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Luke A. WILLIAMS III
Classification: Murderer
Characteristics:
Parricide
- To
collect insurance money
Number of victims: 2
Date of murders:
June 19,
1991
Date of birth:
August 14,
1952
Victims profile: Linda
Williams, 39 (his wife) and Shaun Williams, 12 (his
son)
Method of murder:
Beating
/ Strangulation - Burn the bodies
Location: Edgefield County, South Carolina, USA
Status:
Executed
by lethal injection in South Carolina on February
20, 2009
The United States Court
of Appeals For the Fourth Circuit
The bodies of Williams' wife Linda, and their 12-year-old son, Shaun,
were found in the family van just across the state line into South
Carolina. The van had been driven into a tree in what appeared to be a
botched attempt to stage an accident. The bodies had been doused in
gasoline and set ablaze. Autopsies revealed that Linda had been beated
to death and Shaun had been strangled to death.
Months later, it was discovered that
Williams had secretly insured his wife and child just weeks before
their deaths. The combined payout from several policies was $525,000
and Mr. Williams was the sole beneficiary. Williams was unemployed had
a history of living off insurance settlements for injuries and
accidents. He was out of money and had filed for bankruptcy protection.
A few days before her death, Linda
had contacted United Way’s Help Line a few days before her death and
was referred to a shelter for battered women. The shelter’s phone
number, scrawled on a torn slip of paper, was still in her purse when
her body was removed from the burned out van.
Citations:
State v. Williams, 321 S.C. 327, 468 S.E.2d 626 (S.C. 1996) (Direct
Appeal). Williams v. State, 363 S.C. 341, 611 S.E.2d 232 (S.C. 2005) (PCR). Williams v. Ozmint, 494 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2007) (Habeas).
Final Meal:
Fried chicken, steak, baked potato with sour cream and butter, a
tossed salad, cranberry sauce, peach cobbler, fried turkey and ketchup.
Final Words:
None.
ClarkProsecutor.org
South Carolina Department of
Corrections
Inmate: Williams, III, Luke A.
DOC#: 4874
DOB: 08/14/52
County: Edgefield
Date Received: 11/24/93
Race: White
Trial Judge: L. Brown, Jr.
Man who killed family put to
death
By Lisa Marie Pane -
Charleston Post Courier
Associated Press - Saturday,
February 21, 2009
COLUMBIA — A Georgia man convicted of killing his
wife and son to collect life insurance money was executed Friday. Luke
Williams, 56, was put to death by lethal injection. He made no final
statement and kept his eyes closed as the drugs were administered.
Williams was pronounced dead at 6:13 p.m.
He was convicted of killing his 39-year-old wife,
Linda, and their 12-year-old son, Shaun, in June 1991. Authorities
said he took them across the state line into Sumter National Forest,
where he killed them. Their bodies had been doused with gasoline and
set afire in the family's van. The van had been driven into a tree in
what police called a botched attempt to stage an accident. Linda
Williams had been beaten to death; Shaun strangled.
Williams was arrested the next year after trying to
collect on $525,000 in life insurance policies.
Williams and his family had been living in Georgia,
about 10 miles west of the South Carolina border. Williams had told
authorities that he last saw his family when they went shopping the
morning their bodies were discovered. Investigator Don Bullock said
that shortly after the deaths, Williams' plan became apparent: The
disability money he'd been living off was about to run out, and his
wife was planning to leave him and return to her parents in Florida.
Williams took out life insurance policies totaling
more than half a million dollars on his wife and their son. "I think
he panicked," Bullock said recently. "He decided to take his family
out. ... I think he had a plan, but it wasn't ready. He found out she
was leaving, so he had to act fast."
In the more than 15 years since his conviction,
Williams had exhausted his state and federal appeals. Only eight other
inmates have been on South Carolina's death row longer.
Convicted murderer Williams
executed
By Jennifer Miller - Aiken
Standard
February 21, 2009
COLUMBIA -- Without opening his eyes or flinching
more than a small facial muscle, Luke Williams was executed Friday
night, 18 years after he killed his wife and son. The 56-year-old
chose not to make a final statement before he was administered the
drug cocktail that would kill him.
Williams lay motionless on the steel table in the
death chamber. He was strapped to the table with his left arm
stretched out to the side for the needles that carried the drugs into
his body. The tubes carrying the drugs flinched slightly as the liquid
began flowing at 6 p.m. Within seconds Williams eye lids lightly
fluttered and lips parted slightly as he appeared to snore. By 6:02
p.m. his breathing appeared to stop. At 6:04 p.m. a prison official
walked to the table for a closer look then walked back to the corner.
A few minutes later the official checked again and summoned a doctor
who check his pupils and heartbeat. The doctor nodded at the prison
officials who then pronounced him dead at 6:13 p.m.
Williams was convicted on killing his wife Linda,
39, and their 12-year-old son Shaun in June 1991. Linda had been
beaten to death. Shaun was strangled. Their bodies were doused with
gasoline and set afire in the family van, which was driven into a tree
in the Sumter National Forest in Edgefield County. Police said it was
a botched attempt to make their deaths look like an accident.
The motive was money, authorities said. Shortly
before the murders, Williams took out $525,000 in life insurance on
his family. He was unemployed at the time and was receiving workman's
compensation for an on-the-job injury. He was taking classes at
Augusta Technical Institute.
For his last meal Williams requested fried chicken,
steak, a baked potato with sour cream and butter, tossed salad,
cranberry sauce, peach cobbler, fried turkey and ketchup, according to
Josh Gelinas, Communications Director for the state Department of
Corrections.
Linda's mother, Dora Azrak, said Friday night she
was relieved that Williams had finally been executed. But it was a
tough day for her while she waited on word at her Florida home. "It
just brings back all these memories." She's looking for closure now. "I'm
just hoping I will get better," she said. Since the murders she's been
depressed. And it was hard knowing that for two years after the
murders Williams was free.
It took authorities about a year to arrest him, and
he was free on bond until his trial in 1993.
Williams only visitor Friday was his attorney,
David Bruck of Virginia, who also witnessed the execution. There were
no members of either Williams' or his wife's families at Broad River
Run Correctional Institution on Friday. Former Edgefield County
Sheriff's Investigator Don Bullock, who helped make the case against
Williams, was a witness along with three members of the media.
Linda Williams was a teacher's aide for a
kindergarten class at Belair Elementary School in Columbia County.
Shaun attended Lakeside Middle. The family lived in the Bridlewood
subdivision off Fury's Ferry Road in Evans.
Williams told police he last saw his wife and son
when they left their home about 7 a.m. June 19, 1991 for a shopping
trip in Edgefield and Aiken. However, according to court testimony
Linda was dressed in an oversized T-shirt, sweat pants and no bra when
she was found. The van was found about eight miles from the family
home.
In the 15 years since his conviction, Williams had
exhausted all his state and federal appeals. Only eight other inmates
have been on South Carolina's death row longer. The longest, 50-year-old
Edward L. Elmore, began serving a sentence for murder in 1982. His
execution was the 282nd in South Carolina since 1912.
S.C. man set to die for killing
family for insurance
By Meg Kinnard - Greensburg
Times
Associated Press - Thursday,
February 19, 2009
COLUMBIA, S.C. - Investigator Don Bullock made a
promise nearly two decades ago: He would watch Luke Williams die for
killing his wife and son in a failed attempt to collect life insurance.
Barring an unexpected development, Bullock will make good on that
promise Friday, when South Carolina is set to execute Williams for the
deaths of 39-year-old Linda Williams and 12-year-old Shaun Williams.
Their bodies were found in June 1991 in Sumter
National Forest, where they had been doused with gasoline and set
ablaze in the family’s van. The van had been driven into a tree in
what police called a botched attempt to stage an accident. Linda
Williams had been beaten to death, Shaun strangled. Williams was
arrested the next year after trying to collect on $525,000 life
insurance policies.
Bullock, a retired investigator with the Edgefield
County Sheriff’s Office who spent hours interrogating him, says he
never cooperated with investigators or expressed remorse. “He never
did get upset, he never did cry — nothing like that,” Bullock says.
“He was very, very cold.” Now, authorities say, Williams has exhausted
his state and federal appeals.
He has also sued over the legality of lethal
injection, and a South Carolina federal judge denied his request to
delay execution while that case goes forward. A federal appeals judge
turned down Williams’ appeal of that decision, and his attorneys on
Thursday petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider. It was not
clear when the high court would rule.
Williams and his family had been living in Georgia,
about 10 miles west of the South Carolina border. Williams, now 56,
had told authorities he last saw his family when they went shopping
the morning their bodies were discovered. Shortly after the deaths,
Bullock said, Williams’ plan became apparent: The disability money off
of which he had been living was set to run out, and his wife was
planning to leave him and return to her parents in Florida.
Williams took out life insurance policies totaling
more than half a million dollars on his wife and son, an El Salvador
native orphaned during that country’s civil war. “I think he panicked,”
Bullock says. “He decided to take his family out. ... I think he had a
plan, but it wasn’t ready. He found out she was leaving, so he had to
act fast.”
