Summary:

Thompson, armed with a .25 caliber semiautomatic, and Sammy Butler, armed with a .38 caliber revolver, entered a 7-Evenings convenience store in Houston. Thompson pointed his pistol at store clerk Mubarakali Meredia, who was at the counter, and told him to open the cash register and hand over all of the money.

Thompson shot Meredia in the abdomen when he did not move quickly enough. Thompson also shot at Meredia’s cousin, Mansor Bhai Rahim Mohammed, who also worked at the shop, when Rahim began running toward the rear of the store. Thompson then shot Meredia three more times as he lay on the floor. Thompson ordered Meredia to get up and get the money for him. Meredia did so. Then Thompson put his pistol to Meredia’s neck and pulled the trigger. Nothing happened because Thompson had run out of bullets. Thompson hit Meredia on the head with the butt of his gun and struck him with the cash register drawer. Nonetheless, Meredia survived.

Thompson took the money and ran out of the store, while Butler grabbed a stack of lottery tickets and followed behind Thompson. Thompson jumped into the driver’s seat of their car, while Butler got into the passenger’s seat, rolled down his window, and fired two shots at Rahim who had run to the front door. One bullet hit Rahim in the chest, and he died. Thompson later told detectives he went on a two-month crime spree in 1996 because God told him to do something about Middle Eastern and Asian store clerks who discriminated against blacks.

The killing was one of three he acknowledged to authorities. In two of the slayings, Thompson told detectives he was the gunman. Accomplice Sammy Butler was tried separately and sentenced to life in prison.

Citations:

Thompson v. State, 2003 WL 21466925 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). (Direct Appeal)
Ex parte Thompson, 179 S.W.3d 549 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). (PCR)
Thompson v. Quarterman, 292 Fed.Appx. 277 (5th Cir. 2008). (Habeas)

Final/Special Meal:
 

Final Words:

Thompson, in brief comments from the death chamber gurney, invoked Allah as his God, thanked friends and his mother for their love and support and urged his mother, who sobbed as she watched through a window: “Smile, be happy, don’t cry.” He said he had not meant any harm to his victims’ families, none of whom was present. “I know Allah will forgive me,” he said. “Allah is the forgiver.”

ClarkProsecutor.org

Texas Department of Criminal Justice

O P I N I O N

Applicant was convicted of capital murder for the shooting death of Mansor Bhai Rahim Mohammed during an aggravated robbery at the 7-Evenings Food Store in Houston. Based upon the jury's answers to the special issues set out in Article 37.071,[1] the trial court set punishment at death. This Court affirmed applicant=s conviction and sentence on direct appeal.[2]

Applicant raises six claims in his habeas corpus application filed pursuant to Article 11.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. We ordered the parties to brief two of those claims which we rephrased:

1)Whether applicant is factually innocent of the offense of capital murder; and

2)Whether applicant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel's failure to request a charge on felony murder.

Both of these claims hinge upon the Anewly available fact that Sammy Butler, applicant's triggerman-accomplice, was convicted of felony-murder after applicant's trial.

Applicant's position on the first claim is that

There is no evidence that Applicant personally killed the complainant. To the contrary, the only evidence is that Butler committed the offense. Thus, Applicant's guilt is derivative of Butler's guilt. Simply stated, at most Applicant is guilty of the offense for which Butler is guilty.

Regarding the second claim, applicant argues that the only viable defense strategy in his trial was to request a jury instruction on felony-murderBa strategy which succeeded in the accomplice's trial. Because applicant's counsel did not request an instruction on felony-murder, applicant contends that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington.[3]

The State's evidence at trial showed that applicant and Sammy Butler acted together in planning the armed robbery at the 7-Evenings Food Store. Applicant told Butler that this would be their last robbery and it was going to be Aa big one. Applicant, armed with a .25 caliber semiautomatic weapon, went into the convenience store to exchange a beer he had purchased earlier. Butler, armed with a .38 caliber revolver, came into the store with him.

Applicant approached Mubarakali Meredia, who was tending the counter, pointed his pistol at Mr. Meredia, and told him to open the cash register and hand over all of the money. Applicant shot Mr. Meredia in the abdomen when he did not move quickly enough. He shot at Mr. Meredia's cousin, Mansor Bhai Rahim Mohammed, who also worked at the shop, when he began running toward the back of the store.[4] Applicant then shot Mr. Meredia three more times as he lay on the floor. He ordered Mr. Meredia to get up and get the money for him. Mr. Meredia did so. Then applicant put his pistol to Mr. Meredia's neck and pulled the trigger. Nothing happened. He had run out of bullets. So applicant hit Mr. Meredia on the head with the butt of his gun and struck him with the cash register drawer. Nonetheless, Mr. Meredia survived.

Applicant took the money and ran out of the store. Butler grabbed a stack of lottery tickets as he followed behind applicant. Applicant jumped into the driver's seat of their car, while Butler got into the passenger's seat, rolled down his window, and fired two shots at Mr. Rahim who had run to the front door. One bullet hit Mr. Rahim in the chest, and he died.

