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Daniel WEBB





Classification: Homicide
Characteristics: Juvenile (17) - Kidnapping - Rape
Number of victims: 1 1
Date of murder: August 24, 1989
Date of birth: 1961
Victim profile: Diane Gellenbeck, 37 (Connecticut National Bank vice president)
Method of murder: Shooting
Location: Hartford, Connecticut, USA
Status: Sentenced to death on July 26, 1991

photo gallery


Daniel Webb

No 124596

Sommers Correctional Institution

Somers, Connecticut 

Daniel Webb was sentenced to death for the murder of bank vice president Diane Gellenbeck, whom he kidnapped from a Hartford parking garage in 1989. Webb took her to a nearby park & raped her, then shot her five times when she attempted to escape.

At trial Webb was generally uncooperative with defense attorneys. He refused to express remorse for his crimes, & did not attend court on the day the jury's verdict was announced.

Early one morning in 1988 I was occupying a postage-stamp-size room in Kyoto, Japan. It must have been around 2:00AM when I started to spin the television dial. I stopped at a BBC documentary, only half in English, on the death penalty. Despite an early morning appointment only a few hours away, I was mesmerized by the film.

Months later I learned that the film was called Fourteen Days in May. It was about the last two weeks in the life of Edward Earl Johnson, who was put to death in Mississippi's gas chamber in 1987. I tracked it down & now own a copy. The cinema verite opus served as the catalyst for my project.

Driving up to the Connecticut Correctional Institute at Somers reminded me of the opening scene of Fourteen Days in May. Only the Japenese subtitles were missing. Mile after mile of green, rolling hills passed by.

For this visit I had requested permission to use the large visiting room, & the administration had granted it. We could have the room to ourselves for only a limited time, though. Families had traveled a long way to see their loved ones. I knew the guards would be constantly checking their watches; I'd be in a race against the clock.

The room proved perfect; it was a scene straight out of an old Alfred Hitchcock film. Now, for me, it would be empty. We quickly set up our equipment.

We awaited patiently for Daniel Webb's entrance. Tall & muscular, he stood almost 6 feet, 3 inches tall & weighed about 190 pounds. A rottweiler of a man-thick, deliberate, large-jawed, massive shouldered-he was the most physically imposing of all the men I photographed. Webb sat in the stadium-sized room like a boxer, with his corner men-the guards & the prison psychologist-scrutinizing his every move.

Ever since I had seen Fourteen Days in May, I had dreamed of shooting on death row. Now, 6 years later, I was there. Though my vision had been clear from the beginning, I still struggled with what I saw around me. The more I heard prisoners speak of their lives & crimes, the less I was able to tell truth from fiction.

Though Webb had done time for a similar crime, he maintains his innocence of the murder of Diane Gellenbeck. He claims he was forced by an incompetent defense attorney & an inept judge to defend himself in the court. I find it inconceivable that a judge would tolerate a defendant representing himself in a life-or-death situation. But I know that innocence, ineffective counsel, & politically motivated judges are common in death penalty cases.


Daniel Webb was sentenced to death in 1991. He was convicted of kidnapping, attempted rape, and murder for the slaying of Diane Gellenbeck, a 37-year-old Connecticut National Bank vice president.

Webb, driving a car he had borrowed from his girlfriend, kidnapped Gellenbeck from a downtown Hartford parking garage midday on August 24, 1989, while she was en route to a meeting.

He drove her to Keney Park in the city's North End, attempted to rape her, and then shot her five times when she broke free and tried to run. Witnesses testified that the last shots were fired at close range as Gellenbeck crawled across the grass. Webb fired the final shot point-blank into her face.


State of Connecticut v. Daniel Webb





The defendant's conviction and death sentence were affirmed by this Court in August of 1996. State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 680 A.2d 147 (1996). Although on direct appeal the defendant mounted a non-evidentiary based challenge to electrocution as the method of execution, the legislature changed the method to lethal injection while the appeal was pending. Id. at 488-489. Consequently, the case was remanded "for a hearing limited to the defendant's claim concerning the state constitutionality of lethal injection as a means of execution." Id. at 489.

This Court retained jurisdiction over the matter to in order to review any findings of the trial court. Id. After a motion by the State, the trial court, Espinosa, J., scheduled a hearing on April 2, 1997 to comply with the remand order. As a result of this hearing, both parties filed briefs seeking to resolve issues concerning the scope of the remand hearing. Also, on May 6, 1997, the State informed the defendant of the lethal drugs and quantity thereof that would cause his death. S/App. at 1-3.

The issue of the scope of the remand was argued before the court, Espinosa, J., on June 4, 1997. Judge Espinosa indicated that she would resolve the issue of the scope of the remand before holding an evidentiary hearing. T. 6/4/97 at 40. She also permitted the parties to file simultaneous briefs to present additional arguments regarding any issues discussed during the June 4 hearing, and responsive briefs to address issues raised in the original briefs. Id. After this matter was briefed and argued before Judge Espinosa, but before she was able to decide it, she was transferred from the Hartford Judicial District. See T. 12/5/97 at 2. The case was then assigned to the Honorable Roland Fasano. Id.

After re-argument on the scope of the remand hearing, Judge Fasano ruled that Webb ordered him to determine whether the mechanism of death employed in an execution by lethal injection amounts to cruel and unusual punishment under the State constitution. T. 12/5/97 at 26-27. At the conclusion of an extensive evidentiary hearing, the trial court noted that "the defense abandoned any claim that proper implementation of Administrative Directive 6.15 would constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the state constitution or result in anything other than a virtually painless death." D/App. at 12. Instead the defense "shifted its focus to several new due process claims seemingly unrelated to the purpose of the hearing held pursuant to the order of remand." Id. Nevertheless, in order to comply with the remand, the court ruled that the evidence showed that procedures adopted for executing prisoners were designed "to impose death upon the inmate in as humane a manner as possible." D/App. at A14. The case has returned for this Court's review pursuant to State v. Webb, 238 Conn. at 489.

While the matter was pending in this Court, and after the defendant's brief was filed, defense counsel Norman Pattis filed a motion to withdraw his appearance due to a potential conflict of interest. At a hearing before the trial court, Clifford, J., the defendant was informed of the nature of the conflict and agreed to accept the Public Defender's office as counsel for this appeal. Pattis was allowed to withdraw and the Public Defender's office was appointed to represent the defendant. On a motion from the State, this Court struck Pattis's brief and permitted the Public Defender to file a substitute brief. This is a response to that substitute brief.


