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John
ROONEY
Classification: Murderer
Characteristics:
Robbery
- The
last person executed by North Dakota
Number of victims: 1
Date of murder:
August 26, 1902
Date of birth:
1880
Victim profile:
Harold Sweet (farm worker)
Method of murder:
Shooting
Location: Cass County, North Dakota, USA
Status:
Executed
by hanging in North Dakota on October 17, 1905
John Rooney (1880 – 17 October 1905) was an
American convicted murderer and was the last person executed by North
Dakota.
On 26 August 1902, a farm worker named Harold Sweet
was shot and killed during a robbery near the Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul Railroad tracks on the west side of Fargo, North Dakota. Rooney
was arrested and charged with first degree murder. In January 1903
Rooney was convicted by a jury and on 31 March 1903, he was sentenced
to death by hanging.
Rooney's appeals went to the Supreme Court of the
United States. Rooney argued that because on 9 March 1903, the North
Dakota Legislature had changed the law to mandate that all executions
should be conducted in a prison rather than in public, the application
of his sentence was being applied ex post facto, since no such law
existed at the time of the murder. The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, holding that "the place of execution, when the punishment is
death, within the limits of the state, is of no practical consequence
to the criminal."
Rooney was hanged behind the walls of the State
Penitentiary in Bismarck, North Dakota on 17
October 1905. It was the first execution in North Dakota's history to
be held in a prison as opposed to in public.
North Dakota abolished the death penalty in 1915.
It was reinstated from 1939 to 1977, but no one was executed by North
Dakota during that time, making Rooney the last person executed by
North Dakota.
Wikipedia.org
U.S. Supreme Court
Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319 (1905)
Rooney v. North Dakota
No. 123
Argued January 12, 1905
Decided January 23, 1905
196 U.S. 319
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
Syllabus
By chapter 99, March 9, 1903, Laws of North Dakota,
the statutes in force when plaintiff in error committed the crime for
which he was tried, and when the verdict of guilty was pronounced were
altered to the following effect: close confinement in the penitentiary
for not less than six or more than nine months after judgment and
before execution was substituted for confinement in the county jail
for not less than three nor more than six months after judgment and
before execution, and hanging within an enclosure at the penitentiary
by the warden or his deputy was substituted for hanging by the sheriff
in the yard of the jail of the county in which the conviction occurred.
Held that the changes, looked at in the
light of reason and common sense, are to be taken as favorable to the
plaintiff in error, and that a statute which mitigates the rigor of
the law in force at the time the crime was committed cannot be
regarded as ex post facto with reference to that crime.
Held that close confinement does not
necessarily mean solitary confinement, and the difference in
phraseology between close confinement and confinement is immaterial,
each only meaning such custody as will insure the production of the
criminal at the time set for execution.
Held that the place of punishment by death
within the limits of the state is not of practical consequence to the
criminal.
This writ of error brings in question a final
judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota, affirming
the
judgment of an inferior court of that state by
which, pursuant to the verdict of a jury, the plaintiff in error, John
Rooney, was sentenced to death for the crime of murder in the first
degree.
The sole question upon which the plaintiff in error
seeks the judgment of this Court, and the only one that will be
noticed, is whether the statute under which he was sentenced was
ex post facto, and therefore unconstitutional in its application
to his case. His counsel agrees that the judgment must stand if the
statute be constitutional.
Before, as well as after, the passage of the
statute under which the sentence was pronounced, the punishment
prescribed by the state for murder in the first degree was death or
imprisonment in the penitentiary for life. Rev.Codes of North Dakota,
1889, § 7068.
By the statutes in force at the time of the
commission of the offense, August 26, 1902, as well as when the
verdict of guilty was rendered, it was provided that, when a judgment
of death is rendered, the judge must deliver to the sheriff of the
county a warrant stating the conviction and judgment, and appointing a
day on which the judgment is to be executed, "which must not be less
than three months after the day in which judgment is entered, and not
longer than six months thereafter," § 8305; that when there was no
jail within the county, or whenever the officer having in charge any
person under judgment of death deemed the jail of the county where the
conviction was had insecure, unfit, or unsafe for any cause, he could
confine the convicted person in the jail of any other convenient
County of the state, § 8320; that the judgment of death should be
executed within the walls or yard of the jail of the county in which
the conviction was had, or within some convenient enclosure within
such county, § 8321, and that judgment of death must be executed by
the sheriff of the county where the conviction was had, or by his
deputy, one of whom at least, must be present at the execution.
Rev.Codes of North Dakota, 1899, § 8322.
The sentence of death was pronounced March 31,
1903. Prior to that date, namely, on March 9, 1903, the legislature --
without changing the law prescribing death or imprisonment for life as
the punishment for the crime of murder in the first degree -- passed
an act providing that all executions should take place at the
penitentiary and amending certain sections of the Revised Codes of
1899. By that act, it was provided:
"§ 1. The mode of inflicting the punishment of
death shall be by hanging by the neck until the person is dead, and
the warden of the North Dakota penitentiary, or, in case of his death,
inability, or absence, the deputy warden, shall be the executioner,
and when any person shall be sentenced, by any court of the state
having competent jurisdiction, to be hanged by the neck until dead,
such punishment shall only be inflicted within the walls of the North
Dakota Penitentiary at Bismarck, North Dakota, within an enclosure to
be prepared for that purpose under the direction of the warden of the
penitentiary and the board of trustees thereof, which enclosure shall
be higher than the gallows, and so constructed as to exclude public
view."