Based upon this evidence, the jury convicted applicant of capital murder. During the punishment phase, the jury heard evidence that this robbery-murder was only one part of a robbery-murder spree during which applicant, as the triggerman, had committed two additional capital murders.[5] Based upon all of the evidence submitted, the jury found that applicant would pose a future risk of danger and that there were no mitigating circumstances that would call for a life sentence. The judge sentenced him to death.

A. Claim of Factual Innocence

Applicant contends that he is factually innocent of capital murder because a different jury found Sammy Butler guilty only of felony-murder.[6] He argues that his accomplice liability for the robbery-murder of Mr. Rahim hinges upon Butler's conviction in a separate trial rather than the evidence of his and Butler's conduct and mental states in applicant's own trial. Applicant argues that Ait is the intent of the killer which determines whether the offense is a capital murder or a felony-murder. If the actual killer intended the death, it is a capital murder. If he did not, it was not capital murder. Applicant misinterprets the law.

Under Section 7.02(a), a person is criminally responsible for a capital-murder offense committed by another person's conduct, if

(1) acting with the kind of culpability required for the offense, he causes or aids an innocent or nonresponsible person to engage in conduct prohibited by the definition of the offense; [or]

(2) acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of theoffense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid theother person to commit the offense[.]

Thus, applicant could be found guilty of capital murder under Section 7.02(a) if he had the intent to kill someone during this aggravated robbery, and (1) he caused or aided a totally innocent person to shoot and kill Mr. Rahim, or (2) he solicited, encouraged, directed, or aided Sammy Butler to commit capital murder.[7]

Furthermore, under Section 7.02(b), a person may be found guilty of capital murder if the following conditions are met:

There is nothing in Texas law that limits applicant's criminal responsibility for the conduct of his accomplice, Sammy Butler, to only those specific crimes for which a jury has convicted Butler. In fact, Texas law is exactly the opposite. Section 7.03(2) of the Penal Code states that it is no defense

that the person for whose conduct the actor is criminally responsible has been acquitted, has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different offense or of a different type or class of offense, or is immune from prosecution.^[8]

It is well-established that one accomplice may be found guilty of a different, more serious offense than other accomplices.[9] Indeed, the acquittal of the principal does not prevent conviction of his accomplice.[10] And it does not matter whether the acquittal of the principal occurs before or after the accomplice's trial.[11] What matters under Section 7.02(a) is the criminal mens rea of each accomplice; each may be convicted only of those crimes for which he had the requisite mental state. As Professor LaFave notes:

The notion that the accomplice may be convicted, on an accomplice liability theory, only for those crimes as to which he personally has the requisite mental state, is applicable in a variety of circumstances. It means, for example, that one may not be held as an accomplice to the crime of assault with intent to kill if that intent was not shared by the accomplice. But this limitation has proved most significant in the homicide area, where the precise state of mind of the defendant has great significance in determining the degree of the offense. To determine the kind of homicide of which the accomplice is guilty, it is necessary to look to his state of mind; it may have been different from the state of mind of the principal and they thus may be guilty of different offenses. Thus, because first degree murder requires a deliberate and premeditated killing, an accomplice is not guilty of this degree of murder unless he acted with premeditation and deliberation. And, because a killing in a heat of passion is manslaughter and not murder, an accomplice who aids while in such a state is guilty only of manslaughter even though the killer is himself guilty of murder. Likewise, it is equally possible that the killer is guilty only of manslaughter because of his heat of passion but that the accomplice, aiding in a state of cool blood, is guilty of murder.^[12]

Thus, what is essential to applicant's conviction of capital murder as a party under Section 7.02(a)(2)[13] is evidence that supports a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he intended the death of Mr. Rahim and that he assisted Sammy Butler in causing that death.[14]

The evidence of applicant's intent to kill is not merely sufficient, it is overwhelming:

In a prosecution in which an actor's criminal responsibility is based on the conduct of another, the actor may be convicted on proof of commission of the offense and that he was a party to its commission . . . .^[15]

Applicant argues that Butler's subsequent acquittal of capital murder proves that, under Section 7.03, no capital murder was ever committed. Applicant misreads Section 7.03. That provision applies to the proof offered at applicant's trial, not the evidence offered in some other trial. It was in applicant's trial that the State bore the burden of offering a proof of commission of the offense of capital murder. And indeed it did. There is evidence aplenty that Sammy Butler, as well as applicant, intended to cause Mr. Rahim's death:

*Butler came to the convenience store armed with a .38 revolver;

*Butler knew that applicant came to the convenience store armed with a semiautomatic pistol;

*Butler knew that applicant shot Mr. Meredia several times;

*Butler shot at Mr. Rahim and another customer while applicant was shooting at Mr. Meredia;

*Butler threatened to shoot other customers while applicant was grabbing the money from the cash register;

*Butler did shoot in the direction of Mr. Rahim a second time while both robbers were still in the store;

*After applicant and Butler got into their getaway car, Butler rolled down the passenger-side window and shot Mr. Rahim who had run to the door of the store;

*Butler shot at Mr. Rahim twice;

*One of those shots hit Mr. Rahim in the chest and killed him.

