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Mose YOUNG Jr.
Classification: Murderer
Characteristics:
Robbery
Number of victims: 3
Date of murders:
February 8,
1983
Date of arrest:
Next day
Date of birth:
December 25,
1955
Victims profile: Sol Marks,
80; Kent Bicknese, 22, and James
Schneider, 33
Method of murder:
Shooting (rifle)
Location: St. Louis, Missouri, USA
Status:
Executed
by lethal injection in
Missouri on April 25, 2001
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit
Robbed pawn shop and shot employees after they refused to buy stolen
jewelry.
Prior convictions for Assault and Heroin.
State of Missouri v. Mose
Young
701 S.W.2d 429 (Mo.Banc 1985)
Capital Punishment in Missouri
from Missouri.net
Case facts:
On February 8, 1983 Mose Young entered a pawn
shop in St. Louis to pawn a gold plated stickpin.
Mr. Lee Raseover, the owner of the shop, told
Young the pin was worthless and threatened to call the police and
have him arrested for stealing by deceit.
A heated exchange ensued with both men pushing
each other. Mr. Rascover pulled a gun from a holster on his hip and
ordered Young to leave. Mr. Pascover then telephoned one of his
partners at a different shop and warned him of Young's attempt to
pawn the stickpin and the altercation that took place.
Young showed up at the second shop and tried to
pawn the stickpin for several thousand dollars at which time his
offer was refused. Young left the shop after another argument and an
attempt to take some jewelry he had asked to examine.
Sometime later Young returned to the second shop
carrying a rifle. At the time there were four persons at the shop
including an employee Romaell Bennett, Sol Marks, Mr. Raseover's
grandfather, James Schneider, a partner of Mr. Rascover's, and Kent
Bicknese, a billboard salesman.
As Young entered the store with the rifle Mr.
Bennett sent Mr. Marks to the rear of the store because he feared
there might be trouble.
As Young entered the store he pointed the
rifle at Mr. Bennett and fired a shot whieh hit and killed Mr.
Bicknese who was standing in front of Mr. Bennett. At that moment Mr.
Schneider emerged from his office and Young turned, fired a shot and
killed him.
Mr. Bennett retreated with Mr. Marks to the back of the
store. Mr. Marks tripped and Mr. Bennett left him and went to the
basement where he hid in the vault. While in the basement Mr.
Bennett tripped an alarm.
Mr. Bennett testified that he heard Young
ask Mr. Marks where Mr. Bennett was. After that Mr. Bennett reported
hearing two more gun shots. Mr. Bennett also heard Young yell down
the steps, "Where are you?"
Mr. Bennett remained in the vault until he heard
police radios. The bodies of Mr. Bicknese and Mr. Schneider were
found in the lobby area of the store and the body of Mr. Marks was
found in a hallway leading to the rear of the building.
The top of
the jewelry counter had been smashed and almost all of the jewelry
was gone. There was $576.00 in cash missing from the cash registers
as well as the victims wallets.
Mose Young was born in St. Louis. Missouri on
December 25, 1955.
On August 27, 1975 Young was arrested in St.
Louis City for Possession of Heroin. He pleaded guilty on February
27, 1976 and was sentenced to one year in the city jail.
On June 25, 1981 Young was arrested in St. Louis
City for Assault First Degree. He pleaded guilty on April 19, 1982
and was sentenced to six months in the city jail.
On February 9, 1983 Young was arrested for three
counts of Capital Murder and Robbery First Degree in St. Louis City.
On May 19, 1984 a jury found Young guilty of all
three counts of Capital Murder. On July 6, 1984 Young was sentenced
to death on each count of Capital Murder.
Legal Chronology:
1983
2/8-Mose Young shoots and kills Sol Marks, Kent Bicknese and James
Schneider in a pawn shop in St. Louis.
3/18-Mose Young is charged by information with three counts of
capital murder.
1984
5/19-Mose Young is found guilty by a St. Louis City Circuit Court
jury of three counts of capital murder.
5/21-The jury recommends the death penalty on each count.
7/6-The court denies a motion for a new trial and sentences Young to
three death sentences as recommended by the jury.
7/10-Notice of Appeal filed in the Missouri Supreme Court.
1985
12/17-The convictions and sentences are affirmed by the Missouri
Supreme Court,
1986
1/15-Motion for a rehearing is denied.
5/5-Certiorari denied by the United States Supreme Court.
7/30-Young files a motion for post-conviction relief.
1987
12/11-The motion for post-conviction relief is denied.
1988
1/5-Notice of appeal of court's ruling to deny post-conviction
relief is filed.
1989
5/16-The denial of the motion for post-conviction relief is denied.
1990
10/30-A petition for habeas corpus is filed in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
1995
4/3-Young files an amended petition for habeas corpus.
5/4-A response to the amended petition is filed.
1997
5/9-A petition for Mandamus is filed seeking to compel a ruling on
the petition for habeas corpus.
6/24-The U.S. District Court denies the petitionfor habeas corpus.
10/2-Young files a Notice of Appeal
12/4-The U.S. District Court affirms the conviction and sentence.
1999
1/29-Rehearing by the panel and rehearing en banc denied.
6/28-Certiorari petition filed.
10/4-The United States Supreme Court denies the petition for
certiorari. An execution date is requested of the Missouri State
Supreme Court.
2000
6/9-The Missouri State Supreme Court sets July 12, 2000 as the date
of execution for Mose Young.
7/12-The U. S. Supreme Court grants stay of execution.
2001
3/27-The Missouri Supreme Court sets April 25, 2001 as the date of
execution for Mose Young.
Mose Young
Associated Press
May 25, 2001
MISSOURI - Mose Young, who gunned down 3
people in a pawn shop that wouldn't make a deal, was executed by
injection early today at Potosi Correctional Center. He was
pronounced dead at 12:14 a.m.
Young lost his final bid for mercy Tuesday night
when Gov. Bob Holden rejected his request for clemency and a
commutation of the sentence to life in prison.
A federal appeals
court had rejected Mose's final legal appeal on Monday, leaving the
clemency request his last hope. Shortly before Holden announced his
decision, Young said by telephone from the prison, "It's getting
kind of shaky, but I understand what I'm facing." Young's bid for
clemency restated what he had pleaded in a lengthy series of court
appeals -- that his original defense lawyer did a miserable job.
On Feb. 8, 1983, Young walked into a former
location of Lee's Pawn Shop, at 5934 Natural Bridge Avenue, with a
rifle after employees at both Lee's shops refused to lend him $1,800
for a stickpin.
He murdered Kent Bicknese, 22, of west St. Louis
County, who was on a sales call for his brother's billboard company;
James Schneider, 33, of Edwardsville, a co-owner of the shop; and
Sol Marks, 80, of Creve Coeur, a part-time employee. Ronnell "Rock"
Bennett, another co-owner, escaped to the basement. Bennett, now
deceased, had known Young at Vashon High School and identified him.
Young testified during his trial in 1984 and
insisted that a man nicknamed "Mickey" had fired the shots. Evelyn
Bicknese, 66, of West County, the mother of Kent Bicknese, and three
other relatives witnessed the execution.
Young spent part of Tuesday
with two Roman Catholic nuns and had a last meal. The nuns also
attended the execution. Young glanced their way, said something to
them and smiled before he died.
Young was within 7 hours of execution on July 11
when the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals stopped the countdown.
The court ordered a hearing on the claim that Jane Geiler, a former
assistant prosecutor in St. Louis, had been prevented by then-Circuit
Attorney Dee Joyce-Hayes from reporting her memory of Young's trial
in the clemency appeal. A follow-up hearing went against Young.
In
1984, Geiler was a supervisor to public defender John M. "Jack"
Walsh, who represented Young. Walsh was disbarred in 1988 for his
handling of another death penalty trial.
Young becomes the 3rd condemned inmate to be put
to death in Missouri this year and the 49th overall since the state
resumed capital punishment in 1989. Missouri trails only Texas
(245), Virginia (82), and Florida (51) in the number of executions
carried out since 1977.
Young becomes the 25th condemned inmate to
be put to death this year in the USA and the 708th overall since
America resumed executions on January 17, 1977.
(sources: St. Louis Post-Dispatch
& Rick Halperin)
ProDeathPenalty.com
At 9 a.m. on February 8, 1983, Lee Rascover
opened his pawn shop in St. Louis, and admitted Mose Young who had
been waiting in front of the store.
Young attempted to pawn a gold-plated stickpin
and wanted $1800 for it so he could buy his girlfriend a used
Cadillac. Lee told Young that it was worthless and threatened to
have Young arrested for attempting to steal by deceit.
A heated
exchange ensued during which Young attempted to push Lee. Lee pushed
Young back and drew his gun from a hip holster and ordered Young to
leave, which he did.
Lee telephoned his other pawn shop and warned
Ronnell Bennett, one of his partners, that Young was bringing the
pin there. Young did go to the second pawn shop and attempted to get
several thousand dollars for it. Having been forewarned, Ronnell
would not take the pin.
Young then engaged in an argument with James
Schneider, another partner in the pawn shop. Eventually they all
agreed that Young might have luck pawning a gun or rifle. Young left
after attempting to steal some jewelry which he had asked to
examine.
Sometime later, Young returned to the second pawn
shop carrying a rifle. At the time four people were present. Ronnell,
Sol Marks, who was Lee’s grandfather, Kent Bicknese, who was taking
the semester off from his aerospace engineering studies at the
University of Missouri-Rolla to work for his brother's billboard
company, and James Schneider.
Ronnell saw Young as he entered the store,
apparently sensed danger and sent the 80-year-old Marks to the back
of the store.
About this time, Young raised the rifle and fired
in the direction of Bennett. The shot killed Kent, who was standing
directly in front of Ronnell. At that moment, James emerged from the
office and Young turned and killed him. Ronnell retreated with Sol
Marks to the back of the store.
When Sol hesitated and fell from
Ronnell’s arms, Ronnell left him and escaped to the basement where
he hid in the vault. While in the basement, Ronnell tripped an alarm.
Ronnell remained in the vault until he heard police radios sometime
later. The police found three bodies, Bicknese, Schneider and Marks.
Young was convicted on three counts of capital
murder by a jury and was sentenced to death. "Mose Young is a brutal
triple murderer who committed three heinous crimes and is an example
of why juries in Missouri need to have the option of the death
penalty," Attorney General Jay Nixon said.
Canadian Coalition to Abolish
the Death Penalty
INNOCENCE CLAIM
Mose Young has claimed from day one that a man
named “Mickey”, not he, walked into Lee’s Pawn Shop on February 8,
1983 and opened fire, randomly killing three people.
