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Alvin
Andrew KELLY
Robbery
In the six years between the triple homicide and
his trial, Kelly had several felony convictions which resulted in
prison time, including Burglary and Delivery of a controlled substance.
In 1990, Kelly pleaded guilty to the murder of his roommate, John Ford,
and was sentenced to 30 years in prison. He was serving that sentence
when he was charged with capital murder for the Morgan killings. His
accomplice in the killings, Ronnie Lee Wilson, was convicted of murder
and sentenced to 66 years in prison.
Citations:
Kelly v. Cockrell, 72 Fed.Appx. 67 (5th Cir. 2003) (Habeas).
Final/Special Meal:
"I'm getting communion. I don't want no worldly food. I filled out the
paperwork, and I'm going to have the Lord's Supper for my last meal.
I'm fasting from Sunday to Tuesday, so when I go, I'll be purified."
Final Words:
"I offer my sorrow, and my heart goes out to y'all," Kelly said in his
last statement to the members of the Morgan family who attended his
execution. "I know you believe that you're going to have closure
tonight. As I stand before God today, the true Judge, I had nothing to
do with the death of your family." Kelly then asked for forgiveness
for Ford's murder "because I do stand guilty for my involvement for
that." Kelly also thanked his family, his friends, and God. As the
lethal injection was administered, he sang, "Thank You, Lord Jesus,
for coming into my life. You walked with me through prison. Thank You,
Lord Jesus, because You died for me. Thank You, Lord Jesus, for
remembering me."
ClarkProsecutor.org
HUNTSVILLE, Texas – A former East Texas truck
repair shop owner was executed Tuesday evening for fatally shooting a
22-month-old boy in a spree that also killed the child's parents.
Alvin Kelly thanked God, expressed love to friends
and relatives and denied committing the murder that led to his
execution. "I pray this gives you some peace," Kelly said from the
death chamber gurney, looking at four relatives of the slain family.
"I know you believe that you're going to have closure tonight. As I
stand before God today, the true judge, I had nothing to do with the
death of your family."
Alvin Kelly Kelly, 57, said he would ask God to not
hold that against them. At the same time, he acknowledged killing
another man for whom he was serving time when he was charged in the
death of the 22-month-old, who died in 1984 in Gregg County, about 100
miles east of Dallas.
As the drugs were administered, he began singing a
hymn praising God for coming into his life. "I thank you Lord Jesus
for remembering me ... ," he sang as the drugs took effect and he
slipped into unconsciousness. Twelve minutes later, at 6:30 p.m. CDT
he was pronounced dead.
Kelly was the 10th Texas prisoner executed this
year in the nation's busiest capital punishment state. He's among a
dozen condemned inmates scheduled to die over the next six weeks.
Another lethal injection is set for Thursday.
The U.S. Supreme Court last week refused to review
his appeal. His lawyer returned to the high court with another appeal,
asking for a reprieve while the justices examine a Tennessee case
about whether poor death row inmates seeking clemency from state
officials have a right to taxpayer-paid attorneys. About two hours
before his scheduled execution, the justices turned down the appeal.
Kelly, in an interview last week outside death row, said he didn't
want a reprieve and looked forward to "go home to God." "That's what
this is all about," he said. "I have friends and family who are sad.
But I am happy. I'm not going to die. I have eternal life."
Kelly already was serving a 30-year prison term for
murder when he was convicted of killing Devin Morgan, the 22-month-old
son of Jerry and Brenda Morgan. Relatives discovered the bodies at
their home in Spring Hill, a few miles northwest of Longview. Several
items also had been taken, including a car, at least five guns and
some television and stereo equipment.
The murders went unsolved for six years until a man
in Michigan told authorities that his former wife, who also had been
married to Kelly, had information about the case. Prosecutors said his
ex-wife never felt she could come forward because she feared Kelly,
who turned to drug dealing and manufacturing after his truck repair
business cratered because of his drug addiction. By then, Kelly said
he had found religion in the Gregg County Jail, where he was being
held on a drug charge and then was implicated in the aggravated sexual
assault of two fellow inmates. He turned down several plea deals to
confess to the three slayings, saying that accepting the offers would
force him to lie. "If I was guilty, I would plead guilty," he said
from death row. "But I can't stand before God on a lie."
