458 F.3d 384
Michael Dean GONZALES, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Nathaniel QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal
Justice,
Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
July 31, 2006
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas.
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and GARZA,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Dean Gonzales was found
guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death. During federal
habeas proceedings, the State conceded that he is entitled to a
new sentencing hearing. The issues here include an alleged Brady
claim and two ineffectiveness allegations. Finding no error that
meets the demanding AEDPA review standards, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
A Texas jury convicted Gonzales
of killing Manuel and Merced Aguirre. Gonzales stabbed the
Aguirres to death in their home in Odessa, Texas on the night of
April 21, 1994. Mr. Aguirre was stabbed eleven times and Mrs.
Aguirre had stab wounds too numerous to count, including many
defensive wounds. A blood spatter expert testified that Mr.
Aguirre was overcome quickly, but Mrs. Aguirre fought even after
falling to the floor in the attack. The medical examiner testified
that she had been "basically butchered."
The police investigation of
the crimes quickly focused on Gonzales, who, along with his mother,
wife, and child, lived in the house next door to the Aguirres.
Prior to the night of the murders, the Aguirres had complained to
the police about being disturbed by Gonzales's late night
activities. The Aguirres' son testified that their fear of
Gonzales was one of the reasons why they had put bars on their
windows.
Gonzales was taken into
custody for questioning approximately sixteen hours after the
murders, and he consented to a luminol test of his arms, hands,
and shoes. Except for the site on Gonzales's arm where the police
had drawn blood that day, the luminol test did not indicate the
presence of blood on the portions of Gonzales's body that were
tested. Gonzales was released from custody after being questioned.
The police found a "blood
transfer" stain on a camper parked in the alley between the
Aguirre and Gonzales houses. Police also noticed that the alley
had recently been swept clean. An anonymous Crime Stoppers
informant reported that Gonzales had swept the dirt in that alley
the morning after the murders.
Police also found a red
pepper on the floor underneath Mrs. Aguirre's body. The same type
of pepper was found on Gonzales's back doorstep, and a bowl of the
same peppers was found in his refrigerator. Detective Snow
Robertson testified at trial that he had attempted, unsuccessfully,
to locate such peppers in local stores. There was evidence that
these peppers were not native to Texas and were unique to a
certain area of Mexico.
Linda Olivarez testified that
on the night of the murders, Gonzales and his wife and child came
to her home around 10:15 p.m. Gonzales had brought with him a
plastic bag that he left outside by Olivarez's front gate.
Gonzales left with a man in a truck, and returned shortly
thereafter. He asked his wife to pick up the plastic bag when they
left. The State's theory was that the plastic bag contained the
bloody clothing Gonzales had worn when he stabbed the Aguirres.
On the day after the murders,
a neighbor found property belonging to the victims in front of the
dumpster located on the route from Gonzales's house to the
Olivarez home. Police later found more of the Aguirres' property
in or around the dumpster.
Although there was no sign of
forced entry, the Aguirres' son had identified a microwave, a VCR,
a camera, a stereo, and a .22 pistol as missing from their house.
Less than a week after the murders, Gonzales asked Olivarez and
her husband, Julian, if they wanted to buy a microwave oven.
Julian told Gonzales he would have to see it first. Julian, Linda,
and Gonzales went to Gonzales's house, where Gonzales showed them
a VCR, a camera, and a stereo for sale. The Olivarezes purchased
the microwave, VCR, and stereo. Gonzales also showed Julian a .22
caliber pistol, but told him it was not for sale. Gonzales said, "They
are on to me." When Julian asked what he meant, Gonzales replied,
"No, I can't tell you."
After the Olivarezes took the
items to their home, Gonzales retrieved the stereo because they
had not paid for it yet and he had already sold it to someone else.
During interrogation, Daniel Lugo, a member of Gonzales's gang,
told the police that he had the Aguirres' stolen stereo, which he
had gotten from Gonzales. Gonzales's fingerprint was found on the
back of the stereo. The pistol was eventually recovered from Delia
Sanchez, who testified that she purchased it from Gonzales. All of
these items were later identified as those stolen from the
Aguirres' home. Some empty shell casings found in a box at
Gonzales's house were determined to have been fired from the
Aguirres' gun.
