15. The shotguns were
acquired following the issue of a Shotgun Certificate in 1978. Police
enquiries at that time showed the absence of any previous convictions or
any information casting doubt on his suitability to possess shotguns.
His application had been countersigned by his own Doctor, and this was
verified by the Police. He was known by local Police Officers and
regarded as always well dressed, of good behaviour, courteous and quiet,
but a bit of a loner. This remained so throughout the currency of his
possession of the Shotgun Certificate, which was renewed in 1984 and
1987.
16. On 10 December 1986
an application was received from RYAN for a Firearm Certificate for two
pistols. Enquiries revealed that he had served his probationary period
and was a full member of the Dunmore Shooting Centre, a Home Office
registered club at Abingdon. Nothing was found to RYAN's detriment and
he had already installed a gun cabinet, suitable for the security of the
weapons he sought, in his bedroom at home. The application was granted
on 11 December 1986, with the condition that the firearms could only be
used on approved ranges. Notification was subsequently received that
RYAN had acquired a Beretta 9mm pistol and a Smith & Wesson .38 pistol,
and his certificate was endorsed accordingly.
17. On 2 April 1987, a
further application was received seeking to increase the number of
pistols he was entitled to hold to three. He wanted to acquire .22 and
.32 pistols and to dispose of his Smith & Wesson .38. He again
satisfied the necessary criteria and his security arrangements were
inspected by a Crime Prevention Officer, in accordance with Force policy
when three or more weapons are to be held, with a favourable result.
His firearms cabinet had two separately keyed locks, an internal
ammunition section using a third key and it was fixed by four bolts to
an exterior wall. The variation was granted on 30 April and
subsequently notification was received that RYAN had disposed of the
Smith & Wesson .38 pistol and acquired a Bernadelli .22 and a CZ .32
pistol. His certificate was called in for amendment.
18. On 14 July 1987
RYAN applied to vary his certificate so as to acquire additionally, a
7.62 rifle and a .30 Carbine. He had by now also become a member of the
Wiltshire Shooting Centre, a Home Office approved Club at Station Road,
Devizes (with facilities for shooting full bore rifles) and as his
application complied with all the criteria it was granted on 30 July
1987. Notification was received on 13 August that RYAN had acquired a
Kalashnikov 7.62 rifle and on 14 August that he had acquired an
Underwood Carbine .30 rifle. Enquiries have revealed that he practised
with these weapons at the Wiltshire Shooting Centre prior to 19 August.
19. It is now known
that shortly before the Hungerford incident, RYAN sold the Bernadelli
.22 pistol and sent the .32 pistol for repair with a firearms dealer.
Thus on 19 August RYAN had in his legal possession the three shotguns,
the Beretta 9mm pistol and the two rifles.
20. No adverse
information about RYAN's suitability to hold shotgun or Firearms
Certificates ever came to police notice, although enquiries since 19
August have indicated that at one time RYAN regularly carried one or
more of his pistols around with him in his car and that he occasionally
'took potshots' at road signs with them. Damage to a road sign in
Hungerford, consistent with the discharge of pistols, has since been
found.
21. Full details of
RYAN's shotgun and firearms applications are shown at Appendix 'A' .
RYAN'S ACTIVITIES ON 19
AUGUST
SHOOTING INCIDENTS IN
WILTSHIRE
22. In order of
probable occurrence rather than notification to Police, RYAN's
activities started at the Savernake Forest, approximately seven miles
west of Hungerford (see map at Appendix 'B') at about 12.3Opm with the
shooting of Mrs Susan GODFREY, aged 33, of Reading. Mrs GODFREY had
just finished picnicking with her two children aged 4 and 2½
years, when she was abducted by RYAN at gun-point. RYAN took with her
from the car a groundsheet which was subsequently found spread out on
the grass about 75 yards away. Mrs GODREY was found some 10 yards away
from the groundsheet having been shot 13 times in the back with the
Beretta pistol. It is possible that RYAN intended to rape Mrs GODFREY
and that he shot her when 'she tried to run away, but this has to be
speculation- Mrs GODFREY had not been sexually interfered with and the
only source of any other evidence is that of the only witnesses - her
two very young children .
23. From Savernake
Forest, RYAN is thought to have driven eastwards along the A4 back
towards Hungerford, stopping at the Golden Arrow Service Station, 3
miles short, at about 12.35pm. RYAN was driving his silver Vauxhall
Astra car and at the Service Station he was seen to fill a petrol can
with petrol before discharging a weapon (subsequently identified as the
M1 Carbine) through a glass screen at the cashier. Remarkably unhurt,
the cashier took cover beneath the counter only to be pursued by RYAN
who tried unsuccessfully to fire at her at point-blank range. He then
drove off towards Hungerford.
SHOOTING INCIDENTS IN
HUNGERFORD
24. At around 12.45pm
RYAN was seen to return to his home address and go inside the house,
slamming the door behind him. His intentions then are open to conjecture
because of a lack of eyewitnesses, but it is thought that he then set
the house alight with the petrol he had just bought and that he intended
to drive off somewhere having ensured his survival kit and three
firearms (the two rifles and the Beretta) were in his car. It is of
note that his three shotguns were left in the house. It is believed,
from the fact that he subsequently shot at his car and from what he
later said to Police before he killed himself, that the car would not
start. It seems that RYAN then removed the three firearms from his car
and almost immediately shot his first two victims, Mr Roland MASON and
Mrs Sheila MASON at the rear of their home at 6 Southview. Mr MASON was
killed by the Kalashnikov and his wife by the Beretta.
