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Jack Wade CLARK

 
 
 
 
 

 

 

 

 
 
 
Classification: Murderer
Characteristics: Rape
Number of victims: 1
Date of murder: October 15, 1989
Date of arrest: October 1989
Date of birth: July 29, 1963
Victims profile: Melisa Ann Garcia (female, 23)
Method of murder: Stabbing with knife
Location: Lubbock County, Texas, USA
Status: Executed by lethal injection in Texas on January 9, 2001
 
 
 
 
 
 


 

Summary:

Clark spotted 23 year old Melisa Garcia making a call from a public phone booth on the street.

When she finished the call, Clark approached and stabbed her in the shoulder. He then forced her into her own car, raped her, then stabbed her in the heart.

Defendant led police to body and confessed. Postconviction DNA confirmed guilt.

Tragically, the victim's grandmother was murdered by Adolph Hernandez one year earlier. Both Clark and Hernandez were executed in 2001.

 
 

Texas Attorney General

Friday, January 5, 2001

MEDIA ADVISORY - Jack Wade Clark Scheduled To Be Executed.

AUSTIN - Texas Attorney General John Cornyn offers the following information on Jack Wade Clark who is scheduled to be executed after 6 p.m., Tuesday, January 9th. Jack Wade Clark was convicted and sentenced to death for the October 1989 rape and murder of Melisa Ann Garcia in Lubbock, Texas:

The following is from the written confession Clark gave police. Clark's confession was used as evidence admitted at trial.

In the early morning hours of October 15, 1989, Clark saw Melisa Ann Garcia, who was making a telephone call at a public telephone. He approached her, asked her for a light for his cigarette, walked around the corner to wait for her to finish her call, and then stabbed her in the shoulder.

He then forced her into her own car, drove it away, and sexually assaulted her. Garcia remained in a semi-conscious state as she was being raped. After sexually assaulting her, Clark stabbed Garcia in the heart. He drove her car and parked it near his house, cleaned the knife, and hid it in the attic.

Clark's confession was supported by the trial testimony of a high school honor roll student, who was in jail with Clark while he was in the Lubbock County Jail. Clark had confided in the inmate regarding his involvement in Garcia's murder.

The witness testified that Clark bragged about how he had asked the victim for a lighter, stabbed her, forced her into the car, drove her somewhere, and raped her. Clark further explained to the witness that he stabbed her again so that she could not identify him, and that he had ground the knife down so that it could not be identified as the murder weapon.

There was no evidence that the witness received any benefit for coming forward with Clark's jailhouse confession some six weeks after the witness was released from jail.

The state's pathologist confirmed both of the stab wounds as well as the injuries which were indicative of sexual assault, i.e. traumatized external genitalia, swelling of the vaginal area and various cuts and bruises. The evidence presented at trial also included testimony that the knife later retrieved from Clark showed evidence of recent grinding.

The state produced evidence of Clark's desertion from the Navy and the Army; assault and attempted rape of a relative; hostile and threatening behavior towards Children's Protective Services workers; neglect and abuse and lack of appropriate supervision of his children; threatening behavior toward a landlord and neighborhood boy; intimidating and threatening and assaultive behavior toward his neighbors; faking mental illness and suicidal thoughts in jail; possession of "shanks" in jail; intimidation of guards; and fighting with inmates.

Eight different courts, state and federal, including the United States Supreme Court have reviewed Clark's appeals and rejected them.

 
 

Jack Wade Clark

Txexecutions.org

Jack Wade Clark, 37, was executed by lethal injection on Tuesday, 9 January 2001, in Huntsville, Texas for the rape and murder of a 23-year-old woman.

In October 1989, Clark, then 26, spotted Melisa Ann Garcia at a telephone booth. He asked her for a light for his cigarette, then went around a corner and hid. After she finished her call, walked by him. As she passed, Clark stabbed her in the shoulder, then forced her into her car. She drove them to an abandoned area, where Clark raped her repeatedly then stabbed her twice through the heart.

Afterward, Clark led police to Garcia's body, telling them he spotted it in some tall weeds while making a U-turn on a highway. Based on his description of the scene, police immediately suspected him. He was arrested a few weeks later, and confessed.

At his trial, one of Clark's fellow inmates at the county jail testified that Clark had bragged to him about Garcia's rape and murder. Other testimony showed that Clark had a history of abusing his children and assaulting and threatening relatives and neighbors. In jail, he made weapons and fought with other inmates.

On death row, Clark claimed that he was innocent and that his signed confession was insincere. When recent DNA tests tied him to the crime scene and the rape, he said that the evidence was planted.

The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Clark's appeal in October. Governor Rick Perry rejected his clemency request. This was the first execution in Texas in 2001 and the first during Perry's tenure. Perry, formerly lieutenant governor, became governor upon the resignation of President-elect George W. Bush. Perry had also allowed some executions during Bush's six years as governor, when Bush was out of the state and Perry was the acting governor.

