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Patrick Gene POLAND
Classification: Murderer
Characteristics:
Armored car robbery
Number of victims: 2
Date of murders:
May 24,
1977
Date
of arrest:
May 1978
Date of birth:
March 8,
1950
Victims profile: Russell Dempsey and Cecil
Newkirk(armored car drivers)
Method of murder:
Drowning
Location: Mohave County, Arizona, USA
Status:
Executed
by lethal injection in Arizona on March 15,
2000
Summary:
Patrick Poland is on death row for murdering two armored car drivers
in 1977. His brother Michael Poland was executed last in 1999 for
his participation in the same crime.
On May 24, 1977, two Purolator guards, Russell Dempsey and Cecil
Newkirk, left Phoenix in an armored van on their run to banks in
Prescott, Sedona and Flagstaff.
On Interstate #17 they were stopped by the Polands, who were
disguised as highway patrolmen and were driving a car fitted with
emergency lights. The Polands took the guards captive and removed
close to $300,000 in cash.
On May 25, 1977, authorities found the abandoned Purolator van. That
morning, Michael rented a boat at the Lake Mead marina and piloted
the boat to a little used landing, where he met his brother, Michael
Kent Poland.
They put the guards into canvas bags, took them across
the lake, and dumped them into the water. The bodies surfaced 3
weeks later in a cove on the Nevada side of the lake. The Polands
were convicted in federal court on robbery and kidnaping charges,
and in state court on the murder charges.
In 1982 the Arizona Supreme Court reversed the Polands' convictions,
finding that the jurors had improperly considered extrajudicial
information, including the fact of the Polands' prior federal
convictions for the same offense. On retrial later in 1982, the
Polands were again convicted and sentenced to death.
Arizona Department of
Corrections
On May 24, 1977, two Purolator guards, Russell
Dempsey and Cecil Newkirk, left Phoenix in an armored van on their
run to banks in Prescott, Sedona and Flagstaff.
At the Bumblebee
Road exit on Interstate- 17, they were stopped by the Polands, who
were disguised as highway patrolmen and were driving a car fitted
with emergency lights. The Polands took the guards captive and
removed close to $300,000 in cash.
On May 25, 1977, authorities found the abandoned
Purolator van. That morning, Michael rented a boat at the Lake Mead
marina and piloted the boat to a little used landing, where he met
his brother. They put the guards into canvas bags, took them across
the lake, and dumped them into the water.
The bodies surfaced 3
weeks later in a cove on the Nevada side of the lake. The Polands
were convicted in federal court on robbery and kidnaping charges,
and in state court on the murder charges.
PROCEEDINGS
Presiding Judge: Paul G. Rosenblatt
Prosecutors: Billy Hicks (first trial) Melvin McDonald, Wesley
Jennings, Steven Twist (second trial)
Start of Trial: October 23, 1979 (first trial) October 18, 1982 (second
trial)
Verdicts: November 24, 1979 (first trial) November 18, 1982 (second
trial)
Sentencing: April 9, 1980 (first trial) February 3, 1983 (second
trial)
Aggravating Circumstances:
Prior conviction involving violence , Pecuniary gain, Especially
heinous/cruel/depraved (struck on appeal)
Mitigating Circumstances:
None sufficient to call for leniency
Last Meal
No Last Meal Request
Factual Background
Patrick Poland is on death row for murdering two
armored car drivers in 1977. His brother Michael Poland was executed
last year for his participation in the same crime.
In February of
1977, Patrick, using the name Mark Harris, purchased a taser gun.
Michael was also present when the gun was purchased.
Patrick also
purchased a police scanner in February, 1977. Michael
contemporaneously purchased a police scanner, using the name Mark
Harris in making the purchase. Michael used the name Mark Harris
again in preparing some false identification.
That same month, Michael visited his brother-in-law,
John Eaton, in Flagstaff, Arizona. Mr. Eaton was a campus police
officer at Northern Arizona University, and a reserve officer with
the Flagstaff Police Department. During this visit, Michael spent
approximately 2 hours reading police manuals that Mr. Eaton had in
his home, and he discussed the use of scanners with Mr. Eaton.
On April 25, 1977, a man using the name Mark
Harris purchased three large canvas bags (approximately 6 feet in
length) from Phoenix Tent and Awning. In May of 1977, Patrick and
Michael purchased an emergency light bar, identical to those used on
the roofs of police vehicles.
They claimed the light bar was to be
used in their towing business, but they had no such business.
Patrick and his brother returned to the store twice after the
purchase because the bar was not functioning properly. Store
employees eventually repaired the item.
Also in May 1977, Michael called a friend, David
Manzer, who was a former police officer with the city of Phoenix.
Michael Poland asked Manzer about the belt and holster he had worn
as a police officer, and Mr. Manzer told him where to purchase that
type of equipment.
On May 10, 1977, at 8:09 a.m., Michael made a
collect telephone call to his home from a pay phone in Black Canyon
City. At approximately the same time of day, a Purolator armored van
passed by Black Canyon City on its scheduled run to Prescott, Sedona,
and Flagstaff.
Two weeks later, on May 24, 1977, two Purolator
driver-guards, Russell Dempsey and Cecil Newkirk, left the Purolator
garage in Phoenix at 8:00 a.m. to begin their scheduled run to banks
in Prescott, Sedona, and Flagstaff.
The van carried a total of $328,150 in cash, of
which $288,000 was currency. Bernice Snyder and her husband Arnold
were traveling from Phoenix to Sedona on Interstate 17 that morning.
Near Black Canyon City, a car they believed to be a law enforcement
vehicle passed them with its emergency lights flashing. There were
no Department of Public Safety officers on duty in that area that
morning.
Shortly after the car passed them, Mrs. Snyder saw a light-colored
car and a Purolator van stopped near the Bumblebee Road exit. Mrs.
Snyder saw Michael Poland wearing a uniform and standing near the
light-colored car.
Edna Acker and her husband were also traveling
northbound on Interstate 17 that morning. Mrs. Acker saw the
Purolator van stopped off to the side of the freeway and a man in
uniform standing near the van. She later identified the man as
Patrick.
Dempsey and Newkirk had been scheduled to make
their first stop that morning at the Great Western Bank in Prescott.
At approximately 10:30 a.m., Purolator officials learned that
Dempsey and Newkirk had not arrived at the Prescott bank. Purolator
officials then began calling law enforcement agencies.
At approximately 2:30 p.m., Patrick and Michael
arrived at their father's home and borrowed his pickup truck. They
also borrowed a tarpaulin from their father. Mr. Poland had been
using the tarpaulin to cover some sacks of cement.
On May 25, 1977, at around 6:00 a.m., authorities
found the Purolator van west of Interstate 17 near the Bumblebee
Road exit. A $500 bill and a total of $34,650 in coins remained in
the van, and officers observed blood stains in several areas inside
the van.
The blood was determined to be human blood type O. Dempsey
had type O blood. Law enforcement officers searched unsuccessfully
for Dempsey and Newkirk.
That same morning, Michael rented a boat from
Ralph Van Buskirk at the Temple Bar Marina on the Arizona side of
Lake Mead. Michael was waiting outside when Van Buskirk opened the
rental shop at 6:15 a.m. Michael told Van Buskirk that he planned to
meet someone at Bonelli Landing. Bonelli Landing is approximately 14
miles from the Temple Bar Marina.
At around 2:00 p.m., Michael and another man
returned the boat, telling Van Buskirk that their pickup truck was
stuck at Bonelli Landing. Patrick eventually contacted Stan Sekulski,
a tow truck operator. Sekulski drove Michael and his companion back
to Bonelli Landing.
Upon arrival, Sekulski saw the truck at the
water's edge with all four wheels in the water. The back of the
truck was facing the lake and the truck's tailgate was down. Mr.
Sekulski attached a tow line to the front axle of the truck, and,
after around 45 minutes, freed the truck from the mud.
Within a week, Patrick and Michael, who had been
in severe financial straits, were flush with money. They made
numerous cash purchases and repaid loans in cash, spending more than
$100,000.