In the more than 15 years since his conviction,
Williams has exhausted his state and federal appeals. Only eight other
inmates have been on South Carolina’s death row longer. The longest,
50-year-old Edward L. Elmore, began serving a sentence for murder in
1982.
Bullock said he’s ready to see Williams die. “I
told him I’d be there. I promised him I’d be there,” Bullock said. “I
just want to finalize it.”
Luke Williams: a killer’s
execution that almost didn’t happen
By Rob Pavey - Augusta
Chronicle
February 22, 2009
Almost 18 years after the bodies of Linda Williams
and her son Shaun were found in their van in Sumter National Forest,
justice finally caught up with the man who murdered them. What you’re
about to read is the true story of how it almost didn’t happen.
Friday’s execution of Luke Williams III was carried
out quietly—and humanely—by a lethal injection of drugs and sedatives,
even though his victims—his own wife and son—died a much more violent
death.
Linda, a teaching assistant at Bel Air Elementary,
was pummeled with fists until she lost consciousness and died. Her
nose and cheekbones were shattered. Her lips and face were cut open
and her jaw was broken. Bruises on her wrists and arms showed she
tried in vain to defend herself.
Their 12-year-old son, an adopted orphan from El
Salvador and rising seventh grader at Lakeside Middle School, was
strangled, perhaps after witnessing his mother’s violent death. It was
one of the most notorious murder cases in Columbia County history.
It all started very late the night of June 18,
1991, at the family’s home at 886 Hunting Horn Way East in Bridlewood
subdivision, off Fury’s Ferry Road. The next morning, the family
minivan was found in Edgefield County, where it had been driven into a
tree and set afire. The killer’s intent, police concluded, was that
the van would explode into flames and appear to be nothing more than a
horrific traffic accident. But Mr. Williams made a critical mistake:
after dousing the bodies of his wife and child with gasoline and
setting them afire, he closed the van’s door with its windows rolled
up.
Soon after he left, the fire burned itself out for
lack of oxygen. The bodies were intact enough to tell their story to
investigators. Police knew there was a killer on the loose, but there
were no arrests. For the better part of a year, it was an open case—a
whodunit of epic proportions involving a double homicide that Georgia
and South Carolina authorities each thought should belong in the
neighboring state’s jurisdiction.
Months into the investigation, a break emerged from
an unlikely source: insurance adjustors came to town asking questions
about a claim involving a fatal traffic “accident” for which a sizable
sum was to be paid. It came to light that Mr. Williams had secretly
insured his wife and child just weeks before their deaths. The
combined payout from several policies was $525,000 and Mr. Williams
was the sole beneficiary.
A closer look at the unemployed husband and father
revealed he had a history of living off insurance settlements for
injuries and accidents. He was out of money and had filed for
bankruptcy protection. Police also learned Linda had contacted United
Way’s Help Line a few days before her death and was referred to Safe
Homes Inc., a shelter for battered women. The shelter’s phone number,
scrawled on a torn slip of paper, was still in her purse when her body
was removed from the burned out van.
Just two weeks shy of the one-year anniversary of
the tragedy, police finally took Mr. Williams into custody on two
counts of murder. He had been free all those months, and remained free
on bond for another 18 months until his trial began in autumn of 1993.
The case was to be tried in Edgefield and Prosecutor Donnie Myers did
not hesitate to seek the death penalty.
Although evidence produced by the state in the 11-day
trial was mostly circumstantial, it was also compelling enough to
leave no doubt that Mr. Williams was the only person who could have
carried out such a treacherous crime. But there was one primary
problem in the quest to deliver justice for Linda and Shaun: the
murder trial was held in Edgefield County, where their bodies were
found. Defense lawyers pointed out repeatedly that blood and other
evidence from the family’s house in Bridlewood indicated the murders
occurred in Columbia County, not in South Carolina, which meant
Edgefield had no jurisdiction in the case. The prosecution had little
to counter such arguments but moved ahead with the case as best they
could.
After 23 witnesses had completed their testimony,
and the prosecution rested, the defense made a surprise announcement
on the morning of the trial’s ninth day: they rested their case
without calling any of the three dozen defense witnesses they had
subpoenaed to testify. The reason: Mr. Williams’ lawyers were so
confident the state had not proven the murders occurred in Edgefield
County that the jury would have no choice but to acquit their client.
Mr. Williams’ lawyer, citing a series of indisputable legal precedents,
then petitioned the trial judge to formally instruct jurors that they
must acquit Mr. Williams unless there was proof the killings occurred
in Sumter National Forest.
The judge, over the objections of the prosecutor,
reluctantly agreed. Just before deliberations were to begin, he turned
to the jury and told them they must conclude the ``fatal blows’’ were
``struck in Edgefield County, S.C.,’’ in order to find the defendant
guilty. As jurors retired to deliberate, Mr. Williams was likely
thinking his chances of acquittal were good, but he was in for a big
surprise. Six hours and 12 minutes later, they returned with guilty
verdicts on both counts. After a separate phase of the trial in which
Mr. Williams begged jurors to spare his life, it took them barely 90
minutes to impose the death penalty.
So what actually happened in that jury room? If
you’ve read this far into my story, you’ve likely figured out I was
the reporter who covered that trial so long ago. Was it possible—or
perhaps likely—that Linda and Shaun were killed at their home in
Columbia County? Could the jury have ignored a technicality of the law
in order to prevent a killer from going free?
They may have. Edgefield is a quiet town with
mostly law-abiding folks with little tolerance for people who murder
women and children. “We did our job,” one of the jurors told me. “It’s
what we were supposed to do.” The case was appealed all the way to the
S.C. Supreme Court, where justices eventually declined to second-guess
a jury’s finding of where the deaths occurred.
During the appeals process, one of the high court’s
justices pointed out a shred of irony that could have bolstered the
state’s case: Mr. Williams, in a notarized document he submitted in
his attempt to claim the insurance payout, was asked to specify the
“location of death.” He wrote, “Edgefield County. S.C.”
The appeal for a new trial was denied, and the
jury’s decision was kept intact. Last Friday, at 6:13 p.m., Mr.
Williams was pronounced dead and the sad case came to a close.
In a different town, with a different jury, the
outcome could have been vastly different. Had that happened, the ghost
of a little boy who never had the opportunity to grow up would remain
restless and unsatisfied, and an unrepentant killer would have moved
on to other victims. Perhaps now everyone can rest in peace.
Murders had long lasting impact
By Jennifer Miller - Aiken
Standard
February 20, 2009
If Dora Azrak could ask condemned killer Luke
Williams one question before he's executed tonight it would be "Why?"
"Why, Luke? She was a good wife to you. And Shaun. Why Shaun?" she
said Thursday from her Florida home.
Linda Azrak Williams was her only daughter. Shaun,
12, was her oldest grandchild. At 6 p.m. today Luke Williams is
scheduled to die by lethal injection for their 1991 murders.
Linda was 39 and had been married to Luke for 17
years. The couple had adopted Shaun when he was 2 after he was
orphaned during civil wars in El Salvador.
It's been 18 years since the killings. Linda had
been beaten to death. Shaun was strangled. Their bodies were doused
with gasoline and set afire in the family van, which was driven into a
tree in the Sumter National Forest in Edgefield County. Police said it
was a botched attempt to make their deaths look like an accident. The
motive was money. Shortly before the murders, Luke took out $584,000
in life insurance on his family.
Dora isn't coming to Columbia for the execution.
Neither is her son. She isn't in good health and her doctor's advised
against it. Three years ago she lost her husband Fred who had pushed
authorities to arrest Luke for his daughter and grandson's murders. "It
killed him," she said. "It's been almost 18 years and it hasn't gotten
any better."
Fred and Dora's life were filled with tragedy. In
1967 Fred's brother George was killed while working as a border patrol
inspector in California. George and another officer stopped a vehicle
carrying more than 800 pounds of marijuana. The men were overpowered
by four convicted felons and taken to a remote mountain cabin. The
officers were handcuffed together and shot, according to the U.S
Department of Homeland Security website. Today Border Patrol has a
special award honoring the men -- the Newton-Azrak Award.
Dora's voice lightens when she talks about Linda
and Shaun. Linda was a teacher's aide for a kindergarten class. She
was a good daughter who loved her son. Linda was the breadwinner in
the family. Luke was on disability and at the time of the killings was
taking classes. Dora's 14-year-old granddaughter Lindsey is named for
Linda. "She's the spitting image of Linda."
Shaun, she said, was a precious child. "He would
take my face and hold it and say 'I love you Grandma." He was smart
and talked about being an architect when he grew up. "He told me 'I'm
going to build you a house and you're going to live in it.' I said 'Why,
to clean it?' He said 'No, to live in it with me.'" Those are the good
memories. Her memories of Luke aren't so good. "He is a monster."
Fred didn't like Luke and begged Linda not to marry
him. "But she was 22 and we couldn't tell her anything." When the
Williams lived near the Azrak's in Florida they had dinner together
every week. And later when the couple ran into serious financial
problems it was the Azrak's who gave them money.