At his execution, Clark apologized to Garcia's family, asked for their forgiveness, and quoted a verse of Scripture. He was pronounced dead at 6:27 p.m.

 
 

Jack Wade Clark

Houston Chronicle

January 9, 2001

TEXAS - Convicted killer Jack Wade Clark was executed this evening for the abduction, rape and fatal stabbing of a 23-year-old Lubbock County woman more than 11 years ago. The execution was the 1st in Texas' death chamber this year.

In a brief final statement while strapped to the death chamber gurney, Clark expressed remorse and prayed. "I would like to say to the family that I am sorry and I do ask their forgiveness," he said as five members of his victim's family stood a few feet away watching through a window.

He invited people to attend his funeral Mass and then recited a short prayer, closing with the words "peace and goodness." He sputtered and gasped slightly before slipping into unconsciousness. He was pronounced death at 6:27 p.m., 9 minutes after the lethal drugs started flowing. "If we confess our sins, He is just and true to forgive us of our sins and cleanse us from all unrighteousness," Clark said.

Gov. Rick Perry, in his 1st execution case since succeeding President- elect Bush 3 weeks ago, cleared the way for the execution when he rejected Clark's request for clemency. Last year, with then-Lt. Gov. Perry frequently assuming Bush's duties when the GOP presidential candidate was campaigning out of the state, Texas carried out a record 40 executions.

Clark, 37, led police to the body of 23-year-old Melisa Ann Garcia of Slaton, saying he spotted her body in some tall weeds off a highway while making a U-turn. "But the way he described the scene, he almost had to be the murderer," Rebecca Atchley, the former assistant prosecutor in Lubbock who tried Clark, said.

Clark was arrested and confessed to the murder but insisted from death row he was innocent. "I know I didn't do that," Clark said in an interview last week. "I know for a fact I didn't rape that girl. Never happened." Recent DNA tests on evidence tied him to the crime scene. Clark contended the evidence was planted.

Garcia was making a telephone call outside a convenience store the early hours of Oct. 15, 1989, when Clark approached her and asked if she had a light for a cigarette. When she finished her call, testimony showed he stabbed her in the shoulder, forced her into her own car, drove away and repeatedly raped her before fatally stabbing her in the heart. Clark said he signed his confession in frustration. "I was truly seeking a way out," he said. Clark, brandishing a knife at officers, was arrested following a brief highway police chase a few weeks after he told officers he spotted the body.

"There was no possible way this guy could have seen the body," said former Lubbock District Attorney Travis Ware, who went to the murder scene. "Sometimes these guys will commit a crime like this and get to be the hero by discovering the body. That apparently was what he was up to. "Melisa Ann Garcia was a totally innocent victim of circumstance."

While in the county jail, Clark bragged about the rape and murder to another inmate, who testified against him at his trial. Evidence also showed Clark was a military deserter, was accused of assaulting and attempting to rape a relative, threatening child welfare workers, neglecting and abusing his children and of threatening and assaultive behavior toward neighbors. He also had a history of making weapons while in jail, trying to intimidate guards and fighting with inmates.

Garcia's death was not the 1st murder tragedy for her family. Her 69-year-old grandmother, Elizabeth Alvarado, was beaten to death during a robbery at her home a year before Garcia was killed. The man convicted of that killing, Adolph Gil Hernandez, is set for execution next month. "We have been waiting so long for this day to come," Josie Vargas, Garcia's aunt and Alvarado's daughter, told the Lubbock Avalanche- Journal. "It's been terrible. I don't know how we survived." "That made this case really tragic," Atchley said. "2 victims of vicious murders in one family. It's very horrific."

Clark becomes the 1st condemned inmate to be put to death this year in Texas and the 240th overall since the state resumed capital punishment on Dec. 7, 1982. Clark becomes the 1st condemned inmate to be put to death this year in the USA, and the 684th overall since America resumed executions on Jan. 17. 1977.

 
 

ProDeathPenalty.com

Jack Clark was sentenced to die for the rape and stabbing murder of 23-year-old Melisa Ann Garcia in October of 1989. Clark, a transient, told police he spotted Melissa at a telephone booth, asked her for a light for his cigarette, then stabbed her in the shoulder before forcing her into her car. She drove to an abandoned area, where she was raped and stabbed through the heart.

In a brief final statement while strapped to the death chamber gurney, Clark expressed remorse and prayed. "I would like to say to the family that I am sorry and I do ask their forgiveness," he said as five members of his victim's family stood a few feet away watching through a window.

He invited people to attend his funeral Mass and then recited a short prayer, closing with the words "peace and goodness." He sputtered and gasped slightly before slipping into unconsciousness.

He was pronounced death at 6:27 p.m., 9 minutes after the lethal drugs started flowing. "If we confess our sins, He is just and true to forgive us of our sins and cleanse us from all unrighteousness," Clark said. Gov. Rick Perry, in his 1st execution case since succeeding President-elect Bush 3 weeks ago, cleared the way for the execution when he rejected Clark's request for clemency.