He also denied the possibility he was so strung out
on methamphetamines at the time of the shootings that he couldn't
recall them. "If I did it, I'd remember," he said. "If I did it, I'd
admit to it." And while acknowledging he once viewed himself as a
gangster, he insisted prosecutors "wanted to make me out to be some
John Dillinger."
Lori Kubecka, who was 10 when her aunt, uncle and
nephew were killed, represented her family witnessing Kelly's
execution. "When it comes to what he did to our family, I think he
deserves it," she told the Longview News-Journal. "But it's been so
long. He has sat behind bars for so long now."
At Kelly's trial, prosecutors presented evidence
that showed Jerry and Brenda Morgan had been city marshal reserve
officers, and Kelly's motive was that they were providing information
about him to authorities. He said with his previous murder conviction,
plus convictions for burglary, weapons possession, controlled
substance delivery and possession and aggravated sexual assault, "I
didn't stand a chance."
"I still love Texas," he said. "I love bluebonnets.
Texas didn't put me here. I put me here, by my lifestyle. I'm not
pious. I'm not holy. I'm an old sinner."
Defendant, who was convicted of capital murder in
Texas and sentenced to death, filed petition for federal habeas relief.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
denied the petition, and defendant filed application for issuance of a
certificate of appealability (COA). The Court of Appeals, Benavides,
Circuit Judge, held that: (1) affidavits executed seven years after
defendant's trial did not establish the factual basis underlying
defendant's claim that his death sentence constituted cruel and
unusual punishment because it was secured in part through the use of
perjured testimony; (2) even if defendant was denied sufficient funds
to adequately investigate and prepare his defense in violation of Ake,
defendant made no substantial showing of prejudice; and (3) defense
counsel did not render ineffective assistance. Denied.
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner Alvin Andrew Kelly (Kelly), convicted of
capital murder in Texas and sentenced to death, appeals the denial of
federal habeas relief. In his “Application for Issuance of a
Certificate of Appealability [COA] on Rejected Requests,” Kelly raises
following claims: (1) his conviction and sentence constitute a denial
of due process of law because he is actually innocent; (2) the
prosecutor violated his due process rights by arguing incorrectly to
the jury that his former wife should not be considered an accomplice;
(3) his death sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
because it was secured in part through the use of perjured testimony;
(4) the denial of sufficient funds to adequately investigate and
prepare his defense constitute a denial of due process of law and
cruel and unusual punishment; (5) the failure to provide sufficient
funds to investigate and prepare his defense rendered counsel's
performance ineffective; (6) the state court's denial of his motion to
recuse itself denied him due process; and (7) counsel rendered
ineffective assistance at trial.FN1 For the reasons stated below, we
DENY a COA with respect to each of the seven claims.
FN1. Also, the district court granted a COA with
respect to four claims that have not yet been briefed and thus are not
before us: (1) Kelly's conviction was obtained through the
prosecution's use of perjured testimony; (2) the prosecution failed to
disclose exculpatory evidence; (3) the prosecution did not disclose
that it had agreed not to prosecute Kelly's former wife or brother-in-law
in exchange for their testimony; and (4) the district court made
impermissible credibility determinations in connection with the grant
of summary judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
On the morning of May 1, 1984, in Gregg County,
Texas, the bodies of Jerry Morgan, his wife Brenda, and their twenty-two
month old son Devin were discovered in their home by other family
members. Each person had died of gunshot wounds. Various items were
missing from the victims' home, including a 1977 Pontiac Catalina, a
.22 caliber revolver, a .380 semi-automatic pistol, a 7-millimeter
rifle, a Remington 870 pump action shotgun, a .38 caliber derringer, a
television set, a video recorder, a stereo, decorative brass
butterflies, and a coffee maker.
These murders remained unsolved for six years. In
1990, a man named Chris Vickery called the Gregg County Sheriff's
Office and indicated that his former wife, Cynthia Kelly (Cynthia),
had information for the authorities. At that time, Cynthia lived in
Michigan, and Kelly was serving a 30-year sentence in Texas for the
murder of John Ford.FN2 The authorities contacted Cynthia, and
ultimately obtained an indictment charging Kelly with the capital
murder of Devin Morgan during the course of the robbery of his father,
Jerry Morgan.
