94 F.3d 1177
Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Donald E. Reese,
Paul Delo, Superintendent,
Potosi Correctional Center, Appellee.
Submitted: June 10, 1996
Filed: September 4, 1996
Appeal from the
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
Before WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
DOTY,(*) District Judge.
WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
Donald E. Reese, a Missouri inmate sentenced to
death, appeals the district court's(1) denial of his petition for
writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 2254. We affirm.
On March 25, 1988, Reese was convicted of two
counts of first- degree murder. The details of the crime were set
forth by the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Reese, 795 S.W.2d 69
(Mo. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1110 (1991), and are
On September 9, 1986, four bodies were discovered
at the Marshall Junction Wildlife Reserve shooting range. After the
investigating officers learned that Reese had purchased the type of
ammunition used in the killings, they conducted several interviews
with him, as well as a consensual search of his home.
Following his arrest on September 15, Reese asked
the officers whether he should retain an attorney. The officers
replied that they could not advise him on the matter but that an
attorney could be furnished if he wanted one. Reese replied, "Forget
it," whereupon he was read his Miranda rights. After waiving his
rights, Reese talked with the officers for approximately three hours
and denied participation in the crime.
Later that evening he was arraigned on a
complaint charging him with multiple counts of first degree murder,
armed criminal action, and robbery. He was advised of his right to
retain an attorney, right to be assigned an attorney if he could not
afford one, and right to remain silent. A preliminary hearing was
set for September 18.
The next morning, Reese again waived his Miranda
rights and refused an officer's offer to telephone an attorney for
him by replying, "I didn't do it and I don't need an attorney and I
don't want one." An officer then advised Reese that he needed to
have an attorney for the preliminary hearing and that that policy
required him to fill out a form to determine whether he was
financially eligible for the appointment of the public defender.
Reese continued to talk to the officers for approximately one hour.
He again denied his involvement in the crime and reaffirmed that he
did not need an attorney.
The interview resumed later that afternoon after
Reese confirmed that he had waived his Miranda rights. During the
course of the interview, Reese was visited by his wife and his son.
At approximately 6:00 p.m. that evening, Reese admitted that he
killed the four men. His statement was reduced to writing and
included an express waiver of his Miranda rights. Reese later led
the officers to the place where he had hidden the murder weapon and
the victims' wallets and money.
Reese was charged with two counts of first-degree
murder. After the jury found him guilty, the state presented
evidence at the penalty phase of the trial that Reese had attended
the funeral of two of the victims and had posed as a family friend
despite the fact that he did not know the victims.
John Lewis, Reese's cellmate, testified that
Reese had told him that he went to the shooting range intending to
get money. Reese also related the details of the crime to Lewis.
Despite Reese's presentation of mitigating evidence through family
members and other witnesses, the jury recommended a sentence of
death for both offenses, citing as aggravating circumstances that
Reese had murdered the victims for the purpose of receiving money
and during the course of a robbery.
The trial court sentenced Reese to death for the
murder of James Watson and to life imprisonment for the murder of
Christopher Griffith, after taking into consideration the fact that
Griffith's family had expressed their opposition to the death
On November 14, 1988, Reese filed a motion for
post-conviction relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule
29.15. On July 20, 1989, the post-conviction court denied Reese's
request for relief after conducting an evidentiary hearing. Reese
then appealed both his convictions and sentences, along with the
denial of post- conviction relief, to the Missouri Supreme Court.
See Reese, 795 S.W.2d 69. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed his
convictions, sentences, and the denial of post-conviction relief in
the consolidated appeal. Id.
Reese then petitioned for relief in federal
district court. On October 24, 1995, the district court denied
Reese's second amended petition for habeas corpus and granted him a
certificate of probable cause to appeal. On appeal Reese presents
most of the claims denied by the district court.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Reese first claims that his trial attorney was
ineffective in failing to: (1) investigate his background,
psychological impairments, and family history; (2) withdraw as
counsel or preserve the attorney-client relationship when it began
to break down before trial; and (3) investigate and prepare the
penalty phase evidence.
We review ineffective assistance claims de novo,
as they present mixed questions of law and fact. Laws v. Armontrout,
863 F.2d 1377, 1381 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1040 (1989). The district court held that Reese's ineffective
assistance claims were procedurally barred because he failed to
advance his claims on appeal from the denial of his Rule 29.15
motion for post-conviction relief. We agree. In Missouri, a claim
presented in a Rule 29.15 motion but not advanced on appeal is
considered abandoned. Sloan v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1371, 1382 (8th Cir.
