FISH, Chief J.
Petitioner George Anderson Hopper has filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . For the reasons stated herein, the application is denied.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Hopper v. State, No. 71,477 (Tex.Crim.App., Nov. 5, 1997). [FN1] Petitioner also filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in state court. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied habeas relief in an unpublished order. Ex parte Hopper, No. 23,163-02 (Tex.Crim.App., Mar. 1, 2000). Petitioner then filed this action in federal court. Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.

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During suppression hearings held during trial, as well as at the trial itself, [FN2] the following relevant facts regarding petitioner's various statements were adduced. [FN3] After an extensive multi-state investigation which took several months, petitioner was arrested by the Richardson Police Department on December 20, 1988 in connection with the murder of Rozanne Gailiunas. (SF-LXVI 5). Gailiunas had been discovered in her home on October 4, 1983 with two gunshot wounds to the head. She died three days later. (SF-LXIII: 145-46, 148-51, 206).

The case remained unsolved until 1988 when the Richardson Police Department was given information that a woman named Joy Aylor had hired someone to kill Gailiunas. After some investigation, the police determined that the money given as payment for the murder had passed through several people's hands. The last person in this chain was petitioner, and the police began searching for petitioner in the summer of 1988. But when petitioner was arrested in December of 1988, the police did not know whether he had committed the murder, or whether he had passed some or all of the money he received to another person who had then murdered Gailiunas. (SF-LXVI 16; LXX 6-14, 109, 116-18).

FN2. The facts surrounding petitioner's statements given in February of 1989 were elicited from the relevant parties at both the pre-trial hearing and during trial, with similar if not identical testimony given at both. The circumstances surrounding the petitioner's interrogation on December 20, 1988, however, were not testified to at the pre-trial suppression hearing. Instead, these facts were elicited through the cross-examination of Detective Morris McGowan during trial, after defense counsel were provided a copy of the transcript of this interrogation. (SF-LXXIX 52- 62, 69-110, 117-46).

FN3. See generally the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law signed and entered March 10, 1994, contained in Supplemental Transcript at 1-10.

On December 20, 1988, while in police custody at the Richardson Police Department, petitioner was questioned by the lead detective in the case, Morris McGowan. This interrogation was audio taped. McGowan began the interrogation by reading petitioner his Miranda rights. During the interrogation, petitioner several times mentioned his belief that he needed to speak to an attorney before dealing with the police.

Nonetheless, McGowan continued to talk to petitioner, assuring him that anything he said in the conversation would be off the record and inadmissible in court. Petitioner made no inculpatory statements to McGowan that day. Instead, the two spoke about petitioner's life on the run and his concern for his wife, his children, and his girlfriend, as well as McGowan's desire to have petitioner cooperate with the police. When specifically asked by McGowan during the interview if he had shot "the girl," petitioner answered "no." (SF-LXXXX Defense Record Exhibits 5 and 6).

On December 21, 1988, petitioner was arraigned by a magistrate judge and advised of his Miranda rights. He was not appointed an attorney during the arraignment, nor did he request that one be appointed for him. (SF-LXVIII 26- 31). On December 22, 1988, McGowan received a message that he should contact the jail because petitioner wanted to see him. (SF-LXVI 63).

When McGowan spoke to petitioner, petitioner told McGowan that he was given money to kill Gailiunas but passed $1000 of the money, as well as the information about Gailiunas, to a drug dealer he knew named Chip, who had agreed to kill her. (SF-LXVI 57-58, 63-64). Petitioner also told McGowan where he had last seen Chip and gave a description of him. (SF-LXVI 65). McGowan assured petitioner that anything he said during this interview would not be used against him. (SF-LXVI 64).

On December 27, 1989, Jan Hemphill was appointed to represent petitioner. The two met several times during the next two months. (SF-LXXXX Defendant's hearing exhibit # 2). In January, the lead prosecutor informed Hemphill that the state was interested in prosecuting and seeking the death penalty against the shooter and the person who initially hired the killer. The prosecutors were thus willing to work with the middle-men in the scheme. (SF-LXVI 149-50; LXVII 54).