Clark, 37, led police to the body of 23-year-old Melisa Ann Garcia of Slaton, saying he spotted her body in some tall weeds off a highway while making a U-turn. "But the way he described the scene, he almost had to be the murderer," Rebecca Atchley, the former assistant prosecutor in Lubbock who tried Clark, said.

Clark was arrested and confessed to the murder but insisted from death row he was innocent. "I know I didn't do that," Clark said in an interview last week. "I know for a fact I didn't rape that girl. Never happened." Recent DNA tests on evidence tied him to the crime scene.

Clark contended the evidence was planted. Garcia was making a telephone call outside a convenience store the early hours of Oct. 15, 1989, when Clark approached her and asked if she had a light for a cigarette. When she finished her call, testimony showed he stabbed her in the shoulder, forced her into her own car, drove away and repeatedly raped her before fatally stabbing her in the heart.

Clark said he signed his confession in frustration. "I was truly seeking a way out," he said. Clark, brandishing a knife at officers, was arrested following a brief highway police chase a few weeks after he told officers he spotted the body. "There was no possible way this guy could have seen the body," said former Lubbock District Attorney Travis Ware, who went to the murder scene. "Sometimes these guys will commit a crime like this and get to be the hero by discovering the body. That apparently was what he was up to. "Melisa Ann Garcia was a totally innocent victim of circumstance."

While in the county jail, Clark bragged about the rape and murder to another inmate, who testified against him at his trial.

Evidence also showed Clark was a military deserter, was accused of assaulting and attempting to rape a relative, threatening child welfare workers, neglecting and abusing his children and of threatening and assaultive behavior toward neighbors. He also had a history of making weapons while in jail, trying to intimidate guards and fighting with inmates.

Garcia's death was not the 1st murder tragedy for her family. Her 69-year-old grandmother, Elizabeth Alvarado, was beaten to death during a robbery at her home a year before Garcia was killed.

The man convicted of that killing, Adolph Gil Hernandez, is set for execution next month. "We have been waiting so long for this day to come," Josie Vargas, Garcia's aunt and Alvarado's daughter, told the Lubbock Avalanche-Journal. "It's been terrible. I don't know how we survived." "That made this case really tragic," Atchley said. "2 victims of vicious murders in one family. It's very horrific."

 
 

Clark, Convicted Killer of Slaton Woman, Executed

By Michael Graczyk - Amarillo Globe-News

Wednesday, January 10, 2001

HUNTSVILLE (AP) - Convicted killer Jack Wade Clark was executed Tuesday evening for the abduction, rape and fatal stabbing of a 23-year-old Lubbock County woman more than 11 years ago. The execution was the first in Texas' death chamber this year.

In a brief final statement while strapped to the death chamber gurney, Clark expressed remorse and prayed. "I would like to say to the family that I am sorry and I do ask their forgiveness," he said as five members of his victim's family stood a few feet away watching through a window.

Gov. Rick Perry, in his first execution case since succeeding President-elect Bush three weeks ago, cleared the way for the execution when he rejected Clark's request for clemency. Last year, with then-Lt. Gov. Perry frequently assuming Bush's duties when the GOP presidential candidate was campaigning out of the state, Texas carried out a record 40 executions.

Clark, 37, led police to the body of 23-year-old Melisa Ann Garcia of Slaton, saying he spotted her body in some tall weeds off a highway while making a U-turn. "But the way he described the scene, he almost had to be the murderer," Rebecca Atchley, the former assistant prosecutor in Lubbock who tried Clark, said.

Clark was arrested and confessed to the murder but insisted from death row he was innocent. Recent DNA tests on evidence tied him to the crime scene. Clark contended the evidence was planted.

Garcia was making a telephone call outside a convenience store the early hours of Oct. 15, 1989, when Clark approached her and asked if she had a light for a cigarette.

When she finished her call, testimony showed he stabbed her in the shoulder, forced her into her own car, drove away and repeatedly raped her before fatally stabbing her in the heart.

  


 

 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit

No. 98-11113

JACK WADE CLARK, Petitioner-Appellant,

VERSUS

GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas

January 28, 2000

Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Jack Wade Clark, a Texas death row inmate, whosepetition for habeas corpus relief and request for a Certificate of Appealability ("COA") from the denial thereof were both denied by the federal district court below, now seeks a COA from this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2). For all of the reasons setforth below, we deny the request for a COA.

I. BACKGROUND

According to his own written confession, which was admitted attrial, Clark observed the decedent, Melisa Ann Garcia, making atelephone call at a public telephone in the early morning hours ofOctober 15, 1989. He approached her, asked her for a light, walkedaround the corner to wait for her to finish her call, and thenstabbed her in the shoulder as she completed her call.

He then forced her into her own car, drove it away, and subsequently sexually assaulted her. All the while, the decedent was passing in and out of consciousness. After sexually assaulting her, he stabbed her again in the heart, drove her car and parked it near his house, cleaned the knife, and hid it in the attic.

