Robert Wayne Vickers | Murderpedia, the encyclopedia of murderers

Vickers entered Arizona's prison system as a teenager in 1977 after committing 12 burglaries in 13 days in Tempe. He later admitted to 33 more burglaries in California.

His first murder was of inmate Frank Ponciano, whom Vickers sought out as his cellmate because Ponciano had a TV. Angered that Ponciano did not wake him up for lunch and drank his Kool-Aid, Vickers strangled him and stabbed him multiple times with a sharpened toothbrush. He then carved - and misspelled - the Japanese war cry "Bonzai" in Ponciano's back. "Banzai Bob" had been Vickers' nickname in prison.

Vickers burned a cigarette on Ponciano's foot to show a guard he was dead, then said, "'Get this stinking (expletive) out of my cell."

Vickers later told prison psychologist Kent Spillman that he regretted only one thing about the attack: that he didn't have enough time to carve a swastika to dot the 'i' on Ponciano's body.

Vickers had a knack for creating makeshift knives and bombs, which he used to attack more than 11 prison guards.

Vickers also once escaped from death row and climbed atop the roof of Cellblock 6 through a shaft with another inmate. Vickers had managed to short-circuit the electronic locking mechanism on his cell door and left a dummy in his bed.

Once atop the compound, however, the two realized they had no place to go. The outside fence was too far away, and it was too high to jump to the ground below.

The two then did a striptease for a female tower guard before they were caught by other officers rushing to the roof, corrections Officer Jim Robideau said.

On March 4, 1982, Vickers was on death row at the Arizona State Penitentiary in Florence as a result of killing Ponciano. At around 6:30 p.m., he was out of his cell, allegedly doing clean-up chores. Instead, he paid a visit to Wilmar "Buster" Holsinger, another death row inmate. Vickers was upset over an earlier remark Holsinger had made about Vickers' niece.

He had built a firebomb from hair gel and an ice-cream carton, and he used it to torch Holsinger in his cell.

When a guard asked Vickers if Holsinger was dead, Vickers responded, "He should be. He's on fire." Holsinger died as a result of tracheobronchial bums suffered in the resulting flash fire. The attack also nearly killed a half-dozen other inmates from smoke inhalation and forced officials to evacuate death row.

Afterward, Vickers asked investigators, "Did I do a good job? {ellipsis} I told them they should have gassed me in December when they had a chance."

It was not the first time Vickers had demanded death. In a letter the previous year to then-Gov. Bruce Babbitt, he'd written, "So what's the hold up fella?

"If ya don't do it soon, I'm gonna draw more blood than your cheap mops can absorb. I'm a very impatient person, I never did like waiting. I've got a date with the devil's wife."

The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Vickers' conviction for the murder of Ponciano, but Vickers remained on death row for the murder of Holsinger.

His violence, ingenuity and flair for the dramatic became known even beyond Arizona when he appeared in a HBO special to show how one can escape from cuffs and chains.

Vickers' defense argued that his violent personality was a construct of the Arizona prison system, which failed to provide him with the psychiatric help he needed as a teen and raised him in a culture of violence. Vickers had a history of epileptic seizures, and psychiatrists said he had a brain disorder that resulted in violent outbursts.

Arizona Department of Corrections "Death Row" Web site
"Profiles of Arizona Death Row Inmates," Arizona Attorney General's Office
The Arizona Republic archives

Green Chili Burros - burritos with barbecued steak, french fries and ketchup, vanilla ice cream, cream soda, cigarette.

In Florence, Robert Wayne Vickers, Arizona's longest-serving death row inmate, was executed by injection today for killing a fellow prisoner in 1982.

Vickers lifted his head from the gurney, smiled and nodded at relatives, including his aunt and cousin.

Deadly chemicals began flowing into his veins at 3:03 p.m. and he was pronounced dead 2 minutes later.

Vickers, 41, of Phoenix, was sentenced to prison at 18 for grand theft. In 1979 he strangled his cellmate, Frank Ponciano, with a bedsheet because he didn't wake him for lunch and because he drank Vickers' Kool-Aid.

Vickers carved "Bonzai," a misspelling of a Japanese war cry, in the victim's back with a sharpened toothbrush, earning him the nickname "Bonzai Bob." Vickers received the death penalty, but the verdict was overturned on appeal.

Vickers was executed for killing fellow death row inmate Wilmar "Buster" Holsinger in 1982.

Vickers, released from his cell to perform porter duties, had shown Holsinger a photo of his 10-year-old niece. Vickers became enraged after Holsinger made a vulgar remark about the girl and tossed a flaming cup of hair tonic and toilet paper into Holsinger's cell, igniting a flash fire.

Vickers is the only Arizona inmate sentenced to death for the murder of a fellow inmate.

Vickers' attorneys claimed Vickers suffered from mental problems dating to a boyhood spent in foster homes where he was sexually molested and beaten. They also claimed the attack on Holsinger was not premeditated and did not deserve the death penalty.

Prosecutors called Vickers "shockingly evil." He was double-jointed and could escape from any handcuffs, and he once crawled through ventilation ducts to the prison roof before he was recaptured.