Police also found a white
Dexter & Russell kitchen knife in Gonzales's home. The medical
examiner testified at trial that this type of knife could have
caused both of the victims' wounds. On cross examination, the
medical examiner stated that he could not rule out the possibility
that Mrs. Aguirre was stabbed with more than one knife.
Gonzales was arrested fifteen
days after the murders and charged with capital murder for the
murder of more than one person during the same criminal
transaction. Upon arrest, Gonzales had two teardrop tattoos on his
face; at trial, an officer testified that these tattoos were a
gang symbol signifying the number of people a person has killed.
Gonzales was in a gang called "Homies Don't Play." No one else was
charged in the murders.
On the day Gonzales was
arrested, Charles Kenimer, a guard at the local jail and
Gonzales's relative, saw Gonzales leave a police station
interrogation room with Detective Robertson and a Texas Ranger.
Kenimer testified that Gonzales seemed upset and that he tried to
calm Gonzales by stating, "Boy, you really got these officers
upset. I don't know what you said." Kenimer testified that
Gonzales responded, in Spanish, "They're trying to pin this rap on
me, this murder rap on me. They can't do it. They don't have any
evidence. Although I did it, you know, but they don't have
anything to go on."
During the guilt-innocence
phase, the defense strategy was to highlight evidence of other
parties' involvement in the offense, and to emphasize the State's
burden of proof. The prosecution did not request a jury
instruction on the law of parties. Thus, the jury was required to
find that Gonzales intentionally caused the death of both victims
by stabbing them. During closing argument, defense counsel argued
that the evidence strongly suggested that other suspects were
involved, and that there was no direct evidence that Gonzales
murdered both victims. Defense counsel repeatedly reminded the
jury that Gonzales could not be held responsible for an
accomplice's criminal conduct. Nevertheless, during his final
closing argument, the prosecutor argued, without objection, that
Gonzales was guilty of capital murder even if he killed only one
of the victims and aided and abetted someone else in the killing
of the other victim. During deliberations, the jury asked the
following question: "we need clarification on capital murder
versus murder verdict. If Mr. Gonzales murdered one individual
only, then does his association make him guilty of both." The
trial judge responded by referring the jury to the charge.
The jury found Gonzales
guilty of capital murder. Following the punishment phase, the jury
answered the special issue on future dangerousness affirmatively
and answered the special issue on mitigation negatively; thus,
Gonzales was sentenced to death. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the conviction on direct appeal in June 1998.
Gonzales v. State, No. 72,317 (unpublished). Gonzales's state
habeas application was denied by the trial court and the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals. Ex Parte Michael Dean Gonzales,
No. 72,317, Writ No. D-23,370.
Gonzales filed his federal
habeas petition in January 2000, raising six claims for relief:
(1) the prosecutor denied him due process by concealing the
exculpatory negative result of a luminol test for blood; (2) he
was denied effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal
because his attorney did not appeal the denial of his motion for
new trial; (3) he was denied effective assistance of counsel at
the guilt and punishment phases of his trial (nine sub-claims);
(4) his unwarned confession to Kenimer violated his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination; (5) he was denied due
process because the prosecutor knowingly failed to correct
Kenimer's false testimony that he spontaneously confessed to him;
and (6) the prosecutor denied him due process by knowingly
allowing a police officer to give the jury the false impression
that his teardrop tattoos meant that he had killed two people.
Gonzales filed a supplemental
petition in August, 2000, asserting that the State's psychological
expert witness testified, unconstitutionally, that race is an
indicator of future dangerousness. The State conceded that this
claim is valid and entitled Gonzales to a new sentencing hearing.
The district court so ordered, and neither party has appealed its
ruling on this point.
In March 2001, the district
court held a two-day evidentiary hearing on the Brady and
ineffective assistance claims. The district court denied relief in
a carefully written opinion and denied Gonzales's request for a
certificate of appealability ("COA").
