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Larry
Gene HEATH
(
Location: Russell
County, Alabama, USA
Status:
Executed by
electrocution in Alabama on March 20, 1992
HEATH v. ALABAMA
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
No. 84-5555.
Petitioner hired two men
to kill his wife. In accordance with petitioner's plan, the men
kidnaped petitioner's wife from her home in Alabama. Her body was
later found on the side of a road in Georgia. Petitioner pleaded
guilty to "malice" murder in a Georgia trial court in exchange for
a sentence of life imprisonment. Subsequently, he was tried and
convicted of murder during a kidnaping and was sentenced to death
in an Alabama trial court, which rejected his claim of double
jeopardy. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
Held:
1. This Court will not decide whether the
Alabama trial court had jurisdiction, where petitioner did not
claim lack of jurisdiction in his petition to the Alabama
Supreme Court but raised the claim for the first time in his
petition to this Court. P. 87.
2. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine,
successive prosecutions by two States for the same conduct are
not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
and, hence, Alabama was not barred from trying petitioner. Pp.
87-93.
(a) The dual sovereignty doctrine provides
that when a defendant in a single act violates the "peace and
dignity" of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has
committed two distinct "offences" for double jeopardy purposes.
In applying the doctrine, the crucial determination is whether
the two entities that seek successively to prosecute a defendant
for the same course of conduct can be termed separate sovereigns.
This determination turns on whether the prosecuting entities'
powers to undertake criminal prosecutions derive from separate
and independent sources. It has been uniformly held that the
States are separate sovereigns with respect to the Federal
Government because each State's power to prosecute derives from
its inherent sovereignty, preserved to it by the Tenth Amendment,
and not from the Federal Government. Given the distinct sources
of their powers to try a defendant, the States are no less
sovereign with respect to each other than they are with respect
to the Federal Government. Pp. 87-91.
(b) The application of the dual sovereignty
principle cannot be restricted to cases in which two prosecuting
sovereigns can demonstrate that allowing only one sovereign to
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant will interfere with the
second sovereign's unvindicated "interests." If the prosecuting
entities are separate sovereigns, the circumstances of the case
and the specific "interests" of each are irrelevant. Pp. 91-92.
(c) The suggestion that the dual sovereignty
doctrine be overruled and replaced with a balancing of interests
approach is rejected. The Court's rationale for the doctrine is
not a fiction that can be disregarded in difficult cases; it
finds weighty support in the historical understanding and
political realities of the States' role in the federal system
and in the Double Jeopardy Clause itself. Pp. 92-93.
After a hearing, the trial court rejected
petitioner's double jeopardy claims. It assumed, arguendo, that
the two prosecutions could not have been brought in succession by
one State but held that double jeopardy did not bar successive
prosecutions by two different States for the same act. See Record
776. The court postponed a ruling on petitioner's plea to
jurisdiction until the close of the State's case in chief. See id.,
at 778.
At the close of the State's case, petitioner
argued that Alabama did not have jurisdiction under state law
because there had been no evidence of kidnaping and all the
evidence showed that Rebecca Heath was killed in Georgia. The
State responded that a kidnaping had been proved, and that under
Ala. Code 15-2-3 (1982), if a crime commences in Alabama it may be
punished in Alabama regardless of where the crime is consummated.
The court rejected both petitioner's jurisdictional plea and his
renewed double jeopardy claims. See Record 590.
On January 12, 1983, the Alabama jury convicted
petitioner of murder during a kidnaping in the first degree. After
a sentencing hearing, the jury recommended the death
On appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals rejected petitioner's pleas of autrefois convict and
former jeopardy under the Alabama and United States Constitutions
and affirmed his conviction. 455 So.2d 898 (1983). Petitioner then
filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme
Court, stating the sole issue to be "whether or not the
prosecution in the State of Alabama constituted double jeopardy in
violation of the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution."
App. 92. The court granted his petition, and unanimously affirmed
his conviction. Ex parte Heath, 455 So.2d 905 (1984)
The Alabama Supreme Court noted that "[p]rosecutions
under the laws of separate sovereigns do not improperly subject an
accused twice to prosecutions for the same offense," citing this
Court's cases applying the dual sovereignty doctrine. Id., at 906.
