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Gregory Edward
WRIGHT
Classification: Murderer
Characteristics:
Robbery
Number of victims: 1
Date of murder:
March 21,
1997
Date of arrest:
2 days after
Date of birth:
November 1,
1965
Victim profile: Donna Duncan Vick (female, 52)
Method of murder: Stabbing
with knife
Location: Dallas County, Texas, USA
Status:
Executed
by lethal injection in Texas on October 30, 2008
Donna Duncan Vick was a charitable and religious 52-year-old widow,
who first saw the homelss Wright on a street corner with a sign "Will
work for food." Known for ministering to and aiding the homeless,
Ms. Vick had invited Gregory Wright, a homeless person and
panhandler, to reside in her house in exchange for doing yard work.
She also gave Wright and a homeless friend, John Adams, food and a
place to sleep. Wright was a crack cocaine addict.
One week later, Adams directed
police to her bedroom, where she was found beaten and stabbed to
death. On the night of the murder, Wright, Adams and Ms. Vick
drove to a local VFW lodge, where they stayed until 2:00 a.m. When
they returned to Ms. Vick's home, she cooked some food for the men
then went to bed.
At some point thereafter, the
two men, armed with Adams' pocket knife and a butcher knife from
Ms. Vick's kitchen, went back to her bedroom where they proceeded
to stab Ms. Vick repeatedly to her death. Wright and Adams then
gathered up items in the house belonging to Ms. Vick, including
her microwave, portable CD player, TV, VCR, computer equipment,
and newly purchased weed-eater and placed them in her car where
they transported them to the crack house to trade for drugs.
The next day, Adams asked an
employee at a video store to call the police because he wanted to
turn himself in. Adams directed the police to Donna Vick’s body.
Adams also led the police to a shack that Wright sometimes stayed
in, where they arrested Wright and seized a bloody and gold-paint
splattered pair of blue jeans. Outside the shack, the police found
a bloody knife. DNA evidence established that the blood on the
knife and jeans was Donna’s. Adams later recanted his testimony
and claimed responsibility for the killing. But at a hearing
recently, he renounced that statement. Adams was also convicted of
capital murder and remains on death row.
Citations:
Wright v. State, 28 S.W.3d 526 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000.) (Direct
Appeal). Wright v. Quarterman, 470 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 2006)
(Habeas).
Final/Special Meal:
Two double cheese burgers with everything, 2 baked potatoes with
butter, large salad with ranch dressing, 1 pitcher of milk, any
dessert, and 4 dinner rolls.
Final Words:
"There's been a lot of confusion who done this. I never sold
anything to anyone. My only act or involvement was not telling on
him. John Adams was the one that killed Donna Vick. The evidence
proves that. ... I was in the bathroom when he attacked. I ran
into the bedroom. By the time I came in, when I tried to help her
with first aid it was too late." He said an innocent man was being
put to death and said he loved his family. "I'll be waiting on
y'all. I am finished talking."
ClarkProsecutor.org
Name
TDCJ
Number
Date
of Birth
Wright, Gregory Edward
999253
11/01/65
Date
Received
Age (when Received)
Education Level
02/05/98
32
11
Date
of Offense
Age (at the Offense)
County
03/21/97
31
Dallas
Race
Gender
Hair
Color
White
Male
brown
Height
Weight
Eye
Color
6-0
170
blue
Native
County
Native
State
Prior
Occupation
Knox
Tennessee
Laborer
Prior
Prison Record
None
Summary of incident
On 03/21/1997, in DeSoto, Wright
broke into the home of a white female.
Wright stabbed the
victim with a knife, causing her death.
Wright took many items
from the home and left the scene in the victim's vehicle.
Co-defendants
None
Race
and Gender of Victim
White female
Texas
Department of Criminal Justice
Inmate: Wright, Gregory Edward
Date of Birth: 11/1/65
DR#: 999253
Date Received: 2/5/98
Education: 11 years
Occupation: Laborer
Date of Offense: 3/21/97
County of Offense: Dallas
Native County: Knox County Tennessee
Race: White
Gender: Male
Hair Color: Brown
Eye Color: Blue
Height: 6' 00"
Weight: 170
Prior Prison Record: None
Summary of incident:
On 03/21/1997, in DeSoto, Wright broke into the
home of a white female. Wright stabbed the victim with a knife,
causing her death. Wright took many items from the home and left
the scene in the victim's vehicle.
Co-defendants: None.
Chronology of the Trial and Appeal process
March 23, 1997 - Arrested
March 26, 1997 - Indictment ordered
Aug 25 - Nov, 1997 - Jury Selection
Dec 1-7, 1997 - Trial - Guilt/Innocence
phase
December 8, 1997 - Guilty Verdict
December 9, 1997 - Trial - Punishment phase
December 10, 1997 - Judgement and
sentence of death by leathal injection
December 10, 1997 - Automatic appeal -
Direct Appellate process (State)
July 22, 1999 - State Application for
Habeas Corpus - appeal filed
June 28, 2000 - Texas Court of Criminal
Appeal denies Direct Appeal
July 17, 2000 - State's Response to
Application for Habeas Corpus
January 22, 2001 - Certiorari to U.S.
Supreme Court denied
End of State Appellate Process
Law requires only one year to file Federal Application for Habeas
Corpus
January 18, 2002 - Federal Application for
Habeas Corpus - filed brief
February 26, 2002 - Motion to Disclose
information
September 18, 2002 - State files their
response to Habeas appeal
September 30, 2002 - Denial of Motion to
information
November 18, 2002 - Amended Motion to
Disclose information
September 12, 2003 - Denial of Amended
Motion to Disclose information
March 10, 2004 - Magistrate Judge files a
Recommendation
April 2004 - Greg's Response to the
Recommendation filed
March 28, 2005 - Order from Federal
District Judge denying application
April 8, 2005 - Greg's Motion to alter
or amend judgement filed
June 24, 2005 - Order denying motion to
alter or amend judgement
July 25, 2005 - Appeal for Certificate
of Appealability filed
August 2005 ? - Denial of Certificate of
Appealability
March 15, 2006 - Appellant's Brief in
support of application for Certificate of Appealability
May 2006 - Response in Opposition to
application for COA
Nov 17, 2006 - Denial of COA by 5th Circuit
Dec 7, 2006 - Motion for Panel Rehearing -
5th Circuit
Dec 18, 2006 - Denial of Panel Rehearing -
5th Circuit
March 16, 2007 -
Petition for Writ of Certiorari
June 18, 2007 - Denial of Petition
August 21, 2008 - First Subsequent
Application for a Post-Conviction Writ of Habeas Corpus
Sept. 5, 2008 - Stay of Execution (to
Oct.30, 2008)
Sept. 9, 2008 - TCCA Remand with written
Order to the Trial Court
Oct 8, 2008 - Recommendation for
commutation filed by attorneys
Homeless man executed for killing of N.
Texas Samaritan
By Michael Graczyk - Houston Chronicle
AP - Oct. 30, 2008
HUNTSVILLE — Proclaiming his innocence,
condemned prisoner Gregory Wright was executed Thursday evening
for the fatal stabbing and robbery of a Dallas-area woman who
tried to help him when he was homeless. "There's been a lot of
confusion who done this," Wright said from the death chamber
gurney.
Then, as he has for years, he declared a fellow
homeless man, John Adams, was responsible for the murder of Donna
Vick. "I never sold anything to anyone. My only act or involvement
was not telling on him. John Adams was the one that killed Donna
Vick. The evidence proves that. ... I was in the bathroom when he
attacked. I ran into the bedroom. By the time I came in, when I
tried to help her with first aid it was too late."
He said an innocent man was being put to death
and said he loved his family. "I'll be waiting on y'all. I am
finished talking." Nine minutes after the lethal drugs began to
flow, he was pronounced dead at 6:20 p.m. CDT.
Wright, 42, was one two homeless men convicted
of killing Vick, 52, at her home in DeSoto, just south of Dallas,
in 1997. The woman was known for helping the needy and had given
Wright food, clothing and money after he said she spotted him on a
street corner holding a cardboard sign offering to work for food.
He was the 14th Texas prisoner executed this
year, the second this week. Another six are set to die in November,
including one next week, in the nation's most active capital
punishment state.
Wright was an out of work truck driver when he
befriended Adams, who also was homeless in Dallas. Adams was tried
separately and also was convicted and sentenced to death. He does
not have an execution date. "He could have been the hero in this
if that was a true story," Jerry Don Blanton, Vick's son, said
after watching Wright die. "I really think if there was any truth
in what he said, he could have probably stopped this. "And if he
wanted to protect his friend, all he had to do was call 911 and
get an ambulance out there."