Clark's confession was also supported by the testimony of a high school honor roll student, who was incarcerated with Clark while he was in the Lubbock County Jail, and in whom Clark had confided regarding his involvement in the murder. The witness testified that Clark, in a bragging tone, described how he had asked the victim for a lighter, stabbed her, forced her into the car, drove her somewhere, and "screwed her through her mouth, herass, and her pussy."

Clark further explained to the witness thathe stabbed her again so that she could not identify him, and thathe had ground the knife down so that it could not be identified asthe murder weapon. There was no evidence that the witness received any benefit for coming forward with Clark's jailhouse confession some six weeks after the witness was released from jail.

The state's pathologist confirmed both of the stab wounds aswell as the injuries which were indicative of sexual assault, i.e.traumatized external genitalia, a laceration on the remainder ofthe hymen, and abrasions, contusions, and swelling of the vaginalarea. Additionally, the pathologist testified that the decedent'sanus was dilated, indicating post mortem distention. The evidence presented at trial also included testimony that the knife later retrieved from Clark showed evidence of recent grinding.

The defense presented no evidence what so ever during the guilt phase of the trial and waived argument.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Clark pleaded not guilty and was tried before a jury on thecharge of capital murder in the course of committing or attemptingto commit sexual assault. On February 15, 1991, the jury returneda guilty verdict and on February 21, 1991, during the sentencingphase, the same jury returned answers in the affirmative to the twospecial issues in the applicable version of article 37.071 of theTexas Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the trial courtimposed upon Clark the sentence of death.

Clark's conviction and sentence were automatically appealed tothe Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. On March 9, 1994, that courtaffirmed Clark's conviction and sentence. See Clark v. State , 881S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc). And on February 21,1995, the Supreme Court denied Clark's petition for writ ofcertiorari. See Clark v. Texas , 115 S. Ct. 1114 (1995).

Clark then filed an application for state habeas relief. Thesame judge who had presided over Clark's criminal trial enteredfindings of fact and conclusions of law recommending denial ofClark's state habeas petition. On June 10, 1998, the Texas Courtof Criminal Appeals adopted the trial judge's findings of fact andconclusions of law and denied Clark's application for state habeascorpus relief. Clark then filed his petition for habeas corpus relief in federal district court. The Texas Attorney General answered Clark's federal petition and moved for summary judgment. On August 25, 1998, the district court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed Clark's petition for writ of habeascorpus with prejudice. On September 25, 1998, the district court denied Clark's request for a COA on each of the issues raisedherein.

III. DISCUSSION

Clark seeks a COA from this Court on each of the followingissues: (1) whether summary judgment is an appropriate mechanismfor the disposition of petitions for habeas corpus relief filedpursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254; (2) whether Clark was afforded anadequate opportunity to develop the factual basis underlying hisclaims for relief, i.e. whether he was entitled to discovery and anevidentiary hearing before summary judgment would have beenappropriate; (3) whether the district court erred in deferring tostate court findings regarding his claims A, B, C, E, and F,because he had not been afforded the opportunity to develop theunderlying factual basis for those claims at an evidentiaryhearing; (4) whether the district court erred in failing to granta continuance so as to permit Clark to develop the underlyingfactual basis of his claims; (5) whether the district court erredin denying Clark the appointment of an expert in forensic pathologyto help develop his claims; (6) whether the district court erred indeferring to as reasonable the state habeas court's findingsregarding his claims that a juror failed to disclose the extent ofher relationship with the prosecutor thus violating his due processrights; and (7) whether the trial court's failure to define"mitigating evidence" in the punishment charge to the juryunconstitutionally denied Clark an appropriate vehicle forconsideration of such evidence.

Clark's petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on June22, 1998, and is thus governed by the provisions of theAntiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). See Lindhv. Murphy , 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2068 (1997); United States v. Carter ,117 F.3d 262 (5 th Cir. 1997). Under AEDPA, before an appeal fromthe dismissal or denial of a 2254 habeas petition can proceed,the petitioner must first obtain a COA, which will issue "only ifthe applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of aconstitutional right." 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2).

We have held thata petitioner makes a "substantial showing" when he demonstratesthat his petition involves issues which are debatable among juristsof reason, that another court could resolve the issues differently,or that the issues are suitable enough to deserve encouragement toproceed further. See Drinkard v. Johnson , 97 F.3d 751, 755 (5 th Cir. 1996) overruled in part on other grounds, Lindh , 117 S. Ct.2059 (1997). The same standards which governed issuance of thepre-AEDPA version of the COA, the certificate of probable cause("CPC"), apply to requests for a COA. See id . at 756.

The post-AEDPA version of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) provides as follows:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State courtshall not be granted with respect to any claimthat was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication ofthe claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contraryto, or involved an unreasonable applicationof, clearly established Federal law, asdetermined by the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based onan unreasonable determination of the facts inlight of the evidence presented in the Statecourt proceeding.