The court acknowledged that this Court has not considered the
applicability of the dual sovereignty doctrine to successive
prosecutions by different States. It reasoned, however, that "[i]f,
for double jeopardy purposes, Alabama is considered to be a
sovereign entity vis-a-vis the federal government then surely it
is a sovereign entity vis-a-vis the State of Georgia." Ibid.
Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari from
this Court, raising double jeopardy claims and claims based on
Alabama's exercise of jurisdiction. No due process objections were
asserted. We granted certiorari limited to the question whether
petitioner's Alabama conviction was barred by this Court's
decision in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), and requested the
parties to address the question of the applicability of the dual
sovereignty doctrine to successive prosecutions by two States. 470
U.S. 1026 (1985). For the reasons explained below, we affirm the
judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court.
Despite the fact that this Court did not grant
certiorari on the constitutional objection to Alabama's exercise
of jurisdiction, petitioner has continued to argue in this Court
his jurisdictional claim. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-22, 29-31; Brief
for Petitioner 15. We decline to decide the issue because
petitioner did not claim lack of jurisdiction in his petition to
the Alabama Supreme Court and he raised the claim for the first
time in his petition to this Court. Pet. for Cert. 4. Even if we
were not jurisdictionally barred from considering claims not
pressed or passed upon in the state court, as has sometimes been
stated, see, e. g., State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Duel,
324 U.S. 154, 160 (1945); Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet. 368, 392
(1836), the longstanding rule that this Court will not consider
such claims creates, at the least, a weighty presumption against
review. See, e. g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 218 -222
(1983).
II
Successive prosecutions are barred by the Fifth
Amendment only if the two offenses for which the defendant is
prosecuted are the "same" for double jeopardy purposes. Respondent
does not contravene petitioner's contention that the offenses of "murder
during a kidnaping" and "malice murder," as construed by the
courts of Alabama and Georgia respectively, may be considered
greater and lesser offenses and, thus, the "same" offense under
Brown v. Ohio, supra, absent operation of the dual sovereignty
principle. See id., at 169; Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410
(1980). We therefore assume, arguendo, that, had these offenses
arisen under the laws of one State and had petitioner been
separately prosecuted for both offenses in that State, the second
conviction would have been barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The sole remaining question upon which we
granted certiorari is whether the dual sovereignty doctrine
permits successive prosecutions under the laws of different States
which otherwise would be held to "subject [the defendant] for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy." U.S. Const., Amdt. 5.
Although we have not previously so held, we believe the answer to
this query is inescapable. The dual sovereignty doctrine, as
originally articulated and consistently applied by this Court,
compels the conclusion that successive prosecutions by two States
for the same conduct are not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The dual sovereignty doctrine is founded on the
common law conception of crime as an offense against the
sovereignty of the government. When a defendant in a single act
violates the "peace and dignity" of two sovereigns by breaking the
laws of each, he has committed two distinct "offences." United
States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). As the Court explained
in Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, 19 (1852), "[a]n offence, in its
legal signification, means the transgression of a law."
Consequently, when the same act transgresses the laws of two
sovereigns, "it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been
twice punished for the same offence; but only that by one act he
has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly
punishable." Id., at 20.
In applying the dual sovereignty doctrine, then,
the crucial determination is whether the two entities that seek
successively to prosecute a defendant for the same course of
conduct can be termed separate sovereigns. This determination
turns on whether the two entities draw their authority to punish
the offender from distinct sources of power. See, e. g., United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978); Waller v. Florida,
397 U.S. 387, 393 (1970); Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253,
264 -265 (1937); Lanza, supra, at 382; Grafton v. United States,
206 U.S. 333, 354 -355 (1907). Thus, the Court has uniformly held
that the States are separate sovereigns with respect to the
Federal Government because each State's power to prosecute is
derived from its own "inherent sovereignty," not from the Federal
Government. Wheeler, supra, at 320, n. 14. See Abbate v. United
States, 359 U.S. 187, 193 -194 (1959) (collecting cases); Lanza,
supra. As stated in Lanza, supra, at 382:
"Each government in determining what shall be
an offense against its peace and dignity is exercising its own
sovereignty, not that of the other.
"It follows that an act denounced as a crime
by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against
the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each."
See also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959); Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 258 (1927) (Holmes,
J.) (the proposition that the State and Federal Governments may
punish the same conduct "is too plain to need more than statement").