*Applicant told police during his oral confession that Butler Akept shooting.� He unloaded and I unloaded.^[16]

It might be possible to conclude that Butler did not aim at Mr. Rahim or intend to shoot him in the chest. But applicant's jury was certainly entitled to believe that Butler's two shots were not a sheer accident, and that Mr. Rahim's death was not the result of a wayward bullet that fortuitously ended up striking the unlucky man.[17] It was entitled to conclude that Butler intended precisely what occurred Mr. Rahim's death.[18] And it was also entitled to conclude that applicant intended that Butler shoot and kill Mr. Rahim just as applicant surely would have killed Mr. Meredia if only he had not first run out of bullets.

In sum, there was ample evidence offered at applicant=s trial that Sammy Butler committed the offense of capital murder and that applicant assisted or encouraged him in that endeavor by his own acts of attempting to commit the capital murder of Mr. Meredia. The fact that the jury in Butler's trial declined to convict him of capital murder does not affect the validity of applicant's capital murder conviction.[19]

Thus, although the verdict in Butler's trial may be Anewly available evidence, it is not evidence that shows (or even tends to show) applicant's innocence of capital murder. Therefore, we adopt the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning applicant's claim of factual innocence.

Applicant also contends that his trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance because he failed to request an instruction on the lesser-included offense of felony-murder.[20] Applicant further contends that his counsel's deficient performance probably caused the jury to return a verdict of capital murder rather than felony-murder.

Applicant raised this ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal, arguing that trial counsel should have Arequest[ed] a lesser-included offense charge as it would apply to the offense of murder.[21] This Court rejected that claim because the record did not contain sufficient information concerning trial counsel's strategy. It does now.

In his affidavit, applicant's trial counsel stated that the defense strategy that he and his co-counsel decided upon was that applicant did not anticipate Butler's murder of Mr. Rahim:

The basis of our cross-examination, and defensive strategy was that Mr. Thompson knew of and intended to participate in an aggravated robbery, but in no way did he either know or anticipate that someone would be killed, especially under the circumstances of the complaining witness' death. . . . This was the argument that I made to the jury during the guilt phase of the trial. However, based on the confessions, and the actions of Mr. Thompson while inside the store, i.e. Mr. Thompson shot someone, who did not die, Mr. Williams and I concluded that a request for a lesser included instruction of felony murder was not shown by the evidence.[22]

Thus, trial counsel made the reasoned strategic decision that their strongest argument was that applicant did not and could not have anticipated that Butler would shoot Mr. Rahim as the two departed from the convenience store. That argument was at least as strongBif not strongerB than the argument that Butler did not intend to kill Mr. Rahim and that his act of shooting at him twice was an unforeseeable accident, albeit an act clearly dangerous to human life. Applicant's attorney noted that this defensive position was carried through to the punishment phase concerning the Aanti-parties special issue:[23]

With regard to Special Issue 2, the argument was centered on 1. The fact that Mr. Thompson was not the shooter. 2. That the manner in which the complainant was killed, i.e. as they drove away, Mr. Butler shot in the dark and the complainant was standing at the door. Mr. Thompson was in no way responsible for the death of Mr. Rahim, and could not have anticipated that Butler would shoot as they were driving away and it was dark. 3. That Mr. Thompson's intent was to commit an aggravated robbery and nothing more, which he did.

As applicant's counsel noted, this strategy was ultimately unsuccessful, perhaps because of the evidence of applicant's two other capital murders. But counsel did not create those facts. Applicant now argues that he was not entitled to any charge on the lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery, but he was entitled to a charge on felony-murder. He states that, Agiven those undisputed facts [of applicant's attempts to kill Mr. Meredia and shoot Mr. Rahim] no one could plausibly argue that Applicant should not have reasonably anticipated that Butler might engage in violence, including shooting a person. Such a strategy, argues applicant, is Alaughable.

Applicant notes that in Solomon v. State,[24] this Court held that a person charged with capital murder is not entitled to a lesser-included instruction on aggravated robbery unless there is evidence showing one of three things: (1) there was no murder; (2) the murder was not committed in furtherance of a conspiracy; or (3) the murder should not have been anticipated.[25] In this case, as applicant candidly admits, there is ample evidence that (1) there was a murder; (2) the murder was committed in furtherance of a conspiracy; and (3) the murder should have been anticipated. Thus, he argues, it was error to charge the jury on this lesser included offense. Perhaps so, but it certainly did not harm applicant, and at least it gave the defense attorneys something solid to argue during closing arguments.

Applicant then turns around and contends that counsel should have requested a lesser-included instruction on felony-murder. But submission of felony-murder is not warranted unless there is evidence that shows:

(1) for purposes of party liability under Section 7.02(a)(2), applicant himself did not intend the death of Mr. Rahim or another;

(2) for purposes of conspiracy liability under Section 7.02(b), Butler=s act of shooting Mr. Rahim was not committed in furtherance of a conspiracy; or

(3) for purposes of conspiracy liability under Section 7.02(b), applicant should not have anticipated that Butler would shoot Mr. Rahim.

