|
Assault on Waco
by
Kevin S. Van Horn
On
January 10 the trials of those few Branch Davidians who survived the
Waco Massacre begin. With their home, the Mt. Carmel complex, in ruins,
and families and friends dead, they remain stigmatized by the government
and press as dangerous, lunatic "cultists."
This article is an
attempt to counter the defamation they have suffered and publicize the
crimes committed against them by the government. Given the limited space
available, I have chosen to trade breadth for depth; thus this article
will consider only the accusations made against the Davidians, the
events leading up to the ATF assault on their home, and the assault
itself.
Who
Were the Branch Davidians?
Immediately after the ATF assault on Mount Carmel the Federal Government
began a campaign of vilification against the Branch Davidians. They were
repeatedly portrayed in the press as dangerous, insane, bloodthirsty
fanatics. Yet this supposedly sociopathic sect had lived peacefully in
and near Waco for over half a century. Let's see what their neighbors
have to say about the Davidians.
Collective Impressions
According to the Houston Post, Gene Chapman, owner of Chapman's Fruit
Market, has nothing but kind words for the Davidians. "They're just all
nice, decent, normal people," he said. "Well, not normal."
[30]
A.L. Dreyer, an 80-yr-old farmer,
owns a ranch adjoining the Mt. Carmel property. "I've never had no
trouble with them people," he said. "I've always said if they stay on
their side of the fence, I'll stay on mine... I have no fear of those
people." [31]
The ATF's "storm trooper tactics"
were "a vulgar display of power on the part of the feds," said former
Waco District Attorney Vic Feazell. Feazell unsuccesfully prosecuted
seven Branch Davidians in 1988. "We treated them like human beings,
rather than storm-trooping the place," he told the Houston Chronicle.
"They were extremely polite... They're protective of what's theirs..."
[12]
"(T)hey were basically
good people," said McLennan County Sheriff Jack Harwell. "All of 'em
were good people." [59]
Koresh
Henry McMahon, a former Waco resident and gun store owner, described
David Koresh as a likable guy. "There was nothing out of the ordinary
(about Koresh's personality)," McMahon said, adding that Koresh was "an
average Joe." [41] , [43]
"He (Koresh) is a very gentle
man," said a Waco doctor who had treated Koresh for three years prior to
the ATF assault. "He is very intelligent and articulate. They made him
sound like a ruthless killer and that's just absurd." [18]
Gary Coker, a Waco
lawyer, said he believed Koresh wouldn't hurt anyone unless he was
bothered by outsiders. "It's sort of like a rattlesnake. Unless you step
on him, he's not going to hurt anybody." [23]
Steve Schneider
Steve Schneider emerged as a chief negotiator during the standoff, and
was considered Koresh's lieutenant. FBI Special Agent Bob Ricks called
Schneider "a cool, calm, deliberate individual." Cult Awareness Network
`deprogrammer' Rick Ross described Schneider as well-educated, and said
he was "a man with a history of deep religious conviction, honesty and
integrity." [32]
Wayne Martin
Douglas Wayne Martin held a position of major responsibility among the
Davidians; only he and Steve Schneider ever spoke face- to-face with
federal negotiators during the siege. Martin was a 42-year-old black
lawyer and graduate of Harvard Law School. For seven years he was an
assistant professor at the North Carolina Central University School of
Law. After moving to Waco he maintained a law practice near Mount
Carmel. He had a wife and seven children. [38] ,
[42]
Martin was viewed by many who knew
him as a quiet, jovial and religious person [38] . He was routinely
described as professional and competent in court [34] .
"People may tend to dismiss this
event as just a bunch of religious fanatics, but having known Doug
humanizes it for me," said Mark Morris, a law professor at NCCU. "He was
a very bright, smart, able, kind person, and it's a real shock (Martin's
death)."
"He left about a year after I got
here, but he seemed to be a very nice and personable guy," Associate Law
School Dean Irving Joyner said [38] .
McLennan County Commissioner
Lester Gibson said he and others who knew Martin found it hard to
believe he could have been involved in anything so violent. "He was very
friendly and quiet," said Gibson. "It was common knowledge that he was a
Davidian, but he never talked religion." [34]
Gary Coker, a Waco lawyer,
described Martin as a kind man and a particularly devoted father.