Blanton said he thought both Wright and Adams
were "very much total participants in what happened that night, no
doubt... We're getting the same thing we've got since day one,
each of them blaming it on the other one."
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected an appeal by
Wright less than an hour before he was scheduled to be taken to
the Texas death chamber. Other federal courts had rejected similar
appeals and the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles also refused a
clemency request for Wright on a 7-0 vote Wednesday.
"The truth doesn't matter," Wright told The
Associated Press recently from a visiting cage outside death row,
saying he was stunned at the outcome of his 1998 trial in Dallas.
"I couldn't believe what was happening. I'm very upset at a number
of different people. I don't blame the legal system. I blame
individuals running the legal system. ... I am innocent."
Adams, who implicated Wright as the killer,
earlier this year recanted his statement against Wright. Then at a
court hearing last month, he reversed his recantation. "The co-defendant
has been a bit erratic," Meg Penrose, one of Wright's lawyers,
said Thursday.
She said she understood demands for an
execution in the case "but I thought justice demanded we executed
the right person." "I guess there's a difference of emphasis,"
Penrose said. "I'd rather wait 30 years and make sure we have the
proper individual executed than wait 12 and hedge our bets. I
don't like the rush to review that we're at. A person who is
innocent is rushed to the gurney and is executed."
New DNA tests requested by Wright's lawyers,
which put off Wright's execution initially scheduled for last
month, "on the whole, confirmed Wright's guilt," state attorneys
told the appeals courts in their arguments. Penrose contended the
tests were ambiguous. At Wright's trial, jurors were told that
after the killing, the two men packed up items from inside the
house, drove off in Vick's car and traded the loot for crack
cocaine.
A day and a half later, Adams turned himself in
to police, implicated Wright, directed officers to Vick's home and
helped in the recovery of her car. DNA tests of blood on the
steering wheel of the car was shown to belong to Wright. His
bloody fingerprint also was found on a pillowcase on her bed.
Wright's lawyers disputed the accuracy of the fingerprint evidence.
From death row, Wright refused to talk about
specifics of the crime, saying only that it stemmed from an
argument between Vick and Adams over Adams' smoking. "This should
have been finished long ago because there's no question about his
guilt and there should be no question about the jury's verdict
either," said Greg Davis, who prosecuted Wright. "He and Adams had
been living on the streets together. So what he does, he talks his
way into the victim's home and then he gets Adams in there, too.
Both them actually stabbed her to death."
Scheduled to die next is Elkie Taylor, 47, on
Nov. 6. Taylor was condemned for strangling a 65-year-old Fort
Worth man in 1993 with two wire coat hangers and then leading
police on a four-hour chase in a stolen 18-wheeler. Authorities
said the robbery and murder of Otis Flake at Flake's Fort Worth
home was the second killing linked to Taylor over an 11-day period.
Man set to die today for '97 killing in
DeSoto
By Steve Thompson - Dallas Morning News
Thursday, October 30, 2008
She saw him on a street corner with a sign: "Work
for food." So she took him in. She prepared sandwiches for him and
his friend at her DeSoto home. Then she was stabbed to death.
Donna Duncan Vick was always a charitable woman,
her family said, but she also believed in an eye for an eye, a
life for a life. Today, one of the men who authorities say killed
her is scheduled to receive his half of that equation. Gregory
Wright, a 42-year-old former homeless man, is to be executed for
the March 21, 1997, slaying of Ms. Vick, a religious 52-year-old
widow who gave Mr. Wright and his friend John Adams food and a
place to sleep. "Unfortunately, I think at this point Greg is
nearing the end of his legal challenges," one of his attorneys,
Meg Penrose, said Wednesday.
Appeals asserting evidence of Mr. Wright's
innocence were turned down Tuesday by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals. Mr. Wright insists that he wasn't involved in Ms. Vick's
slaying and that Mr. Adams, also on death row, was solely
responsible. "He blamed everything on me," Mr. Wright said
recently from a visiting cage outside Texas death row. "It's a
nightmare." Mr. Adams later recanted his testimony and claimed
responsibility for the killing. But at a hearing recently, he
renounced that statement.
In explanation, Mr. Adams said he originally
recanted to help his co-defendant with his appeals, Ms. Penrose
said. "He said he was trying to be gracious and give Mr. Wright
more time with his wife." Mr. Wright, who says he was a trucker
before he became homeless, met and married his wife, Connie Wright,
while on death row. She and other supporters say he is innocent.
Mr. Adams, who also was homeless, testified
during trial that Mr. Wright introduced him to Ms. Vick on the
night of the murder. After spending some time at a club, he and Mr.
Wright got a ride to Ms. Vick's home. Ms. Vick made them both
sandwiches, Mr. Adams testified. Before retiring to her bedroom,
Ms. Vick told him to make himself at home and help himself to the
refrigerator, the bathroom and a spare bedroom. Then someone
stabbed her to death in her bed. Each defendant said the other did
it.
A witness told jurors that soon after the
murder, Mr. Wright and Mr. Adams traded Ms. Vick's television, VCR,
microwave and other possessions with him in exchange for crack.
ProDeathPenalty.com
The evidence at trial established that Donna
Vick was stabbed to death in her home in DeSoto, Texas, about 15
miles south of Dallas, in the early hours of March 21, 1997. On
March 22, 1997, John Wade Adams placed an emergency 911 call to
the Dallas Police Department stating that he had witnessed a
murder the night before. Adams subsequently led the authorities to
an abandoned white Chrysler New Yorker registered to Donna Duncan
Vick. This led to the discovery of Ms. Vick, found murdered in the
master bedroom of her home with a pillow covering her face and
lying in a pool of blood.
The lack of evidence to demonstrate a struggle
elsewhere in the room indicated that the attack occurred on Ms.
Vick's bed with her assailant straddling her on the bed during the
murder. Ms. Vick sustained multiple stab wounds, bruises, and cuts
to her face, neck, chin, hands, and throat area. A fifty-two-year-old
widow known for ministering to and aiding the homeless, Ms. Vick
had invited Gregory Wright, a homeless person and panhandler, to
reside in her house in exchange for doing yard work. Wright had
been staying there as a guest for about one week prior to the
night of the killing.
On the day before the killing, Wright and Ms.
Vick drove in her car to a house in north Oak Cliff where Wright
purchased and used crack cocaine before leaving with Ms. Vick.
Later that evening Wright and Ms. Vick returned to the house,
where they met up with Adams. The three left together in Ms.
Vick's car. The evidence reflects that they all went to the VFW
lodge around midnight where they stayed until 2:00 a.m. The three
men returned to Ms. Vick's home, where Ms. Vick cooked some food
for Adams and Wright. Ms. Vick then went to bed.
At some point thereafter, Wright held up a
paper towel toward Adams with the words "Do you want to do it?"
written on it. The two men, armed with Adams' pocket knife and a
butcher knife from Ms. Vick's kitchen, went back to her bedroom
where they proceeded to stab Ms. Vick repeatedly to her death.
Wright and Adams then gathered up items in the house belonging to
Ms. Vick, including her microwave, portable CD player, TV, VCR,
computer equipment, and newly purchased weed-eater and placed them
in her car where they transported them to the crack house to trade
for drugs. Llewelyn Mosley testified that Adams and Wright arrived
at his house on the night of the murder and told him that they had
some things from a woman in DeSoto that they wanted to get rid of,
including a television, a weed eater, a rifle, a color printer,
and a microwave. Several of these items were later identified as
belonging to Donna Vick. Wright negotiated with the dealer. After
exchanging some of the items, Wright and Adams appeared cheerful
and exchanged “high fives.”
The next day, Adams asked an employee at a
video store to call the police because he wanted to turn himself
in. Adams directed the police to Donna Vick’s house and assisted
in recovering her car. DNA testing revealed that blood found on
the steering wheel belonged to Wright. At the house, the police
found Donna’s body on her bed and Wright’s bloody fingerprint on
her pillowcase. In a trash can, the police found a handwritten
note reading, “Do you want to do it?” Adams also led the police to
a shack that Wright sometimes stayed in, where they arrested
Wright and seized a bloody and gold-paint splattered pair of blue
jeans. Outside the shack, the police found a bloody knife. DNA
evidence established that the blood on the knife and jeans was
Donna’s.
Several cans of gold spray paint were found in
Wright’s home, and witnesses testified that Wright had previously
been seen with gold paint on his face and clothes. It was
theorized that Wright had inhaled spray paint to get high. The
police also found mail addressed to Adams at the shack. After
Wright was arrested, he phoned a friend from jail and asked her to
remove any of his clothing from the shack. Adams also led the
police to a knife in a vacant lot near Mosley’s home. DNA testing
revealed that the knife had Donna Vick’s blood on it. A medical
examiner testified that Donna could have been stabbed by more than
one knife. At trial, the prosecution argued that both Adams and
Wright attacked Vick. The jury found Wright guilty, and he was
sentenced to death.