1995) (citing O'Neal v. State, 766 S.W.2d 91, 91 (Mo.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874 (1989)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 728
Reese's contention that the ineffective
assistance claims are not barred because he raised them in his state
habeas corpus petition pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 91 is
without merit. See State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443,
444 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (petitioner who fails to advance claim on
appeal cannot seek review in Rule 91 petition unless claim presents
jurisdictional issue or circumstances so "rare and extraordinary"
that manifest injustice will result). Although the Missouri courts
have not yet determined what circumstances constitute manifest
injustice, we have held that "state habeas proceedings are not to be
used in lieu of Rule 29.15 unless the petitioner can demonstrate
that the claim was not `known to him' when he filed his 29.15
motions." Sloan, 54 F.3d at 1382 (citing Simmons, 886 S.W.2d at
Clearly, this is not the case here. Likewise,
Reese's contention that the claims are not barred because they were
raised in his motion to recall the mandate is without merit, for "a
motion to recall the mandate cannot be used to allege ineffective
assistance of trial counsel." Nave v. Delo, 62 F.3d 1024, 1031 (8th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1837 (1996).
Reese further argues that his claims are not
procedurally barred because Rule 29.15 was designed to thwart
federal habeas review of his state convictions and is thus invalid.
"[A] procedural default under state law may constitute independent
and adequate state law grounds precluding federal review." Oxford v.
Delo, 59 F.3d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Harris v. Reed, 489
U.S. 255, 262 (1989)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1361 (1996). The
state procedural rule must be both firmly established and regularly
followed, however, to preclude federal review. Id. We have
previously rejected claims that Rule 29.15 is an inadequate state
ground to bar federal review. See, e.g., Sloan, 54 F.3d at 1379-81
(time limit procedures under Rule 29.15 adequate); Oxford, 59 F.3d
at 745 (verification requirement of Rule 29.15 was firmly
established and regularly followed). Moreover, Reese fails to even
allege that any procedural requirement under Rule 29.15 was not
firmly established or regularly followed, so as to preclude review
of his claims. See Oxford, 59 F.3d at 744-45.
Because Reese's claims are procedurally defaulted,
he must show cause and actual prejudice from the alleged
constitutional violations to warrant federal review. Forest v. Delo,
52 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 1995). Reese raises the ineffective
assistance of his post-conviction appellate counsel as cause. There
is no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings, however,
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991), and thus a claim that
post conviction appellate counsel was ineffective does not
constitute cause for default. Lowe-Bey v. Groose, 28 F.3d 816, 819
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 674 (1994). Because Reese has
failed to overcome the procedural bar, we decline to reach the
merits of his ineffective assistance claims.
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Reese next raises three claims of prosecutorial
misconduct, contending that the prosecutor failed to disclose three
items of exculpatory evidence: (1) a $500 payment to Reese's wife
for her assistance in obtaining Reese's confession; (2) a deal
between the state and Lewis, Reese's cellmate, for Lewis's testimony
at the penalty phase; and (3) that Griffith's family was opposed to
the death penalty. The district court held that the first two claims
were procedurally defaulted and that the third claim was without
Because Reese failed to bring his first two
claims in Missouri state court, he must establish cause for his
default and prejudice before we will address their merits. Forest,
52 F.3d at 719. To show cause for his default, Reese alleges that
his post-conviction appellate counsel was ineffective and that Rule
29.15 is inadequate. We have already rejected these grounds as cause
for default. Moreover, Reese's allegation that his trial counsel was
ineffective cannot constitute cause because Reese failed to present
this claim in state court. See Oxford, 59 F.3d at 747.
Reese also alleges ineffective assistance of his
appellate counsel as cause. Ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel can constitute cause for default. Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 492 (1986). To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim,
Reese must show that his attorney's performance was professionally
unreasonable and that, but for his deficient performance, the
outcome of the proceeding would have likely been different. Griffin
v. Delo, 33 F.3d 895, 900 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1981
To assess the effectiveness of appellate
counsel's conduct, we must examine Reese's underlying constitutional
claims. Reese must show that the prosecutor suppressed evidence
favorable to his defense that was material to the question of guilt
in order to establish a Brady violation. Cornell v. Nix, 976 F.2d
376, 382 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1020
(1993); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Reese
admitted at his post-conviction hearing that he was aware that the
police had offered his wife a reward if he confessed before trial.
Thus, his claim that the prosecutor had suppressed the evidence is
without merit, and appellate counsel's failure to raise this claim
was not unreasonable.