The slightly built Vickers was a macho braggart who threatened to carve the name of the judge who overturned his original death sentence into his next victim. Several officers and inmates were stabbed, shot or assaulted with some of the dozens of makeshift weapons he crafted from everyday items like toothbrushes and typewriter parts.

Vickers eventually became so dangerous that he was housed alone in a 4-cell block reserved for the most violent prisoners.

Vickers becomes the 5th condemned inmate to be put to death in Arizona this year, the most since 5 prisoners were gassed in 1943. It was the 17th execution in the state since they were resumed there on April 6, 1992.

497 U.S. 1033

Robert Wayne VICKERS, petitioner
v.
ARIZONA.

No. 88-7629.

Case below, 138 Ariz. 450, 675 P.2d 710; 159 Ariz. 532, 768 P.2d 1177.

June 28, 1990.

The petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is denied.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 30, 1990.

Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231 , 2973, 49 L. Ed.2d 859 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the death penalty in this case. Even if I did not hold this view, I would grant the petition to decide whether the Constitution requires a State to provide an indigent defendant access to diagnostic testing necessary to prepare an effective defense based on his mental condition, when the defendant demonstrates that his sanity at the time of the offense will be a significant issue at trial. I believe that our decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), compels us to answer that question in the affirmative.

Petitioner Robert Wayne Vickers was convicted of murdering a prison inmate and sentenced to death. His only defense at trial was insanity.

Specifically, Vickers claimed that he suffered from temporal lobe epilepsy, a brain disorder that can cause violent behavior and render a person unable to appreciate the nature and wrongfulness of his acts.

Vickers' court-appointed psychiatrist, Dr. Paul Bindelglas, determined, after a lengthy interview and an exhaustive review of Vickers' medical records, that Vickers suffered from "definite dissociative reactions" possibly due to temporal lobe epilepsy. App. to Pet. for Cert. B-7.

Dr. Bindelglas based his opinion on Vickers' history of cerebral trauma and seizures, neurological deficits reported by a psychologist when Vickers was a child, improvement in Vickers' condition when he was placed on anti-convulsive and psychotropic medications and reversion when he was taken off the medication, and an abnormal electroencephalogram (EEG) performed four years before the murder. Ibid.

Dr. Bindelglas further opined that Vickers probably was in a dissociative state at the time of the offense, which made him "incapable of rendering any judgement and . . . unable to know right from wrong." Id., at B-9. Dr. Bindelglas stated that he could not make a definitive diagnosis, however, without certain neuropsychological testing. Ibid.

Based on Dr. Bindelglas' recommendation, petitioner requested that the trial court provide access to diagnostic testing. Petitioner included with his request an affidavit from a second psychiatrist, Dr. David Bear, who, after reviewing petitioner's records and examining him for five hours, agreed that there was a "substantial possibility" that Vickers suffered from temporal lobe epilepsy, which may have impaired his ability to " appreciate the quality and nature of the act and its wrongfulness." Id., at C-4, C-9.

Dr. Bear also stated that diagnostic testing, including a careful neurological examination and multiple EEG's, was necessary "before professional judgment can be rendered regarding Mr. Vickers' mental state at the time of the subject offense."

In addition, the state's own expert, Dr. Maier Tuchler, testified at petitioner's competency hearing that diagnostic testing was necessary to determine definitely whether Vickers suffered from temporal lobe epilepsy.

Finally, petitioner supplied the court with the affidavits of two other psychiatrists who testified that strong evidence indicated that Vickers suffered from a mental disorder which impaired his capacity to make rational judgments, but that diagnostic testing was necessary before a firm conclusion could be reached . App. to Pet. for Cert. D and E.

Despite the consensus of these medical experts that diagnostic testing was necessary, the court denied petitioner's request. The court relied on a two-paragraph letter from a psychiatrist appointed at the State's request, Dr. William Masland.

Dr. Masland concluded, on the basis of a quick review of petitioner's medical records, conversations with prisoners and prison staff, and a brief interview with Vickers, that " there is absolutely nothing to suggest that this man is epileptic" and that "further diagnostic testing . . . would be totally superfluous." Id., at F.

The court refused to reconsider its order after receiving additional affidavits from Dr. Bindelglas and Dr. Bear and two neurologists that vehemently contested Dr. Masland's opinion and reemphasized the need for diagnostic testing.

Because of the lack of diagnostic testing, Dr. Bindelglas could testify at trial only that there was a "definite probability" of temporal lobe epilepsy. 159 Ariz. 532, 536, 768 P.2d 1177, 1181 (1989). Before sentencing, petitioner again requested diagnostic testing to establish the brain disorder as a mitigating circumstance; again the court denied his motion.

The Arizona Supreme Court rejected petitioner's argument that the State violated due process by denying him an adequate opportunity to prove his insanity defense. Ibid. The court reasoned that the requested testing would have been expensive and would have posed a "burdensome security problem." Id., at 537, 768 P.2d, at 1182. The court also claimed that nothing indicated that testing would have helped petitioner prove his insanity defense. Ibid.