Texas Execution
Information Center by David Carson
Txexecutions.org
Gregory Edward Wright, 42, was executed by
lethal injection on 30 October 2008 in Huntsville, Texas for the
murder and robbery of a woman in her home.
In 1997, Donna Vick saw Wright, a homeless man,
standing on a street corner, holding a cardboard sign offering to
work for food. Vick befriended Wright, then 31, giving him food,
clothing, and money, and even allowing him to stay with her at
times in her home in DeSoto, a suburb of Dallas.
On the night of 20 March, Wright introduced
another homeless man, John Adams, to Vick. After spending some
time at a club, Wright and Adams got a ride to Vick's home. There,
Vick made both of them sandwiches and told Adams to help himself
to the refrigerator, the bathroom, and a spare bedroom. Vick then
went to bed. She was stabbed to death in her bedroom in the early
morning of 21 March. Wright, then 31, and Adams, 33, stole a
television, microwave oven, rifle, and other items from her home.
They also stole her car.
The next day, Adams turned himself in to police
and assisted in recovering the victim's car, which they had
abandoned in Landcaster, another Dallas suburb. On the steering
wheel, police found blood which DNA tests showed belonged to
Wright. At the house, police found Vick's body on her bed and
Wright's bloody fingerprint on her pillowcase. Adams also led
police to a shack where Wright sometimes stayed, and he was
arrested there. Police found a pair of bloody blue jeans, and,
outside the shack, a bloody knife. DNA tests established that the
blood on the jeans and knife was Vick's. Police also found gold
paint on the jeans, and several cans of gold spray paint in the
shack.
Adams then led police to a vacant lot, where
another bloody knife was found. That blood was also matched to the
victim.
Llewelyn Mosley, whose home was near the vacant
lot where the second bloody knife was found, testified that on the
night of the murder, Wright and Adams drove up to his home in
Vick's car to purchase cocaine from a drug dealer who was staying
with him. Mosley testified that Wright and Adams told him they had
some things from a woman in DeSoto that they wanted to get ride
of. After Wright negotiated a purchase with the dealer, he and
Adams exchanged "high fives."
A medical examiner testified that more than one
knife could have been used to kill the victim. Further testimony
showed that Wright was known to inhale spray paint to get high.
A jury convicted Wright of capital murder in
December 1977 and sentenced him to death. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence in June
2000. All of his subsequent appeals in state and federal court
were denied.
John Adams was also convicted of capital murder
and sentenced to death. He remains on death row as of this writing.
In their trials and appeals, both Wright and
Adams blamed the other for the killing. In one appeal, Adams
recanted his testimony and took sole responsibility for the
killing, but he reversed himself again at a later hearing.
A September execution date for Wright was
withdrawn so additional DNA testing could be done. His execution
was rescheduled after the results of the test were reported back
to the court. "The truth doesn't matter," Wright said in an
interview from death row a few days before his execution. He said
he was stunned when his guilty verdict was announced. "I couldn't
believe what was happening ... I am innocent."
Wright again proclaimed his innocence in his
last statement at his execution. "There's been a lot of confusion
who done this," he said. "I never sold anything to anyone. My only
act or involvement was not telling on him. John Adams was the one
that killed Donna Vick. The evidence proves that ... I was in the
bathroom when he attacked. I ran into the bedroom. By the time I
came in, when I tried to help her with first aid, it was too
late." Wright also expressed love to his family. "I'll be waiting
on y'all," he said in closing. "I am finished talking." The lethal
injection was then started. He was pronounced dead at 6:20 p.m.
The victim's son, Jerry Don Blanton, attended
Wright's execution. A reporter asked him afterward about Wright's
last statement. "He could have been the hero in this if that was a
true story," Blanton answered. "I really think if there was any
truth in what he said, he could have probably stopped this. And if
he wanted to protect his friend, all he had to do was call 911 and
get an ambulance out there."
"I thought justice demanded we executed the
right person," Meg Penrose, one of Wright's lawyers, said. "I'd
rather wait thirty years and make sure we have the proper
individual executed than wait twelve and hedge our bets. I don't
like the rush to review that we're at. A person who is innocent is
rushed to the gurney and is executed."
An execution is scheduled for Oct. 30th 2008:
read why this WILL BE A WRONGFUL EXECUTION OF AN INNOCENT MAN !!!
The US Supreme Court rejected Greg's final appeal - the execution
of an innocent man is completed
Today, the 5th Circuit has effectively torn up
the charge for which Greg was tried, convicted and sentenced, and
substituted one of a "party to the crime" - so admitting that
Texas has failed in its attempt to find conclusive evidence
against him. Greg has never faced a jury under this charge and,
minimally, should be granted a re-hearing of the punishment phase
in front of a jury. "After three test charts and a number of
stimulus test were administered, an analysis of the polygraph
charts was made, and in my professional opinion Mr Wright is being
truthful in all his answers to the relevant test questions." Joe
D. Morris B.S., M.A., C.P.E. Polygraph Examiner, Texas.......... "Is
Gregory E. Wright actually and factually innocent of the murder of
Donna D. Vick and never knew of any intent to harm before the
crime took place?" - "Yes he’s innocent of this crime. I did it."
John Wade Adams, August 11, 2008 My name is John Wade Adams
#999278. I want the record clear that Greg Wright is innocent of
the crime he’s here on death row for. If you kill him your (sic)
killing a innocent man. Greg Wright was used as a scape goat. I’m
doing this because I’m tired of seeing innocent people being
killed for murders they’ve not done the statement I made is a lie
the one that I made at the first of our arrest. Greg Wright is
innocent! I was there and know better. Did you place the murder of
Donna D. Vick on the hands of Gregory E. Wright? Yes to make it
look like he did it. I set him up.
An open letter from Greg Wright's supporters in
Texas, across the USA, and across the world to Governor Rick Perry;
Justices of the 5th Circuit Court of Appeal; Justices of the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals; Members of the Texas Board of Pardons
and Paroles; Craig Watkins, District Attorney for Dallas; Judge
Francis, trial judge
Sirs,
After nearly eleven years of incarceration on death row, and
nearly 11 years of appeals against a wrongful conviction and
sentence for murder, Gregory Wright has been given an execution
date of Oct.30th 2008. We make this final appeal to you, in faith
of the American respect for Justice, and of the value of an
innocent human life. While unreservedly expressing our sympathy
for the relatives of Ms. Donna Vick, and our abhorrence of the
crime by which she lost her life, we cannot accept the wrongful
death of her friend Gregory Wright, in whom she trusted and loved,
and for whom he respected and befriended in turn. The
circumstances of their relationship, and the timing and
circumstances of her death, of course make it difficult to prove
that Greg had nothing to do with her murder. But in the modern age
and sophistication of evaluative judicial process, we believe with
all our hearts and minds that the evidence now available to you is
overwhelming in its conclusion, minimally that sufficient doubt of
guilt exists to justify setting aside this sentence of death, and
that in fact it supports fully the actual innocence as claimed by
Greg over all these years. That evidence is set out once more
below. We appeal to you to assess the evidence anew, and to cast
favorable judgment.
1. A recent written confession by Greg's co-indictee
John Adams, confirmed with a second written document, unsolicited
and freely made available to Greg's attorneys, clearly and
unreservedly exonerates Greg of any responsibility for the crime
of murder. Adams has, under oath, admitted he wrote this
confession, but now, understandably, has decided not to admit its
truth under oath for fear of the consequences for his own life. To
commit a confession in writing is not something done lightly,
especially when done in the knowledge that your own life is
endangered. Adams professed his Christian conversion and
commitment when making this confession. If his word cannot be
taken at face value on this, what worth can his original
accusations against Greg have? Adams, by his own word and by his
own history of knife use against another human being (admitted
with details on his website) has condemned himself, but he
continues to cast blame in an attempt to lessen regard for his own
sole culpability.
2. Substantial DNA testing has been done on
both the murder weapon and on a pair of jeans claimed by the
prosecution to have been worn by Greg whilst participating in the
act of murder. The tests have revealed NO linkage to Greg on the
murder weapon. The tests on the jeans, strongly opposed by the
prosecution, have also revealed NO positive linkage to Greg.
However, the tests did reveal the strong likelihood of a linkage
to Adams. Testimony at the trial showed that Greg was seen wearing
jeans of an entirely different description before the timing of
the murder. The jeans are also too small to have been worn by Greg,
based on his physical measurements taken at his arrest hours after
the crime, and also at the trial. A significant part of the
evidence presented to the original jury has then been shown to
have no reliability of fact. The jeans are more likely to have
been worn by Adams, whose physical dimensions, also measured at
the time of his arrest, match those of the jeans.
