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Dunlap's attorneys laid these facts before the jury
without, again, calling so much as a single expert to attempt to assign
them meaning. So what if the likes of the Sentencing Project, a criminal
justice advocacy group, reports that exposure to violence at a young age
increases an adolescent's propensity for violence by as much as 40
percent? What the jurors heard was a sad story, but one easily dismissed
as irrelevant cliché. Especially considering the closing statement from
Dunlap's own attorney. "How can anyone be so cold?" Forrest Lewis said.
"How can anyone be so cruel? What road can anyone go down that could
take them to the point where they could make the choices that were made
at Chuck E. Cheese? I still don't know.... If you choose to kill my
client under the facts of this case, I will respect your decision and
you will hear not one word of criticism of you from me."
The weak defense paled, too, in comparison to what
the victims' families said in court. They had been warned not to talk
directly to the defendant, but they couldn't help it. "Nathan Dunlap
killed us all," one of Margaret's daughters said. "We just didn't die."
Ben Grant's mother phoned in—she'd left the state after her son's murder—to
say, "Maybe now you understand the fear that was in my son's eyes when
you pointed a gun at his head." Dunlap sat quietly, listening, until
Sylvia's brother confronted him, saying that the murders were racially
motivated (all of the victims were white). Then something in Dunlap
broke, or broke more. He started to rave and rant in a three-and-a-half-minute
monologue that left him sobbing uncontrollably, "Kill me right now. I
have [had] enough of this motherfucking shit. You can take me to the
motherfucking little chair and do what the fuck you want." Dunlap was
given two death sentences for every life he'd taken.
MEANWHILE, IN
ANOTHER COURTROOM
On November 18, 1997, 19-year-old Nathan Thill
approached a Senegalese immigrant named Oumar Dia at a Denver bus stop.
It was nearly midnight, and Thill, a white supremacist, had been
drinking for several hours. He pulled a gun, pointed it at Dia, and
asked him, "Are you ready to die for being a nigger?" Thill shot Dia in
the chest and the neck, killing him. Thill noticed bystander Jeannie
VanVelkinburgh. He couldn't have a witness to the murder, so he shot her
too, leaving her paralyzed.
Thill was arrested quickly, and confessed during a
90-minute interview with District Attorney Bill Ritter. In a subsequent
interview with a Channel 7 reporter, Thill said, "I see a black guy at
the bus stop and I kind of decided he didn't belong where he was at and
how easy it would be to take him out right there. In a war, anybody
caught in an enemy uniform should be taken out."
Denver was outraged by the hate-filled murder, and
the fact that innocent victims had been gunned down; both Dia and
VanVelkinburgh had just gotten off work and were headed home. Ritter
told the media that he'd seek the death penalty. As with the Dunlap
case, the court of public opinion in Denver had already rendered its
verdict, and the court felt compelled to order a change of venue—to the
city of Pueblo—in the Thill matter so he could face a fair jury.
The prosecution presented a straightforward case:
Thill, an admitted skinhead, had killed Dia because he was black. Thill
had attempted to kill VanVelkinburgh because she was a witness to the
murder. The district attorneys showed the jury the taped TV confession.
VanVelkinburgh, who was paralyzed and couldn't be in court, offered a
taped deposition as the prosecutors' star witness. Thill was guilty,
said the district attorneys. He deserved to die.
The court appointed lawyer Sharlene Reynolds to head
Thill's defense. She had already successfully defended another death-penalty
case: In 1998, she convinced a jury that Jon Morris—the man who'd raped
and killed a five-year-old girl—hadn't intended to kill the child and
had been out of his mind at the time. Reynolds used the same strategy in
this case: Thill had killed Dia, but Thill wasn't mentally stable and
was incapable of forming the intent needed for first-degree murder.
The defense steamrolled the prosecution. Reynolds
presented more than 5,000 pages of evidence cataloging Thill's
terrifying mental instability: He was beaten by his father before he was
a year old, began receiving mental health care at five years old,
started attempting suicide at age eight, was put on strong psychiatric
medicine before he was 10, and spent most of his teen years in group
homes and mental hospitals. The defense hired psychologist Suzanne
Bernhard to testify that Thill—whom she had evaluated several times
before the trial and whose medical records she had received—was in a
manic rage from his bipolar disorder at the time of the murder. He
couldn't be guilty of first-degree murder if he was in that state; the
defense argued Thill deserved a conviction of second-degree murder,
which would spare his life.