II. DISCUSSION
This court granted a COA for
Gonzales's claims that:
(1) the prosecutor withheld
exculpatory evidence in violation of the Due Process Clause by
concealing the negative result of a luminol test;
(2) trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to refute a police officer's
testimony that the two teardrops tattooed on Gonzales's face
represented the number of people he had killed; and
(3) trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing timely to object to a police
officer's testimony that Gonzales's mother hid knives from
Gonzales because she feared that he was going to kill her and his
family.
This court denied a COA for
Gonzales's procedurally barred claims and his cumulative
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Gonzales v. Dretke,
No. 03-50021 (5th Cir. Feb.7, 2005).
A. Standards of Review
Gonzales is not entitled to
federal habeas relief on these claims unless the state court's
adjudication of the claims
(1) resulted in a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision
that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A
decision is "contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . if the
state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by
th[e] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a
case differently than th[e] Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A decision "involve[s]
an unreasonable application of [ ] clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . if
the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle
from th[e] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413,
120 S.Ct. at 1523. The inquiry into reasonableness is objective
rather than subjective, and the court is not authorized to grant
relief simply because the court concludes in its independent
judgment that the state court decision applied clearly established
federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Instead, habeas relief may
be granted only if the state court's decision is both incorrect
and objectively unreasonable. Id. at 409-11, 120 S.Ct. at
1521-22. A state court's findings of fact are presumed to be
correct unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption by "clear and
convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Federal law concerning the
disclosure of exculpatory evidence is clearly established: The
prosecution must disclose to the defense evidence that is
favorable and material to the defendant's guilt or punishment.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674-75, 105 S.Ct. 3375,
3379, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). To establish a
Brady violation, a defendant must show: "The evidence at issue
must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory,
or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and
prejudice must have ensued." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.
263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1948, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999).
The law governing ineffective
assistance claims also is well-established: To succeed on these
claims, Gonzales must show that his counsel's performance was
deficient and that he was actually prejudiced by the deficient
performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Whether counsel's
performance was deficient is determined by examining whether the
challenged representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Kitchens v. Johnson, 190 F.3d 698, 701 (5th
Cir.1999). The court's "scrutiny of counsel's performance must be
highly deferential." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct.
at 2065. "[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate
assistance and to have made all significant decisions in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 690,
104 S.Ct. at 2066.
The test for prejudice under
Brady and Strickland is the same: Gonzales must establish
that there is a reasonable probability that, if the evidence had
been disclosed, and/or if counsel had not performed deficiently,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability of a different result is shown when the
suppressed evidence or counsel's mistakes undermine confidence in
the outcome of the trial. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1565-66, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995);
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.
The issue before this court
is not whether Gonzales made the required showing under Brady
and Strickland. Instead, under AEDPA, the issue is whether
the state court's decision — that Gonzales did not make the
required showing — was contrary to, or an unreasonable application
of, that clearly established federal law. See Busby v. Dretke,
359 F.3d 708, 717 (5th Cir.2004).
B. Merits
1. Disclosure of the Luminol Test
Gonzales argues first that the
state court unreasonably applied clearly-established federal law
when it decided that the prosecutor did not unconstitutionally
withhold exculpatory evidence by concealing from the defense that
the luminol test was negative.
When Gonzales was taken into
custody for questioning sixteen to eighteen hours after the
murders, police officers Lambert and Thomas conducted a luminol
test on Gonzales's hands, arms, and shoes. Luminol becomes
fluorescent when it comes into contact with any traces of blood.
The only area that appeared fluorescent was at the crook of
Gonzales's arm, where blood had been drawn shortly before the test.
Lambert's report characterized the test result as "inconclusive."
Defense counsel were aware of
the report describing the luminol test as "inconclusive." When,
after trial, they learned that the result was actually negative,
they sought a new trial, arguing that the prosecution's deception
violated Gonzales's due process rights.