On June 16, 1977, a boater discovered a body
floating in the waters of Debbie's Cove on the Nevada side of Lake
Mead. Debbie's Cove is approximately 5 miles due north of Bonelli
Landing. Bonelli Landing is also the closest point in Arizona to
Debbie's Cove. A canvas bag covered the upper portion of the body.
On June 23, 1977, a second body surfaced
approximately 100 yards from the spot where the first body had been
found. No canvas bag covered this body, but divers found such a bag
a short distance away from the body.
On August 15, 1977, divers found a third canvas
bag beneath the waters of Debbie's Cove. This bag contained a
tarpaulin and a blanket. Divers also found two revolvers and a bent
license plate on the bottom of the cove near the bag. The license
plate bore a depiction of the Arizona state flag, and was similar to
plates used by the Department of Public Safety.
The canvas bags recovered from Debbie's Cove were
those that "Mark Harris" had purchased from Phoenix Tent and Awning.
The tarpaulin was identified as being of the type Patrick and his
brother had borrowed from their father and never returned. Particles
found on the tarpaulin were consistent with those that would be
found on a tarpaulin that had been used to cover sacks of cement.
The revolvers belonged to Dempsey and Newkirk.
The medical examiner for Clark County, Nevada,
performed autopsies on the two bodies, and he identified them as
Dempsey and Newkirk. Both bodies were in advanced stages of
decomposition, and had been in the water for a substantial length of
time.
The medical examiner concluded that both men had drowned,
although there was a possibility that Dempsey might have died from a
heart attack before his body was placed in the water.
Procedural Background
On July 27, 1977, F.B.I. agents executed a search
warrant at Michael Poland's home. The search uncovered two handcuff
cases, a scanner, over $13,000 in cash, a taser gun receipt bearing
the name of Mark Harris, and a police-type gun belt. Agents searched
Michael's car, and discovered a siren that could be activated by a
switch inside the passenger compartment.
Simultaneously, F.B.I. agents executed a search
warrant at Patrick's house. The agents found, among other things,
over $15,000 in currency and a wallet with an insert for a law
enforcement- type badge.
On May 17, 1978, the Federal government charged
Patrick and Michael Poland with five counts of bank robbery, two
counts of kidnapping, and two counts of murder in United States of
America v. Michael Kent Poland and Patrick Gene Poland, CR
78319-TUC-WCF (TFM).
In July of 1978, the United States Attorney
prosecuting the case offered the Polands a plea agreement wherein
they would plead guilty to federal murder charges.
In return, the
federal government would move to dismiss the bank robbery and
kidnapping charges, and would recommend that the State of Arizona
not prosecute the Polands for any crime related to the robbery,
kidnappings and murders in question.
The Polands rejected the
proposed plea agreement. The United States' Attorney's Office
subsequently moved to dismiss both murder counts, and the district
court dismissed those counts.
On February 14, 1979, Patrick was convicted of
five counts of bank robbery and two counts of kidnapping. On March
14, 1979, the district court sentenced Patrick to 100 years
imprisonment, and ordered that Patrick pay a $50,000 fine.
On April 26, 1979, the State of Arizona charged
Patrick and his brother with two counts of first-degree murder in
connection with the same incident underlying their federal court
convictions for robbery and kidnapping. Following a jury trial, the
Polands were convicted of both counts of first-degree murder, and
were sentenced to death on both counts.
On April 13, 1982, the
Arizona Supreme Court reversed the Polands' convictions, finding
that the jurors had improperly considered extrajudicial information,
including the fact of the Polands' prior federal convictions for the
same offense. The Court remanded the matter for a new trial.
On June 8, 1982, the Yavapai County Attorney
filed a motion to dismiss the case without prejudice, claiming that
there was insufficient evidence to proceed to trial at that time.
At
a hearing on this motion, the Yavapai County Attorney argued that
the quantity and quality of the evidence had degenerated
significantly due to the passage of time subsequent to the crime,
and due to evidentiary rulings by the Arizona Supreme Court.
Patrick's counsel did not oppose the motion to dismiss, and asked
that the dismissal be with prejudice.
The trial court denied the
motion, noting that the defendants and the public were entitled to a
trial, and that any problems with the evidence could be worked out.
At a second hearing, the Yavapai County Attorney said that he would
not move to have the matter set for trial and would decline to
prosecute.
The trial court stated that the county attorney could not
simply abandon his responsibility to prosecute, and suggested that
the court could appoint a special prosecutor in the case.
The trial
court also suggested that the county attorney ask the Arizona
Attorney General's Office for assistance in prosecuting the matter.
Finally, the trial judge concluded that, having heard all the
evidence at the trial, he could not find that insufficiency of the
evidence was a valid reason for dismissing the matter.
United States
Attorneys Melvin McDonald and Roland Jennings contacted the Yavapai
County Attorney to offer their assistance in prosecuting the case,
and after being appointed as special Yavapai County prosecutors,
those two men, together with an Assistant Arizona Attorney General,
took over the state prosecution.
The Polands' second trial commenced on October
18, 1982, and, after several weeks of trial, the jury returned
verdicts finding Patrick and Michael guilty of both of the murder
charges. On February 3, 1983, the trial court sentenced Patrick to
death for both murder counts. In its Special Verdict filed that same
day, the trial court found as aggravating circumstances that Patrick
had committed the murders in an especially cruel, heinous, or
depraved manner, and for pecuniary gain. The trial court found
mitigating circumstances, but concluded they were not sufficiently
substantial to call for leniency.
On March 25, 1985, the Arizona Supreme Court
affirmed Patrick's convictions and death sentence. State v. Poland,
144 Ariz. 412, 698 P.2d 207 (1985). The Arizona Supreme Court
reversed the trial court's finding that the murders were especially
cruel, heinous, or depraved, but affirmed the death sentence after
finding no mitigating circumstances sufficient to call for leniency.
The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to review the issue of whether the double jeopardy clause
bars further capital sentencing proceedings when, on appeal from
death sentence, the reviewing court finds the evidence insufficient
to support the only aggravating factor on which the sentencing judge
relied but does not find the evidence insufficient to support the
death penalty. On May 5, 1986, the Court affirmed the Arizona
Supreme Court's ruling on this issue.
On November 4, 1987, Patrick filed a petition for
post-conviction relief, raising 32 claims. On November 15, 1988,
following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the
petition, and the Arizona Supreme Court subsequently denied review.
On June 10, 1993, Patrick filed a second post-conviction
relief petition, raising 17 issues. The petition was denied on the
basis of preclusion.
Patrick filed an amended petition for writ of
habeas corpus in the federal district court in January 1993. The
district court denied the petition, and that decision was affirmed
by the Ninth Circuit on March 1, 1999. The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari review on October 4, 1999, and the Arizona
Supreme Court issued the warrant for execution on February 9, 2000.
Patrick has filed a third petition for post-conviction
relief in Yavapai County Superior Court, that remains pending as of
today's date. The petition raises three claims (1) a Jones issue (arguing
that Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999),
changes the law with regard to whether a defendant is entitled to a
jury determination of aggravating circumstances); (2) a claim that
his lengthy incarceration constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
under Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995); and (3) jury misconduct
based on jurors' consideration of taser gun evidence.
EXECUTION March 15, 2000 - The Execution of ADC
inmate: Patrick POLAND #41126 by lethal injection was carried out
today at ASPC Florence. The execution began at 3.03pm and was
completed at 3.07pm.
Poland's last words included an apology to the
families of the victims. His last words were, "If I may, once again,
to the Newkirk and Dempsey families, please accept my apologies. I'm
sincere. I'm sorry for the pain and suffering I have caused. I do
thank you for your forgiveness. I ask my family to forgive me for
the pain I have caused them. I ask all my friends and people who
believed in me to please forgive me, and I ask the woman I love to
remember I will always love her."
[Source: Arizona Attorney General's Office]
ProDeathPenalty.com
On May 24, 1977, two Purolator guards, Russell
Dempsey and Cecil Newkirk, left Phoenix in an armored van on their
run to banks in Prescott, Sedona and Flagstaff.
