirety, I agree the
application and affidavits do not contain sufficient evidence show
this Court by clear and convincing evidence there is a strong
possibility trial counsel was ineffective for failing to utilize or
identify the complained of evidence.
¶19 I am authorized to state
Judge Lile joins in this writing.