28 U.S.C. 2254(d). We review pure questions of law under the"contrary to" standard of subsection (d)(1), mixed question of lawand fact under the "unreasonable application" standard ofsubsection (d)(1), and pure questions of fact under the "unreasonable determination of facts" standard of subsection(d)(2). See Lamb v. Johnson , 179 F.3d 352, 356 (5 th Cir. 1999)(citing Drinkard , 97 F.3d at 767-69), cert. denied , 1999 WL 754407(U.S. Nov. 15, 1999) (No. 99-6272).

An application of law to facts will not be deemedunreasonable, unless reasonable jurists "would be of one view thatthe state court ruling was incorrect." Drinkard , 97 F.3d at 769. And under this standard, we will grant habeas relief "only if astate court decision is so clearly incorrect that it would not bedebatable among reasonable jurists." Id. Additionally, under 2254(e)(1), a state court's determination of a factual issue mustbe presumed correct, and the habeas petitioner bears the burden ofrebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. The presumption is especially strong when the state habeas court andthe trial court are one in the same. See Amos v. Scott , 61 F.3d333, 347 (5 th Cir. 1995); James v. Collins , 987 F.2d 1116, 1122 (5 th Cir. 1993) (citing Buxton v. Lynaugh , 879 F.2d 140, 146 (5th Cir.1989)).

And while the nature of the penalty in a capital case is anappropriate consideration for determining whether to issue a COA,the severity of the penalty at issue does not, in and of itself, require the issuance of a COA. See Lamb , 179 F.3d at 356. However, in capital cases, doubts as to whether a COA should issuemust be resolved in favor of the petitioner. See id. ; see also Buxton v. Collins , 925 F.2d 816, 819 (5 th Cir. 1991). Bearing thefore going principles in mind, we turn to consider those issuesraised by Clark in his request for a COA.

A.

Clark first contends that he is entitled to a COA on the basisthat summary judgment is not contemplated by 28 U.S.C. 2254 orthe Rules Governing 2254 Cases. He contends that the TexasAttorney General cited no cases, statutes, or rules in the original motion for summary judgment which hold that summary judgment is appropriate in 2254 cases. Yet in his own briefings, Clark citesno authority for the opposite proposition.

As a general principle, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of CivilProcedure, relating to summary judgment, applies with equal forcein the context of habeas corpus cases. See Rule 11 of the RulesGoverning 2254 Cases; Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2). We havepreviously recognized the appropriateness of summary judgment inhabeas corpus proceedings. See e.g., Barnes v. Johnson , 160 F.3d218, 222 (5 th Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 1768 (1999); Harris v. Johnson , 81 F.3d 535, 539 (5 th Cir. 1996) (both applying summary judgment standard in a 2254 case). And nothing in Clark's briefing convinces us that summary judgment is nototherwise appropriate in habeas corpus cases filed pursuant to 28U.S.C. 2254. We find that this issue would not be debatable among jurists of reason, and Clark has thus failed to make asubstantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, we deny Clark's request for a COA on this issue.

B.

Clark's second, third, and fourth issues are related, andrevolve around the district court's alleged error in refusing toallow Clark discovery, an evidentiary hearing, and a continuance,all of which he requested in an effort to investigate and develop the underlying factual basis of his claims, specifically, hisclaims related to a juror's alleged failure to fully disclose the extent of a personal relationship with the prosecutor and the State's alleged use of testimony from a subsequently discreditedpathologist. He contends that his claims required extensive investigation because the pertinent facts are "usually hidden," and that he would have needed a few more months to "continue todevelop a claim." According to Clark, summary judgment was inappropriate in the face of his undeveloped claims.

With regard to discovery, an evidentiary hearing, and acontinuance for more time to conduct an investigation of hisclaims, Clark exhausted all of the funds provided by the state court for investigation, and his request for additional funds was denied. He again requested discovery, an evidentiary hearing, acontinuance, and the appointment of a pathologist expert in hisfederal habeas case in order to develop his juror bias anddiscredited pathologist claims. His requests were denied by thedistrict court.

Under AEDPA, a habeas petitioner's entitlement to an evidentiary hearing when he has failed to develop the factual basisof a claim is restricted to the narrow exceptions of 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(2), which provides:

(2) If the applicant has failed to developthe factual basis of a claim in State courtproceedings, the court shall not hold anevidentiary hearing on the claim unless theapplicant shows that--

(A) the claim relies on--

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, maderetroactive to cases on collateral review bythe Supreme Court, that was previouslyunavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could nothave been previously discovered through theexercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would besufficient to establish by clear andconvincing evidence that but forconstitutional error, no reasonable fact-finder would have found the applicant guiltyof the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(2). These exceptions apply only where thefailure to develop the factual basis is directly attributable to adecision or omission of the petitioner. See McDonald v. Johnson ,139 F.3d 1056, 1059 (5 th Cir. 1998).