At the Bumblebee Road exit on Interstate-17, they
were stopped by Michael and Patrick Poland, who were disguised as
highway patrolmen and were driving a car fitted with emergency
lights. The Polands took the guards captive and removed close to
$300,000 in cash.
On May 25, 1977, authorities found the abandoned
Purolator van. That morning, Michael rented a boat at the Lake Mead
marina and piloted the boat to a little used landing, where he met
his brother. They put the guards into canvas bags, took them across
the lake, and dumped them into the water. The bodies surfaced 3
weeks later in a cove on the Nevada side of the lake.
The Polands were convicted in federal court on robbery and
kidnapping charges, and in state court on the murder charges.
The
Polands stole about $280,000, but only $127,000 was accounted for
when they were arrested the next year. Michael Poland was executed
on June 16, 1999.
Fight the Death Penalty USA
Patrick Poland, XX, 2000-03-15, AZ
Patrick Poland was executed by injection
yesterday, nearly 23 years after he and his older brother robbed an
armored van of $288,000, put the two guards into canvas bags and
dropped them into Lake Mead.
From where he was strapped to a gurney, Poland
looked around at the execution witnesses and apologized to the
families of his victims, Cecil Newkirk and Russell Dempsey. "I'm
sincere. I'm sorry for the pain and suffering I have caused. I do
thank you for your forgiveness,'' Poland said. He also asked his
family and friends for forgiveness. "And I ask the woman I love to
remember I will always love her,'' Poland said, referring to his
girlfriend, Sherri Jo Christensen, who attended the execution.
Earlier, he had mouthed the words "I love you'' to Christensen and
blown her a kiss.
As the lethal chemicals began flowing at 3:03
p.m., Poland's head jerked four times. His body shook slightly, his
head rolled to the side and his eyes shut. He was pronounced dead at
3:07 p.m. Poland, 50, became the 21st inmate executed since the
state resumed executions in 1992. The U.S. Supreme Court denied
three requests for stays yesterday.
Michael Poland, the alleged mastermind of the
crimes, was executed for the crimes last June at age 59. Michael and
Patrick Poland were dressed in fake Highway Patrol uniforms and were
driving a rental car equipped with emergency lights when they
stopped the guards' Purolator van on Interstate 17 near Cordes
Junction on May 24, 1977.
The truck was ransacked of cash and coins
and Newkirk and Dempsey were driven 250 miles to Lake Mead. The next
day, the Polands wrapped Newkirk and Dempsey in custom-made canvas
bags weighted with rocks and pushed them from a rented boat into the
lake.
Prosecutors said the guards may have still been
alive when they were thrown into the water. It took nearly a month
for the guards' bodies to surface on the Nevada side of the lake.
The brothers were arrested in May 1978 - 51 weeks after the crimes -
after leaving a trail of evidence, including spending $127,000 of
the money in their hometown of Prescott. Several people involved in
the case said Patrick Poland seemed sorry for what he had done. Some
had even pleaded for his life.
A. Melvin McDonald, who prosecuted the Poland
brothers in the second of two trials and won conviction in 1982, was
among those who had a change of heart and wanted to see Patrick
Poland's life spared. "I hope that his death will bring peace,''
said McDonald, one of the witnesses yesterday. "Mr. Poland paid for
this crime each and every day for 23 years. I think he had genuine
remorse. I felt justice was done in the execution of the first
brother. "I felt mercy could have been done today by giving Patrick
Poland life in prison.'' Yavapai County prosecutor Arthur Markham,
who did not prosecute the case, spoke to some of the victims'
relatives afterward and said they felt his expressions of remorse
were truthful. "A man would not lie just before death,'' Markham
said.
(Source: Associated Press / APBNews)
Arizona Man Follows Brother to Death Chamber
By Robert Anthony Phillips -
APBNews Online
March 15, 2000
FLORENCE, Ariz. (APBnews.com) --
Patrick Poland's family believes that he was led into a life of
robbery, kidnapping and murder because of abuse and an "evil" older
brother who dominated and beat him. And this brother has now led
Patrick Poland into an early grave with him, a family member says.
Poland was executed by lethal injection today, one week after his
50th birthday. He died in the same death chamber that his brother,
Michael Poland, 59, was executed in on June 17, 1999. The brothers
were sentenced to death for killing two guards during a $300,000
armored van robbery in 1977.
Before he died, Poland apologized for the pain he
caused to his family and the families of the men he murdered, and
asked his girlfriend to remember him.
'Please forgive me'
"I'm sincere," Poland said. "I'm sorry for the
pain and suffering I have caused. I do thank you for your
forgiveness. I ask my family to forgive me for the pain I caused
them. I ask all my friends and people who believed in me to please
forgive me. And I ask the woman I love to remember I will always
love her."
The woman, identified as Sherrie Jo Christensen,
witnessed the execution from a viewing area, Dan Vannelli, a warden
for the state Department of Corrections, told APBnews.com. "She
sobbed quietly and was consoled by [another witness]," Vannelli said.
The deadly mixtures of chemicals began flowing into Poland at 3:03
p.m. and he was pronounced dead at 3:07 p.m., corrections officials
said. Witnesses said that as the chemicals flowed into his arm,
Poland wiggled and fluttered his eyes.
Links (Related Documents):
Execution documents for Patrick Poland
Patrick Poland's probation report
Former Prosecutor Melvin McDonald's letter to
Arizona Board of Executive Clemency
A letter from Jeffrey Poland, the twin brother of
Patrick, in an effort to save him from being executed
Family tells of 'evil' brother Poland's execution
came less than 24 hours after the Arizona Board of Executive
Clemency voted 4-1 not to spare his life. "He knew he had no chance,"
said Melvin McDonald, the prosecutor who put the Poland brothers on
death row but then had a change of heart and tried to save Patrick
Poland from execution. "But the value of the hearing was to let him
know during the last day of his life that people cared for his, and
that his family truly loves him. It was an expression that I think
made his last hours very special to him. He could see the love."
During the emotional, eight-hour clemency hearing Tuesday, Poland's
brothers and sister told of the abuse he had suffered as a child and
how he fell under the influence of Michael Poland, an "evil" brother
who led him into a life of crime and murder. Poland's daughter,
Stacey, told the panel that if she could start her life over and
pick any father that God would give her, she would still choose
Patrick Poland. Philip Poland, his brother, told the clemency board
that if Patrick dies, it wouldn't be the state that killed him -- it
would be his other brother, Michael.
Victims' families wanted justice McDonald, a
former U.S. attorney in Arizona, told the panel that Patrick Poland
had shown remorse and admitted his crimes. He said that "justice had
been done" in the execution of Michael Poland, but now it was time
to show mercy to Patrick.
But the relatives of Cecil Newkirk and
Russell Dempsey, the two guards murdered during the robbery, were
not as forgiving and moved. Newkirk's widow sent a letter to the
clemency panel stating that Patrick Poland had to pay with his life.
Camilla Strongin, a Department of Corrections spokeswoman, said
Poland spent his final hours with a Catholic priest, receiving last
rites about 2 1/2 hours before his execution.
He requested no last
meal, Strongin said. For breakfast he was served the routine prison
fare of a cup of oatmeal, pancakes and sausage and a cup of coffee.
Patrick Poland also did not want his family or children to witness
his execution.
Prosecutor tried to save him The last ditch
efforts to save Poland from the death house had taken a bizarre
twist last week when it was revealed that McDonald -- the prosecutor
who had won death sentences against the Poland brothers -- announced
he was urging the clemency panel to spare Patrick Poland's life.
McDonald told APBnews.com that since prosecuting the Polands, he had
come to believe that it was the evil influence of Michael Poland
that led Patrick into a life of crime. McDonald said Michael Poland
was the "evil" mastermind of the robbery of the armored car and
murder of the guards.
McDonald did admit, however, that Patrick
Poland took an active part in the killings. McDonald said that when
twin brothers Patrick and Jeffery Poland left home as teenagers
because of the abuse from their father, they each went to live with
a different older brother. Jeffery lived with Philip Poland, who
helped him become an architect. Patrick went to live with Michael
Poland, who taught him about crime, McDonald said.