When this Court decided to grant an evidentiary hearing on whether lethal injection violated the state constitution, it did so without the benefit of full briefing by the parties on the propriety of or necessity for such a remand. As this Court has previously noted, it often operates at a disadvantage when it chooses to decide a matter without full briefing by the parties. State v.  Magnano, 204 Conn. 259, at 276-277, 523 A.2d 760 (1987). Had the issue been briefed originally, the Court could have considered whether it has the constitutional authority to invalidate execution by lethal injection, and rejected the defendant's request for a remand on that basis. The Court also would have been informed that no Court has taken similar claims seriously. The State preserved the constitutional issue for appeal knowing full well that the trial court was bound by the remand order to hold the hearing. T. 12/5/97 at 12-13. Therefore, the State presents this constitutional argument first, because it is the primary reason the defendant's claims should be rejected.

A. The Absence of an Express Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the State Constitution Prevents this Court from Invalidating a Form of Punishment

The Connecticut Constitution contains no clause explicitly proscribing cruel and/or unusual punishments. In a state constitutional sense, the absence of a specific clause akin to the Eighth Amendment, which pre-dated Connecticut's 1818 constitution, has important ramifications. For this Court has noted that, when a legal doctrine existed before the drafting of the state constitution and it is not specifically included therein, its "omission is [a] significant indication that the doctrine is not of constitutional magnitude." State v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349, 366 (1978) (where state constitution does not include language in federal constitution, strong presumption that rights enumerated in latter are not meant to be found in former).

Despite the rather obvious void in the constitutional text regarding cruel and/or unusual punishments and the meaning ascribed to it in Worden, this Court cobbled together a state constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment from Article first sections 8 and 9. State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 249, 646 A.2d 1318 (1994). Therefore, to the extent the state constitution affords protection against such punishment, its properties must be divined from existing constitutional clauses and precedent.

In Ross the Court asserted its power by ruling that it was vested with the inherent authority to review the capital sentencing scheme. Nothing in Ross suggests, however, that the Court also wrested for itself the constitutional authority to invalidate an entire form of punishment. In Ross,the Court cautioned that it must use "great restraint" when exercising its authority under its newly-asserted power to decide what punishments are cruel and unusual. State v. Ross, 230 Conn. at 249.

Here, the restraint is all the more imperative because the state constitution gives the Court no
authority to invalidate lethal injection.

1. State constitutional history regarding sentencing limits

Article I Section 9 was the most obvious referent on this subject, because it places explicit constitutional limits on punishments: "No person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly warranted by law." As this Court has recognized, however, the historical antecedent of Article I Section 9 was the Ludlow Code of 1650. State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 178-179, 579 A.2d 404 (1990).

The Ludlow Code was enacted, in part, because citizens were concerned about punishments meted out by a judiciary whose authority was not constrained by the popular will. Thus, the Ludlow Code forbade any punishment that was not codified by the people's representatives in the General Court. H. Cohen and W. Horton, Connecticut's Four Constitutions, 5 Conn. Bar Assn. (1989). Connecticut colonists chose the legislature as the constitutional body which would protect them from arbitrary and cruel punishment at the hands of an unfettered judiciary. H. Hammond Trumbell, Historical Notes on the Connecticut Constitution 1639-1818, at 9-10. Article I Section 9 (originally enacted as Section10) was the final formulation of this concern, and was adopted by the 1818 constitutional convention without discussion. Horton, Annotated Debates of the 1818 Constitutional Convention, Sept. 1, 1818. Logic dictates, therefore, that pursuant to Article I Section 9, the only punishment a Connecticut Court can impose is one duly authorized by the legislature. A corollary of this conclusion, however, is that if the legislature has adopted a specific form of punishment, the Court is powerless to assert the State constitution to invalidate it. The latter conclusion is borne out by both history and precedent.

2. Precedent establishing that the Court cannot rely on the state constitution to invalidate sentencing schemes

In State v. Ellis, 197 Conn. 436, 450-451 n.13, 497 A.2d 974 (1985) this Court noted Justice Swift's reaction to one punishment he considered overly harsh. This Court explored the circumstances wherein Justice Swift Justice explained which branch of government must provide penal reform. Prior to 1821, manslaughter was punished by methods which might be described as medieval. The 1808 statute provided that "whatsoever person shall be guilty of the crime of man-slaughter ... shall forfeit to the public treasury of this state, all the goods and chattels to him or her belonging ... and be further punished by whipping on the naked body, and be stigmatized, or burnt on the hand with the letter M, on a hot iron, and shall also be forever disabled from giving any verdict or evidence in any of the courts within this state." (Emphasis in original.) General Statutes (Rev. to 1808), tit. 66, c. 7.

Zephaniah Swift, a leading legal figure of his day, author of several major works on early Connecticut law, and later Chief Justice of this court, inveighed against this barbaric form of punishment: "The dreadful punishment annexed to this crime, must have been dictated by that horror which is universally entertained respecting homicide, without due attention to the circumstances under which it may be committed." 2 Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut (1796) p. 307.   He argued that the ways of committing manslaughter differed greatly in "criminality" and that "the punishment ought to be varied and proportioned accordingly." Id., p. 306. He concluded that in "this enlightened period, when reason and science have dispelled the gloom of prejudice and superstition, it is to be hoped that the legislature will soon enact more rational and consistent laws on this subject." Id., pp. 307-308.

It is beyond question that the views of Chief Justice Swift proved influential with the legislature. A former legislator himself, he headed the committee appointed by the legislature in 1820 to revise the General Statutes. See Preface to the General Statutes (Rev. to 1821). Notably, one of the objects of the legislature in enacting the new criminal code was "to proportion the punishment according to the nature and grade of the crime...." General Statutes (Rev. to 1821), tit. 22, section 118, p. 177.