25. Thus started RYAN's
trail of shootings in Hungerford, which are described in the following
paragraphs. For ease of reference maps of Hungerford showing his
probable route, together with a schedule of dead and injured persons,
are attached at Appendix 'C'.
26. RYAN, having
murdered Mr and Mrs MASON, first ran eastwards up Southview towards the
footpath leading to the Common, shooting and injuring Mrs Marjorie
JACKSON and Lisa MILDENHALL. Mrs JACKSON telephoned a colleague of her
husband, Mr George WHITE, and asked him to contact her husband, Ivor
JACKSON, both of them being nearby, to let him know what had happened.
This was to lead to both people being shot subsequently.
27. RYAN then moved on
to the footpath leading to the Common. Mr Kenneth CLEMENTS was walking
with his family along the footpath and was confronted by RYAN who shot
and killed him. Mr CLEMENTS had previously been warned of a gunman, but
had disregarded this advice. This death and the following six were all
believed to be carried out with the Kalashnikov.
28. RYAN then returned
back down Southview, shooting and killing PC Roger BRERETON who had just
arrived on the scene and was still seated in his Police car. Whilst PC
BRERETON was murdered with the Kalashnikov, it is believed he was first
shot with the Beretta.
29. RYAN next shot at
Mrs Linda CHAPMAN and her daughter Alison who had just driven into
Southview, seriously injuring both of them. Mrs CHAPMAN was able
however, to drive out of Southview without further injury.
30. RYAN continued
walking down Southview and shot and killed Mr Abdur KHAN, aged 84, who
was in the back garden of his home at 24 Fairview Road, Hungerford. He
then shot and injured Mr Alan LEPETIT who was walking along Fairview
Road, having been previously warned of the shooting in that area.
31. An ambulance which
had been summoned to the scene, had stopped in Fairview Road, before
reversing into Southview Road. RYAN shot at the ambulance slightly
injuring the attendant, Hazel HASLETT. The ambulance then drove off.
32. At this stage Mr
WHITE who had previously been telephoned by Mrs JACKSON, drove into
Southview in his Toyota car with Mr Ivor JACKSON as passenger. RYAN
killed Mr WHITE and seriously injured Mr JACKSON who feigned death. As
a result of the shooting Mr WHITE's Toyota crashed into PC BRERETON's
Police car .
33. Mrs RYAN who had
been shopping, then drove into Southview and parked her vehicle behind
the Toyota. She walked passed both the Toyota and PC BRERETON's Police
car, and was shot dead as she attempted to reason with her son.
34. RYAN left Southview
by the footpath at the east end of Southview having by this stage killed
seven people and injured a further seven in Hungerford.
35. He made his way
across the playing fields where he shot and injured Mrs Betty TOLLADAY
who was in her home in Clarks Gardens. He continued into the Memorial
Gardens where he encountered and killed Mr Francis BUTLER who was
walking his dog.
36. RYAN discarded the
Underwood Carbine at this point and left the Memorial Gardens, shooting
dead Mr Marcus BARNARD who was driving his taxi towards Bulpit Lane. At
this point, RYAN initially discarded his Kalashnikov, but then recovered
it. It is possible it was by then empty. All subsequent deaths were
caused by the Beretta.
37. After walking to
the junction of Bulpit Lane and Priory Avenue, RYAN shot Mrs Ann
HONEYBONE who was driving along Priory Avenue, slightly injuring her.
RYAN then walked up Priory Avenue back in the direction of Southview.
At the junction of Hillside Road, Mr John STORMS was stationary in his
Renault and he was shot and seriously injured by RYAN. At the same time
Mr Douglas WAINWRIGHT and his wife Mrs Kathleen WAINWRIGHT, parents of
PC Trevor WAINWRIGHT of Hungerford Police Station, were driving their
car in Fairview Road. As they drew alongside RYAN, he shot into the car
killing Mr WAINWRIGHT and seriously injuring Mrs WAINWRIGHT.
38. After continuing
along the road towards Tarrants Hill, RYAN shot and slightly injured Mr
Kevin LANCE who was driving a Ford Transit towards him. He then went to
the junction of Tarrants Hill and Priory Avenue shooting dead Mr Eric
VARDY who was driving a Ford Transit along Priory Avenue.
39. After leaving
Tarrants Hill, RYAN walked via Orchard Park Close into Priory Road where
he shot and killed Sandra HILL who was driving her Renault car. He then
walked down Priory Road towards the John O'Gaunt School. On reaching
number 60 Priory Road RYAN broke into the house and shot dead Mr Victor
GIBBS and seriously injured Mrs Myrtle GIBBS, both of whom live at 60
Priory Road. Mrs GIBBS subsequently died from her injuries in hospital.
40. After emerging from
60 Priory Road, RYAN shot at the houses opposite, injuring Mr Michael
JENNINGS at 62 Priory Road and Mrs Myra GEATER at 71 Priory Road.
41. At this time Mr Ian
PLAYLE was driving with his family in his Ford Sierra motor-car. He had
earlier been prevented from entering Hungerford from the Common because
the gunman was thought to be in Southview. As he rounded a sharp
right-hand bend northwards in Priory Road, RYAN fired a single shot and
seriously injured him. Mr PLAYLE later died of his injuries. He was the
last person to receive fatal injuries.
42. RYAN then made his
way towards the John O'Gaunt School shooting and injuring Mr George NOON
who was in the back porch of 109 Priory Road. Mr NOON was the last
person to be shot by RYAN, at about 1.45pm. RYAN was then seen walking
towards the rear of John O'Gaunt School, although his subsequent
detailed movements until he was actually seen there by Police at 5.26pm
were unknown at the time and even now must be speculative.