A change of heart Before the brothers were
indicted and convicted for robbery and murder, they also teamed up
on a bizarre kidnapping scheme in which the wives of bank managers
were kidnapped and held for ransom. McDonald, who was designated as
a special state prosecutor to bring murder charges against the
Polands, said he had offered the brothers a life sentence in return
for guilty pleas. "His brother didn't want him to do it," McDonald
said. McDonald said he had no regrets about winning the death
sentences against both Patrick and Michael Poland. "Back in 1982, it
was the right thing to do," he said. Patrick Poland was the second
condemned killer executed in Arizona this year.
Prosecutor Comes to Killer's Defense
He Put Him
Behind Bars, Now He Wants to Save His Life,"
By Robert Anthony Phillips -
APBNewsOnline
March 12, 2000
PHOENIX (APBnews.com) -- Convicted killer Patrick
Poland is just days away from following in his big brother's
footsteps -- a walk to the state's death chamber. But, in a strange
twist, the prosecutor who put him on death row is now trying to save
him.
Melvin McDonald, who 18 years ago convinced a jury to give
death sentences to Patrick Poland and his brother Michael for
murdering two guards during a $300,000 armored van heist, says he's
making a last ditch effort to save the death row inmate from his
Wednesday afternoon date with an executioner.
McDonald says he is
convinced that Poland was abused as a child and placed in the hands
of his "evil" brother, who continued to beat him and led him into a
life of violence, kidnapping and murder. Michael Poland, who
McDonald says was the mastermind of the bloody robbery, was executed
last year.
'Evil brother' defense emerges
McDonald, a former U.S. attorney in Arizona, told
APBnews.com that he will appear before the Arizona Board of
Executive Clemency on Tuesday morning to urge the panel to recommend
that Poland, now 49, be given a two life sentences without parole. "The
evil architect of the crime was executed, and the brother facing
execution next week has some redeeming value to him," McDonald told
APBnews.com. "This is the product of an evil brother." But it's
unclear whether the clemency panel or Gov. Jane Dee Hull will accept
the abused childhood and "evil brother" defense and commute Poland's
sentence.
A spokesman for Arizona Attorney General Janet Napolitano
said she was aware of the about-face by McDonald and found it "interesting."
She said the attorney general's office would be represented at
Tuesday's clemency hearing.
Posed as lawmen to trick guards
McDonald even admits that there is "no doubt"
that the brothers beat and strangled the guards. He said that Poland
admitted to him in a prison meeting that he took part in at least
one of the murders. The Polands posed as lawmen to stop the armored
car, then killed the guards and tossed their bodies into Lake Mead.
Michael Poland, 59, was executed by lethal injection June 16, 1999.
If Poland is executed, it will mark the second time in about a year
that Arizona has executed brothers. Karl and Walter LeGrand were put
to death in 1999.
A plea to the governor
McDonald said that he sent a letter to Hull
asking for mercy for Poland and has already met with a member of her
staff. The letter also was signed by an FBI agent who helped
investigate the case. Besides McDonald, others scheduled to testify
on Poland's behalf are his family members -- including his two
children who were just 4 and 6 years old when their father was
arrested for the murders.
The five-member clemency board must hear
the plea for mercy and then make a recommendation to the governor.
Hull may choose to ignore the panel's decision, state officials
said. But a staff member with the clemency panel said it is not
unusual for prosecutors to change their minds and urge mercy. He
also recalled that, in one case, a judge who sentenced a man to
death spoke on another condemned man's behalf. McDonald said that he
has already contacted a guard's widow and informed her of his
decision. He refused to say what her reaction was.
Federal prosecutor wins state charges
Because bank robbery is a federal crime, and
murder a state crime, McDonald, then the top federal prosecutor in
Arizona, first won bank robbery and kidnapping convictions against
the Polands in 1979. The brothers were each sentenced to 100 years
in a federal prison. The Polands were then tried on state capital
murder charges in Yavapai County, convicted and sentenced to death
in 1980.
However, McDonald said the verdicts were overturned on
appeal. McDonald said that when he later learned that the Yavapai
County prosecutor was not going to try the Polands again for murder,
he became incensed and pushed to prosecute the brothers in state
court himself. McDonald said he received special permission from his
boss, then-Attorney General William French Smith, to prosecute the
brothers on murder charges. He won guilty verdicts and watched as
the judge sentenced them to death. "I was a warrior," McDonald said.
Documented evidence of abuse?
McDonald, who's now in private practice, said
that since prosecuting the Polands, he continued the investigation
and met with family members, and now believes that Poland was an
abused child, beaten by his father, who ran away from home and ended
up with Michael Poland, who continued to abuse him. Thomas Gorman,
Poland's lawyer, said that the only reason his client participated
in murdering one of the guards was that he was afraid that his
brother would kill him if he didn't.
He says Poland was under "duress"
and had to kill to save his own life. "Michael Poland was a
sociopathic killer who would kill members of his family, and Patrick
believed that [he and his brother] were only going to rob, not kill
the guards," Gorman stated. Gorman said that before running away
from home and living with his brother, Poland was beaten and abused
by his father, who has since died. Poland's mother refused to
provide any information about her sons. "I won't talk about them,"
Arlene Poland said. "They told me not to talk."
Other brothers became architects
McDonald told APBnews.com that Poland has a twin
brother, Jeff. He said that, when both Jeff and Patrick Poland ran
away from home to escape their abusive father, one lived with a
"good" brother and the other with the "evil" brother. Jeff Poland
went to live with his brother Phil, an architect, and later became
an architect himself, McDonald said.
Patrick, however, went to live
with Michael and assumed a life of crime. McDonald described Michael
Poland as a "brilliant" criminal. In one case, Michael Poland
kidnapped a bank manager's wife and devised a unique way to grab the
ransom money right under the FBI's nose. "In one [kidnapping], he
rented a building and dug an underground tunnel to a Dumpster in
which he had installed a trap door," McDonald said. "He told them to
drop the money in the Dumpster. They did and as the FBI watched for
him, he crawled through the tunnel, into the Dumpster and took the
money without them seeing him."
Killer: guard had heart attack
The brothers pulled the $300,000 robbery May 24,
1977. Prosecutors say the Polands disguised themselves as lawmen --
complete with uniforms, badges and a car outfitted with a flashing
siren -- and pulled over the armored car on Interstate 17 near
Bumblebee.
The two guards, Russell Dempsey and Cecil Newkirk, were
on their way to make several bank stops. The van was carrying
$288,000, prosecutors said. Lawmen said that the Polands took the
money, beat and strangled the guards, stuffed their bodies into
canvas bags and dumped them on the Arizona side of Lake Mead.
Michael Poland would later tell Department of Corrections
investigators that during the robbery, one of the guards had a heart
attack and died. He said that he knew he would be charged with
felony murder because of the guard's death and had no alternative
other than to kill the second guard. "Poland said he knows everyone
thinks he is just a killer," said an internal Department of
Corrections document. "But he was forced into killing the second
guard after the first had died."
Bodies float to surface Police and the FBI were
at first stumped by the robbery and the whereabouts of the guards.
McDonald said there was even a belief that the guards were kidnapped,
kept for a few days and later killed.
Investigators were looking for
possible accomplices to the crime. Then, by early summer of 1977,
the decomposed bodies floated to the surface of the lake and were
recovered.
Police divers also found two revolvers and a bent license
plate on the bottom of a cove. Meanwhile, following the robbery and
murders, the FBI said that the Polands went on a spending spree,
repaying loans and making purchases totaling $100,000.
A search of
Michael Poland's house turned up over $13,000 in cash, a stun gun
receipt and a police-type gun belt. A search of his bother's home
turned up $15,000 in cash and a wallet with a law enforcement-type
badge.
Witnesses testified that they saw the Polands at the scene
near the van. Canvas bags used for the bodies and other physical
evidence were traced to items purchased by Poland, who used the fake
name of Mark Harris. The money recovered from the two homes and the
law enforcement equipment helped land a conviction and death
sentence for the pair.