ACTION TO BE TAKEN
We are asking Governor Bob Holden to stay the
execution of Mose Young and to appoint a Board of Inquiry to look
into the differences effective assistance of legal counsel would
have made in the Young case. We also ask this Board of inquiry to
investigate violations of the Batson rule, excluding black jurors
without cause, now substantiated in the testimony of Ms. Jane Geiler
of the Circuit Court Attorney's office of St. Louis where Mr. Young
was tried.
Mose Young Application for
Executive Clemency
TO THE HONORABLE BOB HOLDEN, GOVERNOR OF
MISSOURI:
COMES NOW the applicant, Mose Young, Jr., by and
through his attorneys, Joseph Margulies, Sean D. O’Brien, and John
William Simon, and petitions the Governor for his order staying the
execution presently scheduled for April 25, 2001, and appointing a
Board of Inquiry, pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 552.070; and for his
Order commuting the sentence of the Circuit Court of the City of St.
Louis from death to life without parole.
Mose Young was sentenced to death in a trial in
which the prosecutor used every one of his peremptory challenges to
exclude African-Americans from the jury. Mose’s trial lawyer was an
alcoholic who made no pretense of being prepared; in the next case
he tried, he sat silent through the entire proceeding to protest the
court’s denial of his motion for a continuance. He was disbarred,
but his other client’s sentence was overturned.
Mose has been a good father to his two sons, one
of whom is retarded. He has been a mediator between African-American
and white prisoners, and has prevented more deaths than he was
convicted of causing. He is worth more to the State of Missouri
alive than dead.
Regardless of the broad philosophical issues
involving the death penalty, this is one case in which a consistent
death-penalty supporter can say that life without parole is enough
punishment under the circumstances—that the norms underlying the
continued practice of capital punishment do not support carrying out
this execution, and that the interests of society weigh in favor of
letting this man continue to help raise his sons and to help his
fellow-prisoners get along with each other and with the staff.
Supreme Court upholds
Young's stay of execution
Jefferson City News-Tribune
Wednesday, July 12, 2000
POTOSI, Mo. (AP) - A federal appeals
court on Tuesday granted a stay of execution for convicted killer
Mose Young just hours before he was scheduled to die by injection.
The U.S. Supreme Court refused the state's request to vacate the
stay early Wednesday morning, postponing the execution indefinitely.
Young, on death row since 1984, had been
scheduled to die at 12:01 a.m. Wednesday for killing three men
inside a St. Louis pawn shop 17 years ago.
After waking up alive Wednesday, Young told The
Associated Press from the Potosi Correctional Center, "It's a
beautiful morning." "I didn't shed no tears. I didn't cry because I
know it's never over with." he said. "That was God's will to have
this one day, and it's going to be God's will to have whatever more
days are remaining in my life."
The 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in St.
Louis ruled about six hours before the scheduled execution that St.
Louis Circuit Attorney Dee Joyce-Hayes violated Young's right to due
process by interfering with a witness.
The court ordered U.S. District Judge Jean
Hamilton of St. Louis to reconsider Young's appeal. Hamilton had
rejected it Monday. Missouri Attorney General Jay Nixon's office
said Nixon would appeal the stay so the state could move forward
with the execution as early as Thursday morning.
Young's attorney, Joseph Margulies, argued that
the witness, an attorney now working for Joyce-Hayes named Jane
Geiler, wanted to offer information that could help Young receive
clemency from Gov. Mel Carnahan.
They alleged that Joyce-Hayes
threatened to fire Geiler if she did so. "The Constitution of the
United States does not require that a state have a clemency
procedure, but, in our view, it does require that, if such a
procedure is created, the state's own officials refrain from
frustrating it by threatening the job of a witness," the court
ruling said. "Indeed, there is reason to think that what the circuit
attorney did here amounts to the crime of tampering with a witness,"
the appeals panel wrote. "Such conduct on the part of a state
official is fundamentally unfair."
Joyce-Hayes has denied
threatening to fire Geiler. "I never threatened to fire her, and
some of the things Mr. Margulies alleges she and I discussed were in
fact never discussed by us," Joyce-Hayes said Tuesday night. "It was
never my intention to interfere with Mose Young's due process of law."
The state immediately appealed, asking the U.S.
Supreme Court to set aside the ruling. The court had made no ruling
by late Tuesday. A spokesman for Carnahan said the governor would
not decide on clemency until after all appeals were exhausted.
Margulies claimed that in Young's 1984 trial the jury was racially
stacked against him and his lawyer was ill-prepared. "My reaction
was relief," Margulies said in a telephone interview Wednesday from
Minneapolis. "We are pleased and relieved the court saw the case the
way we saw it." Margulies said prosecutors moved to strike nine
prospective jurors only because they were black. Eventually, the
jury consisted of eight whites and four blacks. Young is black; all
three victims were white.
Young told the AP in an interview Tuesday that he
first met his attorney, Jack Walsh, four days before the trial began.
Walsh warned the court that he hadn't had time to prepare.
Margulies
also claimed that Geiler, an associate of Walsh's at the time of the
1984 trial, would have been willing to describe how poorly Young was
represented if not for the threat from Joyce-Hayes. Young spent
Tuesday visiting with two nuns and talking on the phone with lawyers
and well-wishers, hoping and praying the courts or Carnahan would
halt the execution. "I believe in God -- I'm holding up strong,"
Young said. "I ain't bitter."
The nuns were from a convent in
Savannah, Mo. Young said they began corresponding with him about
five years ago. Young, on death row longer than all but three of the
80 inmates awaiting execution at Potosi, maintained "from day one"
that a man named "Mickey," and not he, walked into Lee's Pawn Shop
on Feb. 8, 1983, and began firing.
Killed were James Schneider, 33,
a co-owner of the shop; Sol Marks, 80, who worked there part-time
and was the grandfather of another partner; and Kent Bicknese, 22, a
billboard salesman who had stopped by to lease space outside the
store for a sign.
Authorities said the evidence was overwhelming
against Young, a convicted drug felon who was suspected of several
unsolved murders in a rough area of north St. Louis. "Mose Young is
a brutal triple murderer who committed three heinous crimes and is
an example of why juries in Missouri need to have the option of the
death penalty," Attorney General Jay Nixon said.
Young said that he had argued with the pawn shop
proprietors over a gold-plated stickpin he had tried to pawn. Young
wanted $1,800 for the pin, and planned to spend the money to buy his
girlfriend a used Cadillac. The pawn shop owners thought it was
worthless. Young left, then returned with a rifle, according to
Ronnell Bennett, also a partner in the pawn shop.
Bennett said he
was the intended target, but the bullet struck Bicknese, who was
taking the semester off from his aerospace engineering studies at
the University of Missouri-Rolla to work for his brother's billboard
company. Bennett escaped to a basement and hid in a vault until
police arrived. Police and Bennett found the three men shot to
death.
Straight from the Heart...
By Sister Audrey Locke, O.S.F.
Just a little over a year ago, I was faced with a
challenge to act on my word. After prayerful deliberation, I made
the decision to step out in faith and take a path that I had never
expected to go in my life time. It was a journey that would be by
far one of the most challenging of my life, a real test of who I say
I am.
On July 6, 2000, I accompanied two of my
religious sisters, Sisters Christine and Kathleen, on a trip to the
Potosi Correctional Center in southeast Missouri. Potosi is
approximately a six to seven hour drive from our home here in
Savannah, Missouri.
Our
mission and purpose were to provide spiritual support for a man who
was on Death Row. Sister Christine had been in communication with
this person for the previous five years via letters, occasional
phone calls, and visits.
Upon our
arrival, we met Mose Young, a 44-year-old African-American who had
been convicted and incarcerated since February, 1983, for the
killing of three men in a pawn shop in St. Louis, Missouri.
My being
able to come face to face with the accused introduced a whole new
dimension of reality of a person on Death Row. I saw before me a man
who was very appropriate in his words and in his behavior. Mose was
a strong extrovert with an outgoing personality and an unusual sense
of humor. He was neatly dressed and well groomed in his simple
prison apparel.
From the
very beginning, I sensed a genuineness in his being and a
comfortableness in his relating to us in spite of our just having
met. Mose had a story that needed to be told, a story that needed to
be heard: his story of conversion and grace after so many long and
difficult years on Death Row. “In spite of all the adversities I
have had in my life, I harbor no grudge or resentment towards anyone.
I was not always of this thinking, but Allah has been good to me and
has worked through me. I praise him everyday for this rebirth.”
Mose had
been given an execution date for July 12, 2000. Several days after
our first visit we were on the road again to Potosi. Throughout the
long trip, “When I was in prison, you visited me.” kept running
through my head. How many times had I read or heard this corporal
work of mercy? How many times had I committed myself to being
present to someone who is confined behind prison walls, unable to
express his or her freedom in ways which I so much take for granted?
Without a doubt in my mind, this experience presented a whole new
meaning to reaching out to those who have no voice and in many ways
are looked at as being disposable.
As we got
closer to foreign territory, I found myself a bit anxious,
apprehensive, and rather emotional. Deep within I knew that this was
just the beginning of the many hurdles that we would have to face.
My focus was not intended to pamper my own fears but an attempt to
meet any needs that Mose might be having during this crucial and
devastating time.
After
being so coldly processed and educated in the do’s and don’ts of the
execution protocol, I did not allow myself to become disempowered by
what I perceived as insensitive and uncaring attitudes of some of
the staff. For some it seemed to be “just a job”. For others their
nonverbal behavior spoke of compassion.
Like many
caught up in the system, Mose openly admitted that his past history
did not deem the “prize”. “I have done some awful things in my life
that I am not very proud of, but I can honestly say today, as was
said eighteen years ago, I am innocent of this crime. I am not a
murderer. I am not the insensitive and selfish person I was years
ago.” A number of the staff confirmed this when they said that Mose
had been a model prisoner throughout his time of being incarcerated.
Mose,
without hesitation, maintained his innocence to the last. So was
this man innocent or not? It is not my nature to minimize or condone
any heinous and violent act that destroys life. At the same time, I
feel a grave responsibility from within that compels me to contend
that life, all life is to be reverenced and protected from harm.
Our first
deathwatch began on July 10th, 2000. Having passed all the tightly
secured checkpoints, we were then escorted down a deserted hallway,
passing through several large automated steel doors that snapped
with a harsh bang, resonating throughout the corridor. This pathway
eventually lead to a long flight of winding stairs, leading down to
subterranean depths of the prison. The holding cell and execution
chamber are within several feet of each other, both being a part of
the prison infirmary. I found this to be most disturbing and
misleading.