43. RYAN used all three
of his firearms during his violent acts, firing at least 119 shots in
Hungerford - 84 from the Kalashnikov, 34 from the Beretta and one from
the carbine. The Carbine was used in Southview without hurting anyone,
and it had also been used at the filling station in Wiltshire when again
one shot was fired without causing injury. The Beretta was used to kill
Mrs GODFREY in the Forest, to kill Mrs MASON (the second death in
Hungerford), to injure PC BRERETON (killed by the Kalashnikov), for the
last six deaths in Hungerford and the suicide of RYAN, a total of nine
deaths. The Kalashnikov was used for the other eight deaths. It is now
also known that RYAN was wearing a bullet resistent waistcoat which
would have protected him against all but our most powerful weapons,
whereas some of his bullets had the capacity to pierce armour.
POLICE RESPONSE
INITIAL RESPONSE
44. The first
notification to the Police of RYAN's activities came from a '999' call
at 12.40pm to Newbury Police Station reporting the shooting incident at
the Golden Arrow Service Station. This was confirmed by a telephone
call from Swindon Police five minutes later. Two Traffic cars, one
driven by PC Roger BRERETON, and a Panda car from Hungerford containing
Sergeant RYAN and PC MAGGS were directed to the A4 to keep observation
for the silver Vauxhall Astra involved in the filling station shooting.
At this stage Police had no knowledge of the shooting at Savernake
Forest.
45. The second Traffic
car driven by PC WOODS contained a personal radio, via which at 12.47pm
he heard the transmission from Newbury of details of the first of the
'999' calls relating to the shootings in Southview, Hungerford, and he
relayed this information to PC BRERETON via VHF. The Officers agreed
directions of approach. PC BRERETON was more familiar with Hungerford
than PC WOODS. As PC BRERETON drove towards Southview he fell in behind
the local Police Panda car containing the Hungerford Sergeant and
Constable. The Sergeant indicated by hand signals his intention to
approach one way, and that PC BRERETON should go in from the other
direction. This would have achieved two mobiles with three Officers on
one side of the reported shootings in Southview, and a mobile with PC
BRERETON on the other, effectively containing the scene. At this stage
it should be stated that two separate prime local witnesses, Miss HALL
(an Air Hostess) and L/Cpl HARRIES, have both said that they were not
initially surprised at hearing gunfire, as this was not unusual from the
Common.
46. The Officers had no
means of knowing that RYAN was moving around the area, nor even that he
was killing people. All they knew was of a report of 'a shooting' . PC
BRERETON entered Southview, a narrow lane leading to Hungerford Common.
RYAN emerged suddenly and shot the Officer four times (a total of
twenty-four bullets entered his car). Just prior to Police Constable
BRERETON's radio call that he had been Shot, the controller in the Force
Control Room had issued a clear and authoritative warning to all mobiles
about firearms and to exercise maximum care.
47. Recordings at
Newbury public telephone exchange show that in the 98 minutes between
12.4Opm when the exchange recorded the first emergency call of the
shootings, and 2.l8pm, a total of 83 '999' calls were routed to Newbury
Police Station and 22 calls to the Ambulance and Fire Services Indeed,
in the 24 hour period from noon on Wednesday, the Newbury Telephone
Exchange, which normally handles 300,000 calls each day, recorded that a
further ½ million calls were attempted. The '999' and normal
telephone systems were totally swamped and unable to cope.
48. It is now known
that RYAN's first victim in Hungerford was shot at about 12.47pm and the
last at 1.45pm, a period of 58 minutes. It is clear that some '999'
callers, when able to enter the '999' system, were reporting RYAN's
shootings to Police up to 40 minutes after they had ceased, but
reporting them as if current at that time. Other calls referred to
incorrect locations .
49. The first Officers
to arrive, those from Hungerford and the two Traffic Department mobiles,
were in the Southview and Hungerford Common areas at about 12.55pm.
Their immediate intentions were to attempt to locate the gunman whose
identity then was unknown, and then as it proved necessary to obtain
medical assistance for the injured, and to urge members of the public to
take shelter. These aims were achieved with considerable success,
inspite of the fact that many Police Officers came under fire from RYAN
before he moved rapidly on. (Apart from BRERETON, Sergeant RYAN and
Police Constables WOODS and MAGGS were positively fired at, and a
further six were in areas at which shots were being fired). However,
without reliable information on sightings, the few Police Officers
available in such an isolated and rural area were unable to prevent any
of the subsequent deaths in the 58 minutes of the shootings as the
gunman moved rapidly and randomly over a relatively wide area. It was
not until about 1.25pm that Police received positive indications of RYAN
moving away from the Southview area, and subsequent conflicting reports
made the task of plotting his movements and redeploying personnel
extremely difficult .
50. By 1.10pm uniformed
Officers from Newbury, including an Inspector, were in Hungerford. Many
dead and injured were already visible in the streets around the
Southview area. Reports of bursts of fire were continuing. The first
Police Officers were deployed to set up road blocks to prevent further
public entry into the danger zone, to try to contain or at least monitor
the gunman and to clear the public from the streets. The local Police
response continued with the arrival of the Sub Divisional Superintendent
and more Officers.
