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Robert Dewey GLOCK II





Classification: Murderer
Characteristics: Kidnapping - Robbery
Number of victims: 1
Date of murder: August 16, 1983
Date of arrest: 5 days after
Date of birth: May 22, 1961
Victim profile: Sharilyn Johnson Ritchie (female, 34)
Method of murder: Shooting
Location: Manatee County, Florida, USA
Status: Executed by lethal injection in Florida on January 11, 2001

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

opinion 98-3425

Florida Supreme Court
Briefs and Opinion


Docket #73363 - Robert Dewey Glock, II, Petitioner, vs. Richard L. Dugger, etc., Respondent. 537 So. 2d 99; January 12, 1989.

Docket #73493 - Robert Glock, Appellant, vs. State of Florida, Appellee.
537 So. 2d 99; January 12, 1989. (Consolidated Case).

opinion petition for extraordinary relief
application for stay of execution brief of appellee


Schoolteacher was kidnapped at gunpoint from mall parking lot, then forced to withdraw money from account at bank. Drove 60 miles and shot in woods.

Joint trial with accomplice Carl Pulatti. Both sentenced to death.


Robert Glock Executed


January 12, 2001

STARKE (AP) -- A man who killed a home economics teacher after robbing her of $100 and her wedding ring sobbed and said he was sorry before being executed by injection Thursday.

''I killed Ms. Ritchie,'' Robert Glock said in his final statement before a cocktail of deadly drugs was injected into his veins. ''I'm sorry for it.'' Glock, strapped to a gurney, sobbed as he gave a two-minute statement, mentioning that he loved his family and saying that he didn't blame the people on the execution team, because they were just doing their job. ''I believe that killing to prove that killing is wrong, is wrong,'' he said.

The victim's father, Kermit Johnson, said in a statement from his home in Palmetto that the Aug. 13, 1983, murder of his daughter, Sharilyn Johnson Ritchie, destroyed his family. ''After 17 plus years, we are still devastated,'' he said. ''This will not bring back our loved one. Our lives changed that fateful August day.''

Glock's wife, Sheila, joined about a dozen anti-death penalty protesters in a pasture across the highway from the prison. ''Execution by the state is premeditated murder,'' said Mrs. Glock, who married the death row inmate in September after meeting him over the Internet.

Glock, 39, was pronounced dead at 6:28 p.m., about 13 minutes after the injection of lethal chemicals began. The start of the execution was delayed for a few minutes because execution staff had trouble finding a vein in Glock's left arm.

The injection was administered through a vein in the back of Glock's right hand. Another delay came after Warden James Crosby read Glock his death warrant.

Glock took a few moments to ''engage the warden in conversation,'' and express his remorse for the killing, said C.J. Drake, a spokesman for the Florida Department of Corrections. Glock gasped and his chin quivered for a few seconds after the procedure began, then his body went still. He declined to take a shot of Valium.

The U.S. Supreme Court denied Glock's final appeals Thursday morning. The applications were filed with Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who referred them to the full court. There was no dissent in the denials. Glock is the first inmate executed in Florida this year and the 51st since the state resumed executions in 1979.

He was given a final meal Thursday morning of New York strip steak, fried shrimp, green beans, Coca-Cola and ice cream. Prior to the execution, Drake said Glock was chatting with a prison chaplain, who served him communion. ''He was calm, he was relaxed,'' Drake said. Glock spent his final days visiting with family members.

Ritchie, who taught at Palmetto High School in Manatee County, was kidnapped at gunpoint at a Bradenton shopping mall on Aug. 16, 1983. Glock and Carl Puiatti, 38, who is on death row, stole her wedding ring and forced her to withdraw $100 from a bank.

They then drove her in her car north 60 miles to Pasco County. They released her in an orange grove near Dade City, handing her a sun visor, her purse and her husband's baseball mitt. They started to drive way, but then decided to kill her. They shot her, then came back and shot her again. She managed to walk about 10 yards before collapsing for the last time.

When her body was found, she was clutching the leather mitt to her chest. Five days later, the two men were stopped by a New Jersey state trooper. They confessed to the murder and in 1984 Circuit Judge Wayne Cobb sentenced them to death.

Defense attorney Terri Backhus argued in appeals that Glock was unfairly barred from appealing the standard jury instructions given at his trial because his first appeal team, heeding clear rulings by the Florida Supreme Court that the instructions were constitutional, hadn't appealed them. The U.S. Supreme Court later found the instructions unconstitutional.

Sharilyn Ritchie, a 34-year-old Manatee County schoolteacher, had just parked her car at a Bradenton mall on Aug. 16, 1983, when she was kidnapped at gunpoint by Glock and a cohort, Carl Puiatti.

They stole her wedding ring, forced her to withdraw $100 from a bank, then drove her car north 60 miles to Pasco County.

They released her in an orange grove just south of Dade City and handed her a sun visor, her purse and her husband's baseball mitt. They started to drive away, then decided to kill her because she could identify them.

Glock and Puiatti returned three times and fired numerous shots at Mrs. Ritchie. She managed to walk about 10 yards before collapsing for the last time.

When authorities found her body, she was clutching the leather mitt to her chest. 5 days later, Glock and Puiatti were picked up by a New Jersey state trooper who could not read the license plate on Mrs. Ritchie's car. Glock and Puiatti both confessed to the murder, and in 1984 they were convicted and sentenced to death by a Pasco circuit judge.

Puiatti, now 38, is still on death row. A date for his execution has not been set. The relatives of Sharilyn Ritchie said Wednesday that they will take no pleasure in Glock's execution. "We forgive him," said Mrs. Ritchie's sister, Rebecca Burke. "We have no animosity for him." Glock said his biggest regret was that he "didn't find God sooner. Mrs. Ritchie wouldn't be dead."


Robert Glock

The Sun Sentinel

January 11, 2001

FLORIDA - An inmate whose execution was stayed in December by a Florida Supreme Court busy with presidential election disputes was executed by lethal injection Thursday at Florida State Prison. Robert Glock, 39, was pronounced dead at 6:28 p.m., said Katie Baur, spokeswoman for Gov. Jeb Bush.

The U.S. Supreme Court denied Glock's final appeals Thursday morning. The applications were filed with Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who referred them to the full court. There was no dissent in the denials. Glock was convicted in the 1983 kidnap-slaying of Sharilyn Johnson Ritchie, 34, who taught home economics.

Defense attorney Terri Backhus of Tampa said Wednesday that she spoke frequently with her client as the execution time drew near. He was hoping for another favorable court ruling and was "of course concerned, ... but he's actually been in good spirits."Glock spent his final days visiting with family members.

Ritchie, who taught at Palmetto High School in Manatee County, was kidnapped at gunpoint at a Bradenton shopping mall on Aug. 16, 1983.

Glock and Carl Puiatti, 38, who is on death row, stole her wedding ring and forced her to withdraw $100 from a bank. They then drove her in her car north 60 miles to Pasco County.

They released her in an orange grove near Dade City, handing her a sun visor, her purse and her husband's baseball mitt. They started to drive way, but then decided to kill her.

They shot her, then came back and shot her again. She managed to walk about 10 yards before collapsing for the last time. When her body was found, she was clutching the leather mitt to her chest.

5 days later, the 2 men were stopped by a New Jersey state trooper. They confessed to the murder and in 1984 Circuit Judge Wayne Cobb sentenced them to death.

Backhus argued in appeals that Glock was unfairly barred from appealing the standard jury instructions given at his trial because his 1st appeal team, heeding clear rulings by the Florida Supreme Court that the instructions were constitutional, hadn't appealed them. The U.S. Supreme Court later found the instructions unconstitutional.

Glock becomes the 1st condemned prisoner to be put to death this year in Florida and the 51st overall since the state resumed capital punishment in 1979. Glock becomes the 3rd condemned prisoner to be put to death this year in the USA and the 686th overall since America resumed executions on January 17, 1977.


Florida Catholic Conference Plea for Mercy

The 1983 murder of Sharilyn Richie was a terrible crime and we express our sincere sympathy for her brutalization and loss of life. Robert D. Glock is scheduled to die for this crime at 6:00 p.m. on January 11, 2001, after a brief stay by the Florida Supreme Court. Once again, we ask Governor Bush to halt this execution.

The added violence of this execution is harmful to our society. Florida law provides for the alternative of life imprisonment without parole. This legitimized killing by the state coarsens us all.

It is only when society cannot be protected in any other way that the death penalty is justified. We diminish ourselves as a people by taking away a human life. Every human life must be respected, even lives of those who fail to show that respect for others.