Despite his influence as a jurist and former legislator, Justice Swift, a source cited by the defendant, had to wait for legislative change to eliminate what he considered a "barbaric" punishment. This view of the state constitution was consistent with Article I Section 9 and its historical antecedents. Not coincidentally, this Court has always understood that its role in determining the validity of a punishment under the state constitution was to decide whether it was consistent with the legislative enactment. For state constitutional purposes, if the punishment was dictated by the legislature, it was constitutional. State v. Williams, 157 Conn. 114, 121, 249 A.2d 245 (1968) (sentence within statutory limits is not, as matter of law, cruel and unusual punishment); State v. McNally, 152 Conn. 598, 602-603, 211 A.2d 162 (1965); State v. Kyles, 169 Conn. 438, 363 A.2d 97 (1979); State v. Kreminski, 178 Conn. 145, 153, 422 A.2d 294 (1979); State v. Levy, 103 Conn. 138, 148, 103 A. 96 (1925); Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 94, 121 A. 678 (1923) (where legislature had not provided for incarceration, court order to contrary violated Article I Section 9). Even the authority cited by the defendant shows that the Court never sought a mechanism for invalidating a punishment prescribed by the legislature: rather it always sought a method of maximizing the penalty decreed.

For example, the defendant claims that State v. Smith, 5 Day, (Conn.) 1811, is an expression of this Court's apparent willingness to abate a defendant's punishment that it perceives as inhumane. D/B at 18. The quote cited by the defendant, however, actually stands for two propositions do not support the argument which must carry the day in this case: (1) while a sentence can be postponed for humane reasons, the goal is to enforce it in the future, and: (2) when evaluating punishments, the trial court should consider the uniqueness of a particular defendant. Smith, is totally silent about any exercise of constitutional authority to invalidate a method of punishment (i.e. ruling that confinement of anyone in Newgate is unconstitutional).

Moreover, what occurred in Smith is actually damaging to the defendant's claim. The question at issue was whether the trial Court could postpone a sentence because the defendant was already serving a sentence for a prior crime. The defendant claimed it would be unconstitutional to impose what we now call consecutive sentences. Id. at 178. This Court rejected his claim. Id. at 179. Thus, any dictum in Smith about humane treatment must be viewed in the context of what the Court actually ruled: the trial court has the ability to cumulate sentences for periods beyond those designated by the legislature for a single offense if doing so ensures that a defendant is fully punished for each individual crime. Smith is relevant only insofar as it holds that the judiciary is empowered to enforce legislatively created punishments to the hilt.

3. The overall harshness of a penalty is unreviewable by this Court

The defendant is claiming, in essence, that executing him by lethal injection is too harsh or excessive a method of punishment. "It is well established that when the sentence imposed is within the limits fixed by statute for the offenses charged, an appellate claim that the sentence is excessive is nothing more than an appeal for clemency and a request that this court exercise discretionary authority it does not possess. (emphasis added) State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 109, 127, 445 A.2d 304 (1982)." State v. Baldwin, 224 Conn. 347, 370-371, A. 2d (1993). From the days of Justice Swift to the writings of a majority of the present Court it has been acknowledged that "we have no discretionary power to modify or overturn a sentence within the limits fixed by statute, except where a trial court appears to have abused its discretion. . . . An abuse of discretion, however, means more than that the defendant's sentence was too severe." Id. Absent statutory authority to the contrary (e.g. General Statutes section 53a-46b), this Court does not have the authority to second guess a legislative determination that lethal injection is the appropriate method for executing a Connecticut prisoner.

4. The legislature has performed the fact-finding necessary to select a constitutional method of execution

In State v. Webb, the Court was concerned with the fact that lethal injection was a sufficiently different method of execution that separate fact finding would be needed to determine whether it was cruel and unusual punishment. 234 Conn. at 488. This Court did not consider, however, whether the requisite fact finding had already been done by the legislature, which heard testimony, debated the issues, and determined that lethal injection was the most humane way to execute a condemned inmate. See, 38 Sen. Proc., PT. 3 1995 Sess. pp 812,816, 820. When the House of Representative passed lethal injection as a mode of execution it was aware of the allegedly "botched" execution that the defendant asks this Court to consider for the first time on appeal. 28 H. R. Proc., PT. 3, 1995 Sess., p.1083 (comments of Rep. Scalettar). The hearings and findings occurred in the only branch of government the state constitution authorizes to select criminal penalties. State v. Ellis, 197 Conn. at 455-56. Despite this Court's willingness to remand this case for state constitutional adjudication, it offered the promise of a remedy that, due to the separation of powers clause of Article second, it cannot provide. On these grounds alone, the defendant's challenge to lethal injection must be rejected.


Assuming arguendo, that the Court rejects the State's argument in Issue I, it must still affirm the constitutionality of lethal injection because it is the most humane method yet devised for imposing capital punishment.

A. Facts Revealed About the Effects of Lethal Injection

Administrative Directive 6.15, which was prepared by the Commissioner of Correction pursuant to General Statutes section 54-100, indicates that the State will execute a prisoner by a continuous intravenous injection of the following substances:

1. Step One- The first step shall require the administration of 2,500 milligrams of Thiopental Sodium (a lethal dose) in 50 ml of clear (without visible precipitate) Sodium Chloride) 0.9% solution of an approximate concentration of 50 mg/ml or 5%.

2. Step Two- The second step shall require the administration of 100 milligrams (mg) of Pancuronium Bromide (contents of ten (10) 5 ml vials of 2 mg/ml concentration) in 50 ml.

3. Step Three- The third and final step shall require the administration of 120 milliequivalent (mEg) of Potassium Chloride (contents of two (2) 30 ml vials of 2mEq/ml concentration) in 60 ml.

Administrative directive 6.15.; D/App. A25-A26. The drugs were selected by Thomas J. Macura, a pharmacist for the state Department of Correction, hereinafter, (DOC), who consulted with officials in other states that use lethal injection and with Dr. Edward Blanchette, a physician employed by the DOC. T. 3/30/98 at 201, 202; 3/31/98 at 69-72.

The person selected as the executioner shall be trained to the satisfaction of a licensed physician to ensure that he/she is qualified to establish the intravenous line and administer the drugs in a professional manner. D/App at A20, A25. Dr. Blanchette indicated that he would be willing to train executioners so that they could carry out the execution in a professional and humane manner. T. 3/31/98 at 72-79.