After two days of deliberation, the jury was
deadlocked. Ten jurors wanted to convict Thill of first-degree murder,
but there were two reluctant holdouts. Tom Mitscher, one of the jurors,
later described Thill as "out in left field somewhere." With a jury
unable to agree, the judge declared a mistrial. Instead of retrying the
case, Bill Ritter and the DA's office gave the defense an offer: If
Thill would plead guilty to first-degree murder, they wouldn't seek the
death penalty. The defense agreed, despite the fact they had just argued
against a first-degree conviction. They had accomplished their narrow
goal: saving Thill's life. "Nathan Thill with a million dollars couldn't
have found better lawyers," Larry Pozner, a well-known defense attorney,
told the Rocky Mountain News, "and likely would have found worse."
WHAT THE JURY
DIDN'T HEAR
The correctional officers wouldn't stop taunting
Dunlap. It was October 13, 1997, and on that day the state of Colorado
was executing Gary Lee Davis, a convicted rapist and murderer. He was
the first man whom the state had put to death in 30 years. The guards
reminded Dunlap that his last days were looming; that he, too, would be
led to a table, where IVs would be threaded into his veins, and he would
wait as his heart pushed three poisons into his body. The first would
render him unconscious. The second would paralyze him. The final, lethal
poison would stop his heart. Two short minutes later, he would be dead.
As Dunlap waited in his cell, paused between life and death, he smeared
feces on his mouth. It was a manic breakdown, doctors realized, and one
that would lead to a mental-health diagnosis: Nathan Dunlap has bipolar
disorder.
Characterized by episodic mood swings between two
poles—mania and depression—bipolar disorder can take up to 10 years or
more to diagnose. A pattern of mental shifts must be established, but
the rate at which a person cycles between the poles varies dramatically.
If a doctor evaluates a person between shifts, identifying the symptoms—sexual
promiscuity, recklessness, delusions of grandeur, to name a few—is a
struggle.
Dunlap, as doctors would piece together, had an
earlier manic episode, on Valentine's Day in 1994. Normally a quiet
prisoner, something, it seemed, was disturbingly wrong with Dunlap, who
was then awaiting his criminal trial. A guard watched as he quietly read
Bible passages at one moment and then ran to the window screaming
obscenities at the next. He was moved into a rubber-walled room and
placed on suicide watch as his pandemonium continued. He would tear off
his clothes and spread feces on his body and the walls. He was taken to
the Colorado Mental Health Institute in Pueblo, looking emaciated,
scared, and wild. The Arapahoe DA's office had been preparing its case
for more than a year, but this breakdown could have changed everything:
Was Nathan even sane enough to stand trial? A two-week stay turned into
a nearly five-month evaluation. A defense expert found that during his
stay in Pueblo, Dunlap showed signs of psychosis at least 10 percent of
the time. But the state's doctor was convinced Dunlap was faking and
told the court so. On July 8, 1994, Dunlap was deemed competent to stand
trial. And despite their own expert's odd evaluation, the defense
avoided discussing his mental health or his unstable behavior at the
mental health institute in Pueblo during the trial.
Bipolar disorder has a strong hereditary link.
Children of a bipolar parent have a 14 percent chance—the rest of the
population only has a 1 to 3 percent chance—of developing the disorder.
In Nathan's family, his maternal grandfather, an uncle, and his mother,
Carol, have all been diagnosed with schizophrenia or bipolar disorder.
Carol's struggle for a diagnosis was particularly turbulent, resulting
in a half-dozen hospital stays that took her in and out of her childrens'
lives. Shortly after Nathan's birth, she was hospitalized in Waukegan,
Illinois, and Nathan was sent with Adinea to a foster home. By the time
he was two, the kids were back with Carol and on the move, stopping in
Michigan for a time, and eventually ending up in Colorado in 1984.