When Luke and Linda lived in Alabama they needed
money to get by while they sold their house. Fred and Dora took out an
$18,000 loan on their home to give to the Williams, she said. Linda
promised to pay the money back as soon as the house sold and even
brought a check to her parents. Luke didn't want to pay them back and
the couple fought over the money. "He was the type that would take
anything from anybody," she said.
She doesn't know what she'll do at 6 p.m. tonight.
She asked for reports of what Luke's final words are and for what
happens during the execution. "I never dreamed it would be so hard."
ProDeathPenalty.com
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on Wednesday, June 19,
1991, the bodies of Linda Williams and Shaun Williams were discovered
inside the family van in a forest in Edgefield County, South Carolina,
approximately six miles from their home near Augusta, Georgia. The
front bumper of the van was against a tree, and fire had partially
damaged the vehicle. The investigators detected a strong odor of
gasoline and found several metal cans containing gasoline inside the
van. Linda was discovered in the driver’s seat, which was positioned
so far back that her feet could not reach the pedals, and Shaun was
seated in the front passenger seat. Blood was found on a piece of PVC
pipe on the van’s floorboard.
Linda was dressed in a gray t-shirt, gray
sweatpants pulled down to her upper thigh, light pink socks, nylon
panties, and she was not wearing a bra or shoes. Shaun was also
shoeless and was wearing a t-shirt and sweatpants. Linda suffered a
black eye, a contusion on the bridge of her nose, contusions on her
left forearm, and abrasions on her left shoulder. These injuries were
consistent with having been caused by a human fist. The autopsy
revealed that Linda’s cause of death was blunt head trauma due to a
beating. Shaun suffered a bruise to his forehead, as well as abrasions
to his chin, back, and right side of his neck. His cause of death was
asphyxiation due to manual strangulation. Wounds created by the fire
were postmortem.
Although the deaths occurred within the same time
frame, a specific time of death was not determined. At trial, several
friends of Linda testified that she always dressed neatly and would
not go out in public dressed in a t-shirt without a bra. Additionally,
they stated that because Linda was short in stature, she always
positioned the driver’s seat of the van close to the steering wheel.
One friend stated that she last spoke with Linda by telephone at 2:50
p.m. on June 18, 1991.
A neighbor testified that on June 19, 1991, a car
drove into the driveway at Williams’ home between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m.
At approximately 7:00 a.m. on June 19, 1991, Linda’s van was not
parked in the driveway. A bath towel and Shaun’s tennis shoes with
blood stains on them were found at Williams’ home. In addition,
Williams’ right hand was severely bruised and swollen — this injury
was consistent with having occurred on June 19th.
Williams told a friend that on the day of the
homicides, Linda and Shaun were planning to go shopping at Columbia
Mall in Columbia, South Carolina. Prior to receiving the autopsy
results, Williams informed the friend that Linda had been beaten to
death, and Shaun had been strangled with a plastic wire wrap similar
to wire wrap Shaun had in his bedroom. When asked if he killed Linda
and Shaun, Williams did not respond.
Williams and Linda were experiencing significant
marital and financial difficulties. Neighbors and friends stated that
they frequently overheard Williams and Linda engaging in hostile
arguments. One neighbor testified that she heard a "loud thump" during
one of the arguments.
In addition, Williams and Linda had declared
bankruptcy, and foreclosure proceedings had been initiated against
their home. Williams had substantially increased life insurance
benefits on Linda and Shaun during May of 1991, designating himself as
beneficiary. On May 7, 1991, Williams upgraded existing policies with
Allstate Insurance Company to include auto related death benefits in
the amounts of $100,000 for Linda and $20,000 for Shaun. Williams
forged Linda’s name on the enrollment form. After their deaths,
Williams made claims under two Allstate policies in the amounts of
$200,000 on Linda and $45,000 on Shaun.
Williams also took out new life insurance policies
for Linda and Shaun with State Farm Insurance Company effective May
30, 1991, providing Linda with death benefit insurance in the amount
of $250,000 and Shaun with $25,000 in death benefit insurance.
Williams applied for $500,000 in death benefit insurance for Linda;
however, until the policy was approved a binder limited the amount of
coverage to $250,000.
Williams indicated on the claims forms that Linda
and Shaun had died in Edgefield County, South Carolina.
Shaun was an orphan from El Salvador who had been
adopted by the Williams couple, and was an honor student in the 7th
grade at the time of his murder. Linda's mother Dora Azrak said that
from the moment she heard the news of her daughter’s death she knew
who was responsible. “I said 'Luke killed her. Call the police and
tell them Luke killed her.' That's what I told my son. I knew. I knew.
I knew,” she said. “I can't get over it. I loved my daughter very,
very much and I miss her every day.”
State v. Williams,
321 S.C. 327, 468 S.E.2d 626 (S.C. 1996) (Direct Appeal).
Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court,
Edgefield County, Luke N. Brown, Jr., Special Judge, of murdering his
wife and adopted son, and he was sentenced to death. He appealed. The
Supreme Court, Burnett, J., held that: (1) sufficient evidence
supported conviction and imposition of death penalty; (2) evidence
that there were marijuana growers in the area was properly excluded;
(3) admission of evidence of marital discord was properly admitted;
(4) court was not required to charge jury on parole minimums; and (5)
photographs of bodies were admissible. Affirmed.
BURNETT, Justice:
In this death penalty case, Appellant Luke A.
Williams (Williams) was convicted of murdering his wife and twelve-year-old
adopted son. We affirm.
FACTS
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on Wednesday, June 19,
1991, the bodies of Linda Williams (Wife) and Shawn Williams (Son)
were discovered inside the family van in a forest in Edgefield County,
South Carolina, approximately six miles from their home near Augusta,
Georgia. The front bumper of the van was against a tree, and fire had
partially damaged the vehicle. The investigators detected a strong
odor of gasoline and found several metal cans containing gasoline
inside the van. Wife was discovered in the driver's seat, which was
positioned so far back that her feet could not reach the pedals, and
Son was seated in the front passenger seat. Blood was found on a piece
of PVC pipe on the van's floorboard. Wife was dressed in a gray t-shirt,
gray sweatpants pulled down to her upper thigh, light pink socks,
nylon panties, and she was not wearing a bra or shoes. Son was also
shoeless and was wearing a t-shirt and sweatpants.
Wife suffered a black eye, a contusion on the
bridge of her nose, contusions on her left forearm, and abrasions on
her left shoulder. These injuries were consistent with having been
caused by a human fist. The autopsy revealed that Wife's cause of
death was blunt head trauma due to a beating. Son suffered a bruise to
his forehead, as well as abrasions to his chin, back, and right side
of his neck. His cause of death was asphyxiation due to manual
strangulation. Wounds created by the fire were postmortem. Although
the deaths occurred within the same time frame, a specific time of
death was not determined.
At trial, several friends of Wife testified that
she always dressed neatly and would not go out in public dressed in a
t-shirt without a bra. Additionally, they stated that because Wife was
short in stature, she always positioned the driver's seat of the van
close to the steering wheel. One friend stated that she last spoke
with Wife by telephone at 2:50 p.m. on June 18, 1991. A neighbor
testified that on June 19, 1991, a car drove into the driveway at
Williams' home between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. Further testimony
established that at approximately 7:00 a.m. on June 19, 1991, Wife's
van was not parked in the driveway.
A bath towel and Son's tennis shoes with blood
stains on them were found at Williams' home. In addition, Williams'
right hand was severely bruised and swollen-this injury was consistent
with having occurred on June 19th. Williams told a friend that on the
day of the homicides, Wife and Son were planning to go shopping at
Columbia Mall in Columbia, South Carolina. Prior to receiving the
autopsy results, Williams informed the friend that Wife had been
beaten to death, and Son had been strangled with a plastic wire wrap
similar to wire wrap Son had in his bedroom. When asked if he killed
Wife and Son, Williams did not respond.
Williams and Wife were experiencing significant
marital and financial difficulties. Neighbors and friends stated that
they frequently overheard Williams and Wife engaging in hostile
arguments. One neighbor testified that she heard a “loud thump” during
one of the arguments. In addition, Williams and Wife had declared
bankruptcy, and foreclosure proceedings had been initiated against
their home.
Williams had substantially increased life insurance
benefits on Wife and Son during May of 1991, designating himself as
beneficiary. On May 7, 1991, Williams upgraded existing policies with
Allstate Insurance Company to include auto related death benefits in
the amounts of $100,000 for Wife and $20,000 for Son. Williams forged
Wife's name on the enrollment form. After their deaths, Williams made
claims under two Allstate policies in the amounts of $200,000 on Wife
and $45,000 on Son. Williams also took out new life insurance policies
for Wife and Son with State Farm Insurance Company effective May 30,
1991, providing Wife with death benefit insurance in the amount of
$250,000 and Son with $25,000 in death benefit insurance.FN1 Williams
indicated on the claims forms that Wife and Son had died in Edgefield
County, South Carolina.
FN1. Williams applied for $500,000 in death benefit
insurance for Wife; however, until the policy was approved, a binder
limited the amount of coverage to $250,000.
