¶12 In Stone, the Supreme Court held that
"where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not
require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus
relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Id. at 482.
We have "held that Stone's 'opportunity for full and fair
consideration' and/or 'litigation' includes, but is not limited to
the procedural opportunity to raise or otherwise present a Fourth
Amendment claim, and the full and fair evidentiary hearing
contemplated by Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 . . . (1963)."
Miranda v. Cooper, 967 F.2d 392
Johnson v. State of Okla., No. PC 95-928, at
1-2 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 1996) (unpublished). In light of the
fact that the case and the statute cited by the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals are clear invocations of the state procedural bar
for claims which "could have been raised on direct appeal, but were
not," Hale, 807 P.2d at 266; see also Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit.
22, § 1086
¶25 Thus "[f]ederal-court review of the claim[s
are] . . .barred unless respondent can establish 'cause and
prejudice' for the default, see Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. [478], 493, 495-96 [1986]." Ylst, 501 U.S. at 806. In
his petition for habeas corpus before the federal district court,
Johnson explained that he failed to raise these claims on state
direct appeal because his "appellate counsel refused and/or
neglected to raise the issue." The district court construed these
statements as an effort by Johnson to show cause for defaulting the
claims in state court; however, the district court found no
appellate attorney error for failing to raise the claims, and thus
the district court found Johnson did not meet the "cause and
prejudice" standard of Murray. Before this court, Johnson has
not argued that his state procedural default should be excused
because of his state appellate counsel's performance; thus we do not
consider the issue. Accordingly, we dismiss claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 on
this ground.5
¶26 Johnson's third federal habeas claim alleged several instances
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.6
The district court lumped this claim in with claims 1, 2, 4, and 5
in its general discussion of state procedural bar. However, this
court has recognized that federal habeas claims involving assertions
of ineffective assistance of counsel must be treated differently
than other claims for procedural bar purposes. See English
v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1261-63 (10th Cir. 1998). In English,
we held that Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit authorities "mandate .
. . that this court never apply a state procedural bar [to an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim] when trial and appellate
counsel are the same." Id. at 1263.7
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