Waco city council member Lawrence
Johnson had known Martin for five years at the time of the assault. He
described Martin as a computer whiz and as a diligent lawyer. "I enjoyed
working with him. He was smart, he was well-educated," Johnson said.
After the raid, Martin,
still the conscientious lawyer, managed to send Johnson money to
reimburse clients he was unable to represent while he was holed up in
the compound. "That was his sense of responsibility coming out." [42]
Perry Jones
Perry Jones was Koresh's father-in-law. News reports described him as a
polite older man, bespectacled and somewhat frail, and well known at
various businesses in the Waco community. Jones was once called "the
kindest man and a perfect gentleman." "He was nice and he had good
manners," said Tim Jander, general manager of Star Tex Propane in Waco.
Jones died a slow and painful
death after ATF agents shot him in the abdomen. [49]
Unsurprisingly, the
feds decided that they did not want to hold the trials of the surviving
Branch Davidians in Waco. Instead they got a change of venue to San
Antonio, nearly 200 miles away, where the jury members would be unlikely
to have independent knowledge of the Davidians' character.
The
Roden Gunfight
One
incident which the government and press used to paint the Branch
Davidians as dangerous and violent was the gunfight with George Roden
that took place at Mt. Carmel in 1988. But it was George Roden who was
dangerous, violent, murderous and insane.
In 1984 a dispute arose between
George Roden and David Koresh over leadership of the Davidians. This
culminated in Roden forcing Koresh and his followers off of the Mt.
Carmel property at gunpoint [21] . Koresh led his
group to the city of Palestine, Texas [26] .
By late 1987 things were faring
badly for George Roden. He had almost no money, few followers, mounting
debts and an angry Texas Supreme Court Justice on his trail
[70] . So Roden decided to conclusively settle the
leadership dispute with Koresh. He went to a graveyard and dug up the
body of a man who had been dead 25 years, put the casket in the Mt.
Carmel chapel, and said that whoever could raise this man from the dead
was the one to lead the Davidians.
Koresh reported the action to the
Sheriff's Department. He was told that his word alone wasn't enough --
proof was needed. So on November 3, 1987, Koresh and several men went
out to Mt. Carmel to take pictures of the body in the casket. The
Sheriff had warned them to be careful, because Roden was dangerous, so
they armed themselves. The plan was to open the casket, take the
pictures, and leave, but Roden caught them, and a gunfight ensued in
which Roden was wounded [64] .
Koresh and seven other Davidians
were charged with attempted murder [20] . Jack Harwell,
McLennan County Sheriff, called Koresh on the phone and informed him of
the charges. He asked Koresh and the others to turn themselves in, and
to surrender their weapons. When deputies arrived at Mount Carmel,
Koresh and the other Davidians peacefully complied [64] . Officials
traced the weapons and found that each was legally purchased
[22] .
On March 21, 1988, Roden was
served with a citation for contempt of court. U.S. District Judge Walter
S. Smith, Jr. sentenced him to six months in jail for continuing to file
expletive-filled motions threatening the justices with AIDS and herpes,
despite orders to cease and desist [70] , [65] , [30]
.
On April 25, Koresh's seven
followers were acquitted, and the jury hung 9-3 in favor of Koresh's
acquittal. The state then dropped the charges against him
[68] , [20] .
Koresh paid up 16 years of
delinquent taxes on the Mount Carmel property, which allowed him and his
followers to move in [68] . Upon returning to the property they found a
methamphetamine lab and large piles of pornographic material. They
burned the pornography and reported the meth lab to the DA's office [64]
.
Fifteen months after
Koresh's trial, in the summer of 1989, Roden was approached by a man who
claimed to be the Messiah. Roden split the man's head open with an ax
[67] . Odessa police charged Roden with murder. The
following year he was found not guilty by reason of insanity and sent to
a state mental hospital [10] , where he remains to
this day [26] .
Allegations of Child Abuse
Another tactic the federal government used to demonize the Davidians was
to accuse them of child abuse. These accusations originally arose from
Marc Breault, a former follower of Koresh who had a bitter falling out
with him. Breault quit the sect at the end of 1989 and moved to
Australia. He then threw himself into a campaign to discredit his former
mentor, in the process leading away most of the Australian members of
the sect.
