After the defendant objects to the state's peremptory strike and
identifies the protected class to which the prospective juror belongs,
the state must provide a reasonably specific and clear, race-neutral
explanation for the strike. If the state articulates a facially neutral
explanation, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate the
state's explanation was pretextual and that the strike was actually
motivated by race.
Id. at 172 (citations omitted). Accord, State v.
Marlowe, 89 S.W.3d 464 (Mo. banc 2002). Cole also
set out the standard by which this Court reviews a determination that a
strike was not discriminatory, stating:
A trial judge's determination that a peremptory strike was made on
racially neutral grounds is entitled to great deference on appeal and
will only be overturned if shown to be clearly erroneous leaving the
reviewing court with the definite and firm impression that a mistake was
made.
Here, defendant objected to the state's strike of Juror Evans,
arguing it was based on the fact that she was African-American. The
prosecutor denied this, asserting that he struck Juror Evans because she
had indicated in voir dire that she believed that her niece had been
treated unfairly by the criminal justice system when her niece had been
arrested and jailed for three months simply because her boyfriend had
used her car when committing a crime. She said her niece was only
released once the boyfriend admitted his guilt and that her niece was
not involved, and that even then the police "did not say anything else
to my niece." The prosecutor concluded from these comments that Juror
Evans had some distrust of courts and prosecutors and struck her for
that reason.
In response, defense counsel argued that this explanation was
pretextual, because the prosecutor failed to strike a similarly situated
white juror, Kristin Tincu. A key factor to be considered in determining
pretext is "[t]he existence of similarly situated white jurors who were
not struck . . . ." State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 940 (Mo.
banc 1992). Defense counsel noted that Juror Tincu had testified
that her nephew had received many years in prison for a burglary, yet
she was a prosecution witness in a case in which defendants only
received seven years in prison for vehicular manslaughter and were
already released. Juror Tincu felt that her nephew was treated too
harshly and the other men too leniently.
The prosecutor explained that he understood Juror Tincu not to be
mad at the court system from her experience, just unhappy with how her
nephew had been treated. Moreover, the defense had actually tried to
strike Juror Tincu for cause because she had responded to other
questions by stating that she might hold it against defendant if he did
not testify. She also testified she had two friends who were carjacked,
raped, shot, and left for dead, and she would try but might have
difficulty keeping her friends' experience from affecting her view of
the case if it also involved a shooting. The trial court was not clearly
erroneous in rejecting the Batson challenge as to Juror
Evans.
Defense counsel also argued that Ronald Burton was stricken due to his
race. In response, the prosecutor stated that he struck Juror Burton
because he worked for the postal service and he "always struck postal
workers," and related an unfavorable experience he once had with a
postal worker. He then stated:
Ever since then I've been going back to my across the board never
not strike a postal worker, particularly one that is very quiet and on
that reason alone and my reason for that is, number one, postal workers
-- the post office is probably one of the biggest bureaucratic
organizations in the country and the workers, unfortunate for them, are
told everyday that there are so many rules and regulations that they
have to follow; the mail needs to go in this particular location, that
mail needs to go there, they need to make sure that everything goes in a
certain location for the mail.
The prosecutor explained that he thought that being on a jury could
be a postal worker's chance to ignore rules in a way he could not at
work. The prosecutor also noted that he had moved to strike other venire
persons whose work was similar to that of a postal worker, specifically
mentioning a juror who worked for Federal Express and one who was
married to a letter carrier.
Defense counsel responded that the "postal worker" excuse was
pretextual because other jurors who also worked for bureaucratic
organizations, including one who (the defense incorrectly believed) was
a retired military worker and another who worked for a city, were not
stricken. The prosecutor responded, stating:
I don't think anybody -- he wasn't in the military, first of all,
and second of all, I'm talking about postal workers per se being a part
of an even -- the most bureaucratic organization in the government. I
don't think you can even characterize fifty-two as -- as close to
similarly situated as to juror fifty-six. I mean he works for the postal
service.
Case law is real clear that employment such as postal, not all
employment, but postal service, that's been -- a lot of lawyers use that
employment as a reason to strike. I don't think I'm coming up with
anything that has never been heard in this courtroom before or even by
opposing counsel. This is not a new thing.
The trial court found that the strike was not pretextual and denied
the challenge.
As the state notes, prior decisions of this Court and of the court
of appeals have approved strikes of potential jurors based in part on
their occupations, including an occupation as a postal worker. See,
e.g., State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 472 (Mo. banc 2003);
State v. Smulls, 935 S.W.2d 9, 16 (Mo. banc 1996) ("Even
assuming the prosecutor's reasons for challenging mail sorters and
postal workers are non-sensical, this does not establish the reasons are
inherently pretextual.").
But, the state goes too far in arguing that a strike automatically
survives a charge of pretext if the prosecutor states the strike was
based on the prospective juror's occupation as a postal worker, without
more. Batson, Purkett, and their
progeny clearly state that once the prosecutor offers a facially valid
reason for a strike, then the defense has an opportunity to show that
the reason given is pretextual. If the mere incantation of the phrase
"he is a postal worker" were sufficient to overcome any showing of
pretext, the third step of the Batson test would be
illusory. The second step -- the identification of a reason, even a
nonsensical one, for striking a juror, would end the inquiry. That is
not in accordance with the United States or Missouri constitutions.
Parker is instructive. Although decided before
Purkett explained how to separate out the second and third steps
of Batson, Parker required a similar series
of steps, stating that if a challenge is made, the prosecutor should
then offer an explanation, and the defense then contest it and the court
determine its validity. Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 939.
It set forth a non-exclusive list of factors that it found especially
useful in determining pretext. "The chief consideration should be the
plausibility of the prosecutor's explanations in light of the totality
of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case." Id.
Second, the "existence of similarly situated white jurors who were not
struck by the prosecution is certainly probative of pretext." Id.
at 940.
Third, "[t]he degree of logical relevance between the proffered
explanation and the case to be tried in terms of the kind of crime
charged, the nature of the evidence to be adduced, and the potential
punishment if the defendant is convicted is likewise important."
Id. Accord, Marlowe, 89 S.W.3d at 469. Fourth, the "prosecutor's
demeanor or statements during voir dire, . . . as well as the demeanor
of the excluded venirepersons, should be considered." Parker,
836 S.W.2d at 940. Fifth, the "court's past experiences with the
prosecutor might also be relevant." Id. Finally, "[o]bjective
factors bearing on the state's motive to discriminate on the basis of
race, such as conditions prevailing in the community and the race of the
defendant, the victim, and the material witnesses, are also worthy of
consideration." Id.
Of course, not all of these factors will apply, or be equally
important, in any given case. State v. Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265,
268-69 (Mo. App. W.D. 1987), however, is useful in explaining how
these factors are relevant when a prosecutor seeks to make a strike
based on the juror's occupation. Butler was one of the
first Missouri cases to attempt to make an exhaustive review of the
types of factors to be considered in determining whether a particular
strike is racially discriminatory. Because it pre-dates Purkett,
it combines steps two and three, but its statement that, in evaluating
the legitimacy of the prosecutor's explanation, the court should
consider whether (1) the explanation is race-neutral, (2) related to the
case to be tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate,
is of continued application today in the analysis of pretext under step
3. Butler's discussion of how to apply these
principles to a very general claimed basis for exclusion, such as
occupation, is particularly useful here:
In addition, the explanation should not "sweep so broadly as to
attenuate its validity," [citation omitted]. If the juror is excluded
because of a trait other than race, the trait must apply to the juror
specifically and to the facts of the particular case. Id.
at 269 (emphasis added).
Butler then cites Slappy v. State,
503 So. 2d 350 (Fla. App. 1987), with approval. Slappy
disapproved of the strike of a teacher on the basis of the prosecutor's
belief that teachers tend to be liberal, because the prosecutor "did not
show any connection between liberalism, schoolteaching and the
particular jurors and facts of the case." Id. at 270.
Moreover, a similarly situated white schoolteacher was not stricken.
Butler itself disapproved of the strike of a potential juror
on the basis that she was elderly and the prosecutor had another elderly
person on a different jury who was easily intimidated. The court said
that without a showing that this rationale applied to this elderly
person, the reason given was pretextual. Butler, 731 S.W.2d at
271. Similarly, in finding an offered ground pretextual,
Marlowe noted the low degree of logical relevance of the claimed
rationale -- class action membership -- to the facts of the criminal
case before it. Marlowe, 89 S.W.3d at 470.
Other judges, in Missouri and elsewhere, have also cautioned that
courts should be especially careful in reviewing claims that a juror was
stricken based on a particular occupation. In State v. Smith,
791 S.W.2d 744, 749 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990), the court rejected a
challenge based on the juror's employment by the government, saying that
the claim that the prosecutor had bad prior experiences with government
employees was pretextual. In State v. Hudson, 822 S.W.2d
477, 481 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991), the court said "We recognize
occupation related explanations are susceptible to abuse as the court in
Smith found." In Hudson, however, the prosecutor
was able to tie the prosecutor's strike of a postal worker based on his
occupation to personal dealings with postal workers in his work and
through his family. The court found this acceptable. Id.; see also
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363-64 (1991) (holding that
the disparate impact on a particular ethnic group of an asserted basis
for exclusion is one indicator of discriminatory intent); United
States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 392-93 (3d Cir. 1993)
(discussing how to measure disparate impact and need to relate reason
for strike to case).
Other Missouri cases approving striking a postal worker also
considered additional reasons for the strike and whether the strike was
applied to other similar jurors; the courts did not merely accept a
strike based on the person's occupation as postal worker, per se.