In arguing that he was not entitled to a charge on aggravated robbery, applicant agrees that there is no evidence supporting prong (2) or (3). And he fails to point to any evidence that affirmatively shows that applicant himself did not intend the death of Mr. Rahim or another.

Applicant relies, instead, upon his oral confession to the police in which he describes Butler's action and surmises about Butler's intent:

Well, he [Butler] shootsBAnd, the man was coming up and was going back. He just shot basically at the window just to make the man go run back in the store as we got away.

This description of Butler's actions and intent, however, is not evidence that affirmatively shows that applicant had no intent to kill.[26] And, under the law of parties, it is applicant's intent that is determinative of his guilt for either capital murder or felony-murder.

The evidence was clearly sufficient to establish that applicant participated in the murder of Mr. Rahim and intended his death. The question concerning an entitlement to the lesser-included of felony-murder is whether the evidence would permit a rational jury to make a contrary finding: that is, based upon the evidence, could a rational jury conclude that Butler acted entirely alone in the shooting death of Mr. Rahim, and that applicant did not intend or anticipate this murder?[27]

That evidence need be only more than a mere scintilla, and it may be impeached or contradicted, but it must be sufficient, if believed, to at least permit a rational jury to return a verdict on the lesser-included offense.[28] Under this standard, applicant was not entitled to a charge on felony-murder and therefore his counsel was not ineffective for failing to request such a charge.[29]

Applicant argues that there was no downside to asking for an instruction on the lesser-included offense of felony-murder. But there might well have been a very serious downside had applicant offered any evidence of lack of intent or had he engaged in any cross-examination that might raise an issue concerning his lack of intent to kill. Once applicant opens the door to the issue of murderous intent, the State would presumably walk right through that door with the evidence of the two extraneous capital murders that applicant himself committed to prove that he had a murderous intent on this occasion just as he had on those two other occasions.[30]

When judging an attorney's conduct in retrospect, we cannot assume that only his conduct might have been different. We must assume that, as in a chess game, if a defendant hypothesizes a different strategy or move by his pawn or queen, the State would have altered its strategy and made a different move with its chess pieces as well. In this case, applicant's case at the guilt phase might have been considerably worsened had he attempted to raise an issue concerning his intent to kill. Therefore, we cannot conclude that his counsel's chosen strategyBto forego an attack upon the State's case concerning his own intent to kill and instead concentrate on a plausible argument (albeit largely unsupported by evidence) that applicant could not have anticipated Butler's act of shooting Mr. RahimBwas a constitutionally ineffective one.

We therefore adopt the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, and based upon those findings and our own independent review, we deny relief on all claims.

*****

^[1] Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071(b) & (e)(1).

^[2] Thompson v. State, No. 73,128 (Tex. Crim. App. June 26, 2003) (not designated for publication).

^[3] 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

^[4] At Butler's trial, the State offered evidence that Butler pulled out his .38 revolver, also shot at Mr. Rahim, and threatened several other customers during this time.

^[5] Applicant had three pending capital murder charges at the time of trial.

^[6] According to applicant, Butler's conviction of the lesser-included offense of felony-murder Ais a jury finding after a full trial, a finding binding upon the State under the principles of collateral estoppel. Both Butler's acquittal of capital murder and his availability to testify are facts which were unavailable at the time of Applicant's trial.

^[7] Put another way, the evidence must show that, at the time of the offense, the parties were acting together, each contributing some part toward the execution of their common purpose. Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

^[8] Tex. Pen. Code ' 7.03(2); see, e.g., Singletary v. State, 509 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (noting that Aan accomplice is not entitled to a new trial or reversal just because a subsequently tried principal has been acquitted. The fact that another jury acquitted the principal in a subsequent trial does not by itself entitle an accomplice to the same offense to a new trial. In many instances different juries reach opposite results on the same evidence.) (citations omitted); Reece v. State, 521 S.W.2d 633, 634-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (either of two co-defendants could be convicted of aggravated robbery although one of them was convicted only of a simple robbery; the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of aggravated robbery for either defendant); see generally, Donald M. Zupanec, Acquittal of Principal, or His Conviction of Lesser Degree of Offense, as Affecting Prosecution of Accessory, or Aider and Abettor, 9 A.L.R. 4^th 972 (1981 & 2005 Supp.).