At the hearing on the motion for
new trial, the prosecutor conceded that the perpetrator probably
would have become bloodstained if he had inflicted all of the stab
wounds that the victims sustained. Detective Thomas testified that,
on the day of the test, he orally informed Detective Robertson
that the result was negative. Robertson did not recall receiving
that information from Thomas and did not mention it in his report.
Lambert and Thomas testified
that they did not ask Gonzales whether he had washed his hands and
arms in the sixteen hours before the test because they did not
think it could have affected the result. Gonzales appeared well-groomed
and clean at the time of the test. Thomas believed that it would
have been "very difficult" for Gonzales to have completely removed
all of the blood from his skin before the luminol test. Lambert
testified that luminol can reveal invisible traces of blood on a
surface that appears to be clean. Both officers agreed that "negative"
would have been more accurate than "inconclusive" to describe the
test result.
Detective Robertson believed, in
contrast, that Gonzales could have washed all of the blood from
his skin in the interval between the murders and the luminol test.
Wilson Young, a serologist with the Texas Department of Public
Safety, testified that Gonzales could have successfully removed
all invisible traces of blood from his skin during the time
between the murders and the luminol test. He admitted that he did
not know whether it was more difficult to remove invisible traces
of blood from human skin than from other surfaces, because he had
no training or experience using luminol on skin.
The trial court denied the
motion for new trial. Gonzales raised the issue in his state
habeas application. The state court recommended that relief be
denied, stating that there was no necessity for a fact finding
hearing as there was ample evidence in the record for the court to
rule on the relief sought, and that this claim was fully litigated
in the hearing on Gonzales's motion for a new trial. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals accepted that recommendation.
The federal district court held
that the prosecutor had an obligation to reveal the negative test
result even though defense counsel had access to the prosecutor's
entire file, including Lambert's report, and even though Gonzales
was present when the test was conducted and the results were
immediately obvious to him. The district court concluded, however,
that the negative test result was not material because there is no
reasonable probability that it would have changed the jury's
finding that Gonzales caused the death of both victims.
The court observed that Gonzales could have worn clothes that
concealed his skin and could have disposed of any bloody clothing
prior to entering his home. Thus, evidence that there was no blood
on his skin sixteen or eighteen hours after the murders did not
negate evidence that implicated him. The court was not persuaded
by Gonzales's argument that the bloody hand-print found on the
kitchen wall near Mrs. Aguirre's body proved that the perpetrator
did not wear gloves when committing the crime. The court noted
that the hand-print was not used as evidence against Gonzales
although it could have belonged to the perpetrator; the hand-print
could also have been that of the victim or of a second assailant.
The court stated further that, after having reviewed a videotape
of the crime scene, introduced into evidence at the guilt-innocence
phase of trial, the court was convinced that the blood was
surprisingly isolated and not the bloody scene Gonzales described
in support of his Brady claim.
The state court's decision to
deny relief is not unreasonable, even when considered in the light
of new evidence presented at the federal evidentiary hearing,
as the test result was not concealed. Gonzales was present during
the test and saw the result. Even assuming that he did not
understand the implications of the test, his attorneys had access
to an open file that contained Lambert's report describing the
test result as "inconclusive." Although defense counsel chose not
to investigate further because of Lambert's conclusion, they
acknowledged that "inconclusive" could cut either way. Had counsel
asked Gonzales what had happened during the test, his response
would have alerted counsel to the possibility that the evidence
could be exculpatory. In short, defense counsel knew of
information that would have enabled them to discover the actual
test result if they had questioned Gonzales or the police officers
who administered the test.
2. Ineffective Assistance:
Teardrop Tattoos
Gonzales's principal ineffective
assistance claim is that the state court unreasonably applied
federal law when it decided that trial counsel were not
ineffective although they failed to refute Detective Robertson's
testimony about Gonzales's teardrop tattoos.
When Gonzales was arrested two
weeks after the offense, he had two teardrops tattooed on his face.
At trial, Detective Robertson testified that teardrops tattooed on
a gang member's face represent the number of people that the
individual has killed. Defense counsel objected on the ground that
Robertson was unqualified to give an expert opinion on the subject.