Thus, in Smulls, the person also was stricken based on her
demeanor, and another person, not African-American, was struck for
reasons similar to those for which the person in question was stricken.
Smulls, 935 S.W.2d at 15-16. In
Williams, the person was not stricken only because she was a
postal worker, but also because she resembled the defendant in physical
appearance and demeanor. Williams, 97 S.W.3d at 471.
In the future, trial courts should similarly consider strikes based
on occupation carefully, assessing them for pretext by looking at
whether the occupation and the claimed traits relate to the particular
case or juror, whether similarly situated jurors are treated
differently, and so forth, considering the factors set out above, and
not allow a strike to rest solely on the claim that the juror is "a
postal worker."
When considered under this standard, this Court finds that the trial
court did not commit clear error in denying the challenge to the
peremptory strike of Juror Burton in the instant case. Here, the
prosecutor did not merely state that he struck the juror because he was
a postal worker. He told the court about his prior negative experience
with postal workers as jurors and gave specific reasons why he felt
postal workers would not be good jurors. While he did not tie those
reasons in with the case against defendant, the lack of pretext in the
reasons given was buttressed by the fact that he struck the two
prospective jurors who were most similar to Juror Burton -- a Federal
Express worker and the spouse of a letter carrier. It was for the trial
court to weigh this against the fact that he did not strike all those
who worked for bureaucracies. The trial court's determination that the
strike of Juror Burton was not pretextual was not clearly erroneous.
B. Voir Dire Restrictions
Defendant claims the trial court unreasonably restricted voir dire
questioning when it prohibited counsel, during death qualification voir
dire, from questioning the venire about whether they could consider
imposing a sentence of life without probation or parole "if the state
proved that appellant had hired another to kill his ex-wife, the
mother of his child." The restriction on asking the jury whether it
would be biased by the fact that he killed the mother of his child, he
says, denied him the right to a fair trial with a fair and impartial
jury, due process, reliable sentencing, and freedom from cruel and
unusual punishment.
A defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial jury. U.S. Const.
amends. VI, XIV; Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 18(a). His counsel may ask
questions that help determine whether a venire member holds prejudices
or biases that would impair the performance of his or her duties. If
prejudices are discovered, an inquiry should take place to reveal
whether a juror can set aside prejudices and impartially fulfill his or
her obligations as a juror. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412, 421-22 (1985). "Without an adequate voir dire the trial
judge's responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able
impartially to follow the court's instructions and evaluate the evidence
cannot be fulfilled." Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729-30
(1992). Relevant here, it is improper to prohibit a party from
inquiring about "critical facts" during voir dire, that is, facts with a
"substantial potential for disqualifying bias." State v. Clark,
981 S.W.2d 143, 147 (Mo. banc 1998).
The trial judge is in the best position "to judge whether a
disclosure of facts on voir dire sufficiently assures the
defendant of an impartial trial without at the same time amounting to a
prejudicial presentation of evidence." State v. Leisure, 749
S.W.2d 366, 373 (Mo. banc 1988). The ruling is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Id. at 374. Even where error occurs, to
entitle defendant to relief, the prohibition on voir dire must have
caused a "real probability of injury." State v. Betts,
646 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Mo. banc 1983); see
also State v. Oates, 12 S.W.3d 307, 310-11 (Mo. banc 2000).
Defendant claims that the relationship between Ms. Cantrell and
defendant -- that she was also the mother of his child -- was a "critical
fact" that needed to be divulged to the venire during death
qualification voir dire to elicit its effect on the jurors' willingness
to consider a sentence of life in prison, citing Clark. In
Clark, a child of three years of age was murdered. The
defense wanted to determine whether any venire member had strong
reservations about a case involving the murder of a young child. The
state objected, arguing that the defense was getting into specifics
about the case. Clark, 981 S.W.2d at 145.
The court sustained the state's objection, stating defendant was "'not
entitled to voir dire on specifics of the case being tried.'" Id.
On appeal, this Court determined that because the victim was a
young child, her age was a critical fact that could bias and prejudice
the jury, so that the trial court's bar of all inquiry on that fact was
reversible error.
This case is distinguishable from Clark. Here, the
victim was not a child, she was defendant's ex-wife. While the victim
and defendant had a child, the child was not present at the scene or
directly involved in the crime. This particular inquiry into the
relationship of the defendant to the victim and their child was thus not
so central to the case as to constitute a "critical fact" within the
meaning of Clark. Nonetheless, the question did relate to
an alleged motive for the crime -- to avoid child support. In these
circumstances, this Court concludes that the question was a permissible
one. But, counsel was not prohibited from getting these same facts
before the potential jurors in other ways. The court merely prohibited
use of the particular, arguably improperly emotion-laden language
defendant wanted to use to inquire into this relationship. The court did
not prohibit counsel from telling the jury that he was accused of having
his ex-wife killed to avoid paying child support for their daughter and
asking whether they could consider this evidence fairly in deciding
punishment.
In fact, during general voir dire, defense counsel asked whether any
of the venire members had been through a divorce and, if so, whether the
divorce involved child support, child custody, or visitation issues. At
another point, he asked a venire person, "With that little bit of
information, if you learned the divorce between Kimber Edwards and
Kimberly Cantrell involved issues of -- over child support, child
custody, visitation, would that factor alone cause you to put Kimber
Edwards at a disadvantage at trial?" He did not attempt further
questioning along this line, nor was he prohibited from doing so,
although the responses to this line of questioning would have been
enough to alert him to the issues about which he now expresses concern.
In these circumstances, no error occurred in refusing to allow him to
ask the specific question at issue.
C. Suppression of Defendant's Statements
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not suppressing the
statements he made to police on August 27 and August 28 in which he
confessed to hiring "Michael" to kill his ex-wife. This Court reviews a
trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress in the light most favorable
to the ruling and defers to the trial court's determinations of
credibility. State v. Villa-Perez, 835 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Mo.
banc 1992). The inquiry is limited to whether the decision is
supported by substantial evidence, and it will be reversed only if
clearly erroneous. State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 845 (Mo.
banc 1998). The Court will consider evidence presented at a
pre-trial hearing, as well as any additional evidence presented at
trial. State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc
1999).
When defendant originally filed his motion to suppress before trial,
he argued only that the statements were the product of physical and
psychological coercion. He explained that he and his family had been
taken to the police station in the middle of the night on August 24 and
questioned, that Erica was then placed in someone else's custody, and
that when he got home he learned that his wife and children had been
separately questioned and that his wife had been asked to and had agreed
to give samples of her hair to be tested and fingerprinted. Defendant
alleges that this conduct was coercive and threatening. He does not seek
to suppress any statements made that night, however.
Defendant seeks to suppress statements he made on August 27 and 28,
confessing to hiring "Michael" and Mr. Wilson to murder Ms. Cantrell. He
alleges that those statements were psychologically coerced because the
police said that they would re-interview his wife and children if he did
not tell them the truth. Only then, he said, to avoid subjecting his
family to what he feared would be a threatening situation, did he agree
to make a statement and confess to the crime.
The court held a hearing on the motion, and then overruled it,
finding the confessions were not the product of coercion. Defendant
contends that this was erroneous. This Court disagrees. Defendant was a
37-year-old correctional officer working at the St. Louis City jail. He
was familiar with police procedures, including those involved in
custodial interrogations. He was not under arrest on the night of August
24, nor were his wife and children, although he and his wife were
considered to be "potential suspects." The court could have concluded
from the evidence that defendant's concerns about his wife and children
were unreasonable and exaggerated and that the police questioned them
not to harass them but because they might have relevant information
about the victim and about their and defendant's whereabouts and actions
in relation to the victim. While defendant's desire to avoid the need
for them to come back to the police station on August 27 is
understandable, it does not make his subsequent confession the product
of coercion. The police do not act unreasonably in investigating a crime.
Further, while defendant said he feared that they would take away his
children if he did not cooperate, there is no evidence that police
threatened to take away his and Jada's children, and Erica was already
placed in her aunt's custody.
At trial, defendant said he wanted to make an offer of proof about
his confessions. The offer indicated that defendant would testify that
after his initial questioning on August 24 but before he was again
questioned on August 27, he consulted an attorney and faxed a notice to
the police on August 26 that he was represented by counsel. He said that
at the beginning of his discussions with police on August 27 he also
told them that he was represented by counsel, but that they nonetheless
questioned him.
The court said it was going to permit use of the fax and other
evidence from the offer of proof, meaning that defendant could offer it
at trial. Defendant then renewed his motion to suppress, asking the
court to reconsider it in light of the new evidence presented. The court
said that the evidence had been available to defendant at the time of
his motion to suppress and should have been included with it, but also
ruled that the motion would be overruled even considering this evidence
because defendant signed Miranda waivers of the right to
counsel and in the circumstances the court would have found the waivers
effective. Defendant then re-took the stand, but failed to offer any of
the evidence contained in his offer of proof concerning the alleged lack
of voluntariness of his confession.
On appeal, defendant complains that the court refused his offer of
proof. As is evident, this is not the case; the court accepted it but
then defendant simply failed to offer the evidence at trial. From the
nature of his arguments on appeal, it appears that the purpose of the
offer was to get the evidence before the trial judge so that the judge
might reconsider his ruling on the motion to suppress in light of that
evidence. When the court overruled the renewed motion to suppress,
defense counsel took that as denying the offer of proof.
