2010-0305 (LA.APP. 1 CIR. 2/11/11)
CARTER, C.J.
The defendant, Amy T. Hebert, was charged by Lafourche Parish grand
jury indictment with two counts of first degree
murder, violations of La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 14:30. The state gave notice
of its intent to seek the death penalty. The
defendant entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of
insanity on both counts. A jury found the defendant
guilty as charged. Defense motions for a new trial and for a
post-verdict judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity
were denied. During the penalty phase, the jury was unable to reach a
unanimous verdict on either count. Thereafter, the
defendant was sentenced on each count to life imprisonment without
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of
sentence. The trial court expressly ordered that the sentences run
consecutively, and the defendant was remanded to the
custody of the Department of Corrections. The defendant appeals,
designating six assignments of error;
1. The trial court erred in denying the motion for post-verdict
judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity.
2. The trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial.
3. The evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdicts.
4. The trial court erred in limiting the presentation of a defense by
not allowing Dr. Spitz to testify as an expert in
forensic pathology as to the defendant's state of mind, specifically
her psychosis, as evidenced by his wound analysis
and the extreme overkill evident in this case.
5. The trial court erred in failing to grant the defense's motion for
change of venue.
6. The trial court imposed an excessive sentence by making the life
sentences consecutive.
For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences.
FACTS
The defendant and Chad Hebert were married on August 9, 1991. In 1994,
they moved to 118 St. Anthony Street, Mathews,
Louisiana, the scene of the offenses. The victim Camille Catherine
Hebert (Camille) was born to the couple on June 4,
1998, and the victim Braxton John Hebert (Braxton) was born to the
couple on May 12, 2000. In July of 2005, the couple
separated, and in April of 2006, they divorced. The defense did not
dispute that on August 20, 2007, the defendant
stabbed both children to death at the family home.
Braxton suffered approximately 20-25 stab wounds to his chest and
approximately 50-55 stab wounds to his back. The number
of wounds could not be determined exactly due to the presence of
perforating wounds, i.e., wounds that went entirely
through his body and exited on the other side. He also suffered five
defensive wounds on his left arm and one or two
defensive wounds on his right arm. Braxton bled to death.
Camille suffered approximately 30-35 stab wounds to her chest and
approximately 30-35 stab wounds to her back. She also
suffered perforating wounds. She had five defensive wounds on her left
arm and nine defensive wounds on her right arm.
She was stabbed in the scalp approximately 30 times. Camille also bled
to death.
The children's paternal grandparents, R.J. "Buck" and Judy Hebert,
lived across the street. On the day of the offenses,
Buck became concerned for the welfare of the defendant and his
grandchildren. He knocked on the defendant's front door,
and when no one answered, he broke into the utility room of the home
by climbing through a window. Buck saw blood
splattered on the floor of the kitchen/dining area. In the master
bedroom, he saw a large quantity of blood and the
defendant lying in bed with the children. Buck tried to exit the house
to summon help, but the doors had been dead-bolted
from the inside, and he could not find the keys.
Upon arrival, the police broke the kitchen door down and entered the
house. When the police entered the master bedroom,
the defendant lifted a large knife in her right hand and shouted, "Get
the f — out." The police used a Taser electroshock
weapon to force the defendant to drop her knife so that they could
attempt a rescue of the children. After removing the
children from the bed, the police discovered multiple knives in the
bed, as well as a dead dog. The police also discovered two notes at
the residence.
The first note states:
Monday 8-20-07 Chad,
You wanted your own life. You got it. I'll be damned if you get the
kids, too.
Your ambition greed for money won out over your love for your family.
The hell you put us through I do mean all of us because you don't know
what the kids used to go through because of course
you weren't here.
This is no kind of life for them to live.
I sure hope you two lying alduttering (sic) home wrecking whores can
have more kids because you can't have these.
Actually I hope you can't because then you'll only produce more lying
homewrecking adultering (sic) whores like
yourselves.
Maybe you can buy some with all of your money you will make from this
house the life insurance benefits you'll get from
the kids.
The second note states:
Monday 8-20-07 Judy,
You run from the very thing you support!
Monica pairs up with a married man, becomes a kept woman your response
is maybe she is in love with him — so that makes
it okay? How stupid! Your sons have affairs bring these whores home
you welcome them all in. I guess its okay for them to
hurt the family as long as it is not you.
Well when you started delivering my kids to that whore, Kimberly, that
was the last straw!