^[9] See generally, 1 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law ' 34 (15th ed. & 2004 Supp.); Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law, 582 (1957); see, e.g., People v. Garcia, 52 P.3d 648, 652 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that A[b]ecause an aider and abettor may potentially be guilty of a more serious offense than the shooter . . . the absence of a shooter's conviction is not dispositive of the aider and abettor=s exposure to liability); State v. Kaplan, 469 A.2d 1354, 1355 (N.H. 1983) (conviction of wife who pleaded guilty to accomplice role in murder of husband would not be reversed even though principal, an alleged contract killer, was acquitted, and noting that A>conviction of an accomplice is thus premised upon proof of the commission of the criminal act, rather than on the guilt of the principal') (citation omitted); Jeter v. State, 274 A.2d 337, 338-39 (Md. 1971) (collecting cases and concluding that virtually all American jurisdictions hold that the subsequent acquittal of a principal does not affect the trial or conviction of an accomplice). The North Carolina Supreme Court has traced this principle back three hundred years to Wallis= Case, 1 Salk. 334. See State v. Whitt, 18 S.E. 715, 716 (N.C. 1893). The Model Penal Code also adopts this position. �See Model Penal Code ' 2.06(7) (2001) (accomplice can be convicted Athough the person claimed to have committed the offense . . . has been acquitted).

^[10] The controlling case on this issue is Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980), in which Standefer was accused of aiding and abetting a revenue official, Cyril Niederberger, in accepting compensation beyond that authorized by law. Niederberger was acquitted of accepting unlawful payments. After Niederberger's trial and before his own trial, Standefer moved to dismiss the charges and argued that he could not be convicted of aiding and abetting the principal when the principal had been acquitted. His motion was denied, he was convicted, the court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Standefer raised two issues before the Supreme Court: (1) the federal aiding and abetting statute was not intended to authorize prosecution of an aider and abettor after the principal had been acquitted; and (2) the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel barred the government from prosecuting him after Niederberger=s acquittal.

The Supreme Court traced the origins of aiding and abetting back to English common law and noted that at early common law all parties to a felony received the death penalty; therefore, certain procedural rules were developed to shield accessories from such severe punishment. 447 U.S. at 15. Among them was the rule that an accessory could not be convicted without the prior conviction of the principal offender: In every way, an accessory [followed], like a shadow, his principal. Id. (quoting 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Law ' 666 (8th ed. 1892)). This procedural bar applied only to the prosecution of accessories in felony cases, not in misdemeanor cases where an accessory could be prosecuted after the principal was acquitted. Id. at 15-16. In 1848, Parliament enacted a statute which permitted an accessory to be convicted even though the principal was acquitted. Id. at 16. Congress followed in 1899 by enacting the first statute in this country which provided that Aall persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the crime or aid and abet in its commission, though not present, are principals, and to be tried and punished as such. Id. at 17-18. The Supreme Court, in its discussion of the historical law on aiding and abetting, stated, ARead against its common-law background, the provision evinces a clear intent to permit the conviction of accessories to federal criminal offenses despite the prior acquittal of the actual perpetrator of the offense. Id. at 19. Thus, all participants in a crime Aare punishable for their criminal conduct; the fate of other participants is irrelevant. Id. at 20.

Moving to the issue of collateral estoppel, the Court noted that several aspects of criminal law make nonmutual estoppel against the government when a principal is acquitted inappropriate. Id. at 21-22. These include limited discovery rights, a prohibition against a directed verdict on behalf of the government, a bar against the government seeking appellate review of an acquittal, and a jury's unfettered right to acquit out of compassion or compromise. Id. at 22. Furthermore, A[t]he application of nonmutual estoppel in criminal cases is also complicated by the existence of rules of evidence and exclusion unique to our criminal law. Id. at 23. Thus, evidence that is admissible against one accomplice may be inadmissible against others, preventing the government from presenting all of its possible proof against some of the participants in the crime. Id. at 23-24. Although Asymmetry of results may be intellectually satisfying, it is not required@; thus, the acquittal of a principal does not bar the conviction of an accomplice. Id. at 25.

^[11] See Owens v. State, 867 A.2d 334, 340 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (noting that the Aclear answer given by other courts and treatise writers is that even after a principal has been acquitted of a crime, another person can be convicted for his role in aiding and abetting the commission of that same crime).

^[12] 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law ' 13.2(c) at 346-47 (2d ed. 2003).

^[13] Because of our disposition of this first claim under Section 7.02(a)(2), we need not address the applicability of applicant's conspiracy liability under Section 7.02(b) which does not require proof of applicant's intent to cause Mr. Rahim's death.

^[14] The jury was not instructed, during the guilt stage, on the law of transferred intent under Section 6.04(b). Thus, the charge required the jury to find that applicant intended the death of Mr. Rahim, rather than some other person under Section 7.02(a)(2).

^[15] Tex. Pen. Code ' 7.03 (emphasis added).

^[16] Applicant's confession was admissible at his own trial but not at Butler's trial.

^[17] As a part of this claim, applicant contends that he has Anewly available evidence from Butler who would testify that he did not intend to kill Mr. Rahim. But this is not newly availableB Butler, like applicant, gave a written confession shortly after his arrest. Applicant's trial counsel stated that he was familiar with the confession in which Butler admitted his participation in the robbery at the 7-Evenings store and that he shot and killed Mr. Rahim. Butler stated then (and presumably would state now) that he did not intend to kill Mr. Rahim. Applicant's trial counsel was aware of Butler's confession at the time of trial and Butler's assertion that he did not intend to kill Mr. Rahim matched applicant's same assertion about Butler's conduct in his confession. Applicant's counsel stated that there was nothing in Butler's confession that caused him to changeBor want to changeBhis overall trial strategy.