The States are no less sovereign with respect
to each other than they are with respect to the Federal Government.
Their powers to undertake criminal prosecutions derive from
separate and independent sources of power and authority originally
belonging to them before admission to the Union and preserved to
them by the Tenth Amendment. See Lanza, supra, at 382. The States
are equal to each other "in power, dignity and authority, each
competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution itself." Coyle v. Oklahoma,
221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911). See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69,
77 (1941). Thus, "[e]ach has the power, inherent in any sovereign,
independently to determine what shall be an offense against its
authority and to punish such offenses, and in doing so each `is
exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.'" Wheeler,
supra, at 320 (quoting Lanza, supra, at 382).
The cases in which the Court has applied the
dual sovereignty principle outside the realm of successive federal
and state prosecutions illustrate the soundness of this analysis.
United States v. Wheeler, supra, is particularly instructive
because there the Court expressly refused to find that only the
State and Federal Governments could be considered distinct
sovereigns with respect to each other for double jeopardy purposes,
stating that "so restrictive a view of [the dual sovereignty]
concept . . . would require disregard of the very words of the
Double Jeopardy Clause." Id., at 330. Instead, the Wheeler Court
reiterated the principle that the sovereignty of two prosecuting
entities for these purposes is determined by "the ultimate source
of the power under which the respective prosecutions were
undertaken." Id., at 320. On the basis of this reasoning, the
Court held that the Navajo Tribe, whose power to prosecute its
members for tribal offenses is derived from the Tribe's "primeval
sovereignty" rather than a delegation of federal authority, is an
independent sovereign from the Federal Government for purposes of
the dual sovereignty doctrine. Id., at 328.
In those instances where the Court has found
the dual sovereignty doctrine inapplicable, it has done so because
the two prosecuting entities did not derive their powers to
prosecute from independent sources of authority. Thus, the Court
has held that successive prosecutions by federal and territorial
courts are barred because such courts are "creations emanating
from the same sovereignty." Puerto Rico, 302 U.S., at 264 . See id.,
at 264-266. See also Grafton, supra (the Philippine Islands).
Similarly, municipalities that derive their power to try a
defendant from the same organic law that empowers the State to
prosecute are not separate sovereigns with respect to the State.
See, e. g., Waller, supra. These cases confirm that it is the
presence of independent sovereign authority to prosecute, not the
relation between States and the Federal Government in our
federalist system, that constitutes the basis for the dual
sovereignty doctrine.
Petitioner argues that Nielsen v. Oregon, 212
U.S. 315 (1909), indicates, albeit in dicta, that where States
have concurrent jurisdiction over a criminal offense, the first
State to prosecute thereby bars prosecution by any other State. We
find that Nielsen is limited to its unusual facts and has
continuing relevance, if at all, only to questions of jurisdiction
between two entities deriving their concurrent jurisdiction from a
single source of authority. In Nielsen, the Court set aside a
conviction obtained by the State of Oregon against a resident of
the State of Washington for his operation of a purse net for fish
in the Columbia River pursuant to a valid license to do so from
the State of Washington. The Court noted:
"By the legislation of Congress the Columbia
River is made the common boundary between Oregon and Washington,
and to each of those States is given concurrent jurisdiction on
the waters of that river." Id., at 319.
"[T]he grant of concurrent jurisdiction may
bring up from time to time . . . some curious and difficult
questions, so we properly confine ourselves to the precise
question presented. . . . It is enough to decide, as we do, that
for an act done within the territorial limits of the State of
Washington under authority and license from that State one
cannot be prosecuted and punished by the State of Oregon." Id.,
at 320-321.
It is obvious that the Nielsen Court did not
attempt to decide or even to consider the double jeopardy effect
of successive state prosecutions for offenses proscribed by both
States; the case, therefore, has no bearing on the issue of the
applicability of the dual sovereignty doctrine presented in this
case.