Nor was appellate counsel's conduct unreasonable
in failing to raise an allegation that the state had an agreement
with Lewis. The district court found there was ample evidence to
refute Reese's claim of an agreement.(2) Because there was no
agreement, Reese could not establish a Brady violation; thus,
appellate counsel acted reasonably in foregoing the claim.
We agree with the Missouri Supreme Court that
Reese's contention that the prosecutor violated Brady by failing to
disclose that the Griffith family was opposed to the death penalty
has no merit. Rejecting the claim on Reese's direct appeal, the
Missouri Supreme Court stated:
The opposition of the parents of one of the
victims to capital punishment is not a material circumstance, and
there was no violation of discovery principles in not disclosing
this opposition. A criminal prosecution is a public matter and not a
contest between the defendant and his victims, or their relatives.
Reese, 795 S.W.2d at 75.
The parties do not dispute that the prosecutor
knew about this evidence and failed to disclose it to Reese. However,
no constitutional violation occurs unless the withholding of such
evidence denies the defendant the right to a fair trial. Walker v.
Lockhart, 763 F.2d 942, 957 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
In other words, if the evidence would have
affected the result of the trial, then the evidence should have been
disclosed. Griffin, 33 F.3d at 904. Because the state court's
determination on the materiality of evidence is a mixed question of
law and fact, our review is de novo.
Cornell, 976 F.2d at 382. The district court found that the
outcome of the trial would not have been affected by the evidence.
The result in the instant case was that the trial
court was told of Griffin's [sic] family's opposition to the death
penalty and reduced accordingly Petitioner's sentence for Griffith's
death. There is no indication that Griffith's family's views on the
death penalty would have influenced the jury when determining
Petitioner's fate for murdering Watson.
We agree with the district court. Moreover, at
least one circuit has held that a petitioner is not entitled to
present evidence that a victim's relative is opposed to the death
penalty. See Robinson v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1505 (10th Cir.
1987) (relevant mitigating evidence only includes "that which
applies to either the character or record of the defendant or to any
of the circumstances of the offense").
IV. Admission of Confession
Reese argues that his constitutional rights were
violated by the improper admission of his confession. He contends
that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated because both his
confession and Miranda waivers were involuntary. In addition, he
alleges that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when
police continued to question him after he filled out an application
requesting the public defender's services. The Missouri trial court
found that Reese was fully aware of and understood his Miranda
rights, and that his waivers and confession were voluntary.
A. Fifth Amendment
We review questions of voluntariness de novo.
Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1294 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 499 (1994). A state court's factual findings are entitled to
a presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. SS 2254(d).
In determining whether a confession is voluntary,
we consider the totality of the circumstances. Sumpter v. Nix, 863
F.2d 563, 565 (8th Cir. 1988). To establish that his confession was
involuntary, Reese had the burden to show that his statements were
the product of police coercion and his "`will [was] overborne and
his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.'" Id. (quoting
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)).
Our review of the totality of the circumstances
persuades us that there was ample evidence to support the trial
court's factual findings. First, Reese was given his Miranda rights
at least four times during the course of the interviews with the
officers. The fact that such warnings were given weighs in favor of
a voluntariness finding. United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347,
1350 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel,
Criminal Procedure 268 (1985)).
In rejecting Reese's claim that he did not
voluntarily waive his Fifth Amendment rights, the trial court
pointed to Reese's receipt of repeated Miranda warnings, his refusal
of a police officer's offer to telephone an attorney, and the lack
of coercive police conduct. In addition, it relied on the fact that
Reese was present at his arraignment hearing and was aware of the
seriousness of the charges filed against him. The court also took
into consideration that Reese was forty-three years old, had a high
school equivalency diploma, and was familiar with the criminal
justice system as he had been previously prosecuted for a felony.
See Reese, 798 S.W.2d at 83 (Appendix encompassing the trial court's
order). Given these circumstances, we agree that Reese voluntarily
and knowingly waived his Miranda rights.
Reese alleges that neither his Miranda waivers
nor his confession was voluntary because he was suffering from
severe clinical depression, passive dependency personality, and low
intelligence. He failed to present this evidence in state court,
however. In any event, some mental impairments alone do not render
statements involuntary. Jones v. Delo, 56 F.3d 878, 888 (8th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1330 (1996). There must also be
coercive police activity. See LaRette v. Delo, 44 F.3d 681, 688-89
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 246 (1995).
We agree with the Missouri trial court that not
only was there a lack of coercion by the police, but "that the law
enforcement authorities displayed a painstaking regard for the
defendant's rights from the time of his arrest to his confession."