On February 21, 1989, petitioner told McGowan he had decided to cooperate with the police. Petitioner informed McGowan that he had spoken with Hemphill and that Hemphill had given permission for petitioner to contact the police. (SF-LXVI 6). McGowan called one of the prosecutors, who in turn verified with petitioner's attorney that the police had permission to speak to petitioner and to verify his story with a polygraph examination. (SF-LXVI 135, 137-38; LXVII 59-61).

On February 22, 1989, petitioner met with McGowan, who again informed petitioner of his Miranda rights. Petitioner then completed a six-page written statement in which he outlined how he received $1500 to kill Gailiunas and gave $1000 of the money to a man named Chip. McGowan informed petitioner that this statement would have to be verified by a polygraph examination, which was scheduled for February 27, 1989. (SF-LXVI 7-12).

Prior to the polygraph examination, petitioner was again given his Miranda rights by the polygraph technician, Richard Strauss. Petitioner then underwent a polygraph examination, which he failed. [FN4] After being told that he failed the examination, petitioner was questioned once again by McGowan. McGowan advised petitioner of his Miranda rights yet again and asked him tell his story once more. After petitioner recounted the "Chip" story again, McGowan stated he did not believe petitioner was telling the whole truth. McGowan then showed him a picture of Chip and informed petitioner the police were in the process of finding Chip.

McGowan asked petitioner what would happen if Chip were questioned about the murder and denied any involvement. Petitioner stated that it would lead "back to him" and asked McGowan if he could "go back and think about it." McGowan replied that he "wanted it now." Petitioner then admitted killing Gailiunas. Petitioner subsequently gave both audiotaped and videotaped statements in which he admitted killing the victim for $1500. His written, audio taped, and videotaped statements were admitted into evidence at trial. (SF-LXVI 16-30).

FN4. Portions of the pre-examination interview with Strauss were admitted into evidence, but all statements and references to the fact that a polygraph examination was given were not. (SF-LXXXX St. Exh. 56B(1)).

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VI. THE BOOK DEAL

In his fifth through seventh grounds for relief, petitioner asserts that his constitutional rights were violated because defense counsel was not informed that the lead detective and primary witness for the state, Morris McGowan, had signed an agreement prior to trial to receive monetary compensation for his assistance in writing a true crime book about the Gailiunas murder. Specifically, petitioner contends that the failure to disclose this information to defense counsel: (1) violated his due process rights under Brady v.. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). (2) violated his rights under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment; and (3) constituted a structural error not subject to a harmless error review.

A. Applicable Law

The suppression of evidence favorable to the accused where the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment violates the accused's due process rights. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. Under Brady, the prosecution has the duty to turn over to the defense both exculpatory and impeachment evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 683-84, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3384-85, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id., 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383 .

A reasonable probability of a different result is shown when the suppression of evidence undermines confidence in the verdict. Id. The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to physically face those who testify against him and the right to conduct cross-examination. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51, 107 S.Ct. 989, . The confrontation clause also guarantees the opportunity for effective cross-examination. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19-20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 294, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (per curiam).

B. Discussion

Prior to the beginning of testimony at the trial of petitioner's co-defendant, Joy Aylor, the prosecutors became aware that the lead detective in both cases, Morris McGowan, had entered into a deal to assist in writing a true crime novel about the facts surrounding the case. Judge Pat McDowell, the trial judge in the Aylor case, who was also the trial judge in petitioner's case, conducted a hearing on this issue prior to the Aylor trial. McGowan was questioned about the book deal by both the prosecution and the defense.

During the state habeas process in this case, Judge McDowell took judicial notice of the relevant portions of the record from the Aylor trial and included those portions of the record in the state habeas transcript. (St.Hab. Tr. 669-791, 926). Through these excerpts from the Aylor trial, along with the actual contract concerning the book, the following relevant facts have been gleaned from the state habeas record.