Nathan was 10.
A year or two later, according to court documents,
Carol was formally diagnosed, but meanwhile she went through unmedicated
periods when her symptoms would return. Pre- and post-diagnosis, her
manic swings were accompanied by corporal violence and left her
hypersexualized. She'd walk around the house naked, stay up cleaning and
moving furniture for days, and take a dozen baths in a 24-hour period.
Nathan would sometimes wake at 3 a.m. to find his mother shrieking,
raving, and stacking their belongings on the lawn. When Dunlap was an
infant, she once discarded him in the trash. She was hospitalized for
trying to hurt Dunlap's younger brother, Garland, and has admitted that
she hated Adinea since conception. For her three young children, living
with Carol was a roller coaster of abandonment and abuse.
By 1989, things had changed. Adinea had moved out of
the house and her lanky, all-elbows-and-knees brother was transforming.
As his robberies escalated—antisocial behavior that a social worker saw
as a cry for help—and Dunlap was shuttled between juvenile detention
centers, Carol started to wonder if her young son wasn't suffering from
the same mental-health demons she struggled with. A 1989 evaluation
while at a juvenile treatment center showed signs of a conduct or
thought disorder. Another examination showed he was depressed. A
psychiatrist thought he might have oppositional disorder, something akin
to bipolar disorder. Again and again, Dunlap was sent home without a
diagnosis. He couldn't be suffering bipolar disorder. After all, he was
just a kid, and kids didn't get bipolar disorder.
Four years later, at the time of the Chuck E. Cheese
murders, it was still uncommon to look for symptoms of bipolar disorder
in children or teenagers. Doctors believed that these symptoms didn't
manifest until after puberty, usually around the age of 19 or 20. But
today, doctors do diagnose children and adolescents. When discovered in
an adult subject, it is difficult to work backward and see when their
symptoms first manifested. Early teenage evaluations may have missed
mood patterns or simply dismissed them as adolescent angst. Today, at
least three doctors have agreed that Dunlap suffers from the disorder,
but they all examined him after the 1996 trial and are unable to say
with any certainty whether he suffered manic episodes earlier than that.
Most important, they don't know if he suffered a manic break on December
14, 1993, the date of the Chuck E. Cheese murders.
David Lane, an attorney who has been an advisor to
Dunlap's defense, believes that Dunlap's trial attorneys should have
done much more to explore the mental-health issue—no matter how murky
the waters. While Dunlap's defense attorneys introduced Carol's mental
health, they presented no medical expert to discuss what, if any, impact
that had had on Dunlap. "It is really incumbent upon the defense to find
well-qualified doctors that have the credentials to be very credible
people to do the full evaluation and tell the jury the whole story,"
explains Lane. "That didn't happen in Nathan Dunlap's case."
There was at least one doctor who was ready to help
the defense—in fact, Dunlap's attorneys engaged her to do just that.
Psychiatrist Rebecca Barkhorn examined Dunlap at the time of the trial
and expected to testify in the penalty phase that he suffered from a
narcissistic personality disorder. But the defense never called her. The
defense also failed to provide her with Dunlap's complete charts from
his time in Pueblo, reports that she wouldn't see until years later
during the appeals process. When she did finally have the complete
picture of Nathan Dunlap's family history and medical histories, she
said that the information would have changed her original evaluation. If
she had known then what she knows now, Barkhorn says, she would have
testified that Dunlap suffered from bipolar disorder and that he had
suffered from the disorder since birth.
THE ODDS
Compared to states like Texas and Florida, it's
incredibly difficult to secure a death sentence in Colorado. Until
recently, juries in Texas and Florida were given an unbalanced choice:
Sentence a heinous murderer for an execution, or he'd be up for parole
eventually. They often chose death. Texas legislators refused to pass
life-without-parole laws for years because capital punishment was an
easy and popular way to prove they were tough on crime. In the 1990s,
Texas, under the leadership of then-Governor George W. Bush, executed
more than 150 people; during the past 30 years, the state has been
responsible for more than a third of the executions in the United States.