Three witnesses offered their expert opinions about whether lethal injection carried out pursuant to the Directive was a painful way to execute a death sentenced inmate. The first was Dr. Edward Brunner, a Board certified anesthesiologist, who was Chairman of the Department of Anesthesiology at Northwestern University Medical School in Chicago. T. 10/6/97 at 3-4. Dr. Brunner had testified before Judge Fasano on the same issue in State v. Breton, S.C.15876. His testimony was offered by the defendant and admitted in this case by agreement of the parties. T. 3/31/98 at 1-10; Exh F. Voir dire of Dr. Brunner revealed that he believed that executing someone by lethal injection was unethical. T. 10/6/97 at 10. Indeed, he was a consultant to the MacArthur Center for Justice, which worked in concert with him and other physicians to sue the Illinois Department of Corrections over the issue of executing inmates by lethal injection. Id. at 13. The theory for that lawsuit was that the "use of medical drugs was unethical and that it was fraught with risks of undue and unnecessary suffering.... [even though the] severe suffering. . . . is not obvious to onlookers." Id. at 13.

Dr. Brunner explained that thiopental sodium is a fast but short-acting barbiturate that is used "to induce the state of anesthesia, that is the state of non-feeling, unconsciousness." Id. at 16. When used for medical procedures the normal dose is 200 or 250 milligrams, depending on the weight of the patient. Id. at 18. Although Dr. Brunner would not admit that there was a known "lethal dose" of thiopental sodium, he indicated that a massive dose might be lethal because it would depress a patient's ability to breathe. Id. at 20. According to Brunner, a patient given a massive dose would fall asleep and eventually die of asphyxiation. Id. at 21. He described Pancuronium bromide as a paralytic drug that is used by surgeons to relax muscles so that they will be easier to manipulate without resistance during surgery. Id. According to Dr. Brunner, a normal dose is between 7 to 20 milligrams for a 150 pound patient. Id. at 22. For medical use, dosage varies according to body weight. Id. When Pancuronium is used in surgery, the patient's muscles are paralyzed and he/she cannot breath. Id. Breathing is performed mechanically by those attending the surgical procedure. Id. Potassium chloride is used to stop a patient's heart during heart surgery. Id. at 24. If a patient is administered a sufficient dose of potassium chloride during surgery and a heart lung machine is not employed, the patient will die. Id. at 25. Dr. Brunner testified that potassium chloride acts very rapidly, and the heart will completely lose its ability to beat in five or six minutes resulting in irreversible brain damage and death of brain tissue. Id. at 25. Dr. Brunner testified that after a normal dose of thiopental sodium, a patient will begin regaining consciousness in four or five minutes, but a massive dose, such as the 2,500 mg used in the execution protocol, would extend that time to five to seven minutes. Id. at 42. On cross-examination, Dr. Brunner explained that thiopental sodium is used to induce a state of "anesthesia" which he defined as a state that relieves a patient of "pain and anxiety." Id. at 78. Indeed, Dr. Brunner uses thiopental sodium in clinical procedures ,"[t]o allow them [his patients] to become anesthetized in a pleasant fashion." Id. 79. Dr. Brunner acknowledged that if thiopental accomplishes its intended task "[i]t induces a state of nonsensation. . . .unconsciousness." Id. at 90.

Then, if Pancuronium is given correctly, the patient will assuredly lie still on the gurney, without twitching or jumping up and down. Id. Finally, the potassium chloride will stop the unconscious, insensate, paralyzed inmate's heart. Id. at 91. Brunner also testified that Administrative Directive 6.15 posed several potential problems which could result in the drugs being improperly administered. Each of these examples was premised, however, on the assumption that something would go wrong during the execution procedure. Dr. Brunner's testimony also was given the Breton hearing of 1997, of a time when he was unaware of the some of the apparatus to be used during Connecticut executions and how these have responded to his concerns. Moreover, Dr. Brunner made it abundantly clear that he did not approve of any of the execution protocols he had reviewed (Illinois, Texas and Delaware); obviously a reflection of his opinion that executing someone by lethal injection is unethical. Despite his strongly held beliefs, Dr. Brunner conceded that if Directive 6.15 were carried out as written "that would be a way to die without any pain." Id. at 91. "If we hypothesize that things are done in an appropriate fashion, then it [execution by lethal injection] is painless." Id. at 103. He also agreed with the proposition that, if a large enough dose of the selected drugs were administered, the only discomfort an inmate would feel is a pin-prick. T. 10/6/97 at 93.

Dr. Jeffrey Gross, a professor of Anesthesiology and Pharmacology at the University of Connecticut School of Medicine also offered his opinion on the substances and procedure employed to execute a prisoner pursuant to Directive 6.15. Dr. Gross testified that when thiopental sodium is injected into the veins it "makes the brain go to sleep" in about thirty seconds. T. 4/1/98 at 12. Due to the fact that the dose prescribed in Directive 6.15 is five times the amount that would be used on a three hundred pound patient, Dr. Gross indicated that it would anesthetize a prisoner slightly faster than a normal patient. Id. at 14.

Dr. Gross confirmed that pancuronium bromide was a paralytic agent that was a synthetic form of curare. Id. at 15. Once introduced into a patient's system it prevents messages from the brain from passing to any part of the body, thus preventing a patient from moving voluntarily or involuntarily. Id. at 15-16. Dr. Gross calculated that the dosage called for in Directive 6.15 would paralyze the prisoner's muscles in approximately two minutes. Id. at 17. Dr. Gross described potassium chloride as a salt that is often found in nutritional salt substitutes. Id. at 18. Potassium chloride can be administered to regulate a patient's heartbeat or, in surgical situations, to stop the patient's heart. Id. "If you administer [potassium chloride] quickly you get a high blood level and you will stop the heart instantly." Id. at 19. Dr. Gross also reminded the court that in medicine, dosages are calculated and drugs are administered to improve somebody's health and well-being. With lethal injection, however, the goal is not to keep the person alive, but to assure that the dosages will end the inmate's life. Id. 23. His opinion about the nature of Directive 6.15, however, was the same as Dr. Brunner's: executing someone by lethal injection is not a medical procedure. Id. at 24. Dr. Gross testified that an individual executed pursuant to Administrative Directive 6.15 "would probably have no pain at all." Id. at 25. Dr. Gross based his opinion, in part, on the fact that when he has used the chemicals set forth in the Directive during major surgery, patients would awaken and inform him that they felt no discomfort during their surgical procedure. Id. at 55. Dr. Gross indicated that he could say "with a reasonable degree of medical probability" that lethal injection was the least painful way to execute someone. T. 4/1/98 at 53. Dr. Blanchette, of the Department of Correction, testified that he felt obligated to review the protocol to ensure the execution process was completed in as humane a method as possible. T. 3/31/98 at 73. He agreed with the opinions stated above, that if the defendant were executed pursuant to the protocol, the only physical pain he would feel is the actual needle used to insert the IV catheter. Id. at 92.

