In a statement to the court, sitting in Wurzburg,
Germany, Ronghi apologised to the army, his unit and his family "for
all the hurt I have caused".
Ronghi, from Niles, Ohio did not try to excuse his
actions, but told the court he had always tried to be a decent person.
"I never did anything wrong before," he said. "I know
what I did was very wrong. That's why I pleaded guilty."
A six-officer panel deliberated for less than an hour
before returning the verdict. Ronghi sat impassively as the decision was
announced.
The court decided that Ronghi had sexually assaulted
and murdered Merita after entering her family's apartment in search of a
23-year-old girl with whom he had been flirting.
Unable to find the older woman, Ronghi
encountered Merita as he was leaving and lured her into the basement
where he sexually assaulted and killed her.
Ronghi was arrested after absconding from a
patrol and making a crude attempt to dispose of the child's body.
Merita Shabiu's parents and two of her siblings,
Kirnete and Sami, travelled from Kosovo to give evidence in the case.
During the trial, her parents told the court about
how they fled from Serb persecution in Kosovo - and how relieved they
later felt at being able to return home under the protection of Nato
forces.
None of the family's six children felt more reassured
by the international presence than 11-year-old Merita, said her father,
Hamdi Shabiu.
"She was very happy because she thought they had come
to protect us," he said.
Ronghi was also stripped of his pay, rank and given a
dishonourable discharge from the army.
He has been taken to a US army prison at Wurzburg,
96km (60 miles) east of Frankfurt, but is expected to be transferred to
a high-security prison in the United States in about a week.
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Frank J.
RONGHI, Staff Sergeant U.S. Army,
Appellant
No.
03-0520
Crim. App. No. 20000635
United
States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued
February 11, 2004
Decided
June 30, 2004
GIERKE,
J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CRAWFORD, C.J., EFFRON,
BAKER, and ERDMANN, JJ., joined.
Judge GIERKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress passed a bill authorizing the court-martial
punishment of confinement for life without eligibility for parole (LWOP)
on November 6, 1997.1 The President signed that bill into law on
November 18, 1997.2 However, the President did not amend the Manual for
Courts-Martial to incorporate LWOP until April 11, 2002.3 The issue in
this case is whether LWOP was an authorized court-martial punishment for
the crime of premeditated murder during the period between enactment of
the LWOP statute and the Manual’s revision. We conclude that the statute
creating LWOP authorized that punishment for premeditated murder
offenses committed after November 18, 1997.
Background
Appellant was deployed with the 82d Airborne Division
in Kosovo on January 13, 2000, when he committed the crimes that
resulted in his sentence to LWOP. As aptly described by the government,
Appellant “took advantage of the trust, respect, and kindness” that
eleven-year-old Merita Shabiu showed to American soldiers. “Appellant
led her to a dark and deserted, filthy, trash-strewn basement where he
indecently assaulted, forcibly anally sodomized, and murdered with
premeditation, this innocent child victim.”
As a result of these brutal acts, Appellant pled
guilty to and was found guilty of premeditated murder, indecent acts
with a child under 16 years of age, and forcible sodomy of a child under
16 years of age, in violation of Articles 118, 134, and 125 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 10 U.S.C. §§ 918, 934, 925
(2000). Appellant agreed to plead guilty under a pretrial agreement that
provided for a non-capital referral.
At trial, both the defense counsel and Appellant
personally agreed that the maximum authorized punishment included LWOP.
On August 1, 2000, a court-martial panel of officer members sentenced
Appellant to LWOP, a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and
allowances, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. The convening
authority approved the sentence as adjudged, and the Army Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings and sentence in an unpublished
opinion.4 We granted review to determine whether LWOP was an authorized
court-martial punishment for the crime of premeditated murder on the
date of Appellant’s offenses.5
Discussion
“It is well established that, absent a clear
direction by Congress to the contrary, a law takes effect on the date of
its enactment.” United States v. Pritt, 54 M.J. 47, 50 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (quoting
Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991)). An
examination of the applicable statutes reveals that Congress authorized
LWOP as a sentence for any premeditated murder committed from the day
after its enactment forward.
Article 56a Authorized LWOP for Premeditated Murder
Offenses
Committed Starting the Day After Its Enactment
Article 56a(a) of the UCMJ provides, “For any offense
for which a sentence of confinement for life may be adjudged, a court-martial
may adjudge a sentence of confinement for life without eligibility for
parole.” 10 U.S.C. § 856a(a) (2000). The statute that added this
language to the UCMJ also provided that Article 56a “shall be applicable
only with respect to an offense committed after the date of the
enactment of this Act.” Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 581(b), 111 Stat. at 1759.
That date of enactment was November 18, 1997, when the President signed
it into law.