The
holding cell symbolized extreme confinement and “untouchable” for
the individual that occupies this minute space. This designated area
was camouflaged by a corrugated door, giving one a feeling of dark
secrecy. In a more descriptive sense, the holding cell is best to be
described as a “cage” or a “dog kennel”. The exterior of the holding
cell is made up of a heavy iron crisscrossed fence, which obscures
one’s view when visiting with the inmate. This area is backed by a
solid concrete wall.
The
limited space consists of one plastic patio chair, a metal bed frame
that extends out from the wall with a foam mattress approximately
three inches or less in depth; a small TV, telephone, and a
stainless steel toilet and washbowl. A guard sits at a small desk,
closely watching, listening, and documenting all activity that goes
on in the holding cell.
Right
outside of the “cage” are two more plastic chairs nailed to the
floor. One could not miss the bold and intimidating red line that
strongly indicated to visitors to stay within their boundary. The
long hours spent in such uncomfortable confinement was indeed
evident of God’s grace for my own personal endurance.
Six hours
prior to the scheduled execution, Mose was granted a temporary stay.
Not knowing just how long the stay would last, we rejoiced in the
moment and expressed our sighs of relief and prayers of thanksgiving.
After leaving the prison around 11:00 PM, we waited anxiously back
at the motel until 1:00 AM, when we received word that the U.S.
Supreme Court had upheld the stay for further investigation. With
this news, we had hoped that Mose would possibly be given a second
chance at a new trial.
In earlier
years, Mose’s legal representatives failed to adequately prepare for
his defense. Sometime later, two of the trial lawyers were disbarred
for numerous misrepresentations and personal discrepancies. One of
the lawyers, with much humility, was courageous enough to admit his
negligence in the case: “This knowledge has haunted me for the past
18 years and will continue to haunt me for the rest of my life.”
Over the
next nine months, we continued to travel to Potosi to visit Mose. A
revised legal team was working very diligently and conscientiously
in trying to bring justice to the forefront. All kinds of legal
tactics were exercised, but to no avail, the darkness was upon us
once again.
March 27,
2001, there was a mandatory lock-down in the prison. Mose shared
with us that a strange feeling came over him. Once he was in his
cell, he was able to look through what is called a bubble, a large
mirror, anchored on the wall. He saw six guards and a prison
official ascending the stairs to the second landing. At that point
he was certain they were coming to retrieve him.
Mose was
informed that the Missouri Supreme Court had issued another warrant
and date for his execution. The execution was scheduled for April
25th. Without further information, Mose was immediately removed from
the prison’s general population and placed in protective custody for
the next 30 days.
Upon
hearing this news, I was intent not to be overcome by the brain-etched
nightmares of last July, for I had committed myself unconditionally
for the duration of this journey, no matter what the outcome.
Sunday,
April 22nd, 12:00 o’clock midnight, when quiet dominates the prison
environment, Mose was transferred to the holding cell. This
transition always occurs 48 hours prior to the execution. Mose,felt
that he had an advantage in knowing what to expect this time around.
Monday,
April 23rd, we began our second deathwatch with Mose. With much
regret, due to prior international meetings, Sister Kathleen was
unable to make this last stretch of Mose’s journey. She was able to
speak with him over the phone reassuring him of her prayers,
blessings and heartfelt wishes.
Shortly
before we were escorted down to the holding cell, we met with Mose’s
attorneys. They were just coming from meeting with him. The lawyers
were quite emotional in their informing us that the outcome was not
looking very favorable. Their last attempt for clemency was
presented to both the governor and the 8th Circuit Court. If either
would refuse to give consideration to the requests, then legally
there was nothing else to be done, for they had exhausted all
avenues.
These
legal advocates were quite moved by Mose’s concern for them. He
reassured and thanked them for all they had done on his behalf. “Can
you believe that he was consoling us and thanking us? We have never
represented anyone like Mose before...ever! Mose’s concern for
others when his own life is less than 36 hours away from being over
is so amazing.”
The
lawyers graciously expressed their thanks and appreciation for our
presence and commitment to Mose. “He will need you more than ever at
this time,” said one of the lawyers. Mose would often say “You don’t
begin to know how much it means to have my ‘special angels’ here.”
We knew, yet his gift of self and example to us outweighed anything
we could have possibly given to him. Truly we were the recipients.
When
entering the holding cell area, we found Mose in good spirits
despite the circumstances. We were graced with shared moments of
spiritual peace, prayer and laughter, recalling some of our previous
visits and how we all looked forward to getting together and sharing
the vending machine meals.
Never
forgetting the seriousness of the situation, there was mutual
determination not to be robbed of our quality time together. In one
sense Mose made it easier for us, we just simply took our cues from
him. He had a way about him that seemed to overshadow the sadness
with peace.
Tuesday
morning, April 24th, 15 hours away from the scheduled execution,
Mose’s lawyers called to inform him that the courts had denied his
request for an appeal. Even at this news, Mose remained composed and
undisturbed, not giving into the forces that had dictated his life
for the past eighteen years.
This
unusual stamina was not one that seemed to come from wrestling with
his foes, but one that comes from the God force within. ”I
understand and I appreciate all that you and the rest of my
supporters have done for me. No matter what, there will be a
blessing, there will be a resurrection, for this thing is much
bigger than Mose. If it is Allah’s will, then so be it. I may have
to die for this cause, but it will not have been in vain.”
Taking
only a brief break during the day, we continued to wait with him,
hoping and praying that the governor’s decision would be honest and
non-political, that it would be a decision of compassion, not one of
vengeance and cruelty. Around 6:10 PM, being very much aware that
visiting hours would be ending at 7:00 PM, we expressed our words of
gratitude and blessings for one another.
For one of
our final prayers we sang “I Will Walk in the Presence of God”. This
song speaks of the freedom which comes when one enters into God’s
presence. We later sang the blessing of St. Francis: “May the Lord
bless and keep you. May he turn his face to you have mercy. May he
turn his countenance to you and give you peace.” Tears welled up in
Mose’s eyes. We knew he could feel the touch of God and that peace
and comfort were his companions.
I said to
Mose, “If the state carries out this execution tonight, embrace
death, for death is a gift. Death is never the hard part; it’s the
getting there. There is this old spiritual I sing once in awhile, ‘I
don’t feel no ways tired, I’ve come too far from where I started
from. Nobody told me that the road would be easy, I don’t believe
he’s brought me this far to leave me’.” Mose’s response: “Amen,
Amen!” He said with much conviction. “This is a very unjust thing
that has happened to me. For eighteen years I have had to live with
this heavy burden strapped to my back, but tonight it is going to
end. Straight from the heart, I am all right, for I am at peace. I
refuse to harbor hate, for hate is deadly in the worst kind of way.
They may be able to destroy Mose’s body, but they will never be able
to claim Mose’s spirit or soul.”
Five
minutes to seven, the escorts had come down to tell me that I must
leave. Sister Christine, Mose’s spiritual advisor, would be staying
until 10:30 As I was leaving the holding cell, the very last words
that I heard were, “I love you, keep it real.”
“I love
you too my brother, be at peace.” I thought how sad and inhuman that
the one who is to die is denied that last human touch with their
loved ones. I remained strong, but the core of my soul grieved for
all of us. It is customary that on the eve of an execution there is
a lock-down of the entire prison. All inmates are accounted for in
their cells.
The guards
are manning their posts. The press conference area is intact. The
telephones are checked for clear connections, and the clocks are all
synchronized. The atmosphere is very quiet, but far from being
peaceful.
I was to
return to the prison at 10:30 PM. The next three and half hours
would seem like an eternity. As I was being escorted to my car, I
was told that the purpose of the escort was for my protection from
the media. Personally, I did not perceive it as a problem. Greater
measures were taken to avoid any possible contact with the victim’s
family. It was even suggested that when I return to the motel, I
park my car at least 2-3 doors down from where I was actually
staying to avoid the “forbidden ”!
It was
later reported that a few minutes before 10:00 PM one of Mose’s
lawyers called to inform him that the governor would be announcing
his decision on television that the execution would be carried out
as planned. Mose was able to hear the announcement simultaneously as
he was speaking to his lawyers.
Mose said,
“I am relieved. The wait is almost over. I will finally get to see
my mother and father tonight. It has been an awful long time since I
have seen them.” Sadly, both parents and numerous other loved ones
had passed away during the time of Mose’s incarceration.
At 10:20 I
started my short trip back to the prison. I felt as if I were in
slow motion. About one half mile before reaching the entrance of the
prison, I was trailed by several security vehicles which followed me
to the front gate. The gate, being closed, was blocked by another
eight or nine security cars.
The
prison’s S.W.A.T. team was heavily strapped with fire arms and
communication gear. One would have thought that some dignitary was
expected to arrive, not that a man was about to be murdered in our
name. I felt a deep hollowness inside.
A couple
of the guards approached my vehicle. After showing some ID and
stating that I was a witness for Mose Young, I was flagged on, led
by a security car to the back entrance of the prison, only to park
my vehicle and be transported in the prison van to the farthest and
most remote section of the prison. Inside the van there were the
driver and a companion guard in the front seat. Directly behind them,
was a steel grate dividing the seats. I was instructed to sit behind
the grate.
No effort
made for conversation. Only after a short distance this overwhelming
distaste of feeling violated and being treated like a criminal came
over me. I insisted that I be let out, so that I could walk the rest
of the way. With much reluctance they complied. Ahead I could see
the chaplain and a “high security” staff person waiting. Sad to say,
I really do not think that either one had a clue as to how
vulnerable a person might be feeling at this time.
I was then
taken to a waiting room, ironically the same waiting room where we
would often visit Mose. There I was to meet Sister Christine. Once
she arrived, we were detained for little over an hour before being
taken to the execution chamber. We as witnesses of the accused were
the last to enter the execution area and the first to leave
immediately once the execution was completed.
The
execution chamber is a core of a larger room. It is enclosed by a
steel door on one side and three viewing rooms. At each window of
the viewing rooms are Venetian blinds that are kept closed until the
procedure is ready to begin.
In the
viewing area to the left of the offender were the state witnesses
and media, the second viewing area, at the foot of the offender was
the victim’s family, and the third viewing area to the right of the
offender were the witnesses for the accused. Only one victim’s
family participated. They felt that the death of this man was
justified in order that they might have some kind of closure.
The father
in this particular case refused to participate in the witnessing.
The second victim’s family are all deceased, and the third victim’s
family stated that they also, did not want to advocate the taking of
another person’s life.
At 11:55
PM the call came for us to go to the execution chamber, the dreaded
dark hour had come. I remember praying over and over, “Lord, God,
let your mercy be upon us. Jesus remember Mose when you come into
your kingdom.”
Once we
were in the chamber, we sat in our designated seats, which consisted
of plastic chairs nailed to a three-tiered platform. There was a
stillness, a shameful silence. A gamut of emotions filled the room.