One of the most interesting pieces of evidence was presented during Dr. Brunner's testimony in Breton. Through Dr. Brunner, the defense introduced the report of a study of capital punishment performed by a Royal Commission in England between 1949 and 1953. Exh B (Brunner); D/App. A28-A35. The portion of the report admitted into evidence ostensibly deals with whether England should select an alternative to hanging as a method of execution. D/App. at A30. At the time, lethal injection was considered an "untried" method. Id. The Commission recognized that an intravenous injection of a lethal drug makes "certain that death will be both quick and painless." Id. at 257. The report also noted that even the British Medical Association agreed that execution by intravenous lethal injection "would be a speedy and merciful procedure." Id. at 258.  One of the potential problems acknowledged in the Royal Commission's Report was the expertise needed to ensure that the injection was actually made directly into the vein rather than the muscle. Id. The Commission determined that doctors are the most skilled at performing this function; but would probably be unwilling to participate. Id. at A32. The Commission noted, however, "that it is not only within the medical profession that the necessary skill is to be found. There are many outside it who are fully competent either to give injections themselves or train others to do it." Id. at A33. On the issue of competent executioners, the Commission concluded: "[o]ur evidence does not justify a conclusion that the difficulty of getting executioners, if it were the only obstacle in the way of a desirable reform (to employ lethal injection), would prove insuperable." Id.

Moreover, it is clear from this report that the Commission was contemplating using one syringe and needle to inject the lethal drug, and only the lethal drug, directly into the prisoner's veins. See, D/App at A34 (discussing giving injections through cut in inmates trousers). There is no indication that the Commission considered what is an important part of Directive 6.15; gaining access to a vein first via an intravenous catheter before ever introducing any lethal drugs. D/App. at A25.

Two things are apparent from this 1956 report: (1) the Commission considered offering prisoners the choice of lethal injection instead of hanging as a "pleasanter method of execution;" and (2) the Commission recommended that the question of execution by lethal injection should be revisited as the science of anesthetics progressed, with the goal of adopting it at some time in the future. D/App at A 33 & 33.

It is no wonder that, upon considering this evidence, the trial court ruled that the procedures adopted for executing Connecticut prisoners were designed "to impose death upon the inmate in as humane a manner as possible." D/App. at A14.

B. The Standards for Determining Cruel and Unusual Punishment

As with any legislative pronouncement, this Court must presume that the selected method of execution is constitutional. State v. Ross, 230 Conn. at 236. Thus, the defendant has the burden of showing that lethal injection in unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Id; State v. Webb, supra. When evaluating this claim, the Court's primary focus must be on the potential for physical pain to the condemned inmate, and not on the psychological discomfort of the inmate or anybody else. Woolls v. McCotter, 798 F.2d at 698; Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1061 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983); State v. Deputy, 644 A.2d at 421. "The suffering due to. . . fear, the law, does not seek to spare." In Re Storti, 60 N.E. 210, 211 (Mass. 1901). Put another way, the defendant must show wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain in the use of lethal injection and must do so by objective evidence. Campbell, 18 F.3d 662, 681-877 (9th Cir. 1994). "[T]he cruelty against which the constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely." Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 67 S.Ct 374, 376 (1947).

1. The trial court reached the only conclusion possible

Although this case was hotly contested below, the trial court reached the only conclusion even remotely suggested by the evidence: lethal injection complying with Administrative Directive 5.15 is the most humane way of executing a prisoner. Indeed, the evidence was so overwhelming that "[a]t the conclusion of the evidence, in its argument to the court and in its subsequent brief, the defense abandoned any claim that a proper implementation of Administrative Directive 5.15 would constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the state constitution or result in anything other than a painless death." D/App at A12. It was obvious even to the defendant that lethal injection meets any and every constitutional standard beyond a reasonable doubt. See, Bailey v. Snyder, 855 F.Supp. 1392, 1412 (D.C. Del. 1994) (court permits petitioner to withdraw Eighth Amendment claim after realizing that defeat is "certain and imminent"). This is not a surprising conclusion because every court that has ruled on this issue to date concurs. Kelly v. Lynaugh, 862 F.2d 1126, 1135 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989); Woolls v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 695, 698 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1031 (1986); LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 469 (D. Ariz 1995); Hill v. Lockhart, 791 F.Supp. 1388, 1394 (E.D. Ark. 1992); Felder v. Estelle, 588 F.Supp. 664, 674 (S.C. Tex. 1984); United States v. Thomas, 43 M. J. 550 (1995); State v. Hinchey, No. CR-92-0104-AP, (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1995), slip op. at 17; State v. Deputy, 644 A.2d 411, 421 (Del. Super. 1994); Hopkinson v. State, 798 P.2d 1186, 1187 (Wyo. 1990); Romano v. Oklahoma, 917 P.2d 12, 17 (1996). State v. Moen, 309 Or. 45, 786 P.2d 111, 143 (1990)(on its face lethal injection not cruel and unusual); People v. Stewart, 123 Ill.2d 368, 123 Ill. Dec. 27, 528 N.E.2d 631, 639, cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1072 (1989). See also, State v. Barber, 753 S.W.2d 659, 670 (Tenn. 1988)(defendant challenges electrocution claiming lethal injection, "more humane.")

Moreover, Connecticut was only the second state to require an evidentiary hearing before rejecting similar challenges. See Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1061 (5th Cir 1983) (accepting as true proffer that prisoner will remain conscious for period of time that will result in some pain and terror from method of execution insufficient as matter of law to require a hearing). Even after this protracted hearing, wherein the defendant received ample time to provide the court with evidence to the contrary: ...the petitioner has failed to identify any authority indicating that any court has found the instant claim [that lethal injection constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment] to be meritorious. He has also failed to show that an eighth amendment violation has arisen in any of the several executions by lethal injection that have taken place in other jurisdictions. [T]he petitioner has failed to provide any sworn factual assertions whatsoever to support it. People v. Stewart, 528 N.E.2d at 639. The trial court concluded likewise, and that decision should be affirmed. D/App. at A9-A17.