51. The local response
was backed up with an intense build-up of resources directed from
Headquarters. By 1.08pm personnel of the Operations Department and
their equipment were en route to Hungerford, where 48 armed Officers
were eventually deployed. The first armed Officer arrived at about
1.2Opm and was deployed on foot. He was followed by a second armed
Officer at 1.28pm who was deployed to the same point. By 1.45pm the
Force helicopter, temporarily grounded for repair, was airborne over
Hungerford having picked up the first armed Officer to provide a better
observation platform. The helicopter was of invaluable assistance in
directing Officers on the ground and members of the public to safety
through its loudspeaker system. It is believed, but cannot be proved,
that it was the activity of the helicopter which caused RYAN to seek
refuge in the school, as opposed to further killings in the town or
making his way into open country. By 2pm five other armed Officers were
deployed on foot and by 2.15pm the remainder of the Support Group had
arrived. Command resources, including the Chief Constable, Assistant
Chief Constable, (Operations) and Senior Operations Department and CID
Officers, supported by communication facilities, arrived before 2pm.
Officers of Divisional Police Support Units totalling 67 in number were
directed to Hungerford by 2.25pm and this build-up continued in the
following hours.
POLICE RESPONSE FOLLOWING
SHOOTINGS AND PRIOR TO RYAN'S CONTAINMENT
52. The problems facing
the Police - and indeed, all the emergency services - continued to be
immense despite the steady build-up of resources. Since 19 August it
has become known how many shootings occurred and over what period of
time they took place: this information took a team of 44 Detectives
over a week to assemble and even now everything is not clear. Of course
the most needed information at the time was the immediate location of
the gunman and his apparent intentions, but inaccurate and misleading
sightings continued throughout the afternoon. From 2.15pm onwards nine
reports were received in respect of several different locations now
known to be incorrect, including the possibility that he was still in
one of the houses at Southview. Examples of other 'sightings' were in
relation to Hungerford Common at 2.17pm ('man with rifle' -turned out to
be the Press with a video camera), Mackim Close at 3.15pm ('man with
rifle'), the canal bank of the Kennet and Avon canal north-west of
Hungerford at 3.20pm ('man running along bank') and Upper Eddington
Road, A338 north of Hungerford at 4.18pm ('two shots heard'). These
'reports' conflicted with one of no greater credibility (at the time)
that he had been seen in the vicinity of the John O'Gaunt School.
53. The Thames Valley
Police facilities available to receive the massive amount of information
coming in, to manage that information and to enable action to be taken
consisted of the following:
a. A one room Police
Station at Hungerford, with two telephone lines on an internal Force
network and a local personal radio network operated from Newbury. (As
mentioned above, this Station is currently being rebuilt and should be
completed this year.)
b. A small
Sub-Divisional Control Room at Newbury Police Station, at which two
Officers (with a third assisting) working under a Senior Officer had the
problem of receiving all emergency and other calls from Hungerford.
Transmission of signals between this Control Room and Divisional
personnel is via three base stations (at Greenham Common, Newbury
Hospital and John O'Gaunt School, Hungerford), each necessary to provide
UHF radio cover for the Sub-Division, albeit incomplete due to the
'dead' areas that still exist. Whilst the controller can transmit on
all three channels simultaneously or separately by operating the
appropriate 'select' button, all incoming messages are received by the
one controller through one loudspeaker, allowing only one incoming
transmission to receive attention. VHF communication could only be used
as an alternative to - not together with - UHF communication. To add to
the controller's problems of selective attention, the room is also the
reception point for exchange telephone lines, and is the site of the
message switch. (A new Divisional Control Room is due to be built at
Wantage, starting this year).
c. An outdated
Headquarters Control Room at Kidlington, with inadequate equipment and
accommodation to take effective command required of an incident of this
magnitude in a relatively isolated area. (A new Force Control Room is
due to be built, starting April 1988.)
54. The communications
difficulties were exacerbated by the unprecedented demands being made on
that day on the public telephone network in Hungerford. It became so
swamped that it was completely unable to cope, and this of course
influenced the Police ability to use lines additional to the internal
Police network. At 6.45pm British Telecom - who gave valuable support
to Police in providing extra facilities - took the decision to 'blank
out' significant parts of the Hungerford telephone exchange so that
Police telephone numbers faced less competition for the remaining
exchange facilities. This remained so until 10pm.
55. Of crucial
assistance to Senior Officers were thirteen Vodaphone cellular
telephones; seven came from the Force's holding, the remaining six were
lent to Police by Racal Vodaphone for use at the incident. One of these
subsequently became the only permanent telephone link between Hungerford
and the Force Control Room when the command pod arrived. However, just
like the overloaded telephone exchange, so it rapidly became impossible
to make or receive calls on the Vodaphone sets because of over-demand on
the cellular system by the Press. When the extent of the over-demand was
appreciated by Racal Vodaphone, and of the importance of the system to
Police command, at 7.05pm Racal 'blanked out' the numbers of Vodaphone
subscribers in the area other than the 'blocks' of numbers within which
the Police numbers were located. This had the effect of significantly
reducing pressure on the cellular system in the area, but of course also
deprived the Police of the use of their own cellular telephones. This
remained so until 9.30pm.
56. It was decided at
an early stage that the Headquarters Control Room would have primacy in
controlling the incident and all information coming into Newbury was
passed by means of an open internal Police line to Kidlington. The
Control Room then managed the incident through its VHF channel, HU,
covering the south of the Force area. There is no forcewide channel
(the Force only has three operational channels) and it was only possible
to dedicate a unique channel to the event by diverting all other routine
radio messages on to the southern channel HT which is kept for PNC
checks. This resulted in all routine messages in the southern part of
the Force coming into competition with PNC checks and routine motorway
radio traffic on the one HT channel.