Some waiting for the first signal to be given, others praying that
the first signal would never come....but it did.
“Operation
Will Begin,” the monotone voice announced. The blinds are
aggressively snapped open. The front line executioners are not
revealed. Alone in the chamber, Mose was lying on a gurney. A bright
white sheet covered all but his face and head, leaving the imprints
of the restraints underneath quite visible. In spite of his mild
lethargic state, Mose immediately made contact with us.
He turned
his head and smiled. With some effort, he was able to raise his
right hand to give the peace sign. He mouthed the words, “I am all
right. I will be with you. I am going to touch you.” Our message to
him, “Mose go towards the light. Finally be at peace, embrace your
God, for Allah is with you forever.”
At the
head of the gurney, there was a hole in the wall that accommodated
three intravenous lines, piggybacked into a main line that was
inserted in Mose’s right arm. As a medical professional, I cannot
count the times I have started IV lines administering medications to
fight infections and inflammations of all sorts, the goal and result
being restorative, yet I felt powerless and much sadness that I was
unable to intervene on behalf of a human being who was intentionally
being put to death.
“Phase One!”
Startled by the unemotional announcer, I was aware that the first
lethal injection, Sodium Pentathal, causing deep unconsciousness,
was being administered. Mose’s immediate response was a mild shudder.
His pupils became fixed. He was still, very still. There was a brief
pause, approximately 60 seconds.
Then on
cue “Phase Two" the next lethal injection, Pancuronium Bromide was
introduced in the lines causing paralysis of the lungs and other
muscles. At this time I began to notice some cyanosis (a bluish tint)
around Mose’s lips. Very little time had passed when we heard the
final instruction, “Phase Three", a lethal injection of Potassium
Chloride administered causing cardiac arrest. After the last drug
was given, there was a 7-8 minute wait, before the announcer
signaled, “Operation complete. Mose Young deceased.”
Soon after
midnight, Mose had succumbed. Flooded with an overwhelming sense of
God’s peace, I was certain that death had come prior to it’s being
officially pronounced. I felt the moment Mose’s freedom came, for
his physical remains presented a different look. His body no longer
housed his soul. I am confident that God embraced this man with a
tenderness which, hopefully, you and I shall come to know. All I
could pray was “Thanks be to God for setting this man free. No
longer enslaved. No longer caught up in a system that denies his
right to life. No more prison bars and locked doors to keep him
confined. No more raping of his humanity and vulnerability. No more
looking over his shoulder, wondering if this is the day someone
makes the decision whether he lives or dies. No more walking in the
shadow of death....No more walking in the shadow of death.”
Just
seconds after the official death pronouncement, the blinds were
lowered. We were hurried out of the chamber area. No allowances or
considerations intended. Sadly, no acknowledgment of the loss.
As we
proceeded to leave the premises, the front entrance that was once
swarming with guards, and security cars was now deserted. The air
was fresh, the sky was clear and the stars were plenty. After all
there was a real celebration going in heaven, a real welcoming home.
Mose had reached the finish line. He had crossed the barren desert,
and he did not die of thirst, for it was his faith and trust in God
that sustained him through the fire.
With
heartfelt regret, I am truly sorry that there was never the occasion
to speak with the victim’s family, not to judge them or challenge
their feelings, but to simply acknowledge their pain and their loss.
As Sister Helen Prejean expresses so well, we need to stand on both
sides of the cross, giving empathy, compassion and understanding for
both the victims and the perpetrators.
I have
often wondered why we are afraid to speak of what heals rather than
what destroys. In the past eighteen years, what had been done to
help families such as these find authentic closure which would bring
healing and peace? I believe that within each person there are inner
resources which can offer comfort and reconciliation. With
appropriate guidance and direction, one can come to recognize these
gifts and channel his or her life in a more holistic way.
For me the
following excerpt speaks volumes, “Vengeance and violence
dehumanizes, gives false satisfaction. Surrendering to vengeance and
violence can only lead to death, spiritual death. If we truly
understand our pain and suffering from serious violation, then why
would we want to inflict this pain on anyone else, especially when
it can only lead to false hope and temporary satisfaction?
Violence
and vengeance crucifies us all, but every time someone responds with
love and forgiveness, that person and all humankind are raised up to
a new vision and quality of life. This is salvation. This is
mirroring the God who makes good come out of evil. This is the
beginning of the end of violence.” (Hidden Friends, Carmelites of
Indianapolis)
Personally
having experienced violence in my own family, the murders of a
grandfather and three cousins, I feel compelled as a human being to
be a part of what seeks, advocates, and promotes peace and justice.
In the struggle to find that unity of reverencing life, all life, we
must become reconciled. It is imperative that we give value and
worth to all people, even those who have made poor choices in their
lives, especially those whom we perceive as radically different from
ourselves. In reality they reflect a dimension of who we are and
what we are capable of “but for the grace of God”.
Though our
“Green Mile” has been long and emotionally draining, my life has
been touched in a very sacred way, a way that not even I will be
able to fully grasp until that day when I too shall be in total
presence of God. I give thanks to him for this rich experience, and
the grace to endure it. As I look back and process this tragic
ordeal, I feel a much deeper appreciation for the protection that
accompanied us. God’s shock absorbers were indeed a blessing!
As people
of God, we must all continue to rise and move against the grain for
justice, remembering and praying for those who have fallen at the
hands of violence. Through faith we are committed to divine law
rather than the law of the state, knowing that this is the only way
we can come to God’s true peace and forgiveness of one another.
---Sister
Audrey Locke, O.S.F.
Application for Executive Clemency
TO THE HONORABLE BOB HOLDEN, GOVERNOR OF MISSOURI:
COMES NOW the applicant, Mose Young, Jr., by and
through his attorneys, Joseph Margulies, Sean D. O'Brien, and John
William Simon, and petitions the Governor for his order staying the
execution presently scheduled for April 25, 2001, and appointing a
Board of Inquiry, pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 552.070; and for his
Order commuting the sentence of the Circuit Court of the City of St.
Louis from death to life without parole.
Mose Young was sentenced to death in a trial in
which the prosecutor used every one of his peremptory challenges to
exclude African-Americans from the jury. Mose's trial lawyer was an
alcoholic who made no pretense of being prepared; in the next case he
tried, he sat silent through the entire proceeding to protest the
court's denial of his motion for a continuance. He was disbarred, but
his other client's sentence was overturned.
Mose has been a good father to his two sons, one of
whom is retarded. He has been a mediator between African-American and
white prisoners, and has prevented more deaths than he was convicted
of causing. He is worth more to the State of Missouri alive than dead.
Regardless of the broad philosophical issues
involving the death penalty, this is one case in which a consistent
death-penalty supporter can say that life without parole is enough
punishment under the circumstances-that the norms underlying the
continued practice of capital punishment do not support carrying out
this execution, and that the interests of society weigh in favor of
letting this man continue to help raise his sons and to help his
fellow-prisoners get along with each other and with the staff.
A National Perspective on This Application
The Nation is embroiled in a debate over the death
penalty. Each new day brings fresh accounts of racial bias,
incompetent counsel, and law enforcement untroubled by conscience.
Roused by countless studies, and angered by appalling anecdotes, the
public increasingly doubts whether the ultimate penalty can be
administered fairly-free from the ugly taint of racism, free from the
pathetic spectacle of counsel sleeping through his client?s trial,
free from the horrifying risk of an innocent man executed. Support
for the death penalty has fallen, and across the country, momentum
gathers for a moratorium.
To date, over 1000 local, state, national, and
international organizations have joined the call for a moratorium to
study the persistent problems in the administration of the death
penalty. Nearly two dozen municipalities have called for a halt on
executions, including Atlanta, Baltimore, Buffalo, Detroit,
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and the City and County of San Francisco.
Many of the most prominent newspapers in the country have added their
voice to this chorus, including the St. Louis Post Dispatch, New York
Times, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, San
Francisco Examiner, The Oklahoman, and the Sarasota Herald Tribune.
Even the conservative Washington Times has endorsed a moratorium.
Nationally recognized religious leaders have called
for a moratorium, including Cardinal Mahoney in California, Cardinal
Keeler in Baltimore, Bishop Fiorenza, and Pat Robertson. Moratorium
bills have been introduced in a dozen state legislatures, including
Missouri, and passed in Nebraska and Illinois. In New Hampshire, the
legislature repealed the death penalty, the first state in the modern
era to do so, although the Governor vetoed the bill. Prominent
national and international organizations have joined the campaign,
including the American Bar Association and the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights.
In 1997, the ABA published a 147-page report on the
death penalty, and concluded that the "decisions about who will live
and who will die turn not on the nature of the offense the defendant
is charged with committing, but rather on the nature of the legal
representation the defendant receives." (Report of the American Bar
Association on the Administration of the Death Penalty at 6 (1997)).
The ABA called for an end to executions until the states implemented
important reforms, notably in minimum standards for defense counsel
and the elimination of racial disparity. Yesterday, July 10, 2000,
the incoming president of the American Bar Association renewed this
call, and urged lawyers in their states to work for a moratorium until
persistent questions about racial profiling and incompetent counsel
are resolved. U.S. Lawyers Leader Seeks Death Penalty Moratorium, New
York, July 10 (Reuters).
On the national level, the Justice Department
revealed last week that it is studying the influence of racial bias in
the federal death penalty, and Senator Richard Durbin (D-Ill.) and
Senate Judiciary Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) have called for Senate
Hearings on the administration of the death penalty. Senator Patrick
Leahy (D-Vt.) has introduced The Innocence Protection Act, designed to
ensure, among other things, that people charged with a capital crime
will have access to competent counsel. In the House, Representatives
Jesse Jackson, Jr., (D-Ill.) and Jan Schakowsky, (D-Ill.) introduced
legislation calling for a seven-year moratorium on all executions
while studies proceed on the fundamental inequity in the death penalty.
And on July 7, 2000, the Clinton Administration announced that it
would delay the first scheduled federal execution in nearly forty
years to study the undeniable evidence of racial imbalance in the
federal death penalty.
The events unfolding on the national stage provide
a fitting backdrop to Mr. Young?s case. The recurring themes in the
national debate are persistent concerns about racial disparity and
incompetent counsel. Yet both themes figure prominently in Mr.
Young?s case, and explain the result: Mose Young was prosecuted by a
racist, and defended by a drunk. But the leading men in this tragedy
are themselves a product of a broken system-a system that tolerated
institutional racism, just as it created a defense that collapsed
under the weight of impossible burdens, until defense counsel became
no better-and no different-than the sleeping lawyer. Mose Young?s
trial was a mockery and a farce, and you should not allow his
execution to go forward. The execution should be stayed and a Board
of Inquiry appointed to study both the troubling evidence of racial
profiling in the selection of jurors, and the appalling performance of
Mr. Young?s attorney.