FN2. Kelly had pleaded guilty to the unrelated
murder of John Ford, which occurred after the instant offense.
At trial, Steven Kelly, Kelly's younger brother,
testified that Kelly and he were in the business of selling drugs.
Kelly's source of drugs or “main man” was Walter Shannon.FN3 Several
days prior to the instant offense, Steven drove with Kelly and Ron
Wilson, a fellow drug trafficker, to a home later identified as the
victims' home. Prior to exiting the vehicle, Kelly instructed Steven
to remain in the vehicle. Disregarding that instruction, Steven walked
around to the back of the house because he heard an argument. Steven
observed Kelly pointing a gun at Jerry Morgan and threatening “I want
you to know that I can kill you at any time.” Kelly noticed Steven
watching and angrily ordered him back to the vehicle. As Steven
returned to the vehicle, he heard Wilson arguing with a woman inside
the home. Kelly and Wilson also returned to the vehicle. As the three
men drove away, Wilson, who was obviously upset, said to Kelly “I told
you not to bring him [Steven] because ... we're supposed to take care
of some business, and ... we didn't take care of it, ... we're
supposed to prove a point, and now, that they're going to be upset
with us.” Kelly responded “we can always come back later and take care
of it, ... there's no problem there.”
FN3. Walter Shannon was also known as W.W. Shannon.
Steven further testified that a few days later on
the night of April 30, 1984 (the night of the instant offense), Kelly,
Wilson and Cynthia arrived at his house after he and his wife had gone
to bed. Appearing very nervous and in a hurry, Kelly said he was in
serious trouble and needed money. Kelly confessed that he had killed
the family Steven had seen him threaten, and the child was “involved.”
Kelly then opened a briefcase, handed Steven a pistol, FN4 and asked
for “five hundred dollars to get out of town.” Steven gave Kelly the
five hundred dollars, and Kelly left with Cynthia and Wilson.
FN4. Kelly was wearing a pistol when he entered
Steven's house but he did not give that gun to Steven.
Cynthia testified that she met Kelly sometime in
1982 or 1983 and they began living together in Tyler, Texas.FN5
Cynthia thereafter became addicted to methamphetamine and would
frequently accompany Kelly while he was conducting drug deals. Kelly
carried a firearm and had Cynthia carry a pistol to “watch his back.”
FN6
FN5. Cynthia and Kelly were married after the
instant offense on September 5, 1985.
FN6. Kelly told Cynthia that the police could not
perform a ballistics test on a .22 caliber gun.
On the evening of April 30, 1984, after drinking
beer and injecting methamphetamine, Cynthia, Kelly, and Wilson drove
to the victims' home. Upon arrival, Kelly ordered Cynthia to remain in
the vehicle. Cynthia had been unaware of both the destination and the
purpose of this trip. While waiting for the men, Cynthia heard gunfire
and a baby crying. She entered the home and saw that Kelly had a woman
(Brenda Morgan) pinned against the wall and that a baby (Devin Morgan)
was crying. Cynthia picked up the child and shielded him from the
sight of his mother struggling with Kelly. Kelly shot Brenda in the
back of the neck and dragged her to a bedroom. Cynthia put the baby in
a chair and followed Kelly to the bedroom. Brenda's husband Jerry had
already been shot, and Kelly placed Brenda next to him. Brenda begged
Cynthia for help, and Cynthia responded by retrieving a towel and
placing it under Brenda's head.
Cynthia returned to the living room and attempted
to comfort the crying baby. Kelly grabbed the crying infant from
Cynthia and shot him in the head. Kelly aimed his gun at Cynthia and
ordered her to return to the vehicle. As she exited the home, Cynthia
heard Kelly again shoot the infant. Cynthia testified that Kelly used
the same gun, a .22 caliber pistol, to shoot both Brenda and the baby.