After Robertson described his gang-related training, the trial
court overruled the objection and admitted the testimony. Defense
counsel did not cross-examine Robertson about the tattoos, and did
not present expert testimony about the possible meaning of the
tattoos at the guilt phase of trial. In closing argument, the
prosecutor characterized the tattoos as an admission of the
murders of two people:
Some of the days that you were
here, you saw me wearing a Shriner pin. I am a Shriner. I am proud
of that, and I wear that symbol proudly. Well, gangsters in their
own way have their symbols and they wear them proudly. Two
teardrops. What does that mean? That means he has killed two
people. And the symbol is there for those of his kind to see and
appreciate. He doesn't try to hide it. It is as much as leaping
out and saying to you, "I did it, but they will never prove it."
On direct appeal, Gonzales
argued that Robertson's testimony about the two teardrop tattoos
was offered to prove that he had committed two extraneous
murders, and that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to object to the testimony on that ground. The Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals disagreed, stating that, from the context of
the testimony, Robertson seemed to be presenting evidence that
Gonzales committed the murders of Mr. and Mrs. Aguirre. The court
concluded that, because the testimony was not extraneous offense
evidence, trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by
failing to object to it as such.
In his state habeas application,
Gonzales raised three claims with respect to Robertson's testimony
about the teardrop tattoos: (1) the prosecution violated Brady
by failing to reveal that teardrop tattoos on the face of a gang
member have many possible meanings, as opposed to the false
testimony at trial that they mean that the person bearing such
marks murdered someone; (2) the prosecution allowed Detective
Robertson to present false testimony concerning the teardrop
tattoos; and (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to investigate (including by consulting with a gang expert
or Gonzales) the meaning of the teardrop tattoos and failing to
use the fact that such tattoos can have many different meanings,
and by failing to object to Robertson's testimony as evidence of
an extraneous offense.
In support of his state habeas
application, Gonzales presented three affidavits, all stating that
teardrop tattoos have multiple meanings. In one, Gonzales himself
averred that
The tear drop tattoos on my face
did not mean that I had killed two people.
Gonzales also presented the
affidavit of a private investigator, who related a hearsay
conversation with a gang expert about what meaning the tattoos can
have and was told that they have "many meanings." Finally, a
probation officer averred that the meaning of the tattoos "varies
from gang to gang," and is most commonly associated with violence.
Only the third affidavit elicited even arguably admissible
evidence. The state habeas court denied relief, stating that the
ineffective assistance claim had been treated on direct appeal.
In his federal habeas petition,
Gonzales asserted for the first time that because the tattoos were
the only evidence that he murdered both of the Aguirres,
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to rebut
Robertson's opinion about the meaning of the tattoos. Gonzales
argued further that trial counsel could have nullified Robertson's
opinion with the testimony of a street gang expert and that the
prosecution knowingly allowed Detective Robertson to give the jury
the false impression that his teardrop tattoos meant that he had
killed any two people, including the Aguirres, when Robertson knew
that such tattoos can signify the killing of a member of a rival
gang.
At the federal evidentiary
hearing, Robertson testified that, before trial, he did not talk
to Gonzales's counsel about the teardrop tattoos. He testified
that, if they had asked him about the tattoos, he would have
researched the topic more thoroughly and would have discovered
that the tattoos had alternative, innocent meanings. Officer
McCann, the Odessa police department's gang expert, testified that
he would have told counsel, had they interviewed him, that
teardrop tattoos have many meanings, including mourning for a dead
or imprisoned gang member, or prior incarceration. Finally, a gang
expert testified that teardrop tattoos relating to killings
committed by the wearer usually have a different appearance and
location than the ones on Gonzales's face. He opined that
Gonzales's tattoos are the "mourning" type and that Robertson's
trial testimony was misleading.