III
Petitioner invites us to restrict the
applicability of the dual sovereignty principle to cases in which
two governmental entities, having concurrent jurisdiction and
pursuing quite different interests, can demonstrate that allowing
only one entity to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant will
interfere with the unvindicated interests of the second entity and
that multiple prosecutions therefore are necessary for the
satisfaction of the legitimate interests of both entities. This
balancing of interests approach, however, cannot be reconciled
with the dual sovereignty principle. This Court has plainly and
repeatedly stated that two identical offenses are not the "same
offence" within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause if they
are prosecuted by different sovereigns. See, e. g., United States
v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (same conduct, indistinguishable
statutes, same "interests"). If the States are separate sovereigns,
as they must be under the definition of sovereignty which the
Court consistently has employed, the circumstances of the case are
irrelevant.
Petitioner, then, is asking the Court to
discard its sovereignty analysis and to substitute in its stead
his difficult and uncertain balancing of interests approach. The
Court has refused a similar request on at least one previous
occasion, see Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); id.,
at 196 (BRENNAN, J., separate opinion), and rightfully so. The
Court's express rationale for the dual sovereignty doctrine is not
simply a fiction that can be disregarded in difficult cases. It
finds weighty support in the historical understanding and
political realities of the States' role in the federal system and
in the words of the Double Jeopardy Clause itself, "nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb." U.S. Const., Amdt. 5 (emphasis added). See
Wheeler, 435 U.S., at 330 .
It is axiomatic that "[i]n America, the powers
of sovereignty are divided between the government of the Union,
and those of the States. They are each sovereign, with respect to
the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to
the objects committed to the other." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 410 (1819). It is as well established that the States,
"as political communities, [are] distinct and sovereign, and
consequently foreign to each other." Bank of United States v.
Daniel, 12 Pet. 32, 54 (1838). See also Skiriotes v. Florida, 313
U.S., at 77 ; Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S., at 567 . The
Constitution leaves in the possession of each State "certain
exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power." The
Federalist No. 9, p. 55 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Foremost among the
prerogatives of sovereignty is the power to create and enforce a
criminal code. See, e. g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto
Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982); McCulloch, supra, at
418. To deny a State its power to enforce its criminal laws
because another State has won the race to the courthouse "would be
a shocking and untoward deprivation of the historic right and
obligation of the States to maintain peace and order within their
confines." Bartkus, 359 U.S., at 137 .
Such a deprivation of a State's sovereign
powers cannot be justified by the assertion that under "interest
analysis" the State's legitimate penal interests will be satisfied
through a prosecution conducted by another State. A State's
interest in vindicating its sovereign authority through
enforcement of its laws by definition can never be satisfied by
another State's enforcement of its own laws. Just as the Federal
Government has the right to decide that a state prosecution has
not vindicated a violation of the "peace and dignity" of the
Federal Government, a State must be entitled to decide that a
prosecution by another State has not satisfied its legitimate
sovereign interest. In recognition of this fact, the Court
consistently has endorsed the principle that a single act
constitutes an "offence" against each sovereign whose laws are
violated by that act. The Court has always understood the words of
the Double Jeopardy Clause to reflect this fundamental principle,
and we see no reason why we should reconsider that understanding
today.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama is
affirmed.
"Larry Gene Heath did intentionally cause the
death of Rebecca Heath, by shooting her with a gun, and Larry
Gene Heath caused said death during Larry Gene Heath's abduction
of, or attempt to abduct, Rebecca Heath with intent to inflict
physical injury upon her, in violation of 13A-5-40(a)(1) of the
Code of Alabama 1975, as amended, against the peace and dignity
of the State of Alabama." Id., at 728.
*****
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL
joins, dissenting.
I concur wholeheartedly in JUSTICE MARSHALL'S
dissent. I write separately only to clarify my views on the role
that "different interests" should play in determining whether two
prosecutions are "for the same offence" within the meaning of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
In Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959), in addition to arguing that the dual sovereignty doctrine
permitted successive state and federal prosecutions, the Federal
Government also urged that the federal prosecution was not barred
because the two prosecutions were not "for the same offense." The
Government's theory was that, because the federal and state
statutes involved had divergent specific purposes - the federal
law to protect communications and the state law to protect private
property - and thus promoted different "interests," the
prosecutions were really for different offenses.
I rejected this argument in a separate opinion.
Id., at 196-201. My concern was that "this reasoning would apply
equally if each of two successive federal prosecutions based on
the same acts was brought under a different federal statute, and
each statute was designed to protect a different federal interest."
Id., at 197 (emphasis in original). That result I found clearly
barred by the Fifth Amendment.