Colorado has been far more judicious in its
application of capital punishment since the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed
that the death penalty was constitutional in 1976, after a brief
nationwide ban. While legislators have tinkered with the law in an
attempt to increase executions, Colorado juries have been given the
option to sentence a murderer to life in prison without parole since
1979. Juries like this option: They don't have to choose between life
and death. With a criminal forever locked behind bars, jurors can be
secure knowing that society is safe from harm, and that they did justice.
Currently, there are only two men on Colorado's death
row: Nathan Dunlap and Sir Mario Owens, both sentenced in Arapahoe
County. Owens got a death sentence in May for murdering a witness
scheduled to testify against a friend of Owens' in his drug trial. (He
also killed the witness's fiancée.) Owens has been on death row for
months; Dunlap has been there for 12 years, watching only one inmate,
Gary Lee Davis, be executed, while all of the other death-marked inmates
have been spilled back into life terms.
The reasons why one heinous murderer is sentenced to
death while another heinous murderer is sentenced to life has less to do
with the facts of the cases and more to do with happenstance and the
prevailing political winds. Consider the death sentences prosecuted in
Denver by DA Bill Ritter, who reserved capital-punishment trials for
cases where he "reasonably believed we could get it." Out of more than
600 murders in Denver between 1993 and 2004, Ritter prosecuted only
seven death-penalty cases for multiple homicides or a rape/murder
combination. All of the defendants faced overwhelming evidence that they
had committed horrible murders. Still, none of those men will be
executed.
A few years later, Ritter tried Jacques Richardson, a
serial rapist who had hog-tied a 34-year-old woman named Janey Benedict
during a robbery in 1997. Benedict suffocated from the ties. Richardson
confessed. Two years later, jurors ruled the murder was unintentional,
and Richardson was given a life term.
In other cases, Ritter instructed his prosecutors to
use the mere threat of a death-penalty trial in order to get a
conviction. Frightened, four men accused of murder—Cong Van Than, Omar
Ramirez, Samnang Prim, and Edward Robert Brown—pleaded guilty to first-degree
murder. Those tactics weren't unusual: Across the state, prosecutors
were happy to plea-bargain and avoid the cost, stress, and possible
public failure of securing a death sentence. District attorneys realized
that while the public, in theory, was eager to press executions, the
reality was that such a reaction was more visceral than just, and that
folks in the jury boxes were far more reluctant to exact an eye for an
eye, a life for a life.
Colorado legislators, eager to please the vengeance-happy
public, hadn't been sated. Denver wasn't sentencing anyone to death, and
the suburbs and rural parts of the state weren't doing much better. So,
in 1995, at the peak of capital punishment's groundswell, lawmakers
attempted to ramp up executions. With the explicit public support of
Ritter and other district attorneys around the state, legislators
created three-judge panels—not the juries that tried the case—to
determine death sentences. Still, legislators were stymied: even judges
wouldn't give death orders. A three-judge panel refused to execute Donta
Page—who brutally raped, robbed, and stabbed 24-year-old Peyton Tuthill
to death in 1999—claiming that his murder lacked "diabolical frenzy or
hellish subhuman behaviors." Page received a life sentence. The politics
of killing and the law continued to collide. In 2002, the U.S. Supreme
Court found that the death-sentencing scheme of the three-judge panels
cooked up by the Colorado legislators was unconstitutional, because
those panels do not represent a trial by peers. Five Colorado men on
death row had their sentences vacated; five murderers destined for
lethal injection received a reprieve because they had committed their
crimes while the legislature was tampering with the law.
As DA, Bill Ritter kept his word to Romer. He tried
death-penalty cases, but rarely, and only when he thought he could get
the ultimate conviction. As Ritter's tenure as district attorney
stretched into the 21st century, death-penalty cases became increasingly
rare in Colorado. Prosecutors had tried about a half-dozen death-penalty
cases annually in the late 1980s through the late 1990s, but by the time
Ritter stepped down in 2004, the state average had dropped to one or two
a year. Of course, those statistics provided no comfort to Dunlap.
