Joseph S. Peeples,
Michael R. Jones, for appellant.
Michael Miller was convicted by a
jury in Walton County of murder and armed robbery.
He was sentenced to death for the murder. We affirm.
[1]
On the evening of October 27,
1987, Miller and Darrell Cook were riding around
Atlanta in a van Cook had stolen, looking for money.
They kidnapped Jimmy Evans in the parking lot of a
bar, tied him up, and forced him to tell them where
he lived. They then proceeded to his apartment,
which they entered using his key. They tied up his
roommate, and stole several items from the apartment.
Evans was driven to a deserted area, where he was
thrown out of the van, and Miller urinated on him.
Leaving Evans by the side of the
road, Miller and Cook met with Teresa Okoia. The
three of them drove to Covington, where they spent
the day buying drugs. They were returning on Miller-Bottom
Road in the early morning of October 29 when they
decided to stop the first car they saw and rob it.
That car was driven by Larry
Sneed. Miller shot several times at his car with a
.22 rifle. When Sneed put on his brakes, his car was
struck from the rear by the van, and left the road.
Sneed exited his car and ran. Miller shot him in the
back and went through his pockets while Okoia
searched the car. They got Sneed's wallet, a cooler,
a check, and several credit cards. When the
porchlight of a nearby house came on, they drove
away. Sneed bled to death.
On November 11, 1987, Miller, who
was in jail on an unrelated charge, told the police
he had information about the robbery and shooting of
Sneed. Miller said he was not involved but had heard
about it from "Monte" and Cook. However, Miller gave
the officers so many details of the crime they
suspected he was involved. Asked if he would take a
polygraph examination, Miller told the officers it
was not necessary as he was going to tell them about
it. He now admitted that he was with Cook and Monte,
but claimed he did not do anything except observe.
On November 24, 1987 Miller was
given a polygraph examination. Before the test,
Miller read and signed a waiver of his Miranda
rights and also signed a form stipulating that the
results would be admissible at trial. The examiner
testified at trial that, in his opinion, Miller was
untruthful when he denied shooting Larry Sneed.
1. On voir dire, the trial judge
asked the prospective jurors if any of them were
conscientiously opposed to the death penalty. None
of the jurors responded. The district attorney
introduced himself and again asked if any of them
were conscientiously opposed to the death penalty.
Again, no one responded. However, after further
questioning, one prospective juror indicated she was
opposed to the death penalty. Both counsel agreed to
excuse her. The district attorney then requested
that the question be asked to each juror
individually. Over objection, the court granted the
state's request. Miller contends that individually
questioning all 71 prospective jurors about the
death penalty put undue emphasis on it and created
in the jurors' minds the idea that the death penalty
was mandatory and life imprisonment should not be
considered.
Death-qualification of
prospective jurors is not improper. Pope v. State,
256 Ga. 195 (7) (345 SE2d 831)
(1986). Moreover, "[i]n cases in which the
death penalty is sought, the trial judge shall
address all Witherspoon and reverse Witherspoon
questions to prospective jurors individually."
Uniform Superior Court Rule 10.1. The trial judge
committed no error when he death-qualified each
juror.
2. "[U]pon an express stipulation
of the parties that they shall be admissible, the
results of a lie detector test shall be admissible
as evidence." State v. Chambers,
240 Ga. 76 (239 SE2d 324) (1977).
Miller contends that since the district attorney did
not personally sign the polygraph stipulation, it is
not binding, and the test results should have been
excluded from the evidence. However, although the
district attorney did not sign the stipulation
himself, he authorized Investigator Yarbrough to
administer a polygraph examination and to obtain a
stipulation from Miller to use the results of the
examination at trial. Once Yarbrough was expressly
authorized to obtain a stipulation, he was acting as
an agent of the district attorney. Thus he had the
power to enter into the stipulation. We hold there
was an "express stipulation by the state and the
accused." Willis v. State,
249 Ga. 261 (290 SE2d 87) (1982).
The trial court did not err by allowing the test
results in evidence.
3. The jury found the presence of
two statutory aggravating circumstances to support
the death sentence for the murder of Larry Sneed:
(1) "The murder was committed during the course of
another capital felony, to-wit, armed robbery," and
(2) "The murder was committed for the purpose of
receiving money and other property of monetary value,
to-wit, a credit card." See OCGA
17-10-30 (b) (2) and (b) (4). The evidence supports these
findings. OCGA
17-10-35 (c) (2).
4. The death sentence was not
imposed under the impermissible influence of passion,
prejudice, or other arbitrary factor. OCGA
17-10-35 (c) (1). Nor is it excessive or disproportionate
to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the crime and the defendant. OCGA
17-10-35 (c) (3). The
similar cases listed in the Appendix support the
imposition of the death penalty in this case.
APPENDIX.
Lee v. State,
258 Ga. 82 (365 SE2d 99) (1988);
Frazier v. State,
257 Ga. 690 (362 SE2d 351) (1987);
Ford v. State,
257 Ga. 461 (360 SE2d 258) (1987);
Romine v. State,
256 Ga. 521 (350 SE2d 446) (1986);
Cargill v. State,
255 Ga. 616 (340 SE2d 891) (1986);
Ingram v. State,
253 Ga. 622 (323 SE2d 801) (1984);
Finney v. State,
253 Ga. 346 (320 SE2d 147) (1984);
Spivey v. State,
253 Ga. 187 (319 SE2d 420) (1984);
Roberts v. State,
252 Ga. 227 (314 SE2d 83) (1984);
Putman v. State,
251 Ga. 255 (304 SE2d 882) (1983);
Wilson v. State,
250 Ga. 630 (300 SE2d 640) (1983);
Rivers v. State,
250 Ga. 288 (298 SE2d 10) (1982);
Jones v. State,
249 Ga. 605 (293 SE2d 708) (1982);
Berryhill v. State,
249 Ga. 442 (291 SE2d 685) (1982);
Solomon v. State,
247 Ga. 27 (277 SE2d 1) (1981);
Dick v. State,
246 Ga. 697 (273 SE2d 124) (1980);
Jones v. State,
243 Ga. 820 (256 SE2d 907) (1979);
Amadeo v. State,
243 Ga. 627 (255 SE2d 718) (1979);
Corn v. State,
240 Ga. 130 (240 SE2d 694) (1977);
Peek v. State,
239 Ga. 422 (238 SE2d 12) (1977);
Birt v. State,
236 Ga. 815 (225 SE2d 248) (1976);
Pulliam v. State,
236 Ga. 460 (224 SE2d 8) (1976);
Dobbs v. State,
236 Ga. 427 (224 SE2d 3) (1976);
Goodwin v. State,
236 Ga. 339 (223 SE2d 703) (1976);
Mitchell v. State,
234 Ga. 160 (214 SE2d 900) (1975);
Moore v. State,
233 Ga. 861 (213 SE2d 829) (1975);
Gregg v. State,
233 Ga. 117 (210 SE2d 659) (1974).
John M. Ott, District Attorney,
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Andrew S. Ree,
for appellee.
Notes:
1. The crime was committed on
October 29, 1987. Indictments were returned on
November 16, 1987, and the case was tried November
15 and 16, 1988. A motion for new trial was filed
December 21, 1988 and denied February 24, 1989. The
case was docketed in this court March 30, 1989. Oral
arguments were heard June 6, 1989.