In March 1990 Breault, his wife
and a number of his Australian followers swore out more than 30 pages of
affidavits claiming that Koresh was abusing children. A second set of
affidavits was sworn out for use in a child custody hearing in early
1992, in which a Michigan man named David Jewell petitioned to gain
custody of his daughter, then living at Mt. Carmel with Jewell's
ex-wife. However, the allegations were mostly general and lacking in
detail [48] .
Thus the allegations of child
abuse sprung from two sources: (1) a man who hated Koresh and was
obsessed with discrediting him; and (2) a child-custody dispute. Note
that allegations of child abuse are a common tactic in child-custody
disputes.
As a result of Breault's efforts,
local authorities began an investigation of the child abuse charges.
Officials of the Child Protective Services division of the Texas
Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, and the McLennan
County sheriff's office, visited Mt. Carmel in February and March 1992.
They found no evidence of child abuse [46] .
On April 23, 1993, in response to
the Clinton administration's continued claims of child abuse, the Texas
Department of Protective and Regulatory Services offered the following
summary of its nine-week investigation: "None of the allegations could
be verified. The children denied being abused in any way by any adults
in the compound. They denied any knowledge of other children being
abused. The adults consistently denied participation in or knowledge of
any abuse to children. Examinations of the children produced no
indication of current or previous injuries." Texas child protection
officials also said they received no further abuse allegations after
that time [48] .
Breault had also contacted the
FBI, accusing Koresh of a number of other crimes besides child abuse. A
February 23, 1993 FBI memo, obtained by the Dallas Morning News, stated
that no information had been developed to verify the allegations of
"child abuse and neglect, tax evasion, slavery and reports of possible
mass destruction."
The Clinton administration alleged
that the Davidians were abusing children during the siege of Mt. Carmel.
This was contradicted by those who actually saw the children. During the
siege a man named Louis Alaniz managed to sneak past federal officials
to visit the Davidians (he was not a Davidian himself). After leaving,
he reported that the children at Mt. Carmel appeared happy, playing and
laughing continuously, and that there were no outward signs of child
abuse [44] .
Sheriff Jack Harwell, who was the
only outside negotiator brought into the Mount Carmel siege, said there
was never any proof that children were being abused inside the compound.
None of the children who were released from the compound, Harwell said,
showed any signs of physical abuse [45] .
According to Texas child
protective services officials, none of the 21 children released to the
authorities showed signs of abuse, and none of them confirmed that any
abuse was committed. The children were physically and psychologically
examined [45] , [47] . Dr. Bruce Perry, the head of
the team treating the children, stated flatly: "(N)one of the 21
children had been sexually abused or molested." [69]
After the blaze that killed most
of the Davidians, the Clinton administration stepped up its "child
abuse" offensive. White House communications director George
Stephanopoulos claimed that "there was overwhelming evidence of child
abuse in the Waco compound." [39] But this claim was
contradicted by others within the federal government itself.
FBI director William
Sessions said his agency had "no contemporaneous evidence" of child
abuse in the compound during the siege [48] . "(T)here had been no
recent reports of the beating of children." In response to Janet Reno's
claim of reports that "babies were being beaten," Sessions said, "I do
not know what the attorney general was referring to specifically."
[37]
The Justice Department
itself put the lie to Clinton's and Reno's wild accusations. In a report
released in early October, the Justice Department said there was no
evidence of child abuse at the compound during the siege or even enough
evidence to arrest Koresh on such charges before the February 28 raid
[5] .
The
Gun Arsenal
The
press and the federal government made much of the Davidians' collection
of guns. President Clinton claimed the Davidians had "illegally
stockpiled weaponry and ammunition." [1] But there is
no law limiting the number of legal weapons one may accumulate.
Furthermore, by Texas standards the Davidians' gun collection was rather
small. After the siege investigators found only 200 firearms in the
ruins of Mt. Carmel [57] , which amounts to about two
guns per adult. But Texas' 17 million residents own a total of 68
million guns, for an average of four guns apiece, while 16,600 Texans
legally own machine guns [33] .
The government also
claimed that the Davidians were planning an assault on Waco. This claim
was based on third-hand information related to ATF Special Agent Davy
Aguilera, who filed the affidavit for the original raid on Mt. Carmel.