To all my friends thanks for all the help support you tried to give
me.
1 love you all,
Sorry Daddy, Celeste Renee I love you all too.
The defendant was taken to the emergency room for treatment of her
injuries. The defendant's wrists were severed,
exposing tendons; both of her lungs were collapsed from stab wounds to
her chest; and she had stab wounds on her skull
and neck and wounds to her eyelids.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
The defendant combines her first three assignments of error for
argument. She argues the evidence was insufficient to
convict her because the preponderance of the evidence established she
was insane at the time of the offenses. The
defendant maintains she proved she was psychotic at the time of the
offenses, and Doctors Salcedo and Seiden were unable
to rebut her proof.
Insanity at the time of the offense requires a showing that because of
mental disease or mental defect the offender was
incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with reference to
the conduct in question. See La.Rev.Stat. Ann. §
14:14. The law presumes a defendant is sane and responsible for her
actions. La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 15:432. The defendant
has the burden of establishing the defense of insanity at the time of
the offense by a preponderance of the evidence. La.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 652. The State is not required to offer any
proof of the defendant's sanity or to offer
evidence to rebut the defendant's evidence. State v. Thames, 95-2105
(La. App. 1 Cir. 9/27/96); 681 So. 2d 480, 486, writ
denied, 96-2563 (La. 3/21/97); 691 So. 2d 80. Instead, the
determination of whether the defendant's evidence successfully
rebuts the presumption of sanity is made by the trier of fact viewing
all of the evidence, including lay and expert
testimony, the conduct of the defendant, and the defendant's actions
in committing the particular crime. Thames, 681 So.
2d at 486. The issue of insanity is a factual question for the jury to
decide. Thames, 681 So. 2d at 486. Lay testimony
concerning a defendant's actions, both before and after the crime, may
provide the jury with a rational basis for
rejecting even a unanimous medical opinion that a defendant was
legally insane at the time of the offense. Thames, 681
So. 2d at 486. Louisiana does not recognize the defense of diminished
capacity. State v. Pitre, 04-0545 (La. App. 1 Cir.
12/17/04); 901 So. 2d 428, 444, writ denied, 05-0397 (La. 5/13/05);
902 So. 2d 1018. A mental disease or defect short of
insanity cannot serve to negate an element of the crime. Pitre, 901
So. 2d at 444.
In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence in regard to a
defense of insanity, we must apply the test set
forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) to determine
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
defendant had not proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that she was insane at the time of the offense. Thames, 681
So. 2d at 486.
Defense witness Dr. Alexandra Phillips testified as both a fact
witness and as a court-accepted expert in psychiatry. Dr.
Phillips was the attending physician for the acute psychiatric unit
when the defendant was brought to the hospital. She
attempted to talk with the defendant on August 21, 2007, the day after
the offense, but the defendant was unresponsive.
Dr. Phillips again met with the defendant on August 23, 2007. The
nurses were concerned because the defendant was not
eating; the defendant told Dr. Phillips she was not eating because she
was afraid of getting sick and vomiting. The
defendant advised Dr. Phillips that she had heard the words of Satan
for a long time and had pushed them away with the
words of Christ and prayer. The defendant said she had not been
planning on killing herself, but Satan took over, and she
snapped. Dr. Phillips asked the defendant if she was hearing the voice
of Satan at that moment, and the defendant stated
Satan was in the room laughing at her. Dr. Phillips observed the
defendant's eyes tracking the room. Dr. Phillips's
attempts to redirect or calm the defendant were unsuccessful, and the
defendant began to scream. Dr. Phillips concluded
the defendant was completely psychotic and responding to internal
stimuli so anti-psychotic medication was prescribed.
The court accepted defense witness Dr. Phillip Resnick as an expert in
psychiatry. Dr. Resnick examined the defendant on
August 6, 2008. The defendant told Dr. Resnick that in the summer of
2007 she was depressed, had lost weight, and did not
have a good appetite. She was having trouble sleeping and lost
interest in things. She felt fatigued and worthless. The
defendant indicated she had trouble concentrating and remembering
things and had thoughts of suicide.
Dr. Resnick defined "psychosis" as being out of touch with reality. In
his opinion, on the day of the offenses, the
defendant suffered an auditory hallucination. The defendant said she
heard a forceful male voice telling her that her ex
-husband was going to take away her children, that she had to keep the
family together, and that the family had to die to
stay together. The defendant told Dr. Resnick that the voice
instructed her to stab her children and to kill herself, and
after she killed the victims, the voice dictated the notes she left at
the scene. Dr. Resnick noted the defendant told
Dr. Phillips that she heard Satan laughing at her. According to Dr.