Reasons for Exercising Clemency
I. The sentence of death against Mose Young is
not the result of a fair and rational weighing of aggravating and
mitigating factors but of raw prejudice in the selection of the twelve
citizens who would make this decision-prejudice against African-Americans
when they were not in a position to defend themselves at the ballot
box.
At Mose's trial the prosecutor used all nine of his
opportunities to strike a prospective juror without giving a reason to
exclude African-Americans from the jury, when Mose is an African-American
and the decedents in the pawnshop robbery of which he was convicted
were white. It is impossible to present a more compelling inference
of racial discrimination than to show that the prosecutor used 100% of
these "peremptory challenges" against people of color. The St. Louis
defense bar has long contended that behavior such as this is no fluke-that
prosecutors in St. Louis deliberately discriminate against African-Americans
in jury selection.
In the judicial courts-as distinguished from this
proceeding-the fact that the prosecutor used his entire allotment of
peremptory strikes to remove people of color would arguably not
support an inference of intentional discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment's guaranty of the equal protection of the laws,
even when it is combined with the anecdotal understanding of the
defense bar. In court-as distinguished from a clemency proceeding-such
a claim requires direct proof of discriminatory purpose, as the
Supreme Court of the United States held in Swain v. Alabama.1 This
factor is one of several in this case in which the courts have been
limited by Congress-or have created limits for themselves-that allow
life-and-death constitutional grievances to go unremedied without the
intervention of the Executive. The courts expressly rely on clemency
as a backstop when they announce such self-imposed limitations.2
Direct proof of racially discriminatory intent is
notoriously difficult to secure.3 In this case, the difficulty has
been greater still because prosecutors have maintained a strict code
of silence about their practice. Commissioner Jane Geiler's
courageous decision to break that code of silence has enabled Mr.
Young, for the first time, to establish that prosecutors in St.
Louis-in his case and numerous others-routinely, repeatedly, and
deliberately excluded African-Americans from juries in criminal cases.
Previous litigation in this case focused on whether
Mr. Young could receive the benefit of Batson v. Kentucky-the United
States Supreme Court decision setting forth the constitutional rules
to apply when a prosecutor's strikes appear to be racially motivated
in a given case.4 The Supreme Court decided Batson before Mose's
appeal became final. That question was resolved against Mose because
trial counsel, Jack Walsh, did not raise the objection necessary to
preserve the issue for review, and because Walsh had no duty under the
Supreme Court decision defining the constitutional guaranty of the "effective
assistance of counsel" to anticipate the Supreme Court's Batson
decision.5 As a result, the prosecutor's discriminatory use of his
peremptory challenges was governed by the earlier rule of Swain v.
Alabama.6 Because of the culture of silence which prevailed in the
prosecuting attorney's office with respect to its deliberate practice
to discriminate against African-Americans in the selection of jurors,
that proof was beyond the reach of any competent defense lawyer at the
time of Mr. Young's trial. Commissioner Geiler's recent appointment
makes that proof available for the first time.
The relevant facts are few. In state post-conviction proceedings,
trial counsel for Mr. Young, Jack Walsh, testified that the prosecutor
in this case, Ed Rogers, used all nine peremptory challenges allotted
to the prosecution to remove African-Americans from the jury. No one
has never denied or refuted this testimony.
On June 23, 2000, Joe Margulies-one of Mr. Young's
present attorneys-spoke by telephone with Ms. Jane Geiler, and asked
then Assistant Circuit Attorney Geiler about the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges by prosecutors within the Circuit Attorney's
Office. Ms. Geiler told Mr. Margulies she has been a prosecutor with
the Circuit Attorney for the City of St. Louis, the same office that
prosecuted Mose in the name of the State of Missouri, since late 1984
or early 1985. She joined the office shortly after Mose's trial.
Ms. Geiler often choked back sobs as she talked.7
She told Mr. Margulies that prosecutors in that office routinely and
repeatedly used their peremptory challenges to remove blacks from
criminal juries. "Speaking slowly and emphasizing her words, Ms.
Geiler said that prior to the Supreme Court decision in Batson v.
Kentucky, prosecutors in her office 'always, always' used their
strikes against blacks. Blacks, she said, were not viewed as
individuals but as a group-just as they viewed members of certain
professions, or people with advanced degrees. People in these groups
were considered presumptively hostile to the prosecution."8 Ms.
Geiler stated, "[y]ou didn't have to be a racist to use all your
strikes against blacks, you just had to be a good prosecutor who
wanted to win."9 Ms. Geiler was not surprised that Ed Rogers had used
all nine of his strikes against blacks, including some whom he removed
without asking a single question.
Later in the day on June 23, 2000, Mr. Margulies
received a voice mail message from Ms. Geiler, who indicated that she
had recently left a meeting with her boss (Circuit Attorney D. Joyce
Hayes), and said she had been forbidden from cooperating on behalf of
Mose Young. Ms. Geiler made it clear that if she did cooperate with
Mose's attorneys, she would have to leave the office. At Ms. Geiler's
request, Mr. Margulies called her at her home in the morning of June
24, 2000. Ms. Geiler reaffirmed that she had crossed the line when
she offered to cooperate with Mr. Young: "There was no ambiguity. [Circuit
Attorney D. Joyce Hayes] told me if I give you a statement, I will
lose my job." Choking back tears, Ms. Geiler explained that she could
not afford to lose her job for many reasons of a highly personal
nature.10 If subpoenaed to a hearing on this matter, Ms. Geiler will
testify in accordance with her statements as set forth in Mr.
Margulies' affidavit.
In related litigation, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit observed that it was uncontested that
the State of Missouri-through Circuit Attorney Dee Joyce Hayes-"has
deliberately interfered with the efforts of petitioner to present
evidence . . . ."11 The Eighth Circuit found it even worse than than
a civil wrong: "[i]ndeed, there is reason to think that what the
Circuit Attorney did here amounts to the crime of tampering with a
witness, see Mo. Ann. Stat. § 575.270(1)." Based on these
propositions of fact-later found to be true by the district court
after a trial-the Eighth Circuit ruled that Ms. Hayes's conduct had
independent constitutional significance:
The instant complaint alleges that the defendant
Hayes, with the purpose of inducing Ms. Geiler to withhold evidence,
threatened her with loss of her job. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (a
comparable federal statute). Such conduct on the part of a state
official is fundamentally unfair. It unconscionably interferes with a
process that the State itself has created. The Constitution of the
United States does not require that a state have a clemency procedure,
but, in our view, it does require that, if such a procedure is created,
the state's own officials refrain from frustrating it by threatening
the job of a witness. [Id. at 853.]
Counsel learned what Ms. Geiler had to say several
months ago. Ms. Geiler did not immediately become available as a
witness because of the chill which state actors placed on her
testimony. Ms. Geiler's testimony became available only recently,
when she left the Circuit Attorney's Office to accept an appointment
as Commissioner for the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit.12
Ms. Geiler's testimony provides the proof needed to
support the Swain claim-proof that was previously beyond Mr. Young's
reach. To get to first base by making a prima facie showing under
Swain, an accused citizen must produce "[s]uch proof [that] might
support a reasonable inference that African-Americans are excluded
from juries for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the
particular case on trial and that the peremptory system is being used
to deny African-Americans the same right and opportunity to
participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the white
population."13 An accused citizen "is not required to show that the
prosecutor always struck every black venireman offered to him . . .
but the facts must manifestly show an intent on the part of the
prosecutor to disenfranchise blacks from traverse juries in criminal
trials in his circuit."14 In federal habeas corpus, a petitioner can
make a prima facie "showing either by coming forward with statistical
evidence or by using testimony from individuals who have witnessed the
prosecutor's manner of exercising his peremptory strikes."15
Without Ms. Geiler's testimony, redress for Mose
Young's Swain claim was beyond his reach. A senior member of the
Eighth Circuit, the Hon. Myron Bright, observed that prosecutors have
too often relied on the tough evidentiary standard of Swain to to get
away with bare-faced racial discrimination:
In case after case, this court has decried the
frequency with which we have been called upon to examine prosecutors'
use of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors from the trials of
black defendants. . . . The number of appeals in which such challenges
are made indicates that many federal prosecutors have been ignoring
the Supreme Court's prohibition against the purposeful exclusion of
black jurors from the juries of black defendants solely on account of
their race. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) [303], 25 L. Ed. 664 (1880). Prosecutors
seem to have been relying on the tough evidentiary standard of Swain
to bar a defendant from successfully demonstrating error due to a
prosecutor's conduct of peremptory striking of all or almost all
potential black jurors. Prosecutors seem also to have been relying on
Swain' s evidentiary standard to insulate themselves from being forced
by the district court to provide the reasons for their use of
peremptory strikes to eliminate black jurors.16
This observation applies with special force to Mose
Young's case because the prosecution went to extraordinary lengths to
enforce the code of silence that concealed their practice and policy
to discriminate against African-Americans in the selection of trial
juries. The history of this case speaks loudly and clearly that, in
Judge Bright's words, "So far as prosecutors have relied upon the
evidentiary standard in Swain to shield themselves from being forced
to relate their reasons for peremptorily striking black prospective
jurors, their reliance is neither justified nor in good faith."17
Using the standards the courts impose on themselves,
the fact that Rogers used his peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans
from Mose's jury was not sufficient in and of itself to establish a
constitutional violation. Commissioner Geiler's testimony provides
direct evidence of the prosecutor's intentional racial discrimination.
It changes the entire legal landscape of the racial discrimination
issue in this case. If Mose could receive judicial consideration of
this claim now that the Geiler evidence is available, under the Eighth-Circuit
law, the burden would shift to the prosecution to show that it did not
discriminate (which it cannot): when direct proof of the state's
discriminatory intent is provided, the state is no longer entitled to
the presumption that it exercised its peremptory challenges in a
lawful manner.18
Mose Young cannot count on the courts to enforce
the rules in his case, because these courts frequently apply the
Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA) to cases that were filed before its effective
date, as Mose's was. In his case, the retrospective application of
the AEDPA to bar his due process and equal protection claim would do
little more than reward the state for obstructing justice. But for
the code of silence, he would have had the information he needed to
succeed on a Swain claim years ago. Now he faces the denial of a
judicial forum to present his federal constitutional grievances
because of the application of a statute which was not even drafted,
let alone enacted, at the time he filed his petition for federal
habeas corpus.