At the conclusion of the State's case, counsel for
Williams moved for a directed verdict maintaining that there was
insufficient evidence linking Williams to the murders, that venue in
Edgefield County was not established, and that the circuit court
lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The motions were
denied, after which Williams waived his right to testify and present a
final argument. The jury found Williams guilty of murder. He was
sentenced to death after the jury determined the existence of two
statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) Williams committed the
murders to receive money or a thing of monetary value; and (2) two or
more persons were murdered.
DISCUSSION
I. Denial of the Motion for a Directed Verdict
Based Upon Lack of Evidence.
Williams contends the trial court erred in refusing
to direct a verdict in his favor because the evidence failed to link
him to the homicides. We disagree.
The trial court has a duty to submit the case to
the jury where the evidence is circumstantial if there is any
substantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the
accused or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced.
State v. Williams, 303 S.C. 274, 400 S.E.2d 131 (1991); State v.
Edwards, 298 S.C. 272, 379 S.E.2d 888 (1989). In ruling on a motion
for a directed verdict, the trial judge is concerned with the
existence of evidence, not with its weight. State v. Edwards, supra.
When this Court reviews the denial of a motion for a directed verdict,
it views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, and if there is any direct or substantial circumstantial
evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused,
refusal by the trial judge to direct a verdict is not error. State v.
Stokes, 299 S.C. 483, 386 S.E.2d 241 (1989); State v. Edwards, supra;
State v. Irvin, 270 S.C. 539, 243 S.E.2d 195 (1978).
The record provides evidence from which Williams'
guilt could fairly and logically be deduced: (1) Williams and Wife
were having severe marital as well as financial difficulties; (2)
Williams substantially increased life insurance benefits for Wife and
Son during the month prior to the homicides and made himself the
beneficiary, and the resulting death benefits would remedy Williams'
poor financial situation; (3) Williams forged Wife's name to insurance
forms; (4) no motive for robbery was established, and it appeared from
the way the victims were dressed and placed in the van that they had
been forced from their home suddenly; (5) shortly after the homicides,
Williams did not deny killing Wife and Son; (6) Williams knew details
about the homicides prior to receiving results from the autopsy
reports; (7) Williams' hand was injured and Wife's injuries were
consistent with having been caused by a human fist; and (8) a towel
and shoes were found at Williams' residence on which human blood was
discovered. Accordingly, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to
submit this matter to the jury.
II. Denial of the Motion for a
Directed Verdict With Respect to Venue and Jurisdiction.
Williams asserts he was entitled to a directed
verdict because there was insufficient evidence to establish that the
homicides occurred in Edgefield County, South Carolina. Therefore, he
maintains that Edgefield County was without venue, and the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction over him. We disagree.
A criminal defendant is entitled to a directed
verdict when the State fails to present evidence that the offense was
committed in the county alleged in the indictment. State v. Evans, 307
S.C. 477, 415 S.E.2d 816 (1992); State v. McCoy, 98 S.C. 133, 82 S.E.
280 (1914). For the purpose of establishing jurisdiction in a criminal
prosecution, it is not necessary that the county in which the crime
was committed be proved affirmatively if there is sufficient evidence
from which it can be inferred. State v. McLeod, 303 S.C. 420, 401 S.E.2d
175 (1991); State v. Wharton, 263 S.C. 437, 211 S.E.2d 237 (1975);
State v. Henderson, 285 S.C. 320, 329 S.E.2d 448 (Ct.App.1985).
Moreover, venue, like jurisdiction, in a criminal
case need not be affirmatively proved, and circumstantial evidence of
venue, though slight, is sufficient to establish jurisdiction. State
v. Owens, 293 S.C. 161, 359 S.E.2d 275 (1987); Wray v. State, 288 S.C.
474, 343 S.E.2d 617 (1986); State v. Wharton, supra. Generally, it can
be inferred that the crime was committed in the state as well as
county where the body is found. United States v. Rees, 193 F.Supp. 849
(D.Md.1961). Furthermore, where some acts material to the offense, and
requisite to its consummation, occur in one county, and some in
another, venue is proper in either county. State v. McLeod, supra;
State v. Gasque, 241 S.C. 316, 128 S.E.2d 154 (1962).
Although there is evidence that some of the acts
material to the homicides may have been committed in Georgia, the
deaths occurred sometime between the time the victims were last seen
in Georgia and the time the fire started in the van in South Carolina.
Because both bodies were found in Edgefield County, we conclude there
was sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could reasonably
infer that the victims died there. Moreover, Williams signed insurance
documents conceding that Wife and Son died in Edgefield County.
Accordingly, we find that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence,
although not conclusive, to support the inference that the victims
died in Edgefield County, South Carolina, and Williams was not
entitled to a directed verdict.
III. Proffer of Evidence.
At trial, Williams proffered evidence that there
were marijuana manufacturers in the area where the bodies were found
who had subsequently threatened the lives of a confidential informant
and a narcotics agent. Williams maintains that because these men had
the motive and opportunity to kill the victims, the circuit court
erred in refusing to allow him to introduce this evidence to create a
reasonable doubt of his guilt. We disagree. We have held that:
[E]vidence offered by accused as to the commission
of the crime by another person must be limited to such facts as are
inconsistent with his own guilt, and to such facts as raise a
reasonable inference or presumption as to his own innocence; evidence
which can have (no) other effect than to cast a bare suspicion upon
another, or to raise a conjectural inference as to the commission of
the crime by another, is not admissible.... But before such testimony
can be received, there must be such proof of connection with it, such
a train of facts or circumstances, as tends clearly to point out such
other person as the guilty party.
Remote acts, disconnected and outside the crime
itself, cannot be separately proved for such a purpose. An orderly and
unbiased judicial inquiry as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant
on trial does not contemplate that such defendant be permitted, by way
of defense, to indulge in the conjectural inferences that some other
person might have committed the offense for which he is on trial, or
by fanciful analogy to say to the jury that someone other than he is
more probably guilty. State v. Gregory, 198 S.C. 98, 104-05, 16 S.E.2d
532, 534-35 (1941). See also State v. Southerland, 316 S.C. 377, 447
S.E.2d 862 (1994); State v. Parker, 294 S.C. 465, 366 S.E.2d 10
(1988).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the
evidence offered by Williams failed to establish that the persons
arrested for growing marijuana had any connection whatsoever to the
homicides. Hence, the drug offenses were isolated from the homicides,
and evidence pertaining to them should not have been admitted to
insinuate that someone other than Williams could have murdered the
victims. Accordingly, because Williams failed to show that the
proffered evidence was inconsistent with his guilt, the circuit court
exercised sound discretion in excluding it.
IV. Admission of Evidence of Marital Discord.
Williams maintains that he is entitled to a new
trial because the details about prior marital difficulties should not
have been admitted. He specifically asserts that testimony referring
to a telephone conversation he had with Wife concerning a bill was
prejudicial and inadmissible. In addition, he contends that the
following colloquy between the Solicitor and a witness and the
Solicitor's subsequent references to it prejudiced his case: A. Well,
one time I heard a loud thump but I didn't know what it was. Q. What
do you mean by a loud thump? A. Like something was knocked over. Q.
Coming from inside the house? A. From inside the house. Q. Now would
this be during the daylight hours or nighttime or what? A. This was
during the day. Well, it wasn't real late. It was somewhere between 5
o'clock in the evenin' time. Q. A loud thump noise.
In homicide cases, although evidence of previous
quarrels and ill feelings or hostile acts between parties is
admissible to show that animus probably existed between the parties at
the time of the homicide, the details of the difficulties should be
excluded. State v. Clinkscales, 231 S.C. 650, 99 S.E.2d 663 (1957) (details
relating that husband had previously shot his wife in the back with a
shotgun were held to be inadmissible).
The evidence presented did not detail the problems
of the marriage, but merely established that there was animus between
Williams and Wife. Although references to loud altercations and
controversial telephone conversations between the couple established
that their relationship was strained, specific details of the marital
disputes were not revealed. Furthermore, references to the fact that
“something” was knocked over inside the house does not qualify as a
detailed description of a marital problem. Accordingly, we find no
error in the admission of this evidence.
V. Refusal of the Request to Charge.
Williams argues that the circuit court neither
charged the jury on parole minimums nor did it charge the jury that
the term life imprisonment was to be understood in its ordinary and
plain meaning.
Williams first contends that the circuit court
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in refusing to instruct
the jury that if they sentenced him to life without an aggravating
circumstance, he would serve a minimum of twenty years without parole,
and if they found an aggravating circumstance, he would serve a
minimum of thirty years without parole.
Under the Eighth Amendment,FN2 States cannot limit
the sentencer's consideration of any relevant circumstance which could
cause the jury to decline to impose the death penalty. Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991); State
v. Stewart, 288 S.C. 232, 341 S.E.2d 789 (1986). The United States
Supreme Court has “deferred to the State's choice of substantive
factors relevant to the penalty determination.” California v. Ramos,
463 U.S 992, 1001, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3453, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983).