Defendant also claims that the court erred in overruling his renewed
motion to suppress based upon alleged violations of his right to
counsel. Defendant first argues that he invoked his right to counsel by
faxing his desire to be represented by counsel to the police on the
afternoon of August 26, before he confessed on August 27. Under
Edwards v. Arizona, 471 U.S. 477 (1981), if he had invoked his
right to counsel while in custody, yet was nonetheless subjected to
uncounseled custodial interrogation, a subsequent confession would not
be admissible absent counsel being made available or defendant's
initiation of "further communication, exchanges, or conversations with
police." State v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d 908, 918 (Mo. banc 1994).
Here, however, the evidence showed that at the time that defendant
alleges he sent the fax invoking his right to counsel he had left the
police station, was not in custody, had not been charged but was, along
with others, regarded as a "potential suspect." In these circumstances,
no Sixth Amendment right to counsel had arisen, and so, his subsequent
interrogation, after being given his Miranda rights and
waiving them orally and in writing, was not improper. While defendant
claims that he again invoked his right to counsel before questioning on
August 27, the trial court did not have to accept this claim, which is
not supported by any other evidence. The state's evidence does show that
he signed Miranda waivers on both days and gave written
and oral statements on both days. Based on this evidence, again, the
trial court did not err in overruling the motion to suppress and
admitting his confessions.
D. Non-Testifying Co-Defendant's Statements Admitted
Ortell Wilson, defendant's alleged accomplice and the contract killer,
did not testify. The briefs reveal that he was found guilty of
first-degree murder in Kimberly Cantrell's death and sentenced to life
in prison. Because Mr. Wilson did not testify, police were unable to
introduce evidence of Mr. Wilson's statements about Mr. Edwards'
involvement in the crime for their truth. To do so would not merely
introduce hearsay; it would violate Mr. Edwards' right to confront his
accusers, a right protected by the Confrontation Clauses of the United
States and Missouri constitutions. See, e.g., Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-37 (1968); State v. Debler, 856
S.W.2d 641, 648 (Mo. banc 1993). As defendant recognizes, however,
hearsay evidence is nonetheless admissible if it falls within a "firmly
rooted" exception or shows particular guarantees of trustworthiness.
Debler, 856 S.W.2d at 648.
The trial court, cognizant of the above rules, did not permit
introduction of Mr. Wilson's statements for their truth, and none of his
statements implicating defendant in the crime were admitted at all. Much
of the police investigation and discovery of evidence had been based on
information told them by Mr. Wilson, however. The prosecutor argued that
he needed to introduce some evidence about what Mr. Wilson told the
officers to explain why the officers, for instance, went to the deserted
house where they found the murder weapon. The trial court permitted use
of Mr. Wilson's statements for this limited type of purpose. On appeal,
defendant argues that it was not necessary to admit these statements to
explain police conduct and that the limitation on the use of the
evidence simply was not effective. He also argues that the state
purposely used the evidence as a way to circumvent the Confrontation
Clause and to present evidence that Mr. Wilson implicated Mr. Edwards as
his co-conspirator in the murder.
The trial court has broad discretion to admit and exclude evidence at
trial. An appellate court will reverse only for an abuse of that
discretion. See State v. Mayes, 63 S.W.3d
615, 627 (Mo. banc 2001); State v. Johns, 34 S.W.3d 93, 103 (Mo.
banc 2000). Here, the record shows that the court and all counsel
were very concerned about avoiding the types of improper inferences of
which defendant now complains. The court went over this issue with
counsel very carefully outside the hearing of the jury, approving some
questions and disapproving others. The witnesses were directed not to
repeat any statements by Mr. Wilson implicating defendant. To a large
extent they were successful, merely testifying about their
investigations. When testifying about their discussions with Mr. Wilson,
they generally would state that they spoke with him and, then, went to a
particular location or talked with a particular witness. They attempted
not to directly inform the jury of statements made by Mr. Wilson, and on
the few occasions when they spoke more directly about what Mr. Wilson
told them, nothing that they said suggested that defendant was guilty.
The police rather testified as to how they found the gun, and it was
admitted that the gun they found was the murder weapon. It was not
claimed that the defendant used the gun himself. The police were
permitted to explain how they found the murder weapon.
On this record, the Court cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion in overruling defense counsel's objections and allowing the
testimony to be offered in this limited fashion to show the officers'
subsequent conduct and not for the truth of the matters stated. Hearsay
testimony is admissible to explain subsequent conduct. State v.
Black, 50 S.W.3d 778, 786 (Mo. banc 2001); State v.
Leisure, 796 S.W.2d 875, 880 (Mo. banc 1990); see also State v.
Basile, 942 S.W.2d 342, 357-58 (Mo. banc 1997) (no error in
admitting statements of co-conspirator to prove state of defendant's
marriage rather than for their truth).
E. Evidence Regarding Failure to Plead Guilty to Criminal
Non-support
Defendant argues that the state improperly attempted to introduce
evidence of another crime by repeatedly getting witnesses to state that
he had not pleaded guilty to criminal non-support at the August
25, 2000, hearing held three days after the murder.
Defendant is correct that a defendant has the right to be tried only for
the offense for which he is on trial, and that evidence of other crimes
committed by defendant is normally inadmissible. State v. Barriner,
34 S.W.3d 139 (Mo. banc 2000), citing, State v. Clover,
924 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Mo. banc 1996); State v. Trimble, 638 S.W.2d
726, 732 (Mo. banc 1982). But, evidence of other crimes is
admissible for certain purposes, such as to show motive, intent, lack of
accident or mistake, or common scheme or plan. State v.
Skillicorn, 944 S.W.2d 877, 886-87 (Mo. banc 1997); State v.
Bernard, 849 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Mo. banc 1993); State v.
Kenley, 693 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Mo banc 1985). And, as defendant
necessarily acknowledges, this exception is applicable here, since the
prosecution's theory of the case was that defendant had his ex-wife
killed to avoid paying child support. Therefore, the evidence that
defendant had not paid child support for over one year and was charged
with criminal non-support was clearly relevant to motive.
But, defendant argues, although this evidence was properly admitted, the
court erred in also admitting evidence that defendant had not
pleaded guilty to the crime charged. Even were the latter fact
irrelevant, it is hard to understand how it comes within the rule
prohibiting evidence of other crimes. As just noted, the reference to
the charge of criminal non-support itself was clearly permissible, and
evidence that defendant did not admit his guilt of the crime can
hardly be considered further "other crimes" evidence. Rather, it is
evidence of not committing a crime. In any event, the fact that,
after his ex-wife's death, defendant refused to agree that he owed and
did not pay past-due child support is itself independently relevant to
substantiate that the desire to avoid these payments was his motive to
kill her. The court did not err in overruling defendant's objections to
this evidence.
F. Failure to Disclose Defendant's Comments
Defendant next argues that the state committed a discovery violation
when it failed to disclose in discovery two comments that Mr. Edwards
made to Detective Brady when interviewed at approximately 5 a.m. on the
morning of August 24, 2000. After Detective Brady testified that he told
defendant that his ex-wife was dead, the detective was asked:
Q: What did you observe when he was told that?
A: Very nonchalant, had a smile on his face, carefree.
Q: Did not seem to be distressed by the news?
A: Not at all.
Q: Did you say anything to him?
A: At one point I did.
Q: What did you say?
A: I told him I couldn't understand how he could just sit there and be
so relaxed and have such a carefree attitude knowing that his ex-wife,
the mother of his daughter, was killed.
Q: Did he have any response?
A: Shook his head with a smile, said it's not his business. He had
nothing to do with it.
At this point, defense counsel approached the bench and asked for a
mistrial because the state had failed to disclose in discovery that
defendant had said "it's none of his business" and "he had nothing to do
with it."
The trial court agreed that this violated Rule 25.03, which requires the
state to disclose defendant's own statements to him upon request of
counsel. Counsel had made such a request. But, determining that the
prejudice could be cured by an instruction, the court instructed the
jury that it should disregard "the last statement of Detective Brady
regarding any words that were uttered by Mr. Edwards." Defendant
requested that the court also grant a mistrial. The court refused.
Defendant now argues that this constituted reversible error. This Court
disagrees:
The sanction to be imposed for a violation of Rule 25.03 lies within the
discretion of the trial court. State v. Kilgore, 771 S.W.2d 57,
66 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 211,
107 L.Ed.2d 164 (1989). A trial court's denial of a requested sanction
is an abuse of discretion only where the admission of the evidence
results in fundamental unfairness to the defendant. Id.
Fundamental unfairness exists where there is a reasonable likelihood
that the failure to disclose the evidence affected the result of the
trial. Id. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 843.
Defendant argues that the lack of disclosure did affect the result of
the trial, because it enabled the prosecutor to repeatedly emphasize
defendant's coldness and lack of caring about his ex-wife's death.
However, defendant has not cited this Court to any point at which the
prosecutor repeated either of the two statements that the court ordered
stricken. At the points in the transcript cited by defendant, the
prosecutor did emphasize defendant's coldness. But, he did so by
reminding the jury that the detective had described defendant's attitude
as nonchalant, that it was a contract killing, that this indicated cool
reflection, that he had shown no remorse, and was cold and dispassionate
about the death. It was not just a mistake, it was a business decision.
Defendant, however, did not object to any of the detective's testimony
about defendant's nonchalance, about his smiling when he was told of his
wife's death, about his lack of caring. His only objection was to the
detective's statements that defendant said his ex-wife's death was none
of his business and that he had nothing to do with it. The statement
that defendant said he had "nothing to do with it" is, if anything, an
exculpatory statement, not an inculpatory one. Moreover, it was
cumulative, for defendant said a number of times that he was not
involved in his ex-wife's death. Admission of this statement involved no
prejudice of any kind.