Involved in escape plot
Arizona Department of Corrections records show
that, in 1997, Michael Poland tried to arrange a bizarre and
elaborate escape plot by offering a prison guard a $2 million bribe
to allow him to flee while en route to a local hospital for medical
treatment.
He told the guard the money was hidden from the armored
car robbery. When corrections investigators got wind of the scheme,
they searched Michael Poland's cell and found handwritten notes and
a detailed map of the hospital. When interviewed by corrections
investigators, Michael Poland told them he liked to plan escapes
because "it was just something fun to do." Corrections investigators
said that over the years, the Polands did not to appear to interact
much while on death row.
Condemned interested in law career
A mandatory probation report made after Poland
was sentenced to death has no mention of childhood abuse. According
to the report, Poland, then 32, said he was one of four brothers and
a sister from a "law-abiding family." He told the probation officer
that he had a twin brother, Jeff, and that two siblings were
architects.
He also said that he was raised Methodist and that his
grandfather was a minister. Poland also revealed that he dropped out
of high school but later earned a GED certificate in 1969. He said
that he had an interest in law enforcement; he had applied and was
rejected by the Phoenix Police Department on four occasions.
At the time of his arrest, Poland stated that he
and Michael owned and managed a game room in Prescott. He also was
involved in gun sales and claims to have once tried his hand at
being a private detective. Poland told the probation officer that he
had held a variety of low paying jobs, including working as a cook,
painter, carpenter, tour guide and computer technician.
Death Row Killers Have Brotherly Bond
Dozens of
Siblings Face Execution Together
By Robert Anthony Phillips -
APBNews Online
March 12, 2000
PHOENIX (APBnews.com) -- They grew up together,
played together and murdered together. On occasion, they were
sentenced to death together. While it is rare that brothers end up
on death row, it does happen. Texas alone has executed brothers on
six occasions, dating back to 1925. South Carolina put to death
stepbrothers on the same day in 1998.
If Patrick Poland, 49, follows
his brother Michael to the death chamber here Wednesday, there will
still be two sets of brothers awaiting execution in Arizona. Rudi
and Michael Apelt were sentenced to death for the murder of Michael
Apelt's wife in 1988. Prosecutors say the brothers killed her to
collect $400,000 in life insurance.
Bank branch manager killed
Also on Arizona's death row are Robert and Roger
Murray. The Murrays were on their way back from Las Vegas when they
decided to rob someone. They entered a home, shot two residents,
burglarized the home and fled, prosecutors said. And just last year,
the state executed Walter and Karl LaGrand for fatally stabbing a
bank branch manager during an attempted robbery. Karl LaGrand was
executed by lethal injection Feb. 3, 1999, and Walter LaGrand was
gassed on March 3, 1999.
The Golphin brothers are on death row for
shooting and killing a state highway patrol officer and a deputy
sheriff in 1997. The brothers, wanted for a robbery in South
Carolina and driving a stolen car, were stopped on Interstate 95.
Prosecutors said that Tilmon Golphin, 20, shot one of lawmen with an
assault rifle as he wrestled with his brother. And Kevin Golphin,
19, also grabbed a one of the officer's gun to shoot the second
lawman.
Shot, stabbed employees
Anthony and Jeffrey Farina are the only brothers
on Florida's death row. They were convicted and sentenced to death
for killing a 17-year-old college student during a fast-food
restaurant robbery in 1992. Prosecutors said that the Farinas tied
up four employees and shot or stabbed each one. Three survived.
The
brothers were convicted and sentenced to death in 1998. Anthony
Farina is now 26 and Jeffrey Farina, 24. California brothers
Christopher Self and Orlando Gene Romero were sentenced to death in
1996 for being involved in a carjacking, kidnapping and robbery
spree that resulted in a murder. They were part of a gang that
terrorized Riverside County, prosecutors said.
Wait lasted 21 years Half-brothers Larry Gilbert
and J.D. Gleaton were executed on the same day in South Carolina --
Dec. 4, 1998. Gilbert, 43, and Gleaton, 53, had been convicted of
the 1977 robbery and murder of a gas station owner. They were on
death row for about 21 years.
In Texas, Jose and Jessie Gutierrez
were executed for the murder of a jewelry store clerk during a
robbery Sept. 5, 1989. Jessie Gutierrez, 29, was the first brother
to die. He was executed by lethal injection in Texas in September
1994. Jose Gutierrez, 39, was executed in November 1999.
In the Supreme Court of the
United States
476 U.S. 147
106 S.Ct. 1749
90 L.Ed.2d 123
Patrick Gene POLAND, Petitioner, v.
ARIZONA.
Michael Kent POLAND,
Petitioner, v.
ARIZONA.
Nos. 85-5023, 85-5024.
Argued Feb. 24, 1986.
Decided May 5, 1986.
Syllabus
Petitioners robbed a bank van of
$281,000 in cash and killed the guards by dumping them into a lake
in sacks weighted with rocks. Petitioners were convicted of first-degree
murder in an Arizona state court. At a separate hearing, while
finding that the statutory aggravating circumstance that the offense
was committed for "pecuniary gain" was not present because it
applied only to contract killings, the trial judge sentenced
petitioners to death upon finding that the statutory aggravating
circumstance that the offense was committed in "an especially
heinous, cruel, or depraved manner" was present. The Arizona Supreme
Court, while reversing and remanding for a retrial on other grounds,
held that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of the
"especially heinous" circumstance, but that the trial judge erred in
finding the "pecuniary gain" circumstance limited to contract
killings, and that if petitioners were again convicted the judge
might find this circumstance present. On remand, petitioners were
again convicted of first-degree murder and the trial judge again
sentenced them to death, finding that both the "pecuniary gain" and
"especially heinous" circumstances were present. The Arizona Supreme
Court affirmed, rejecting petitioners' argument that the Double
Jeopardy Clause barred reimposition of the death penalty. The court
found the evidence still insufficient to support the "especially
heinous" circumstance but sufficient to support the "pecuniary gain"
circumstance.
Held: Reimposing the death
penalty on petitioners did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Pp. 152-157.
(a) When a conviction is reversed
on appeal, it is nullified and " 'the slate wiped clean,' " so that
if the defendant is convicted again, he may constitutionally be
subjected to whatever punishment is lawful. Bullington v.
Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 442, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 1860, 68 L.Ed.2d
270. This rationale is, however, inapplicable where a jury agrees or
an appellate court decides that the prosecution "has not proved its
case." Id., at 443, 101 S.Ct., at 1860. Therefore, the
relevant inquiry in these cases is whether the sentencing judge or
the reviewing court has "decided that the prosecution has not proved
its case" for the death penalty and hence has "acquitted"
petitioners. Bullington v. Missouri, supra; Arizona v. Rumsey,
467 U.S. 203, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164. Pp. 152-154.
(b) The trial judge's rejection of
the "pecuniary gain" aggravating circumstance was not an "acquittal"
of that circumstance for double jeopardy purposes, and did not
foreclose its consideration by the reviewing court. Moreover,
because the reviewing court did not find the evidence legally
insufficient to justify imposition of the death penalty, there was
no death penalty "acquittal" by that court. The Double Jeopardy
Clause, therefore, did not foreclose a second sentencing hearing at
which the "clean slate" rule applied. Pp. 154-157.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion
of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and POWELL, REHNQUIST, STEVENS,
and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which BRENNAN and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. ---.
W.K. Wilhelmsen, for petitioner in
each case.
Gerald R. Grant, Phoenix, Ariz.,
for respondent in each case.
Justice WHITE delivered the
opinion of the Court.
The question presented is
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a further capital
sentencing proceeding when, on appeal from a sentence of death,
the reviewing court finds the evidence insufficient to support
the only aggravating factor on which the sentencing judge relied,
but does not find the evidence insufficient to support the death
penalty.
* In 1977 petitioners Patrick
and Michael Poland, disguised as police officers, stopped a
Purolator van that was making cash deliveries to various banks
in northern Arizona. After removing some $281,000 in cash from
the van, petitioners took the two Purolator guards to a lake and
dumped them into the water in sacks weighted with rocks.