3. Fingerprint evidence presented at trial,
always looked upon by juries as strong evidence of guilt, has now
been proven to have had no status other than that of "junk science".
Testimony from the state's own forensic department at the trial,
plus evidence from a defense independent fingerprint expert (inexplicably
not called at the trial to give his evidence), and evidence from a
further expert in recent days - all state that the fingerprint in
question was of such poor and incomplete quality that it would
have been impossible to make a positive identification as
belonging to Greg. The trial defense team have admitted in
affidavit that they were in error in not protecting and preserving
Greg's legal rights in respect of this matter at the trial. This
trial evidence then is also proven to have no reliability of fact.
4. A scene-of-crime officer, charged with the
collection and handling of evidence following discovery of the
crime, has been shown publically to have been employed
fraudulently by the state. He had made untrue and illegal claims
of qualification and experience to his employers. This fact alone
should render any evidence handled by him as at least unreliable,
and probably inadmissible. The further fact that he has
subsequently been accused of murder, and is recorded as one of
America's most wanted criminals, should render his contribution to
the evidence against Greg as worthless.
5. Greg has submitted himself to an
independently conducted polygraph test by one of the state's most
respected polygraph practitioners, himself often employed by the
state. His evidence concludes that Greg's assertions of innocence
are entirely truthful. While polygraph evidence is not admissible
in a court of law, in these circumstances where unreliability of
guilt has amply been demonstrated by other means, it is reasonable
and not without precedence to weigh such evidence in favor of the
accused.
6. The additional issues, raised in detail by
Greg's attorneys, Bruce Anton and Mary Penrose, in the Writ of
Habeas Corpus (available in full and in summary elsewhere on this
site) have not been rejected in fact by any court. Again, the
cumulative value and effect on the merits of at least full review
of Greg's case can surely be undisputed.
We pray for your fair consideration of this
case, a new trial or review, and for the release of Gregory Wright
from wrongful threat of execution. The admission of error, or the
admission of subsequent uncertainty, is not weakness in the eyes
of the law or public. This capacity is rather what gives us all
confidence and respect for the legal process and legal
institutions. We thank Greg's attorneys, Bruce Anton and Meg
Penrose, now working pro bono, for their tireless work in making
these findings possible.
Sincerely and respectfully yours,
Peter Bellamy, Gregory Wright Supporters
Coordinator
on behalf of supporters and family of Gregory Wright
Gregory Wright
UnfairTrial.net
Back in 1997 Gregory Edward Wright was
convicted for the murder of Donna Duncan Vick; though yet another
man named John Wade Adams was convicted for the same crime. They
both now are held in the Polunsky Unit in Texas, USA, awaiting
their death penalty. Although the attorneys did have enough
evidence against Mr. Adams to understand that Mr. Wright was
innocent, he is still in there awaiting the answer on his last
appeal. This site will provide you the information about the case,
and hopefully you will help us to help Greg get a new and fair
trial.
The next pages contain Mr. Wright's legal
issues and links to other web sites. It is the combined effort of
caring individuals that we publish this case hoping to get the
interest and the public's awareness that "INJUSTICE" is practiced
in the Courts of the U.S., State of Texas.
We are not trying to prove guilt or innocence.
That is for a jury to decide. We are, however, showing that Greg
Wright's trial was tainted by prosecutorial misconduct and
ineffective assistance of counsel, both at trial and on state
appellate process. Mr. Wright's rights as a United States citizen
insuring that he get a fair and impartial trial has been infringed
upon. The capital murder scheme in the state of Texas is flawed.
Greg is indigent and seeking legal and financial help for upcoming
attorney fees, if granted a new trial.
U.S. DEATH ROW PRISONER - STATE OF TEXAS
Gregory E. Wright
Age 38
Born 11-01-65
Caucasian
Greg's own account of his background
I was brought up in a productive family
environment. Farming, school, church and sports took up all of my
adolescent years. I was an athletic star and in total have
approximately 20 plaques and trophy awards that depict my
performances in football (U.S. style), baseball and basketball. I
had to keep up my grades in order to participate in these extra
curricular activities. I took advanced pre-college classes in high
school, which include Typing 1, Introductory Computers, Chemistry,
and all available math classes, Sociology, Psychology, Reading
Composition, Biology and Art. The rest of my hours were spent on
sports or farm work.
I married young, at age 19. My wife could not
have children due to a medical problem, so I have no children. We
divorced after seven years of marriage, and I filed the legal
paperwork myself on the grounds of "irreconcilable differences".
My profession in life was cross-country tractor/trailer operator
in the U.S. I have logged over (1,000,000) one million miles
behind the wheel of this big tractor rig, travelling coast to
coast, from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean.
Due to marriage and family difficulties, I
developed a drinking condition. This caused tension between my
family members and I and finally cost me my driving license for
six months. I was never judgemental about who my friends were.
This non-judgemental stance finally cost me my freedom and now,
possibly my life.
Sitting in the United States, on Texas'
notorious "Death Row", I await judgement from the Federal Courts
concerning my appeal to the conviction of Capital Murder. To date,
I have never given a written or an oral statement as to events
leading to the murder of my friend, Donna D. Vick, a middle-aged
street minister. I did not testify at my trial. Why, you may ask?
It was evident the judge and prosecutor were setting me up for a
fall when I found out about the missing 911 - tapes. I don't think
the jury would have given my testimony any credit. The first day
of trial was when I found out that there existed voice tapes of
Emergency 911 calls, conducted by John Wade Adams. The prosecutor
claimed, "They had lost them".
Greg remember facts leading to arrest
I am writing this myself and I must make clear
before I go any further, that I can not divulge certain facts in
regards to the sudden demise of my friend Donna Duncan Vick. I
have never made a legal statement, nor did I testify. What I am
offering is a look at all information the Federal Courts now have.
Thinking back, I think the year was 1995. I had
been operating a tractor/trailer rig, hauling produce or
containers from New York to California, for an owner/operator in
Dallas, Texas. We were having trouble collecting for toll bridges
from the company we were hauling the produce for. Finally, he took
the truck off line and that left me in Dallas, searching for
another job. It took me three weeks to spend my small savings on
hostel costs and living expenses. I ended up homeless and on the
streets in Dallas, Texas, still searching for a job driving. I did
not settle for underpaid local hauling, I was holding out for
something cross-country.
While on the streets, I worked odd jobs for a
day labor company. That small earning kept me fed. After some
weeks I became the victim of a gunshot wound, point blank, just
under my nose, from a small caliber handgun. I was protecting a
man in his 30s from being robbed by 5 Mexican Americans. The five
were in their late teens and early twenties. The one I protected
was drunk and passed out. I was rushed to the hospital and there
received reconstructive surgery to my upper palate, jaw bone, and
dug my upper front to back teeth out of the back of my throat. The
bullet lodged in my right jawbone causing hearing loss in my right
ear, even today. I was told to wait 1 ½ or 2 years before I tried
to get teeth put back in.
My father visited while I was in intensive care.
He later took me back home with him, so I could recover. After six
or seven months, I started working again. I was working, driving
for an insulation company. The insulation goes between house and
house roof. The trucking industry is always hiring and it is just
a matter of finding the proper pay and insurance coverage. I like
long hauls, taking me from state to state.
I never drank alcohol when I was working.
However, just as soon as I got a little free time, you would find
a beer in my hand. There is a sleeping bed in the tractor, so I
lived in the truck between runs. While in Atlanta, Georgia, after
getting false directions that led me into a small housing project,
I had trouble turning the tractor and 53' foot trailer around. I
ran over a brick or rock fence, and took down a power line. The
truck was just too big for that neighbourhood.
Instead of filing a police accident report at
the scene, I decided since only my rig suffered the most damage, I
would call the State police at the nearest truck-stop that
supplies fuel, food, beverages and restrooms. The rock fence was
toppled, but I had torn my air brake canister and airline. Getting
service for those rigs is a long waiting process and I had a
pick-up for the following morning. I did not know about the power
line. While at the truck stop, I went and purchased beer, went
back to the truck and caught up on all of my paperwork. The state
officials would want to see that paperwork of service hours. I was
on my fourth beer and have completed all the paperwork and filled
out an accident report and was fixing to go in and call the State
police when a female officer approached my rig and saw me drinking
the beer.