"§ 3. When a person is sentenced to death, all
writs for the execution of the death penalty shall be directed to the
sheriff by the court issuing the same, and the sheriff of the county
wherein the prisoner has been convicted and sentenced shall, within
the next ten days thereafter, in as private and secure a manner as
possible to be done, convey the prisoner to the North Dakota
Penitentiary, where the said prisoner shall be received by the warden,
superintendent, or keeper thereof, and securely kept in close
confinement until the day designated for the execution. . . ."
"§ 14. That section 8305 of the Revised Codes of
1899, relating to judgment of death, warrant to execute, be amended so
as to read as follows:"
" § 8305. When the judgment of death is rendered,
the judge must sign and deliver to the sheriff of the county a warrant
duly attested by the clerk under the seal of the court, stating the
conviction and judgment, and appointing
a day upon which the judgment is to be executed,
which must not be less than six months after the day in which the
judgment is entered, and not longer than nine months thereafter."
"§ 16. All acts and parts of acts in conflict with
the provisions of this act are hereby repealed."
Laws of North Dakota, 1903, c. 99, p. 119.
By the sentence, it was ordered that the accused be
conveyed to the state penitentiary, "there to be kept in close
confinement until October the ninth, 1903," and, within an enclosure
in that building to be erected for the purpose, be hung by the warden
of the penitentiary, or, in case of his inability to act or his
absence therefrom, by the deputy warden, before the hour of sunrise on
the day fixed for the execution.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the
Court.
It appears from the statement of the case that the
statutes in force when the sentence of death was pronounced differed
from those in force when the crime was committed and when the verdict
was rendered, in these particulars:
1. By the later law, close confinement in the
penitentiary for not less than six months and not more than nine
months, after judgment and before execution, was substituted for
confinement in the county jail for not less than three months nor more
than six months after judgment and before execution.
2. By the later law, hanging within an enclosure at
the penitentiary, by the warden or his deputy, was substituted for
hanging by the sheriff within the yard of the jail of the county in
which the conviction occurred.
We are of opinion that, in the particulars just
mentioned, the statute of 1903 is not repugnant to the constitutional
provision declaring that no state shall pass an ex post facto
law. It did not create a new offense, nor aggravate or increase the
enormity of the crime for the commission of which the accused was
convicted, nor require the infliction upon the accused of any greater
or more severe punishment than was prescribed by law at the time of
the commission of the offense. The changes, looked at in the light of
reason and common sense and applied to the present case, are to be
taken as favorable, rather than as unfavorable, to him. It may be
sometimes difficult to say whether particular changes in the law are
or are not in mitigation of the punishment for crimes previously
committed. But it must be taken that there is such mitigation when, by
the later law, there is an enlargement of the period of confinement
prior to the actual execution of the criminal by hanging. The giving,
by the later statute, of three months' additional time to live, after
the rendition of judgment, was clearly to his advantage, for the court
must assume that every rational person desires to live as long as he
may. If the shortening of the time of confinement, whether in the
county jail or in the penitentiary, before execution, would have
increased, as undoubtedly it would have increased, the punishment to
the disadvantage of a criminal sentenced to be hung, the enlargement
of such time must be deemed a change for his benefit. So that a
statute which mitigates the rigor of the law in force at the time a
crime was committed cannot be regarded as ex post facto with
reference to that crime. Calder v. Ball,
3 Dall. 386, 3 U. S. 391,
Chase, J.; Story, Const. § 1345; Cooley, Const.Lim. *267;
Commonwealth v. Gardner, 11 Gray, 443; 1 Bishop, Crim.Law. § 280.
Besides, the extension of the time to live, given by the later law,
increased the opportunity of the accused
to obtain a pardon or commutation from the governor
of the state before his execution.
Nor was the punishment, in any substantial sense,
increased or made more severe by substituting close confinement in the
penitentiary prior to execution for confinement in the county jail. It
is contended that "close confinement" means "solitary confinement,"
and In re Medley,134 U. S. 160,
is cited in support of the contention that the new law increased the
punishment to the disadvantage of the accused. We do not think that
the two phrases import the same kind of punishment. Although solitary
confinement may involve close confinement, a criminal could be kept in
close confinement without being subjected to solitary confinement. It
cannot be supposed that any criminal would be subjected to solitary
confinement when the mandate of the law was simply to keep him in
close confinement.
Again, it is said that the law in force when the
crime was committed only required confinement, whereas the later
statute required close confinement. But this difference of phraseology
is not material. "Confinement" and "close confinement" equally mean
such custody, and only such custody, as will safely secure the
production of the body of the prisoner on the day appointed for his
execution.
The objection that the later law required the
execution of the sentence of death to take place within the limits of
the penitentiary, rather than in the county jail, as provided in the
previous statute, is without merit. However material the place of
confinement may be in case of some crimes not involving life, the
place of execution, when the punishment is death, within the limits of
the state, is of no practical consequence to the criminal. On such a
matter he is not entitled to be heard.
The views we have expressed are in accord with
those announced by the Supreme Court of North Dakota. State v.
Rooney, 12 N.D. 144, 152.
We are of opinion that the law of 1903 did not
alter the