The only objected-to statement from which any prejudice could have
arisen was the detective's statement that defendant said his ex-wife's
death was "not his business." In light of the unobjected to testimony
that defendant smiled and acted nonchalant and uncaring when he was told
his ex-wife had been murdered, the fact that he had said the murder was
none of his business -- a statement that also could be considered simply
to be a denial of involvement in her death -- could not have affected
the outcome of the trial. Nonetheless, the trial court ordered the jury
to disregard the statements. This was a reasonable sanction to impose
for the discovery violation. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in so ruling.
G. Denial of Continuance
Defendant filed a motion for continuance the day before trial, in which
he listed numerous witnesses or pieces of evidence that he wished to
locate before trial. The court held a hearing on the record, at which he
reviewed each ground for continuance asserted. As to one request, the
court ordered partial relief, directing the state to make a witness
available for an interview; as to another, the prosecutor agreed to
investigate certain facts, and the court left its ruling open for
further review.
The ninth ground for continuance in defendant's written
motion stated that defense counsel needed a continuance to locate four
witnesses, but on appeal he claims error in overruling the motion only
as to one of these four witnesses, "Robert Smith." Although defendant's
motion for continuance contained no explanation at all as to Mr. Smith's
anticipated testimony, at the hearing counsel said that Mr. Smith, a
former maintenance man for defendant's apartment buildings, would
testify to defendant's good character and helpfulness. Counsel also
believed Mr. Smith would be helpful in impeaching the testimony of
Donnell Watson that defendant had gone to Ortell Wilson's apartment the
evening of August 22. Counsel said that his investigator had repeatedly
tried to find Mr. Smith and serve him with a subpoena but had been
unable to do so. When the court asked why counsel believed that he would
be any more successful in locating Mr. Smith if granted a continuance,
counsel said only that he had reason to believe that Mr. Smith still
lived in the City of St. Louis. The court overruled the motion for
continuance, stating, "You will have -- you'll certainly have time from
now until the time you're going to need those witnesses for your
investigator to still try to get them served. If you don't, you've had
all this time. Chances are you are not going to get them served."
The decision to grant a continuance is within the sound discretion of
the trial court. State v. Christeson, 50 S.W.3d 251, 261-62
(Mo. banc 2001); State v. Wolfe, 13 S.W.3d 248, 261
(Mo. banc 2000). Reversal is warranted only upon a very strong
showing that the court abused its discretion and prejudice resulted.
State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 465 (Mo. banc 1999); State
v. Taylor, 949 S.W.2d 925, 930 (Mo. banc 1997). "When ruling on
a request for a continuance based upon the absence of a witness, the
trial court may consider the probability that the witness cannot be
found." State v. Dodd, 10 S.W.3d 546, 554 (Mo. App.
W.D. 1999). If a continuance is not likely to result in the presence
of the witness at trial, the court will not be held to have abused its
discretion in denying the continuance. Id.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion here. Rule 24.10(b)
requires the party moving for a continuance in order to locate a witness
to provide the court with "facts showing reasonable grounds for belief
that the attendance or testimony of such witness will be procured within
a reasonable time." While defendant did not put this information in his
motion, the court properly permitted counsel to supplement the written
motion at the hearing with an explanation of his efforts to locate Mr.
Smith and how he planned to locate him in the future. See Lee v.
Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 372-73 (2002) (stating where motion is
deficient but record provides judge and counsel with reasonable basis
for understanding why witness is needed and what he will testify to,
purpose of rule is satisfied and court abuses its discretion in denying
motion on technical grounds). Here, however, defense counsel offered the
court no explanation as to how future efforts to find Mr. Smith would be
more successful than were past efforts and no reason to believe that Mr.
Smith would be found within a reasonable time. The trial court acted
within its discretion in overruling defendant's motion for continuance.
Moreover, even had the court erred in its ruling, no prejudice resulted.
While defense counsel did not explain Mr. Smith's proposed testimony in
any detail to the court at the time of the motion for continuance,
counsel did locate Mr. Smith by the time of the motion for new trial two
months later. Mr. Smith said he sat outside his apartment between 8:00
and 9:00 p.m. on August 22 and saw Mr. Edwards arrive but did not see
him go into Mr. Wilson's apartment. But, other testimony put Mr. Edwards
at the apartments after 9:00 p.m., and Mr. Smith could not say that Mr.
Edwards had never talked to Mr. Wilson that night, just that he had not
entered the latter's apartment while Mr. Smith was on his porch between
8:00 and 9:00 p.m. He also did not know whether Mr. Wilson and Mr.
Edwards had met on other nights. This testimony would have had minimal
impeachment value and would not have changed the outcome of the trial.
H. Improper Comments in Voir Dire and Guilt-Phase Closing Argument
Defendant argues that the prosecutor made two improper comments during
voir dire. Defendant acknowledges he did not object to either comment.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor made seven improper statements
during guilt-phase closing argument. Again, defendant acknowledges that
he did not object to any of these comments.
By failing to object to the prosecutor's comments made during voir dire
and closing argument, defendant failed to preserve his claims of error
as to those comments for review. See, e.g., Mayes, 63 S.W.3d
at 632; State v. Barnum, 14 S.W.3d 587, 592 (Mo. banc 2000)
(defense counsel's failure to object to prosecutor's statements during
voir dire constituted waiver). Counsel nonetheless asks this Court to
review his claims for plain error under Rule 30.20, claiming that the
comments were so egregious that the trial court erred in not sua
sponte declaring a mistrial.
"Courts especially hesitate to find plain error in the context of
closing argument because the decision to object is often a matter of
trial strategy, [citation omitted], and 'in the absence of objection and
request for relief, the trial court's options are narrowed to uninvited
interference with summation and a corresponding increase of error by
such intervention.'" Mayes, 63 S.W.3d at 632-33, quoting,
State v. Clemmons, 753 S.W.2d 901, 907-08 (Mo. banc 1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988). A conviction will be reversed
based on plain error in closing argument only when it is established
that the argument had a decisive effect on the outcome of the trial and
amounts to manifest injustice. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d at 456.
Moreover, both the state and the defense are entitled to argue
reasonable inferences from the evidence. State v. Kreutzer,
928 S.W.2d 854, 873 (Mo. banc 1996). A trial court
maintains broad discretion in the control of closing arguments.
State v. Barton, 936 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Mo. banc 1996). An
argument does not require reversal unless it amounts to prejudicial
error. Barnum, 14 S.W.3d at 592; see also
State v. Johnson, 558 S.W.2d 284, 286 (Mo. App. E.D. 1977)
("[A]n improper statement on part of counsel during voir dire does not
necessarily require declaration of a mistrial or discharge of a jury.").
Closing arguments "must be interpreted with the entire record rather
than in isolation." State v. Graham, 916 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Mo.
App. E.D. 1996).
Burden of Proof. Defendant notes that at one point during voir
dire, when discussing the need to find aggravating circumstances, the
prosecutor misstated the burden of proof by stating that the state had
the burden of proving aggravating circumstances "to your satisfaction"
unanimously. Counsel's comment can either be taken as a misstatement of
the definition of "reasonable doubt" or as a misstatement of the burden
of proof as being "to the jury's satisfaction" rather than to a
reasonable doubt. In either event, the comment was improper. See
sec. 565.030.4 ("The trier shall assess and declare
the punishment at life imprisonment without eligibility for probation,
parole, or release except by act of the governor: (1) If the trier does
not find beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the statutory
aggravating circumstances. . . ."). "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the truth of a proposition."
MAI-CR3d 313.30A; State v. Kenley, 952 S.W.2d 250, 275 (Mo.
banc 1997).
But, where, as here, no objection was made to the comment, this Court
will not reverse the judgment unless the Court believes the comment
affected the outcome of the trial. State v. Rosendahl, 938
S.W.2d 274 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997), is instructive in making this
determination. In that case the prosecutor was held to have attempted to
define "reasonable doubt" by stating "'what you reasonably believe, you
cannot reasonably doubt.'" Id. at 277. The court noted
that c ounsel is free to discuss reasonable doubt during argument, but
cannot attempt to define it, as it may confuse the jury. Id.
But, the prejudicial effect of the comment must be viewed in context and
in light of the proper definition given in the instructions. Considered
in this light, the court concluded:
We review the impermissible argument in the context of the whole
argument and under the stricter plain error standard. We are not
persuaded that the jury was misled or confused by the prosecutor's
argument so as to result in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of
justice.
Id. As this Court concluded on similar facts in
State v. Burnfin, 606 S.W.2d 629 (Mo. banc 1980), "in
view of the instructions that were given by the court, we cannot say as
a matter of law that a jury composed of reasonably intelligent persons
were [sic] confused or misled by the argumentative statement of the
prosecutor so as to result in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of
justice." Id. at 631.
Here, while the prosecutor did misstate the law at one point, the
correct standard of proof was restated multiple other times during voir
dire and in argument, and the jury was properly instructed. No manifest
injustice resulted.
Contract Killing. Defendant also argues that the prosecutor
improperly argued an element of the case when he said that this was a
contract killing case and may have confused the jury that this was to be
taken as fact rather than that it was a matter that the state had to
prove. In context, however, it was clear that the prosecutor was stating
that this was the theory of the case, not that this was a matter the
jury could take as given, and the jury was repeatedly told on multiple
other occasions that this was a contested issue. No manifest injustice
resulted from the statement.