Resnick, the defendant was having auditory
hallucinations when she heard the voice of Satan. Dr. Resnick
maintained it was not surprising that the defendant's
hallucination at the time of the offenses reflected her concerns that
her children were getting close to her ex-husband's
fiancée, that he was building a new house, and that she might lose
custody of them. The defendant advised Dr. Resnick
that when she stabbed Camille, Camille said, "Mommy, I love you. I
don't want to die," and the defendant told her, "I
love you, but I don't want daddy to take you away."
Dr. Resnick concluded that on the day of the offenses the defendant
was suffering from major depression and killed her
children because she was psychotic. In his opinion, with reasonable
medical certainty, due to severe psychotic
depression, distorted mind, delusions, and hallucinations, the
defendant could not distinguish whether stabbing her
children was right or wrong because she believed it was in their best
interests. He conceded, however, that he had seen
no evidence the defendant had been diagnosed as psychotic prior to the
offenses, including when she saw a neurosurgeon
and physical therapists in August 2007. He also conceded that Dr.
Phillips's conclusion that the defendant was suffering
from psychosis beginning long before Dr. Phillips saw her was
unsupported by the evidence.
The defense also presented testimony at trial from Dr. Glenn Wolfner
Ahava, who was accepted by the court as an expert in
forensic psychology. He became involved in the case in January of 2008
and interviewed the defendant four times between
March 28, 2008, and August 11, 2008. Dr. Ahava did not think the
defendant was malingering. He diagnosed the defendant as
suffering from major depressive disorder that was severe, recurrent,
and with psychotic features. In his opinion, on the
day of the offenses, it was more likely than not that the defendant
could not distinguish right from wrong with respect
to her criminal conduct. The defendant, a religious woman, had a
delusional belief consistent with depression that God
was speaking to her and commanding her. According to the defendant, on
the day of the offenses, God spoke to her and told
her "he" was going to take the children away, and she had to kill the
children and herself to keep the family together so
that they could go to heaven. The defendant advised Dr. Ahava that the
voice told her to stab the victims in the head.
The defendant told Dr. Ahava that as she stabbed the victims, she told
them she loved them, but she could not let their
father take them. The defendant explained that the voice told her to
kill the family dog and, then, to make coffee to
stay awake to write the notes. The defendant told Dr. Ahava she
hesitated twice before stabbing the victims, but the
voice told her to practice on a bed.
Dr. Ahava testified that the defendant, who was forty-one years old
when he saw her, reported a history of mental health
issues dating back to her early twenties. He conceded, however, there
were no medical records to support her claim. The
defendant told him she had heard voices prior to the date of the
offenses; however, she had not made that claim to any of
the other doctors who had interviewed her. According to Dr. Ahava, the
number of stab wounds inflicted on the victims
indicated the defendant was obviously psychotic.
Dr, David Self testified as an expert in forensic psychiatry. Dr. Self
interviewed the defendant on July 16, 2008, and
August 14, 2008. He diagnosed her as suffering from major depression
that was recurrent and severe with psychosis. He
indicated with reasonable psychiatric certainty that due to mental
disease the defendant was incapable of distinguishing
the wrongfulness of her conduct in killing the victims. The defendant
advised Dr. Self that she suffered from symptoms of
major depression following the birth of Braxton, and her depression
became much worse when her husband announced his
intent to separate from her. Dr. Self testified that the likelihood of
a person suffering from mental illness increased
if other family members suffered from mental illness. The defendant's
sister had a psychotic breakdown in her teens; the
defendant's uncle had been diagnosed with schizophrenia; and the
defendant's maternal grandfather had committed suicide.
The defendant told Dr. Self that on the day of the offenses she heard
a male voice taunting her, "He's going to take the
children. He's going to take them." According to the defendant, the
voice told her she had to keep the family together by
killing the children and then herself, and to stab the brains of the
children. Dr. Self, reflecting on the defendant's
self-inflicted wounds, stated that only the most psychotic people
attack their own eyes.
The State presented testimony at trial from Dr. Rafael Salcedo, a
court accepted expert in clinical and forensic
psychology. He interviewed the defendant on April 28, 2008. In Dr.