Relying on McDonald , Clark argues that 2254(e)(2) does notapply to preclude an evidentiary hearing here because the failureto fully develop the record below is not attributable to any faultof his own, but rather to the state court's failure to permit himadditional discovery. While we agree that 2254(e)(2) does notapply to Clark's situation, as we stated in McDonald , overcomingthe preclusive effect of 2254(e)(2) does not guarantee anevidentiary hearing, it only opens the door for one. See McDonald , 139 F.3d at 1059-60. Pursuant to Rule 8 of the RulesGoverning 2254 Cases, the district court retains discretion overthe decision to grant an evidentiary hearing once a petitionerovercomes the barriers presented by 2254(e)(2). See id. at 1060.

The district court's decision to deny Clark's request for anevidentiary hearing will thus be reviewed by us on appeal for anabuse of discretion. See id. Likewise, the district court'sdecision regarding the availability of discovery is also committedto the sound discretion of the district court, and is reviewedunder the abuse of discretion standard. See Rule 6(a) of the RulesGoverning 2254 Cases; Campbell v. Blodgett , 982 F.2d 1356 (9 th Cir. 1993). Our pre-AEDPA jurisprudence is instructive inevaluating whether the district court's denial of discovery and an evidentiary hearing was an abuse of discretion.

Prior to the enactment of AEDPA, we consistently held thatwhen there is a factual dispute which "'if resolved in thepetitioner's favor, would entitle [the petitioner] to relief andthe state has not afforded the petitioner a full and fair hearing,'a federal habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to discovery and anevidentiary hearing." Perillo v. Johnson , 79 F.3d 441, 444 (5 th Cir. 1996) (quoting Ward v. Whitley , 21 F.3d 1355, 1367 (5 th Cir.1994); see also Moawad v. Anderson , 143 F.3d 942, 947-48 (5 th Cir.), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 383 (1998). To find an abuse ofdiscretion which would entitle Clark to discovery and an evidentiary hearing to prove his contentions, we would necessarily have to find that the state did not provide him with a full andfair hearing and we must be convinced that if proven true, his allegations would entitle him to relief. See Moawad , 143 F.3d at948.

With respect to whether Clark was afforded a full and fairhearing by the state court, Clark contends that he requestedadditional funds (once he exhausted those provided by the statecourt) and an evidentiary hearing to develop the record, but thatthe state court denied his requests. The state court then deniedhis request for state habeas relief based upon the pleadings andaffidavits which had been submitted and without holding a liveevidentiary hearing, i.e. Clark was given only a "paper hearing." See Perillo , 79 F.3d at 446 n.7.

A full and fair hearing does not necessarily require livetestimony. Indeed, we have repeatedly found that a paper hearingis sufficient to afford a petitioner a full and fair hearing on thefactual issues underlying the petitioner's claims, especiallywhere, as here, the trial court and the state habeas court were onein the same. See id . at 446-47 (listing cases where thepresumption of correctness, which attached to factualdeterminations made after a full and fair hearing under the pre-AEDPA version of 2254(d), was established with only a paperhearing before the same state judge who presided over the criminaltrial). We conclude that the state habeas court, after firstpresiding over Clark's criminal trial, after providing Clark withstate-funded exploration of his claims, though not to the extentClark may have liked, and after considering the pleadings andaffidavits before it, provided Clark with a full and fair hearing.

In evaluating whether the district court abused its discretionin denying Clark discovery and an evidentiary hearing, we next consider whether there is a factual dispute which, if resolved inClark's favor, would entitle him to relief. Based upon our reviewof the record, including all of the affidavits submitted by Clarkin support of his petition, we find that Clark has alleged no fact which if proved, would entitle him to relief on his habeas claims.

Clark's allegations with respect to the State's testifying pathologist, Dr. Erdmann, do not involve specifics. Rather, Clark contends that "many problems [were] discovered in autopsies conducted by Dr. Erdmann." Clark presented no specific evidence ofmisconduct in the performance of the victim's autopsy in this case.

In his request for the appointment of an expert forensic pathologist, Clark did advise the district court that a Dr. GlenGroben, after reviewing Dr. Erdmann's testimony, initially opinedthat Dr. Erdmann's procedures and conclusions may be false ormisleading. However, the cited passages of Dr. Groben's initialopinion reference only differences of opinion and allegations ofthe lack of other physical evidence to support Dr. Erdmann'sconclusions as to the sequence of the victim's injuries. Nospecific errors are cited. We previously examined a nearly identical allegation involving the same Dr. Erdmann in Boyle v.Johnson , 93 F.3d 180 (5 th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 968(1997).

In Boyle , the petitioner presented evidence by other experts who disagreed with Dr. Erdmann's conclusions, but since Erdmann's testimony was consistent with the overwhelming physical evidence, we found that the presumption of correctness owed to thestate habeas court's findings, which findings rejected the claimthat Erdmann testified falsely or mislead the jury, had not been overcome. See Boyle , 93 F.3d at 186-87.