The petitioner, Larry Gene
Heath, under a sentence of death, appeals the district court's
denial of his habeas corpus petition.
The police also arrested Sanders Williams who
initially agreed to kill Mrs. Heath and who accepted a down
payment but later backed out of the conspiracy
In Georgia, Sanders Williams and Denise Lambert
pled guilty to the conspiracy count and each was sentenced to ten
years in prison. Heath's brother initially pled guilty but then
withdrew his plea, went to trial, and was acquitted. Owens and
Lumpkin were convicted of murder. The prosecutor withdrew his
request for the death penalty. The court, therefore, sentenced
them to life imprisonment
Alabama also indicted Owens, Lumpkin, Jerry
Heath and Denise Lambert. Jerry Heath and Lambert both pled guilty
and accepted 10 year sentences for conspiracy. Lumpkin was
convicted and given a life sentence. Owens was sentenced to death,
but the conviction was reversed on appeal. Owens v. State, 531
So.2d 22 (Ala.Cr.App.1987). In lieu of a retrial, Owens pled
guilty and accepted a life sentence
Heath claims that his appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise two claims on appeal: a pre-trial
publicity claim and a Fifth Amendment claim. Heath also brings
these two claims as independent constitutional violations. Alabama
state courts have not deemed the ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel claim procedurally barred and the state does not
argue that it is procedurally barred. Therefore, we will reach the
merits of the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.
In reaching the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim
we must discuss the two underlying claims regardless of whether
they are barred from our review as independent constitutional
violations because we need to determine whether or not Heath's
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these
claims on appeal. The state, nevertheless, argues that the two
underlying claims are procedurally barred as independent
constitutional violations. Heath disagrees. Therefore, before
discussing each of the underlying claims we will determine whether
there is a procedural bar which prevents us from reaching the
merits of the claim as an independent violation
It should be noted that Heath's counsel could
have brought an interlocutory appeal of his double jeopardy claim.
See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d
651 (1977) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause allows
interlocutory appeals because part of the right not to be placed
in jeopardy twice is lost if the claim is not brought prior to
trial). Consequently, if his counsel felt that the claim was so
strong, he could have brought a claim prior to trial and he could
have thereby focused his appeal from the final judgment on other
grounds
In addition to our considering this claim in
the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Heath
argues that we can consider it as an independent constitutional
violation. The state argues that the claim is not properly
exhausted and would be procedurally barred if it were brought back
to the state courts. We, however, find that this claim was
properly exhausted. The claim was raised before the trial court
during the Alabama error coram nobis proceeding and the Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals, the last state court to issue an
opinion, explicitly stated that it considered, and rejected, each
of the claims raised in the collateral review petition. The Court
of Criminal Appeals, moreover, adopted, and attached to its
opinion, the trial court opinion which discusses this claim. Heath
v. State, 536 So.2d 142 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 536 So.2d 142
(Ala.1988)
Such numbers create a false impression. Early
into the voir dire, Heath's lawyers fell into a pattern of asking
four or five questions (did you hear about this case in the media,
did you hear that Heath pled guilty in Georgia, can you be a fair
and impartial juror, and have you decided that Heath was guilty)
and then in every case where the veniremember stated that he or
she had heard of the case, Heath's lawyers moved to excuse the
individual for cause. In short, Heath's motions to excuse a juror
for cause quickly became a routine not necessarily tied to any
direct indications of bias
While we have stated that we are "hard pressed
to think of anything more damning to an accused than information
that a jury had previously convicted him for the crime charged,"
United States v. Williams, 568 F.2d 464 (5th Cir.1978), we cannot
automatically conclude that, in this habeas case, the jury's
awareness of Heath's plea of guilt resulted in an unfair trial.