Reese, 795 S.W.2d at 84 (Appendix). The officers questioned Reese
intermittently over a two-day period. The interviews were not
excessive in length, and following each break in the interrogation
process, the officers informed Reese of his Miranda rights. As the
trial court found, "[Reese] was never deprived of food, drink or
toilet facilities. He was never threatened or abused by the officers.
He was allowed to visit with his family."
The trial court also rejected Reese's claim that
the police coerced him into making the confession by eliciting his
wife's assistance in obtaining the confession. First, Reese's wife
visited Reese at her own request. Second, she did not relay any
statements made by Reese to the police. Third, Reese was aware that
his wife had spoken to the police on the matter because she told him
that the police wanted her help in obtaining his confession. See
Reese, 795 S.W.2d at 84 (Appendix). Given these circumstances, we
agree with the Missouri trial court that Reese's confession was
B. Sixth Amendment
We also agree with the Missouri Supreme Court's
conclusion that Reese's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated
when the police questioned him after he filled out a request for
assistance from the public defender. The court stated:
Counsel had not been appointed. The defendant's
eligibility for the public defender's services had not been
determined. There was no request for counsel during interrogation.
There was, by contrast, an explicit waiver. The authorities made it
clear to the defendant, numerous times, that counsel would be
available to him if he would only say the word. The mere mention of
counsel by the defendant is not sufficient to preclude further
police questioning. There must be a request.
Reese, 795 S.W.2d at 73 (internal footnote
omitted). Reese's application, at the most, amounted to a request
for counsel at the preliminary hearing. An examination of the
surrounding circumstances makes it clear that he did not request an
attorney during the interrogation process. In fact, he unequivocally
stated that he did not want an attorney on several occasions. Thus,
Reese's Sixth Amendment claim necessarily fails.
V. Fourth Amendment Claim
Reese alleges that the district court erred in
finding that his Fourth Amendment illegal arrest claim was
procedurally barred. He contends that he was arrested without a
warrant and without probable cause, and that the evidence seized on
account thereof should have been suppressed. Reese waived this claim
in the trial court and also failed to raise it on appeal. Thus, we
will only review the merits of this claim if Reese establishes cause
for his default and prejudice as a result thereof. Krimmel v.
Hopkins, 56 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 578
(1995). Reese argues that cause is shown by his trial counsel's
waiver of the claim and by his appellate counsel's failure to
present the claim on appeal.
Although an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim can constitute cause for a default, it must first be presented
to the state court in a procedurally correct manner. Reynolds v.
Caspari, 974 F.2d 946, 948 (8th Cir. 1992). Reese did not present
his claim that trial counsel was ineffective in his post-conviction
relief proceeding. Thus, the claim was defaulted and cannot form the
basis for cause. Id.
Reese did properly present his ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claim in his motion to recall the
mandate. See Hall v. Delo, 41 F.3d 1248, 1250 (8th Cir. 1994) (motion
to recall mandate is proper procedure to bring allegations of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel). Thus, his ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claim must be evaluated under the
Strickland test. Reese must overcome the strong presumption that his
attorney's performance was objectively reasonable. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689 .
Appellate counsel does not have a duty to raise
every nonfrivolous claim on appeal. Sidebottom v. Delo, 46 F.3d 744,
759 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 144 (1995). Moreover,
counsel has discretion to abandon losing issues on appeal. Horne v.
Trickey, 895 F.2d 497, 500 (8th Cir. 1990). To show that his
attorney was deficient in failing to raise the claim on appeal,
Reese must show a reasonable likelihood that, but for his attorney's
error, the result on appeal would have been different. Blackmon v.
White, 825 F.2d 1263, 1265 (8th Cir. 1987).
A review of the record reveals that counsel
raised twelve claims on appeal. It is apparent that counsel was
familiar with Reese's case and with the legal issues relevant to the
appeal. At the outset, we note that appellate counsel's
effectiveness should be evaluated in light of the circumstances. To
present this claim on appeal, appellate counsel would have had to
overcome the hurdle of trial counsel's waiver. If the claim had been
brought on appeal, it would have only been reviewed at the court's
discretion and for plain error. Mo. Sup. Ct. Rule 29.12(b); 30.20.