We all know that racial discrimination is wrong for
several reasons. First, it deprives a large segment of our population
of the right to participate in self-government. Second, it distorts
the fact-finding process by limiting the perspective of the jury to
the perspective of one group in our society. Nowhere is this evil of
racial discrimination more pronounced than in the sentencing portion
of a capital trial. Stacking the deck by artificially increasing the
number of jurors who will naturally empathize with the decedents as
opposed to the accused citizens interferes with the rational
consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors which is essential
to the Supreme Court's decisions allowing the states and the federal
government to resume capital punishment.
II. Mose Young's trial lawyer was admittedly and
chronically unprepared to represent him.
Mose Young was represented by Mr. Jack Walsh, who
has since given up his license and resigned from the practice of law.
Mr. Margulies has attached an affidavit recounting his conversation
with Ms. Geiler. Most notably, she recalls Mr. Walsh as ?a functional
alcoholic,? with a running tab at a local tavern. Every night after
work-whether he was in trial or not-Mr. Walsh retreated to the
familiar comfort of his bar stool at C.J. Muggs and ?drank his sorrow
away.? This practice is confirmed by the affidavit of James McKay,
who worked at the time as a junior attorney in the same office, but
who later became its Director. McKay was drinking with Mr. Walsh
during the capital trial that followed immediately after Mr. Young?s-where
Mr. Walsh sat mute during trial, and the case was reversed for
ineffective assistance. (Affidavit of James McKay.)
Often choking back tears, Ms. Geiler described Mr.
Walsh?s utter and abysmal failures throughout Mr. Young?s case,
beginning with an unmitigated failure to prepare. Mr. Walsh inherited
the case virtually at the last minute, and tried the case immediately
after defending a major rape trial, which followed immediately on the
heels of another murder trial. Immediately after Mr. Young?s trial,
Mr. Walsh was forced to try yet another capital case. By the time
this last trial started, Mr. Walsh was coughing up blood.
Operating under these conditions, Ms. Geiler
recalls that Mr. Walsh never visited the scene of the crime in Mr.
Young?s case, and made no attempt to investigate or prepare prior to
trial. Ms. Geiler remembers that Mr. Walsh had given no thought, let
alone prepared for, the punishment phase. Ms. Geiler still recalls
the night, during trial, when Mr. Walsh came to her home, well past
midnight. In this meeting, Ms. Geiler developed the punishment phase
instructions to the jury, and attempted to force-feed Mr. Walsh the
arguments he could use to beg for his client?s life. In the trial for
Mr. Young?s life, Mr. Walsh did virtually nothing.
But Ms. Geiler does not blame Mr. Walsh. Ms.
Geiler describes Mr. Walsh as a tragic hero, who failed miserably and
collapsed under the weight of an oppressive system. To understand Mr.
Walsh?s abysmal failure, Ms. Geiler believed it was also necessary to
comprehend the equally abject conditions under which her office
operated. The Office of the Special Defender was overwhelmed. (See
also Affidavit of James McKay.) Even in the most serious cases,
attorneys litigated without the time, resources, and support essential
to their clients? defense. In many cases, Ms. Geiler explained, the
attorneys working in her office were veritable walking violations of
the right to effective assistance of counsel. When counsel asked
specifically whether this applied to Mr. Walsh?s defense of Mr. Young,
Ms. Geiler said without hesitation that it did. When asked
specifically whether Mr. Young received a fair trial, Ms. Geiler said,
again without hesitation, that he did not.19 Her office was a classic
example of institutional ineffectiveness, and Mr. Young?s defense was
the shining illustration.
Sadly, the themes of racial disparity and
incompetent counsel in this case are linked: because of counsel?s
incompetence, the prosecutor?s racism has escaped review. As noted,
Mr. Walsh did not object to the prosecution?s discriminatory use of
its peremptory challenges because he believed, incorrectly, the issue
would be preserved for federal review even without an objection.20 He
also acknowledged at the PCR hearing that: (1) he knew the local
prosecutors used their peremptory challenges to excuse minorities from
the venire; (2) he had objected to this practice in other cases; (3)
he had intended to lodge the same objection in this case, even though
he believed no objection was necessary in order to preserve the claim;
and (4) he had no strategic or tactical reason not to make the
objection, and in fact was surprised to discover that he had not done
so.21
In the midst of Mose Young?s death penalty trial,
Walsh experienced a sudden realization that would cost him his license
to practice law in the State of Missouri. Exhausted from a crushing
caseload, meager resources, aggressive prosecutors, and the unbending
demands of the judiciary, Walsh nevertheless went through the motions
of defending Young?s capital trial even though he knew he was ill-prepared.
That was simply the path of least resistance. It was easier to
proceed to trial on a capital charge than to stand up for his client?s
right to be defended by an adequately prepared lawyer.
On a Saturday morning in May 1984, a St. Louis jury
returned a verdict fixing Mose Young?s punishment at death. Walsh
spent the rest of the weekend intoxicated. The following Monday,
still vomiting from his binge, Walsh appeared for jury selection in
the capital case of State of Missouri v. Walter Harvey. He urged the
court and the prosecutor to continue the case. He was physically
exhausted. Since being appointed to represent Harvey, he had been
tied up in numerous other trials-including one case in which he met
his client for the first time on the morning of trial. Walsh told the
court that he had done no preparation whatsoever for Harvey?s trial;
he was not ready to give the case the defense it deserved. His plea
for for an opportunity to give his client a fair trial fell on deaf
ears; the court denied his request and proceeded with jury selection.
Fearful that any effort that he might put forth on
Harvey?s behalf would simply sanitize an injustice, Walsh determined
that Harvey would be better off if he simply refused to participate in
the trial. He did not make any challenges or strikes from the venire
panel. He gave no opening statement. He conducted no cross-examination.
He presented no witnesses. He made no argument. His sole effort
consisted of repeatedly reminding the court that he was not prepared
to give his client a fair trial.
Walsh took this action knowing that he was putting
his legal career at substantial risk. He excused his young apprentice,
assistant public defender James McKay, so that McKay would not suffer
any repercussions from Walsh?s conduct. Walsh felt there was no real
alternative for Harvey?s defense under the circumstances. He had
nagging doubts about Harvey?s guilt. There were promising avenues of
investigation he had not explored. There were aspects of the
prosecution?s case that did not ring true. And he believed that
Harvey did not deserve the death penalty.
Walsh?s desperate decision had the anticipated
consequences. Harvey?s conviction was reversed on appeal in a
begrudging opinion by the Missouri Supreme Court. At his retrial, a
jury spared Harvey?s life. Angry judges and prosecutors pursued
disciplinary action against Walsh in the Missouri Supreme Court;
recognizing that his career as a trial lawyer had gone down the tubes,
Walsh surrendered his license and returned to his boyhood home,
Chicago Illinois. When asked if he had any regrets, Walsh replied
that he wishes his epiphany had come ten days earlier-when he had the
life of Mose Young in his hands.
The same factors which prompted Walsh?s kamikaze
move in Harvey?s trial applied with equal justification in the Mose
Young trial. Even though Young consistently asserted his innocence,
Walsh had conducted no investigation. He had not viewed the crime
scene. He had not interviewed Patricia Wilson, an eye-witness who was
inside the pawn shop when the shooting started, even though Ms. Wilson
had made statements suggesting that Young was not the shooter. Walsh
did not investigate Ronnell Bennett, the only witness produced at
trial who claimed to have seen Young open fire in the pawn shop. The
jury did not know that Bennett and Young had a history; several years
earlier, Bennett?s brother had shot Mose Young in the back. Young
still has the bullet lodged near his spine.
Aside from the issue of guilt or innocence, there
were many facets of Young?s hard life growing up in the projects which
could have moved a jury to spare his life. Many witnesses willing to
vouch for his character and his amenability to rehabilitation.
Circumstances strongly suggesting that Mose was suffering from severe
mental and emotion difficulties, which may have been induced or
exacerbated by use of toxic street drugs. He had been seen by
witnesses shortly before the shooting, acting irrationally. Young
appeared to be engaged in a heated argument with someone, even though
he was alone.
The cases of Mose Young and Walter Harvey share
many similarities. Both involved high-publicity crimes which were
being prosecuted by skilled and aggressive prosecutors. In both
cases, Walsh was haunted by doubts about guilt, which he had not had
the opportunity or resources to investigate. Both clients persistently
asserted their innocence. Neither deserved to die. The only
difference between Mose Young and Walter Harvey is the fortuitous
timing of their trials. Walsh concedes that if Harvey had gone to
trial first, Harvey would now be on death row, and he would have
thrown his career away to save Mose Young. In Walsh?s own words, to
even attempt to mount a defense in either case, in light of the dearth
of resources, his burdensome caseload, and his absolute failure to
prepare, would have been ?a fraud on the system.? Mose Young?s
execution would perpetuate that fraud.
III. Mose Young is a valued part of a family in
which he has fulfilled his role as a parent even from prison.
Mose is of value to others even within the walls of
a maximum security prison. He has remained a positive factor in his
sons' lives. Although his own parents have passed away, he remains an
active, valued member of his extended family.
A. Mose Young grew up in public housing projects
as a generous, likeable child, whom his relatives remember with
affection.
Mose grew up in public housing projects in St.
Louis; his family did not have the resources most families had; his
father worked at intermittent, poorly paying jobs. (App. 5.) Mose
sometimes helped his father on the job. (App. 1 & 8.) Mose and his
siblings sometimes had to use rolled-up socks instead of baseballs in
order to play games. (App. 5.)
In spite of the negative factors in this
environment, Mose grew up as a well-behaved, likeable child. He was
generous to other children, sharing what little he had. His relatives
now recall him as he was then, and regard him fondly. (App. 2, 5 &
9.)
The jury that returned a death verdict did not know
about Mose's strong family ties, because counsel did not contact them.
One after another of the relatives who have provided affidavits in
support of clemency say that clemency counsel was the first attorney
for Mose to contact them, and that if they had been contacted in
preparation for Mose's trial, they could have provided more
information. Mose's cousin, Geraldine Wynne, adds that some of the
relatives to whom she would have referred previous counsel if they had
contacted her have died since Mose's trial.
B. Mose Young has positively participated in the
upbringing of his sons, one of whom has cerebral palsy.
Mose had a long-lasting, monogamous relationship
with Linda Brownlee, and she bore him two sons, Mose Brownlee and
Morio Brownlee. (App. 2.) Mose Brownlee has cerebral palsy and is
mentally retarded. (App. 2 & 11.)
Morio is nineteen, and graduated from Roosevelt
High School in 1999. (App. 11.) He recounts that his father kept him
and his brother out of trouble; his father encouraged him to stay in
school, and he graduated. (App. 11.) Morio plans to continue to keep
his father involved in his family as he has children of his own, if
the State of Missouri does not kill him first. (App. 11.)