Aguilera had interviewed ATF Special Agent Carlos Torres, who had
interviewed Joyce Sparks, an investigator with the Texas Department of
Human Services. According to Aguilera's affidavit, Torres told Aguilera
that Sparks had told him that Koresh had told her "that he was the
`Messenger' from God, that the world was coming to an end, and that when
he `reveals' himself the riots in Los Angeles would pale in comparison
to what was going to happen in Waco, Texas." Furthermore, this
self-revelation "would be a `military type operation' and... all the
`non-believers' would have to suffer." Koresh supposedly said this on
Sparks' second and final visit to Mt. Carmel to investigate child-abuse
charges, on April 6, 1992 [63] . But the LA riots broke
out on April 29, more than three weeks after Sparks last visited
Koresh!
Enter the ATF
In
Feb. 1982, the Senate Judiciary Committee said in a report that the ATF
had "disregarded rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the
United States." Illegal ATF actions included entrapment and secret
lawmaking via unpublished administrative interpretations of gun laws.
The report noted that "expert evidence was submitted establishing that
approximately 75 percent of BATF gun prosecutions were aimed at ordinary
citizens who had neither criminal intent nor knowledge, but were enticed
by agents into unknowing technical violations." In the wake of the
report, plans to abolish the agency were shelved after neither the U.S.
Customs Bureau nor the Secret Service would accept the transfer of the
discredited ATF agents into their organizations [3] .
The ATF acted true to form in its
investigation of the Davidians -- the purpose of the raid appears to
have been to bolster the ATF's image, rather than any protection of the
public safety. From Aguilera's affidavit it appears that the ATF
collected no reliable new information for its investigation after June
23, 1992. But in mid-November "60 Minutes" began contacting ATF
personnel about allegations of sexual harrassment in the agency
[61] . In early December the investigation picked up
again, after a lapse of 5-1/2 months [62] .
On January 12, 1993 the segment
aired. It presented allegations by female ATF agents that they had been
sexually harrassed on the job and that the agency intimidated victims
and witnesses who had pressed sexual harrassment claims. Among the
charges was one of near-rape: agent Michelle Roberts charged that
another agent had pinned her against the hood of a car while two others
tore at her clothes. ATF agent Bob Hoffman told "60 Minutes" that he had
verified the complaints of one female agent, and said, "In my career
with ATF, the people that I put in jail have more honor than the top
administration in this organization." Shortly afterwards, there was also
a front-page article in the The Washington Post about racial
discrimination in the ATF.
The "60 Minutes" story devastated
both the public image and morale of the ATF. ATF Director Stephen
Higgins must have been in a panic. A Republican appointee, he stood a
good chance of losing his job with a Democratic administration coming
in. Even if he didn't, he was going to have a rough time at the
congressional budget hearings coming up on March 10. Said one high-level
former ATF senior official who requested anonymity, "The show had great
repercussions within the bureau... (S)ome (within the ATF) concluded
that he (Higgins) was... looking for a high-profile case to counteract
the negative image and enable him to go to the budget appropriations
hearings with a strong hand." [52]
This analysis was supported by a
followup "60 Minutes" report on May 23. Based on statements from ATF
agents, Mike Wallace concluded the report by saying, "Waco was a
publicity stunt, which was intended to improve the ATF's tarnished
image." Consistent with this interpretation, the ATF notified the media
before the raid [50] , [56] ,
[35] , and there were a large number of television and
newspaper reporters at the site on the morning of the raid [50] .
Appendix G of the Treasury
Department report on Waco suggests another, more disturbing motive for
the raid. The appendix, entitled "A Brief History of Federal Firearms
Enforcement," contains the following statement:
In a larger sense, however, the raid fit within an
historic, well-established and well-defended government interest in
prohibiting and breaking up all organized groups that sought to arm or
fortify themselves... From its earliest formation, the federal
government has actively suppressed any effort by disgruntled or
rebellious citizens to coalesce into an armed group, however small the
group, petty its complaint, or grandiose its ambition.
In other words:
regardless of whether you break any law, if some federal official
doesn't like your politics and thinks you have too many weapons, you
will be exterminated.
Serving the Warrant
On
February 25 ATF Special Agent Davy Aguilera filed for and received a
warrant to search the premises of Mt. Carmel, claiming evidence of
illegal conversion of (legal) semiautomic weapons to automatic. Contrary
to early ATF claims, there was no arrest warrant for Koresh. The
affidavit supporting the warrant was seriously flawed, containing many
inaccuracies and patently false statements (such as the "LA riots"
quote). According to several legal experts, including a former ATF
senior enforcement official with more than 20 years' federal firearms
experience, it is questionable that the affidavit demostrated probable
cause for a search [51] , [58] .