Therefore, whether parole eligibility is relevant to the sentencing
determination is a matter of state law. Id. We have determined parole
eligibility is not relevant to a jury's sentencing considerations.
State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991) (Chandler, A.J.,
concurring); State v. Davis, 306 S.C. 246, 411 S.E.2d 220 (1991). We
therefore conclude that the Eighth Amendment was not violated. FN2.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Nevertheless, under the Fourteenth Amendment,FN3
when the State places the defendant's future dangerousness at issue,
and the only available alternative sentence to the death penalty is
life imprisonment without parole, due process entitles the defendant
to inform the jury that he is parole ineligible. Simmons v. State, 512
U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994). However, Simmons is
inapplicable in this case because the State did not rely upon Williams'
future dangerousness as a justification for the jury to impose the
death penalty. See State v. Tucker, 319 S.C. 425, 462 S.E.2d 263
(1995); State v. Young, 319 S.C. 33, 459 S.E.2d 84 (1995); State v.
Southerland, supra. FN3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Next, Williams contends the circuit court should
have charged the jury that the term life imprisonment is to be
understood in its ordinary and plain meaning. If a capital defendant
requests it, a charge must be given at the sentencing phase that the
life imprisonment means imprisonment for life. State v. Davis, supra;
State v. Atkins, 293 S.C. 294, 360 S.E.2d 302 (1987). According to our
review of the record, Williams did not request a plain meaning charge.
Moreover, because Williams failed to object to the trial judge's
instructions, this issue is not preserved. State v. Torrence, supra (a
contemporaneous objection must be made to preserve error).
VI. Admission of Photographs.
Williams asserts error in the admission during the
sentencing phase of five close-up autopsy photographs of the victims.
Three photos illustrated the wounds to Son's neck and face. The two
other photos portrayed the wounds to Wife's forearm and injuries to
her face and shoulder. Williams argues that the photos were admitted
to inflame the passions of the jury. We disagree.
Photographs of the victim's body are admissible in
the sentencing phase of a capital trial to show the circumstances of
the crime and the character of the defendant. State v. Kornahrens, 290
S.C. 281, 350 S.E.2d 180 (1986). The trial judge must balance the
prejudicial effect of the photographs against their probative value.
However, the scope of the probative value is much broader during the
sentencing phase. Id.
Although the admitted photographs were taken during
the autopsy rather than at the scene, they are not unnecessarily
gruesome. The photographs merely illustrate the nature of the bruises
on the victims' bodies. Moreover, they depict the manner in which the
homicides were committed, thus, corroborating testimony given during
the sentencing phase. Accordingly, we find no error in their admission.
VII. Upholding of the Death Sentence.
Williams contends that when determining his guilt
the jury relied on circumstantial evidence which was too unreliable to
uphold a death sentence consonant with the Eighth Amendment. We
disagree.
We have held that a conviction and sentence of
death based upon circumstantial evidence is not improper. State v.
Owens, supra. Furthermore, in several other cases, courts have
determined that circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to sustain
the imposition of capital punishment: People v. Hawkins, 10 Cal.4th
920, 897 P.2d 574, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 (1995) (imposition of death
penalty for murder conviction based on circumstantial evidence is not
unconstitutional); People v. Alcala, 4 Cal.4th 742, 842 P.2d 1192, 15
Cal.Rptr.2d 432 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 877, 114 S.Ct. 215, 126
L.Ed.2d 171 (1993) (imposing the death penalty is not cruel and
unusual punishment even though the conviction rests in part upon
circumstantial evidence); Boggess v. State, 855 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.Crim.App.1989),
vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 915, 109 S.Ct. 3237, 106 L.Ed.2d
585 (1989), on remand, 855 S.W.2d 645 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), cert.
denied, 509 U.S. 921, 113 S.Ct. 3034, 125 L.Ed.2d 721 (1993) (circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to support defendant's sentence to death);
Nelson v. State, 247 Ga. 172, 274 S.E.2d 317 (1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 882, 102 S.Ct. 365, 70 L.Ed.2d 192 (1981) (imposition of death
penalty based upon circumstantial evidence is not unconstitutional).
As previously addressed, the following
circumstantial evidence existed from which the jury could conclude
that Williams had the motive, means, and opportunity to perform the
homicides: Williams and Wife were having severe marital as well as
financial difficulties; Williams substantially increased life
insurance benefits for Wife and Son immediately prior to the homicides
and made himself the beneficiary-the resulting death benefits would
remedy Williams' poor financial situation; Williams forged Wife's name
to insurance forms; no motive for robbery was established and it
appeared that the victims had been forced from their home suddenly;
shortly after the homicides, Williams did not deny killing Wife and
Son; Williams knew details about the homicides prior to receiving
results from the autopsy reports; Williams' hand was injured and
Wife's injuries were consistent with having been caused by a human
fist; and a towel and shoes on which human blood was found were
discovered at Williams' residence.
While the State offered no evidence directly
connecting Williams with the homicides, we find that the
circumstantial evidence presented sufficiently supported Williams'
conviction and the imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, the
Eighth Amendment was not violated.
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the
death sentence was not a result of passion, prejudice, or other
arbitrary factors and the evidence supports the jury's finding of the
aggravating circumstances. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25(C)(1)-(2) (1985).
The death sentence is not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases. State v. Tucker, supra; State v. Southerland,
supra; State v. Owens, supra; State v. Kornahrens, supra. Accordingly,
Williams' convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED.
Williams v. State,
363 S.C. 341, 611 S.E.2d 232 (S.C. 2005) (PCR).
Background: After affirmance of his murder
convictions and death sentence, 321 S.C. 327, 468 S.E.2d 626,
defendant sought post-conviction relief (PCR). The post-conviction
trial court, Edgefield County, Marc H. Westbrook, J., granted a new
capital sentencing proceeding. Certiorari was granted.
Holdings: The Supreme Court held that: (1) trial
counsel performed deficiently in failing to request instruction, at
sentencing phase of capital murder trial, that the term “life
imprisonment” is to be understood in its plain and ordinary meaning,
but (2) defendant was not prejudiced by the deficient performance, and
thus, counsel was not ineffective. Reversed.
PER CURIAM:
We granted certiorari to review a post-conviction
relief (PCR) order granting respondent a new capital sentencing
proceeding, finding his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
request a “plain and ordinary” meaning jury charge.FN1 We find that
counsel's performance was deficient, but that there is no evidence of
resulting prejudice. We therefore reverse the PCR order.
FN1. It is well settled that a capital defendant is
entitled upon request to a jury charge in the sentencing phase of his
trial that the term life imprisonment is to be understood in its plain
and ordinary meaning. See Southerland v. State, 337 S.C. 610, 524 S.E.2d
833 (1999) (reviewing the history of the “plain meaning” charge).
FACTS
Respondent was convicted of murdering his wife and
his son and received two death sentences. His direct appeal was
affirmed. State v. Williams, 321 S.C. 327, 468 S.E.2d 626 (1996). At
the PCR hearing, trial counsel acknowledged that there was no
strategic or tactical reason why he failed to request a “plain meaning”
charge. The PCR judge granted relief, and the State sought a writ of
certiorari to review that decision.
ISSUE
Whether there is any evidence in the record to
support the PCR judge's finding that respondent received ineffective
assistance of counsel in the sentencing phase of his capital trial?
ANALYSIS
A PCR applicant claiming trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance must demonstrate that (1) counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
(2) but for counsel's error, there is a reasonable probability that
the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984);
Sellers v. State, 362 S.C. 182, 607 S.E.2d 82 (2005). In other words,
the applicant must establish both error and prejudice. Id. On
appellate review, this Court will uphold the PCR judge's findings of
fact and conclusions of law if there is any evidence of probative
value in the record to support them. Id.
The PCR judge found that trial counsel's testimony
established the error prong of the ineffective assistance test. We
agree. He found resulting prejudice from the failure to give “the
plain meaning” charge because: 1) respondent had no prior criminal
record; 2) respondent had been out on bond prior to the trial and
remained out until the guilty verdicts were returned; and 3) the
penalty phase evidence was predominately circumstantial, far from
overwhelming, and the State had primarily relied on this weak evidence
in aggravation during the penalty phase. We disagree.
We have carefully considered whether the record
supports the PCR judge's conclusion that respondent was prejudiced by
the lack of a plain meaning charge, and conclude it does not. While
the factors cited by the PCR judge might support a prejudice finding
in some cases, they do not in the context of this case. The evidence,
albeit circumstantial, showed that respondent and his wife were
experiencing significant marital problems and financial difficulties,
and had in fact declared bankruptcy and seen foreclosure proceedings
initiated against their marital home.
In May 1991, respondent substantially increased
life insurance benefits on his wife and child, naming himself as
beneficiary. He also forged wife's signature on an automobile
insurance form in the course of increasing that coverage. On June 19,
the bodies of respondent's wife and son were found in the family car,
which had been partially burned. The wife had died of blunt head
trauma consistent with that inflicted by a human fist, and son had
been strangled. Respondent had hand injuries consistent with beating,
and told others the causes of death prior to receiving autopsy results.
We do not agree with the PCR judge's
characterization of the evidence of respondent's guilt as weak.
