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Terance
VALENTINE
Classification: Murderer
Characteristics:
Revenge - Kidnapping - Torture
Number of victims: 1
Date of murder:
September 9, 1988
Date of birth: January 21, 1949
Victim profile: Ferdinand Porche (the husband of his ex-wife)
Method of murder:
Shooting
Location: Hillsborough County, Florida,
USA
Status: Sentenced to death April 12, 1990
Florida Supreme Court Briefs and Opinions
Docket #75985 -
Terance Valentine, Appellant, vs. State of Florida, Appellee.
616 So. 2d 971; April 15, 1993.
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit,
Hillsborough County, Case #88-12996
Sentencing Judge, Trial I: The
Honorable M. William Graybill
Sentencing Judge, Trial II: The
Honorable Diane Allen
Attorneys, Trial I: Thomas
Meyers & Linda McKinley - Assistant Public Defenders
Attorneys, Trial II: Walter M.
Lopez Jr., Esq. & Simson Unterberger, Esq.
Attorney, Direct Appeal I:
Douglas S. Connor - Assistant Public Defender
Attorney, Direct Appeal II:
Douglas S. Connor - Assistant Public Defender
Attorney, Collateral Appeals: To
Be Assigned – Registry
Date of Offense: 09/09/88
Date of Sentence I: 04/12/90
Date of Sentence II: 09/30/94
Circumstances of Offense:
Terance Valentine and his wife Livia Romero immigrated to the United
States in 1975. The couple settled in New Orleans and adopted a child,
Giovanna. After seeking a divorce from Valentine in 1986, Romero
married Ferdinand Porche. Romero then relocated with her daughter and
new husband to Tampa, Florida. Shortly after the move, Romero began
receiving threatening phone calls from Valentine.
On
09/09/88, Ferdinand Porche returned home to meet his family. When
Porche entered the house, Valentine shot him in the back, severing his
spinal cord and rendering him paralyzed from the waist down.
Valentine
said to Porche, “This is my revenge.” Porche was forced to crawl into
the bedroom where he saw his pregnant wife naked, bound and gagged, and
his baby crying. Valentine then began to systematically beat and
torture Porche, announcing, “I’m gonna kill you, but you’re gonna
suffer.”
Valentine then transported Porche and Romero to a remote location and
shot them both. Livia Romero survived the attack and informed police
that Valentine was the assailant. In the weeks following her release
from the hospital, Romero began to receive calls from Valentine. With
the help of police recording devices, Romero taped her conversations
with Valentine, which subsequently led to his arrest.
Trial Summary:
09/21/88 Defendant
indicted on the following charges:
01/25/90 Judge Graybill declared a mistrial
after the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict as to Valentine’s
guilt. A new trial was set for 03/26/90.
03/29/90 The new jury found the defendant
guilty on all counts charged in the indictment.
03/30/90 Upon advisory sentencing, the jury,
by a 10 to 2 majority, voted for the death penalty.
04/12/90 The defendant
was sentenced as follows:
Count I: Armed Burglary –
99 years
Count II: Kidnapping - 99
years
Count III: Kidnapping – 99
years
Count IV: Grand Theft 2nd
Degree Motor Vehicle – 5 years
Count V: First-Degree Murder
- Death
Count VI: Attempted
First-Degree Murder – Life
04/15/93 The Florida Supreme Court reversed
Valentine’s convictions and sentence and remanded for a new trial due to
the trial court’s failure to conduct an adequate inquiry into
allegations that the State used its peremptory challenges to exclude
African Americans from the jury during voir dire. The Florida Supreme
Court found a violation of State v. Neil, 457
So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
07/16/94 At retrial, the jury found the
defendant guilty on all counts charged in the indictment.
07/19/94 Valentine waived the jury’s
advisory sentence recommendation.
09/30/94 At retrial, the defendant was
sentenced as follows:
Count I: Armed Burglary –
Life
Count II: Kidnapping - Life
Count III: Kidnapping – Life
Count IV: Grand Theft 2nd
Degree Motor Vehicle – 5 years
Count V: First-Degree Murder
- Death
Count VI: Attempted First-Degree Murder – 30 years
Case Information
On 05/14/90, Valentine filed a
Direct Appeal in the Florida Supreme Court. In that appeal, he argued
that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an adequate inquiry
into the defense’s claim that the State used peremptory challenges to
exclude African Americans from the jury in violation of State v.
Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984). Neil set forth the
guidelines for determining whether a peremptory challenge was unlawfully
exercised on the basis of race.
The Florida Supreme Court also examined
Valentine’s claim according to the dictates of State v. Slappy,
522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988). In Slappy, the Florida Supreme Court
mandated that, unless the trial court can cite specific circumstances in
the record to eliminate the all allegations of discrimination, then an
inquiry must be conducted.
Subsequent to Valentine’s conviction and
prior to the disposition of his Direct Appeal, the Florida Supreme Court
addressed this same issue in State v. Johans, 18 Fla. L. Weekly
S124 (Fla. Feb. 18, 1993). In Johans, the Florida Supreme Court
dictated that, once a party made an objection to the use of peremptory
challenges during voir dire and showed that the challenged individuals
were from a specific race, then an inquiry must be conducted. Since
Johans was not decided at the time of Valentine’s conviction, the
Florida Supreme Court analyzed Valentine’s claim under the provisions of
Neil and Slappy. As such, the Florida Supreme Court found
error in the trial court’s failure to conduct an inquiry into the
defense’s allegation that the State used peremptory challenges to
exclude African Americans.
In addition, the Supreme Court noted that
several more of Valentine’s claims had merit. The court stated:
Although the above issue is
dispositive of this case, we briefly evaluate several additional claims
to assist the trial court in the event of retrial. In the context of
this case, we find no merit to the following claims: The State failed to
obtain the daughter's consent prior to recording the family's telephone
calls; and Romero's testimony concerning the Bronco was inadmissible
hearsay.
The following claims have merit: The daughter's taped
conversation was inflammatory and irrelevant; Romero's taped statement
that Valentine was a drug dealer was irrelevant; the daughter's prior
inconsistent statement should not have been admitted without a proper
foundation; the sentencing order is flawed by the court's failure to
conduct an independent weighing of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances; and the jury was improperly instructed on the aggravating
circumstance of heinous, atrocious or cruel per Espinosa v. Florida,
112 S. Ct. 2926, 120 L. Ed. 2d 951 (1992).
The Florida Supreme Court
reversed Valentine’s convictions and sentences and remanded for a new
trial on 04/15/93.
Following retrial, Valentine was again convicted on all counts charged
in the indictment and sentenced to death. He again filed a Direct
Appeal in the Florida Supreme Court. In that appeal, Valentine argued
that since he and Romero were never legally divorced, portions of her
testimony should have been barred under the spousal evidentiary
privilege.
Valentine also claimed that he was illegally arrested on a
flawed warrant and thus his statements to law enforcement were tainted
by the illegal arrest. He also argued that the introduction of
footprint evidence was error because it insufficiently linked to him to
the crime. Additionally, Valentine argued that his conviction for
Attempted First-Degree Murder was erroneous. The Florida Supreme Court
affirmed Valentine’s sentence of death on 12/19/96.
On 05/16/97, Valentine filed a
Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court that was
denied on 10/16/97.
On 05/28/98, Valentine filed a
3.850 Motion in the State Circuit Court. Amended 3.850 Motions were
filed on 5/14/01 and 5/3/02. The motion was granted in part on 08/01/02
for an evidentiary hearing and denied in part the same day.