Kelly and Wilson took several items from the
victims' home, including guns, decorative brass butterflies, and a
coffee maker. Kelly, with Wilson as a passenger, drove the victims'
car and ordered Cynthia to follow him in their vehicle. Pursuant to
Kelly's instructions, the three wiped the victims' car to destroy any
fingerprints and abandoned the car in a hospital parking lot in Tyler,
Texas. Subsequently, while driving, Kelly and Wilson discussed needing
money, and the three “ended up at” Steven's home. Cynthia's memory
became “blurry” after that point; however, she did remember Kelly and
Steven retreating to the pool room to have a conversation.FN7. Cynthia
did not hear any of their conversation.
The State introduced evidence corroborating several
points of Cynthia's testimony, including the location of the mother's
and child's gunshot wounds, the caliber of the murder weapon, the
location and position of the bodies in the home, the towel that was
found under the mother's head, and the location of the victims' car (which
was devoid of fingerprints). The State also introduced evidence that
Jerry and Brenda Morgan had been City Marshal Reserve Officers and
argued that Kelly's motive for killing the Morgans was that they were
providing information to law enforcement.
Additionally, Cynthia's sister Violet Brownfield
testified that Kelly had “bragg[ed]” about killing a family, including
a child. Danny Moore, who had met Kelly through Moore's cousin,
testified that Kelly said he collected “debts at a forty-sixty split”
for Walter Shannon. Moore further testified that Kelly said he had
“taken care of that job ... [and] need[ed] to go see the man about
some money.” Kelly further explained that “that man, his old lady, and
the kid ... they're not coming back.” Kelly became angry and said “I
warned them, they had a chance. [T]hey wouldn't do nothing.” Kelly
warned that “there's going to be a lot more people end up like this if
they don't pay up.”
Kelly's defense theory was that the victims were
killed by an unidentified black assailant. He relied on the following
evidence: (1) hairs with Negroid characteristics were found in vacuum
sweepings from the Morgans' home; (2) a pick-up truck was stolen from
a parking lot near the victims' abandoned car; (3) two black males
were apprehended for the theft of that truck; and (4) a necklace was
recovered which two of the victims' family members initially
identified as belonging to Brenda Morgan. Kelly's theory was that
Cynthia had a relationship with a black man and she had fabricated her
story to protect that man and/or to attempt revenge against Kelly.FN8
FN8. The State introduced evidence through Timothy
Fallon, a Trace Evidence Analyst, that the hairs that had Negroid
characteristics did not match either of the two black men who were
apprehended for theft of the truck. Additionally, Fallon explained
that hair that had Negroid characteristics did not necessarily come
from a black individual and could come from a Caucasian individual.
In October of 1991, a Gregg County, Texas jury
found Kelly guilty of capital murder. At the punishment phase of the
trial, the State introduced evidence that Kelly has a bad reputation
for violence and a record of criminal convictions, including burglary,
unlawful weapon possession, controlled substance delivery and
possession, aggravated sexual assault, and murder. The jury
affirmatively answered the special issues set forth in Article
37.071(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and the trial court
sentenced Kelly to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
the conviction and sentence, Kelly v. State, No. 71,361 (Tex. Crim.App.
June 26, 1996), and the Supreme Court denied Kelly's petition for
certiorari on March 24, 1997. Kelly v. Texas, 520 U.S. 1145, 117 S.Ct.
1316, 137 L.Ed.2d 479 (1997).
Kelly filed a state habeas petition, and the state
trial court recommended denying relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals
denied relief without written order, Ex parte Kelly, No. 36,791-10 (Tex
.Crim.App. April 8, 1998), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on
October 5, 1998. Kelly v. Texas, 525 U.S. 891, 119 S.Ct. 210, 142 L.Ed.2d
172 (1998).
The federal district court dismissed Kelly's first
federal habeas petition as unexhausted. Kelly then filed a second
application for state post-conviction relief, which was dismissed as
an abuse of the writ by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Ex Parte
Kelly, No. 36,791-02 (Tex.Crim.App. September 13, 2000). Kelly then
filed the instant petition, which the district court denied. As
previously indicated, the district court granted Kelly's motion for a
COA with respect to four claims that have yet to be briefed. Before us
now is Kelly's application for a COA with respect to seven issues.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As indicated, Kelly requests a COA from this Court.