Society needs to be protected from criminals, but we need not go to the extent of executing them. The cycle of violence must end. We must seek justice without vengeance. "As I live, says the Lord God, I swear I take no pleasure in the death of the wicked man, but rather that he may be converted and live ." (Cf. Ezekiel 33:11)

We are a government of, for and by the people. Let those speak loudly who agree that these executions are not taking place in our names. We appeal to Governor Bush for mercy in the case of Robert D. Glock, II.


At Death, Glock Says He's Sorry

Robert Glock is executed for killing Sharilyn Ritchie of Palmetto 17 years ago

By Howard M. Unger - Sarasota Herald-Tribune

Friday, January 12, 2001

Sharilyn Ritchie died clutching her husband's baseball glove, the only comfort she could find in her final moments. She had pleaded for it before the two men who kidnapped her from DeSoto Square Mall in Bradenton took her car and left her in an orange grove. One of her killers, Robert Dewey Glock, died Thursday strapped to a gurney, a lone tube stuck in his right arm.

More than 17 years after kidnapping Ritchie from the mall in broad daylight and sending a community into shock, Glock was pronounced dead at Florida State Prison at 6:28 p.m. The state's first execution of 2001, a series of eight deadly injections, took 13 minutes.

The first intravenous injections, administered at 6:15 p.m., contained sodium pentothal, a sedative used to relax the human nervous system. The second series contained pancuronium bromide, a chemical used to stop breathing. And finally, Glock received a fatal dose of potassium chloride, stopping his heart. Glock gasped and his chin quivered for a few seconds after the procedure began; then his body went still. He declined to take a shot of Valium.

Glock is the 51st inmate executed since the state resumed executions in 1979. In a three-minute statement before dying, an often tearful Glock expressed remorse for his crime and denounced the death penalty. "I killed Mrs. Ritchie," he said. "I'm sorry for it." Later, he said, "I believe that killing to prove that killing is wrong, is wrong." With that, he expressed his love for his family and told witnesses in between deep breaths that he was "ready to go see Jesus."

Ritchie, who taught at Palmetto High School in Manatee County, was kidnapped at gunpoint Aug. 13, 1983. Glock, 39, and Carl Puiatti, 38, who is on death row, stole her wedding ring and forced her to withdraw $100 from a bank.

They then drove her in her car 60 miles north to Pasco County. They released her in an orange grove near Dade City, handing her a sun visor, her purse and her husband's baseball mitt. They started to drive away, then decided to kill her.

They shot her, came back and shot her again. She managed to walk about 10 yards before collapsing for the last time. Five days later, the two men were stopped by a New Jersey state trooper. They confessed to the murder and in 1984 Circuit Judge Wayne Cobb sentenced them to death.

Glock's latest round of appeals brought the case back in front of Cobb, a judge known for his candor. Glock's attorney, Terri Backhus, argued that her client was the victim of racial profiling when Glock was stopped by a New Jersey state trooper four days after the murder. On Jan. 5, the Florida Supreme Court disagreed. And in recent days, so, too, did the federal 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. At 11:30 a.m. Thursday, the U.S. Supreme Court followed suit.

At the same time, Glock was finishing a last meal of New York strip steak and fried shrimp. It was accompanied by french fries, green beans and Coca-Cola and followed by a bowl of heavenly hash ice cream. He ate it early to avoid complications with the execution and, for security reasons, he used a plastic spoon.

In prison, Glock found religion and love. In September, he married a woman he met through an Internet matching service used to start letter-writing exchanges with death row inmates.

Thursday morning, she, two of Glock's half-sisters and two of their daughters paid their last respects before the prison chaplain offered communion. "My husband had a tremendous amount of faith," said Sheila Glock, who traveled from Gary, Ind., with her family. "He has been sorry for Mrs. Ritchie's death for all these years. If it could have been him, he would have given his life."

More than 17 years later, he did just that. "When they do these executions, they have to realize that there are families," she said while standing outside the prison, where she and about two dozen protesters lit candles, sang and prayed as the state administered its death sentence. "My husband did something bad, but so did they."

In Palmetto, Ritchie's father, Kermit Johnson, paraphrased President Franklin D. Roosevelt's radio address after Pearl Harbor was bombed to describe the day his daughter was killed. "August 13, 1983, for our family, is a day that will live in infamy just as December 7, 1941, did for our nation," he said.

"We were devastated that day. And after court actions, judicial renderings and multiple appeals, we are still devastated." Johnson said he would find no solace in Glock's execution. It would not make up for the loss of his "dearest miracle." Puiatti is still waiting on death row, more than 16 years after being sentenced. "That only solves 50 percent of the problem," Johnson said after Thursday's execution.


Floridians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty

Robert Glock will be killed on Dec. 8, 2000 at 6:00pm (EST) in revenge for his participation in the murder of Sharilyn Ritchie. There is no question of guilt in this case. Glock is contesting this execution and according to one e-mail exchange I saw over the weekend, he may still get a stay.

Robert Glock’s life was marked by neglect and violence. It is scheduled to end by execution on December 8. Together with his co-defendant Carl Puiatti he was sentenced to death for the 1983 murder of Sharilyn Ritchie.

Both defendants were convicted in a joined trial, although Robert’s lawyers had asked for separate proceedings.

Furthermore Robert’s defense counsel failed to properly investigate and present evidence of petitioner’s childhood abuse, his mental disturbance, and the domination by his co-defendant.

He did not obtain available information and important mitigating evidence from Robert’s family. By doing so he failed to aid the mental health experts in showing the deficiencies in Robert’s character. Throughout his lifetime Robert was searching for love and support but in turn he was neglected.

As a child Robert suffered under an abusive and alcoholic mother. According to Roberts sister, Tammy Glock, she “spent most of her time drunk. When she would vomit all over herself we would clean her up and put her in bed so that our stepfather wouldn’t know that she had been drinking. If we didn’t help her in this way, she would get furious at us...We were just too scared not to do anything to keep her from beating us... She would dress (Bobby) up like a little girl and make him to go to school like that. Bobby would try to sneak normal clothes out of the house with him, but if she caught him, she would beat him badly... She did not approve who he was. She did not like him because of who his father was”. Robert was not allowed to play with his peers and after he had tried to run away several times, he was sent to a foster home at age thirteen. Within a year he moved to his father’s in Florida.

There he would endure even more pain, this time by his stepmother. She was jealous at him and considered him a danger to her children’s status, and although Robert desired her sympathy she would be violent against him. As a result of his upbringing Robert never developed a healthy self-esteem.

Showing self-defeating and schizoid traits, Robert also suffered under Post-Traumatic Stress-Disorder. He was small of stature and became easily dependant on others. Soon he was a follower and an easily led pleaser of people who would make him feel comfortable. At the end this is why he became involved in the killing of Sharilyn Ritchie.

According to Doctor Merikangas, “Robert Glock has a passive dependant personality disorder and is subject to undue influence and domination. In my opinion, Robert was under the domination of Mr. Puiatti during the offense. If not for this domination and influence by Mr. Puiatti, Robert would not have participated in such an offense”.

In contrast to his co-defendant, Robert had no significant history of prior criminal activity. He is also deeply remorseful for what he did and evaluations have found him to be a good candidate for rehabilitation.


Glock: 'I killed Ms. Ritchie. I'm sorry for it'

Robert Dewey Glock II makes his final statement, closes his eyes and is executed Thursday at Florida State Prison.

By Cary Davis - St. Petersburg Times

January 12, 2001

STARKE -- With just minutes to live Thursday evening, Robert Dewey Glock II couldn't wait until the brown curtains of the execution chamber were pulled opened to make his final statement.

It was past 6 p.m., the scheduled time for his execution, but Glock was busy telling Florida State Prison Warden James Crosby that he was sorry for the murder of Sharilyn Ritchie, a Manatee County schoolteacher.

The execution already had been delayed several minutes while doctors struggled to find a suitable vein in Glock's arm, but Crosby heard the condemned man out. Then, at 6:12 p.m., the curtains were snapped back, revealing Glock strapped to a gurney and covered with a sheet.

Glock nodded at one of his attorneys seated in the front row of the witness room, then looked up to the microphone hanging from the ceiling of the brightly-lit execution chamber. "Hey everybody," he said with a slight smile, then paused for a moment as tears welled in his eyes. "I killed Ms. Ritchie. I'm sorry for it." He ended his statement two minutes later, saying, "I'm ready to go see Jesus," then shut his eyes as Crosby signaled to an executioner, hidden behind a one-way mirror, to start the procedure.