Further, the evidence demonstrated that respondent's motives were
financial gain and the elimination of his domestic problems. Having
achieved what he set out to accomplish, it is not surprising or
meaningful that respondent met the obligations of his bond. Further,
given the nature of these crimes, we find the fact that he had no
prior criminal record irrelevant to the question whether he was
prejudiced by the lack of a “plain meaning” charge.
The jury, by its guilty verdicts, found respondent
planned in cold blood the deaths of his child and his wife, making
arrangements to benefit financially. Further, the “plain meaning”
charge evolved from the Court's concern that capital juries were
speculating about parole eligibility. See Southerland v. State,
footnote 1, supra. There is nothing in this record to indicate that
the jurors in respondent's capital trial were concerned with parole
eligibility, or confused about the meaning of a life sentence. We hold
there is no evidence in the record to support the PCR judge's
conclusion that respondent was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient
performance, that is, that had the jury been given a “plain meaning”
charge there is a reasonable possibility that it would have returned
two life sentences. Sellers v. State, supra.
CONCLUSION
Finding no evidence to support the PCR judge's
conclusion that respondent was prejudiced by the lack of a “plain
meaning” charge, the order granting respondent a new sentencing
proceeding is REVERSED.
Williams v. Ozmint,
494 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2007) (Habeas).
Background: Following affirmance of his state court
murder convictions and death sentence, 321 S.C. 327, 468 S.E.2d 626,
and denial of postconviction relief, petitioner sought writ of habeas
corpus. The United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, Cameron McGowan Currie, J., granted petition. State appealed,
and petitioner cross appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Michael, Circuit
Judge, held that: (1) state court reasonably determined that counsel's
failure to request plain meaning instruction was deficient performance;
(2) state court reasonably determined that capital defendant was not
prejudiced by failure to request instruction; (3) state court
reasonably applied reasonable doubt standard in determining that
evidence was constitutionally sufficient; and (4) state court
reasonably determined that sufficient circumstantial evidence existed
for jury to find that murders occurred in South Carolina, as required
for venue. Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
MICHAEL, Circuit Judge:
Luke A. Williams, III, was convicted and sentenced
to death in South Carolina state court for the 1991 murders of his
wife and son. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed his
conviction and sentence and later denied his application for post-conviction
relief. Thereafter, Williams petitioned for habeas review in federal
court. The district court issued the writ, concluding that Williams
received ineffective assistance when his counsel failed to request a
jury instruction that the term “life imprisonment” should be
understood in its “ordinary and plain meaning.” See State v. Davis,
306 S.C. 246, 411 S.E.2d 220, 222 (1991). The state appeals, and we
must reverse. We conclude that the Supreme Court of South Carolina did
not unreasonably apply Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), when it determined that Williams's
defense was not prejudiced by the lack of a plain meaning instruction.
We also reject Williams's cross-appeal, concluding that the state
supreme court did not unreasonably apply the standards enunciated in
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560
(1979), when it determined that the evidence was sufficient to
establish that Williams committed the murders and that venue was
proper in Edgefield County, South Carolina.
I.
The facts, as recounted by the Supreme Court of
South Carolina in its opinion in Williams's direct appeal, are as
follows:
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on Wednesday, June 19,
1991, the bodies of Linda Williams (Wife) and Shawn Williams (Son)
were discovered inside the family van in a forest in Edgefield County,
South Carolina, approximately six miles from their home near Augusta,
Georgia. The front bumper of the van was against a tree, and fire had
partially damaged the vehicle. The investigators detected a strong
odor of gasoline and found several metal cans containing gasoline
inside the van. Wife was discovered in the driver's seat, which was
positioned so far back that her feet could not reach the pedals, and
Son was seated in the front passenger seat. Blood was found on a piece
of PVC pipe on the van's floorboard. Wife was dressed in a gray t-shirt,
gray sweatpants pulled down to her upper thigh, light pink socks,
nylon panties, and she was not wearing a bra or shoes. Son was also
shoeless and was wearing a t-shirt and sweatpants.
Wife suffered a black eye, a contusion on the
bridge of her nose, contusions on her left forearm, and abrasions on
her left shoulder. These injuries were consistent with having been
caused by a human fist. The autopsy revealed that Wife's cause of
death was blunt head trauma due to a beating. Son suffered a bruise to
his forehead, as well as abrasions to his chin, back, and right side
of his neck. His cause of death was asphyxiation due to manual
strangulation. Wounds created by the fire were postmortem. Although
the deaths occurred within the same time frame, a specific time of
death was not determined.
At trial, several friends of Wife testified that
she always dressed neatly and would not go out in public dressed in a
t-shirt without a bra. Additionally, they stated that because Wife was
short in stature, she always positioned the driver's seat of the van
close to the steering wheel. One friend stated that she last spoke
with Wife by telephone at 2:50 p.m. on June 18, 1991. A neighbor
testified that on June 19, 1991, a car drove into the driveway at
Williams' home between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. Further testimony
established that at approximately 7:00 a.m. on June 19, 1991, Wife's
van was not parked in the driveway.
A bath towel and Son's tennis shoes with blood
stains on them were found at Williams' home. In addition, Williams'
right hand was severely bruised and swollen-this injury was consistent
with having occurred on June 19th. Williams told a friend that on the
day of the homicides, Wife and Son were planning to go shopping at
Columbia Mall in Columbia, South Carolina. Prior to receiving the
autopsy results, Williams informed the friend that Wife had been
beaten to death, and Son had been strangled with a plastic wire wrap
similar to wire wrap Son had in his bedroom. When asked if he killed
Wife and Son, Williams did not respond.
Williams and Wife were experiencing significant
marital and financial difficulties. Neighbors and friends stated that
they frequently overheard Williams and Wife engaging in hostile
arguments. One neighbor testified that she heard a “loud thump” during
one of the arguments. In addition, Williams and Wife had declared
bankruptcy, and foreclosure proceedings had been initiated against
their home.
Williams had substantially increased life insurance
benefits on Wife and Son during May of 1991, designating himself as
beneficiary. On May 7, 1991, Williams upgraded existing policies with
Allstate Insurance Company to include auto related death benefits in
the amounts of $100,000 for Wife and $20,000 for Son. Williams forged
Wife's name on the enrollment form. After their deaths, Williams made
claims under two Allstate policies in the amounts of $200,000 on Wife
and $45,000 on Son.
Williams also took out new life insurance policies
for Wife and Son with State Farm Insurance Company effective May 30,
1991, providing Wife with death benefit insurance in the amount of
$250,000 and Son with $25,000 in death benefit insurance. [Williams
applied for $500,000 in death benefit insurance for Wife; however,
until the policy was approved a binder limited the amount of coverage
to $250,000.] Williams indicated on the claims forms that Wife and Son
had died in Edgefield County, South Carolina. State v. Williams, 321
S.C. 327, 468 S.E.2d 626, 628-29 (1996).
At the conclusion of the state's case, Williams
moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the evidence was
insufficient to convict him of the murders, that Edgefield County,
South Carolina, was not the proper venue, and that the Edgefield
County circuit court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction.
The circuit court denied the motion, and Williams thereafter declined
to testify or present other evidence. The jury returned a guilty
verdict on both charges of murder. In the penalty phase the jury
recommended death sentences, finding two (statutory) aggravating
circumstances: (1) that Williams committed the murders for monetary
gain and (2) that he murdered two or more persons by one act or
pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct.
The circuit court followed the jury's
recommendation and imposed a separate death sentence for each murder.
In his direct appeal to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, Williams
claimed, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to
establish venue and guilt. The state supreme court, in a thorough
opinion, affirmed Williams's convictions and sentences, id., and the
U.S. Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari,
Williams v. South Carolina, 519 U.S. 891, 117 S.Ct. 230, 136 L.Ed.2d
161 (1996).
Williams filed two applications for state post-conviction
relief, the second of which was granted by the circuit court (PCR
court). The PCR court concluded that Williams was denied effective
assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to request a
jury instruction that the term “life imprisonment” should be
understood in its ordinary and plain meaning. According to the PCR
court, the instruction was necessary to ensure that the jury
understood the nature of its life imprisonment option.
The PCR court therefore granted Williams a new
sentencing proceeding. The state then petitioned the Supreme Court of
South Carolina for a writ of certiorari, and that court reversed the
decision of the PCR court. Although the state supreme court concluded
that Williams's counsel was ineffective for failing to request a plain
meaning instruction, it ultimately determined that Williams was not
prejudiced by the deficient performance. Specifically, the court found
“no evidence in the record to support the ... conclusion ... that had
the jury been given a ‘plain meaning’ charge there is a reasonable
possibility it would have [reached a different result and] returned
two life sentences.” J.A. 188.
Next, Williams filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in U.S. District Court, and that court granted relief.