57. At Hungerford
Police Station contact with either Newbury or Headquarters Control Rooms
was extremely difficult, with the two telephone lines being totally
inadequate for the mass of traffic required. Radio communication by VHF
channel HU was possible but such was the pressure on the air-time there
was no opportunity without another channel for command discussions or
for decisions to be effectively co-ordinated- Eventually it became
possible to dedicate one of the two Force internal telephone lines as a
permanent link with Headquarters Control Room .
58. Difficulties were
also encountered with getting a Mobile Communications Vehicle to the
scene, as the Immediate Response Vehicle had just become defective.
This was an unusual and most unlucky misfortune; the Force
communications vehicle is excellent and normally instantly available.
After a short delay, an older replacement vehicle was despatched and
this was quickly followed by a Command Pod to provide full base station
facilities later on. The significance of these delays was highlighted
by a second factor, namely that the number of radios with the National
Firearms Channel 76 issued to the Force proved insufficient for an
emergency of this magnitude. Thus, some of the Firearms Officers
deployed did not have a channel 76 set and this caused communication
problems during the 'searching' and 'containment' phases.
59. With this lack of
technological support, the Officers at the scene continued very
effectively with their tasks of ensuring members of the public took
cover, providing medical assistance to the injured and trying to locate
RYAN. Roads were physically blocked to ensure RYAN could not leave the
area in a vehicle. Cordons were maintained to ensure that the area
south of Park Street and west of the High Street was kept as 'sterile'
as possible, although as stated above some calls suggested that the
gunman was outside that area and indeed, for some long time there was no
knowing whether RYAN was still in Hungerford at all.
60. Members of the
Support Group, the Force's Tactical Firearms Team, were deployed to
various locations within the sterile area to observe and watch for any
movements of the gunman. It was at this time impossible without the
facility of armoured vehicles, which Thames Valley Police do not
possess, to allow a sweep search for injured and dead persons because of
the risks involved. Such a vehicle would also have been invaluable in
reconnoitring the area. At 2.20pm the Metropolitan Police were
approached for the loan of two armoured Land Rovers (a loan rapidly
agreed to and gratefully received) and these arrived at 4.10pm. They
were immediately used under Thames Valley Police command to bring the
only known remaining injured member of the public to safety. It later
transpired that there was one other injured person who, unknown to
Police, was uncared for and she was subsequently removed by ambulance to
hospital when RYAN had been located.
61. As the afternoon
continued information suggesting that the gunman was at the school was
firmed up, although it was still far from clear how reliable this was.
At 4.40pm shots were heard from the vicinity of the school, and at
5.15pm a shot was heard which had definitely come from the school. It
is thought that several shots were fired during the afternoon by the
gunman at the Police helicopter, and possibly other Press helicopters
flying over Hungerford: the shots heard at 4.40pm and 5.15pm may have
been some of them. The Police Firearms Team moved in to contain the
school.
POLICE RESPONSE DURING
CONTAINMENT PHASE
62. As soon as it was
confirmed that the gunman was at the school, a team of Police Officers
with the Fire Brigade and Ambulance Service personnel attended Southview
to extinguish fire at 1-4 Southview - the fire started by RYAN had
spread during the early afternoon to all four houses in the terrace.
Police also secured the area for Police forensic purposes.
63. Back at John
O'Gaunt School a rifle, subsequently identified as the Kalashnikov, was
thrown out of a third floor window at 5.25pm, and one minute later a man
was seen inside the window A dialogue with the man began. By 6pm
containment around the school by armed Officers was complete, and an
outer cordon had also been established.
64. A Sergeant from the
Support Group kept up the dialogue with the man, who confirmed that he
was RYAN and started to talk about himself. He stated that he had an
Israeli fragmentation grenade and a handgun. He appeared rational, and
gave the impression initially that he was thinking of giving himself up.
He shouted that "none of this would have happened" but for the Policeman
(meaning PC BRERETON) coming on the scene, although by then he had
already killed three in Southview, and his (RYAN'S) car not starting.
He expressed regret about the death of his mother and his dog and said
of having killed all the others, "It's funny, I've killed all those
people but I haven't the guts to blow my own brains out".
65. At 6.52pm a single
shot was heard coming from the school and subsequently RYAN failed to
respond to questions. Because of the uncertainties about RYAN's
weapons, whether in fact he had killed himself, the possibility of
traps, or even if others were with him, an armed operation involving the
two armoured Land Rovers was carefully planned and finally at 8pm it was
executed. At 8.10pm Police entered the third floor room where RYAN had
been seen, and he was found slumped against a wall by a window. dead,
having shot himself through the head with his Beretta pistol.
THE AFTERMATH
66. The emergency
response now gave way to the twin tasks of supporting the people of
Hungerford and the massive task of investigating the incident. Control
of the immediate areas of the shootings was secured so as to exclude all
activity, notably the Press, and enquiries were carried out to locate
next of kin and witnesses. A sweep search of a large part of Hungerford
was carried out to ensure that everyone was accounted for and that no
injured or dead person had been overlooked. The Casualty Bureau, which
had been opened at Kidlington from 3pm received the many incoming calls
from anxious members of the public and operated continuously for 48
hours, receiving 904 enquiries.