At 6:16 p.m., the mixture of deadly chemicals now coursing through his veins, Glock's chest began to rise and fall in convulsive gasps, and his lips fluttered. A minute later his body relaxed and his face started to turn blue. A prison doctor declared Glock dead at 6:28 p.m.

Glock, 39, became the seventh Florida inmate to be executed by lethal injection since the state abandoned its mistake-prone electric chair in 1999.

Glock was condemned for the 1983 slaying of Mrs. Ritchie, a 34-year-old home economics teacher at Palmetto High School, in a Dade City orange grove. Mrs. Ritchie, who had taken a year off from teaching to have a baby with her husband, had just parked her car at a Bradenton shopping mall when she was kidnapped at gunpoint by Glock and a cohort, Carl Puiatti.

Glock and Puiatti stole her car and her wedding ring, forced her to withdraw $100 from an ATM, then drove her 60 miles north to Pasco County. They initially agreed to release her, and handed her a sun visor, her purse and her husband's baseball mitt.

They started to drive away, then decided to kill her because they feared she could identify them. They made three passes in the car, shooting Mrs. Ritchie numerous times until she finally collapsed, clutching the baseball glove to her chest.

Five days later, Glock and Puiatti were pulled over on the New Jersey Turnpike by a trooper who couldn't read the license plate on Mrs. Ritchie's car. They both confessed and in 1984 they were tried together, convicted and sentenced to death. Puiatti, 38, remains on death row. A date for his execution has not been set.

"Solace will not come for us with the execution today," Mrs. Ritchie's father, Kermit Johnson, said in a telephone interview Thursday night from his Manatee County home. "One of the most valuable and dearest miracles from God, our daughter Sharilyn, was taken from us by a heinous crime."

In September, unaware that Gov. Jeb Bush was about to sign his death warrant, Glock married a 45-year-old steelworker from Gary, Ind., he met on the Internet. "If he could have given his life for Mrs. Ritchie, he would have," Sheila Glock-Garrett said after the execution. "I'm proud of my husband."

Glock spent his last day visiting with family members and his legal team, then took communion from a prison chaplain. Using a plastic spoon -- inmates aren't allowed to eat with forks or knives -- Glock polished off his final meal of New York strip cut into small pieces, fried shrimp, french fries, green beans, Coca-Cola and Heavenly Hash ice cream. "He was calm, relaxed," C.J. Drake, spokesman for the Florida Department of Corrections, told reporters. "He seemed fairly composed."

Glock's execution originally was scheduled for early December, but on the day before he was scheduled to die, the Florida Supreme Court granted him a temporary stay, saying it was too busy with the presidential voting matter to hear his appeal. On Thursday, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rejected all of Glock's arguments.


State Supreme Court Weighs Man's Death Sentence

His lawyer says he was pulled over because he was white, voiding any evidence found during the stop

By Chase SQUIRES - St. Petersburg Times

January 5, 2001

Defense attorney Terri Backhus took her bid to save the life of killer Robert Dewey Glock II to the Florida Supreme Court on Thursday, facing questions from justices who sounded equally skeptical of the defense and the prosecution. Live audio and video from the 45-minute session were carried on the Internet from Tallahassee.

Backhus renewed arguments rejected last month by Circuit Judge Wayne Cobb in Dade City that Glock and co-hort Carl Puiatti -- both white -- were the victims of New Jersey State Police racial profiling.

They were stopped on the New Jersey turnpike and arrested after kidnapping 34-year-old schoolteacher Sharilyn Ritchie from a Bradenton mall in 1983 before driving her to Dade City, where they shot her to death. Both men were sentenced to death.

Backhus was appointed in November to represent Glock before his scheduled December execution. Within days, she said 91,000 pages of newly released New Jersey State Police documents could show that her client was stopped illegally.

Supreme Court Justice Barbara Pariente on Thursday wondered how Glock, 38, could have been the victim of racial bias. "Isn't it a problem that your client is not a member of the protected class, in that he is not a racial minority?" she asked. Backhus said it was not just black motorists who were victims of racial profiling -- a controversial policing technique that encouraged agents to focus on specific races for traffic stops in a bid to slow drug traffic. "It became more an instance of not just being one particular race that was being profiled. It was Hispanics, blacks, it was Italians, Chinese," she said. "One of the two members of the party, Mr. Puiatti, is Italian-American, which is one of the ethnic groups that they were targeting.

It was obvious that there was a pattern of choosing -- picking and choosing different races as the basis for the stop." Backhus has said that if the stop were illegal, then prosecutors could not use statements the men made after their arrest, nor could they use evidence -- including a pistol -- collected during the stop.

Backhus argued the same thing before Cobb, asking the judge to hold a full hearing, during which the trooper who made the stop could testify about the stop that led to the men's arrest and subsequent confessions.

Trooper William Moore has testified that he stopped the car Glock and Puiatti were riding in because their license tag was unreadable. After Backhus' appeal before Cobb last month, Moore, who is black, again said he did not use racial profiling when he stopped the pair.

Glock was scheduled to be executed Dec. 8, but the Supreme Court agreed to hear Backhus' appeal. The justices did not immediately issue a ruling after hearing her arguments Thursday. Six days after the Supreme Court held up the December execution, Gov. Jeb Bush signed a new death warrant, setting Glock's execution for 6 p.m. Jan. 11.

While justices peppered Backhus with questions about legal procedure and the strength of her argument, they pondered aloud the constitutional issues of fair searches and equal protection for all citizens, the executive powers of the governor, the interpretation of legislative intent, and past case law. They sounded equally skeptical of arguments by Bob Landry, an lawyer with the state Attorney General's Office.

Landry's position was that the legality of the stop had been hashed out in lower courts and even upheld by the state Supreme Court. There was no need to go over it again. Besides, he argued, Glock is white. Really there is no particular claim that the defendant can make at this time," Landry said. "The defendant -- both he and his co-defendant, colleague, Mr. Puiatti -- were both Caucasian."

Both Justice Leander Shaw and Justice Harry Lee Anstead wondered aloud that if racial profiling improperly targeted Puiatti because of his Italian descent, then maybe Glock's arrest would also have been improper, because the two were together.

In 1987, when he was originally scheduled for execution, Glock wanted to be executed, he told the Times last month. He said he was suicidal and depressed, and felt empty inside. Now, he said, it's different.

He said he has a strong belief in God and wants to share more time with his new family -- in September he married a 45-year-old steelworker and mother of six from Gary, Ind. The Supreme Court did not immediately set a date when the justices would return with a ruling.


Glock Executed For 1983 Killing

By A.P. Thompson - The Gainesville Sun

Friday, January 12, 2001

STARKE - A man who confessed to a 1983 murder and kidnapping apologized for his crime Thursday just before he was executed. Robert Glock, 39, shot and killed Sharilyn Johnson Ritchie, a 34-year-old home economics teacher at Palmetto High School in Manatee County.

As he was strapped to a gurney in the execution chamber at Florida State Prison near Starke, Glock told witnesses he was sorry for his crime. "Hey everybody," Glock said as a brown curtain concealing him from witnesses and reporters was pulled back at 6:12 p.m., "I killed Ms. Ritchie. I'm sorry for it. I'll be seeing her when I go to see Jesus."

Glock's execution -- set to begin at 6 p.m. -- was delayed because prison doctors had trouble locating veins in Glock's arms, said Florida Department of Corrections spokesman C.J. Drake. A second delay was caused when Glock tried to speak to James Crosby, the prison warden, to "amplify his remorse over his crime," Drake said.

Drake said he did not know if Crosby responded. A vein just above Glock's right wrist was finally used to administer three separate drugs that rendered him unconscious, paralyzed his muscles and then stopped his heart. Glock was pronounced dead at 6:28 p.m., 13 minutes after the drugs began flowing into his body.

Glock won a 30-day emergency stay of execution in December from the Florida Supreme Court so his lawyer, Terri Backhus of Tampa, could file last-minute appeals. But the U.S. Supreme Court denied his final appeal Thursday morning.

In his final statement, Glock -- who was visibly nervous and sobbed slightly before the procedure -- said he loved his family. He said he didn't hold correctional officers responsible for his death. He declined a Valium, which is normally offered Death Row inmates before their sentence is carried out.

"These guys are only doing their job," he said with his lips and chin trembling, "but I believe that killing to prove that killing is wrong, is wrong." He then paused briefly while staring at the ceiling and then said, "I'm ready to go see Jesus." He continued to talk after the microphone was turned off. Two minutes later, he let out a final gasp.