Victim Impact Argument. Defendant objects to the prosecutor's
comments that "[t]his child was denied the joy of having her mother
seeing her while she is going to high school proms, the joy of having
her mother help her plan her wedding, the joy of her mother seeing her
daughter grow in with a family, . . ." and "the tragedy Phyllis will
never forget and that picture of your sister laying lifeless on the
floor." He argues that these were really arguments about the impact of
the murder on the victim's family and that such arguments are proper
only in penalty-phase closing argument.
The second comment was simply a description of what Phyllis experienced
as the person who discovered the body and did not constitute victim
impact evidence. The first comment did address the impact of the murder
on the victim's daughter, although, as the prosecutor argues, the
comment was one that the jury's common sense would tell them was true
even if it had not been mentioned. Nonetheless, it should have been
saved for penalty-phase closing argument. See State v. Simmons,
955 S.W.2d 752, 766 (Mo. banc 1997) (victim impact evidence is
permissible in penalty-phase closing argument). But, considered, as
here, for plain error, it cannot be said the outcome of the case was
affected or manifest injustice occurred.
Improper Personalization by Prosecutor. Defendant argues that the
prosecutor improperly personalized the case by telling the jury, "[Y]ou
know what, I don't think most people in here believe that Michael
actually exists." This was not improper personalization, however, but
merely a permissible comment by the prosecutor on reasonable inferences
to be drawn from the evidence. Clemmons v. State, 785
S.W.2d 524, 530 (Mo. banc 1990); State v. Weathersby, 935 S.W.2d
76, 79 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996). This includes "the right, within the
limits of closing argument, to provide the State's view on the
credibility of witnesses." Clemmons, 785 S.W.2d at 530.
Improper References to Facts Not in Evidence. Defendant also
argues that three comments by the prosecutor constituted improper
references to facts not in evidence. He is incorrect. The first comment,
"[I]f a contract killing is not cool reflection then, there is not cool
reflection," was merely a comment on whether the state had met its
burden of proof as to the state of mind necessary for first-degree
murder. The second comment, made to counter defendant's claim that he
confessed to the crime only to protect his family from further
interrogation and not because he was guilty, was a comment on the
credibility of that claim. (FN4) The third
comment objected to was made in response to defendant's argument that
the fact he did not cash a check to pay the killer showed he did not
hire someone to kill his ex-wife. While the comment may not have been
very persuasive, since all criminals must be found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to be convicted, the comment that prisons are
full of such people cannot be considered an attempt to argue matters not
in evidence. (FN5)
Uncharged Misconduct. Finally, defendant argues that the
prosecutor referred to "uncharged misconduct" when he stated, "And this
business about Florida, he couldn't do any of the things he said because
he was in Florida. Was anybody offended by that? Here's a guy who hasn't
paid child support taking trips to Florida. It's not just a trip, he's
looking at a time share to buy into." But, this comment must be
considered in context.
The portion of the argument defendant objected to is only part of the
prosecutor's argument on this point. Defendant was accused of killing
his ex-wife to avoid paying $500 per month in child support. The
prosecutor's argument continued, "I guess he'd have money freed up, he
wasn't going to have to be paying five hundred dollars a month. He was
expected to give his ex-wife five hundred dollars a month from the
family budget he could be using in the time share in Florida." In other
words, the argument was a proper comment on defendant's motive for the
murder -- to save child support money that he could use for other
purposes -- not an attempt to refer to uncharged misconduct.
III. PENALTY PHASE ALLEGIONS OF ERROR
Defendant argues that numerous errors occurred in the penalty phase of
the trial, including that: (A) the court erred in refusing to give a
no-adverse-inference instruction during the penalty phase; (B) the state
failed to charge aggravators in the indictment and, thus, was precluded
from seeking the death penalty; (C) there was insufficient evidence to
support the sole aggravator found by the jury, that this was a contract
killing; (D) the prosecutor was improperly permitted to comment on
defendant's failure to testify in the penalty phase and to make other
improper closing arguments; and (E) the sentence of death is
disproportionate to his crime and to the sentences of others for similar
crimes.
A. Refusal to Give No-Adverse-Inference Instruction
Defendant testified in the guilt phase of the trial that he was
innocent, that his confessions were false, and that he was not involved
in his ex-wife's death. The jury apparently rejected his testimony, for
it convicted him of first-degree murder. In the penalty phase, the state
presented the testimony of Ms. Cantrell's sister and brother as to the
impact of the victim's death on her family. Defendant called nine family
members, friends, and co-workers to testify as to his character and
childhood and to ask for mercy. Defendant himself chose not to again
testify in the penalty phase of the trial.
During the penalty-phase instruction conference, defense counsel
requested that a no-adverse-inference instruction be read to the jury.
Counsel proposed that the court give an instruction modeled after
MAI-Cr3d 308.14, but omitting the words "of guilt." The offered
instruction would have stated [with the deleted words in brackets]:
Under the law, a defendant has the right not to testify. No presumption
[of guilt] may be raised and no inference of any kind may be drawn from
the fact that the defendant did not testify.
The trial court refused to give the requested instruction, stating "as I
read that instruction, the words 'of guilt' are not in -- they appear to
be substantive in that instruction, which would indicate it only applies
to the guilt phase." In other words, the trial court thought that a
defendant in a capital case was only entitled to a no-adverse-inference
instruction in the guilt phase.
The trial court was incorrect. Applying the Supreme Court of the United
States' decisions in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468
(1981), and Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S.
288, 305 (1981), this Court held in State v. Storey, 986
S.W.2d 462 (Mo. banc 1999), that a defendant's right not to have
adverse inferences drawn from his exercise of his privilege against
self-incrimination applies to the penalty as well as to the guilt phase
of a capital murder trial.
In Storey, defendant testified in the guilt but not the
penalty phase of his trial. On appeal, the penalty-phase verdict was
reversed and the case was remanded for a new penalty-phase trial. Storey
did not testify in the new penalty-phase trial, nor did the jury hear
his testimony from the original guilt-phase trial. Defendant asked the
court to instruct the jury that it could not draw an adverse inference
from his failure to testify, but the court refused to give the
instruction, believing that the right to such an instruction applied
only to the guilt phase of a trial. This Court reversed, stating:
"[T]he Fifth Amendment requires that a criminal trial judge must give a
'no-adverse-inference' jury instruction when requested by a defendant to
do so." Carter, 450 U.S. at 300, 101 S.Ct. 1112. There is
"no basis to distinguish between the guilt and penalty phases of [a]
capital murder trial so far as the protection of the Fifth Amendment
privilege is concerned." Estelle . . . Therefore, when a
defendant does not testify in the penalty phase of a capital murder
trial, the court must give a "no-adverse-inference" instruction if the
defendant so requests. Storey, 986 S.W.2d at 464 (bold added).
This Court reaffirmed Storey in Mayes, 63 S.W.3d
at 636-37, handed down shortly prior to the trial of this case. In
Mayes, defendant did not testify in the guilt or penalty
phases of the trial. The trial court instructed the jury in the guilt
phase that no presumption of guilt could be drawn from his failure to
testify, but refused to instruct the jury in the penalty phase that no
inference could be drawn from his failure to testify then either.
Id. at 634-35. The jury imposed the death penalty. This Court
reversed, reaffirming that the giving of the no-adverse-inference
instruction in the penalty phase is mandatory when requested, even where
such an instruction has been given in the guilt phase. Id. at
636-37. Accordingly, MAI-Cr3d 313.30A, Note on Use 4, states that
various guilt-phase instructions, including MAI-Cr3d 308.14's
no-adverse-inference instruction, should be modified to be used in the
penalty phase when appropriate. Further, MAI-Cr3d 308.14, Note on Use 2,
states that instruction 308.14.1 must be given if the defendant does not
testify and requests it be given.
The state implicitly concedes that the trial court's refusal to instruct
the jury violated Storey and Mayes, but says
that this should be excused because defense counsel did not cite them or
Note on Use 4 to the judge. While those citations would have been
helpful, the state cites no authority that in addition to requesting a
mandatory instruction a defendant must also submit a brief in support of
the request in order to complain on appeal when the instruction is not
given. There is no such requirement.
The state's other point has more merit. It notes that the instruction
that defendant offered was taken from the language proffered in
Storey and Mayes and would simply have instructed
the jury that no presumption arose and no inference of any kind should
be drawn from a defendant's failure to testify. That may have been
proper language in those cases, the state says, in which the juries
being instructed had never heard any testimony from either defendant.
Here, however, Mr. Edwards did testify in the guilt phase before this
same jury, and the jurors were elsewhere told in the instructions that
they should consider all of the evidence offered in the guilt phase, as
well as that in the penalty phase, in arriving at their verdict. It
would have been inaccurate, and may have confused the jurors, to tell
them they could not consider defendant's failure to testify, for he had
testified in the guilt phase, and the instructions also told the jurors
that they should consider that testimony.
This Court agrees that, in the circumstance in which a defendant
testifies in the guilt phase of a capital case but not in the penalty
phase, and the two phases are tried before the same jury, as here, the
proper course would be to modify the no-adverse-inference penalty-phase
instruction implicitly approved in Storey to state that no
presumption or inference should be drawn "from the fact that the
defendant did not testify in the penalty phase."
Defendant did not do that here, and, as this Court recently noted in
State v. Derenzy, 89 S.W.3d 472, 475 (Mo. banc 2002), a
defendant's "failure to submit a correct instruction under these
circumstances renders his claims of error unpreserved. State v.