67. Activity continued
for several days as the Police investigation uncovered the full
implications of the tragedy. A CID Major Incident Room was set up at
the Force Training Centre, Sulhamstead, utilising the AUTOINDEX
computerised crime investigation system (HOLMES is still in the process
of being acquired by the Force) . A massive stressful task faced the
Scenes of Crime and Coroner's Officers in covering the many bloody
scenes, dealing with the bodies of the deceased and recovering the many
items of evidence. Fifteen vehicles were removed for examination - in
which approximately 78 bullet holes were found - and a large number of
other exhibits were recovered from the various scenes. Enquiry teams
visited all the injured persons and known witnesses and house-to-house
enquiries were carried out to seek further evidence of what had
occurred. Overall a total of 55 CID and other specialised Officers were
involved for two and a half weeks in bringing the investigation to a
satisfactory conclusion.
68. The Press were much
in evidence and three full press conferences were held. Both the Prime
Minister and Home Secretary visited the scene, and the situation was
explained to them by Officers who had been involved. Funerals of all
the deceased were subsequently held, each one being attended by a Chief
Officer of the Thames Valley Police.
69. A substantial
Police responsibility following the incident has been the handling of
stress in respect of many Officers connected with the events. Stress
has manifested itself not only in those close to the shootings in
Hungerford, but also in other Officers (such as those in Control Rooms)
who had an awesome responsibility during the early stages. Outdated
equipment and the overall shortage of manpower within the Force were no
doubt factors which made the task much harder for all Officers on the
day, factors which have now heightened their stress level through the
sadness that some of them feel at the appalling death toll revealed.
Stress Counselling has been made available by the Force to all of those
involved, through the offices of the Force Welfare Officers and
involving the services of a professional counsellor, Dr Peter AGULNIK, a
Consultant Psychiatrist of Littlemore Hospital, Oxford. This will be a
long term problem, but it is well in hand.
70. An Inquest was held
by HM Coroner for West Berkshire, Mr Charles HOILE, at Hungerford on 24,
25 and 28, 29 September. In his summing up, before the Jury retired, he
said:
"I would think there may
be two areas where your minds might well be moving towards - if there is
anything you can suggest to prevent similar fatalities. Clearly the
response of the Police is an important matter and how quickly that came
about. I would like to say this, that we as a nation, community, cannot
have it both ways, by that I mean we cannot insist upon an unarmed
Police Force and at the same time expect that Police in an emergency of
that sort to become armed and become available at 'the drop of a hat' .
We have got to accept the fact that we have got to pay for the privilege
of having a Police Force which is -if you like - on our side, not
threatening us, an important part of our liberty. Most people would be
very reluctant to say do away with that.
So far as the Police
response, leaving aside the armed branch of the Force or that part of
the Force which can become armed, the response of the Police obviously
is pretty prompt because quite clearly one of the first people to be
killed was PC BRERETON answering the call and he was not alone he was
with another Officer in another vehicle and two other Officers who were
local Policemen called to the emergency. Looking at it from that view
their response would be difficult to fault. . There is then a gap
because the whole character of the occurrence changes from being that of
a domestic quarrel, the whole thing changes to something which is
absolutely unprecedented, something which we in this county and in the
whole country - a man going beserk and killing.
The other thing that you
may be thinking about is the question of firearms and you will remember
that this is a matter which has already exercised the mind of the Home
Secretary."
The Jury returned the
predictable verdicts and commended various people, including PCs
BRERETON, WOODS, MAGGS and Sergeant RYAN. They made only one
recommendation to the Coroner, which he accepted, namely:
"The Jury felt that
semi-automatic weapons should not generally be available and that an
individual should not be allowed to own an unlimited quantity of arms
and ammunition. However, knowing that this subject is under review by
the Government, the Jury makes no detailed recommendations."
71. One complaint
against Police has been received in respect of the incident. Mrs
Elizabeth PLAYLE, the wife of the deceased Mr Ian PLAYLE (who was the
Clerk of the Justices for West Berkshire) has complained that whilst
approaching Hungerford with her husband and two children in their car,
they were stopped by plain clothes Officers at Hungerford Common and
turned back. The basis of her complaint is that because they were given
inadequate information about what was happening, they then made their
way to Hungerford via another route, entering via Priory Road, where her
husband was shot. She has also complained that she was given inadequate
assistance by the Police in relocating her two children after they
became separated at the scene of the shooting. The complaint has been
recorded under Section 85 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and
Chief Superintendent M HARLAND, Hampshire Constabulary, has been
appointed the Investigating Officer. It is being supervised by Mrs
VICKERS of the Police Complaints Authority.
CONCLUSIONS
72. The Hungerford
incident is quite unprecedented in the British experience and we can but
hope no similar incident will ever occur again. Not only was it more
violent and unpredictable than anything previously encountered, but it
also occurred at a location which could hardly be more remote. Given
these circumstances the Police operation went well.
73. The limitations
imposed on the Force by the lack of manpower and equipment could
certainly have become a relevant factor had RYAN not been traced and
contained rapidly. No Force, even with the most up-to-date equipment,
would have been able to handle the vast flood of varied and sometimes
contradictory information coming in during the early stages. However,
as the incident continued on into the early evening the lack of good
communications equipment and accommodation started to become significant
and this might have had serious consequences had the operation become
protracted. Much of the success of the operation is due to the
proficiency and initiative showed by many individual Officers, some of
whom showed great courage.