About 25 protesters, including Glock's wife, Sheila, stood outside the prison singing and holding candles. "If he could have given his life for hers, he would have," a crying Sheila Glock said after the execution. "He was sorry for his crime all these years. My husband did wrong, yes, but so is the state. It's nothing but premeditated murder." The two met over the Internet five years ago and married Sept. 13.

Glock confessed to the abduction and slaying he and another man, Carl Puiatti, 38, committed when Glock was 21 years old. On Aug. 16, 1983, the two men approached Ritchie at gunpoint as she got out of her car at a Bradenton shopping mall.

After robbing her, they drove her more than 60 miles to an orange grove outside Dade City, where they stole her wedding ring and gave Ritchie her purse, a visor and her husband's baseball mitt before dropping her off. They drove away but then decided to kill her and returned. Puiatti shot her twice. After driving off a second time, the men noticed she was still standing. They drove back again and Glock shot her a third time.

When her body was found, Ritchie was hugging the glove to her chest. Glock and Puiatti were stopped several days later in New Jersey by police for an illegible license plate. The men then confessed the murder to police.

Backhus argued in an appeal that New Jersey police used racial profiling tactics to pull the men over, resulting in an inadmissible confession. Backhus said police were taught to pull over people who looked like Italians because they are more likely to be involved in organized crime. The appeal was denied Jan. 5 by the state Supreme Court. Puiatti is also on Florida's Death Row. No date has been set for his execution. (The Associated Press contributed to this report.)


There is Something Wrong When We Begin to Assume That All Death Penalty Cases are Flawed

By Bob Greene - Jewish World Review

January 30, 2001

I FAVOR the death penalty and believe it is just. I also deeply admire the attorneys and journalists who have investigated cases in which people have been put on Death Row who do not belong there. That is a crime in itself. But there is something wrong when we begin to assume that perhaps all death penalty cases are flawed. They're not.

As far as I can tell, no one has spoken much about the injustice done to a woman named Sharilyn Ritchie. She was not accused of harming anyone. She herself was murdered. A second injustice to her -- in my opinion --was done in the years after she was killed. One of her murderers -- Robert D. Glock -- was executed this month in Florida.

He killed Mrs. Ritchie in 1983. He was finally put to death this month. That is where I believe the injustice comes in. Glock was allowed to live for almost 18 years after he killed Mrs. Ritchie.

She was a 34-year-old home economics teacher at Palmetto High School in Florida. She had taken a year off to have a baby with her husband, Larry, who had been a baseball coach at the same school. On Aug. 13, 1983, Mrs. Ritchie stepped out of her car at the DeSoto Square Mall to go shopping. She was met by Robert Glock and an accomplice, Carl Puiatti (Puiatti remains on Death Row today).

What happened next is not in question; the killers admitted it. They forced Mrs. Ritchie to withdraw $100 from a drive-through ATM. She begged them for two things: to allow her to keep her wedding ring, and her husband's baseball mitt.

She used to attend the games her husband coached, and evidently the mitt meant a lot to her. They took the wedding ring, but let her have the mitt. They put her out of her car in an orange grove. They drove away, but came back. Puiatti shot Mrs. Ritchie twice with a .38-caliber Colt revolver. They started to leave again, but noticed Mrs. Ritchie might still be alive.

So they returned, and Glock shot her again. She still seemed to be alive. Glock shot her once more, and Mrs. Ritchie stopped moving. She died while holding onto her husband's baseball mitt.

They were arrested and sentenced to die in the electric chair. But because of the various appeals and protections given to Death Row inmates, Glock -- who killed Mrs. Ritchie in 1983, who admitted it and who was convicted in 1984 -- was still alive and being sheltered, clothed and fed by the State of Florida in 2000. Glock received a final stay of execution last year when his attorney argued that, when police in New Jersey arrested Glock in Mrs. Ritchie's car, the police had made Glock a victim of racial profiling.

Glock is not African-American. His attorney argued Glock and Puiatti were unfairly pulled over because they looked Italian. A Florida judge soon rejected that argument, and Glock was executed this month.

He died by lethal injection even though he had been sentenced to the electric chair. New rules in Florida -- put in place after murderers apparently suffered during their executions -- allow Death Row inmates their choice of the method of execution. (Mrs. Ritchie was not given a choice of how she would die.) Glock was given a final meal of New York strip steak, fried shrimp, french fries, green beans, corn on the cob, Coca-Cola and heavenly hash ice cream. (Glock did not give Mrs. Ritchie a choice of her last meal.)

For almost 18 years after Glock killed Mrs. Ritchie, he was allowed to laugh at television comedies, to enjoy the sound of music, to fall in love (he got married while in prison to a woman he met on the Internet), to speak and correspond with people he cared for, to follow whatever sports events and political stories interested him, to develop whatever friendships he could make while behind bars, to hope and dream. In short, Glock was allowed to live.

Mrs. Ritchie was allowed none of that. She was not granted a single extra day of life. She was executed on that August day in 1983, without a trial, without appeals, without her pleas for mercy being answered -- except with more gunshots. Yes, there are injustices in capital cases -- and sometimes they concern people accused of crimes they did not commit. But there was an injustice in this case, too. The injustice was to Sharilyn Ritchie. The injustice was that Robert Glock was permitted to live and breathe for 18 years after he killed her.


36 F.3d 1014

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Glock v. Singletary

October 7, 1994

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, KRAVITCH and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges.

TJOFLAT, Chief Judge:

Robert Dewey Glock II is a Florida prison inmate. In 1983, a jury convicted him, along with his codefendant Carl Puiatti, of one count each of first degree murder, kidnapping, and robbery. The jury recommended that both Glock and Puiatti receive the death penalty for the murder; the trial court accepted the jury's recommendations and sentenced the defendants accordingly. After failing to obtain relief through a direct appeal and state collateral attacks, Glock filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 (1988), seeking the vacation of both his murder conviction and his death sentence.

The district court dismissed Glock's petition, concluding that, on its face, the petition failed to state a valid claim for relief, 752 F.Supp. 1027. Glock appeals. Finding no merit in Glock's attack on his murder conviction, we affirm the district court's refusal to disturb that conviction. Glock's death sentence must be set aside, however, because the trial court, at the conclusion of the sentencing phase of Glock's trial, failed to provide the jury with an adequate instruction regarding the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance that was relied upon by the State as a ground for seeking the death penalty. We therefore direct the district court to issue the writ with respect to Glock's death sentence.



On the morning of August 16, 1983, Glock and Puiatti confronted a woman as she attempted to exit her vehicle at a shopping mall in Bradenton, Florida, forcing her back inside her car at gunpoint. As Puiatti drove from the mall, Glock took fifty dollars from the victim's purse. Glock and Puiatti then coerced the victim into cashing a $100 check at her bank.

With the proceeds of the check in hand, the pair drove the victim across South Florida, eventually arriving at an orange grove outside Dade County where they took the victim's wedding ring and abandoned her at the side of the road. After driving a short distance, however, the pair decided that the woman, if left alive, would be a potential witness against them and that she therefore should be killed.

Glock and Puiatti returned to where they had left the victim, whereupon Puiatti shot her twice at close range and drove away. Upon glancing back and realizing that the victim had not fallen to the ground, Puiatti turned the car around. Glock then took the gun and fired a third shot into the victim and Puiatti drove away once more. When the woman still did not fall, Glock and Puiatti made a third pass at which point Glock fired the shot that felled her; she died shortly thereafter.

Four days later, Glock and Puiatti were still in possession of the victim's vehicle when they were stopped in New Jersey by a state trooper who noticed that the automobile's license plate was displayed improperly. Neither Puiatti nor Glock was able to present the trooper with a valid driver's license, so the trooper asked to see the car's registration. As Puiatti opened the glove box, the trooper noticed a handgun inside.

The trooper then seized the firearm, and with permission from Puiatti and Glock, searched the vehicle, thereby finding a second handgun. The officer arrested both men for possession of two handguns without permits. The handgun taken from the glove box proved to be the weapon used in the Florida slaying.

On August 21, the day following their arrests, Glock and Puiatti made separate tape recorded statements to two Pasco County, Florida, detectives,1 in which each confessed to the Florida kidnapping, robbery, and killing.

In his statement, Glock recounted the events described above, differing from that account in just two respects: Glock claimed that Puiatti had suggested initially that the two men kill the victim and that Puiatti had fired the final shot. Puiatti's statement, given later that day, was virtually identical to Glock's statement; not surprisingly, however, Puiatti claimed that the killing had been Glock's idea and that Glock had fired the last shot.