Steve Holbrook, an attorney in
Washington, D.C. area, whose law practice specializes in gun-related
offenses, was unequivocal: "Probable cause did not exist. There was
evidence cited of a large quantity of legal firearms and parts,
including interchangeable parts... Nowhere in the affidavit is it said
all necessary parts and materials to convert semiautomatic weapons into
machine guns were obtained (by Koresh)." [51]
The claimed violation itself is a
tricky area of the law. "This is a very, very convoluted, technical,
angels-dancing-on- the-head-of-a-pin kind of argument," says Robert
Sanders, former enforcement chief of the ATF. "And there are no
published rulings telling you what is and isn't (a violation)." [62]
Importantly, this was not a
no-knock search warrant, in which agents may knock down doors and burst
in heavily armed without prior warning to occupants; such warrants must
be specifically applied for, which the ATF failed to do
[53] . Nor was a no-knock approach necessary. As we have seen,
Koresh and his followers had peacefully cooperated with law enforcement
officers on at least three occasions in the past (once after the Roden
gunfight, twice during the child-abuse investigation). And in July 1992
Koresh had actually invited ATF investigators to come out to Mt. Carmel
and inspect the Davidians' guns [4] , [6]
, [55] , but he was angrily told "we don't want to
do it that way." [6]
Furthermore, the ATF knew that
nearly all the guns at Mt. Carmel were locked up and only Koresh had a
key [63] . To avoid any possibility of armed resistance from the
Davidians, they could have simply detained Koresh during one of his
frequent excursions outside of Mt. Carmel [18] , [29]
and had him unlock the store of guns in their presence.
Absent a no-knock warrant, U.S.
law (Title 18, U.S.C. 3109) states that an officer must give notice of
his legal authority and purpose before attempting to enter the premises
to be searched. Only if admittance is refused after giving such notice
is it legal for an officer to use force to gain entry. Said one former
senior ATF official, "Irrespective of the situation inside, the notice
of authority and purpose must be given... Unless the occupants of a
dwelling are made aware that the persons attempting to enter have legal
authority and a legal warrant to enter, the occupants have every right
to defend themselves..." [54]
Dick DeGuerin, a well-known
Houston lawyer, put it more bluntly: "...if a warrant is being
unlawfully executed by the use of excessive force, you or I or anybody
else has a right to resist that unlawful force. If someone's trying to
kill you, even under the excuse that they have a warrant, you have a
right to defend yourself with deadly force, and to kill that person."
[4]
It appears that the ATF never
intended to serve the warrant in a lawful manner. ATF agents told the
Houston Post that before the raid they had practiced to where it took 7
seconds to get out of their tarp-covered cattle trailers and 12 seconds
to get to the front door. It is absurd to imagine that after such a mad
dash to the door, the ATF agents intended to stop, knock, calmly state
their legal authority and purpose, demand entry, and wait for a
response, all before taking further action.
So how did the ATF
serve its warrant? On Sunday morning, February 28, 1993, 100 federal
agents arrived at Mt. Carmel in cattle cars and helicopters. About 30
agents dressed in black commando uniforms and armed with machine guns
stormed the complex [9] , [19] .
According to an Associated Press report, "Witnesses said the law
officers stormed the compound's main home, throwing concussion grenades
and screaming `Come out,' while three National Guard helicopters
approached." [2]
Who
Shot First?
The
question of who shot first is in a sense irrelevant, as the ATF agents
clearly attacked first when they threw grenades at the Davidians' home.
Once the ATF used unlawful force, the Davidians had the legal right to
resist them with deadly force.
Nevertheless, the Davidians insist
that ATF agents shot first. "They fired on us first," Koresh told CNN.
"...I fell back against the door and the bullets started coming through
the door... I was already hollering, `Go away, there's women and
children here, let's talk.'" [19] Davidians in another part of the
city-block-sized complex said the battle began when the helicopters
circling overhead fired on them without warning [13] .
David Troy, ATF intelligence
chief, said a videotape was taken of the entire mission
[36] . But although parts of this tape were released to the media,
one important part was not: the start of the raid. It seems unlikely the
ATF would have withheld this footage if it supported the ATF's
contention that the Davidians fired first.