Wurtzberger, 40 S.W.3d 893, 897 (Mo. banc 2001)." Here, however, it
seems harsh to apply this rule where the language that defendant offered
was that implicitly approved for use in the penalty phase by Mayes
and Storey, the instruction was not so confusing that the
jury would not have deciphered it, and the objection that the state
raises now was not raised below, nor was it the reason that the trial
court refused to give the requested instruction. The trial court never
reached the instruction's wording, since it believed there was no right
to an instruction of any wording in the penalty phase.
Ultimately, however, the Court need not determine whether in these
circumstances the issue should be considered subject only to plain error
review, see, e.g., Derenzy, 89 S.W.3d at 475 (where
instruction clearly wrongly referred to different crime but court never
reached wording and instead rejected it out-of-hand for invalid reason,
court would review for plain error). For, even if this Court considers
the error preserved, reversal for a new penalty phase will not result.
Storey held that where an error in failing to give a
no-adverse-inference instruction is preserved this Court will reverse
unless the state shows that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Storey, 986 S.W.2d at 464 (determining that
a harmless error analysis is applicable to a refusal to give such an
instruction under the principles set out in Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967), and Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279 (1991)). Accord, Mayes, 63 S.W.3d at 636-37.
In Storey, the error was not shown to be harmless, for
defendant did not testify and the jury was never told, except in voir
dire, that it could not use this failure to testify against him. In such
a case, the jury "can be expected to notice a defendant's failure to
testify, and, without limiting instructions, to speculate about
incriminating inferences from a defendant's silence." Carter,
450 U.S. at 304.
In Mayes, defendant did not testify in either phase of the
trial. The very fact the court gave a no-adverse-inference instruction
in the guilt phase, but not the penalty phase, might have affirmatively
misled the jury into believing it could consider defendant's silence on
the issue of punishment, just not on the issue of guilt. Mayes,
63 S.W.3d at 636-37.
Here, the defendant did testify, albeit in the guilt phase, and
the jury was told it could consider that testimony when it was told that
it could consider the guilt-phase evidence in deciding punishment. Thus,
defendant was not entirely silent, and the jury had his testimony to
consider in both phases. While under the law he was still entitled to an
instruction that the jury could not consider his failure to again
testify in the penalty phase against him, in this circumstance the jury
would not draw the same, almost automatic, negative inference from the
fact that he did not testify in the penalty phase that it draws where a
defendant fails to testify at all.
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that defendant has cited to
this Court no case that has reversed due to the trial court's failure to
give a no-adverse-inference instruction in these circumstances. The
state has uncovered only a single case that has addressed the issue
whether a no-adverse-inference instruction must be given on facts such
as these, Beathard v. State, 767 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Crim. App.
1989). In Beathard, defendant testified in the guilt
phase that he was not involved in the victim's murder. He also related
"his version of the facts, his current and past employment, his
educational attainments, his family background, and his lack of any
criminal record." Beathard, 767 S.W.2d at 433 n.17.
The jury rejected defendant's claim of uninvolvement, finding him guilty
of first-degree murder.
In the Beathard penalty phase the state presented no
additional evidence. Defendant presented six additional witnesses, but
did not testify again himself. Defendant asked for a
no-adverse-inference instruction, but the court refused to give one.
Defendant was found guilty. On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals found the refusal to give the instruction error, but held it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt:
The right to a "no-adverse-inference" instruction is rooted in a jury's
natural tendency to assume that the decision not to testify stems from a
defendant having something to hide. See generally Carter v. Kentucky,
supra. In the instant case, this was not a concern. By testifying during
guilt/innocence, the jury heard numerous things from the appellant. In
addition, the state presented no evidence at the punishment phase. Thus,
appellant was not placed in a position where the jury would expect him
to counter factual assertions made by the state.
Id. at 432. In a footnote, Beathard noted,
"[a]side from a plea for mercy, which was made by appellant's mother, we
can think of nothing that appellant could have said during the
punishment phase that he had not already said." Id. at 432
n.17. It continued:
In fact, if the jury was to draw any improper inference from a failure
to present a case, it would have been against the state. Appellant did,
however, call six witnesses. Limited to the unusual factual setting of
this case, we find that the trial judge's error in failing to give a
"no-adverse-inference" instruction was, beyond a reasonable doubt,
harmless. Id. at 432-33.
This Court finds the approach taken in Beathard to be the
correct one. By this, the Court does not mean that it will find a
Missouri court's refusal to give the instruction is always harmless if
the defendant has testified in the guilt phase. Rather, in deciding
whether the error was harmless in a case in which defendant testified in
the guilt but not the penalty phase and the court refused to give a
no-adverse-inference instruction in the penalty phase (a situation that
should not occur again following this opinion), it is appropriate for
this Court to look at the specific facts of the case to see whether the
jury would have expected the defendant to also testify in the penalty
phase and draw a negative inference from his failure to do so.
If, in the guilt phase, for instance, defendant admitted to killing the
victim but claimed self-defense or a mental state less than that
required for first-degree murder, then the jury might expect that in the
penalty phase defendant would take the stand, express remorse, and offer
reasons why his punishment should be life imprisonment rather than
death. But, in other circumstances, such as this case, no such
expectation would arise.
Defendant testified in the guilt phase that he was a corrections officer
for the City of St. Louis; that he was innocent; that his confessions
were coerced and false; and that he had no connection with his ex-wife's
death and did not hire "Michael" or Mr. Wilson to kill her. The jury
clearly rejected this testimony by finding defendant guilty of
first-degree murder in the guilt phase. In the penalty phase, the state
offered very limited additional evidence, presenting only two witnesses,
both of whom testified only on the issue of victim impact. In response
to this limited evidence, the defense presented nine additional
witnesses, including family, co-workers, and friends, who testified why
defendant should not be sentenced to death. None of these witnesses had
testified in the guilt phase.
In these circumstances, the jury would not have expected defendant to
again take the stand and to be the sole witness to testify in both
phases of the trial. Indeed, as in Beathard, there is
little more he could have said, except repeat a story the jury had
already rejected and ask for mercy, and other witnesses asked for mercy
on his behalf. On these particular facts, the failure to give the
no-adverse-inference instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
B. Failure to Charge Aggravators in Indictment
Defendant argues that the trial court should have quashed the
information because it failed to specifically charge him with the
statutory aggravating circumstances later submitted in the penalty
phase. He alleges that the principles set out in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), require that aggravating
circumstances be set out in the indictment. This Court has repeatedly
rejected similar arguments. Where, as here, the state gave the defendant
pretrial notice, pursuant to section 565.005, of the aggravating
circumstances it intended to prove at the penalty phase of trial, it was
not required to list them in the indictment. State v. Gilbert,
103 S.W.3d 743, 747 (Mo. banc 2003); State v. Tisius, 92
S.W.3d 751, 766-67 (Mo. banc 2002); Cole, 71 S.W.3d at 171.
The trial court did not error in overruling defendant's motion to quash.
C. Insufficient Evidence Supports Sole Aggravator
The state submitted three statutory aggravating circumstances
against defendant. The jury did not find against defendant on two of
the aggravators -- that he had murdered Ms. Cantrell for money or
that he had murdered her because she was a witness in a pending
prosecution for criminal non-support. The jury did find the third
aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt, however -- "Whether the
defendant hired Ortell Wilson and/or a person known only as Michael
to murder Kimberly Cantrell."
Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove the
sole statutory aggravator found by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt; thus, the court should not have submitted it, and the
judgment imposing the death penalty should be set aside. In support,
he first correctly notes that the state cannot rely on Mr. Wilson's
statements incriminating defendant since they were not admitted or
were admitted only to show the course of the police investigation,
not for their truth. Of course, there was still defendant's
confession that he hired Mr. Wilson or "Michael" to murder his ex-wife.
But, as defendant notes, out-of-court confessions, statements, or
admissions by the accused are generally not admissible unless they
are corroborated by independent evidence, either circumstantial or
direct, showing the corpus delicti of the crime. State
v. Fears, 803 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Mo. banc 1991); State v.
Summers, 362 S.W.2d 537, 542 (Mo. 1962). Here, defendant
argues, if his confession is not considered, and since Mr. Wilson's
confession cannot be considered, there is no corroborating evidence,
and so no corpus delicti, and the aggravating circumstance
should not have been submitted.
The burden to establish the corpus delicti is upon the state.
State v. Black, 611 S.W.2d 236, 240 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).
The corpus delicti in a homicide case consists of two
elements: (1) proof of the death of the victim and (2) evidence that
the criminal agency of another was the cause of the victim's death.
Fears, 803 S.W.2d at 608. These factors may be
shown by circumstantial evidence, but are not established until it
has been proved that the death was not self-inflicted nor due to
natural causes or accident. State v. Meidle, 202 S.W.2d
79, 81 (Mo. 1947). The corpus delicti cannot be presumed
and must be proved by legal evidence sufficient to show that the
crime charged has been committed by someone. Summers, 362
S.W.2d at 542.
As applied here, this Court need not decide whether proof of the
corpus delicti only requires corroboration of the fact of the
murder, as the state argues, or whether it also requires
corroboration of the existence of an aggravating circumstance, as
defendant argues by analogy to and extension of the principles set
out in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). In either
case, corroborating evidence may be circumstantial and "need not be
absolutely conclusive of guilt or demonstrate impossibility of
innocence, and the mere existence of other possible hypotheses is
not enough to remove the case from the jury." Fears, 803
S.W.2d at 608, quoting, State v. Payne, 612 S.W.2d
353, 354 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980). "It is enough if the state
establishes by circumstantial evidence the 'appearance of acting in
concert.'" State v. Williams, 897 S.W.2d 631, 635 (Mo. App.