THE KEY WORDS
ARE "INEFFECTIVE" AND "PROBABLY"
In the 15 years since Nathan Dunlap killed four
people at the Chuck E. Cheese, the state has spent more than $2 million
trying to kill him. The original trial had more than 21,000 pages of
discovery materials alone, listed more than 900 potential witnesses, and
lasted five weeks. Twelve Coloradans were asked to judge whether Dunlap
should live or die. But, if Nathan had a choice, no juror would have
been in a Colorado Springs courtroom trying to decide whether he should
be sent to death row. Just days after the first anniversary of his crime
in 1994, Nathan offered a plea bargain to the Arapahoe County DA's
office: If the state agreed not to kill him, Dunlap would plead guilty
to four charges of murder and accept his punishment. He would never
leave prison. But Gallagher's office was adamant; Dunlap would face
death. The offer was summarily rejected.
"If Nathan Dunlap [had been permitted to] plead
guilty to life without parole, he would have faded into obscurity years
ago," says David Lane. "He'd be doing his life sentence without the
possibility of parole. There would have been no trial that cost millions.
There would have been no appellate process that's cost millions. He
would have been another prisoner in the system." Instead, Nathan Dunlap
entered the languishing, confusing, stop-and-go, and enormously costly
appeals process. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected Nathan's first
appeal in 1999 and another in 2001. A year later, the U.S. Supreme Court
refused to look at the case.
Just over six years ago, in 2002, the original trial
court granted Dunlap's request for a Crim. P. 35(b) hearing to consider
the reduction of his sentences. The hearing lasted an unprecedented 52
days and gave Dunlap a second chance at presenting his case. This time,
Dunlap's new attorney, Philip Cherner, would call witnesses, put expert
after expert on the stand in front of the same Judge John Leopold that
had presided over the first trial. And there was something there. While
the court would only look at evidence relating to the time of the trial—meaning
that Dunlap's 1997 manic break was out—Cherner kept plugging away at
what a mess the original trial counsel had made. The court agreed, going
so far as to vacate two minor sentences and declaring that Dunlap's
trial counsel had been deficient.
It might have been a stunning decision—if it were not
for the caveats. Because of what the judge described as "overwhelming"
evidence of Dunlap's guilt, the court declared that the attorneys'
performance was "ineffective" but did not fall below a constitutionally
acceptable bar. The court went on to acknowledge that while more was
known about bipolar disorder, it was irrelevant. As for Dr. Barkhorn, "she
could have been a valuable asset for the defense if she had had all of
the [medical and mental-health] materials." Still, the court ruled that
while Dunlap could suffer from the disorder and Dr. Barkhorn's testimony
would have been helpful, the evidence "probably would have been
unpersuasive here."
In other words, even though the defense was deficient,
experts weren't called to testify, and Dr. Barkhorn was not given full
access to Dunlap's record, the court found that no juror would have been
swayed. Effectively, the court guessed that even if these issues were
dealt with during the original trial, all 12 jurors would still have
voted for death. Nathan Dunlap appealed again, this time to the state's
highest court, the Colorado Supreme Court. If his trial counsel had been
deficient, so went the appellate argument, didn't that impact the jury?
In May 2007, the Colorado Supreme Court said no. And in a unanimous
decision the state Supreme Court struck down the lower court's
deficiency finding.
All of Nathan Dunlap's legal hopes have been
exhausted in the state courts. Today, prisoner No. 89148's appeals have
moved onto the U.S. District Court, where yet another team of attorneys—this
time a federal public defender, Madeline Cohen—will submit arguments
similar to those made time and again to the state judges. (Cohen
declined to comment for this story and advised Dunlap to not comment.)
While this legal phase will linger for as much as three or four years,
there's little to no reason to expect a different outcome, meaning
there's little to no chance the federal court will change Dunlap's death
sentence. Thus far, Dunlap has spent 180 months in prison; the troubled
boy is now a young dead man walking.
Perhaps the only time when Nathan Dunlap's life and
mind were not enveloped by chaos, abuse, and psychosis came just a few
months before that December night inside the Chuck E. Cheese. Dunlap's
mother and father, Carol and Jerry, were in Tennessee working on their
marriage, and Carol left Nathan in the care of a coworker and friend,
Benton Jordan. Jordan, a tall man with gray hair and earrings in both
ears, and who now works at a pottery store, watched Dunlap for two or
three weeks. "He was a good kid," Jordan says. "He had potential. He
just needed a stable home." Jordan tried to give him that by treating
him as if he were one of his own two kids, giving Dunlap chores and
watching over him.