Section 2253(c)(1) provides that “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge
issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to
the court of appeals....” Recently, the Supreme Court made clear that
“until a COA has been issued federal courts of appeals lack
jurisdiction to rule on the merits of appeals from habeas petitioners.”
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039, 154 L.Ed.2d
931 (2003). To obtain a COA, Kelly must make “a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Miller-El,
123 S.Ct. at 1039; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483, 120 S.Ct.
1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). To make such a showing, he must
demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for
that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a
different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at 1039 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
In Miller-El, the Supreme Court reiterated that we
“should limit [our] examination to a threshold inquiry into the
underlying merit of [the] claims.” Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at 1034 (
Slack, 120 S.Ct. 1595). The Court explained that “a COA ruling is not
the occasion for a ruling on the merit of petitioner's claim....” Id.
at 1036. Instead, a COA ruling “requires an overview of the claims in
the habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits.” Id. at
1039. To make this assessment, a court of appeals “look [s] to the
District Court's application of AEDPA to petitioner's constitutional
claims and ask[s] whether that resolution was debatable amongst
jurists of reason.” Id. “This threshold inquiry does not require full
consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the
claims.” Id. If a court of appeals denies a COA by deciding the merits
of an appeal, it essentially decides the appeal without jurisdiction.
Id.
We must be mindful that “a claim can be debatable
even though every jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been
granted and the case has received full consideration, that petitioner
will not prevail.” Id. at 1040. As such, we do not decide the merits
of Kelly's claims, but only whether he has demonstrated that “
‘reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” ’ Id. (quoting Slack, 529
U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. at 1604). Additionally, when a district court
denies a claim on a procedural ground, “a COA should issue when the
prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.” Id.
III. ANALYSIS
A. DUE PROCESS VIOLATION BASED ON CLAIM OF
ACTUAL INNOCENCE
Kelly first argues that his conviction and sentence
constitute a denial of due process because he is actually innocent of
the crime. Relying on Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853,
122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), the district court concluded that “[b]ecause
clemency can be obtained from the Board of Pardons and Paroles of the
State of Texas, actual innocence, by itself, is not a claim for which
relief can be granted in federal habeas corpus for someone sentenced
to death under Texas law.” Finding the claim not cognizable in federal
habeas proceedings, the district court denied relief and a COA.
“Claims of actual innocence based on newly
discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal
habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring
in the underlying state criminal proceeding.” Herrera, 506 U.S. at
400, 113 S.Ct. 853. Instead, a claim of actual innocence is a “gateway
through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise
barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Id. at 404, 113
S.Ct. 853. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court's
conclusion is not debatable among jurists of reason.
Kelly argues that the independent constitutional
claim is the due process violation based on the state's awareness of
the false testimony it elicited at trial. However, as noted previously,
the district court has granted a COA with respect to that particular
due process claim. At this point in the appeal, we are addressing only
the claims that involve a request for a COA.
B. DUE PROCESS VIOLATION BASED ON PROSECUTORIAL
ARGUMENT
Kelly argues that his due process rights were
violated by the prosecutor's incorrect argument that Cynthia should
not be considered an accomplice with respect to the instant offense.
For constitutional error to have occurred, a prosecutor's improper
argument must have “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make
the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 91 L.Ed.2d 144
(1986); cf. Earvin v. Lynaugh, 860 F.2d 623 (5th Cir.1988) (the
evidence must be so insubstantial that no conviction would have
occurred but for the argument made by the prosecutor).
During closing arguments at the guilt-innocence
phase, the prosecutor referred to the jury instructions and stated the
following:
The law in Texas is that if an accomplice testifies,
before a Jury can convict, there must be some other evidence to
connect the Defendant to the offense charged. The Court goes on to
tell you what an accomplice is. And we submit, ladies and gentlemen,
Cindy Kelly is not an accomplice because Cindy Kelly did not act with
intent to promote or assist in the commission of this offense. She did
not enter the house with the intent to commit the murder or the
robbery. In fact, Cindy Kelly acted in an attempt to stop what was
done. She attempted to stop the murder of the baby. She begged this
Defendant to leave the baby at a doorstep and to save the baby's life.