Killing Mose would needlessly deprive his sons of a
father who continues to be a positive influence in their lives.
Because it has arisen since his incarceration, the
jury could not have had the full sense of this fact about the value of
Mose's life even if his previous lawyers had bothered to interview his
sons, which they didn't. Like the information about his upbringing
that the jury never heard, this is a mitigating factor that you are
the first-and last-decisionmaker to consider.
IV. Mose Young has played a valuable role for
staff and other prisoners.
One of the principal determinants of a decision
between life without parole and the death penalty is whether the
accused citizen will be a threat to others if sentenced to prison or
whether he will make a contribution to society while confined. By his
conduct in the Department of Corrections, Mose Young has proved that
the interests of the State of Missouri would be better served by
keeping him alive than by killing him. The jury and the sentencing
court could not have know this: you do.
A. Mose Young has healthy respect among both
black and white prisoners on account of his unique combination of
seriousness and good humor.
Virtually anyone who takes the trouble to meet Mose
Young, Jr., will agree that he is an impressive person. He is
friendly, and at the same time serious. This combination of personal
strengths was developing, or perhaps already developed, before he went
to the Department of Corrections. (App. 1 & 9.)
This combination of good personal attributes has
not been lost on his fellow prisoners. (App. 16 & 17.)
B. Mose Young uses the respect he has earned to
prevent violence and other violations of good order.
Lamentable as its effects has been outside the
walls of our prisons, our country's sad history of racial conflict has
had fatal consequences among men who are confined at close quarters
and are not selected from among the most restrained and lawabiding
among us. Grievances that could lead to removal from one's holiday
card list in the outside world could lead to assault or even homicide
in a prison, and routinely do.
Mose Young has repeatedly used the credibility he
has established among other prisoners to prevent potentially fatal
situations from getting out of hand. (App. 13-18.) In presenting
this information, counsel do not rely on the word of their client's
black fellow prisoners, but on a Native American (who regards himself
as a neutral observer of conflicts between white and blacks, App. 15)
and two whites (one of whom the State of Missouri has characterized as
a white supremacist, App. 13). In light of the evidence from men who
might be expected to be hostile toward Mose, one can safely assume
there would be numerous testimonials from staff if they were not
gagged by those in the Department of Corrections who put killing a few
of their prisoners ahead of protecting the mass of them.
In acting as a mediator, Mose has exposed himself
to hostility from other prisoners who may regard him as a traitor to
his fellow blacks or as uppity toward whites, as the case may be. (App.
14.) In doing so, he has undoubtedly saved lives of staff and
prisoners alike.
Mose Young is a real-life analog to John Coffey in
The Green Mile. Of course he has not performed miracles; but The
Green Mile is a work of fiction. Mose Young has stopped race riots,
and has saved more lives than he has been convicted of taking.
Sparing his life would be readily understandable to anyone who can add
and subtract, especially if they have seen this movie.
WHEREFORE, the applicant prays the Governor for his
order staying the execution and appointing a Board of Inquiry, and
thereafter commuting the death sentence of Mose Young or granting
other and further appropriate relief.
Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH MARGULIES JOHN WILLIAM SIMON
*****
1380 U.S. 202 (1965).
2E.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
3Cf. United States v. Wilson, 816 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir. 1987) (discussing
"the tough evidentiary standard of Swain").
4476 U.S. 79 (1986).
5Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
6"[A] defendant cannot, under Swain, establish an equal protection
violation 'solely on proof of the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges to strike black jurors at the defendant's own trial.'"
Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509, 511 (8th Cir. 1987), citing Griffith
v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
7Affidavit of Joe Margulies, p. 1. (Submitted with this document.)
8Id. at 4.
9Id.
10Id., p. 5.
11Young v. Hayes, 218 F.3d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 2000).
12The office of Commissioner is a quasi-judicial position created by
Missouri statute. In that capacity, Commissioner Geiler presides over
drug prosecutions by special order of the Presiding Judge of the 22nd
Circuit.
13Swain, 380 U.S. at 224; Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1454 (11th
Cir. 1991).
14Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1220 (11th Cir. 1983)(emphasis in the
original); Horton v. Zant, 941 at 1454.
15Id. at 1455; Love v. Jones, 923 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1991).
16United States v. Wilson, 816 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1987) (Bright,
J., concurring).
17Id.
18See Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir. 1990); Garrett v.
Morris, 815 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1987). In Walton, the Eighth Circuit
held that a violation of Swain v. Alabama is established when the
explanation for peremptory strikes reveals a discriminatory intent.
916 F.2d at 1359. Direct evidence of the prosecutor's racially
discriminatory intent establishes the Swain violation and justifies
habeas corpus relief.
19Affidavit of Joseph Margulies at Para. 5.
20PCR Tr. at 139 (?[I]t was always my understanding of federal law
that in terms of preservation of it you need not make a formal record
at the trial stage.?)
21PCR Tr. at 139-40; 151-53.
161 F.3d 1159
Mose
Young, Appellant, v.
Michael Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center, Appellee
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Sept. 21, 1998.
Decided Dec. 4, 1998
Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD
ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.
RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.
MoseYoung was convicted and sentenced to
death for the murder of three men in a St. Louis pawn shop. After
unsuccessful state appeals, he petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that numerous aspects of
his trial violated his constitutional rights. The District Court1
denied the application, and Young now
appeals on three grounds. First, he argues that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to
object to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude
black people from the jury. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Second, he argues the trial
judge should have granted a mistrial because of an unanswered
question by the prosecutor directed to the defendant on cross-examination,
which, Young argues, improperly implied
that he had committed prior violent acts. And third, he claims he
was denied due process by several allegedly improper remarks made
by the prosecutor during closing arguments in the penalty phase of
the trial. We find no merit to Young's
arguments and affirm.
I.
The facts concerning the crime
itself are not relevant to the issues on appeal, except to point
out that Young, who is black, was charged
with shooting and killing three men on February 8, 1983.
Young's
first argument relates to the failure of his trial attorney to
object to what he contends was the prosecutor's racially
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Counsel's trial notes
indicate the prosecutor used all nine of his peremptory strikes
against black veniremen.2
Counsel did not object to this tactic, although he claimed he was
well aware of the state prosecutor's practice of excluding black
people from juries, had objected to this practice in the past, and
had intended to do so in this case. Young
claims that this oversight deprived him of the effective
assistance of counsel and resulted in a structural defect that
tainted the entire trial.
In order to prevail on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, Young
must show that his attorney's assistance "fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness," and that "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984). We find it unnecessary to discuss the reasonableness of
counsel's conduct because, in any event, Young
cannot show he was prejudiced by this oversight. As Strickland
makes clear, "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we
expect will often be so, that course should be followed."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Young cannot satisfy the prejudice requirement and has not
attempted to do so. Instead, he urges this Court to view his
counsel's failure to lodge the Batson objection as a "structural
defect" which is presumptively prejudicial. According to
Young, a Batson error is a structural
defect which renders the entire trial unreliable, and it
necessarily follows that prejudice should be presumed. Otherwise,
Young argues, he is forced into the
impossible position of showing how the outcome of the trial would
have been different in the absence of a structural defect.
We cannot accept this position.
This case is controlled by Wright v. Nix, 928 F.2d 270 (8th
Cir.1991). In Wright, we were also confronted with a defendant
whose attorney had failed to object to the prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges to exclude non-whites from the jury.3
Because the defendant Wright had failed to raise this issue
properly, he was required to show both cause and prejudice for his
omission in order to attack his state conviction in a federal
court. Wright argued that the ineffective assistance of his trial
counsel was the cause of the omission, and thus he had to satisfy
the two-part Strickland test. Like Young,
Wright argued that requiring him to show prejudice in the sense of
a reasonable probability of a different outcome asked the
impossible. We rejected Wright's attempt to avoid the prejudice
requirement of Strickland. We explained that an error by counsel
does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal
proceeding on collateral attack if the error had no effect on the
judgment. Wright, 928 F.2d at 273 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
691, 104 S.Ct. 2052).
A passage from the concurring
opinion in Wright is relevant here:
[Wright] has not shown that the individual
jurors who tried him were not impartial, and, as already noted, he
has not even begun to show that the presence of the black juror[s]
in question on the jury that tried him would have affected the
outcome at all. It is in the sense of outcome, I submit, that the
Strickland Court used the term "prejudice." The focus is on the
outcome of the individual trial. Is there a reasonable likelihood
that it would have been different? Here, I am persuaded that there
is no such likelihood, and I therefore agree that this judgment
should be affirmed.
928 F.2d at 274.
Young has not shown a reasonable
probability that the results of the proceeding would have been
different, and his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must
fail.
Young's
next argument relates to the prosecutor's conduct during cross-examination.
The prosecutor began questioning Young
regarding the origin of an alleged disability which defense
counsel mentioned in opening arguments. Defense counsel had
referred to the fact that Young had a
slight limp while explaining Young's
version of his hasty retreat from the crime scene. In response to
the question about the disability, Young
volunteered that he had also been shot in the back, and then
explained that his limp was the result of an old football injury.
The prosecutor followed up with a question about the gunshot wound,
and defense counsel objected. A sidebar followed, and the trial
judge sustained the objection. The prosecutor then returned to
cross-examination, and the following exchange ensued:
Q: "Mr. Young, how
many people have you shot?"
A: "Have I shot?"
Q: "Yeah, how many."
Defense counsel quickly objected
and requested a mistrial, arguing that the prosecutor was
attempting to introduce evidence of other crimes. The judge
sustained the objection, denied the request for a mistrial, and
Young never answered the question.
Although the prosecutor admitted
during sidebar that he was referring to "specific prior bad acts,"
the State now suggests that the jury most probably interpreted the
question to refer to how many people Young
shot in this case. We will assume the jury's interpretation of the
question was consistent with the prosecutor's purpose. Even so,
the unanswered question is not "so egregious that [it] fatally
infected the proceedings and rendered [the] entire trial
fundamentally unfair." Moore v. Wyrick, 760 F.2d 884, 886 (8th
Cir.1985). The question did not refer to any specific past acts or
indicate what the circumstances surrounding those acts might be.
Moreover, the evidence of Young's guilt
was overwhelming, and the jury relied on multiple aggravating
circumstances when setting the penalty.
III.