The jury in Butler's trial apparently believed that statement, while the jury in applicant's trial did not believe that Butler unintentionally killed Mr. Rahim. We cannot dispute the right of two different juries in two different trials to reach two different verdicts concerning two different defendants based upon two different sets of admissible evidence.

^[18] It is both a common-sense inference and an appellate presumption that a person intends the natural consequences of his acts, Whitlock v. State, 146 Tex. Crim. 594, 600, 177 S.W.2d 205, 208 (1943), and that the act of pointing a loaded gun at someone and shooting it toward that person at close range demonstrates an intent to kill. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Flannagan v. State, 675 S.W.2d 734, 744-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh'g); Womble v. State, 618 S.W.2d 59, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).

^[19] Applicants argues that his Afactual innocence claim is cognizable under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), as one involving both a constitutional violation and a gateway innocence claim. But it is not. Applicant makes no showing that he is innocent of capital murder or that the State violated his constitutional rights by trying him before his accomplice, Sammy Butler.

^[20] Applicant asserts this claim under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under the Texas Constitution, article I, ' 10. Because he provides no separate analysis under the Texas Constitution, we will presume that applicant=s position is that the two provisions are identical for purposes of his claim. See Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 n.22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

^[21] On direct appeal, applicant contended that trial counsel should have requested an instruction on simple murder because the jury might have believed that applicant only knowingly caused the death of the victim.

^[22] At the time defense counsel was appointed, applicant had three pending capital murder charges and three aggravated robbery charges. Applicant had given oral confessions admitting his involvement in all of those pending cases. Concern about the admissibility of extraneous offenses would surely have been at the forefront of defense counsel's mind as he planned his strategy for the guilt phase of this trial.

^[23] That special issue read as follows:

This charge, unlike the one at the guilt stage, did incorporate the doctrine of transferred intent.

^[24] 49 S.W.3d 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

^[25] Id. at 369.

^[26] See Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 741-42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).� In Salinas, another capital murder case involving the law of parties, we rejected the contention that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request an instruction on felony-murder. Id. There, as here, A[t]he critical question is whether the evidence showed that appellant (as a principal or party) had the intent only to rob or to kidnap, and he did not have the intent to kill. Id. at 742. We noted in Salinas that A[w]hether appellant was the actual actor or criminally responsible for the acts of his cohorts by virtue of the law of parties, the evidence shows not only an intent to commit robbery or a lesser included offense, but also the intent to kill. Id. (emphasis in original). The same is true in the present case; applicant points to no evidence that affirmatively demonstrates his lack of intent to kill.

^[27] See Aguilar v. Dretke, ___ F.3d ___, __, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 22031 *9-11 (5^th Cir., Oct. 12, 2005) (holding that Texas capital murder defendant was not entitled to charge on lesser-included offense of murder when co-defendant caused death of second victim but defendant had motive to kill victim or his family members). As the Fifth Circuit explained:

Id. at *9-11.

^[28] Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 672-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (Asome evidence must exist in the record that would permit a jury rationally to find that if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense) (emphasis in original); see also Cordova v. Lynaugh, 838 F.2d 764, 767 (5^th Cir. 1988) (holding that a lesser included offense instruction should be given if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater).

^[29] Id. at 742; see also Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 272-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (counsel in capital murder trial not ineffective for failing to request lesser-included offense of felony-murder instruction because Athere is no evidence upon which a jury could rationally have found that appellant did not intend to kill when he shot the deceased.).

^[30] See, e.g., Navarro v. State, 154 S.W.3d 795, 797-98 (Tex. App.BHouston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd) (evidence of other violent acts toward his intended victim admissible under Rule 404(b) in capital murder trial to prove both defendant's intent to kill and absence of mistake in attempting to kill his intended victim); Johnson v. State, 932 S.W.2d 296, 302-04 (Tex. App.BAustin 1996, pet. ref'd) (in capital murder trial, evidence of extraneous offense was admissible to prove the culpable mental state of intent to kill when the accused presented evidence to dispute that intent).

To obtain a COA, Thompson must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right”. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). To make such a showing when the district court's habeas denial is on the merits of an issue, Thompson must demonstrate “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further” (reasonable-jurists standard). Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (quoting Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595) (internal quotation marks omitted).

When the district court's denial of relief for a claim is based on a procedural ruling, such as the claim's being unexhausted, the requisite showing is expanded. See Foster v. Quarterman, 466 F.3d 359, 364 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Hall v. Cain, 216 F.3d 518, 521 (5th Cir.2000)), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct. 2099, 167 L.Ed.2d 817 (2007). “In that situation, the applicant must show jurists of reason would find debatable whether: the habeas petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right; and the district court's procedural ruling was correct.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (reasonable-jurists/procedural standard).