Salcedo's opinion and within a reasonable degree of
psychological certainty, at the time of the offenses, although the
defendant was suffering from a psychotic disorder
(major depression), the disorder did not rise to the level that it
impaired her ability to distinguish right from wrong.
Stated differently, the defendant was capable of distinguishing right
from wrong when she murdered her children.
Dr. Salcedo delineated numerous sources of stress in the defendant's
life from 2006 until the date of the offenses. The
defendant's husband, Chad, had moved out and ultimately divorced her.
The defendant did not want the divorce. The
defendant was a single mom, and Braxton suffered from Asperger's
disorder, a mild form of autism. The defendant was very
angry with her ex-husband and that anger intensified when she learned
that he was involved with Kimberly. Moreover, the
children were excited that Chad and Kimberly were building a house.
Camille was becoming attached to Kimberly; the
defendant had seen Camille at a ball game holding hands with, or
sitting next to, Kimberly. Camille was excited about
being a flower girl at Chad and Kimberly's wedding. The defendant also
was upset by Chad's mother, Judy, encouraging a
relationship between Braxton, Camille, and Kimberly.
Dr. Salcedo testified that psychosis builds up over time. A delusion
that lasts four hours — beginning suddenly without
any evidence of delusional thinking and ending after being shocked by
a Taser — would be very unusual. Dr. Salcedo
pointed out that the defendant first claimed she was acting at the
direction of God and later at the direction of Satan.
Moreover, the defendant's note to Chad did not appear to be written by
someone who was psychotic. Dr. Salcedo explained:
It is logical. The content is consistent with the circumstances that
were found to be in evidence later on. It shows no
evidence of loosening of associations. See, one of the things that I
didn't mention is that psychosis is not just
hallucinations and so called delusions. Usually, a psychotic
individual also displays disorganized thinking, loosening of
associations, you know, they go off on tangents. You ask them one
question, they come back with something else. You know,
it incorporates what we call cognitive distortions, cognitive
disorders. That's a very well-written, well-organized,
thought-out letter.
Dr. Salcedo stated the defendant's statement in the note, "You wanted
your own life. You got it. I'll be damned if you
get the kids, too," presented a plausible motive for the behavior she
manifested. When the defendant wrote, "I sure hope
you two lying alduttering (sic) home wrecking whores can have more
kids because you can't have these," she was telling
Chad that she was getting ready to kill, or had already killed, the
children, and he was not going to have them. Dr.
Salcedo also remarked the note showed no evidence of delusional
ideation; specifically, the note did not refer to heaven
or being together.
Dr. Salcedo also discussed the defendant's note to her
ex-mother-in-law, Judy. The defendant's statement, "Well when you
started delivering my kids to that whore, Kimberly, that was the last
straw!" was consistent with Judy supporting
Kimberly developing a close relationship with Camille and Braxton. The
defendant had a huge amount of anger at her
mother-in-law and had not let Camille and Braxton visit Judy's house,
which was across the street from her own house,
since June of 2007. Dr. Salcedo concluded his analysis of the notes by
stating:
Well, what you have here is something that I've never had in the
numerous not guilty by reason of insanity cases that
I've been involved with and, that is, you have an authored description
written by the defendant of her mental state at
the time.
Sometimes you have observers. Sometimes you have a video camera.
Sometimes you have witnesses. But rarely are you able to
get inside the mind of the defendant in such close proximity to the
time of the commission of the alleged offense. It's
almost like having a videotape of her thought processes at the time.
That's what's remarkable about this case.
And I would add that there's no mention of psychosis or delusions or,
you know, nothing psychotic in the notes
themselves, as opposed to what she self-reported.
Dr. Salcedo indicated in a retribution killing of children, also known
as a spousal revenge killing of children, the
woman who kills her children loves them but that love is overridden by
her hatred for her spouse. It is typical in such a
killing to leave behind a note to inflict cruelty on the other spouse.
Dr. Salcedo testified that people who are depressed often commit
suicide. A suicidal mother may be very concerned about
what will happen to her children after the parent kills herself and,
therefore, may decide to kill the children too.
Given the defendant's religious belief that heaven was a better place
— which he noted was not a delusion but, rather, a
belief shared by many people from her church — and her anger toward
Chad, she decided to kill her children and herself.