There is evidence to support
Koresh's version of events. Federal law enforcement sources told Soldier
of Fortune magazine the following:
* One ATF agent had an accidental
discharge getting out of one of two goose-necked cattle trailers used to
transport and conceal agents -- he wounded himself in the leg and cried
out, "I'm hit!" [14] Unless you have a very disciplined
group, you can expect all hell to break loose once any shot is fired;
and according to Charles Beckwith, a retired Army colonel and founder of
the military's antiterrorist Delta Force, the ATF's raid was "very
amateur." [28]
* Steve Willis, one of the ATF agents
killed in the raid, was assigned to "take out" Koresh if necessary. When
Koresh came out, Willis began firing a suppressed MP5 SD submachine gun
at him from the passenger side of the leading pickup. Reporters kept
some distance away from the action would not have heard a silenced MP5
SD, while the cattle trailer would likely have blocked their view [14] ,
[15] .
The
Assault
Concurrent with the attack on the front of the Mt. Carmel complex were
two other attacks on the Davidians.
According to Davidians who
surrendered during the siege, the helicopters circling overhead fired
down through the roof into the complex, killing one man and two women as
they lay in their beds [64] [72] . The children, whose
dormitory was on the second floor, crawled under their beds as bullets
ripped through the walls above them [15] , [25] .
Houston attorney Dick DeGuerin viewed the inside of the complex after
the raid, when federal officials allowed him to meet with the Davidians
and try to persuade them to surrender. He reported seeing bullet holes
on the second storey, clearly coming from the outside in, at such an
angle that they could only have come from above the complex [64] .
Moments after the assault began,
an 8-man ATF team began ascending the roof near an upstairs window which
they believed to be in the vicinity of Koresh's bedroom and weapons
locker [12] , [15] . Video footage of the raid shows the agents breaking
the window, tossing grenades inside, and indiscriminately spraying
gunfire within.
A well-placed federal official
told the Houston Post that at least 10 Davidians were killed in the
battle. One of those confirmed dead was Koresh's two-year-old daughter
[24] . Another was Winston Blake, a 28-year-old
printer, painter, and welder; he was shot to death as he stood unarmed
by the complex's water tank [40] .
Four ATF agents were killed in the
gunfight, and numerous wounded. Dan Hartnett, associate director of the
ATF, claimed that the ATF suffered heavy casualties because of strict
rules of engagement that prohibit shooting without a definite target.
"We had to wait for a target because there are so many women and
children inside," he said. But broadcast video of the raid shows agents
exercising poor fire control, firing over vehicles with little or no
view of what they were shooting at, at a rate of two rounds per second
[11] , [27] .
The ATF's concern for the women
and children inside was further demonstrated by their use of the "9 mm.
Cyclone" round in their submachine guns. This highly-penetrating round
is available only to law-enforcement special operations teams and the
military, and is specifically designed to cut through body armor
[17] .
Two separate federal sources told
Soldier of Fortune magazine that such a round was removed from a wounded
ATF agent, and that many, if not most, of the ATF casualties resulted
from "friendly fire." [17] Newsweek also reported that a federal source
involved in the Waco situation said that "there is evidence that
supports the theory of friendly fire," and that during the assault
"there was a huge amount of cross-fire." [8]
Furthermore, in the released video footage of the raid, there is little
or no evidence of return fire from the Davidians.
The attack terrified the
Davidians, and they were eager for a cease-fire. Wayne Martin telephoned
his friend, Waco city councilman Lawrence Johnson. According to Johnson,
Martin said "they were in a firefight, they were taking casualties, and
a lot of people were hurt. He asked me to contact the media." [42] The
New York Times reported that after capturing four federal agents, the
Davidians disarmed and released them during the firefight. And both
Martin and Koresh phoned 911 about the attack.
ABC broadcast portions of the 911
tapes on its Nightline program. Martin phoned first and spoke with
Lieutenant Lynch of the Waco Sheriff's Department. He told Lynch,
"There's about 75 men around our building and they're shooting it up in
Mt. Carmel... Tell them there are women and children in here and to call
it off!" Calling it off took some time. During a later return phone
call, even as Lynch and Martin were trying to arrange the cease-fire,
Martin's location was receiving heavy gunfire and Martin himself was
hit. When requested not to return fire, an unidentified Davidian replied
in a disgusted tone, "We haven't been." [7]
In the end, it was not
humanitarian concerns or negotiations that brought an end to the
hour-long assault; it was lack of ammunition. The 100 agents who
participated in the assault had a total of only 40 rounds left among
them when they finally backed off [16] .