In deciding whether to grant a COA, we can make only a threshold inquiry into the district court's application of AEDPA to Thompson's constitutional claims; we may not consider the factual or legal merits in support of the claims. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029. “When a court of appeals sidesteps this process by first deciding the merits of an appeal, and then justifying its denial of a COA based on its adjudication of the actual merits, it is in essence deciding an appeal without jurisdiction.” Id. at 336-37, 123 S.Ct. 1029.

For purposes of our threshold inquiry, we are cognizant that, under AEDPA, the district court was required, with limited exceptions described below, to defer to the state court's resolution of Thompson's claims. Those exceptions turn on the character of the state-court's ruling. Foster, 466 F.3d at 365.

First, on questions of law, as well as mixed questions of law and fact, the district court was required to defer to the state-court's decision unless it “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court”. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Miller, 404 F.3d at 913. The state-court's decision is considered contrary to clearly established federal law if it “reaches a legal conclusion in direct conflict with a prior decision of the Supreme Court or if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court based on materially indistinguishable facts”. Miller, 404 F.3d at 913 (quoting Miniel v. Cockrell, 339 F.3d 331, 337 (5th Cir.2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Second, our threshold inquiry must recognize the district court's obligation to defer to the state-court's factual findings, unless they “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding”. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Along that line, the district court was required to presume the state-court's factual findings were correct; Thompson had to rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Moreover, our threshold inquiry requires consideration of a COA request against the backdrop of the elements of Thompson's underlying constitutional claim. See Miller, 404 F.3d at 913. Needless to say, meaningful review of the district court's ruling, for COA purposes, on whether Thompson made the requisite 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” requires our considering these elements.

In the light of the district court's well-reasoned and thorough opinion, and essentially for the reasons stated in it, reasonable jurists could not debate the district court's rulings-for either the reasonable-jurists or the reasonable-jurists/procedural standards. This is especially true in the light of Thompson's conclusory briefing for most of the 15 requested COAs. Nevertheless, we address each claim.

A.

As a threshold matter, Thompson complains that the district court erred in denying his motions for factual development of the record. He seeks remand or a stay to develop the factual basis for several of his 15 claims. The district court denied his motions for expansion of the record, discovery, and an evidentiary hearing “because he failed to identify the evidence he wanted to produce, he did not show good cause for discovery, and did not show that he had diligently attempted to develop the record in state court”. Thompson, No. 4:06-CV-148 (21 Dec. 2007) (discussing Thompson, No. 4:06-CV-148 (30 Nov. 2007) (denying motions)). Such denials are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., In re Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 304 F.3d 410, 433 n. 43 (5th Cir.2002) (expansion of the record) (citation omitted); Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 766 (5th Cir.2000) (discovery and evidentiary hearing).

At issue are only Thompson's COA requests. These alleged procedural errors are not phrased as COA requests, but they bear upon his requests. We consider them here for purposes of ruling on those COA requests. See Reyes v. Quarterman, 195 Fed.Appx. 272, 278-79 & n. 2 (5th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (unpublished) (considering procedural issues before addressing COA requests); Clark, 202 F.3d at 765-68 (considering procedural issues in context of COA requests). Most of those requests are inadequately briefed; nevertheless, we will address each request.

1.

First, Thompson sought expansion of the record with “the following materials, including but not limited to ... (1) Letters predating the filing of the petition in district court; (2) Documents; (3) Exhibits; (4) Answers under oath; [and] (5) Written Interrogatories propounded/approved by the judge (if so directed)”. Thompson's motion identifies no specific documents. As the district court found: “Thompson's motion makes no effort to show what omissions exist in the record, ... specific material he wants to include, or why that material is necessary.... [It] is, in essence, a general discovery request”. Thompson, No. 4:06-CV-148 (30 Nov. 2007).

As noted, as well as discussed below, Thompson also sought discovery. The district court considered the motions together, and denied them for “lack of specificity”. Id. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying expansion of the record.

2.

Second, Thompson sought discovery to obtain unspecified documents from an assistant district attorney and serve interrogatories on the jurors, defense counsel, assistant district attorney, and bailiff for his trial, as well as “others as necessary”. As noted, this motion, too, was denied for “lack of specificity”. Id. “A party shall be entitled to invoke the processes of discovery available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if, and to the extent that, the judge in the exercise of his discretion and for good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not otherwise.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997) (quoting R. Governing § 2254 Cases 6(a)). “ ‘[W]here specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is ... entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry’ ”. Id. at 908-09, 117 S.Ct. 1793 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969)). On the other hand, “[c]onclusionary allegations are not enough to warrant discovery under Rule 6 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Petitions; the petitioner must set forth specific allegations of fact. Rule 6 ... does not authorize fishing expeditions”. Ward v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 1355, 1367 (5th Cir.1994) (citations omitted); see also Murphy v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 809, 814 (5th Cir.2000) (finding no abuse of discretion).

As discussed, the district court ruled the motions “lack[ed] the necessary specificity”. Thompson, No. 4:06-CV-148 (30 Nov. 2007). As such, Thompson did not “point to specific evidence that once existed and may continue to exist that holds the potential to exonerate him.... [And he] has not shown any likelihood that physical evidence exists that would render his request for information ... more than a ‘fishing expedition’ ”. Reed v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 465, 477 (5th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny discovery. See id. (finding no abuse of discretion); United States v. Webster, 392 F.3d 787, 802 (5th Cir.2004) (denying COA on denial of discovery because petitioner “failed to identify, with specific allegations, any dispositive factual disputes”).