The State offers two theories
why the evidence presented at the federal evidentiary hearing
should not be considered. First, the State contends, albeit in a
footnote, that Gonzales was not entitled to any federal
evidentiary hearing, as he "failed to develop the factual basis"
of his teardrop tattoo claim with admissible evidence in state
court. The State correctly relies on AEDPA for its formulation of
the narrow grounds on which federal courts can conduct evidentiary
hearings on habeas petitions from state convictions. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (permitting a federal evidentiary hearing if
the defendant "has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim
in State court proceedings" only if the federal claim
relies on a new rule of constitutional law, a newly discovered
factual predicate, or actual innocence supported by clear and
convincing evidence). But see Guidry v. Dretke, 397 F.3d
306, 323 (5th Cir.2005) and opinion on denial of rehearing en banc.
Second, the State argues that this evidence is "unexhausted"
because it was not offered in state court. It is true that "[e]ven
if the petitioner raises precisely the same legal claims in
state and federal proceedings, reliance in the two proceedings
upon different factual grounds that `fundamentally' alter
the legal claim will foreclose a conclusion that the claim is
exhausted." 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 23.3c, at 1087 (2005); see
Graham v. Johnson, 94 F.3d 958, 968 (5th Cir.1996). Here, it
is not clear that Gonzales has presented "material additional
evidentiary support that was not presented to the state court."
Graham, 94 F.3d at 968. Instead, the testimony offered in the
federal hearing simply reinforces his state court affidavits. In
any event, we need not discuss these powerful procedural
contentions further, because even if the evidence presented at the
federal evidentiary hearing is considered, Gonzales has not proved
that the state courts unreasonably determined his ineffectiveness
claim.
While the district court found
Gonzales's attorneys deficient, it also concluded that Gonzales
was not prejudiced under Strickland because, considering
all of the evidence against him, the tattoos were not critical to
his conviction for both murders. The district court reasoned that
the tattoos' significance concerning the murders was open to
interpretation, even absent objection, and that the tattoos were
not definitive like the fingerprint and ballistic evidence that
implicated Gonzales in both murders.
It therefore concluded that there is not a reasonable probability
that the result would have changed with expert testimony or
argument challenging the meaning of the tattoos and when Gonzales
acquired them.
Gonzales contends that
Robertson's testimony that the two teardrops meant he had killed
two people was extremely damaging because it was the only physical
evidence that he personally killed both victims.
He asserts that even if his counsel chose not to dispute the
meaning of the tattoos, they could have argued that the tattoos
were irrelevant because the State failed to prove that he acquired
them after the Aguirres were murdered.
Gonzales also urges that the
detective's interpretation of the tattoos was highly significant
in the context of the whole trial. The prosecution emphasized in
closing argument that Gonzales had two tattoos; the
prosecutor obviously regarded the testimony as important to
proving that Gonzales killed two people. Defense counsel did not
object to Robertson's testimony, did not present any alternative
theory as to the tattoos' meaning during the guilt phase of trial,
and never mentioned the tattoos in closing argument, despite the
fact that the prosecutor referred to them as a silent confession
to murdering the two victims. The jurors were not informed that
the meaning of the tattoos was open to interpretation — they had
only heard Detective Robertson's testimony that they meant that
Gonzales had killed two people. Finally, although the State never
proved when the tattoos were obtained, the defense never pointed
that fact out to the jury during the guilt phase.
Despite Gonzales's comprehensive
argument, we, like the district court, conclude that Gonzales was
not prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to refute
Robertson's testimony regarding the meaning of the tattoos. That
testimony is subject to interpretation, as evidenced by the fact
that Gonzales himself argued in state court that the testimony
related to extraneous offenses, and not to the charged murders of
Mr. and Mrs. Aguirre. The lack of evidence concerning whether
Gonzales got the tattoos before or after the murders would have
been obvious to the jury. Most important, however, is that
Gonzales's expert in the federal habeas proceedings could not rule
out the possibility that the number of teardrops represented the
number of people Gonzales had killed. If counsel had presented
such expert testimony at trial, the prosecution would still have
countered that Gonzales's two tattoos meant that he had killed two
people. At best, defense attorneys could have argued that teardrop
tattoos have multiple meanings, one of which is inculpatory to
Gonzales.