Three days later, on August 24, Glock and Puiatti gave the detectives a joint statement before a court reporter. Puiatti spoke first. As Glock listened silently, Puiatti told the detectives that "[Glock] said to me that he thought we should shoot her ... [a]nd after going back and forth a little bit, I agreed, and turned the car around." Puiatti then admitted to firing the first shot, at which point Glock interrupted and continued the narration.

Glock reported, and Puiatti agreed, that Puiatti initially fired three shots and that at least two of those shots struck the victim, one in the right shoulder and one in the chest. Glock continued, stating that he also shot the victim twice--once on the second pass in the car and once on the third. Glock also confessed that the victim collapsed after he shot her on the third pass.2 At the conclusion of the joint statement, both men stated that they were in "full agreement with each other as to the [joint] statement ... [and] that the incident came down exactly that way."


On October 12, 1983, the State of Florida charged Glock and Puiatti with one count each of first degree murder, kidnapping, and robbery. Before trial, each defendant moved for separate trials because the State intended to present both of their individual confessions to the jury. The trial court denied their requests for severance and, in March 1984, Glock and Puiatti went to trial.

At trial, the State introduced all three confessions into evidence as part of its case in chief. Glock and Puiatti each objected to the introduction of the other's individual statement. As each defendant's statement was received, the court instructed the jury to disregard it to the extent that it implicated the other defendant. With respect to the joint statement, no objection was made and no curative instruction was given. After the State rested its case, neither defendant took the stand to rebut the State's proof. The jury accepted the State's proof and convicted each defendant on all three counts.

The trial then proceeded to the penalty phase,3 where the same jury was asked to make a recommendation as to whether Glock and Puiatti should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. The State called no witnesses, relying instead upon the evidence adduced during the guilt phase of the trial. Glock, in his case, called a number of witnesses, including his sister and his stepmother, both of whom testified as to the difficult circumstances of Glock's childhood.

Glock also presented a mental health expert who testified that Glock would not have committed the crimes but for the substantial domination exerted over him by Puiatti,4 and that Glock, who did not have a criminal profile, was capable of rehabilitation and therefore was unlikely to commit any future crimes. Finally, Glock testified that he felt remorse over what he had done.

At the close of the evidence at the penalty phase, the trial judge instructed the jury to consider five statutory aggravating circumstances in reaching its recommendation concerning the defendants' respective sentences: whether the murder was committed: (1) while the defendant was engaged in the commission, the attempted commission, or the flight after the commission or attempted commission, of the crime of kidnapping, Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 921.141(5)(d) (West 1985 & Supp.1994); (2) for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 921.141(5)(e); (3) for financial gain, Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 921.141(5)(f); (4) in a "cold, calculated, and premeditated [manner] without any pretense of moral or legal justification," Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 921.141(5)(i); or (5) in a manner that was "especially wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel,"5 Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 921.141(5)(h) (hereinafter, the "atrociousness circumstance").6 The court also instructed the jury with respect to both statutory mitigating circumstances, see Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 921.141(6), and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.

The jury recommended, by a vote of eleven to one, that both Glock and Puiatti receive the death penalty. Because Florida law does not require it to do so, the jury did not indicate the specific aggravating circumstances that formed the basis for its death penalty recommendation.7 The trial judge adopted the sentencing recommendations of the jury and imposed the death penalty. As to both defendants, the trial judge specifically found three aggravating circumstances: that the murder was committed (1) for financial gain; (2) to avoid arrest; and (3) in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner.

The judge rejected two aggravating circumstances--that the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and that the murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping--because the facts necessary to support them comprised the basis for the judge's finding of two other aggravating circumstances.8 In Glock's case, the judge found a statutory mitigating circumstance in Glock's lack of a prior criminal history, and three nonstatutory mitigating circumstances in Glock's cooperation in the police investigation, his capacity for rehabilitation, and his good behavior while incarcerated. In the court's view, however, those mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the three aggravating circumstances that attended the murder.

Following the imposition of sentence, Glock appealed his murder conviction and death sentence; he did not appeal his convictions for kidnapping and robbery.9 The Florida Supreme Court found no error in the proceedings before the trial court and therefore affirmed.10 Puiatti v. State, 495 So.2d 128 (Fla.1986) ("Puiatti I ") (joint resolution of individual codefendants' direct appeals), vacated in part, 481 U.S. 1027, 107 S.Ct. 1950, 95 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (only as to Puiatti; Glock did not file a writ of certiorari).11

Glock then moved the trial court for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. In his Rule 3.850 petition, Glock listed sixteen claims of trial court error, including, inter alia, the court's refusal to sever his case from Puiatti's (at both the guilt and penalty phases) and to charge the jury as he had requested at the conclusion of the penalty phase of his trial. See supra note 6. Glock also claimed that his attorney was ineffective both in the penalty phase of the trial and at the subsequent sentencing hearing before the court. The trial court, without holding an evidentiary hearing, examined and rejected each of Glock's claims, finding that some of his claims had been waived, that some had been decided against him on direct appeal and thus were not cognizable in a Rule 3.850 proceeding, and that the rest lacked merit.

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Rule 3.850 relief. Glock v. Dugger, 537 So.2d 99 (Fla.1989).12 In its opinion, the court discussed only two of the sixteen claims that Glock presented: (1) that the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's (Puiatti's) confession violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), and as applied in Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987), a case similar to Glock's; and (2) that Glock's attorney rendered ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of the case. The court found Glock's remaining claims patently meritless.

The Florida Supreme Court rejected Glock's Bruton claim, finding that the joint statement Glock and Puiatti made to the police "clearly indicates [the] reliability" of Puiatti's confession.13 Glock, 537 So.2d at 102. The court also rejected Glock's ineffective assistance claim as meritless on its face. After the court handed down its decision, the Governor signed Glock's death warrant and his execution was scheduled for January 17, 1989.

On January 3, 1989, Glock, replicating the sixteen claims raised in his Rule 3.850 petition, filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The district court, concluding that Glock's claims were meritless on their face and that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary, denied the writ.14 The court did grant a certificate of probable cause, however, thereby permitting this appeal.

On appeal, Glock presents seven of the claims he asserted in the district court. One of the claims attacks his murder conviction; the remaining six challenge his death sentence. In Part II, we consider whether Glock is entitled to a new trial because the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him by admitting the confession of his nontestifying codefendant, Puiatti.15 Although we conclude that the trial court denied Glock his right of confrontation, we nonetheless affirm Glock's murder conviction because the denial constituted harmless error.

In Part III, we examine Glock's claim that the trial court's jury instruction regarding the atrociousness circumstance was unconstitutionally vague, thus preventing the jury, and subsequently the trial judge, from making a reliable capital sentencing determination. We conclude that the instruction was unconstitutionally vague and that Glock's sentence, therefore, must be set aside. Given this conclusion, we need not examine Glock's five remaining challenges to his sentence.



The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of a criminal defendant to confront the witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI.16 Thus, in a joint trial, the Confrontation Clause prevents a party from introducing a nontestifying codefendant's statement that inculpates a defendant, because that defendant is denied the opportunity to confront, and cross-examine, the nontestifying codefendant.17 Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 189, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 1717, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987) (citing Pointer v. State, 380 U.S. 400, 404, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965)). Moreover, a violation of the Confrontation Clause cannot be cured by instructing the jury to consider the statement only in assessing the guilt of the codefendant who made it. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1627-28, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (finding that the "risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions [to disregard the nontestifying codefendant's statement] is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant," that a limiting instruction is insufficient to insulate against the Confrontation Clause violation).

It was not until Cruz, however, that the Court addressed a situation similar to the case presently before us, where, in addition to the statement given by the nontestifying codefendant, the defendant made a statement of his own that corroborates the nontestifying codefendant's statement.18 In Cruz, the Court held that the introduction of a defendant's own confession that corroborates, or "interlocks" with, the nontestifying codefendant's statement "might, in some cases render the violation of the Confrontation Clause harmless, but could not cause introduction of the nontestifying codefendant's confession not to constitute a violation." Id. 481 U.S. at 191, 107 S.Ct. at 1718 (adopting reasoning of concurring opinion in Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 77-80, 99 S.Ct. 2132, 2141-42, 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Thus, in a joint trial, a nontestifying codefendant's statement, to the extent that it implicates another defendant, violates Bruton even though that statement "interlocks" with the statement of the implicated defendant. Id. The Bruton error is not fatal, however, if it is deemed harmless by a reviewing court.