3.

Third, Thompson sought an evidentiary hearing. His motion maintained: he did not receive a full, fair evidentiary hearing in state court; and “[t]he facts in dispute from the state trial court are the effective assistance of the trial counsel[,] the failure to disclose relevant Brady v. Maryland information ... [, and] the failure of the trial court to conduct a hearing on a potentially racist comment by a jury member”. The district court ruled the motion “lack[ed] specificity and fail[ed] to make the necessary showing that such development is permitted by [AEDPA] or necessary for the proper adjudication of the claims”.

Thompson now asserts the lack-of-specificity denial of his motion is erroneous because the state court did not hold a “true hearing” and specificity “is impossible to provide” without discovery. He does not challenge the district court's ruling he failed to show such factual development would be permitted by AEDPA or to provide sufficient specificity. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), an evidentiary hearing is only appropriate when “(A) the claim relies on-(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense”. Comeaux v. Cain, 204 Fed.Appx. 471, 474 n. 4 (5th Cir.2006) (holding district court erred in granting hearing where petitioner “clearly cannot meet these requirements”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)) (emphasis added).

As Thompson does not show, or attempt to show, that he meets § 2254(e)(2)(A)'s requirements, the denial of an evidentiary hearing was not an abuse of discretion.

B.

As stated, Thompson seeks a COA on 15 issues. They relate to: whether his capital-murder conviction or death sentence violates the Constitution (his issues 1, 2, & 4); whether the State suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation of his due-process rights (his issue 3); whether the trial court's procedural and evidentiary errors violated his Constitutional rights (his issues 6, 9, & 15); and whether his counsel's assistance was ineffective, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right (his issues 5, 7-8, & 10-14). As stated above and discussed below, none satisfies the above-defined reasonable-jurists or reasonable-jurists/procedural standards for obtaining a COA.

1.

Initially, Thompson seeks a COA for his three claims that his conviction and sentence violate the Constitution.

a.

First, Thompson seeks a COA on whether he is factually innocent of capital murder, so that his conviction violates due process. Relying on Butler's conviction for only felony murder and citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), he asserts he cannot be held liable for capital murder because: “The state ... cannot hold the vicarious liability of a party to a higher standard than the actual liability of the true perpetrator”; and he did not shoot the victim and was not responsible for Butler's actions. (Emphasis in original.)

Tison, however, holds the imposition of the death penalty upon a major participant in a felony who showed reckless indifference to human life is not a violation of the due-process clause. 481 U.S. at 158, 107 S.Ct. 1676. Instead, the Constitution requires that a death sentence “be tailored to [a defendant's] personal responsibility and moral guilt”. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). And, under Texas law, Thompson can be criminally responsible for capital murder even if Butler, who fired the fatal shot, is not. See Tex. Penal Code § 7.02(a) (defendant intended to kill someone during the aggravated robbery and solicited, encouraged, directed, or aided his accomplice, who also had that intent, to do so), (b) (defendant conspired to commit aggravated robbery and the death was a consequence he should have anticipated); Ex parte Thompson, 179 S.W.3d at 552-54.

The state-habeas trial court ruled Thompson's factual-innocence claim was a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, which is not reviewable in state-habeas proceedings. Ex parte Thompson, 179 S.W.3d at 551 (adopting state-habeas trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law). On the other hand, the TCCA ordered supplemental briefing on this issue. Ultimately, the TCCA held the jury could have convicted Thompson under any of three theories and had sufficient evidence to find him guilty of capital murder, and also adopted the state-habeas trial court's ruling. Id. at 551-57.

The district court held: Thompson did not show any of those three theories violates due process as described in Enmund, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, and Tison, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676; and “the Constitution does not require that Thompson's conviction and sentence be less severe than Butler's”. Thompson, No. 4:06-CV-148 (30 Nov. 2007).

b.

Next, Thompson seeks a COA on whether his capital-murder conviction or resulting death sentence, in the light of Butler's felony murder conviction and less-than-death sentence, violates due process or equal protection. He asserts the Constitution is violated because Butler was convicted of only felony murder and was not sentenced to death. As support, he cites Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1895, 141 L.Ed.2d 76 (1998) (stating death penalty cannot be imposed where defendant “was a minor participant in the crime and neither intended to kill nor had shown reckless indifference to human life” (citations omitted)), and Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797, 102 S.Ct. 3368 (holding Eighth Amendment does not allow imposition of the death penalty on one who does not kill, attempt to kill, or intend or contemplate that a killing would occur). Thompson relies, however, on Butler's felony murder conviction. He does not contend that he was a minor participant who did not attempt to kill, intend that a killing occur, or show reckless indifference to human life.

For the foregoing reasons, a COA is DENIED.

Robert Lee Thompson