The very crime scene itself shows that Cindy Kelly is not a party to
this offense because she is the one that left the folded towel under
the head of Brenda Morgan in an attempt to comfort the victim. The
Court further instructs you that to be a party to the offense, they
must be connected to the offense before or during the commission of
the offense. Cindy Kelly, at the order and direction of Alvin Kelly,
drove away at his instructions and his direction. At his order, she
helped wipe the car down in Tyler after the capital murder was
complete. She had no intent prior to or during to aid or assist in the
commission of the offense. She just thought this was business as usual
when her [sic] and Al went out. The Court also tells you that mere
presence alone does not make a person an accomplice. Even if there's
any question in your mind as to whether Cindy Kelly is an accomplice,
the testimony is corroborated and overwhelming by three witnesses -
three witnesses who this Defen[d]ant confessed to - Steve Kelly, his
brother, Violet Brownfield, and Danny Moore.
The record contains evidence supporting the
prosecutor's argument that Cynthia was not an accomplice. As such, the
argument is a fair comment on the evidence.
Relying on Creel v. State, 754 S.W.2d 205 (Tex.Crim.App.1988),
the district court denied relief. In Creel, the Court of Criminal
Appeals reiterated that without an affirmative act on the part of the
witness to assist or encourage the murder, the witness is not an
accomplice. Id. at 213. Indeed, Kelly points to no evidence at trial
that Cynthia committed an affirmative act to assist or encourage the
murder of the baby, Devin. We conclude that the district court's
resolution of this issue is not debatable among jurists of reason.FN9
FN9. In support of his argument, Kelly relies on
the Supreme Court's decision in Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 78 S.Ct.
103, 2 L.Ed.2d 9 (1957). There, the Supreme Court held that the
petitioner's due process rights were violated when the prosecutor
knowingly elicited testimony that gave a false impression of material
evidence to the jury. Alcorta did not involve a claim of improper
prosecutorial argument. To the extent that Kelly is attempting to
argue that his due process rights were violated based on the
prosecution's knowing use of perjured testimony and failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence, as noted previously, those claims are
not yet before us.
* * *
G. VIOLATION OF SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the
familiar two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. (Terry)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1511, 146 L.Ed.2d
389 (2000) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). To demonstrate that counsel was
ineffective, a petitioner must establish that counsel's representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See id. To show
prejudice, he must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. See id. at 1511-12.
1. Failure to Properly Examine Cynthia
Kelly argues that counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to cross-examine Cynthia with respect to the
existence of any agreement she had with the State for her testimony.
During the state habeas proceedings, the state court found that
“[t]here was no agreement between the State and Cynthia ... that she
would not be prosecuted for the murders to induce her to testify.”
Kelly admits that because Cynthia denied any such
agreement during her pre-trial deposition, counsel correctly would
have expected her to continue to do so at trial. Kelly further
acknowledges that the prosecutor personally represented to the court
that no deal had been made with Cynthia in exchange for her testimony
and that the State did not consider Cynthia a codefendant or a
coconspirator. Instead, according to the State, Cynthia was a witness
to the murders. Nonetheless, Kelly asserts that had counsel asked
Cynthia whether she had received anything for her testimony, it would
have (at least) raised a question of credibility for the jurors.
The district court assumed arguendo that counsel's
failure to make this inquiry constituted deficient performance. With
respect to the second prong, the district court “adopted” the state
court's finding that there was no agreement between the State and
Cynthia that she would not be prosecuted in exchange for testifying
against Kelly. Based on this factual finding, the district court found
there was not a reasonable probability that, had counsel cross-examined
Cynthia with respect the existence of any such agreement, the outcome
of the guilt or sentencing phase would have been different.
Relying on the affidavits of Kelly's sister Nancy
Brown and her husband, Conley Brown, defense investigator Barry
Higginbotham, Cynthia's sister, Beverly Stemen, and state habeas
counsel Mark Breding, Kelly contends that subsequent investigation has
demonstrated that the authorities either: (1) coerced Cynthia into
testifying by threatening her life and that of her son; or (2)
promised, advised, or lead Cynthia to believe that she would not be
prosecuted if she returned to Texas to testify.