In Dr. Salcedo's opinion, Dr. Phillips did not have enough information
to render an accurate diagnosis. Dr. Phillips's
final diagnosis of the defendant was "psychosis NOS," which means "not
otherwise specified," or the diagnosis does not
fit in any category of psychosis. Dr. Salcedo opined that Dr. Phillips
did not have any background information on the
defendant and assumed the defendant was crazy because she talked about
Satan and God and seemed to be hyper-religious.
State witness Dr. George Seiden was accepted by the court as an expert
in general and forensic psychiatry. He interviewed
the defendant on March 24, 2009. Dr. Seiden stated that, although the
defendant was suffering from a depressive episode,
on the day of the offenses, she was capable of distinguishing right
from wrong in connection with the killings of the
victims.
Dr. Seiden found no evidence in the defendant's medical records that
she had exhibited any psychotic features prior to
the day of the offenses. He pointed out that on August 16, 2007, on a
"Functional Health Intake Summary" for a physical
therapist, the defendant indicated she could fully concentrate.
The defendant told Dr. Seiden that a voice had commanded her to kill
her children. She also told him she attempted to
stab one of the children, left, and then came back. The defendant
explained she hesitated because she "could not hurt her
babies." According to Dr. Seiden, the defendant's statement indicated
she knew she was going to hurt her children.
Dr. Seiden found nothing in the defendant's note to Chad that
indicated she was in a psychotic state when it was written.
He found no evidence of the psychotic disorganization of thought that
is seen in a true psychosis. To the contrary, Dr.
Seiden felt the note indicated the defendant was not psychotic at the
time it was written. The defendant's statement in
her note, "Sorry Daddy, Celeste Renee I love you all too," was
significant in that it was a statement acknowledging she
had done something wrong. Dr. Seiden defined a delusion as a fixed
false belief that cannot be changed with any amount of
information and that is not consistent with the culture. Herein, there
was no delusion but, rather, the defendant's fear
of losing her children either through formal legal means or through
the loss of their love.
In thirty years of practice, Dr. Seiden had never seen or read about a
psychotic disorder that began and ended suddenly.
Psychoses gradually develop and gradually ebb. Dr. Seiden concluded
that Dr. Phillips was mistaken in her diagnosis of
the defendant on August 23, 2007, because Dr. Phillips did not view
the defendant's claim of Satan being in the room and
laughing at her within the context of the defendant's religious
beliefs — that Satan is a real and tangible entity.
After a thorough review of the record, we are convinced any rational
trier of fact could have found the defendant failed
to rebut her presumed sanity at the time of the offenses. The verdicts
returned in this case indicate the jury credited
the testimony of the witnesses presented by the State and rejected the
testimony of the witnesses presented by the
defense. As the trier of fact, the jury was free to accept or reject,
in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness.
State v. Johnson, 99-0385 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/5/99); 745 So. 2d 217,
223, writ denied, 00-0829 (La. 11/13/00); 774 So. 2d
971. On appeal, this court will not assess the credibility of
witnesses or reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact
finder's determination of guilt. State v. Glynn, 94-0332 (La. App. 1
Cir. 4/7/95); 653 So. 2d 1288, 1310, writ denied,
95-1153 (La. 10/6/95); 661 So. 2d 464. Further, in reviewing the
evidence, the jury's determination was not irrational
under the facts and circumstances presented. See State v. Ordodi,
06-0207 (La. 11/29/06); 946 So. 2d 654, 662. An
appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence
and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact
finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an
exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and
rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La.
1/21/09); 1 So. 3d 417, 418 ( per curiam).
These assignments of error are without merit.
RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE
Defense witness Dr. Daniel Spitz was accepted by the court as an
expert in forensic, anatomic, and clinical pathology. In
assignment of error number 4, the defendant argues the trial court
violated her right to present a defense by refusing to
allow Dr. Spitz to render an opinion on the defendant's state of mind
at the time of the offenses based on analysis of
the victims' wounds.
The Louisiana Code of Evidence provides for the admission of opinion
testimony by experts. If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise. La. Code Evid. Ann. art. 702.
Dr. Spitz testified that he had reviewed the autopsy reports, a
sheriffs office report, photographs of the autopsies and
the crime scene, medical records, and reports of other doctors. During
Dr. Spitz's testimony, the State approached the
bench and advised the court that in one of his reports, Dr. Spitz had
written, "The nature of this homicidal violence
towards both children together with the presence of extreme overkill
is most indicative of an assailant who is suffering
from severe psychiatric illness such as an acute psychosis." The State
objected to Dr. Spitz testifying about the
defendant's mental state because he had not been qualified as an
expert in any area involving mental health, and no
evidence had been presented that he had ever treated anyone with a
psychiatric condition or ever rendered a diagnosis in
the field of mental health. The defense responded that Dr. Spitz had
provided similar testimony in the past and one need
not be a psychiatrist to testify about the defendant's mental state.