2. Issues that are not part of the constitutional equation

The defendant raises several objections to the details of the process that he suggests renders lethal injection unconstitutional. D/Brief at 26-31. Although the state will briefly respond to these concerns below, it is important to understand that these matters are of no moment to this Court. [T]here is a presumption that public officials entrusted with specific public functions related to their jobs properly carry out their duties. See, e.g., Beechwood Gardens Tenants' Assn. v. Dept. of Housing, 214 Conn. 505, 514-15, 572 A.2d 989 (1990); Bowman v. 1477 Central Avenue Apartments, Inc., 203 Conn. 246, 255, 524 A.2d 610 (1987); Brookfield v. Candlewood Shores Estates, Inc., 201 Conn. 1, 6, 513 A.2d 1218 (1986); Aczas v. Stuart Heights, Inc., 154 Conn. 54, 58-59, 221 A.2d 589 (1966); State v. Lenihan, 151 Conn. 552, 555, 200 A.2d 476 (1964). Indeed, " '[i]t is ... presumed until the contrary appears that a public officer acting officially has done his duty.' State v. Lenihan, [supra, at 555, 200 A.2d 476]." State v. Crawford, supra, 202 Conn. [443] at 451, 521 A.2d 1034 [1987]. State v. Figueroa, 235 Conn.145, 181, 665 A.2d 63 (1995). This particular presumption has important constitutional significance relevant to lethal injection because, executing an inmate is a governmental act that is wholly assigned to the executive branch. In the area of penal operations, this Court yields to the expertise of those charged with carrying out the executive branch's penal function. See, Washington v. Meachum, 238 Conn. 692, 725-727, 680 A.2d 262 (1996) (and cases cited therein). Here the evidence reflects that Connecticut has selected the substances and adopted a methodology to execute people "professionally" and "humanely." There is no cause to question the executive decision made in this matter.

Moreover, courts are loath to undertake judicial review of the details of an execution process as long as the agent of death (here lethal drugs) presents a facially constitutional method. Thus, in Illinois the court refused to consider a challenge to lethal injection even where the state lacked a protocol entirely. People v. Stewart, 528 N.E. 2d at 384. Stewart is consistent with two distinct lines of cases which refutes the premise that the Court has to review the details of the execution protocol before deciding on its constitutionality. There is no requirement that the legislature provide minute details about how a defendant is to be executed. Ex Parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d. 503, 510 (Tex. Crim App. 1978) (en banc) (absence of a detailed blueprint for execution does not render sentencing statute vague); State v. Gee John, 211 P. 2d 676, 682 (1923) (statute providing for execution by lethal gas in proper enclosure not invalid for failing to provide greater detail); see also, Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1830) (death penalty not invalid due to absence of legislatively authorized method of execution as long as death is the authorized punishment). When reviewing the method of execution, the Court does not speculate about what could go awry during the execution process. "The risk of accident need not be eliminated from the execution process in order to survive constitutional review." Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d at 687. For example, in LaGrand v. Lewis the petitioner challenged Arizona's execution protocol in federal court. 883 F. Supp. at 470. The petitioner 's effort included an offer of proof in the form of an affidavit from a physician indicating that the protocol used "could cause the condemned to feel great pain." Id . The federal district court refused to give any credence to speculative assertions about potential mishaps during the administration of the lethal drugs and thus affirmed use of lethal injection. Id. at 470. In Hill v. Lockhart, 791 F. Supp. 1388, 1394 (E.D. Ark. 1992) the court rejected a claim that lethal injection was unconstitutional because of the executioner's inability to locate a vein. The court noted that even in hospital settings intravenous access can be difficult, but this rare difficulty is "hardly" cruel and unusual punishment. Id. Similarly, a Delaware superior court judge refused to hold an evidentiary hearing on a defendant's challenge to lethal injection based on his claim that there was a possibility that a prisoner could suffer a lingering death during an execution by lethal injection. See, Bailey v. Snyder, 855 F. Supp. 1392, 1412 (D.C. Del. 1994). Bailey's trial court affidavits failed to prove that the state Department of Corrections could not carry out his execution in accordance with the Eighth Amendment. Id. Courts do not consider evidence of possible problems or potential pitfalls of an execution protocol because of the overriding presumption that the state officer will act in compliance with the Constitution. LaGrande v. Lewis, at 470; see also, Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 686 (9th Cir. 1994) (evidence of botched hangings properly excluded). As in Campbell, the trial court was not required to consider allegedly "bungled" executions that were performed in other states, but only had to review the process selected in Connecticut. Id. at 686. Although someone may be executed "in such a bungling fashion" as to produce intense pain and suffering," "this is not argument against execution by [that] method." State v. Gee John, 211 P. ar 681. Indeed, even when an execution fails and the process has to be repeated, "the hardship imposed on the petitioner [does not] rise to the level of hardship denounced as a denial of due process because of cruelty." Francis v. Resweber, 67 S.Ct. at 376.

3. The concerns raised by the defendant are contrary to the evidence

a. The Dose of Thiopental Sodium will perform adequately

The defendant's first complaint is that the dose of thiopental sodium may not be sufficient to render the inmate unconscious and maintain the proper level of anesthesia. D/B at 27. The problem with his analysis is that it relies on a medicinal use of thiopental sodium which is designed to anesthetize a patient but permit recovery. As Dr. Gross testified, however, the defendant will be given a dose five times more powerful than what is needed to anesthetize a 300 pound man. T. 4/1/98 at 14. He also indicated that no additional dose is needed if the inmate exceeds 300 pounds. Id. Thus, the dose given to an inmate will certainly render him completely unconscious and insensate. Although Dr. Brunner testified that the thiopental sodium could so depress an inmate's breathing that he would die of asphyxia, he never testified this would be painful. T. 10/6/97 at 20.  Indeed, according to Dr. Brunner, the purpose for using thiopental sodium was to render a patient unconscious and insensate and to relieve him of pain and anxiety. Id. at 78-79. Thiopental sodium lets a patient becomes anesthetized in "a pleasant fashion." Id. at 79. Thus, the dosage used in this process would pleasantly put the inmate to sleep a bit more quickly and for a longer period than a clinical dose of the same drug. Id. at 42. It might also stop his breathing, causing death by asphyxiation, but if that occurs, the inmate will be unconscious and insensate. There was no evidence that death in this manner would be anything but peaceful and painless.