Here as well, the overwhelming evidence, including Clark's unassailed confession, comports with Dr. Erdmann's conclusions asto the sequence and extent of the victim's injuries, the sexual assault, and the cause of death. Indeed, the record clearly reveals that even without Dr. Erdmann's testimony, each of hisconclusions had been independently established by other evidenceand testimony.

Furthermore, while Clark refers to evidence that Dr. Erdmann was accused of misconduct in other cases, he haspresented no evidence that Dr. Erdmann did so in this case. Simplyput, Clark has failed to present clear and convincing evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of correctness to which thestate habeas court's factual findings are entitled, and he has failed to establish that even if resolved in his favor, the factualdispute as to Dr. Erdmann's credibility would entitle him torelief.

With respect to Clark's claims that a juror failed to disclose the extent of her relationship with the prosecutor, Clark claims the facts underlying this claim are hidden and that he needed bothtime and more resources to complete his investigation and todevelop a claim. His request is tantamount to a request for an impermissible fishing expedition. See Perillo , 79 F.3d at 444(noting that Rule 6 of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases "'does not authorize fishing expeditions.'") (quoting Ward v. Whitley , 21 F.3d1355, 1367 (5 th Cir. 1994)). Discovery must relate solely to aspecifically alleged factual dispute, not to a general allegation. See Ward , 21 F.3d at 1367 .

In its order granting summary judgment and dismissing Clark'spetition, the district court noted that Clark has failed todemonstrate by "clear and convincing" evidence that the statecourt's dispositive factual findings regarding his juror disclosureclaims are incorrect, and based upon our own review of the record,we agree.

Clark is not entitled to relief as these claims were adequately developed below, and as the district court noted, he hasfailed to demonstrate anything more than was disclosed at voirdire. He seeks merely to cast a line in the hopes of hooking additional evidence which might support his claims, and has notsought discovery or an evidentiary hearing with respect to aspecific factual allegation which would entitle him to relief. Thediscovery provisions of Rule 6 do not contemplate the type offishing trip on which Clark seeks to embark.

Related to his alleged need to more fully develop his claimsprior to the entry of summary judgment, Clark lastly contends thatthe district court erred in denying his request for a continuanceof the habeas proceedings in order to afford him more time todevelop the factual basis of his juror and pathologist claims. Adistrict court's denial of a motion to continue in habeas cases isgoverned by the abuse of discretion standard. See Spinkellink v.Wainwright , 578 F.2d 582, 590-91 n.11 (5 th Cir. 1978) (citing UnitedStates v. Mendoza , 574 F.2d 1373 (5 th Cir. 1978)).

For the reasonsdiscussed above, we find that Clark was not entitled to anyadditional discovery or an evidentiary hearing, and thus he waslikewise not entitled to additional time to develop those claimswhich the district court determined had already been adequatelydeveloped.

In sum, because Clark was provided a full and fair hearing bythe state court on his claims, and because there is no factualdispute which if proven true, would entitle Clark to relief, wefind that he was not entitled to, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying him additional discovery, acontinuance, or an evidentiary hearing. The issues had been sufficiently developed below such that the district court was ableto decide as a matter of law whether, when construing all of thefacts, both developed and allegedly undeveloped, in a light most favorable to Clark, he was not entitled to habeas relief.

Accordingly, the district court did not err in deferring to factualdeterminations of the state court and summary judgment was appropriately entered. We thus find that Clark has failed todemonstrate that his petition involves issues which are debatable among jurists of reason, that another court could resolve theissues differently, or that the issues are suitable enough to deserve encouragement to proceed further, and accordingly we denya COA on Clark's second, third, and fourth issues.

C.

In his fifth issue, Clark contends that he is entitled to aCOA on the basis of the district court's failure to grant hismotion for the assistance of an expert in forensic pathology. Aswith his requests for additional discovery and an evidentiary hearing, the basis for Clark's request for the assistance of anexpert in forensic pathology was to help him develop his claim thatDr. Erdmann, the state's pathologist, may have testified falsely athis trial.

Clark's request for expert assistance was filed pursuant to 21U.S.C. 848(q)(4)(B) and (q)(9). (1) The most pertinent provisionsof 848(q) provide as follows:

(9) Upon a finding that investigative, expert, orother services are reasonably necessary for therepresentation of the defendant, whether inconnection with issues relating to guilt or thesentence, the court may authorize the defendant'sattorneys to obtain such services on behalf of thedefendant and, if so authorized, shall order thepayment of fees and expenses therefor underparagraph (10).

21 U.S.C. 848(q)(9). Claimants under this section "need onlyshow indigence and that the services requested are 'reasonablynecessary.'" Fuller , 114 F.3d at 502.

That Clark was indigent is without dispute. However, becausewe find that Clark has failed to establish that he had asubstantial need for the assistance of an expert forensic pathologist under the statute, he was not denied a constitutional right that would require the issuance of a COA. As discussed above, the state trial court, in reviewing Clark's state habeas petition made specific findings which rejected Clark's contention that Dr. Erdmann perjured himself in Clark's case. Those factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness, especiallywhereas here the trial judge and state habeas judge were the same. See Boyle , 93 F.3d at 186. And Clark has failed to present clearand convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption ofcorrectness to which those state court factual findings areentitled.