Autopsies indicated that the most probable cause of the guards'
death was drowning, although one may have died of a heart attack.
It was not possible to determine if the guards were drugged, but
there was no evidence of a struggle.
The jury disbelieved
petitioners' alibi defense and convicted them of first-degree
murder. Pursuant to former Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-454(A) (Supp.1973),
the trial judge then sat as sentencer in a separate proceeding.
At the hearing, the prosecution, relying on the evidence
presented at trial, argued that two statutory aggravating
circumstances were present: (1) that petitioners had "committed
the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation
of the receipt, of [something] of pecuniary value," former
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-454(E)(5) (Supp.1973); and (2) that
petitioners had "committed the offense in an especially heinous,
cruel, or depraved manner," former Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-454(E)(6)
(Supp.1973). The trial judge made the following finding with
respect to the "pecuniary gain" aggravating circumstance:
"The court finds the
aggravating circumstance in § 13-454E(3) [sic] is not
present. This presumes the legislative intent was to cover a
contract killing. If this presumption is inaccurate, the
evidence shows the defendants received something of pecuniary
value, cash in the amount of $281,000.00.
"This, then, would be an
aggravating circumstance." App. 15-16.
The judge found that the "especially
heinous, cruel, [or] depraved" aggravating circumstance was
present, stating that the murders were "shockingly evil,
insensate, and marked by debasement." Id., at 16. Finding
that this aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating
evidence, the judge sentenced petitioners to death. Id.,
at 14.
On appeal, petitioners argued
that the evidence was insufficient to support the judge's
finding of the "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved"
aggravating circumstance. They also argued that the jury's
verdict was tainted by a jury-room discussion of evidence not
admitted at trial. The Arizona Supreme Court agreed that the
jury's verdict was tainted, necessitating reversal and retrial.
State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 283-285, 645 P.2d 784,
798-800 (1982).
The court next held that the
evidence on which the State relied at the first sentencing
hearing was insufficient to support a finding of the "especially
heinous, cruel, or depraved" aggravating circumstance. Id.,
at 285, 645 P.2d, at 800. Finally, the court stated that the
trial court "mistook the law when it did not find that the
defendants 'committed the offense as consideration for the
receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of
pecuniary value.' " Ibid.
The court explained that this
aggravating circumstance is not limited to situations involving
contract killings, see State v. Clark, 126 Ariz. 428, 616
P.2d 888 (1980), and added that "[u]pon retrial, if the
defendants are again convicted of first degree murder, the court
may find the existence of this aggravating circumstance." 132
Ariz., at 286, 645 P.2d, at 801.
On remand, petitioners were
again convicted of first-degree murder. At the sentencing
hearing, the prosecution, relying on the evidence presented at
the second trial and also presenting additional evidence, argued
that the "pecuniary gain" and "especially heinous, cruel, or
depraved" aggravating factors were present in each petitioner's
case. The prosecution alleged a third aggravating circumstance
in petitioner Patrick Poland's case: previous conviction of "a
felony . . . involving the use or threat of violence on another
person," Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-454(E)(2) (Supp.1973).1
The trial judge found all of the aggravating circumstances
alleged by the prosecution, and again sentenced both petitioners
to death.
Petitioners argued on appeal,
as they had at their second sentencing hearing, that the Double
Jeopardy Clause barred reimposition of the death penalty. Their
theory was that the Arizona Supreme Court's decision on their
first appeal that the evidence failed to support the "especially
heinous, cruel, or depraved" aggravating circumstance amounted
to an "acquittal" of the death penalty. Cf. Bullington v.
Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270
(1981); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 104 S.Ct. 2305,
81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984). A majority of the Arizona Supreme Court
rejected this argument, stating:
"Our holding in Poland I
. . . was simply that the death penalty could not be based
solely upon [the 'especially heinous, cruel, or depraved']
aggravating circumstance because there was insufficient evidence
to support it. This holding was not tantamount to a death
penalty 'acquittal.' " State v. Poland (Patrick), 144
Ariz. 388, 404, 698 P.2d 183, 199 (1985). Accord, State v.
Poland (Michael), 144 Ariz. 412, 698 P.2d 207 (1985).
The court found the evidence
still insufficient to support the "especially heinous, cruel, or
depraved" aggravating circumstance, but sufficient to support
the "pecuniary gain" aggravating circumstance with respect to
both defendants and the "prior conviction involving violence"
circumstance with respect to Patrick Poland. State v. Poland
(Patrick), supra, at 404-406, 698 P.2d, at 199-201; accord,
State v. Poland (Michael), supra.
After again reviewing and
independently weighing the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, the court concluded that the death penalty was
appropriate in each petitioner's case. We granted certiorari to
consider whether reimposing the death penalties on petitioners
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. 474 U.S. 816, 106 S.Ct. 60,
88 L.Ed.2d 49 (1985). We hold that it did not.
II
In Bullington v. Missouri,
supra, this Court held that a defendant sentenced to life
imprisonment by a capital sentencing jury is protected by the
Double Jeopardy Clause against imposition of the death penalty
in the event that he obtains reversal of his conviction and is
retried and reconvicted. The Court recognized the usual rule to
be that when a defendant obtains reversal of his conviction on
appeal,
"the original conviction has
been nullified and 'the slate wiped clean.' Therefore, if the
defendant is convicted again, he constitutionally may be
subjected to whatever punishment is lawful, subject only to the
limitation that he receive credit for time served." Id.,
451 U.S., at 442, 101 S.Ct., at 1860 (quoting North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 721, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2078, 23 L.Ed.
656 (1969)).
However, the Court found that
its prior decisions had created an exception to this rule: "[T]he
'clean slate' rationale . . . is inapplicable whenever a jury
agrees or an appellate court decides that the prosecution has
not proved its case." Bullington, 451 U.S., at 443, 101
S.Ct., at 1860.2
Although it is usually "impossible
to conclude that a sentence less than the statutory maximum 'constitute[s]
a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove
its case,' " ibid. (quoting Burks v. United States,
437 U.S. 1, 15, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978)), the
Court found that Missouri, by "enacting a capital sentencing
procedure that resembles a trial on the issue of guilt or
innocence, . . . explicitly requires the jury to
determine whether the prosecution has 'proved its case,' " id.,
at 444, 101 S.Ct., at 1861 (emphasis in original).3
Accordingly, the Court held
that the jury's decision to sentence Bullington to life
imprisonment after his first conviction should be treated as an
"acquittal" of the death penalty under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
Recently, the Court held that
the rationale of Bullington applies to the Arizona
capital sentencing scheme at issue in this case. Arizona v.
Rumsey, supra.4
In Rumsey, the trial judge erred in exactly the same way
as the trial judge did at petitioners' first sentencing hearing
in these cases, by construing the "pecuniary gain" aggravating
circumstance as limited to "murder for hire" situations. Unlike
the trial judge in this case, however, the trial judge in
Rumsey found no aggravating circumstances, and entered a
sentence of life imprisonment. This Court held that "[t]he
double jeopardy principle relevant to [Rumsey's] case is the
same as that invoked in Bullington: an acquittal on the
merits by the sole decisionmaker in the proceeding is final and
bars retrial on the same charge." Id., at 211, 104 S.Ct.,
at 2310.
Under Bullington and
Rumsey, therefore, the relevant inquiry in the cases before
us is whether the sentencing judge or the reviewing court has "decid[ed]
that the prosecution has not proved its case" for the death
penalty and hence has "acquitted" petitioners. Bullington,
451 U.S., at 443, 101 S.Ct., at 1860.
III
At no point during petitioners'
first capital sentencing hearing and appeal did either the
sentencer or the reviewing court hold that the prosecution had "failed
to prove its case" that petitioners deserved the death penalty.
Plainly, the sentencing judge did not acquit, for he imposed the
death penalty. While the Arizona Supreme Court held that the
sentencing judge erred in relying on the "especially heinous,
cruel, or depraved" aggravating circumstance, it did not hold
that the prosecution had failed to prove its case for the death
penalty.