In the present case, the trial court violated the Bruton rule by admitting the statement of a nontestifying codefendant, Puiatti, that incriminated the defendant, Glock. Moreover, the Bruton violation was not avoided by either the trial judge's clear and concise instruction to the jury not to consider Puiatti's statement as evidence against Glock or by the fact that both Glock's individual statement and the joint confession of Glock and Puiatti unquestionably corroborated Puiatti's statement. Accordingly, we must review the circumstances in which the error was made in order to determine whether that error was harmless.


Traditionally, harmless error analysis of Bruton violations has followed the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), which came before the Court on direct review. See Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969). This well-established standard, however, is no longer applicable to harmless error examinations undertaken in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. In Brecht v. Abrahamson, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1722, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993), the Supreme Court announced a "less onerous standard on habeas review of constitutional error." Under Brecht, the proper inquiry is "whether the error 'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' " Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1722 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1253, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). Thus, the "habeas petitioner[ ] may obtain plenary review of [his] constitutional claims, but [he is] not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless ... it resulted in 'actual prejudice.' "19 Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1722.

The Bruton violation in this case had no substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict.20 Here, unlike in Cruz, the defendant suffering the constitutional deprivation never contested the probative value of any of the three confessions introduced at trial.21 On the contrary, both Glock and Puiatti admitted at trial and while giving their confessions that their statements were truthful, voluntary, and freely-given. As such, the interlocking nature of the three confessions, two of which were directly admissible against Glock,22 "may be considered on appeal in assessing whether any Confrontation Clause violation was harmless." Cruz, 481 U.S. at 194, 107 S.Ct. at 1719; see also id. at 192, 107 S.Ct. at 1718 (noting that a Bruton violation may be harmless if "the defendant were standing by his confession, in which case it could be said that the codefendant's confession does no more than support the defendant's very own case").

Thus, because Glock is "standing by" his confessions, and because those confessions substantially corroborate the statements in Puiatti's confession that incriminate Glock, the interlocking nature of the multiple confessions supports a finding that, with respect to the substance of Puiatti's statement, the Bruton violation caused by the admission of Puiatti's statement was harmless error.

A review of the trial transcript confirms our view that the admission of Puiatti's statement, this time with respect to the procedural aspects of the statement's admission, was harmless error. Initially, the individual taped statements of Puiatti and Glock that were played to the jury were virtually identical in duration. Also, the taped statements were played to the jury in immediate succession, with Glock's being played first, such that neither statement was accorded undue influence before the jury.

Additionally, aside from the actual playing of the tape, Puiatti's confession was never again brought to the attention of the jury, either during the examination of witnesses or in the closing arguments of counsel.23 Finally, although counsel for Glock and Puiatti frequently objected to the court's admission of the statements and to the court's refusal to sever their cases, all of their objections were made at side bar, and thus did not draw the jury's attention to the statements or result in any prejudice or harm.

Accordingly, based on the record taken as a whole, we find that the improper admission of Puiatti's individual statement was harmless error that did not substantially affect the jury's verdict. In his individual statement and in the joint confession, Glock corroborated the damaging portions of Puiatti's statement by admitting to having been at the scene of the crime and to having participated in the murder both by agreeing to kill the victim and by actually firing shots into the victim. Moreover, the trial transcript reveals no instances in which Puiatti's individual confession was used in an overly prejudicial or damaging fashion. In fine, the Bruton violation constituted harmless error, and Glock's conviction for first degree murder is affirmed.


In his habeas petition, Glock presented a number of challenges to his sentence of death.24 Because we find that the trial court's instruction to the jury with respect to the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance was constitutionally deficient, we vacate Glock's death sentence, rendering unnecessary an examination of his remaining claims of error regarding the sentencing phase of his trial.


Under the Florida capital sentencing scheme, a defendant found guilty of capital murder receives a separate hearing to determine whether the appropriate penalty for his crime is life imprisonment or death. Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 921.141(1) (West 1985 & Supp.1994). The hearing, typically conducted before the same jury that heard the evidence at the guilt phase, entails the presentation of aggravating evidence by the prosecutor and mitigating evidence by the defendant. After the presentation of evidence and the arguments of counsel, the judge instructs the jury to consider whether certain statutorily enumerated aggravating circumstances exist in the case, and if so, whether those aggravating circumstances are outweighed by any mitigating circumstances that may be present. Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 921.141(2). While there are a number of statutorily defined mitigating circumstances, the jury is instructed that it may consider any evidence that mitigates in favor of a life sentence.

Upon being charged, the jury, by majority vote, renders an advisory verdict of either death or life imprisonment.25 Notwithstanding the recommendation of the jury, however, the trial court, in a subsequent sentencing proceeding, independently weighs the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and renders the final determination as to life or death. Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 921.141(3). In arriving at its sentence, the court is required to place "great weight" upon the recommendation of the jury. Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975). As such, the jury's recommendation, be it a recommendation of life imprisonment or death, constitutes an important factor that must be incorporated into the judge's independent weighing process. Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446, 1454 (11th Cir.1988) (en banc) ("The case law reflects an interpretation of the death penalty statute that requires the trial court to give significant weight to the jury's recommendation, whether it be a recommendation of life imprisonment or a recommendation of death."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071, 109 S.Ct. 1353, 103 L.Ed.2d 821 (1989).

These well-established procedural rules recently led the Supreme Court to observe that, under the Florida capital sentencing scheme, the judge and jury are "co-sentencers." Espinosa v. Florida, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 2929, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992). Moreover, the Court concluded that, where the state "decides to place capital-sentencing authority in two actors rather than one, neither actor must be permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances." Id. See also Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2119, 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992) (holding that a sentencer weighing "invalid" aggravating circumstance violates the Eighth Amendment); Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1140, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992) (holding that use of vague or imprecise aggravating circumstance invalidates death sentence); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1450, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990) (same).26


In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), and its progeny, the Supreme Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment to require that the discretion of a capital sentencer be channelled and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 1858, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). Thus, to the extent that an aggravating circumstance, as defined in the death penalty statute, provides insufficient guidance, it must be accompanied by narrowing language that provides a "principled way to distinguish [a] case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not." Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1767, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980).

In a long line of cases, beginning with Godfrey, the Supreme Court established conclusively that instructions that do little more than recite the words of the statute, "heinous," "atrocious," and "cruel," must be accompanied by language that effectively narrows the sentencer's discretion. Stringer, 503 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1135. See also Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29, 100 S.Ct. at 1764-65 (invalidating death sentence based on aggravating circumstance that the killing was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman"); Maynard, 486 U.S. at 359, 108 S.Ct. at 1856 (same result as to language that killing was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"); Espinosa, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2927 (same as to "especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel").

The Supreme Court of Florida has provided additional language designed to channel the sentencer's discretion with respect to the atrociousness circumstance used in the statute:

that heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and, that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others. What is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the actual commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital felonies--the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.

State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943, 94 S.Ct. 1950, 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974). The United States Supreme Court has found Florida's narrowing construction for the atrociousness circumstance to be constitutional, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2968, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976); Sochor v. Florida, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2121-22, 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992), making clear in the process that the portion of the Dixon language necessary to meet constitutional scrutiny is the statement that the atrociousness circumstance applies only to a " 'conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.' " Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2121 (quoting Dixon, 283 So.2d at 9).


In this case, Glock's death sentence must be vacated because one of parties charged with determining his sentence, the jury, weighed an unconstitutionally vague aggravating circumstance. At the close of the sentencing hearing, the court instructed the jury with the language rejected by the Supreme Court in Espinosa:27 whether the crime for which the defendant was to be sentenced was "especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel." The jury was not provided any narrowing instructions.

The trial judge believed it was unnecessary to instruct the jury with the narrowing language in Dixon because, under Florida law, capital sentencing juries are not required to make specific findings as to the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In other words, the judge erroneously believed either that he was the sole sentencer under the Florida scheme or that his own final and independent sentencing determination could cure any defect with respect to the jury's sentencing determination. Indeed, in his specific findings, the trial judge refused to apply the atrociousness circumstance in reaching Glock's sentence.

Under the Florida capital sentencing scheme, however, neither the fact that the trial judge did not apply the atrociousness circumstance nor the presumption that the judge independently applied the Florida Supreme Court's narrowing language in arriving at Glock's sentence can cure the constitutional error in failing to give the jury an appropriate limiting instruction on the atrociousness circumstance.