In past years, before the laws on drinking and
driving changed, I would have been within legal rights. I was
parked, off duty, and on store property, with no posted signs of
drinking on or off premises. The laws in Georgia changed. Now, if
you are drinking and sitting behind the wheel of a vehicle with
the keys in the ignition switch, then you are considered in
control or "operation" of that vehicle. If the motor is running,
as mine always was, then you are definitively operating that
vehicle. I will not lie and play ignorant to that state's laws. It
is our job to keep up with the state laws in which we travel
through. The law slightly vary from state to state. The ending
result to all this, I was charged with "drinking while in
operating of a motor vehicle" and lost my Commercial Driver's
license for six months with a fourteen hundred dollar fine. Of
course I was fired. Can't work without a license.
Now, you reader asks, "What does all this have
to do with your case?" It had been almost two years since I had
been shot. I was told the state would pay all or half to replace
my upper teeth. I was a victim of a crime in the State of Texas,
and the city of Dallas had a Crime Victim's Fund that I would be
eligible for. Since I could not work, I decided to go back to
Dallas, Texas and get my teeth fixed. This all happened in 1996. I
arrived in Dallas around September 1996. This is why I was in
Dallas, Texas in the first place. I stayed with Sylvia P. and her
family. I knew her brother from downtown Dallas from the last time
I had been in the city, almost two years prior. I could not find
work in her neighbourhood. This led me right back to the streets
of Dallas and being homeless. I worked enough to feed myself, and
I held a sign on the side of the street informing passers-by that
I was out of work and would do odd jobs for food. Some put me to
work around their house, fee me and took me back to where they
found me. Others would offer anywhere from 2-5 dollars for a meal,
and drive on.
All pride leaves an individual when they are
hungry. I was greatly humbled by that experience. I never regard
homeless people the same as I used to. Their life is hard. People
do not realize. The whole homeless experience is like camping,
only for a longer period. Alcohol and food was my priority. My
drinking was heavy and my body built a resistance to the normal
effects and I consumed a large quantity daily, but never getting
so drunk so that I could not function or maintain awareness. The
city streets are dangerous. Remember my gunshot wound? I did. It
left me suspicious of everyone. I had been placed on a one-year
waiting list for repairs and dental work. I was informed that if a
position opened up, they would send a letter to Sylvia P.'s
address and tell me. My license being suspended for six months,
nothing I could do but make the best out of a bad situation. I
also had to pay that hefty fine as well, in order to get
reinstated.
January 1997 finally came around. Enough
clothes and plenty of alcoholic beverages were getting me through
the coldest days. I had also picked up smoking cocaine rock, but
never had enough money to make a habit out of it. This is where
John Wade Adams shows up on the streets and introduces himself. He
tells myself and other homeless individuals that were sitting
around drinking, that he had just gotten out of prison and was on
parole. He never stated what he had done, and I never asked. John
Wade Adams had paroled out to the Life Foundation, in Dallas,
Texas. They took in and fed homeless people for $ 3,00 dollars to
$ 5,00 dollars per night. It was a religious based organization
and I, myself, had worked there as a security guard.
No one could drink alcohol there or come in
drinking, or drunk. You would be turned down for the night unless
it was really cold. John W. Adams made his decision to leave the
Life Foundation and live as a homeless person. He asked me to show
him the ropes to living and making money and I did. I also showed
him where I went to smoke marijuana and crack cocaine. I now wish
I had never done that. As days went by, John W. Adams was making
more and more trips to the dope house, and in the daylight hours.
That is something I had never done. The money that people gave us
was for food or beer, and they would watch to see what we did with
their gift. If I had money by the end of the week to splurge on
drugs, then I went, but only at night.
February showed its face and I had made the
decision it was time to dry out, get my license back and return to
the trucking work force. I left the city and John Wade Adams
behind me and set up camp in a nearby suburb of Desoto. Lancaster
was just across an overpass. These were dry townships, meaning
they did not sell beer or liquor at the stores. They did have a
V.F.W bar for members. If you paid a fee for admission, one could
drink there. I was drying out and so they probably saw me four
times out of 45 days. I went back to holding a "Work For Food"
sign and worked the odd jobs people would give me. I had done
pretty good out there and gained my weight back. I was even trying
to save up some money for an apartment.
I filed for a tax return for the previous year
I had worked, before I had lost my license. Got that money and
went to see how things in the city were doing. I ran into Adams
and while drinking together he informed me that he was afraid his
parole officer might revoke his parole and send him back to prison
if he did not get a job. I told Adams how well I was doing, and
that I had set up camp in a burned out house with a huge fireplace
set well off of the beaten path. I asked police officers who might
own the place, and after checking records they said it belonged to
a bank. There were no "No Trespassing" signs present. There was
nothing of value left. None seemed to mind that I was there. I
invited Adams out to the camp with the promise of finding him a
job. For about four days, Adams stayed out in the Desoto/
Lancaster area. The fact that he could not buy beer and not find
any drugs caused him to go back to the city. He left his
footlocker and some clothes with me at the burned out house. Twice
he returned for a day or two, get clean clothes, and then make his
way back to the city. For about three weeks I never saw him.
I met Donna Duncan Vick in March, 1997. I was
holding my "Work For Food" sign and she needed her lawnmower
cleaned and started, and some yard work done. Said she would fix
me a couple of steaks for my supper, an offer I could not refuse.
I found out she was very religious and dedicated her life to
helping the homeless and bringing Jesus' love and message of
forgiveness to them. She asked me how I became homeless and I told
her. I did her yard work and met one of her neighbours, and when
she came out and asked me to take a ride with her, I complied. We
ended up at the Department of Motor Vehicles. She wanted to verify
my story about my commercial driver's license. We waited our turn,
I gave my C.D.L. number and the whole status of my license was
printed out to us, for a small fee of course. She smiled from ear
to ear when she discovered that I had been telling her the truth.
We also found out that my Texas License was still active, but I
could not get a hard copy. You can only possess one State C.D.L.
My Texas License should have been deactivated when I got my
Tennessee License, I turned in the hard copy. Someone had not done
his or her job at the Department of Motor Vehicles in Tennessee.
From then on, everywhere we went, she wanted me to drive, in order
to get back into the practice. It had been many months since I had
driven.
She owned two vehicles. I worked on many chores
around the house. She picked me up again the next day with a new
proposition. She would let me have her guest bedroom to sleep in,
and she would supply food and cook if I helped her with the
maintenance and upkeep of the house, yard, garage, and motor
vehicles. The idea was to help me get back on my feet and I
accepted. Days later, Ms. Vick asked me if I knew any others like
myself, needing an extra hand getting back on their feet. She had
a room she used as a study and stated it could be used as a
bedroom as well. I thought of John Wade Adams, and told her the
complete situation with Mr. Adams, leaving nothing out. She said,
"Let's go and get him." I had scheduled an appointment at a Mobile
Home dealership for a job that day. I was interviewed by their
secretary and she stated her boss would be gone until the
following week, but that they were hiring and was pretty sure I
would get the job. They needed 3 or 4 workers.
That evening we found John W. Adams at the dope
house. I went in, leaving Ms. Vick in the car. I explained to Mr.
Adams I had found him a job and a place to live. He was high and
almost incoherent. After 15 minutes, I finally escorted him out to
the car. Drugs and the Gospel just don't mix. He did not like Ms.
Vick preaching to him and said as much. She ignored him, and
continued preaching for his soul, all the same. She had done this
with me on our first meeting, so I was used to it. Never was I
offended by it, the way Mr. Adams was. He was dirty, from living
on the streets. I had picked up a mailed package form Sylvia P.'s
house my parents had sent. It contained clean clothes and a pair
of work boots. We stopped at a gas station to let John change
clothes and get cigarettes. I was wearing the boots. John still
being high, I asked Ms. Vick to drop us off at that V.F.W. bar so
to give him a chance to come off his high. Alcohol slows you down.
She dropped us off, making sure I had enough money for cab fare
home.
We found a ride with some patrons of that
establishment and made our way to Ms. Vick's residence. The next
morning she was dead. I've left out details here, to protect
myself in case I am blessed with a new trial. There are other
details I have left out to keep this as brief as possible. However,
you, the reader, know more than my trial jury did when they
reached their guilty verdict on the word and statements of John W.
Adams and Llewelyn Mosely, the owner of the said, "dope house". I
did not call the police, and I transported Mr. Adams and some
stolen property of Ms. Vick's to the place I picked him up. After
fixing a flat tire, I left him there, with the stolen merchandise,
wanting never to be associated with him again. Yes, I made several
bad decisions. However, not once did being accused of murder enter
my mind. When you're not guilty of something, it does not become a
factor in any decisions. I knew the police would be looking for
me. I was the last one seen with her. Everybody I knew was
informed of our living agreement. My fingerprints were everywhere,
of course. I was in shock. That is the only way to explain it. Two
days later, a small assault team attacked the burned out house and
roughly arrested me, after bouncing a flash bang grenade off my
chest. I was not hurt. It bounced and did not go off until it hit
the floor. I was then arrested, stunned for the second time.