The book deal began when McGowan spoke to an attorney friend in June of 1988, after Joy Aylor had been arrested but before petitioner had been identified as a suspect. The friend mentioned that the case would make an interesting book. A week later, McGowan contacted the friend about the possibility of someone writing a book about the case. (St.Hab. Tr. 669-670, 693, 695-96). This friend subsequently contacted the writer, Carlton Stowers. McGowan met with Stowers in July of 1988. No decision about writing a book was made at that time. (St.Hab. Tr. 672, 702, 704).

In January of 1989, McGowan met with another true crime author, who offered him $75,000 to help with the writing of a book. McGowan ultimately declined this offer. (St.Hab. Tr. 706, 708-10). Stowers and McGowan continued to speak periodically. (St.Hab. Tr. 674). In late 1989 or early 1990, McGowan and Stowers entered into an agreement to collaborate on a book. (St.Hab. Tr. 711).

In August of 1990, Stowers sent McGowan a book proposal, along with a letter agreement setting out the terms and conditions of a financial agreement. (St.Hab. Tr. 714). McGowan did not read this information initially and told Stowers that he did not want to read any of the financial information at that point. (St.Hab. Tr. 714-15). In June of 1991, McGowan met with an attorney, Don Crowder, and gave Crowder power of attorney to negotiate, on his behalf, a contract with Stowers. (St.Hab. Tr. 690, 725).

The contract was signed with Stowers in July 1991. (St.Hab. Tr. 690, 185). The gist of this contract, unknown to McGowan at that time, was that McGowan would receive a $12,500 advance against royalties when the book was halfway finished, another $12,500 advance when the book was completed, fifty percent of any future profit from the book, and fifty percent of any profit from any future movie or mini-series based on the book. (St.Hab. Tr. 606, 728-31). McGowan acknowledged at Aylor's trial, however, that although he did not know the specifics of the contract, he anticipated that he would receive fifty percent of any profit from the book. (St.Hab. Tr. 728).

In a meeting with both his attorney and Stowers prior to petitioner's trial, McGowan agreed to speak with Stowers about the book after petitioner's trial. McGowan agreed to do so because, at that point, Joy Aylor was still at large and he did not believe she would be returning. (St.Hab. Tr. 732-33). During the trial, McGowan had dinner with Stowers and a woman from a film production company, who attended the trial along with Stowers. They did not discuss McGowan's investigation of the case. (St.Hab. Tr. 734-35).

After petitioner's trial ended in March of 1992, McGowan met with Stowers about the case and discussed the investigation in detail. (St.Hab. Tr. 736-38). In July of 1992, McGowan received a check for $55,000. (St.Hab. Tr. 739-41).

By the time of Joy Aylor's trial in 1994, McGowan had received approximately $109,500, including a fee and royalties from a fictionalized mini-series based on the book. (St.Hab. Tr. 742-46). McGowan never told the prosecutors about this agreement until he was specifically asked about it in 1994, before Joy Aylor's trial began, because he knew that the prosecutors would not approve of the agreement. (St.Hab. Tr. 622, 747). At Aylor's trial, McGowan testified that his financial interest in the book never affected his investigation of the case. (St.Hab. Tr. 751).

1. Brady Claim

Respondent concedes that the evidence of the book deal was evidence that could have been used to impeach McGowan's testimony at petitioner's trial and that this evidence was withheld from the defense. The only question, therefore, is whether this evidence constitutes material impeachment evidence.

The evidence shows that McGowan became interested in collaborating with a writer about the case of the death of Rozanne Gailiunas in 1988. Although he spoke to a couple of authors about the possibility, he did not enter into an oral agreement to do so until after the end of 1989 or the beginning of 1990-- several months after petitioner confessed to him. The written agreement was signed prior to petitioner's trial, in which McGowan was a key prosecution witness. Petitioner contends that evidence of the book deal is material because it may have affected McGowan's investigation and trial testimony by providing him with a financial incentive to see that petitioner was arrested, tried, and convicted.