b. The lethal dose will be administered sequentially and expeditiously

DOC pharmacist Thomas Macura assembled a system for delivering the lethal drugs in the proper order and with the proper safeguards to ensure that the execution will proceed quickly and without complication. The system includes a chemical delivery manifold with several ports to be used for the infusion of the necessary agents. Exh. G. T. 3/31/98 at 16; S/App 4. Each of the drugs will be contained in its own syringe. Exh H. At one end of the manifold there is a syringe port for thiopental sodium. Exh. H. The syringe is locked into place what called a "clave connector," a device designed to minimize potential problems and avoid delaying the execution. T. 3/31/98 at 22. The next syringe is for the delivery of a saline solution. T. 3/31/98 at 16. Locked next in line is a syringe of pancuronium bromide. Id. The final syringe port is for the fatal dose of potassium chloride. Id; A colored stopcock ensures that the drugs are not infused into the intravenous line until the proper time. Id. Pharmacist Macura selected a particular "J-loop" to fit into the angiocatheter inserted into the inmates arm. Exh H. This J-loop has been used in other states to avoid complications from the rapid delivery of a high volume of fluids. T. 3/31/98 at 24-26. According to Dr. Blanchette, this manifold will ensure that all the drugs are delivered in an appropriate fashion and in the right sequence. T. 3/31/98 at 92. Systems such as the one assembled by Macura are especially appropriate for delivering drugs sequentially and rapidly. Id. at 93. The manifold was selected because it is also an effective tool that doctors use to prevent administering drugs in the wrong order. T. 3/31/98 at 43. To the extent Dr. Brunner testified that he was concerned about the speed and sequence of the injection process, concerns echoed in the defendant's brief, these concerns were expressed without any knowledge of the equipment Connecticut plans to use to execute its inmates. Indeed, the trial court was aware of these concerns in Breton when it stated "the state is on notice with respect to the legitimate risks and concerns associated with procedures to effect execution by lethal injection and should take advantage of the opportunity to `fine tune' its procedures accordingly." D/ App. at A7. In this case, however, after hearing evidence about the system assembled by Macura, the trial court stated: the employment of tested procedures used in medicine is perfectly consistent with the purpose behind death by lethal injection; that is to impose death upon the inmate in as humane a way as possible. D/App. at 6. Thus, the protocol and equipment selected respond to the concerns the defendant expresses about the speed and order in which the drugs will be administered.

1. Baseless fears about the competence of the executioner

Any concerns about the skill and training of the executioner are baseless. Deputy Commissioner Peter Matos indicated that DOC intended to employ Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) or paramedics as executioners, but did not rule out using a nurse. T. 2/24/98 at 137-38. Training on inserting an intravenous line is included in the licensing procedure for EMTs, and the person(s) selected would have to have just such a license. T. 3/31/98 at 84. Dr. Gross confirmed that people such as EMTs are often trained to establish intravenous lines. T. 4/1/98 at 26. The protocol makes it clear that a licensed Connecticut physician must be satisfied that the executioner can perform the execution properly. D/App at A20, A21, A25. Dr. Blanchette, of the DOC, is willing to train the executioner accordingly, because his goal is to ensure that the execution will be as humane as possible. T. 3/31/98 at 78-79, 83-84. Dr. Gross indicated that it would be easy for someone to learn the proper way of injecting the drugs through the manifold. T. 4/1/98 at 33. The defendant wants this Court to presume that Dr. Blanchette's training will overlook the need to administer the drugs in a timely manner and that something considered rather easy to learn will become difficult for the already skilled people eventually selected as executioners. As set forth above, a court does not engage in such speculation.

2. Baseless concerns about "flocculence"

The defendant also complains that the protocol does not prevent "flocculence" which Dr. Brunner claims could cause an excruciatingly painful death. D/B at 29. Flocculence occurs when two chemicals, here thiopental sodium and pancuronium bromide, are incompatible. T. 3/31/98 at 38-40; T. 4/1/98 at 36-38; T. 10/6/97 at 56-57. If they come in contact with each other, they interact and form a precipitate (flocculence) that would clog the intravenous line, stop the flow of drugs, and possibly prevent them from acting as intended. T. 3/31/98 at 39. The protocol, however, has severalmechanisms in place to avoid this problem. First, the protocol and system call for the intravenous line to be flushed with saline between the infusion of each drug. Id. at 39-40. This process is in place to prevent flocculence. Id; T. 3/31/98 at 82. Second, the system has two intravenous lines, one in each arm, so if one becomes clogged, the other can be used to deliver the next dose from the manifold. D/App. at A25. Finally, Dr. Gross's testimony disputed Dr. Brunner's claim that flocculence causes pain. According to Dr. Gross, flocculence does not cause any pain because it can only occur outside the vein in the intravenous line. T. 4/1/98 at 39. If the drugs interact within the veins no flocculence occurs and the drugs flow freely. Id. Moreover, throughout this stage of the process the inmate is asleep and insensate from the thiopental sodium. Id. If, at this juncture, flocculence causes the execution to fail, the inmate will not suffer any pain; he will simply wake up from his anesthetizedstate. Id. at 39. See, Francis v. Resweber, supra.

c. The drugs will be introduced intravenously

The defendant is concerned that there is no guarantee that the executioner will insert the IV catheter properly. D/B at 30. Although everyone agreed that this is the only real skill involved in the execution, there was substantial disagreement as to whether someone could be trained to perform this task correctly. As set forth in Section b., however, the executioner will be properly trained to establish the IV line, and will be required to complete this task before introducing any of the drugs used in the execution.