In these circumstances, counsel's decision to forgo the claim on
appeal was entirely reasonable. See Pollard v. Delo, 28 F.3d 887,
889-90 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 518 (1994) (appellate
counsel not ineffective for failing to raise claim for first time on
appeal). Even if we assume, arguendo, that appellate counsel's
performance was deficient in not presenting the claim on appeal,
Reese would still not prevail on his illegal arrest claim, for there
was ample evidence in the record to establish probable cause for
VI. Instructional Error
Reese presents two instances of instructional
error. First, he contends that Missouri's reasonable doubt
instruction violated his due process rights because it allowed the
jury to convict him based on a lower burden of proof than that
required by the Constitution. We have held, however, that such a
challenge to Missouri's reasonable doubt instruction is barred by
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Murray v. Delo, 34 F.3d 1367,
1382 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2567 (1995).
Reese also argues that Missouri's mitigating
circumstances instruction violates Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367
(1988), and McCoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990), in that it
requires that a finding of a mitigating circumstance must be
unanimous. This contention is meritless. The Missouri Supreme Court
has upheld the language of the mitigating circumstances instruction
as constitutional under Mills and McCoy. See State v. Petary, 781
S.W.2d 534, 542-44 (Mo. 1989) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 494
U.S. 1075 (1990), reaff'd, 790 S.W.2d 243 (Mo.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 973 (1990). We have agreed with this holding.
Battle v. Delo, 19 F.3d 1547, 1562 (8th Cir. 1994), on reh'g, 64
F.3d 347 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S Ct. 1881 (1996);
Murray v. Delo, 34 F.3d at 1381.
Reese further challenges the instruction on the
ground that it states that the jury "may also consider any [mitigating]
circumstances," arguing that the use of the permissive "may"
violates the holding of Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987),
that a jury may not refuse to consider any relevant mitigating
evidence. The constitutional infirmity in the instruction in
Hitchcock v. Dugger, however, lay in the fact that it restricted the
jury to considering only the statutorily enumerated mitigating
circumstances, in clear violation of the Court's holdings in Skipper
v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104 (1982); and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
We agree with the Missouri Supreme Court's
holding in State v. Petary, 781 S.W.2d at 543, that no such
infirmity inheres in the instruction challenged here, for there was
no exclusion of any mitigating evidence, and the jury was instructed
that it must determine whether one or more mitigating circumstances
existed which outweighed the aggravating circumstance or
circumstances found to exist. Thus, rather than foreclosing the jury
from considering evidence of mitigating circumstances, "`May
consider' signifies that the jury is given discretion as to what
weight the mitigating evidence should receive." Id.
VII. Evidentiary Hearing
Finally, Reese contends that the district court
erred in refusing to grant him an evidentiary hearing so that he
could introduce evidence not presented to the state court in support
of the previous grounds raised in this appeal. A habeas petitioner
who has failed to develop evidence in state court is only entitled
to an evidentiary hearing in federal court if he can establish cause
for his failure to do so and prejudice resulting therefrom.
Sidebottom, 46 F.3d at 750; see also Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992).
No evidentiary hearing is warranted if the
petitioner's claims are procedurally barred or are without merit.
Wilson v. Kemna, 12 F.3d 145, 146 (8th Cir. 1994). Because all of
Reese's claims can be disposed of on the state record, the district
court did not err in its refusal to grant a hearing on the merits of
remaining issues that Reese
presented to the district
court have either been
abandoned on appeal or are
without merit. The order
denying the petition for
writ of habeas corpus is
copy. Attest: CLERK, U. S.
COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH
The HONORABLE DAVID S. DOTY,
United States District Judge
for the District of
Minnesota, sitting by
The Honorable Charles A.
Shaw, United States District
Judge for the Eastern
District of Missouri.
The district court pointed
out that Lewis had denied
the existence of an
agreement with the
prosecution while under oath
during the penalty phase. In
addition, he referred to a
letter apparently signed by
the prosecutor which
expressly stated, "Although
prior to his testimony we
had promised Mr. Lewis
nothing for his testimony,
it was his feeling that
justice would have been
frustrated should he refuse
The district court noted the
following facts that were
known to the police officers
at the time of the arrest:
Petitioner was arrested when
he refused to voluntarily
accompany two law
enforcement officers to the
Squad headquarters to be
photographed. At that time,
it was known that Petitioner
had had a gun and ammunition
similar to the kind used to
kill four men, had recently
used such ammunition, and
smoked the same brand of
cigarettes as found at the
murder scene. Additionally,
several of his statements
were inconsistent with the
facts. For example, he had
recently purchased a car and
his explanation for the
source of those funds, that
he had been paid early, was
refuted by the foreman of
his employer. He also told
the interviewing officers
that he had sold his .30
caliber carbine to a
stranger who approached him
on the street outside a
thrift shop as he was
unloading his guns from the
trunk of his car.