That's exactly what Jordan was doing one day—watching
over Dunlap—when he saw a curious thing. He'd assigned Dunlap the age-old
summer chore of staining the deck. From a window, Jordan watched as the
kid dipped the brush in a polyurethane stain and began coating the
weathered boards. Dunlap worked for a while, then paused, scooped
something up in his hands, and gently set it aside, out of the way.
Jordan was intrigued. He asked Dunlap what it was that he had moved. A
beetle, Dunlap told him, had crawled into the path of his brush. Dunlap
said, "I put him on the side of the deck to keep from killing him."
At 19, when Colorado first caught a glimpse of Dunlap,
they wanted to kill him, says attorney Lane. But if they had seen him
when he was 10, they would have done anything to help him. "Nathan
Dunlap's odds are probably not very good," Lane says. "If justice will
be done, somebody should stand up and say, 'Hey—had this kid's entire
mental-health picture been adequately presented to the jury, there would
have been at least one juror that would have said, 'No, given his level
of mental illness, I'm not going to kill this kid.'"
The only person who can do that now is Governor Bill
Ritter.
THE ENORMITY
OF IT
It is, to say the very least, an odd circumstance
that Bill Ritter knows firsthand what it feels like to kill a human
being. As a young lawyer in the district attorney's office, Ritter
distinguished himself, rapidly rising through the ranks, and by 1987, at
the age of 30, was a chief deputy DA. Yet his commitment to his faith-based
convictions trumped careerism. Married with a one-year-old son, Ritter
left the DA's office, left Denver, left the country. With his young
family, he traveled to Zambia, Africa, where he worked as a Catholic
missionary, running a nutrition clinic. And one day, while Ritter was
driving down a road in a small truck, a man stepped into the truck's
path. Ritter tried to swerve, but the brakes hadn't caught in time. The
back of the truck swung into the man. Ritter rushed the man to a local
hospital, over the roads cratered with potholes and the shoulders
overflowing with pedestrians. At the hospital, the man died within a day.
The man's name, according to one of the very few
media reports of the incident, was Mushibi Katiki Chinyama. Chinyama had
a wife and a family; he was a good man, an innocent man, not unlike
Ritter, who himself had been a victim that day, a pawn in a terrible,
unforeseen accident. At first blush, one might understandably wonder
what Chinyama's death and Ritter's role in it have to do with Nathan
Dunlap's looming execution and Governor Ritter. One possible answer is
nothing at all. Then again, when one strips away the law and the
politics, the answer might be everything.
Public support for the death penalty has fallen as
violent crime has plummeted in the past decade. Murder rates are at
their lowest in Denver and nationally since the 1960s. John Dilulio, who
created the superpredator model, has retracted his idea, saying the data
to support the catch-all term is no longer there. Now, only about 47
percent of Americans support capital punishment, down from a high of 80
percent. When further questioned, many Americans are equally content
with life sentences for first-degree murder.
Meanwhile, undermining the supposed high bar of
evidence in the capital-punishment system, several death-row convicts
have seen their charges overturned through DNA evidence. In 2002, after
evidence in Illinois proved that 13 men on death row were innocent,
Republican Governor George Ryan commuted all 167 death-row sentences to
life without parole, citing the vast inequality and ineffectiveness of
the system. Ryan's mass commutation was exceptional, but other governors—both
Democrats and Republicans—have used their clemency privileges to commute
sentences. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, 244 men
escaped death courtesy of commutations. Many of the reasons were
humanitarian: The criminal had a history of mental illness or trauma, or
received ineffective legal counsel.