Indeed, the court clearly
indicated that there had been no such failure by remarking that
"the trial court mistook the law when it did not find that the
defendants 'committed the offense as consideration for the
receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of
pecuniary value,' " and that "[u]pon retrial, if the defendants
are again convicted of first degree murder, the court may find
the existence of this aggravating circumstance," 132 Ariz., at
286, 645 P.2d, at 801.
Petitioners argue, however,
that the Arizona Supreme Court "acquitted" them of the death
penalty by finding the "evidence [insufficient] to support the
sole aggravating circumstances found by the sentencer." Brief
for Petitioners 16. Petitioners' implicit argument is, first,
that the sentencing judge "acquitted" them of the "pecuniary
gain" aggravating circumstance, and second, that the Double
Jeopardy Clause rendered this "acquittal" final, so that the
evidence relating to this circumstance was effectively removed
from the case at the time of petitioners' first appeal.5
We reject the fundamental
premise of petitioners' argument, namely, that a capital
sentencer's failure to find a particular aggravating
circumstance alleged by the prosecution always constitutes an "acquittal"
of that circumstance for double jeopardy purposes. Bullington
indicates that the proper inquiry is whether the sentencer or
reviewing court has "decided that the prosecution has not proved
its case" that the death penalty is appropriate.6
We are not prepared to extend
Bullington further and view the capital sentencing
hearing as a set of minitrials on the existence of each
aggravating circumstance. Such an approach would push the
analogy on which Bullington is based past the breaking
point.
Aggravating circumstances are
not separate penalties or offenses, but are "standards to guide
the making of [the] choice" between the alternative verdicts of
death and life imprisonment. 451 U.S., at 438, 101 S.Ct., at
1858. Thus, under Arizona's capital sentencing scheme, the
judge's finding of any particular aggravating circumstance does
not of itself "convict" a defendant (i.e., require the
death penalty), and the failure to find any particular
aggravating circumstance does not "acquit" a defendant (i.e.,
preclude the death penalty).
It is true that the sentencer
must find some aggravating circumstance before the death
penalty may be imposed, and that the sentencer's finding, albeit
erroneous, that no aggravating circumstance is present is an "acquittal"
barring a second death sentence proceeding. Arizona v. Rumsey,
467 U.S. 203, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984). This is
because
"the law attaches particular
significance to an acquittal. To permit a second trial after an
acquittal, however mistaken the acquittal may have been, would
present an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with its
vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant so that
'even though innocent he may be found guilty.' " United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2194, 57
L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) (quoting Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 188, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957)).
This concern with protecting
the finality of acquittals is not implicated when, as in these
cases, a defendant is sentenced to death, i.e., "convicted."
There is no cause to shield such a defendant from further
litigation; further litigation is the only hope he has. The
defendant may argue on appeal that the evidence presented at his
sentencing hearing was as a matter of law insufficient to
support the aggravating circumstances on which his death
sentence was based, but the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
require the reviewing court, if it sustains that claim, to
ignore evidence in the record supporting another aggravating
circumstance which the sentencer has erroneously rejected.
Such a rule would have the odd
and unacceptable result of requiring a reviewing court to enter
a death penalty "acquittal" even though that court is of the
view that the State has "proved its case." Our decisions in
Burks and Bullington do not support such a rule,
which would certainly give the prosecution cause to "complain of
prejudice." Burks, 437 U.S., at 16, 98 S.Ct., at 2149.
We hold, therefore, that the
trial judge's rejection of the "pecuniary gain" aggravating
circumstance in this case was not an "acquittal" of that
circumstance for double jeopardy purposes, and did not foreclose
its consideration by the reviewing court. Furthermore, because
the reviewing court did not find the evidence legally
insufficient to justify imposition of the death penalty, there
was no death penalty "acquittal" by that court. The Double
Jeopardy Clause, therefore, did not foreclose a second
sentencing hearing at which the "clean slate" rule applied.
The judgment of the Supreme
Court of Arizona is
Affirmed.
*****
Justice MARSHALL, with whom
Justice BRENNAN and Justice BLACKMUN join, dissenting.
There is one difference
between these cases and Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203,
104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984), in which seven Members of
this Court interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar
imposition of a death sentence after a life sentence has been
reversed on appeal: the sentencing judge in petitioners' cases
made two errors of state law, while Rumsey's judge made only one.
According to the majority, that makes the difference between
life and death.
In Rumsey, the
defendant was convicted of murder and robbery; the trial judge
sentenced him to life imprisonment upon finding that none of the
statutory aggravating circumstances provided by Arizona law
applied to the defendant's case. One of those aggravating
circumstances—murder committed as consideration for pecuniary
gain—the court rejected in the belief that it applied only to
murders for hire.
On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Arizona held that murder for pecuniary gain could also
include murder in the course of a robbery. Accordingly, it set
aside Rumsey's life sentence and remanded for resentencing. This
time, Rumsey was given a death sentence, supported by the
aggravating circumstance of murder for pecuniary gain. On writ
of certiorari, this Court concluded that the Arizona death-sentencing
procedure is equivalent to a trial for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, under the doctrine of Bullington v.
Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270
(1981).
We then concluded that
Rumsey's initial life sentence had constituted an "acquittal" on
the merits of the central issue of the proceeding: whether death
was the appropriate punishment for the offense. Under
traditional double jeopardy principles, retrial of that issue
was thereafter precluded, even though the "acquittal" was
predicated upon a mistaken interpretation of state law.
Rumsey, supra, 467 U.S., at 211, 104 S.Ct., at 2310.
Petitioners, Patrick and
Michael Poland, were convicted of the murders of two guards in
the course of a robbery. Like the trial court in Rumsey,
the sentencing court rejected the aggravating circumstance of
murder for pecuniary gain, believing that it applied only to
murders for hire. Unlike the Rumsey court, however, the
trial judge did not then impose a life sentence. Instead, he
concluded that another of the statutory aggravating
circumstances was present: that the murders were "especially
heinous, cruel, or depraved."
Based on this sole aggravating
circumstance, therefore, the court sentenced petitioners to
death. On joint appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the
death sentences and concluded that the evidence was insufficient
as a matter of state law to establish that the murders had been
"especially heinous, cruel, or depraved," because the State had
not proved that the victims had suffered, as state law requires.
App. 61.
Before remanding, however, the
court took the opportunity, sua sponte, to note that
murder for pecuniary gain was not limited to murders for hire,
and therefore was available as a possible alternative basis for
a death sentence. On remand, the trial court once more sentenced
petitioners to death, again concluding that the murders were "especially
heinous, cruel, or depraved," and also that they were committed
for pecuniary gain.*
The Arizona Supreme Court again reversed the aggravating
circumstance of "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved," but
this time upheld the death sentences on the ground of pecuniary
gain.
The Court makes much of the
fact that, unlike Rumsey, petitioners never received sentences
of life imprisonment. Yet the majority fails to recognize the
teaching of Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct.
2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). In Burks, we held that an
appellate reversal of a conviction, based on the legal
conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to support the
verdict, has the same effect under the Double Jeopardy Clause as
an acquittal at trial. Id., at 16, 98 S.Ct., at 2150. "To
hold otherwise," the Court concluded, "would create a purely
arbitrary distinction between those in petitioner's position and
others who would enjoy the benefit of a correct decision by the
District Court." Id., at 11, 98 S.Ct., at 2147.
That arbitrary distinction is
precisely the one that the Court creates today. The initial
death sentences that petitioners received were "convictions,"
see Rumsey, supra, and their reversal for insufficiency
of the evidence to support the sole aggravating circumstance
found by the sentencing judge must, under Burks, be
accorded the same effect as an "acquittal" at trial—the same
effect as Rumsey's life sentence. As much as Rumsey's life
sentence constituted the all-important "acquittal on the merits,"
even though predicated on an error of law, so, too, did the
reversal of petitioners' death sentences.
The analogy, first drawn in
Bullington v. Missouri, supra, between an acquittal at trial
and an "acquittal" of death at sentencing, is not perfect, and
the imperfections perhaps can explain the majority's
mischaracterization of the issue in these cases. At trial, a
defendant is charged with an offense containing certain
specified elements; he is either convicted or acquitted of that
offense, the trier of fact having concluded that the prosecution
has or has not proved all the elements of the offense.