Williams can be distinguished because it arose on direct appeal,
and the petitioner in a habeas case must show a constitutional
violation which requires a higher showing than that required in a
case arising on direct appeal. Before we can conclude in a habeas
case that a juror's knowledge of guilt is sufficient to mandate a
retrial, we must conclude that the juror's knowledge " 'would
prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or her]
duties as a juror.' " Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105
S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448
U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980)). We
might be prepared to make such a finding in a case where the
juror's knowledge of a prior conviction is buttressed by other
indications of actual bias. However, in the case at hand, we find
no evidence in the record to suggest that the jurors in question
were in fact biased. Based on the record, we can conclude only
that the jurors had read the local papers and were aware that
Heath had pled guilty in Georgia
Heath acknowledges the fact that the record of
the voir dire is distinctly unhelpful in this appeal because the
questions asked by his attorneys were neither searching nor very
effective. By way of example, a typical question was "[now] you
wouldn't be biased at all?" Heath attempts to raise as error the
fact that, early in the voir dire, the trial court sustained the
state's objection to Heath's question into what a veniremember had
read about the case. The state objected to the form of the
question because it called for a narrative. Even if the ruling was
incorrect and unfairly narrowed Heath's voir dire, it is unclear
that the trial court's ruling rises to the level of a
constitutional error. Cf. Mu'min v. Virginia, --- U.S. ----, 111
S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991) (holding that it is not a
violation of the Sixth Amendment or the Due Process Clause for a
judge to refuse to inquire into the venire's knowledge of the
specific contents of pre-trial publicity). Furthermore, the trial
court ruled against only the form of the question; at other points
in the voir dire, the trial court allowed more specific questions
into the veniremember's knowledge and allowed other general
questions when they were phrased correctly. The failure of the
voir dire to elicit proof that the venire harbored alleged biases
against Heath cannot be attributed to this ruling by the trial
court
The Georgia legislature quickly passed such a
statute in the aftermath of the Heath murder. See Ga.Code Ann. §
16-5-80
For example, one editorial actually came out
against the Alabama prosecution because the paper thought it
violated the double jeopardy clause and basic principles of
fairness
In addition to our considering this claim in
the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Heath
argues that we can consider it as an independent constitutional
violation. The state argues that this claim was neither presented
nor exhausted in state court and currently would be procedurally
barred if Heath attempted to return to state court to litigate it.
Heath claims that we should not imply a procedural bar because
Alabama law is not consistently applied. Because this claim is
easily resolved on the merits, we do not address the state's
contentions that the claim is procedurally barred. See Kennedy v.
Dugger, 933 F.2d 905, 910 n. 5 (11th Cir.1991)
The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Coleman
v. Thompson, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (June
24, 1991), does not change this analysis. Coleman altered Harris
to require the federal habeas courts to first make a finding that
the state court's procedural bar analysis either is interwoven
with an analysis of federal law or the state court primarily
relied on federal law before applying Michigan v. Long's plain
statement rule. Since the state court's finding, in the case at
bar, was interwoven with federal law, we can properly use the
plain statement rule
See Ala.Code § 15-2-3. ("When the commission of
an offense commenced in the State of Alabama is consummated
without the boundaries of the state, the offender is liable to
punishment therefor in Alabama.")
Heath claims that he pled guilty in Georgia on
the condition that he not receive the death penalty. Heath claims
that the plea was not entered knowingly because his counsel did
not investigate Alabama's intentions regarding the death penalty.
However, it is unclear that had Heath's Alabama counsel attacked
the Georgia guilty plea such an attack would have been successful.
During this habeas proceeding, the state placed into evidence
affidavits from the Georgia prosecutors who swear that, during the
plea negotiations, they did not make any representations about
potential criminal penalties in Alabama. Moreover, we note that
the voluntariness of the plea depends only upon whether the
defendant is aware of the direct consequences of the plea. Mabry
v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2547, 81 L.Ed.2d
437 (1984). For example, the use of a plea as a sentencing
enhancement for another crime is considered a collateral, not a
direct, consequence. Wright v. United States, 624 F.2d 557 (5th
Cir.1980). Also, the Seventh Circuit has held that the use of a
plea to establish an element of a crime in a separate prosecution
is also a collateral consequence. United States v. Jordan, 870
F.2d 1310 (7th Cir.1989). Finally, while the existence of this
plea could have constrained possible defenses, there is nothing in
the record to demonstrate that the plea actually played any role
in constraining Heath's defenses
The prosecution rebutted the double jeopardy
argument by pointing out that the judge had already ruled on it
and would not be instructing the jury on double jeopardy
Heath's counsel also noted that the cigarette
butt found in Heath's kitchen was irrelevant because no one tied
the cigarette to the alleged kidnappers. They also argued that the
fact the fan was left on is irrelevant because there was no air
conditioning in the house, and the crime occurred in Alabama in
mid-August