Short summary of “Statement of Facts” in Greg’s
application for relief:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT DALLAS 3:01_CV_0472_X
GREGORY EDWARD WRIGHT Applicant VS. STATE OF TEXAS Respondent
APPLICATION FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 2254
Bruce Anton
Carrie Sperling
Mary Margaret Penrose
ATTORNEYS FOR APPLICANT
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
Greg was indicted for the offense of murdering
Donna Vick, a 52 year-old widow, by stabbing her with a knife, in
the course of a robbery on March 23, 1997, in DeSoto, Texas. The
State indicted John Wade Adams for the same crime. The State,
however, chose to try Greg first. The jury charge required the
jury to find that Greg was the primary actor, and not simply an
accomplice. Ms Vick and Greg had a friendly relationship prior to
her death. Ms Vick was a “street minister” who often ministered to
the homeless in the Dallas area. In the week prior to her death Ms
Vick invited Greg to stay in her home where he in return performed
household duties and yard work. Ms Vick purchased Greg new clothes
and shoes, provided him with transportation and planned to attend
church with Greg. Greg also at that time associated with a man
named John Wade Adams who had recently been paroled from the
penitentiary.
The State offered conflicting testimony about
the activities of Greg, John Wade Adams and Ms Vick the evening
prior to the murder March 20, 1997. On the night Ms Vick was
murdered Greg was seen with Ms Vick at the VFW Club. They had been
at the club that evening where they had some drinks and spoke with
other people in the club. Before leaving, Ms Vick had invited a
Donald Cole to her house for breakfast. At approximately 7:30 on
Saturday, March 22, 1997, Daniel McGauhey, a video store clerk,
placed a 911 call to the Dallas Police Department (“DPD”).
Detectives Dan Tripple and Carlton Marshall responded to the call
and met with John Wade Adams at Red Coleman’s Liquor Store on
Industrial Boulevard in Dallas.
Daniel McGauhey first gave a statement to DPD
Officer Freeman in which he said that Adams had approached him and
stated “ I murdered someone in DeSoto and I can’t deal with it. I
want to turn myself in”. This statement was given to the defense
after the trial had begun on December 1, 1997. McGauhey later
provided DPD with a written statement on March 25, 1997. In that
statement he again said that Adams had approached him and asked
McGauhey to call the police because “there was a murder and he (Adams)
wanted to turn himself in.
Despite of the importance of these 911 tapes,
the District Attorney’s Office lost the only copies of the tapes
prior to that time the defense had been able to listen to them.
These tapes have never been given to Greg or his attorneys. Adams’
reversal of field, suddenly placing all blame on Greg,
contradicted his original statement to McGauhey, “I murdered
someone..”.
Only the State knew of this impeachment
evidence and did not turn over this to the defense until the trial
had begun and it was too late to locate Mr McGauhey. Thus, the
State created a false impression that McGauhey merely called 911
because Adams wanted to report a murder, when in fact he had told
investigators that Adams in fact confessed to be the perpetrator.
The State also misled the jury saying it had not had contact with
McGauhey for months and did not know his whereabouts, and trial
judge denied a continuance to find him.
Federal habeas counsel for Greg have located
McGauhey and he maintains that the State kept in close contact
with him and knew his whereabouts and how to contact him. All this
amounts to prosecutorial misconduct in violation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It ultimately allowed
the State to paint a false impression that Greg was the sole
perpetrator when the State knew Adams in fact had confessed. Greg
was thus denied his right to present evidence regarding his claim
of factual innocence.
When taken into custody, Adams proceeded to put
all blame on Greg, something that became the lynchpin of the
prosecution’s case against Greg. The State pursued the theory that
Adams’ statement was credible, that Greg, not Adams, had stabbed
Ms Vick using Adams’ knife. However, when the State subsequently
tried Adams for his participation in the murder, the same State
vigorously objected to the admission of this same statement,
claiming now that the statement was unreliable, self-serving
hearsay.(Adams Trial Vol. 32, pp. 17-19).
At the conclusion the jury was instructed that
Greg was allegedly the sole perpetrator of the murder, and that
Adams was an accomplice, who just happened to be there. Greg was
ultimately found guilty of capital murder and is currently
incarcerated on death row in Texas. The same State indicted John
Wade Adams on capital murder charges for the March 21, 1997,
slaying of Donna Duncan Vick in July 1998, saying he was the sole
perpetrator Greg's Appeal, Evidence
The State's Evidence Against Greg
The State's evidence against Greg at trial
consisted solely on circumstantial evidence linking him to the
crime. Only the statement of Adams and a convicted drug dealer by
the name of Mr Mosley, both highly unreliable witnesses with a
clear motive to fabricate their testimony, directly placed Greg at
the scene of the crime. In fact, when Mosley testified against
Greg, he was facing possible prosecution by the State for receipt
of stolen property, possession of cocaine, possession with intent
to sell, and enhanced by his prior record, he would have received
minimum 25 years if found guilty of his admitted crimes.
A. Evidence found in Ms Vick's home
Investigators found several pieces of physical
evidence in Ms Vick's home, as there would be when he in fact was
living there. Therefore it is not surprising that he would have
left a fingerprint on a Dr Pepper bottle, a gym bag of clothes,
toiletries, and a drop of blood equivalent with what you would
leave on a shower towel in the bathroom while shaving. None of the
investigators could compare the partial fingerprint found on a
pillowcase that covered Ms Vick to a known print, however, the
State then put forward a dubious expert, James Cron, and he
ultimately said the print matched the little finger of Greg. The
testimony should never have been allowed in court, since it never
met any reasonable standard for recognised fingerprint
identification.
B. Evidence found in Ms Vick's car
The fingerprints of Adams were found on the
driver's side window, along with his cigarettes on the driver's
side floorboard, and a wallet with identification all belonging to
Mr Adams. Adams' prison parole papers were found beneath the car's
astray, and if anything the evidence points to Adams as the
individual who murdered and stole her car, since he did not have
permission to drive the car.
C. Evidence found at Llewelyn Mosley's house
Mr Adams led the police to Mosley's house, a
reputed crack house, and there Adams led them to his knife that
contained Ms Vick's blood, along with some other items belonging
to Ms Vick. No physical evidence was linked to Greg. However,
Adams admitted to detective Pothen that he buried the knife there
at Mosley's property.
D. The Umen Jeans
DPD found five pairs of jeans at Greg's former
shack, one of which was the Umen jeans contained with Ms Vick's
blood in the leg and crotch area. The evidence at trial
established that in fact Greg was wearing dark new jeans the night
of the murder. Furthermore, the jeans would not have fit Greg
since he is 6' and weighed 190 lbs when he was arrested and a 36
waist, whereas the bloody the jeans were a size 32. When Adams was
arrested March 23, 1997, he weighed 165 lbs and wore jeans a size
32.
E. The State's deal with L. Mosley
Mosley, a habitual felon, admitted to
committing several serious crimes during his testimony in the case
as mentioned before. At trial he testified under oath that he had
received no inducements from the State in return for his testimony,
however, federal habeas counsel have discovered that Mosley in
fact was promised that he would not be prosecuted for his crimes
for which he had confessed if he testified for the State against
Greg. Kent Taylor, Mosley's attorney, stated under oath at Adams'
trial that Mosley had received an "offer". The fact that this
offer was not disclosed to the defense prior to Mosley's testimony
shows that the State knowingly misled the jury and violated Greg's
Sixth Amendment right to confront and impeach witnesses against
him at trial.
F. The 911 tapes
The best evidence of McGauhey's 911 call would
be the tapes that was made. Excited utterances are accepted as a
hearsay exception, however, the actual 911 call reporting a murder
would be the most accurate version of that confession. As the
court well knows, 911 tapes are routinely preserved as evidence in
assault cases because of their crucial nature. Curiously, in this
case the prosecutor claims to have misplaced McGauhey, but also to
have lost any record of his call.
G. The Existence of Jerry Causey
Despite the State's clear obligation, it failed
to alert the defense of another important witness, Jerry Causey.
The State used him in Adams' trial as its witness to convict Adams
for the murder of Ms Vick. Causey testified that he was present at
Mosley's crack house when Adams turned up trying to exchange
stolen goods for crack just hours after the murder. Causey asked
Adams whose car he was driving and Adams said: "It's the bitch's
car", whereupon Causey asked Adams, "What bitch?", and Adams said:
"The bitch I killed". Despite the obvious exculpatory nature of
this statement concerning Greg, the State never informed his
attorneys of the existence of Jerry Causey. The State never
identified or listed Causey as a possible witness in Greg's trial
although they knew about this before Greg's trial. Like Adams'
confession to Mr McGauhey, the video store clerk, the confession
to Mr Causey inculpated Adams while exculpating Greg. The State's
failure to inform Greg's attorneys of this obvious exculpatory
evidence undermined his ability to present his claim of factual
innocence.