First, the district court agreed with the Supreme Court of South
Carolina that Williams's counsel was ineffective for failing to
request a plain meaning instruction. Second, the court determined that
counsel's ineffectiveness “was reasonably likely to have affected the
outcome of [Williams's] capital sentencing hearing” because, among
other things, Williams's “prior history contained a number of
mitigating factors,” including no criminal record. J.A. 385. The
district court rejected Williams's claim that the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions or South Carolina venue. The
state appeals the award of the writ on Williams's ineffective
assistance claim, and Williams cross-appeals, arguing that the writ
should have been awarded on the additional ground that the evidence
was not sufficient to establish his guilt or proper venue.
II.
When, as in this case, a district court's decision
on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is based on a state court
record, our review is de novo. Frazer v. South Carolina, 430 F.3d 696,
703 (4th Cir.2005). Federal habeas review in this case focuses only on
legal determinations made by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in
adjudicating the merits of claims raised by Williams. Accordingly, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L.
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), provides that a federal writ may
not be issued unless the underlying state court adjudication “resulted
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The
Supreme Court instructs us that “[u]nder § 2254(d)(1)'s ‘unreasonable
application’ clause ... a federal habeas court may not issue the writ
simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that
the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal
law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be
[objectively] unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411,
120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).
III.
A.
Williams contends that he was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to assistance of counsel when his lawyer failed to
request the South Carolina “plain meaning” instruction in his capital
sentencing proceeding. In rejecting Williams's claim, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court
case that sets the standards for judging whether a criminal
defendant's conviction or death sentence must be set aside because
counsel rendered ineffective assistance. A conviction or death
sentence must be set aside when counsel's performance was deficient
and the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687, 104
S.Ct. 2052.
The deficiency inquiry centers on whether counsel's
performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” as
measured by prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
To avoid “the distorting effects of hindsight,” however, “a court must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689, 104
S.Ct. 2052. The defendant (or petitioner) bears the burden of
overcoming this presumption. Id. When counsel's assistance in a
capital sentencing proceeding was deficient, the prejudice inquiry
centers on “whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent [counsel's]
errors, the sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Id.
at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The “totality of the evidence before the judge
or jury” must be considered in making this determination. Id. Our
review convinces us that the Supreme Court of South Carolina did not
engage in an unreasonable application of Strickland when it determined
that although Williams's counsel performed in a deficient manner when
he failed to request the plain meaning instruction, there was no
resulting prejudice.
B.
South Carolina law provides a capital defendant
with the right, invoked by request, to a jury instruction at
sentencing that “the term life imprisonment is to be understood in its
ordinary and plain meaning.” Southerland v. State, 337 S.C. 610, 524
S.E.2d 833, 835 (1999). The instruction is available even if the
defendant might become eligible for parole, and a trial court's
refusal to grant a request for the instruction is reversible error on
direct appeal. Id. at 834. The purpose of the plain meaning
instruction is to ensure that the jury understands its sentencing
options (life imprisonment or death) without speculating about the
possibility of parole. See State v. Norris, 285 S.C. 86, 328 S.E.2d
339, 344 (1985).
Because a South Carolina capital defendant's right
to the plain meaning instruction is so well entrenched, the state
supreme court concluded that Williams's trial counsel rendered
substandard (deficient) performance when he failed to request the
instruction. Instead of asking for a plain meaning instruction,
counsel's initial strategy was to ask for a parole eligibility
instruction to advise the jury that, if it opted for a life sentence,
Williams would be eligible for parole in thirty years. Counsel
explained at the PCR hearing that he requested the parole eligibility
instruction to enable the jury to understand that a life sentence
meant “more than five or ten or fifteen years.” J.A. 63.
The trial court refused the parole eligibility
instruction, which is not required to be given at the defendant's
request. See McWee v. State, 357 S.C. 403, 593 S.E.2d 456, 457 (2004).
Williams's counsel did not follow up with a request for the plain
meaning instruction. As the South Carolina Supreme Court observed,
counsel acknowledged that he had no strategic or tactical reason for
not requesting the plain meaning instruction. He admitted that he
believed the trial court would give the plain meaning instruction as a
matter of course; and when it was not given, it did not occur to him
to raise the issue with the court.
In these circumstances the Supreme Court of South
Carolina did not unreasonably apply Strickland's performance standard.
Williams's counsel was well aware of the plain meaning instruction and
of its availability upon request. He surely knew that the instruction
would have furthered his goal of making the jury aware that a life
sentence would in all events result in a long prison term, and he
could not provide a satisfactory explanation for his failure to ask
for the instruction. Thus, the state supreme court reasonably
concluded that the representation provided by Williams's counsel was
deficient under Strickland's performance standard, that is, it fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness as measured by
prevailing professional norms. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104
S.Ct. 2052.
After determining that Williams's counsel was
deficient in his performance, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
considered whether counsel's substandard performance prejudiced the
defense. The state supreme court's analysis focused first on why the
PCR court had erred in concluding that Strickland's prejudice
requirement was satisfied. The PCR court believed that, without the
plain meaning instruction, Williams's defense at the sentencing phase
was prejudiced because: (1) the state relied largely on its
circumstantial proof in the guilt phase to establish the statutory
aggravating factors in the sentencing phase; (2) Williams had no prior
criminal record; and (3) he was released on bond prior to trial. The
state supreme court, after “carefully consider[ing]” the trial record,
concluded that Williams was not “prejudiced by the lack of a plain
meaning charge.” J.A. 187.
In the sentencing phase the jury found two
statutory aggravating factors that allowed it to recommend that
Williams be sentenced to death for each murder: (1) Williams committed
each murder for the purpose of receiving money or a thing of monetary
value, and (2) he murdered two or more persons by one act or pursuant
to one scheme or course of conduct. The Supreme Court of South
Carolina concluded that strong evidence, “albeit circumstantial,”
supported the jury's finding of the two statutory aggravating factors.
J.A. 187. The state supreme court recounted this evidence as follows.
Williams and his wife had been experiencing
significant martial problems, and they were in dire financial straits;
they had recently declared bankruptcy, and foreclosure proceedings had
been initiated against their home. In the month before the murders,
Williams had substantially increased life insurance coverage on his
wife and son, naming himself beneficiary. Williams forged his wife's
signature on forms that added vehicle-related death benefits under
family automobile policies.
The bodies were found in the family van, which had
been partially burned. Right after the murders Williams displayed
injuries to his right hand (severe bruising and swelling) that were
consistent with the beating (or blunt head trauma) that killed his
wife. The son's death was due to strangulation. After the murders, but
before Williams received the autopsy results, he accurately described
the causes of the deaths to a friend, stating that his wife had been
beaten to death and that his son had been strangled by a plastic wire
wrap. From this evidence the Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded
that the jury “found [Williams] planned in cold blood the deaths of
his child and his wife, making arrangements to benefit financially.”
J.A. 188.
The gist of the state supreme court's analysis of
the factual record is that the strong evidence supporting the two
statutory aggravating factors-two murders, both committed for
financial gain-weighs in favor of the conclusion that Williams was not
prejudiced by the lack of a plain meaning instruction. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“[A] verdict or conclusion only
weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by
errors than one with overwhelming record support.”).
The Supreme Court of South Carolina then considered
the two items of mitigating evidence considered by the state PCR court,
specifically that Williams was released on bond (and met his bond
conditions) prior to his convictions and that he had no prior criminal
record. The state supreme court indicated that the lack of a plain
meaning instruction did not affect the jury's consideration of these
two mitigating factors. First, the state supreme court found it
unsurprising that Williams met the conditions of his bond. After all,
the court said, Williams “ha[d] achieved what he set out to accomplish,”
that is, the death of his wife and son and the prospect of substantial
life insurance or death benefits. J.A. 188. Second, the court
concluded that “given the nature of [Williams's] crimes ... the fact
that he had no prior criminal record [is] irrelevant to the question
whether he was prejudiced by the lack of a ‘plain meaning’ charge.” Id.
Here, the court was referring to “the evidence
demonstrat[ing] that [Williams's] motives were financial gain and the
elimination of his domestic [or financial] problems.” Id. It was the
depraved motive of financial gain that allowed the jury to find one of
the aggravating factors that triggered the recommendation of death.
The state supreme court thus indicated by its evaluation that the
aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors by a significant
degree.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded its
analysis of Strickland's prejudice factor by considering whether there
was anything “in th[e] record to indicate that the jurors in [Williams's]
capital trial were concerned with parole eligibility, or confused
about the meaning of a life sentence.” J.A. 188. The court found
nothing, and the record supports that determination. First, the
aggravating factors found by the jury (two murders and a financial
motive) are not ones that indicate that the jury was concerned about
how long Williams would serve if he received a life sentence or
whether he would be a danger to society if he was paroled at some
future date. It appeared to be solely the nature of, and the motive
behind, Williams's crimes that triggered the jury's recommendation of
death. Second, there is no indication in the record that a plain
meaning instruction would have prompted the jury to give more weight
to the mitigating evidence. The aggravating factors-a double murder
planned in cold blood for financial gain-simply outweighed the
mitigating factors, such as bond compliance and lack of a prior
criminal record.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina thus concluded
that there was no reasonable probability that, had a plain meaning
instruction been given to Williams's sentencing jury, the jury would
have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors
did not warrant the death sentence. This decision, we conclude, did
not involve an unreasonable application of Strickland. Of course, the
district court concluded that the decision of the Supreme Court of
South Carolina was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of Strickland, in four respects. We will evaluate the
district court's decision and explain why that court's reasoning does
not provide a sufficient basis under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) to set
aside the state court determination.
