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Juan Ignacio Blanco  

 

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Johnny Paul PENRY

 
 
 
 
 

 

 

 

 
 
 
Classification: Murderer
Characteristics: Rape
Number of victims: 1
Date of murder: October 25, 1979
Date of birth: May 5, 1956
Victim profile: Pamela Moseley Carpenter, 22 (sister of American football star Mark Moseley)
Method of murder: Stabbing with a pair of scissors
Location: Polk County, Texas, USA
Status: Sentenced to death on April 9, 1980. Commuted to life in prison on February 15, 2008
 
 
 
 
 
 

STEVENS, J., Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

492 U.S. 302

Penry v. Lynaugh

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT


No. 87-6177 Argued: January 11, 1989 --- Decided: June 26, 1989


JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

As I stated in my separate opinion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 318-319, and n. 2 (1989), it is neither logical nor prudent to consider a rule's retroactive application before the rule itself is articulated. Nor am I at all sure that courts should decide the retroactivity issue if it was not raised below. Cf. Zant v. Moore, 489 U.S. 836, 837 (1989) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). Finally, I do not support the Court's assertion, without benefit of argument or briefing on the issue, that Teague's retroactivity principles pertain to capital cases. Cf. Teague, 489 U.S. at 321, and n. 3 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But assuming, arguendo, that those principles do apply, it is clear that the Court's discussion of the mitigating evidence question, with which I agree, does not establish a "new rule" [p350] as that term is used for retroactivity purposes. I thus join Parts I, II-B, and III.

In Part IV-A, the Court decides that a rule that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a mentally retarded person ought to apply retroactively. Assuming retroactivity is pertinent, I agree that the first exception to Justice Harlan's nonretroactivity doctrine

should be understood to cover not only rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct but also rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense,

ante at 330, and that this claim lies within that exception. [*]

The remaining sections of Part IV adequately and fairly state the competing arguments respecting capital punishment of mentally retarded persons. In my judgment, however, that explication -- particularly the summary of the arguments advanced in the Brief for American Association on Mental Retardation et al. as Amici Curiae, ante at 336-337 -- compels the conclusion that such executions are unconstitutional. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in its entirety.

* Because I believe that retroactivity should not be considered until after a right is established, see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 318-319, and n. 2 (1989) (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), the Court's rejection of this claim ordinarily would preclude me from agreeing even for purposes of argument that the rule Penry seeks may be applied retroactively. I do so here because the Court has fleshed out the merits of Penry's claim sufficiently to allow me to reach a contrary conclusion.

 

 

 
 
 
 
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