Contrary to Kelly's contentions, the hearsay in the
affidavits regarding some vague threat by the authorities does not
rise to a substantial showing. None of the affidavits provide that
Cynthia admitted that she had an agreement with the State. The closest
allegation is that representatives of the district attorney's office
told Cynthia's sister Beverly Stemen that although Cynthia would not
be granted immunity, she would not be prosecuted. Kelly's argument is
that Cynthia was not prosecuted even though her sister informed
Assistant District Attorney Rebecca Simpson that Cynthia had confessed
to shooting Jerry Morgan.
However, the state court found that Beverly never
had a conversation with Simpson or the District Attorney's Office
investigator Russell Potts concerning Cynthia shooting Morgan.
Moreover, as set forth previously, in a 2001 deposition, Cynthia's
sister Beverly contradicted her previous affidavit by testifying that
“I remember [Cynthia] saying very clearly on that point, very clearly
that in [Cynthia's] dream she had shot the man.” FN19 Further, the
state court found that Cynthia never told her sisters that she shot
Jerry Morgan and that Cynthia's reference to shooting a man was only
in the context of a nightmare.
FN19. As set forth previously, Beverly stated in
her deposition that she was angry at Cynthia at the time she lied.
Beverly also indicated that she was taking “medications” and went to
see a psychiatrist because the medicine “was causing me to do things
and say things that weren't of my nature, that were inappropriate.”
Specifically, the state court found that Beverly was taking the
following medications when she had executed the affidavit: “Luvox,
Wellbutrin, Cytomel, Trazodone, Methyphaidate, Conazepam, Methpheid,
Cyclobenzaabr, Ultram, and Zepharine.”
The State's position has been that Cynthia did not
participate in the murders and thus she would not be prosecuted. The
state court found that District Attorney's Office investigator Russell
Potts and Sheriff's investigator Chuck Willeford informed Cynthia that
“if it was shown that she participated in the crime she would be
prosecuted. She was informed that mere presence at the scene was not
sufficient to charge her with the crime.”
In any event, the question before us is whether
Kelly has made a substantial showing that there is a reasonable
probability of a different outcome had defense counsel cross-examined
Cynthia regarding any deal she allegedly had with the State. Although
defense counsel did not inquire regarding a deal with the State,
counsel did question Cynthia's motives while on the stand. Counsel
asked Cynthia whether the State had charged her with any offense, and
she responded no. On cross-examination, Cynthia admitted that the
State paid for her trips between Michigan and Texas and for her stay
in Texas.
Additionally, the state court found that defense
counsel cross-examined Cynthia regarding her decision to speak to law
enforcement after the dismissal of a child support lawsuit against
Kelly. In view of the evidence against Kelly at trial and the
questions regarding Cynthia's motivation to testify, we are confident
that Kelly has not shown that the district court's conclusion (that
there exists no reasonable probability of a different outcome had
defense counsel cross-examined Cynthia regarding any deal she
allegedly had with the State) is debatable among jurists of reason.
Kelly also argues that counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to cross-examine Cynthia with respect to the
role she played in the murder of John Ford.FN20 Kelly argues that such
cross-examination would have disclosed to the jury that Cynthia had
far greater involvement in “criminal activities than she admitted at
trial.” According to Kelly, this questioning “would have indicated
that she was actually an accomplice in the Morgan killings, rather
than simply being present and forced to assist at gunpoint, as she
claimed at trial.” Of course, as found by the state court during
habeas proceedings, had counsel conducted such a cross-examination
during the guilt phase, the jury would have been informed that Kelly
had committed another murder. Indeed, Kelly's counsel had filed a
motion in limine to exclude evidence of extraneous offenses such as
the Ford murder. The district court denied relief on this claim,
concluding that Kelly had not met the first prong of Strickland. 466
U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
More specifically, the district court opined that
“[c]onsidering that Kelly denied guilt in the Morgan murders, the
Court cannot say that a strategy of not admitting to the Ford murder
during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, in order to lessen the
chance of jury prejudice, would have been objectively unreasonable.”