First, the district court said that the Supreme
Court of South Carolina's determination that Williams's lack of a
prior criminal record was irrelevant to the prejudice question is
contrary to Strickland, which required the state court to consider the
“totality of the evidence.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct.
2052; see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15, 102 S.Ct.
869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (sentencer may not be precluded from
considering any mitigating factor).
The state supreme court did not exclude Williams's
clean record from its consideration of the prejudice factor. Rather,
the state supreme court weighed Williams's lack of a prior record
against the cold-blooded and brutal nature of the murders and the
aggravating factors of financial motive and a double murder; only then
did the court conclude that the lack of a prior record was irrelevant
to the prejudice question. The court was thus saying that the
aggravating factors were so significant that the addition of a plain
meaning instruction would not have transformed Williams's clean
record-which the jury was instructed to consider in mitigation-into a
factor that outweighed William's depraved motive and his cold-blooded
planning and execution of the murders.
Second, the district court noted that the Supreme
Court of South Carolina, in concluding that the lack of a plain
meaning instruction did not prejudice Williams, erred in relying on
lack of evidence of juror concern about parole eligibility under a
life sentence. The district court believed that the state court's
reliance on this factor was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court
decisions in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187,
129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994); Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 121
S.Ct. 1263, 149 L.Ed.2d 178 (2001); and Kelly v. South Carolina, 534
U.S. 246, 122 S.Ct. 726, 151 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002).
These decisions require a state court, as a matter
of due process, to instruct a capital sentencing jury that a defendant
would be ineligible for parole if the prosecution has put the
defendant's future dangerousness in issue, and the only sentencing
alternative to death is life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. See, e.g., Shafer, 532 U.S. at 51, 121 S.Ct. 1263. Kelly made
clear that a court must give a parole ineligibility instruction under
these circumstances regardless of whether the jury indicates concern
about parole. 534 U.S. at 256-57, 122 S.Ct. 726.
Neither Kelly nor any other Supreme Court case has
considered the question raised by the district court-whether a state
court may rely on the absence of evidence of juror concern or
confusion about parole eligibility or the meaning of a life sentence
in considering whether the lack of a plain meaning instruction
prejudiced the defense. Again, the purpose of South Carolina's plain
meaning instruction is to ensure that a capital jury understands its
sentencing options (life imprisonment or death) without speculating
about the possibility of parole. It is not unreasonable for a court,
in reviewing a record for prejudice resulting from lack of a plain
meaning instruction, to look for signs of juror confusion about parole
eligibility or the meaning of a life sentence. In any event, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina in Williams's case did not act
contrary to, or unreasonably apply any U.S. Supreme Court precedent,
when it relied on the lack of evidence of juror confusion about the
consequences of the sentencing options.
Third, the district court concluded that the state
supreme court, in conducting its prejudice analysis, unreasonably
failed to consider the likely effect of statements made by the
prosecution and defense in closing arguments. The prosecutor told the
jury that imposing a life sentence on Williams would “pat him on the
back” and indicate that Edgefield County “forgave” him. J.A. 376.
Defense counsel later told the jury that it would hear a charge that
“life [in prison] means the remainder of one's natural life.” J.A.
377. This charge never materialized because counsel did not request a
plain meaning instruction. The district court concluded that these
statements could have confused the jury about the meaning of a life
sentence. We disagree.
The prosecutor's statement simply reflected the
view that a death sentence would be the most appropriate punishment.
This view was expressed without any mention that parole might be
possible under a life sentence. Further, it is not likely that defense
counsel prompted the jury to make parole eligibility a deciding factor
in its sentencing recommendation when he mistakenly said that a plain
meaning instruction would be given. The statements therefore are not
of sufficient materiality to allow us to say that the state supreme
court was unreasonable in determining that “[t]here is nothing in th[e]
record to indicate that the jurors in [Williams's] capital trial were
concerned with parole eligibility, or confused about the meaning of a
life sentence.” J.A. 188.
Fourth, the district court concluded that the
Supreme Court of South Carolina's prejudice inquiry involved an
unreasonable application of Strickland because the court “did not
mention” several mitigating factors. These factors included Williams's
good behavior during childhood; his many friends in high school, where
he was active in sports; his ten-year estrangement from his family as
a result of a will contest, and the reconciliation after he was
arrested for murder; and his “quiet, withdrawn” nature while an inmate
in the Edgefield County Jail. J.A. 379.
The district court treated the state supreme
court's failure to mention these factors as an indication that the
state court did not follow Strickland's directive to “consider the
totality of the evidence before the ... jury,” including the
“aggravating and mitigating circumstances,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As we discussed above, the state supreme court
specifically mentioned two mitigating factors: that Williams adhered
to his bond conditions and obligations and that he had no prior
criminal record.
Moreover, the state supreme court stated that it
had “carefully considered whether the record supports the ...
conclusion that [Williams] was prejudiced by the lack of a plain
meaning charge.” J.A. 187. The state supreme court thus implied that
it considered all of the mitigating circumstances, including the
unmentioned ones, but ultimately determined there was not a reasonable
probability that, had a plain meaning instruction been given, the jury
would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating
factors warranted two life sentences instead of death. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This determination did not involve an
unreasonable application of Strickland.
For the foregoing reasons the district court's
order granting Williams's application for a writ of habeas corpus will
be reversed.
IV.
In Williams's direct appeal the Supreme Court of
South Carolina rejected his claims that the evidence was not
sufficient to support either his convictions or venue in South
Carolina. Williams reasserted these claims in his federal habeas
petition, and they were also rejected by the district court. He cross-appeals
this aspect of the district court's decision.
“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects a defendant in a [state] criminal case against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “To determine whether this due process
right has been violated, the appropriate inquiry before the passage of
AEDPA was a straightforward question of ‘whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Sarausad v. Porter, 479 F.3d 671, 677
(9th Cir.2007) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (emphasis
in original)). Now, under the AEDPA provision codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1), “we inquire whether a state court determination that the
evidence was sufficient to support a conviction was an ‘objectively
unreasonable’ application of [the standard enunciated in] Jackson.” Id.
A.
South Carolina defines murder as “the killing of
any person with malice aforethought.” S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-10. In
rejecting Williams's claim that the evidence was insufficient for a
jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina began by focusing on the evidence that demonstrated
Williams's motive and planning. He and his wife were experiencing
severe financial difficulties, as evidenced by their bankruptcy and
the foreclosure on the family home; neighbors regularly overheard loud
arguments between Williams and his wife; and he substantially
increased the life insurance coverage (naming himself the beneficiary)
on his wife and son a month before the murders.
Immediately after the murders, Williams's right
hand was severely bruised, and the injury marks on his wife's body
were consistent with injuries that would be inflicted in a beating
with a human fist. Finally, Williams described the methods that were
used to murder his wife and son before he received the autopsy results.
This evidence, along with the other evidence recited in the statement
of facts, see part I supra, was sufficient for any rational trier of
fact to find Williams guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of murdering
his wife and son.
B.
South Carolina law requires a murder indictment to
specify the place of the victim's death for purposes of establishing
venue and providing adequate notice to the defendant. See S.C.Code Ann.
§ 17-19-30; State v. Brisbon, 323 S.C. 324, 474 S.E.2d 433, 436 (1996)
(quoting State v. Bostick, 243 S.C. 14, 131 S.E.2d 841, 842 (1963)).
Williams's jury was thus instructed that the state
was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murders
occurred in Edgefield County, South Carolina, as alleged in the
indictment. Williams contends here, as he did in his direct appeal,
that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the
murders occurred in Edgefield County rather than in Georgia. The
factual issue of where the murders occurred is a close one to be sure.
The evidence would have allowed the jury to find that the victims were
murdered in either Edgefield County, South Carolina, or in Georgia.
The jury nevertheless found that the deaths occurred in Edgefield
County. An objectively reasonable application of the Jackson standard
requires that a reviewing court “faced with a record of historical
facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume ... that the
trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution,
and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S.Ct.
2781.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina pointed to
evidence that supported the jury's determination that the murders
occurred in South Carolina: the victims were dressed in a way that
suggested they were forced from their home suddenly while still alive;
their bodies were found in South Carolina; and Williams signed
insurance claim forms conceding that his wife and son had died in
Edgefield County. The state supreme court's conclusion that there was
sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the inference (and a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt) that the victims died in South
Carolina was not objectively unreasonable under the standards
enunciated in Jackson.
V.
For the reasons stated in part III of this opinion,
the district court's order issuing a writ of habeas corpus for Luke A.
Williams, III, is reversed. For the reasons stated in part IV, the
district court's determination that the writ cannot be granted on the
grounds that the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt or venue
is affirmed.
REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART
Shaun Williams
Linda Williams and her husband Luke, in happier
times.