74. Force
communications are due to be upgraded in the early 1990s by the
introduction of a Command and Control system which will comprise a
computerised incident logging facility, new radio and telephone control
equipment, an integrated communications network, properly designed and
provided Control Rooms and additional VHF radio channels. Had this
planned system been in operation on 19 August, co-ordination of the
Police response would have been far easier to manage. Each Division is
to have its own dedicated VHF channel which, together with all the local
UHF schemes, will be controlled from a Divisional Control Room. All
requests for Police action and the deployment of local resources will be
dealt with in one place. Controllers at the Force Headquarters Control
Room, at present provided with obsolete equipment and lacking access to
any of the many Force UHF radio schemes, will have the ability to
control any radio channel within the Force. This, together with the
management information available from the Command and Control computer,
will enable the Chief Constable and his senior management team to deal
more effectively with any incident. A necessary prerequisite to these
plans is the provision of 8 VHF radio channels (3 more than at
present): one for each Division; one for motorway control and one for
major incident and emergency use. The need for more personal radios
channelled to the firearms channel 76 is already being dealt with.
75. The following three
issues, which have not been covered in any depth above, also need to be
addressed:
(a) Private
Helicopters
Whilst the invaluable
benefits of the deployment of the Force helicopter have been mentioned,
it must be said that its use was significantly impeded on occasions by
the use of other helicopters hired by the Press. The first was sighted
at 3.30pm. It was not only a distraction for the Pilot of the Police
helicopter, but it was necessary that its Pilot was advised that he was
flying within firearm range It is thought that RYAN did fire a number
of shots at helicopters. Transmission of a warning by Air Traffic
Control, RAF Benson, to the Press helicopter produced no response. It
flew within an estimated 75 metres of the Force helicopter. The Press
helicopter finally moved away, only to be replaced by another. Radio
contact was not possible with the Pilot of that machine either. By
4.10pm four further helicopters were flying over Hungerford at heights
between 800 and 1,500ft despite a ban by then imposed by the Civil
Aviation Authority on flying below 3,000ft within a 2.5 mile radius of
Hungerford for aircraft other than the Force helicopter.
The noise from all these
helicopters seriously disrupted Police operations on the ground. Armed
Officers placed in containment around John O'Gaunt were unable to hear
radio transmissions and their progress was slowed. Later negotiation
between Police and RYAN was frequently interrupted.
It may be appropriate for
representations to be made to the Civil Aviation Authority to review
regulations governing methods of operation with a view to Police
Aviation Units having air space priority in such circumstances, and the
provision of a wavelength for air to air communications with a Police
aircraft in the absence of Air Traffic Control communication.
(b) Armoured Police
Vehicles
The facility to effect the
rescue of a seriously injured man from 109 Priory Road, Hungerford, and
later to deploy armed Officers within range of RYAN's firearms was
invaluable, but could not have been achieved without the aid provided by
the armoured Land Rovers of the Metropolitan Police.
As stated earlier, if a
Senior Officer had been able to enter the area to assess the situation,
the Police task would have been immeasurably easier.
Such vehicles - two for a
Force of the size of Thames Valley Police with its level of deployment
of armed Officers in response to protection and firearms incident duties
- are clearly needed. Protected vehicles will need to be equipped to
carry out a number of functions:
i. Casualty evacuations.
ii. Accommodation for
armed Officers being deployed within range of firearms.
iii. Reconnoitring an area
where firearms are being used .
iv. Public Order duties
when the Police response is to a disorder that contains elements
discharging firearms or other lethal missiles.
(c) Firearms
Legislation
Little that occurred
during these events or contributed to their cause indicates the need for
any specific change in the legislation or procedures relating to
firearms. However, the public are not only amenable to, but will
demand, that this tragic event is used as a catalyst for changes in both
the law and administrative procedures which have long been thought
desirable and well overdue.
i. There is no
legitimate sporting or leisure interest that would be seriously damaged
or even significantly impeded if the more lethal firearms were
prohibited from normal sale and could not be kept by the private person
in his own home. I refer to self-loading full bore rifles, carbines and
shotguns.
(Footnote: The case of
ex-soldier J A G HAIG in Suffolk on 13 May 1987, when he took his
father's self-loading full bore rifle and fired freely in Lowestoft is
relevant) .
ii. Accepting some
firearms enthusiasts like to produce their own ammunition and some
ammunition needs to be held at home for killing vermin etc, there is an
essential need to prevent wherever possible, the storage of ammunition
at the home of a private person. It would be relatively easy not to
permit every person who justifies a firearm merely for target practice,
to keep ammunition at home. For this or any other use for which a case
can be made to keep ammunition at home should be the subject of greater
scrutiny to acquire storage justification.
iii. The suitability of
any person to own any firearm, Part I or shotgun, needs to be the
subject of much stricter rules. The local Police Officer is the best
person to undertake any such enquiries; and as the Chief Constable has
to deal with any subsequent offence or incident, he should be given
greater authority to judge suitability. The task of the Police would be
made more effective if an applicant was required to put up referees of
standing who were willing to support the applicant. The Police should
be entitled to consult whomsoever they thought useful, and rules of
confidentiality should not be a barrier. Of significant importance, the
court (to whom appeals must be possible, if perhaps only to the High
Court) should be more supportive if the Police refuse a request.
Historically, Judges come from a sports shooting background, and tend to
be liberal, without appreciating the consequences of guns in less
responsible hands.
iv. A shotgun which falls
into the wrong hands has the same lethal power as Part I Firearms, and
should be subject to exactly the same restrictions and laws.
v. Authority to purchase
or acquire ammunition should be explicit to prevent armour piercing
ammunition falling into the hands of any private citizen .