McGowan's behavior in entering into the book deal and failing to disclose it to the prosecutors is certainly not laudable. Nothing in the record, however, indicates that McGowan had any financial incentive that would influence the methods he used and choices he made in investigating the case or in obtaining petitioner's conviction. McGowan did not enter into an agreement until several months after petitioner confessed to the murder. He did not sign a written contract until several months later.

There is, therefore, no evidence that this book deal was a financial incentive for McGowan during the five years that he investigated the case, up to and including the point where petitioner confessed. Indeed, two different authors expressed an interest in writing a book about the case before petitioner was identified as a suspect, indicating that the success of a book about the story would not hinge on petitioner's participation in the crime.

Moreover, none of the money McGowan anticipated receiving was tied to petitioner's conviction. Rather, it was based on when the book was completed and on sales of the book and future movies. Petitioner argues that McGowan had a financial interest in insuring that he was convicted because this would increase the likelihood of the book's success on the market. In addressing this claim, the state habeas court observed that Stowers' book focused on Joy Aylor.

Indeed, the details of petitioner's trial are not recited until the epilogue and cover only four and a half pages of the 357 pages in the book. (St.Hab. Tr. 928, # 121). Petitioner has not argued, much less presented clear and convincing evidence, that these factual findings are incorrect. The record therefore indicates that petitioner's guilt was insignificant to the success of Stowers' book.

Further, in determining the materiality of the evidence withheld, a court should look to whether the testimony was strongly corroborated by other evidence. Kopycinski v. Scott, 64 F.3d 223, 226 (5th Cir.1995). A defendant must show that the evidence withheld could reasonably be taken to put the case in a different light so as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Gibbs v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 253, 256 (5th Cir.1998) , cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1089, 119 S.Ct. 1501 (1999).

Much of McGowan's testimony was corroborated by other evidence. Brent Tourangeau testified that he was present when petitioner made his initial full confession on February 27, 1989. He heard petitioner ask to "go back and think about it." (SF-LXXI 101-10). As noted earlier, the subsequent audio taped and videotaped confessions petitioner gave on February 27 were admitted into evidence, along with the written statement petitioner gave on February 22, 1989. (SF-LXXXX St. Exh. 55, 56 & 56(A)). Portions of the pre-polygraph examination, in which he repeated the "Chip" story, were admitted into evidence. (SF-LXXXX St. Exh. 56B(1)).

In his confessions, petitioner admitted that he used a friend's gun and explained how he obtained it. The testimony of that friend, Terry Harmon, along with a police officer who responded to the scene of the murder and a firearm specialist, established that Harmon's gun was used to kill the victim. (SF-LXIV 62-65; LXXI 72-80, 151). In his confession, petitioner explained that he gained entrance into the house by posing as a flower delivery man and that he left a plant in the house on the floor.

This was corroborated by photographs from the house showing a plant sitting on the floor of the living room. (LXXXIX St. Exh. 11, 21). Finally, two of petitioner's friends testified that petitioner confessed to them that he had murdered the victim. Petitioner's letter confession to one of the friends was admitted into evidence. (SF-LXVIII 68-79; LXXXVII 10-77; LXXXX St. Exh. 63A).

In light of this corroborating evidence, the suppression of information regarding McGowan's book deal cannot reasonably be seen to have put petitioner's case in a different light so as to undermine confidence in the guilty verdict. In denying this ground for relief, the state habeas court initially concluded that petitioner had not established McGowan's potential bias. (St.Hab. Tr. 929-30, # 127-28). Alternatively, the state habeas court concluded that evidence of McGowan's potential bias was not material due to the corroborating evidence of petitioner's confessions and guilt. (St.Hab. Tr. 933- 35). These conclusions are not unreasonable.

2. Confrontation Clause Claim

Petitioner also contends that he was denied his constitutional rights under the confrontation clause because his attorneys were not able to cross-examine McGowan about the book deal. As support, petitioner cites Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). In Davis, the Supreme Court ruled that Alaska's state policy of not disclosing juvenile court records violated Davis' right to cross-examine a prosecution witness at his burglary trial for his possible bias when the witness himself was on juvenile probation for two separate burglaries.