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's 1976 ruling that
capital punishment is constitutional, 14 states have either banned or
never enacted death penalty laws. In 2007, abolishment gained some
traction in Colorado, when Rep. Paul Weissmann, a Democrat from
Louisville, proposed a bill that would take Colorado's death-penalty
expenditures—$4 million annually—and invest them in a cold-case homicide
unit to tackle unsolved murders. "Does it really make sense to spend [millions
of dollars] a year on something we never use?" Weissmann says. "Any
other program that costs us that kind of money and had the results that
we've had would have been gone a long time ago." A victims families'
advocacy group, Families of Homicide Victims and Missing Persons,
supported the bill. Because about 1,400 murders have gone unsolved in
the past 30 years in Colorado, and presently detectives only solve
around 60 percent of all homicides, supporters of the bill reasoned that
maybe solving murders and catching the killers might be a better use of
resources than spending money on the appeals and executions of a select
few convicted murders. Currently, there's not just a good chance you
won't be executed for murder in Colorado—there's a good chance you'll
get away with it.
At the time Weissmann presented his bill, Archbishop
Charles Chaput, the head of Ritter's Catholic church in Colorado,
weighed in. "The death penalty is a bad idea because it diminishes the
society that employs it," Chaput wrote in his column in the Denver
Catholic Register. "It doesn't deter capital crime. It doesn't bring
back the dead. It doesn't give anyone 'peace.' It sometimes kills the
innocent. It coarsens our own humanity and sense of justice. And while
both Scripture and long Catholic tradition do support the legitimacy of
capital punishment in extraordinary cases, the conditions that would
justify its use in developed countries like the United States almost
never exist." But lacking the support of Democrats like then-Speaker of
the House Andrew Romanoff and Governor Bill Ritter—the kind of Democrat
leaders needed to get behind a tough proposal—the bill died.
Governor Ritter's spokesperson repeatedly declined to
make the governor available for an interview for this story. Left
unexplained, it is surprising that Ritter supports capital punishment.
Ritter has said that if Roe v. Wade were overturned, he would sign a
bill banning abortion, provided it had exceptions for rape, incest, and
the mother's health—a bold statement for a Democrat. As governor, he
instituted a pragmatic, centrist agenda that looks at the cost-effectiveness
of government programs. He knows that some Coloradans support capital
punishment, but wilt under the life-or-death pressure inside the
courthouse. "Our experience in Denver, at least," Ritter told the
University of Colorado Law Review in the late 1990s, "is that some juror
or jurors...are not just awed by [the decision], they're overwhelmed by
it."
Judging by the history of Nathan Dunlap's case, it's
most likely that his remaining appeals will drag on for a few more years,
that his legal hopes will be unsuccessful, and that either a first-term
or second-term Governor Bill Ritter will one day find a clemency
petition on his desk. Ritter will be faced with a choice: He could allow
Dunlap to be executed, or he could intercede and grant Dunlap life in
prison. However, as governor, Ritter has the constitutional power to
commute Dunlap's sentence now. Dunlap could do no more harm, maybe
receive some treatment for his mental illness, perhaps some counseling,
perhaps from a prison missionary.
If Ritter's "strong reservations" and "personal
doubts" about the death penalty motivate him to do so, he could also
help pass legislation abolishing capital punishment statewide. Such a
decision could affect his political future. Political observers see
Ritter, like Senator Ken Salazar and Montana Governor Brian Schweitzer,
as the kind of moderate Western politician that will be impervious to
the Republican attack machine and able to helm the future Democratic
Party.
Back in 1995, when the Colorado legislature was
weighing the idea of creating that three-judge panel to impose death
sentences rather than leaving it up to juries, Ritter gave the Rocky
Mountain News his thoughts on the subject. "It is a traumatic
decision to confront," Ritter said. "But the decision made in the voting
booth is so far removed from one a jury must make when they look across
the bar at a human being. Until you've been in that situation you can't
imagine the enormity of it."
Governor Ritter is not removed from the enormity of
Nathan Dunlap. And if the convicted killer is executed, it will be no
accident. The governor could wash his hands of the case, taking shelter
in the fact that Dunlap is not the innocent man young Ritter struck
while driving a truck on a Catholic service mission in Zambia. Or Ritter
could see Dunlap, like Chinyama, as a life. Regardless, unlike that
fatal tragedy in Zambia, this time around Ritter can see the human being
in his path.