As stated above, Florida has adopted a capital sentencing plan in which the sentencing recommendation of the jury is inextricably linked to the sentencing determination made by the trial judge, such that neither the judge nor the jury may be permitted to consider an invalid aggravating circumstance. Because the trial judge must accord great weight to the jury's sentencing recommendation, the jury's recommendation of death in this case, tainted as it was by the inadequate instruction on the atrociousness circumstance, necessarily tainted the trial judge's final decision. Accordingly, Glock's sentence cannot stand; he must be afforded another sentencing proceeding in which the jury is given instructions that fully comport with the Constitution.


In conclusion, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to Glock's conviction for first degree murder. We REVERSE, however, the district court's denial of the writ as to Glock's claim that the jury instruction on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance was constitutionally invalid. The case is REMANDED to the district court with instructions to issue the writ setting aside Glock's death sentence unless the State provides him with a new sentencing proceeding before a newly empaneled jury.




The two detectives took the statements in Burlington County, New Jersey, where Glock and Puiatti had been taken following their arrests


When questioned about the specific number of shots fired, Glock and Puiatti explained that they fired as many shots as they could, but that they were unable to fire the last bullet contained in the handgun because it jammed in the chamber


Before the penalty phase began, Glock and Puiatti again moved for a severance, which the court denied


Puiatti likewise sought to establish through psychiatric evidence that, at the time of the murder, he was under the substantial domination of Glock and that, but for his association with Glock, he would not have participated in the crimes


Although the statutory language for this aggravating circumstance read "especially, heinous, atrocious, or cruel," the phrasing employed by the trial judge in instructing the jury was whether the murder was "especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel."


Prior to instructing the jury, the court held several charge conferences during which Glock (or Puiatti, joined by Glock) requested specific limiting instructions for a number of the aggravating circumstances. As to the standard for the heinous, atrocious, or cruel circumstance, Glock and Puiatti requested that the jury be instructed as follows:

While all murders are heinous, this aggravating factor contemplates the conscienceless, pitiless, or unnecessarily torturous crime which is accompanied by such additional acts as to set it apart from the norm of capital felonies.... 'Atrocious' means outrageously wicked and vile. 'Cruel' means designed to inflict a high degree of pain, or with utter indifference to or even enjoyment of the suffering of others.

They based this request on the fact that the terms contained in this aggravating circumstance "have developed very narrow and specific meaning within the case law" such that the narrowing language "could be appropriate ... to the jury to assist them and provide them some structure in reaching their verdict which is the structure provided by the law of the state." After hearing these arguments, the trial judge denied the defendants' requested instructions.


For a more detailed description of the Florida capital sentencing scheme, see infra part III(A)


The court declined to find the existence of the aggravating circumstance of committing a murder while engaged in the commission of, or while in flight after the commission of, a kidnapping, because the only facts in the case that could support such a finding were also necessary to support the finding that the murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest. The court employed a similar "double counting" analysis in rejecting the atrociousness circumstance in favor of its finding that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated. See White v. State, 403 So.2d 331, 337-38 (Fla.1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229, 103 S.Ct. 3571, 77 L.Ed.2d 1412 (1983); Provence v. State, 337 So.2d 783, 786 (Fla.1976) (prohibiting the application of multiple aggravating circumstances based on identical facts), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969, 97 S.Ct. 2929, 53 L.Ed.2d 1065 (1977). In each instance, the court determined that it had selected the more appropriate aggravating circumstance


Similarly, Glock did not challenge these two convictions in his Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 motion in the state trial court or in the instant habeas petition in the district court


On direct appeal, Glock presented five claims of error. One claim concerned his murder conviction: that the court erred by excluding prospective jurors because they were opposed to the death penalty. The remaining claims concerned his sentence: Glock contended that the trial court had abused its discretion by failing to sever his sentencing hearing from Puiatti's; by instructing the jurors and receiving their penalty recommendation on a Sunday; by finding the aggravating circumstance of cold, calculated, and premeditated; and by refusing to conclude that Glock's cooperation and his potential for rehabilitation were sufficiently mitigating to warrant a life sentence. Puiatti v. State, 495 So.2d, 128, 132 (Fla.1986), vacated, 481 U.S. 1027, 107 S.Ct. 1950, 95 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Glock, however, did not challenge the jury instruction for the atrociousness circumstance


After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, only Puiatti petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court granted the writ, vacated the Florida Supreme Court's judgment against Puiatti, and remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987). See Puiatti v. Florida, 481 U.S. 1027, 107 S.Ct. 1950, 95 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Glock did not seek certiorari review in the Supreme Court; thus, his conviction and sentence became final when the Supreme Court of Florida denied his petition for rehearing on October 28, 1986


The state supreme court simultaneously denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus that Glock had filed with the court pending the disposition of his Rule 3.850 proceeding


In disposing of Glock's Bruton claim, the Florida Supreme Court reiterated the rationale it used in disposing of Puiatti's similar claim in Puiatti v. State, 521 So.2d 1106 (Fla.1988) ("Puiatti II "), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 184, 102 L.Ed.2d 153 (1988). In Puiatti II, on remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Florida Supreme Court again determined that there was no Confrontation Clause violation. Specifically, the Court found that the interlocking nature of the multiple confessions assured their reliability, such that there could be no Bruton violation. Finally, the court held in the alternative, that even if there was a violation of the Confrontation Clause, that violation was harmless


Like the Florida Supreme Court, the district court found that only two claims merited any discussion: Glock's Bruton and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In rejecting them, the district court also adopted the Florida Supreme Court's rationale in Puiatti II


The State argues that Glock procedurally defaulted his Bruton claim when he failed to raise it on direct appeal from his conviction, see supra note 10; in fact, Glock specifically abandoned this claim in the Notice of Abandonment he filed in the Florida Supreme Court. We find that the claim is not procedurally barred, however. Although Glock did not raise his Bruton claim on direct appeal, he did raise it in his Rule 3.850 motion. The lower court denied Glock's Bruton claim, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed on the merits. Glock, 537 So.2d at 102. Federal habeas review of the claim therefore is not barred. See, e.g., Oliver v. Wainwright, 795 F.2d 1524, 1528-29 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 921, 107 S.Ct. 1380, 94 L.Ed.2d 694 (1987)

The State argues alternatively that Glock cannot rely upon the rule laid down in Cruz because that rule did not come into effect until after Glock's conviction became final in October 1986; consequently, its retroactive application here is barred by the "new law" doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). It is clear, however, that in light of the Florida Supreme Court's explicit application of Cruz to the facts of this case, Cruz is the law of the case as it comes to us; thus, there can be no Teague bar.


The Confrontation Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. State, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068-69, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965)


Ordinarily, a confession is admissible at trial against the person who made it. A Confrontation Clause violation arises in the joint trial context, however, because notwithstanding the admissibility of the confession as to the nontestifying codefendant who made it ("Defendant A"), it is inadmissible against a defendant who did not participate in its making ("Defendant B") to the extent that the confession given by Defendant A implicates Defendant B


The Court used Cruz as a vehicle to revisit the issue of multiple codefendant confessions first addressed in Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 99 S.Ct. 2132, 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979). In Parker, a plurality decision, the Court was unable to resolve the question whether Bruton applies in a case where the defendant's confession, which is admissible against him, corroborates the nontestifying codefendant's statement. Id. at 77-80, 99 S.Ct. at 2141-43 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun refused to join a portion of the principal opinion because "it abandons the harmless error analysis the Court previously has applied in similar circumstances and now adopts a per se rule to the effect that Bruton is inapplicable in an interlocking confession situation." Id. at 77, 99 S.Ct. at 2141


Petitioner seeks to avoid application of the Brecht standard by characterizing the error not as an error at trial, but rather as a structural defect occasioned by the trial court's refusal to sever the proceedings against Glock and Puiatti. "Trial error 'occur[s] during the presentation of the case to the jury,' and is amenable to harmless-error analysis because it 'may ... be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine [the effect it had on the trial].' " Brecht, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1717 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1264, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). In contrast, a "structural defect" involves an error that is so fundamental as to affect the very "framework within which the trial proceeds," thus requiring outright reversal as opposed to harmless error analysis. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310, 111 S.Ct. at 1265. Examples of such error include the denial of counsel or of an impartial judge. Although Glock's severance claim may appear at first glance to present a structural defect, it is clear upon closer scrutiny that the claim is based almost entirely upon the prejudice associated with the introduction of Puiatti's confession and thus cannot be said to create a structural defect in the trial procedure. As such, the error, properly assessed as a violation of the Bruton rule, is nothing more than a trial error to which Brecht clearly applies

We similarly reject the remaining grounds for Glock's argument that severance was necessary to avoid a structural error at the guilt phase. In addition to the Bruton violation, Glock's claim for severance was based upon the possibility of: (1) antagonistic defenses; (2) one defendant testifying and thereby calling attention to the other defendant's decision not to testify; and (3) juror inability to give proper consideration to each defendants' case. A thorough review of the transcript of the guilt phase of the trial, however, reveals that none of the concerns raised by Glock came to pass. The two defenses were virtually identical, neither Glock nor Puiatti testified at the guilt phase, and there was no indication of juror confusion caused by the trial court's decision to try the defendants jointly. Accordingly, we reject Glock's claim that the trial court's failure to sever the guilt phase of his trial constituted a structural error.