The Court concluded that Davis was entitled to the reversal of his burglary conviction because there had been "constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it." Id., 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. at 1111, citing Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131, 88 S.Ct. 748, 750, 19 L.Ed.2d 956 (1968). However, the Supreme Court has subsequently held that a confrontation clause violation is subject to a harmless error analysis. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) .

Other than citing to Davis v. Alaska, petitioner does not explain why the book deal cannot be addressed fully under the standard outlined in Brady and its progeny. Contrary to petitioner's reliance on Davis v. Alaska, the Supreme Court in Bagley specifically differentiated between the failure of the government to disclose impeachment evidence and the direct restriction on cross-examination that occurred in Davis. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 677-78, 105 S.Ct. at 3381.

The Court then went on to hold that suppression of impeachment evidence amounts to a constitutional violation only if it deprives a criminal defendant of a fair trial. This occurs only if the evidence is material to the case. Id., 473 U.S. at 681-82, 105 S.Ct. at 3383. Clearly, the Supreme Court has specifically rejected the extension of its confrontation clause case law to circumstances where a defendant asserts that impeachment evidence has been withheld by the prosecution.

The state habeas court concluded that petitioner's confrontation clause claim was without merit because he failed to establish that the book deal showed any bias by McGowan and because any denial of the right of confrontation was harmless. (St.Hab. Tr. 936). These conclusions did not result in a decision that is contrary to clearly established federal law.

3. Structural Error Claim

Finally, petitioner asserts that McGowan's behavior in accepting financial remuneration for his assistance in writing a book about the case violated his due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and constituted "structural error" requiring the reversal of his conviction and the granting of a new trial. He asserts that, unlike a constitutional error that occurs during the presentation of the case to the jury, the book deal was an error which cannot be properly analyzed under a harmless error standard and instead requires an automatic reversal of the conviction.

As support for this claim, petitioner relies on various cases where attorneys were paid by third parties, where attorneys had media deals, and where government witnesses had received some sort of payment for testifying. Petitioner's assertion, however, is not supported by the cases he cites. As petitioner acknowledges, none of these cases holds, or even suggests, that his allegations amount to "structural error" that is immune to a harm analysis.

To the contrary, the Fifth Circuit has specifically held that a claim that counsel had a "media deal" with the client in order to be paid for his work must be addressed using the Strickland standard, under which prejudice must be shown. Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1272-73 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1157, 116 S.Ct. 1547 (1996). The Fifth Circuit has also concluded that reversal of a conviction where contingent fees are paid to a government witness is warranted only where an informant is paid to target a particular defendant before the crime is committed. United States v. Yater, 756 F.2d 1058, 1067 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 225 (1985) .

In short, none of the cases cited by petitioner supports his claim that, as a matter of public policy, his conviction should be reversed because a police investigator in the case signed a book deal before his trial began. Moreover, the Supreme Court has acknowledged only a limited set of circumstances involving structural error. These include where there has been a total deprivation of counsel or where the trial judge was not impartial. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). Thus, there is no support in Supreme Court precedent for petitioner's contention that the structural error doctrine should be extended to his case.

Nor is petitioner entitled to relief under a harmless error standard. Under this standard, a petitioner must prove that an error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." McGowan's book deal must, therefore, be analyzed in the context of its effect on petitioner's trial--not, as petitioner urges, as a bad act committed by a public official. Its effect on the trial was defense counsel's inability to question McGowan about his potential bias because of the book deal. The Brady/Bagley materiality standard, however, is even stricter than the Brecht standard. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435-36, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566-67, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). Because this court has already determined that the book deal evidence was not, under Brady, material evidence requiring a reversal of this conviction, there is no need to re-evaluate the harm under the Brecht standard.

Petitioner raised this issue in his state habeas application. The state court concluded that petitioner was not entitled to relief since none of the case law cited supported petitioner's contention that his conviction should be overturned due to McGowan's book deal. (St.Hab. Tr. 944, 950). This conclusion did not result in a decision contrary to clearly established federal law. Petitioner's fifth through seventh grounds for relief are overruled.

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Petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.