The court explained it was usual for a pathologist to testify about
the wounds to a victim, the type of weapon used, the
angle of entry of the weapon, the force used, and the violent nature
of the act based on the wounds, but diagnosis of the
mental state of the person inflicting the wounds was "a far stretch."
The court ruled testimony from Dr. Spitz relating
wound analysis to the state of mind of the defendant or to a medical
diagnosis, such as acute psychosis of the defendant,
was outside of his expertise. The defense objected to the court's
ruling and supplemented the record with testimony from
Dr. Spitz. See La. Code Evid. Ann. art. 103.
Outside the presence of the jury, Dr. Spitz indicated he had examined
the wounds to both victims in accordance with the
procedures and methodologies from his training as a forensic
pathologist. The defense then asked Dr. Spitz if the wound
pattern was consistent with the defendant suffering from severe
psychiatric illness, such as acute psychosis. Dr. Spitz
replied:
It would be. The extreme overkill is the wound pattern that's being
analyzed. And if you — in certain cases, when the
wound pattern is so unusual, it can be used as an indicator for the
state of mind of the assailant.
And in this case the extreme overkill, the excessive wounding of both
child victims, as well as the family dog, was
indicative of an individual who was suffering a severe psychiatric
illness. In other words, this was well outside the
typical — what is typically expected with the overwhelming majority of
homicides. And when you have homicides that
involve young children where the mother is the believed assailant and
you have extreme overkill, you're really down to a very limited number of situations
that can account for it as far as the state of mind
of the assailant.
And I'm not here to analyze the assailant in terms of a psychiatric
approach. This is the — this is a wound analysis to
help identify what might be going on with the assailant. As far as the
wounds go, there is [sic] a limited number of
possibilities.
In response to questioning by the defense, Dr. Spitz answered
affirmatively when asked if he had "done this on prior
occasions," and if this would fall within the realm of wound analysis
and is part of the field of forensic pathology.
When again in the presence of the jury, Dr. Spitz testified that the
photographs of the victims and the family dog showed
a similar wounding pattern; "extensive injury, extreme overkill,
unnecessary wounding in order to cause death, a very
extreme nature of the injuries." The defense then asked Dr. Spitz to
define "overkill" as it was used in his profession.
Dr. Spitz replied, "Overkill is something that I see fairly
infrequently. In fact, it's infrequent to say the least. And
what it is is extreme wounding, wounding that is far beyond what is
necessary to result in somebody's death, wounding
that is so extreme that it raises a variety of questions."
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
the supplemental testimony of Dr. Spitz. The
defendant's mental condition at the time of the offenses was outside
of the scope of Dr. Spitz's expertise. Further,
although neither the State nor the defense referenced Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993),
under that decision, trial courts must exercise a gatekeeping function
to ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant but also reliable. The defense
failed to establish the reliability of its theory
that wound analysis can be used to determine whether an assailant was
suffering from psychosis. Moreover, the defense
presented its theory that the defendant was suffering from psychosis
at the time of the offenses through numerous other
experts at trial.
The gatekeeping duty imposed upon trial courts in Daubert with regard
to scientific testimony applies to all expert
testimony. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147
(1999).
This assignment of error is without merit.
CHANGE OF VENUE
In assignment of error number 5, the defendant argues the trial court
erred in denying the motion for change of venue
because a jury composed of fair and impartial jurors could not be
secured in Lafourche Parish. She relies on the
testimony of Elliot Stonecipher, an expert in public research, and
claims nearly all of the prospective jurors had heard
of the case from the media and/or talked about it with family and
friends.
Each person charged with a crime is presumed innocent until proven
guilty and is entitled to a speedy, public, and
impartial trial in the parish where the offense or an element of the
offense occurred, unless venue is changed in
accordance with law. La.Const. Ann. art. I, § 16. Concurrent with that
right, the law provides for a change of venue when
a defendant establishes she will be unable to obtain an impartial jury
or a fair trial at the place of original venue.