When Congress adopted Article 118, it provided only
two authorized sentences for the offenses of premeditated murder and
felony murder: “death or imprisonment for life.” Art. 118, UCMJ; 10
U.S.C. § 918 (2000). When it adopted Article 56a, Congress plainly
intended to authorize LWOP as a third available sentence for a
premeditated murder that occurred after November 18, 1997. Thus, absent
some other statutory provision limiting LWOP’s availability, it was an
authorized sentence when Appellant committed his offenses on January 13,
2000.
The 2000 Manual for Courts-Martial
Did Not Conflict with the LWOP Statute
For most of the UCMJ’s punitive articles, the
President plays a role in determining the maximum authorized punishment.
Article 56 provides, “The punishment which a court-martial may direct
for an offense may not exceed such limits as the President may prescribe
for that offense.” Art. 56, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 856 (2000). Article 18
similarly authorizes the President to prescribe “limitations” on the
punishments adjudged by general courts-martial. Art. 18, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 818 (2000). The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of this
general delegation of Congress’s “authority to define criminal
punishments” for military offenses. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S.
748, 768 (1996). The President has executed this delegated authority by
establishing maximum punishments in Part IV of the Manual for Courts-Martial.
The 2000 edition of the Manual for Courts-Martial,
which governed Appellant’s case,6 provided that the maximum punishment
for premeditated murder was “death.” Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, Pt. IV, para. 43.e(1) (2000 ed.) [hereinafter 2000 Manual]. The
same Manual provision noted that the mandatory minimum punishment for
premeditated murder was “imprisonment for life.” Id. Because LWOP is a
lesser punishment than the maximum (death), the Manual’s maximum
sentence provision did not conflict with the congressionally- authorized
sentence of LWOP in a premeditated murder case.
Additionally, the 2002 executive order that amended
the Manual for Courts-Martial to incorporate LWOP indicated that the
punishment “shall only apply to offenses committed after November 18,
1997.” Exec. Order 13,262 § 6.b, 67 Fed. Reg. 18,773, 18,779 (April 11,
2002). Thus, the executive order itself recognized LWOP’s availability
as an authorized sentence at the time of Appellant’s offenses.
Another presidential limitation on court-martial
sentencing authority is Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1003, which
provides an exclusive list of the kinds of punishments that a court-martial
may impose. The 2000 Manual’s version of R.C.M. 1003 did not
specifically mention LWOP. Rather, the 2000 Manual’s version of R.C.M.
1003, like its predecessors, authorized “confinement” as a form of
punishment without addressing the term of confinement at all. But R.C.M.
1003 nevertheless allowed LWOP, because it is not a new form of
punishment, but simply a longer term of confinement than military law
had previously allowed a court-martial to adjudge.7
In State v. Allen, 488 S.E.2d 188 (N.C. 1997), the
North Carolina Supreme Court faced a similar issue. Under North Carolina
law, premeditated murder is punishable by only death or life
imprisonment without parole. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (2003). The North
Carolina Constitution provides:
The following punishments only shall be known to the
laws of this State: death, imprisonment, fines, suspension of jail or
prison term with or without conditions, restitutions, community service,
restraints on liberty, work programs, removal from office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit
under this State.
N.C. Const. art. XI, § 1. One issue in Allen was
whether the North Carolina legislature was authorized to create the
punishment of LWOP, which Article XI did not expressly mention. The
North Carolina Supreme Court held that it was, reasoning that “the term
‘life imprisonment without parole’ falls within the meaning of the
constitutional term ‘imprisonment,’ so the sentence was authorized by
the Constitution.” Allen, 488 S.E.2d at 737. We find Allen persuasive.
Applying the North Carolina Supreme Court’s reasoning to the military
justice system supports the conclusion that “confinement for life
without eligibility for parole” falls within the meaning of R.C.M.
1003(b)(7)’s term “confinement.”
We hold that LWOP was an authorized punishment for
Appellant’s offenses. To resolve the present case, we need not, and do
not, address the availability of LWOP for any other offense.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the United States Army Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
*****
FOOTNOTES:
1 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 581, 111 Stat. 1629, 1759 (1997) (codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 856a (2000)).
2 Signing Statement, 33 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1861
(Nov. 18, 1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2707.
3 Exec. Order No. 13,262, 67 Fed. Reg. 18,773 (April
17, 2002).
4 United States v.Ronghi, No. ARMY 20000635 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. May 27, 2003).
5 See United States v. Ronghi, 59 M.J. 167 (C.A.A.F.
2003) (order granting review).
6 The 2000 Manual incorporated the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000’s UCMJ amendments and Executive
Order 13,140’s amendments to the Manual. 2000 Manual at Preface. The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, which is not
relevant to this appeal, was enacted on October 5, 1999. Pub. L. No.
106-65, 113 Stat. 512 (1999). Executive Order 13,140 was signed on
October 6, 1999, and generally took effect on November 1, 1999. See Exec.
Order 13,140 § 4, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,115, 55,120 (Oct. 12, 1999).
7 See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 269 (1974) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (“Confinement without possibility of parole is unknown
to military law; it is not and never has been authorized for any UCMJ
offense.” (footnote and citations omitted)).