We note again, as the district court did, that the state presented a great deal of other evidence, including Clark's two confessions, all of which overwhelmingly established Clark's involvement, the nature and extent of the victim's injuries, the sexual assault, and the cause of death, as well as those conclusions to which Dr. Erdmann testified. Indeed, the record clearly reveals that even without Dr. Erdmann's testimony, each ofhis conclusions had been independently established by otherevidence and testimony, and that irrespective of this fact, his testimony was consistent with the physical evidence which the statepresented.

As a result, we cannot conclude that the assistance ofan expert in forensic pathology was substantially necessary since,in light of the strength of the case presented against Clark, impeachment of Dr. Erdmann's credibility would have been futile. The district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grantClark's request for the assistance of an expert forensic pathologist, and because he has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, we deny Clark's request for a COA on this issue.

D.

In his sixth issue, Clark argues that he is entitled to a COA because the district court erred in deferring to as not being unreasonable those state habeas court fact findings used to defeat his claims that a juror failed to disclose the extent of herrelationship with the prosecutor thus violating his due processrights. Clark contended that venire member, Sondra Kay Jones,failed to disclose the extent of her "close relationship" with the district attorney and that he was consequently denied the right tobe tried by an impartial jury.

For primarily the same reasonsgiven by the district court, and based upon our own review of the record, we find that Clark has not made a substantial showing ofthe denial of a constitutional right on this issue. The sameevidence which Clark presented to the district court was presented to the state habeas court, which as we have noted above, was the same court which conducted Clark's criminal trial. Therefore, thestate habeas court's factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness, and Clark has failed to rebut the presumption ofcorrectness with "clear and convincing" evidence that such factualfindings are incorrect. The evidence presented established nothing more than that Ms. Jones had a strictly professional working relationship with the district attorney.

Furthermore, under AEDPA, the state court's adjudication ofthis issue is dispositive unless it involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidencepresented. Based on Clark's failure to put forth anything more than what was disclosed during voir dire and based upon the affidavits and proffers presented to it, the state court's factual determination that Ms. Jones answered truthfully regarding the extent of her relationship with the district attorney, as well asits conclusion that there was no constitutional violation, wereboth reasonable and without error. Clark has failed to demonstrate that this issue would be debatable among jurists of reason, that another court could resolve the issue differently, or that theissue is suitable enough to deserve encouragement to proceed further. We therefore deny Clark's request for a COA on thisissue.

E.

In his final issue, Clark argues that he is entitled to a COA because the trial court's punishment phase jury instruction failedto define mitigating evidence in violation of the Eighth Amendmentand the due process clause of the Constitution. Clark contendsthat the jury instruction given at the punishment phase of histrial was devoid of a proper definition of mitigating evidence andfailed to focus the jury on his personal and moral culpability orblameworthiness.

The jury in this case was instructed as follows:

When you deliberate about the questions posedin the Special Issues, you must consider anymitigating circumstances raised by theevidence present in both phases of the trial. You are instructed that any evidence which, inyour opinion, mitigates against the impositionof the death penalty, may cause you to have areasonable doubt as to whether or not thedeath penalty should be imposed in this case.

Even if you find and believe beyond areasonable doubt that the conduct of the defendant which caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and withthe reasonable expectation that the death ofthe deceased, [the named decedent], would result; and even if you find and believebeyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that wouldc onstitute a continuing threat to society; ifyou have a reasonable doubt based upon the mitigating evidence that has been presented inthis case as to whether the death penaltyshould be imposed in this case, then you will answer the Special Issues propounded to youherein "No."

We find that Clark has failed to make a substantial showing ofthe denial of a constitutional right with respect to this issue. The district court noted that the relevant question with respect tothis issue is whether there was a reasonable likelihood the jury interpreted the given instruction as precluding their considerationof constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. See Johnson v.Texas , 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993).

The district court concluded, andwe agree that the jury was in no way hindered or limited in their consideration of mitigating evidence. The decisions of the statecourts, both on direct criminal appeal and on state habeas review,denying relief on this ground were neither contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent nor based on an unreasonable application thereof, and are thus dispositive of the issue. Here again, Clark has failed to demonstrate that this issue would bedebatable among jurists of reason, that another court could resolvethe issue differently, or that the issue is suitable enough to deserve encouragement to proceed further, and accordingly we denya COA on this issue as well.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that Clarkhas failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of aconstitutional right with respect to any of the issues raised inhis request for COA, and accordingly we DENY his request for COA onall issues raised therein.

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1.   1 We note that while a COA is required for habeas appeals,there is no such requirement for appeals brought under 848(q)(4)(B). See Fuller v. Johnson , 114 F.3d 491, 501 n.4 (5 th Cir.), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 399 (1997).

 

 

 
 
 
 
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