H. Adams' confession to Charles Nealy
John Wade Adams confessed to several people
that he, not Greg, murdered Ms Vick. He also confessed to Charles
Nealy while being incarcerated in Dallas County Jail prior to his
trial. Check affidavit of Charles Nealy. Mr Nealy came forward
with this evidence when he learned that Greg had in fact been
convicted of the crime. Jail records show that Greg was never
housed with Nealy so could not have concocted the confession,
furthermore, he never knew Greg. Moreover, Greg has adamantly
denied committing this crime, telling police officers all along "You
have the wrong guy". This affidavit also supports Greg's claim of
factual innocence.
I. Adams' use of Greg's shack
The State withheld from Greg's defense crucial
evidence that Adams shared Greg's former residence, the so-called
Beckley shack where there among other things the incriminating
jeans were found. Along with the blood soaked jeans correspondence
and other personal documents belonging to Adams were found. The
State's failure to disclosure this exculpatory evidence until the
State's final day, namely that Adams had control of the shack,
prevented Greg from properly presenting his claim of factual
innocence.
CONCLUSION BY GREG'S ATTORNEYS
Greg has steadily alleged that he is not guilty
of the murder of Donna Duncan Vick. Instead, John Adams, another
man on death row, is responsible. Indeed, Adams has confessed to
several people that he murdered Ms Vick. The State of Texas,
however, now claims that both Greg and John Wade Adams murdered Ms
Vick as co-actors in the crime. This is a completely new theory of
the crime embraced after the conviction of Greg. Rather, during
Greg's trial, the State of Texas argued to the jury that Greg
murdered Ms Vick, and Adams was merely caught at the scene by
happenstance
In addition to his factual claim of innocence
Greg further alleges that the State of Texas withheld exculpatory
evidence that would have allowed him to establish his claims of
innocence. The omitted and withheld evidence would have convinced
a jury that Adams acted alone in murdering Ms Vick. In fact, the
State of Texas continues to withhold crucial material evidence
from Greg and his attorneys. First, the State withheld evidence
material to the defense and at trial knowingly misrepresented
evidence, more specifically the witnesses favourable to the
defense, witnesses that were known to the State and available to
testify at trial. The State also manufactured fingerprint evidence
against Greg at trial. The State continues to withhold some of
this evidence, claiming it is either lost or misplaced.
The State of Texas also throughout the trial
continuously argued that Greg acted alone in murdering Ms Vick,
asserting that Adams was a mere bystander or victim of
circumstance. The same State's assertion however completely
changed once Greg was convicted and sentenced to die and Adams
stood accused of the same crime in the subsequent separate trial.
The State of Texas in Adams' trial suddenly
shifted to arguing that the bloody jeans in fact were Adams', and
Adams' sudden shift in confessing that it was in fact Greg that
murdered Ms Vick was just a way to save his own neck, then no one
can have confidence in the verdict that Greg was the murderer. "This
case appears to be a classic miscarriage of justice. Wright was
framed by Adams, law enforcement, put to trial at ambush, and
provided with State writ attorneys who did not prepare properly".
(P. 27 APPLICANT'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT)
Prayer
"Wherefore, premises considered, applicant
respectfully prays that this court conduct an evidentiary hearing
on the disputed matters of fact raised in the writ including, but
not limited to, the State's use of inconsistent theories of
prosecution, the failure to disclose Brady evidence, including
witnesses Causey and McGauhey, the factual basis, if any, for
Cron's fingerprint testimony, whether applicant is capable of
wearing the jeans worn by the murderer, the existence of and
circumstances surrounding the offer made to witness Mosley in
return for his testimony, the disposition of the original 911
tape, defense counsel's effort to investigate and present
mitigating evidence. After hearing, applicant prays that this writ
be in all things granted and that the underlying conviction be set
aside". (P. 28 APPLICANT'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT)
Life on Death Row
Gregory E. Wright's statement concerning living
conditions on Death Row
I the year 2000, Texas moved its prisoners of
Death Row from Ellis One Unit in Huntsville, Texas, to a much more
secure facility; Polunsky Unit in Livingston, Texas. The Polunsky
Unit, once known as the Terrell Unit, is a Super Maximum Security
facility complete with surrounding guard towers, multiple
perimeter fences, rows upon rows of razor wire, and a high voltage
15'foot high perimeter fence. The unit also houses prisoners
serving years of time for their conviction. Currently, there are
approximately 450 prisoners on Death Row. We are locked in single
man cells located on what is referred to as Pods. There are six
such Pods - A, B, C, D, E, and F Pod. Each Pod has 84 cells.
Management has created a classification status for its Death Row
prisoners. Depending on your conduct and ability to follow rules
and orders, Death Row prisoners are assigned Level #1, Level #2,
or Level #3 status, where 1 is the best, 3 being the worst. I have
maintained a near perfect record, with no disiplinary actions
taken against me ever since the date of my incarceration, March of
1997. I have sustained level #1 status up until August 2003, after
having been denied my request of being moved to another pod. I
damaged my cell door, trying to get ranking official's attention,
by kicking on it. My level was downgraded for "Destruction of
State Property". Now, I have been moved back to level #1 again.
Since moving to the Polunsky Unit, in the year
2000, the hardest thing to get used to is being in a one-man cell,
23 hours every day, with only a small headphone radio and pen-friend
letters to confirm that an outside world exists. The other one-hour
is used for recreation, which is conducted in a big cage. The
mental anxiety and frustration of this type of "Deprivating
Incarceration" is enough to drive a sane individual into a
depressive or opposite, aggressive state of mind. According to the
individual's own adaptable capabilities and willingness to follow
orders, this type of incarceration will slowly take its toll on
the mind set and attitude, causing the prisoner to not want to
live and to give up their life, deciding the sooner the better.
Texas Death Row is the only Death Row in the U.S. that does not
allow its prisoners viewing privileges and television. This is
most problematic for prisoners that cannot read or write, or have
a low I.Q. Family and friends can only send letters, greeting
cards, post cards and photographs from home. A "pre -approved"
retailer or store management must send all books, newspapers and
magazines, after purchasing the subscription. Everything else,
such as stamps, stationary, hygiene items, clothes, food, and
drinks, must be purchased through the unit's store. Family and
friends send money orders to an Inmate Trust Fund in Huntsville,
Texas. This money is recorded on a central computer system. Once a
week, when the prisoner makes a store purchase, the amount is
deducted from his Trust Fund.
Food is a touchy subject with Death Row
prisoners. The complaints are many, and I'll name only a few;
Dirty trays or spoons, cold food, undercooked/overcooked, spoiled
meat, unwashed vegetables, portion of food too small, and those
serving meal trays are not always wearing plastic gloves or hair
net. Please keep in mind, the facility has a "Grievance system"
and does address each complaint. Unfortunately, it would seem, it
takes a substancial number of complaints to get anything done. The
food care and variety has greatly improved since the year 2000.Prisoners
receive three meals a day, regardless if they are able to purchase
food from the unit's store or not. The amount varies from day to
day and if the prisoner is reducted to classification level #3,
their food portions will be cut in half for 30 days, for
disiplinary reasons, or as a way of controlling assaultive
attitudes. It is debatable on the productability of this type of
discipline.
There are two types of "Jailers", if I may use
such a term. These make up the unit's staff. They are "Guards" and
"Ranking Officers". It is my personal experience that some guards
will lie to a prisoner to appease him of their complaint. However,
Ranking Officers have a higher standard of moral ethics and
usually can be relied upon for most complaints. However, if the
prisoner is known for not adjusting to rules and authority, their
respective complaints may be subjected to an indifferent attitude.
Because of the high security of this facility, it is "policy" to
conduct cell- to-cell searches on a nightly basis. A cell list is
produced by computer and cells picked at random for these searches.
If the searching guard does not like you, your personal property
will be left in disarray throughout the cell. There is a limit to
the amount of property a Death Row prisoner may possess. This
topic has generated numerous complaints because the property is
placed in what looks to be a two-foot, by one-foot rectangle box
that is approximately 18 inches deep. If these measurements are
not exact, then they are certainly a close estimation. Please keep
in mind that a Death Row prisoner lives in the cell. While a
property limit is necessary, the restricting limit now set is
slightly too retraining.
Two mandatory "Lock - Down" prisoner /cell
searches are conducted annually. This Lock - Down status stops all
prisoner movement until all cells and property have been searched.