Young's
final argument concerns several statements the prosecutor made
during closing arguments at the penalty phase of the trial. In
arguing that the evidence supported finding the crime was
committed with "depravity of mind," an aggravating circumstance,
the prosecutor stated, "it's disgusting and it's as cold as
anything I've ever seen." The prosecutor also stated, "if the
death penalty is an appropriate punishment, you tell me a
situation where it's more appropriate than here." The defense did
not object to either of these statements. The third allegedly
improper remark relates to the prosecutor's attempt to imply that
if Young did not receive the death
penalty, he might take the life of a fellow inmate. The prosecutor
suggested, "why should he hesitate to take a life of somebody he
doesn't like in the penitentiary ... [w]hat would it be for then,
folks, a pack of cigarettes, a stick of gum, a[n] extra fifty
cents." Counsel objected to this line of argument and again moved
for a mistrial, the objection was overruled, and the motion was
denied. Young failed to raise any of
these issues in his motion for a new trial. The Missouri Supreme
Court, therefore, reviewed the allegedly improper comments for
plain error, State v. Young, 701 S.W.2d
429, 435 (Mo.1985) (en banc), and we will do the same. Hornbuckle
v. Groose, 106 F.3d 253, 257 (8th Cir.1997).
The test for prosecutorial
misconduct has two parts. First, the remarks must have been
improper, and second, the remarks must have been so prejudicial as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. United States v.
Hernandez, 779 F.2d 456, 458 (8th Cir.1985). The first remark was
clearly improper. It invited the jury to rely on the prosecutor's
personal opinion about the relative coldness of this crime and
compared the circumstances of this crime to other crimes that were
not in the record. Analyzing the prejudicial effect of these
remarks requires us to consider a number of factors: (1) the type
of prejudice that arose from the remark; (2) whether defense
counsel did anything in his argument to minimize the prejudice;
(3) whether the jury was properly instructed; and (4) whether
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
sentencing phase would have been different, taking into account
all of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Antwine v.
Delo, 54 F.3d 1357, 1363 (8th Cir.1995). As noted above, the
prosecutor made this statement as part of his argument that the
crime involved depravity of mind and was outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible, or inhuman. There was overwhelming evidence from
which the jury could have found the presence of this aggravating
circumstance aside from the prosecutor's personal opinion that it
was as cold as anything he had ever seen. In addition to finding
depravity of mind, the jury designated four other aggravating
circumstances for two of the murders and five others for the third.
After taking all of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
into account, we see no probability that the sentence would have
been any different. The error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The second remark was the
prosecutor's statement that "if the death penalty is an
appropriate punishment, you tell me a situation where it's more
appropriate than here." We do not find this type of rhetorical
statement improper. Even if it were, it would certainly not rise
to the level of a constitutional violation.
Finally, Young
argues that it was improper for the prosecutor to comment on his
future dangerousness during the sentencing phase of trial. In
support of this position, Young cites to
a case from the Seventh Circuit which held that the "government
may not attempt to obtain a conviction by appealing to jurors to
prevent future crimes by finding present guilt." United States v.
Cunningham, 54 F.3d 295, 300 (7th Cir.1995) (emphasis supplied).
This is not the case here. The prosecutor's comments were made
during the sentencing phase, and the Supreme Court has
specifically approved capital-sentencing procedures that allow the
jury to consider the probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76, 96 S.Ct.
2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). Because we do not find this comment
improper, it is unnecessary to determine whether any prejudice
resulted. The argument did no more than invite the jury to
consider that a life sentence might not be sufficient to deter
this defendant, who had killed three people, from committing
murders in the future. Juries are fully capable of properly
weighing this kind of rhetoric.
The claim Wright's attorney failed to preserve
relied on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d
759 (1965). The reasoning of our Wright opinion would apply with
at least equal force to a Batson claim
218 F.3d 850
Mose Young,
Appellant, v.
Dee Joyce Hayes, Circuit Attorney for the City of St. Louis,
and Alfred D. Luebbers, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional
Center, Appellees.
No. 00-2705
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit
July 11, 2000
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri.
Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, BEAM,
and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.
RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.
This is an action under 42 U.S.C.
1983. The plaintiff (appellant in this Court) is Mose Young, a
prisoner who is under sentence of death in the State of Missouri.
For our opinion affirming the dismissal of Mr. Young's petition for
habeas corpus, see Young v. Bowersox, 161 F.3d 1159 (8th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 192 (1999). The sentence of death is
scheduled to be carried out at 12:01 a.m. tomorrow, Wednesday, July
12, 2000. The District Court dismissed Mr. Young's complaint on
motion for summary judgment. The appellant seeks reversal and a stay
of execution in this Court.
We state the facts and our
conclusions briefly because of the exigency of time. The essential
theory of the complaint is that the defendant Hayes, Circuit
Attorney for the City of St. Louis, has threatened to fire one of
the lawyers under her supervision, Jane Geiler, if Ms. Geiler
provides information to the Governor of Missouri in connection with
a clemency petition Mr. Young wishes to file. Interference by an
official of the State with the clemency process, Mr. Young argues,
threatens to deprive him of his life, without due process of law.
Our first duty is to decide our
own jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
523 U.S. 83 (1998). Is the case moot? Defendants argue that it is,
for two reasons: (1) Ms. Hayes has withdrawn her objection to Ms.
Geiler's participation in the clemency proceeding; and (2) Ms.
Geiler has actually provided the Governor with an affidavit. We
conclude that neither of these events renders the case moot. As to
Ms. Hayes's action, we think it sufficient to quote the recent
opinion of the Supreme Court in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693, 708
(2000):
It is well settled that "a
defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not
deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of
the practice." City of Mesquite, 455 U.S., at 289, 102 S. Ct. 1070.
"[I]f it did, the courts would be compelled to leave '[t]he
defendant . . . free to return to his old ways.'" Id., at 289, n.
10, 102 S. Ct. 1070 (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345
U.S. 629, 632, 73 S. Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953)). In accordance
with this principle, the standard we have announced for determining
whether a case has been mooted by the defendant's voluntary conduct
is stringent: "A case might become moot if subsequent events made it
absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur." United States v. Concentrated
Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199, 203, 89 S. Ct. 361, 21 L.Ed.2d
344 (1968). The "heavy burden of persua[ding]" the court that the
challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again
lies with the party asserting mootness. Ibid.
Here, even if we assume that Ms.
Hayes's withdrawal of her prior statement about firing Ms. Geiler is
full and ungrudging, we have nothing more than the voluntary
cessation of allegedly illegal activity.
As to the affidavit that Ms.
Geiler has submitted, at least one good reason remains why the case
is not moot. The affidavit covers only one of the two subjects that
Ms. Geiler initially agreed to testify about. The affidavit
describes what Ms. Geiler regards as the inadequate representation
that Mr. Young received in his capital trial. It does not address Ms.
Geiler's further observation (if representations by counsel for Mr.
Young as to the conversation he had with Ms. Geiler are to be
believed) that the Circuit Attorney's office, during the relevant
time period, uniformly and without exception exercised peremptory
challenges to remove black jurors. This omission, we think, is
arguably due to Ms. Hayes's insistence, even after the threat of
discharge had been removed, that Ms. Geiler, her employee, not say
anything to the Governor or to the Missouri Board of Probation and
Parole that would embarrass the Circuit Attorney's office. This case
was decided on motion for summary judgment. The burden of
demonstrating mootness is on the defendants. Friends of the Earth,
supra. It seems to us that a trier of fact could reasonably infer
that Ms. Geiler's willingness to provide information freely is still
under some substantial restraint as a result of actions by the
defendant Hayes.
What about the merits? On this
point, the District Court simply dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a claim, holding that there is no right whatever to due
process of law in connection with a clemency proceeding. This view
is inconsistent with the position quite recently taken by a majority
of the Supreme Court. See Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard,
523 U.S. 272, 288-89 (1998)(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
JJ.); id. at 290 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In particular, Justice O'Connor stated:I do not . . . agree
with the suggestion in the principal opinion that, because clemency
is committed to the discretion of the executive, the Due Process
Clause provides no constitutional safeguards.
The State relies on two decisions
of this Court, Perry v. Brownlee, 122 F.3d 20 (8th Cir. 1997), and
Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1994). In both of those
cases we rejected due-process claims aimed at state clemency
hearings. We do not think that the general expressions in these
opinions about the applicability of due process in clemency
proceedings are controlling in the particular circumstances of the
present case. In any event, if the cases are read as laying down an
absolute rule that no due-process violation can ever occur in a
clemency proceeding, they are inconsistent with the later
pronouncements of a majority of the Supreme Court in Woodard. This
panel is bound by previous panel opinions of our own Court, but we
are not so bound if an intervening expression of the Supreme Court
is inconsistent with those previous opinions.
Certainly the discretion of a
governor to grant or deny clemency is unlimited in any ordinary
circumstances. No claim is advanced here that the petitioner has a "liberty
interest" in the grant of clemency or the right to any particular
outcome when he seeks it. The allegation is quite different.
Apparently Missouri regularly receives evidence from any and all
sources in clemency matters, and the Governor is not restricted as
to the nature of the considerations he may entertain or the evidence
he may receive. If clemency is sought on the ground of ineffective
assistance of counsel, racial discrimination in the trial process,
or other procedural grounds, the Governor may grant or deny it as he
chooses. The claim here is that the State, acting through the
Circuit Attorney of the City of St. Louis, has deliberately
interfered with the efforts of petitioner to present evidence to the
Governor. It is uncontested that the interference did in fact occur
at one time. As we have tried to explain above, the question whether
the effects of the interference still persist is one on which
reasonable people could differ, and therefore for a trier of fact.
Indeed, there is reason to think
that what the Circuit Attorney did here amounts to the crime of
tampering with a witness, see Mo. Ann. Stat. 575.270(1). This
statute provides, in pertinent part:
A person commits the crime of "tampering
with a witness" if, with purpose to induce a witness or a
prospective witness in an official proceeding . . . to absent
himself . . ., or to withhold evidence, information or documents, .
. ., he:
(1) Threatens or causes harm to
any person or property; or
(2) Uses force, threats or
deception;
. . ..
The instant complaint alleges that
the defendant Hayes, with the purpose of inducing Ms. Geiler to
withhold evidence, threatened her with loss of her job. Cf. 18 U.S.C.
1505 (a comparable federal statute). Such conduct on the part of a
state official is fundamentally unfair. It unconscionably interferes
with a process that the State itself has created. The Constitution
of the United States does not require that a state have a clemency
procedure, but, in our view, it does require that, if such a
procedure is created, the state's own officials refrain from
frustrating it by threatening the job of a witness.
This reasoning makes it
unnecessary for us to address petitioner's alternative claim under
the First Amendment.
The judgment of the District Court
is reversed, and this cause is remanded to that Court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. The motion for stay of
execution is granted, and the defendant Luebbers is hereby enjoined
and restrained from carrying out the sentence of death in Mr.
Young's case until further order of this Court, the District Court,
or the Supreme Court.
Petitioner's pro se motion for a
stay of execution is denied as moot.