State v. Lee, 05-2098 (La. 1/16/08); 976 So. 2d 109, 132, cert denied,
___U.S. (2008).
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Annotated article 622 provides:
A change of venue shall be granted when the applicant proves that by
reason of prejudice existing in the public mind or
because of undue influence, or that for any other reason, a fair and
impartial trial cannot be obtained in the parish
where the prosecution is pending.
In deciding whether to grant a change of venue the court shall
consider whether the prejudice, the influence, or the
other reasons are such that they will affect the answers of jurors on
the voir dire examination or the testimony of
witnesses at the trial.
In unusual circumstances, prejudice against the defendant may be
presumed. See State v. David, 425 So. 2d 1241, 1246 (La.
1983) ("[U]nfairness of a constitutional magnitude will be presumed in
the presence of a trial atmosphere which is
utterly corrupted by press coverage or which is entirely lacking in
the solemnity and sobriety to which a defendant is
entitled in a system that subscribes to any notion of fairness and
rejects the verdict of the mob."). Otherwise, the
defendant bears the burden of showing actual prejudice. Lee, 976 So.
2d at 132.
A defendant must prove more than mere general public knowledge or
familiarity with the facts of the case to have her
trial moved to another parish. Lee, 976 So. 2d at 133. A defendant is
not entitled to a jury entirely ignorant of her
case and cannot prevail on a motion for change of venue merely by
showing a general level of public awareness about the
crime. Lee, 976 So. 2d at 133. However, courts must differentiate
largely factual publicity from that which is invidious
or inflammatory because they present real differences in the potential
for prejudice. Lee, 976 So. 2d at 133.
Whether a defendant has made the requisite showing of actual prejudice
is a question addressed to the trial court's sound
discretion, which will not be disturbed on appeal absent an
affirmative showing of error and abuse. Lee, 976 So. 2d at
133. Several factors are pertinent in determining whether prejudice
exists rendering a change in venue necessary,
including: (1) the nature of pretrial publicity and the degree to
which it has circulated in the community; (2) the
connection of government officials with the release of the publicity;
(3) the length of time between the dissemination of
the publicity and the trial; (4) the severity and notoriety of the
offense; (5) the area from which the jury is to be
drawn; (6) other events occurring in the community that either affect
or reflect the attitude of the community or
individual jurors toward the defendant; and (7) any factors likely to
affect the candor and veracity of the prospective
jurors on voir dire. Lee, 976 So. 2d at 133.
Prior to trial, the defense moved for a change of venue, arguing the
publicity this matter had received, the age of the
two victims, their manner of death, and their relationship to the
defendant, all supported an immediate change of venue.
In the alternative, if the trial court should defer disposition of the
motion until jury selection, the defense moved for
individual, sequestered voir dire.
Defense expert Stonecipher testified at the hearing on the motion for
change of venue. Stonecipher offered scientific
evidence regarding prejudice in the minds of prospective jurors in the
case. According to the United States census, as of
2006, the population of Lafourche Parish was 93,554, and as of July
15, 2008, voter registration was 56,233. In May of
2008, Stonecipher conducted a telephone poll of 406 Lafourche Parish
registered voters concerning prejudice against the
defendant in the public mind. Stonecipher claimed a 400-person sample
yields data that is accurate within five percent,
plus or minus, at the 95 percent confidence level. According to
Stonecipher, 86 percent of the survey respondents knew of
the case with no mention of names. Stonecipher indicated 25 percent of
the survey respondents who had heard of the case
were able to name the defendant. According to Stonecipher, 3 percent
of respondents who had heard of the case felt
strongly the defendant was innocent; 4 percent of respondents who had
heard of the case leaned toward believing the
defendant was innocent; 12 percent of respondents who had heard of the
case leaned toward believing the defendant was
guilty; and 46 percent of respondents who had heard of the case felt
strongly the defendant was guilty.
Additionally, Stonecipher stated 31 percent of survey respondents who
believed the defendant was guilty, or leaned toward
believing the defendant was guilty, believed that if convicted she
should be given the death penalty. Stonecipher
concluded, "there is unquestionably a high degree of prejudice
existing in the public mind of Lafourche Parish," and it
would be impossible for the defendant to receive a trial by fair and
impartial jurors in Lafourche Parish. On cross-examination, Stonecipher stated that approximately two-thirds (66
percent) of the population of the State of Louisiana
believe in the death penalty.