Further, expert testimony about
the tattoos would not change the fact that Gonzales confessed to
Kenimer, nor would it refute the other substantial circumstantial
evidence that he committed both murders. The evidence presented at
trial easily lends itself to the inference that Gonzales stabbed
Mr. Aguirre, who was easily overcome, and then moved on to murder
Mrs. Aguirre, who fought back valiantly. Gonzales alone sold and
profited from the Aguirres' possessions. "[A]ny arguable weakening
of the State's [teardrop tattoo] evidence resulting from testimony
questioning [the meaning of the tattoos] must be viewed in light
of the totality of the evidence the State produced at trial."
Leal v. Dretke, 428 F.3d 543, 549 (5th Cir.2005).
Given the strength of the
evidence against Gonzales, it was not unreasonable for the state
courts to decide both that Gonzales could not show a reasonable
probability of a different result and that counsel's failure to
investigate the tattoos, even if deficient, did not undermine
confidence in the outcome of the trial. We are mindful of the
requirement that we must look "through the prism of AEDPA
deference." Ward v. Dretke, 420 F.3d 479, 499 (5th
Cir.2005). As noted in Ward: "While we may take issue with
the correctness of this determination, we cannot say that
it constitutes an objectively unreasonable application of federal
law to the facts of this case." "[W]e must always keep in mind
that the statutory term `unreasonable' requires a very high
deference to state court decisions." Neal v. Puckett, 286
F.3d 230, 249 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc) (Jolly, concurring); see
also id. at 246 (per curiam) ("[O]ur focus on the `unreasonable
application' test under Section 2254(d) should be on the ultimate
legal conclusion that the state court reached and not on whether
the state court considered and discussed every angle of the
evidence.").
3. Ineffective Assistance:
Gonzales's Mother's Testimony
Finally, we consider whether the
state court unreasonably applied federal law when it decided that
trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing
timely to object to Detective Robertson's testimony that
Gonzales's mother hid knives from him because she was afraid that
he was going to kill her and his family.
Detective Robertson testified on
direct examination that, after Gonzales's arrest, police found
knives hidden under a couch cushion in the house where Gonzales
lived with his mother, wife, and child. The prosecutor asked who
led the police to those knives, and Robertson responded: "The
criminalistics team found them. Michael Gonzales' mother told me
about them." The prosecutor asked, "And why were they in there?"
Robertson responded: "Because she was afraid that he was going to
kill her and his family." After the jury heard this testimony,
defense counsel objected:
Excuse me, your Honor, I was a
little slow in getting on my feet on that one. It's obviously
hearsay and it is a rather extremely wild accusation that this
lady harbored this fear from her son. I object to that answer. I
object to the conclusion that this witness has drawn. There is no
predicate for it. There is nothing involved in this case that
would cause an investigation to be made of such an allegation and
I think that this statement was made simply for the purposes of
showmanship in front of the jury.
Counsel asked the trial court to
strike "the last remark" that Robertson made and instruct the jury
to disregard it. The trial court granted the motion and instructed
the jury not to consider "the last remark" for any purpose.
On direct appeal, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals characterized the testimony as "improper."
It concluded, however, that Gonzalez had not demonstrated
prejudice under Strickland because he had "set[ ] forth no
argument as to why the instruction to disregard did not cure the
error." The state habeas court denied relief on this claim on the
ground that it was treated on direct appeal.
Gonzales argues that he has
proved prejudice: counsel should have done more to prevent the
jury from hearing this damaging testimony or to protect Gonzales
from it by requesting a mistrial. He contends that the jury was
never told to disregard the irrelevant fact that knives were found
hidden under a cushion in the home he shared with his mother; and
that the testimony the jury was instructed to ignore was so
inflammatory that no reasonable juror could have been expected to
ignore it. He asserts that the state court's conclusion that the
instruction to disregard the testimony cured the error is
unreasonable, in the light of the enormous prejudice caused by a
hearsay accusation that a client's mother thought him capable of
murdering her and his family.