E.D. 1995). Only "slight corroborating facts" are needed.
State v. McQuinn, 235 S.W.2d 396, 397 (Mo. 1951);
State v. Evans, 992 S.W.2d 275, 285 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999).
Defendant's argument that the state has not proved the corpus
delicti is not well taken for numerous reasons. First, his
argument in his point relied on is that, because of the lack of
corroboration, the instruction submitting aggravators was not
supported by the evidence. In other words, he alleges instructional
error. Yet, he does not even allege that he objected to the relevant
instruction on this basis. He failed, therefore, to preserve this
issue for review. Rule 28.03 provides, inter alia,
that no party may assign as error the giving of an instruction "unless
the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its
verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds
of the objection." Consequently, because defendant failed to object
to the instruction prior to submission, the claim is not preserved
for our review. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 989 S.W.2d
594, 596 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999); State v. Brisco, 934 S.W.2d.
335, 336 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996).
Second, the cases prohibit admission of a confession in the
absence of proof of corroborative proof of the corpus delicti.
The general rule, however, is that if otherwise inadmissible
evidence comes in without objection, it may be considered in
determining whether a submissible case has been made, its weight
being for the jury. Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp.,
863 S.W.2d 852, 863 (Mo. banc 1993); see also State v. Butler,
24 S.W.3d 21 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000).
Here defendant did not object to admission of his statements on the
basis that the state had not yet proved the corpus delicti of
the crime. He objected to their admission on the basis that they
were involuntary and obtained in violation of Miranda,
objections found meritless. Having failed to object to the admission
of this evidence on the basis of lack of corroboration, defendant
waived that objection to its admission. Once admitted without
objection on this basis, however, there was no bar to use of his
confession in support of submission of the statutory aggravator that
defendant hired Mr. Wilson or another to murder his ex-wife.
Id. Therefore, the trial court did not err in submitting
this aggravator to the jury.
Third, even were the issue preserved, this Court would find no
error. When a defendant "challenges the sufficiency of evidence to
support an aggravating circumstance, the test is whether a
reasonable juror could reasonably find from the evidence that the
proposition advanced is true beyond a reasonable doubt." State
v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d 278, 294 (Mo. banc 1995). The reviewing
court does not weigh the evidence but determines whether it was
sufficient to permit reasonable persons to have found the defendant
guilty. State v. Porter, 640 S.W.2d 125, 126 (Mo. banc
1982). Upon a review for sufficiency of evidence, the reviewing
court takes the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.
Fears, 803 S.W.2d at 607.
Here, the state clearly established the corpus delecti of the
crime charged with evidence other than the mere out-of-court
confession of defendant. As to the occurrence of the crime itself,
and its commission by Mr. Wilson, even without consideration of
defendant's confession, the state presented evidence of Ms.
Cantrell's death by being shot twice in the head on August 22, 2002.
It also presented evidence that Mr. Wilson took a black bag to work
with him that day, and Donnell Watson, Mr. Wilson's roommate,
testified that he dropped Mr. Wilson off, carrying a black bag, at
approximately 4:30 p.m. on August 22, at a location 200 to 300 yards
from the victim's home.
The victim's neighbor testified that he saw a black man with a black
bag trying to get into Ms. Cantrell's apartment shortly before 5:00
p.m., but no one answered -- Ms. Cantrell did not leave work until
shortly after 5:00 p.m. that night. She arrived home a few minutes
later. At 5:15 p.m. or so, another neighbor heard two shots and a
woman scream. Ms. Cantrell did not attend a class she was to attend
that evening or go to work the next day. Family members found her
shot to death in her apartment on the evening of August 23. Ortell
Wilson knew defendant and worked for him at his apartments on Palm
Street. Mr. Wilson looked like the person who the neighbor saw
pounding on the victim's door shortly before the shooting, and the
neighbor later identified him as the person who had tried to enter
the victim's home. In Mr. Wilson's apartment, the police found a
black bag like that carried by the assailant, containing rubber
fingertips. This was sufficient evidence of the murder by Mr.
Wilson.
In addition, the state presented evidence that defendant was having
a dispute with his ex-wife over child support, that he had been
charged with criminal non-support, and that he had a hearing in
three days on that case. Hughie Wilson, Ortell Wilson's brother,
testified that during the spring or summer of 2000, Mr. Edwards
asked him where he could get a "throwaway" gun. Hughie also
testified that when he went to visit Ortell at his apartment on
about August 7, 2000, Mr. Edwards was in the apartment with Ortell,
and Hughie saw a gun on a table that was similar to the gun used to
kill the victim. Once Hughie arrived, Mr. Edwards told Ortell to put
the gun away.
In addition, Donnell Watson, Ortell Wilson's roommate, testified
that defendant again visited Mr. Wilson at the apartment at about
7:30 p.m. on the evening of August 21, 2000, the day before the
murder. As noted, the next day Mr. Watson dropped Mr. Wilson off a
few hundred yards from the victim's home at about 4:30 p.m. Mr.
Wilson returned to the apartment at about 7:30 p.m., looking sweaty.
At around 8:00 p.m., defendant came to the apartment to see Mr.
Wilson.
This evidence, that Mr. Wilson had a gun and defendant told him to
hide it, that he and defendant met the night before the crime and
the night of the crime, that defendant had a motive, that defendant
had sought to obtain a gun that could not be identified a few weeks
to months before the murder, as well as the evidence showing Mr.
Wilson worked for defendant, that he committed the murder, and the
actual finding of the gun that was used in the murder, is more than
sufficient to constitute the "slight corroborating facts" needed to
prove the corpus delicti. Defendant's confession was properly
admitted, and the court did not err in submitting this aggravator to
the jury.
D. Improper Penalty Phase Comments in Closing Argument
Defendant also raises numerous claimed errors in regard to the
prosecutor's closing argument in the penalty phase of the trial. As
was true in regard to guilt-phase closing argument, counsel failed
to object to any of the arguments about which he now complains.
These claims are reviewable, if at all, only for plain error.
Rule 30.20; State v. Ervin, 835 S.W.2d 905, 920 (Mo. banc
1992). As this Court noted in State v. Clemons, 946
S.W.2d 206, 224 (Mo. banc 1997), "[T] he 'plain error' rule is
to be used sparingly and may not be used to justify a review of
every point that has not been otherwise preserved for appellate
review." Id., citing, Ervin,
835 S.W.2d at 920. To justify plain error review d efendant's
claim must facially establish substantial grounds for believing that
manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice resulted from the
error. Id.; Brown, 902 S.W.2d at 284;
State v. Parker, 856 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Mo. banc 1993).
None of the claims raised justify plain error review. The Court
nonetheless ex gratia addresses each briefly.
Defendant claims that the prosecutor commented on defendant's
failure to testify by stating, "What's the one thing we haven't
heard about that Kimber Edwards has expressed to anyone, remorse.
Any remorse, any sadness about the killing of Kimberly Cantrell and
why haven't you heard about it? Because he hasn't obviously
expressed it to anybody." But, numerous cases have approved of a
prosecutor's reference to a defendant's lack of remorse because it
is relevant to defendant's character, an important issue in deciding
punishment. These cases reject similar claims that such references
are an improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify.
See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 79 S.W.3d 420, 439-40 (Mo.
banc 2002); State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753, 769 (Mo.
banc 1996). This Court does also in this case.
Defendant also complains that the prosecutor commented in closing
argument that the prosecution believed that this was a contract
killing and that it was done to shut up a witness. He further
contends the state argued that witnesses would be afraid to testify
in the future if they "felt there was a chance they'd be killed,"
and "[i]f there was ever a case in which the death penalty was
merited, it's a case in which a person has a criminal witness
scheduled because the system will break down." Defendant said that
this made the prosecutor an unsworn witness by suggesting he had
outside, superior knowledge as to why the case merited death. But,
the state had submitted as statutory aggravators that this was a
contract killing and that this killing was done to prevent a witness
from testifying. It was not improper for the prosecutor to argue
that the evidence supported these two aggravators and supported
imposition of the death penalty. Moreover, the prosecutor was not
suggesting he had superior, secret information, but rather was
stating that he believed killing to keep a potential witness from
testifying merited death. As this Court noted in Clemons,
a "prosecutor may state his personal opinions on whether the
death penalty should be imposed so long as that argument is fairly
based on the evidence." Clemons, 946 S.W.2d at 231.
Defendant argues plain error because the prosecutor referred in
closing argument to defendant's failure to pay child support and
said, "[M]ost father's [sic] in their divorce cases don't enjoy
child support, but you know they do it because it's the right thing
to do and if they love their child, they really do it. This love of
Erica, this child he wouldn't even support, I don't buy it." Again,
a prosecutor is permitted to comment on and make reasonable
inferences from the evidence. "Prosecutors may also comment on the
evidence and the credibility of witnesses, even to the point of
belittling or discussing the improbability of specific testimony."
Id. at 229, citing, State v. Weaver, 912 S.W.2d
499, 513 (Mo. banc 1995). Defendant sought mercy from the jury
by presenting numerous witnesses who testified to his love for Erica
and the rest of his family. It was not improper for the prosecutor
to comment on the lack of credibility of the testimony about that
love, particularly where the state claimed defendant killed his ex-wife
to avoid paying child support for Erica.