The trial court denied the motion to change venue and in reasons
explained:
The evidence of the publicity and the results of the poll, while it
shows knowledge on the part of many, and a
predisposition to vote guilty and impose the death penalty on the part
of a significant number interviewed, does not
satisfy the defendant's burden, that this community is so prejudiced,
collectively, against her, that a jury cannot be
selected from its citizens to afford her a fair and impartial trial.
The defendant requested supervisory relief from this court. State v.
Hebert, 09-0039 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/13/09)
(unpublished). We denied the writ application, finding no abuse of the
trial court's discretion in the application of the
pertinent factors used to determine whether actual prejudice existed,
and noting under the jurisprudence, a decision on a
motion for change of venue could best be determined immediately before
the trial date. We further stated, if during the
completion of voir dire, the trial court found a fair and impartial
jury could not be obtained because of prejudice, it
could reconsider its ruling.
Jury selection began on April 16, 2009. The prospective jurors were
divided into four groups, which were further divided
into panels. Prospective jurors were questioned individually on three
separate issues: sequestration, pre-trial
publicity, and the death penalty. Many jurors expressed familiarity
with the case from media reports. Others indicated
having heard the case discussed amongst friends, family, or
co-workers. Most recollections were of a mother who had
killed her children and then tried to kill herself.
A thorough review of the record fails to reveal error or abuse of
discretion in the denial of the motion to change venue.
The defendant failed to establish actual prejudice by her trial being
held in Lafourche Parish. At most, she established
a general level of public awareness about the offenses. The television
news stories, newspaper articles, and transcribed
radio stories offered in support of the motion for change of venue
spanned the period from August 20, 2007, through July
19, 2008. The presentation of evidence at trial began on May 4, 2009.
Most of the media coverage was factual in nature,
and no attempt was made to demonize the defendant. Many of the stories
portrayed her in a positive manner, referring to
the defendant as a good person and loving mother who was law abiding
and active in her church. None of the media coverage
referenced the notes the defendant left at the scene or her claim that
Satan had spoken to her during the offenses. The
local sheriff was referenced in some of the media reports, but the
Lafourche Parish District Attorney's Office issued an
official statement that it would not make any public statements
regarding the case as long as it was pending.
Although the offenses were severe and notorious, the defense did not
dispute the defendant had killed the victims. Thus,
prior knowledge by prospective jurors of the fact that the defendant
had killed the victims was much less significant
than in a case where identity was at issue. See State v. Lee, 559 So.
2d 1310, 1313 (La. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
954 (1991) (no abuse of discretion in denying motion for change of
venue where only penalty phase at issue, and thus,
prior knowledge of basic facts "not nearly as significant as it might
be").
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the
defendant's motion for change of venue. This assignment
of error is without merit.
EXCESSIVE SENTENCES
In assignment of error number 6, the defendant argues the imposition
of consecutive, rather than concurrent, life
sentences was excessive. It is within sentencing court's discretion to
order that sentences run consecutively, rather
than concurrently. State v. Berry, 95 1610 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/8/96);
684 So. 2d 439, 460, writ denied, 97-0278 (La.
10/10/97); 703 So. 2d 603. Prior to imposing sentences, the trial
court heard argument from counsel regarding whether
consecutive or concurrent life sentences were appropriate in this
particular case. The trial court provided ample
justification for its express imposition of consecutive sentences. The
trial court properly reasoned that the two
convictions involved two distinct and separate acts. The court stated
that it had considered both La. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. arts. 883 and 894.1 and listed particular factors to be
considered: the victims, their perpetrator, and any past
history of violence. The trial court described the present crimes as
particularly vicious and heinous. The trial court
concluded that imposition of anything other than concurrent sentences
would deprecate the seriousness of the offenses.
The trial court expressly directed that the two first degree murder
convictions were to run consecutively; thus, those
sentences are outside the scope of La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 883,
which provides the rule of construction when a
court does not expressly direct whether sentences are to be served
concurrently or consecutively. See State v. Palmer,
97-0174 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/29/97); 706 So. 2d 156, 160.
While we acknowledge the defendant's status as a first felony
offender, the reasons given by the trial court support the
imposition of consecutive sentences. The defendant brutally killed her
two helpless, young children; she is the worst
kind of offender. Consecutive sentences are not necessarily excessive,
and in this instance, the record amply supports
the trial court's decision. See State v. Palmer, 97-0174 (La. App. 1
Cir. 12/29/97); 706 So. 2d 156, 160. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in ordering that the sentences be served
consecutively.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.
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