The federal district court
stated that it was hard to imagine that a juror could disregard
testimony that Gonzales's mother hid her knives because she feared
her son. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the state
court's decision was objectively reasonable and denied relief. We
agree. Gonzales has not demonstrated that the state court
unreasonably concluded that the trial court's instruction to
disregard that testimony was adequate to cure any error, or that
the state court unreasonably applied Strickland when it
decided that counsel did not render ineffective assistance by
failing to request a mistrial.
III. CONCLUSION
The state courts did not
unreasonably apply Strickland and Brady. The judgment of
the district court denying Gonzales's petition for federal habeas
relief on these conviction-related issues is, therefore,
AFFIRMED.
Notes:
These facts are largely taken from the opinion of the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals affirming Gonzales's conviction on
direct appealGonzales v. State, No. 72,317 (unpublished).
Detective Robertson suspected that two other
gang members, Daniel Lugo and Jesse Perkins, were involved in the
murders. Julian Olivarez believed that both of them probably had
something to do with the murders. Lugo had told a friend that
there were dead bodies in the Aguirres' house at least an hour
before the crime was reported by the Aguirres' son
In part of his habeas petition for which this
court did not grant a COA, Gonzales argued that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to impeach Kenimer with the somewhat
different statement Kenimer made soon after this confession. Then,
Kenimer reported that:
I was escorting [Gonzales] back
to his cell, in D Block. He then blurted out "They can't pin
nothing on me". I told him I don't know, I'm not familiar with
what your case is. Michael Gonzales is my third cousin, on my
mother's side, and he knows I'm his cousin. Michael then said "I
did it, but they can't pin nothing on me." I then told him I don't
know what you're talking about. He replied was (sic) "On the
murder of the old man and the old lady."
Gonzales argues that the district court applied
a too-stringent materiality standard in holding that the evidence
"would not have changed" the jury's verdict. The issue at this
stage, however, is not whether the federal district court applied
the wrong standard, but whether the state court's decision was an
unreasonable application of federal law. Based on our conclusion
that the test result was not concealed from Gonzales's defense, we
need not reach the question of materiality underBrady.
At the hearing, Gonzales presented the
testimony of a forensics expert who performed an experiment to
demonstrate the unlikelihood of a negative luminol test on a
person who had just committed a bloody crime. This experiment did
not duplicate the conditions of the crime and the test conducted
on Gonzales. The expert coated his left hand with blood, let it
sit for an hour while playing a computer game, took a shower to
remove the blood, and then a few hours later applied luminol. In
contrast, Gonzales had at least sixteen hours to remove any blood
from his skin. The expert's test did not prove that blood could
not be removed under the circumstances of this case, and the
expert testified that he had never seen any reference to luminol
on human skin
In a motion for rehearing, Gonzales reiterated
that Robertson's testimony about the teardrop tattoos was related
to an extraneous offense. He asserted that the Court of Criminal
Appeals ignored that Robertson referred to "people" in relation to
the tattoos but called the victims by their names elsewhere in his
testimony. Gonzales's motion for rehearing concluded: "A review of
all the testimony of Robertson clearly shows that the evidence of
tattoos did not relate to the instant offense." The Court of
Criminal Appeals denied rehearing
Gonzales asserts that the district court may
have confused the facts of this case with another case, because
the murder weapon was a knife, no fingerprint evidence was
recovered from the scene, and there has never been any fingerprint
or ballistic evidence implicating him in both murders. It is
Gonzales who errs. One of Gonzales's fingerprints was found on the
back of the stereo stolen from the victims' home. Also, ballistics
testing indicated that some empty shell casings found in a box at
his home had been fired from the victims' .22 caliber gun that
also was stolen from their home on the night of the murders.
Accordingly, the district court was not confused when it referred
to ballistic and fingerprint evidence in this case
This argument is contrary to his state court
contention that the teardrops were evidence ofextraneous
murders, and thus could be said to represent an unexhausted or
procedurally defaulted claim. The State does not so contend,
however, and it seems reasonable that the implications of the
tattoos may be considered irrespective whether they pertained to
the Aguirres' murder, as the state courts found, or to extraneous
murders. |