Similarly, the Court rejects defendant's argument that it was
improper for the prosecutor to comment on why he believed, based on
the evidence, that defendant's middle-class lifestyle was an
aggravating rather than a mitigating factor, because he decided to
kill his wife so he would have more money to maintain that lifestyle.
This was simply a comment on the testimony, and not improper. It was
up to the jury to determine whether defendant's character and
lifestyle constituted mitigation.
E. Disproportionate Sentence
Defendant argues that his sentence was a product of bias and
prejudice and was disproportionate to his crime under section
565.035.3. (FN6) This Court has an
independent duty to review a death sentence under section 565.035.3,
RSMo 2000, to determine whether: (1) it was imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; (2)
there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of a statutory
aggravating circumstance and any other aggravating circumstance
found; and (3) the sentence was excessive or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering the crime, strength of
the evidence, and the defendant. State v. Clayton,
995 S.W.2d 468, 484 (Mo. banc 1999). The ultimate purpose of
this review is to prevent freakish and wanton applications of the
death penalty. Black, 50 S.W.3d 778.
In support of his claim that the sentence was the product of bias
and prejudice, defendant points to three issues that he alleged
constituted trial error -- the exclusion of two African-American
jurors in violation of Batson; the refusal to allow
defendant to explore the effect of the fact that he murdered his
daughter's mother; and the lack of a no-adverse-inference
instruction -- and alleges that these errors caused the jury to
reach its verdict on the basis of passion and prejudice rather than
on the basis of the evidence. Having found no reversible error in
any of the regards noted, this Court rejects the claim that any such
error caused bias and prejudice on the part of the jury.
Defendant also argues that the single aggravator found by the jury
-- that defendant hired "Michael" or Ortell Wilson to commit the
murder -- was not supported by the evidence. For the reasons set out
above in rejecting the claim that there was insufficient evidence to
submit that aggravator in the instructions, this argument is also
rejected.
Last, defendant claims that the sentence of death is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. In support,
he points to his offer of evidence that Ortell Wilson was sentenced
to life imprisonment rather than death for the murder of Kimberly
Cantrell. He argues that it is inherently disproportionate that he
should receive death when the person who actually shot his ex-wife
received a life sentence. He notes that in two other cases involving
contract killings of a spouse, the contract killers were sentenced
to death, but the spouses who hired the contract killers were
sentenced to life in prison, and argues there is no meaningful way
to distinguish his case from theirs, citing Clay, 975 S.W.2d
at 146, and Basile, 942 S.W.2d 342. In addition,
he notes, Erica has asked that her father not be sentenced to death,
even though she believes he killed her mother. In light of this
evidence, he argues, this Court should find his sentence of death
disproportionate to his crime and to the penalty imposed in similar
cases.
None of the three "similar" cases that defendant cites are actually
similar to his situation. Ortell Wilson pleaded guilty and as part
of his plea bargain received a life sentence. In Basile,
the actual killer was given a death sentence, but the spouse was
acquitted in state court, not convicted (although he was
convicted and given a sentence of life imprisonment in a separate
federal prosecution. United States v. Basile, 109 F.3d
1304, 1306 (8th Cir. 1997) ). In Clay, the spouse
was found guilty of only second-degree murder; therefore, the death
penalty was not an option; the contract killer was given a death
sentence. Clay, 975 S.W.2d at 146. "Co-actors' plea
agreements and convictions for crimes other than first-degree murder
are not to be considered in the proportionality review of a death
sentence." Id.
Second, even were these specific cases more analogous, section
565.035.3 states that in determining whether the punishment is
disproportionate, the Court is not just to consider the type of
crime -- that is, whether it is a murder for hire, a passion-related
crime, a drug-related killing, and so forth -- but also "the
strength of the evidence and the defendant." Sec.
565.035.3 (emphasis added). Moreover, section 565.035.3 requires
this Court to consider whether the death penalty is disproportionate
or excessive "to the penalty imposed in similar cases," not just in
a specific other case in which a similar category of crime was
committed. As this Court noted in Clay, this means
that:
The issue when determining the proportionality of a death sentence
is not whether any similar case can be found in which the jury
imposed a life sentence, but rather, whether the death sentence is
excessive or disproportionate in light of "similar cases" as a whole.
Clay, 975 S.W.2d. at 146.
For this reason, the proportionality of the death penalty can never
be determined solely by looking at whether it was imposed in some
other particular case. The fact that, on the particular facts of
particular cases, juries or judges determined not to impose the
death penalty on certain defendants does not mean that other persons
who committed similar crimes can never receive the death penalty.
They, too, must be judged for their crime based on their individual
circumstances, both good and bad. So, too, must defendant be judged
on the crime and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in his
case.
This makes sense, for this is what the instructions tell the jury to
do -- to consider all of the evidence, including all of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, in determining whether to
impose the death penalty. A death sentence is never mandatory.
Mayes, 63 S.W.3d 615. It would be strange indeed if this
Court then used an entirely different standard to judge whether the
jury's imposition of the death penalty was disproportionate. This
Court's role is not to apply a different standard, but rather to act
as a safeguard by ensuring that a sentence of death is not imposed
in a case in which to do so is freakish and disproportionate to the
sentence given in similar cases considered as a whole.
Here, while defendant did not pull the trigger himself, he chose to
hire a hit man for $1,600 to kill his ex-wife. There is evidence he
did so to avoid paying child support. He did so the night before his
ex-wife was to pick up his daughter. He planned the killing weeks or
months in advance and expressed no remorse at all for his actions.
He was a correctional officer, an office of public trust, familiar
with the criminal justice system. He offered little evidence in the
way of mitigation other than testimony from family and friends
offered in his support. That testimony did nothing to explain how he
could have arranged such a cold-blooded killing in order to avoid
supporting his daughter.
In other cases, this Court has approved imposition of the death
penalty for one defendant even where it appeared that an accomplice
had done the actual killing. Skillicorn, 944 S.W.2d at 899
(death penalty not disproportionate even though defendant did
not do the actual killing where victim was killed so that he would
not alert the police, stating murder "to avoid inconvenience to the
murderer exhibits a lack of respect for human life that has been
held to warrant the harshest penalty"); State v. Copeland,
928 S.W.2d 828 (Mo. banc 1996); State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369
(Mo. banc 1994); State v. Kilgore, 771 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. banc
1989); State v. Schlup, 724 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. banc 1987);
State v. Roberts, 709 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. banc 1986) (defendant
verbally directed attack on prison guard and then twice immobilized
the guard while others stabbed him); State v. Gilmore, 681
S.W.2d 934 (Mo. banc 1984) (defendant ordered another to "take
care of" the victim).
The cases defendant has identified in which a defendant received a
life sentence are not comparable for the reasons noted, and on these
facts the Court does not find that the imposition of the death
sentence in this case was wanton or freakish. While the jury was not
required to impose the death penalty, while it is never required to
do so, its decision to impose the harshest of penalties was not
disproportionate to the crime, the evidence or the defendant.
Sec. 565.035.3.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because none of Mr. Edwards' claims on appeal are meritorious, the
judgment and sentence of death are affirmed.
*****
Separate Opinion:
Concurring Opinion by Judge Richard B. Teitelman: I concur. I
write separately to emphasize the importance of careful judicial
scrutiny of Batson claims and cases involving cumulative
trial errors.
As the principal opinion notes, courts should review more carefully
peremptory strikes based upon occupation because, in the vast
majority of cases, a prospective juror's employment has nothing to
do with his or her ability to fairly weigh the evidence and arrive
at a just decision. For the same reason, courts should also review
more closely attempts to justify peremptory strikes based upon vague
references to a venireperson's attire, demeanor, and similar
attributes. These attributes are largely irrelevant to one's ability
to serve as a juror and expose venirepersons to peremptory strikes
for no real reason except for their race. As Justice Marshall
predicted in Batson, if these and similar justifications are
routinely deemed sufficient, then the protections afforded by
Batson will be rendered illusory. See Smulls v. State, 71
S.W.3d 138, 159 (Mo. banc 2002) (J. Wolff concurring) (citing
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986)(J. Marshall,
concurring)). However guilty a defendant may be, the law requires
that a conviction only be obtained through a fair trial. The right
to sit before a jury of one's peers, chosen not because of race, but
because of their standing as citizens doing their civic duty, is
essential to a fair trial.
Additionally, courts should remain cognizant of the possible
prejudicial impact of cumulative errors. A new trial can be ordered
due to cumulative error, even without deciding if any individual
error constitutes grounds for reversal. See Crawford ex
rel. Crawford v. Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 91 S.W.3d
646, 652 (Mo. App. 2002); State v. Cole, 867 S.W.2d 685, 687
(Mo. App. 1993); Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Mo.
1959); but see State v. Gardner, 8 S.W.3d 66, 74 (Mo.
banc 1999); State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 390 (Mo. banc
1994).
The trial errors limiting Edwards' voir dire and refusing to give a
no-adverse-inference instruction during the penalty phase are
troublesome. The law requires that the no-adverse-inference
instruction should have been given, and it would have been a simple
matter to so instruct the jury and emphasize the importance of not
considering Edwards' decision not to testify in the penalty phase.
The objective in a criminal trial is to provide a fair trial and let
the jury decide guilt or innocence without subtly stacking the deck
against the defendant. Although the errors in this case do not
warrant reversal, courts should be mindful of the effect of errors
that, while harmless when taken alone, have the cumulative effect of
prejudicing the defendant.