The sentencing proceeding,
however, is quite different. In Arizona, for example, a death
sentence may be imposed if any one of seven statutory
aggravating factors is proved. While it might be possible to
treat each aggravating circumstance as a separate "offense," of
which a defendant is either convicted or acquitted, this Court
has taken a different approach. We have said that "on the merits"
of a capital proceeding, the "central issue [is] whether death
was the appropriate punishment for [the] offense." Rumsey,
467 U.S., at 211, 104 S.Ct., at 2310. Thus, the "offense" for
which the defendant receives his "conviction" or "acquittal" is
that of the appropriateness of the death penalty, not the
elements of any particular aggravating factor. Ante, at
153, n. 3.
In these cases, the trial
judge found death to be the appropriate punishment because
petitioners' offenses were "especially heinous, cruel, or
depraved." On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the
sole basis offered by the trial court to support its "conviction"
of petitioners was insufficient as a matter of law.
The majority believes that,
since other aggravating circumstances might have been found to
support the "convictions," it was permissible to remand the
cases for further factfinding on those alternative factors. But
this overlooks what our cases have said a conviction is
in the sentencing context—a determination that death is the
appropriate penalty, not separate trials on the existence of all
statutory aggravating circumstances, conducted seriatim.
In these cases, that
determination was reversed because there was insufficient
evidence to support the ground relied on by the trial judge in
reaching it. Any remand for further factfinding on the question
whether the death sentence should be imposed was thereafter
prohibited. See Rumsey, supra, at 211-212, 104 S.Ct., at
2310-2311. In no other circumstance would the Double Jeopardy
Clause countenance the offer of a second chance to the State and
the trial judge to find a better theory upon which to base a
conviction. Nor should it do so here. I dissent.
Thus, a defendant charged with first-degree
murder but only convicted of the lesser included offense of
second-degree murder has been acquitted of the greater
charge for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. In the
event his conviction is reversed on appeal, "a retrial on
the first-degree murder charge [is] barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause, because the defendant 'was forced to run
the gantlet once on that charge and the jury refused to
convict him.' " Bullington, 451 U.S., at 443, 101
S.Ct., at 1860 (quoting Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 190, 78 S.Ct. 221, 225, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957)).
Also, when a defendant's conviction is
overturned on appeal on the grounds that the evidence was
insufficient to convict, the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids
a retrial. " 'Since we necessarily accord absolute finality
to a jury's verdict of acquittal—no matter how
erroneous its decision—it is difficult to conceive how
society has any greater interest in retrying a defendant
when, on review, it is decided as a matter of law that the
jury could not properly have returned a verdict of guilty.'
" Bullington, supra, 451 U.S., at 442-443, 101 S.Ct.,
at 1859-1860 (quoting Burks v. United States, 437
U.S. 1, 16, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978)).
The "case" to which the Court referred in
Bullington was the prosecution's case that the
defendant deserved the death penalty. The analogy drawn was
between a death sentence and a verdict of guilty, a life
sentence and a verdict of innocent. The Court emphasized
that the sentencer was required to make a choice between "two
alternative verdicts," 451 U.S., at 438, 101 S.Ct., at 1858,
a statement inconsistent with the view that for double
jeopardy purposes the capital sentencer should be seen as
rendering a series of mini-verdicts on each aggravating
circumstance. See also Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S.
203, 209-210, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 2309-2310 (1984) ("The
sentencer—the trial judge in Arizona—is required to choose
between two options: death, and life imprisonment without
possibility of parole for 25 years").
The Court explained the similarities
between the Arizona and Missouri systems as follows:
"The capital sentencing proceeding in
Arizona shares the characteristics of the Missouri
proceeding that make it resemble a trial for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. The sentencer the trial judge in
Arizona—is required to choose between two options: death,
and life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25
years. The sentencer must make the decision guided by
detailed statutory standards defining aggravating and
mitigating circumstances; in particular, death may not be
imposed unless at least one aggravating circumstance is
found, whereas death must be imposed if there is one
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance
sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The sentencer
must make findings with respect to each of the statutory
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the sentencing
hearing involves the submission of evidence and the
presentation of argument. The usual rules of evidence govern
the admission of evidence of aggravating circumstances, and
the State must prove the existence of aggravating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [T]hese
characteristics make the Arizona capital sentencing
proceeding indistinguishable for double jeopardy purposes
from the capital sentencing proceeding in Missouri." Ibid.
(citations omitted).
Petitioners have not made this argument
with any clarity, but we can discern no other plausible
basis for their contention that the Arizona Supreme Court "acquitted"
them of the death penalty at the time of their first appeal.
Any suggestion that the court intended to acquit them
is negated by the language in Poland I and is
rendered even more untenable by the court's statement at the
time of the second appeal that "[o]ur holding in Poland
I, however, was . . . not tantamount to a death penalty
'acquittal.' " State v. Poland, 144 Ariz., at 404,
698 P.2d, at 199.
Petitioners seem to attach importance to
the fact that the prosecution did not cross-appeal the trial
judge's finding regarding the "pecuniary gain" aggravating
circumstance. However, the Arizona Supreme Court did not
accord any significance to the prosecution's failure to
cross-appeal, and we certainly cannot say that as a matter
of state law the court was precluded from considering the
evidence regarding the "pecuniary gain" aggravating
circumstance.
With respect to petitioner Patrick Poland,
an additional aggravating factor was invoked to support the
second death sentence, based on events subsequent to the
first penalty proceeding.
U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
No. 97-99004
PATRICK POLAND, Petitioner-Appellant, v.
TERRY L. STEWART, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections,
Respondent-Appellee.
Argued and Submitted April 22,
1998
Before: Procter Hug, Jr., Chief Judge, James
R. Browning and Thomas G. Nelson, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
T.G.
NELSON, Circuit Judge:
Arizona death row inmate
Patrick G. Poland appeals
the district court's denial
of his petition for writ of
habeas corpus filed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. S 2254.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
In 1980, Patrick Poland
("Patrick" or "Poland") and
his brother, Michael Poland
("Michael"), were convicted
in Arizona state court of
two 1977 murders and
sentenced to death. The
convictions arose from the
May 1977 hijacking and
robbery of an armored car
during which the two armored
car guards, Russell Dempsey
and Cecil Newkirk, were
murdered.1
The convictions were
overturned by the Arizona
Supreme Court on the basis
of jury misconduct. State v.
Poland, 645 P.2d 784 (Ariz.
1982) (in banc) (Poland I).
When the case returned to
the Arizona Superior Court
("trial court") following
the reversal in Poland I,
the newly elected county
prosecuting attorney moved
to dismiss the charges on
the basis that there was
insufficient evidence on
which to proceed to trial.
The trial court denied the
motion and a subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
Following denial of the
motions, counsel for the
Polands moved to disqualify
the trial judge for bias.
The motion was referred to
another judge of the Arizona
Superior Court, who found no
bias and denied the motion.
The Polands were again
convicted and sentenced to
death. The convictions and
sentences were upheld on
appeal by the Arizona
Supreme Court, State v.
Patrick Poland, 698 P.2d 183
(Ariz. 1985) (in banc), and
State v. Michael Poland, 698
P.2d 207 (Ariz. 1985) (in
banc), and by the Supreme
Court of the United States
on certiorari, Poland v.
Arizona, 476 U.S. 147
(1986).
Poland's first post-conviction
relief ("PCR") petition was
denied by the trial court,
and the Arizona Supreme
Court denied review without
comment. Poland then filed a
petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in federal
district court. While that
was pending, he filed a
second PCR petition in the
trial court.
The trial court held that
a number of claims were
precluded under the
applicable state rules
governing PCR proceedings.
The claims in the second PCR
petition became the basis of
the amended habeas petition
which the district court
denied. We have jurisdiction
over this timely appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291
and S 2253, and we affirm.
*****
CONCLUSION
The district court's
denial of Patrick Poland's
petition for writ of habeas
corpus is AFFIRMED.