In Ake v. Oklahoma, supra, at 83, this Court held that when an indigent "defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense." (Emphasis added.)

The right to a competent psychiatrist necessarily includes the right to have the State provide the psychiatrist with the tools he requires to conduct an adequate examination and evaluation of the defendant. To hold otherwise is analogous to requiring the State to provide an indigent defendant with an attorney, but not requiring it to pay for the attorney's legal research expenses.

This is not to say that an indigent defendant is entitled to every scientific procedure that has only a remote possibility of bolstering his defense. Thus, we recognized in Ake that "the Court has not held that a State must purchase for the indigent defendant all the assistance that his wealthier counterpart might buy." 470 U.S., at 77 ( citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974 )).

But when a defendant demonstrates that his sanity will be a significant issue at trial, and his psychiatrist makes a plausible showing that certain testing is necessary for him to perform his Ake function, that testing must be considered one of "the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense" that the State must provide. 470 U.S., at 77 .

Petitioner undoubtedly satisfied the threshold requirements. First, his sanity was a significant factor in his defense. Vickers' "sole defense was that of insanity," id., 470 U.S., at 86 , and six experts testified that there was a substantial possibility that Vickers suffered from a mental disorder at the time of the offense that might have impaired his capacity to understand the nature of his actions.

Indeed, the trial court's appointment of Dr. Bindelglas itself shows that petitioner's sanity was a significant issue. Second, Vickers' court- appointed psychiatrist established that testing was necessary for him to perform his Ake role adequately. Dr. Bindelglas stated in the clearest terms that he could not make a definitive diagnosis without specific testing. App. to Pet. for Cert. B-9.

Six other medical experts, including the State's expert, Dr. Tuchler, affirmed the need for testing. Pet. for Cert. 7. Without such testing, Dr. Bindelglas could offer only a tentative opinion at trial. Clearly, then, Dr. Bindelglas' ability to contribute to petitioner's defense was impaired unreasonably by the State's refusal to provide access to diagnostic testing.

The trial court's reliance on Dr. Masland's opinion that testing would be superfluous-an opinion not shared by any of the other doctors- does not justify its denial of access to testing. Ake requires the appointment of a psychiatrist who will assist in the preparation of the defense, not one who will merely give an independent assessment to the judge or jury. 470 U.S., at 83 .

Although a judge or jury may choose to believe the State's experts rather than the defendant's at trial, a court may not permit the State's experts to determine what resources the defendant's experts may use. To allow such a veto power is akin to permitting a prosecutor to decide on what cases defense counsel may rely or what witnesses he may call. As long as the defendant makes the threshold showing of the need for testing, the court must provide access to it.

The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision in part on the assumption that the necessary testing would have to be performed out of state and would last four to six weeks, thus imposing substantial costs on the State and creating a security problem. 159 Ariz., at 537, 768 P.2d, at 1182.

The court based this assumption on Dr. Bindelglas' request that Vickers be tested in a California hospital "if at all possible" because the Arizona State Hospital might have been prejudiced in favor of its previous diagnosis and might not perform the job adequately. App. to Pet. for Cert. B-9.

The trial court, however, never sought a compromise; it refused to provide for testing altogether. Any problem posed by sending Vickers to California is a red herring, then, to the extent that less burdensome testing would have satisfied the State's obligation. If, however, the testing procedure suggested by Dr. Bindelglas was in fact the only adequate means of arriving at a medically sound diagnosis, the burden on the State does not justify denying that testing. As we held in Ake, the State's interest in preserving its fisc is not substantial when compared with the compelling interest of both the defendant and the State in the fair and accurate adjudication of a criminal case, particularly one in which the defendant's life is at stake. 470 U.S., at 78 -79-1094.

Finally, the Arizona high court maintained that further testing was of "questionable value" to petitioner's insanity defense and that the risk of an erroneous judgment was minimal because three state experts testified that Vickers was not insane at the time of the offense. 159 Ariz., at 537, 768 P.2d, at 1182.

This reasoning wrongly subjects Ake claims to harmless error analysis. In Ake, we did not endeavor to determine whether the petitioner's case had been prejudiced by the lack of a psychiatrist. Rather, we determined that, in general, psychiatric assistance is of extreme importance in cases involving an insanity defense, id., at 79-82-1096, and that without that assistance "the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high," id., at 82. Because the petitioner had made the threshold showing that his sanity was a significant issue at trial and the State had failed to offer psychiatric assistance, we reversed and remanded for a new trial.

In this case, then, the trial testimony of the State's experts is irrelevant. Vickers' sanity was a significant issue at trial and testing was necessary for his psychiatrist to perform his Ake function. Because the trial court nevertheless refused to require the State to provide access to the requisite testing, Vickers is entitled to a new trial.

Our decision in Ake v. Oklahoma recognized the right of an indigent defendant to a competent court-appointed psychiatrist when his sanity is seriously in question. To deprive a defendant of diagnostic testing necessary for the psychiatrist to perform adequately his Ake function renders that right meaningless. I therefore dissent from the denial of certiorari.