d. The executioner will flush the line

The protocol calls for the introduction of "Sodium Chloride 0.9% solution of approximate concentration of 50 mg/ml or 5%" as part of the process of injecting the thiopental sodium. D/App. at A25. This saline flush will prevent flocculence. T. 3/31/98 at 40; see, T. 4/1/98 at 22-23. Although no flushing is needed between pancuronium bromide and sodium chloride, the plan is to do so anyway. T. 3/31/98 at 40. This concern is meritless.

e. The timing of the defendant's last meal

The defendant has the burden of proving that Directive 6.15 does not provide an adequate time interval between the defendant's last meal and is execution. He has failed to do so. Dr. Brunner testified that to avoid complications from a meal, there should be a lapse of six to eight hours between the inmate's last meal and the execution. T. 10/6/97 at 59. Directive 6.15 calls for the inmate to be fed at the normal time. D/App. at A23. The execution is scheduled for after 2:00 p.m. Id. at A25. The defendant had ample opportunity to ask DOC officials about the "normal" mealtime and prove that the interval between it and the execution was insufficient, but he did not. Nevertheless, Dr. Blanchette testified that one item he was concerned about was the "timing of meals." T. 3/31/98 at 69. That he approved Directive 6.15. indicates that any concern about the "timing" of meals was properly addressed. Moreover, the drafters of Directive 6.15 were also concerned about the type of food the prisoner would eat prior to execution. T. 2/24/98 at 133. Thus, the directive indicates that the warden will make "reasonable efforts" to serve the last meal of the inmate's choosing. D/App. at A23. The DOC has fully resolved any complications that could be caused by the inmate's last meal.

f. The use of medical personnel

This demand that "medical personnel must be used is vague because it does not clarify what he means by the term. If the defendant means physicians, then his is a poorly disguised effort to make execution by lethal injection an impossible tautology. Under his theory, the court would require doctors to be present at an execution as a matter of constitutional law. Then the state might find it impossible to find any executioners because medical practitioners are ethically constrained from participating in the process. Nevertheless, the defendant has no constitutional right to have a physician perform his execution. Hill v. Lockhart, 791 F.Supp. at 1394. On the other hand, if the defendant claims that nurses, EMTs, or paramedics to be used by DOC are not medical personnel, then he ignores the fact that nevertheless these people are trained to establish intravenous lines as part of the licensing process. On this issue, the defendant has failed to establish that the DOC will allow "anyone other than trained medical personnel to administer lethal injections." Woolls v. McCotter, 798 F.2d at 698; see also Ex Parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 508 (Tex. 1978) (approving constitutionality of Texas' protocol in light of testimony that lethal injection could be administered by "a medical technician or any person trained in intravenous injection"); Hill v. Lockhart, supra. Moreover, the defendant's reliance on the Report of the Royal Commission misuses that body's findings. The Commission recognizes than many different people can obtain the skills necessary to access veins and that advances in anesthesiology will improve the prospect of using this process. The Commission concluded that finding skilled executioners would not present an insurmountable problem should lethal injection be adopted in England. D/App. at A33. As the system and Directive assembled by the state indicates, that time has come. The defendant is also concerned with allegedly "botched" executions, a term used by death penalty opponents anytime there is a glitch in the process that has nothing to do with the inmate's suffering. As set forth in footnote 18, the trial court gave these claims little credence. In Breton, however, the trial court also heard the testimony of David Nunnelee; "a witness to 121 executions in Texas. Mr. Nunnelee characterized these executions as seemingly painless, having witnessed no outward signs of physical pain or torture." D/App. at A4. Mr. Nunnelee confirmed, from firsthand knowledge that the mishaps listed as "botched" executions were "relatively minor and had little effect on the parties to the execution." Id. To the extent there remains a possibility that something could go amiss during the execution, a reality extant in every human endeavor, "[t]he risk of accident need not be eliminated from the execution process in order to survive constitutional review." Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d at 687.

g. The American Medical Association's Code of Ethics

The defendant claims that execution by lethal injection offends society's standard of decency. His primary source for this statement is the American Medical Association's Code of Ethics.  Society's standard of decency, however, is measured by its legislative enactments. State v. Webb, 238 Conn at 404. Connecticut is one 33 states along with the federal government that have selected lethal injection as a humane method of execution. Even abolitionists recognize that a multitude of legislative enactments such as these are the true measure of society's standard of decency. Gomez v. United States District Court for Northern District of California, 503 U.S. 653, 112 S.Ct. 1652 (1992) (Stevens, J., and Blackmun, J. dissenting).


"There are powerful reasons for concluding capital cases as promptly as possible. Delay in the execution of judgments imposing the death penalty frustrates the public interest in deterrence and eviscerates the only rational justification for that type of punishment." Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. 918, 117 S. Ct. 285 (Stevens, J; Breyer, J., dissenting in remand). Litigation on the issue remanded has taken over three years and the defendant has failed to produce one iota of evidence indicating that this Court's decision on the constitutionality of lethal injection should be any different than that of any other court that has considered the subject. The remand has wrought only delay. The time has come to enter a final judgment. The defendant has been given a chance to prove that the method selected to execute him should not be used because it is too painful. The process he complains about is not merely painless; it also affords him the opportunity to visit with his family until 30 minutes before his execution. D/App. at A25. He will have access to a religious counselor who can remain with him until just before the execution and witness the execution if the defendant so desires. Id. He then will be strapped to a gurney, feel the pin prick of a needle and shortly thereafter drift off into a "pleasant" state of unconsciousness from which he will not awaken. Then there is the death of Dianne Gellenbeck. As this Court confirmed, her death, just like the death of every victim of present death row inmates, was especially heinous and cruel. State v. Webb, 238 Conn. at 485-488. She suffered through an extended abduction and was subjected to an attempted sexual assault. Id. at 486. After the defendant inflicted excruciating gunshot wounds, she repeatedly cried for help as she crawled away from him. Id. The defendant callously returned to the victim and shot her three times from point blank range with hollow point bullets. Id. Ms. Gellenbeck never had a chance to say good-bye to her family, to have a counselor at her side, to settle her accounts, or to learn how her life would finally be terminated and complain about how cruel it would be. "The death- by- injection. . . . looks pretty good next to that." Callins v. Collins, 114 S.Ct. at 1128 (Scalia, J., concurring). This Court should affirm the trial court's finding that lethal injection is a humane and constitutional method of execution.

Respectfully submitted,

July 1999



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