Colin SMITH CVO QPM Chief
Constable
*****
Appendix 'A'
DETAILED BACKGROUND TO
RYAN'S POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
Shotgun Certificate
RYAN was first granted a
Thames Valley Shotgun Certificate on 2 February 1978. His application
was countersigned by his Doctor, and verified as such by Police enquiry
that also showed the absence of any previous conviction or any
information to RYAN's detriment casting doubt on his suitability to
possess a shotgun. He was known by local Police Officers and regarded
as always well dressed, of good behaviour, courteous and quiet, but a
bit of a loner. This remained so throughout the currency of his
possession of the Shotgun Certificate, which was renewed in l984 and
1987.
Firearms Certificate
On 10 December 1986, an
application was received from RYAN for a Firearms Certificate. He
sought authority to acquire a 9mm Browning Pistol and a 38 Colt
Revolver for the purpose of target shooting at the Dunmore Shooting
Centre Club, Wootton Road, Abingdon. He also sought permission to
possess a maximum of 500 rounds for each weapon at any one time, by
purchase of up to 200 rounds at a time.
In any application to
possess Section 1 Firearms for target shooting purposes it has long been
the policy of this Force only to grant the authority where it is shown
that the applicant is a full member of a bona fide club. There are some
exceptions to this rule but these are rare and have only been granted
after very careful consideration and on an individual basis. For
example, members of the British Pentathlete Team are not individual
members of a club, but they meet the necessary overall criteria of a
good reason to possess firearms.
Enquiries into RYAN's
application revealed that he had served his probationary period and was
a full member of the Dunmore Shooting Centre Club.
The Dunmore Shooting
Centre is a Home Office Registered Club and was first granted a Club
Certificate in September 1986. One of the Club rules reads as follows:-
'A minimum period of 12
weeks and maximum of 6 months probation including a minimum of 12 x
½ hours details shall normally be served by all Probationary
Members. On completion of the above period the secretary shall review
the applicant's number of attendances, depth of interest, apparent
character and conduct, and if in the Company's opinion these are
satisfactory, confirm Full Membership and issue a Membership Card to
this effect. The Company may refuse Full Membership without giving any
reason whatsoever.’
Enquiries by Police again
revealed nothing to RYAN's detriment. He had already installed a gun
cabinet in his bedroom, which was adequate for the weapons he sought to
acquire. It had two separately keyed locks and a separately keyed
internal compartment for ammunition. It was fixed by four bolts to an
external wall within the house.
RYAN's application for a
Firearms Certificate was granted on 11 December 1986, but was so
conditioned that the firearms could only be used on approved ranges.
On 23 December 1987, the
Dunmore Shooting Centre, which is also a Registered Dealer in Firearms,
notified Thames Valley Police Firearms. Department that they had sold a
Beretta 9mm Pistol to RYAN.
Similar notification was
received that RYAN had acquired from them a Smith & Wesson .38 Pistol on
8 January 1987.
RYAN's Certificate was
called in for the acquisitions to be formally endorsed on his
Certificate. This follows the practice of calling in certificates for
inclusion of all acquisitions and disposals of weapons.
On 2 April 1987 a further
application was received from RYAN seeking to acquire a .32 pistol and a
.22 pistol and stating his intention of disposing of the .38 Smith &
Wesson. The additional firearms were for use at the Dunmore Shooting
Centre where he was still a member. He again satisfied the criterion of
a 'good reason to possess .
Whenever any applicant
seeks to acquire three or more firearms the premises where it is
proposed to store them are inspected by a Crime prevention Officer.
This was done and a favourable report was received.
On 30 April 1987, he was
granted a variation to his Certificate so as to enable him to purchase
the two pistols and relevant ammunition. He was authorised with the
issue of a Temporary Permit to dispose of the .38 Smith & Wesson Pistol
to ensure that it was in fact sold and not retained by him. On 6 May
l987 RYAN notified the sale of the .38 Smith & Wesson to the Dunmore
Shooting Centre and he returned the Temporary Permit. The same day the
Dunmore Shooting Centre notified Police that they had sold RYAN a .22
Bernadelli Pistol.
On 15 May 1987,
notification was received from 'SPORTIQUE' Sporting Firearms of
Cheshire, that they had sold RYAN a .32 CZ pistol. RYAN'S Certificate
was again called in for amendment.
On 14 July 1987, RYAN
submitted an application to vary his Certificate so as to acquire
additionally a 7.62 rifle and a .30 carbine. As well as being a member
of the Dunmore Shooting Centre, he was by now also a member of the
Wiltshire Shooting Centre, Station Road, Devizes. This Home Office
approved Club is also known as the 'Tunnel Rifle and Pistol Club' and
has facilities for shooting full bore rifles. RYAN'S application met
all the criteria and his application was granted, to acquire the two
firearms and requisite ammunition, on 30 July 1987.
On 13 August 1987,
notification was received that RYAN had purchased a 7.62 calibre
Kalashnikov from Westbury Guns, Westbury, Wiltshire, on 6 August 1987.
On 14 August 1987, notification was received that on 8 August 1987 he
had acquired a .30 Underwood Rifle from the Wiltshire Shooting Centre.
It is now known that RYAN sold the Bernadelli .22 Pistol shortly before
the Hungerford incident and the CZ .32 Pistol was undergoing repair with
a Firearms Dealer.
THAMES VALLEY FIREARMS
GENERALLY
It is perhaps relevant at
this point to describe briefly the position of firearms possessed by the
general public in the Thames Valley Police area.
There are 34,188 people
who hold a shotgun certificate, and of course each can legally possess
an unlimited and unspecified number of firearms and ammunition and
without any Police supervision of their security arrangements.