References
1.
Press conference
given by President Clinton in Washington, D C., on April 20, 1993, 1:36
p.m. EDT.
2.
Associated Press, March 1, 1993; appeared in
Knoxville News- Sentinal
3.
Washington Times, June 1, 1993, p. E3.
4.
Houston Press, July 22, 1993.
5.
San Francisco Chronicle, October 9, 1993.
6.
Houston Chronicle
7.
ABC's "Nightline", June 9, 1993.
8.
"Was It Friendly Fire?", Newsweek, April 5, 1993, p.
50.
9.
Reuters News Service, February 28, 1993.
10.
Associated Press, February 28, 1993.
11.
"Gun Gestapo's Day of Infamy," Soldier of Fortune,
June 1993, p 48..
12.
Ibid., p. 49.
13.
Ibid., p. 50.
14.
Ibid., p. 51.
15.
Ibid., p. 52.
16.
Ibid., p. 53.
17.
Ibid., p. 62.
18.
Ibid., p. 63.
19.
Houston Post, March 1, 1993, p. A1.
20.
Ibid., p. A8.
21.
Ibid., p. A4.
22.
Houston Post, March 2, 1993, p. A8.
23.
Ibid., p. A13.
24.
Houston Post, March 3, 1993, p. A1.
25.
Ibid., p. A12.
26.
Ibid., p. A18.
27.
Houston Post, March 4, 1993, p. A1.
28.
Ibid., p. A20.
29.
Houston Post, March 5, 1993, p. A1 and A16.
30.
Ibid., p. A22.
31.
Houston Post, March 8, 1993, p. A1.
32.
Ibid., p. A10.
33.
Houston Post, March 9, 1993, p. A8.
34.
Ibid., p. A13.
35.
Houston Post, March 12, 1993, p. A20.
36.
Houston Post, March 29, 1993, p. A6.
37.
Washington Post, April 21, 1993, p. A15.
38.
Houston Post, April 22, 1993, p. A21.
39.
Ibid., p. A1.
40.
Ibid., p. A21.
41.
Ibid., p. A20.
42.
Washington Post, April 22, 1993, p. A15-16.
43.
Reuters News Service, April 22, 1993.
44.
Houston Post, April 23, 1993, p. A5.
45.
Houston Post, April 24, 1993, p. A18.
46.
Washington Post, April 24, 1993, p. A8.
47.
Washington Post, April 25, 1993, p. A1.
48.
Ibid., p. A20.
49.
Washington Post, April 28, 1993, p. A4.
50.
Washington Post, April 30, 1993, p. A1.
51.
"Waco's Defective Warrants," Soldier of Fortune,
August 1993, p 46..
52.
Ibid, p. 48.
53.
Ibid, p. 49.
54.
Ibid, p. 74.
55.
"Truth and Cover-up," The New American, June 14,
1993, p. 24, quoting an April 21st television interview with Henry
McMahon, the man who relayed the offer to the ATF
56.
Testimony of BATF Director Stephen E. Higgins before
the House Judiciary Committee, April 28, 1993
57.
Associated Press, May 5, 1993.
58.
"Gunning for Koresh," The American Spectator, August
1993.
59.
Ibid, p. 32.
60.
Ibid, p. 33.
61.
Ibid, p. 39.
62.
Ibid, p. 33.
63.
Affidavit to obtain search warrant, submitted by Davy
Aguilera on February 25, 1993
64.
Speech by Ron Engleman on the Waco Massacre. Engleman
was a Dallas radio talk-show host whom the Davidians requested as a
negotiator during the siege Engleman's speech was based on his own
experiences and interviews with others A videotape of the speech may be
obtained from Libertarian Party of Dallas County, P O. Box 64832,
Dallas, TX 75206.
65. Marc Breault and Martin King,
Inside the Cult, p. 71 (1993).
66.
Ibid, p. 100.
67.
Ibid, pp. 106-107.
68. Ibid, p. 369.
69. "The Waco Massacre: A Case
Study on the Emerging American Police State," The McAlvany Intelligence
Advisor 19 (July 1993)
70. Brad Bailey & Bob Darden, Mad
Man in Waco, p. 81 (1993).
71. Ibid, p. 88.
72. Ibid, p. 173.
|