On appeal, Kelly does not acknowledge, much less challenge, this
conclusion. Accordingly, because cross-examination of Cynthia
regarding another murder would have introduced very prejudicial
evidence during the guilt phase, we conclude that Kelly has not shown
that the district court's resolution of this issue is debatable among
jurists of reason.
FN20. Kelly was serving a sentence for the murder
of John Ford at the time the instant, unrelated offense was solved.
2. Failure to File Prepared Motion to Transfer
Venue
Elizabeth Fulton, who was co-counsel for Kelly's
lead attorney Harry Heard, prepared a motion to transfer venue that
was never filed. Under Texas law, to prevail on a motion to transfer
venue based on unfavorable pretrial publicity, a defendant must
establish, among other things, that pretrial publicity was pervasive,
prejudicial, and inflammatory. McManus v. State, 591 S.W.2d 505 (Tex.Crim.App.1979);
Demouchette v. State, 591 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).
Relying on three affidavits and twenty-seven
newspaper articles covering the instant offense, Kelly argues that
trial counsel should have filed the motion, and it would have been
granted.FN21 In support of this argument, Kelly points to two
statements made by each of the affiants. The first statement in each
of the affidavits reads as follows: “It is my belief that a conspiracy
of influential people constituting a dangerous combination against
Alvin Kelly that would preclude a fair trial in Gregg County, Texas,
exists.” The second statement by the affiants reads as follows: “It is
my belief that the newspaper accounts that attempt to tie the murder
of the Morgan family to the Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) murders would
also preclude a fair trial in Gregg County, Texas.” The apparently
unrelated “KFC murders” in the region had received a good deal of
media coverage and had not been solved (at least at the time of
Kelly's trial).
FN21. The district court assumed arguendo that
twenty-seven newspaper articles over a six-year period constituted
pervasive press coverage.
With respect to the first statement made by the
affiants, the district court found that the conspiracy allegations and
prejudice against the defendant are vague and conclusory. With respect
to the allegation that Kelly was prejudiced by the newspaper articles,
the district court found that none of the summaries offered by Kelly
indicate that the respective writers attempted to tie the instant
murders to the KFC murders. Indeed, all the references found by the
district court indicated that the instant murders and the KFC murders
were not related.FN22 Thus, the district court concluded that the
state trial court would not have found credible the assertion in the
affidavits that the newspaper coverage connecting the instant offense
to the KFC murders would have precluded a fair trial.
FN22. We also note that the references to the KFC
murders were in four articles published in 1984 and one article in
1989. The instant trial was conducted in 1991.
In his brief, Kelly does not attempt to demonstrate
that the district court's conclusions were incorrect. This Court is
not persuaded that twenty-seven articles over a time period in excess
of six years is pervasive. Moreover, in light of Kelly's failure to
show that the conspiracy allegations were more than conclusory or that
the newspaper coverage attempted to connect the instant offense with
the KFC murders, we are convinced that the district court's resolution
of Kelly's claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance for
failing to file the motion to transfer venue is not debatable among
reasonable jurists.
3. Counsel was Intoxicated During Trial
In the alternative to the above arguments, Kelly
argues that no prejudice is necessary because his counsel was
intoxicated during trial and a “drunk lawyer is no better than a
sleeping one.” In Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir.2001) (en
banc), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1120, 122 S.Ct. 2347, 153 L.Ed.2d 174
(2002), this Court held that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is violated when that defendant's counsel is repeatedly asleep
through not insubstantial portions of the defendant's capital murder
trial. Under such circumstances, it must be presumed that the
violation prejudiced the defendant. Contrary to Kelly's reliance on
Burdine, in that case, this Court distinguished intoxicated counsel
from sleeping counsel, explaining that sleeping or unconscious counsel
could not perform at all for his client. Id. at 349. We are bound by
precedent to reject Kelly's argument that he need not show prejudice
based on defense counsel's alleged intoxication. See also Burnett v.
Collins, 982 F.2d 922 (5th Cir.1993) (rejecting claim that counsel
rendered ineffective assistance simply because counsel abused
alcohol).
Accordingly, because Kelly has failed to make a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right with
respect to each of his claims, we DENY a COA.