A recent opinion of this court has held that the state bears the burden of proving, under Brecht, that a trial error was not prejudicial. Bonner v. Holt, 26 F.3d 1081 (11th Cir.1994). The Supreme Court recently has granted certiorari on the burden of proof issue, O'Neal v. Morris, 3 F.3d 143 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that the petitioner bears the burden of proof under Brecht ), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1396, 128 L.Ed.2d 70 (1994). Because the outcome in this case would be the same regardless of who bears the burden of proving or disproving actual prejudice, we need not await the Supreme Court's resolution of this issue before disposing of Glock's Confrontation Clause claim


In Cruz, two brothers, Eulogio and Benjamin, were tried jointly for the murder of a gas station attendant; moreover, both allegedly had confessed to their involvement in the murder to a third party (the brother of the victim) who testified to that effect at trial. Cruz, 481 U.S. at 188-89, 107 S.Ct. at 1716-17. The testimony of the third-party witness was admissible against both Eulogio and Benjamin. At trial, the state also introduced a confession that Benjamin had given to the police in which he implicated both himself and Eulogio. Id. at 189, 107 S.Ct. at 1717. Because Benjamin did not testify at trial, his confession was inadmissible as evidence against Eulogio; accordingly, the trial judge instructed the jury not to consider Benjamin's testimony as evidence against Eulogio. As part of his defense, Eulogio attempted to persuade the jury that the third-party witness believed that Eulogio and Benjamin had murdered his brother, and that the witness therefore had fabricated his testimony in order to exact revenge against them

The court of appeals, in reviewing Eulogio's Bruton claim, determined that the admission of Benjamin's confession constituted harmless error because Eulogio's own confession to the third-party witness corroborated the confession given by Benjamin.

In rejecting the court of appeals' analysis of the Confrontation Clause violation, the Supreme Court first held that, regardless of the potentially interlocking nature of the two confessions, the admission of Benjamin's confession violated Bruton, such that the only question remaining was whether admission of that confession amounted to harmless error. The Court then held that, although the interlocking nature of two confessions (here, the fact that the joint confession and Benjamin's confession were substantially similar) may not be relied upon to avoid the application of Bruton, it generally may be considered in evaluating whether a Bruton violation was harmless. Id. 481 U.S. at 193-94, 107 S.Ct. at 1719. In cases such as Eulogio's, where the defendant contests the veracity of his own allegedly corroborative confession, moreover, the Court stated that admission of a confession of a nontestifying codefendant that violates Bruton (here, Benjamin's confession) could not be treated as harmless, absent a finding that the defendant's corroborating confession (Eulogio's) was in fact genuine. Because the record could not support such a finding in Eulogio's case, the Court reversed and remanded for additional findings.


Glock also maintains that a Confrontation Clause violation attaches to Puiatti's statements in the joint confession because, although he was present at the giving of the confession, his silence cannot be construed as an adoption of Puiatti's statements. While it is true that a defendant is under no duty to speak and that his mere silent presence during a codefendant's confession cannot be viewed as an adoption of that codefendant's statement as his own, such facts are not present here. See Hall v. Wainwright, 559 F.2d 964, 965 n. 4 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1076, 98 S.Ct. 1266, 55 L.Ed.2d 782 (1978). In Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the Former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981

Here, Glock actively participated in the giving of a truly joint confession. In addition to making frequent interjections during Puiatti's account of the events of the day in question, Glock contributed much of the narrative that directly concerned the events of the shooting. He described the first shots fired by Puiatti; he admitted to having actually fired two shots, including the one that ultimately felled the victim; and he stated that it was he who first noticed that the victim was still standing after she was shot the first time. Finally, at the conclusion of the joint statement, Glock stated that he had been treated fairly by the police and that he was in full agreement with the entire description of the event. Moreover, Glock has never contended, either at trial or subsequently, that the joint statement was involuntary. As such, Glock's claim that he was a mere silent witness at the joint confession is contrary to the full weight of the evidence indicating that he actively participated in making, and subsequently adopted, the statement. Accordingly, the entire joint confession was admissible against Glock, thus precluding a Confrontation Clause violation.


The only discernible reference to Puiatti's statement before the jury came during Puiatti's closing argument. In an attempt to demonstrate that Puiatti's involvement in the murder was not premeditated and that Glock's constant banter caused Puiatti to "snap" momentarily, Puiatti's counsel cited, over the prosecution's objection, a portion of Puiatti's individual confession where Puiatti stated "I don't want to, I don't want to." Even according this reference to Puiatti's statement its full potential prejudicial effect in Glock's case, it is impossible to say that the statement had a substantial and injurious effect or influence upon the jury's verdict


Glock raises seven challenges to his death sentence on appeal. Glock interposes one claim against his trial counsel: that the assistance rendered during the penalty phase of the proceedings was ineffective. The remainder of Glock's claims assert errors by the trial court: (1) failing to sever Glock's and Puiatti's sentencing hearing based, inter alia, on the admission of codefendant Puiatti's individual confession; (2) issuing constitutionally deficient jury instructions on aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and thus failing to channel the jury's discretion; (3) unconstitutionally shifting to Glock (in the jury instructions) the burden of proving that death was an inappropriate penalty for his crime; (4) unconstitutionally diluting the jury's sense of responsibility; (5) failing to find (in its sentencing order) the presence of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances; and (6) sentencing Glock and Puiatti in a joint order, thereby failing to provide Glock with an individualized and reliable capital sentencing determination

Additionally, Glock challenges the district court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on several of his claims. Glock is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, however, because he has not "allege[d] facts that, if proved at the hearing, would entitle [him] to relief." Meeks v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 316, 319 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1362, 122 L.Ed.2d 741 (1993). With the possible exception of his claim that his attorney's performance was ineffective at the sentencing phase of the trial, Glock's claims presented only issues of law; an evidentiary hearing therefore would not have aided the disposition of those claims. In addition, our decision to vacate Glock's sentence obviates the need to determine whether the district court should have held a hearing on Glock's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.


As we have noted, the jury, in recommending the death penalty, does not make specific findings regarding the existence of individual aggravating or mitigating circumstances


Florida argues that the trial court was not required to provide a constitutionally adequate instruction to the jury because "[i]t cannot be said that prior precedent dictated or compelled the Espinosa determination that in Florida the jury is a co-sentencer or that Florida has 'essentially split the weighing process in two.' " While it is true, under Teague, that except under certain limited circumstances, a habeas petitioner such as Glock may not obtain relief in a federal court by reliance on a new rule of law, that situation is not presented here because Espinosa does not announce a new rule of law. According to Teague, "a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. at 1070 (emphasis in original). See also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (applying Teague retroactivity analysis to capital cases)

In Espinosa, the Supreme Court made clear that its determination that the judge and jury are cosentencers under the Florida scheme was based on principles of Florida law that were established long before Glock's sentence became final. Espinosa, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2928 ("Our examination of Florida case law indicates, however, that a Florida trial court is required to pay deference to a jury's sentencing recommendation, in that the trial court must give 'great weight' to the jury's recommendation.... Thus, Florida has essentially split the weighing process in two.") (citations omitted). Specifically, the Court recognized that since 1975, when the Florida Supreme Court decided Tedder v. State, the trial judge, in arriving at his final capital sentencing determination, has been required to place "great weight" on the jury's recommendation. Id. Accordingly, we find that Espinosa involves nothing more than a straightforward application of Florida law that was in existence long before Glock's sentence became final.


The Supreme Court has determined dispositively in cases such as Espinosa, Maynard, and Clemons that jury instructions for the atrociousness circumstance that do not include narrowing language are unconstitutionally vague; these cases were foreordained by Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), and thus do not announce a new rule of law. Stringer v. Black, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1135, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992). Accordingly, we need not conduct an extensive Teague inquiry with respect to this point



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