No one-hour recreation, showers only three times per week, no
visits (unless it is attorney or planned pre-scheduled "special"
visits), and no store purchases. There are approximately 440 cells
and property to be searched and the lenght of time can take
upwards of four weeks, putting a real mental strain on the
prisoners. The only phone calls conducted are from attorneys or
family members during an emergency of life threatening
circumstances. Death Row prisoners in Texas do not otherwise make
phone calls. Air quality and temperature is managed by a central
air system. The prisoner may purchase fans from the unit's store,
if necessary. A mat of compressed cotton or wool is given to us to
sleep on. After three months, depending on prisoner's weight, the
mattress compresses to a hard flat object that makes for uneasy
sleeping. This mat may be exchanged after a one-year period.
Texas Death Row prisoners are allowed one visit
per week. These visits are conducted with plexiglass and phone
recievers. There is a big pane of glass between the parties and to
hear each other, they must talk and listen through a telephone
receiver. No physical contact. Whenever a prisoner in being
escorted, whether to recreation, shower, medical or visit, two
guards are doing the escorting and prisoner is always handcuffed.
I now have scars and callous on my wrists where I have been
handcuffed so many times. Prisoners request books from either the
unit's library or Law Library. A list will be provided for titles
or information in obtain certain literature. These are not big
libraries but adequate for for the prisoner's general needs. It
must be noted that upon a downgrade in classification status,
regular library privileges will be forfeited. However, Law Library
requests may still be conducted. Regular library requests are made
on a one-to-two week intervals. Law Library requests are done
three times per week, with only three material requests honored
each time. This makes learning legal rules, guidelines and the law,
in general, a slow and tedious process. All requests are made from
the cell. Death Row prisoners do not visit the libraries.
Remember, I have been homeless. I would take
the life and freedom of a homeless person over this type of
existence, any day. For fear of repercussions, I will end here,
but will answer personlized questions in the form of corresponding
letters.
About Us
Evy and Bente
-TWO NORWEGIANS AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY
Bente Hjortshoj
I am 44 years old, Danish of origin, but a
resident of Norway since 1982 where I got married, had two
children, now 21 and 18 years of age. I finished at the Teacher's
College in 1987 and have since then been teaching English at a
private high school called Aglo, north of Trondheim in Central
Norway. In the year 2000, I finished my post-graduate studies in
American history and politics at the University of Trondheim in
Central Norway while teaching English full time. It was rewarding,
educational and extremely interesting. In that connection my
mentor asked what topic I would choose for my Master's Degree, and
by then I just knew it somehow had to be about the use of the
death penalty in the USA. I had been a member of Amnesty
International for a while, and recently joined a Norwegian
organization against the death penalty, NORAX. I received my first
letter from Greg October 20, 2000. My intention, as well as NORAX',
was to reach out to a fellow human being, to be a support in an
inmate's daily ordeals. I never gave it any thought whether Greg
might be guilty, it was not my job to judge or presume anything.
So for the first year or so I did not ask him any questions about
the case. Based on advice from NORAX, which unfortunately does not
exist today, we were told to let the actual inmate decide whether
he or she wanted to disclose any information. Besides, I knew the
prison officials were scanning all letters, and might hold any
information against him. However, had Greg at any time admitted or
stated that he was guilty it would have made no difference. That
is and never was any issue for me. I simply cannot support a
system that kills to prove that killing is wrong. It is inhumane,
to put it mildly. Not to mention the fact that it without any
doubt has killed innocent people due to extreme flaws in the
system, something that I deal with in my thesis; "The Exonerated".
Throughout the entire year I got the feeling
that Greg was something out of the ordinary, extremely caring,
intelligent and with a great sense of humor, something which I
admired him for being in that position. He always asked about my
kids, my students, my bad back, and I was impressed with his
personality. He never asked for anything, not even money. He did
not strike me as a hardened criminal, so I finally decided that I
wanted to know the specifics about his case, guilty or not. He
gave me the names and addresses of his lawyers, and I got the case
files from them. That probably became the turning point in my
interest since both the private investigator at that time, Tina
Church, and his lawyers, Bruce Anton and Carrie Sperling, seemed
to think he had a good case. I read the State's rejection of his
first appeal, and later his application for relief with great
interest. It is not something anybody can just read and understand
just like that. I have, though I am a non-scholar in this field,
due to my research in connection with my own thesis on the subject
established some knowledge on the matter.
However, there were and still are many things I
still not quite fathom. For instance, how is it possible for the
State of Texas still to withhold material evidence from Greg and
his lawyers? How could the State of Texas first convict Greg as
the murderer, claiming among other things that he wore the bloody
Umen jeans size 32, knowing full well he was a size 36, and then
convict Adams with the exact same evidence, knowing he fit the
trousers being a size 32? My problem is that I think as a European,
but to understand the question I have to think as a Southerner, a
Texan, and then it makes sense, sadly enough. The State of Texas
will not admit any wrongdoings, perhaps it never will. Obviously
John Wade Adams has a different version, just check out his web
site. I do not blame him for that, if I were him I would fight for
my life too. I do not want him dead; I just want justice for Greg,
which ultimately includes a new but fair trial.
That is what this is all about. Greg was
railroaded, and framed by his ex-friend, and subsequently I got
more and more involved in his case, e-mailing his lawyers, looking
into articles from Texan courts, checking out information on the
Internet for him, for instance about his medical situation, and I
kept in touch with one of the few people who actually visits him
on a regular basis, a good decent Christian woman, whose name I
will not reveal since I have not asked her permission. This past
summer, July 3, my daughter Line, who was an au pair in Long
Island at the time, and I visited Greg at Polunsky Unit, and
luckily I actually met this amazing woman at the prison, and I am
glad to say that she was everything I thought she was. She visits
several inmates voluntarily. I got the opportunity to thank her
for being there for Greg. I know he treasures her visits. It was
both the worst and the best we have ever done. It was tough to see
Greg being brought into that small visiting room like an animal in
a cage, but we had a good time during our three-hour visit. We had
prepared ourselves as well as we could for the emotional ordeal it
would be to see Greg, and Greg was in fact what I had imagined he
would be. You see, you do not really know what a person is like
just based on three years of correspondence, or do you? We both
felt deeply moved seeing him, and to be honest he handled the
situation far more superb than we did. It was hard to see all the
rows of inmates and their families, parted by a wall of glass and
only a telephone at our disposal. I kept thinking as a European,
and what our prisoners are allowed to. It almost broke our hearts
saying goodbye, and we were happy that my distant cousin was
waiting outside to take us back to Dallas. It felt good to talk to
him about everything we had experienced. I kept thinking that
whatever we must feel, it was still far worse for Greg, he was
still stuck there.
A year ago I also started telling my adult
students about Greg and his case, not just because of self-interest,
but it is in fact on our English curriculum to learn about capital
punishment, and what better way to inform them than from "real
life"? One thing led to another, and soon they volunteered to send
both letters and monetary gifts to help Greg. He was very happy to
find out that so many cared about him and his situation. This is
where my former student, Evy, comes in. She heard about him this
last school year, and during that year she also wrote him a letter.
All my students knew that I was going to see Greg during my
vacation, and they all wanted to meet with me when I returned to
hear all about it. There and then Evy decided that she wanted to
help me out creating a web site to seek sponsors for Greg, and
this is the result. She has the knowledge on the creation of such
a web site, I had the personal knowledge about Greg and his case,
and so it made sense to join forces. Together we ask for your help.
Obviously he firstly needs money for his defense, secondly he
needs money for items common and easily accessible for us, like
paper, pens, and envelopes. They will enable him to keep in touch
with family and friends, as well as his lawyers. Perhaps you will
as well? October 16, 2003, a local paper interviewed my daughter
Line and me in connection with our visit to Polunsky Unit, and
Greg. I had together with my students and Evy in particular, found
out that we wanted more people to know about the horrible
conditions under which death row inmates live, and obviously to
make them aware of the injustice of the system. We had decided to
try to gather support for Greg and his case, something which both
this article and web site are examples of.
Evy Lovtangen
I am just an average 25-year-old girl/woman who
cares when justice has failed. Bente immediately got my attention
when she introduced Greg's situation to me. I wrote him a long
letter, asking him a lot of questions and telling him about my
self and my life. Besides of writing letters to Greg and working
on this web-site I am the mother of a six-year-old boy, and I am
also a student at The Norwegian University of Nature-science and
Technology (NTNU) where I am currently studying Biotechnology and
English. I have not yet decided what to become when I grow up, but
I am planning on taking nursery school this autumn due to the fact
that I do have Paramedic education and would like to work as a
nurse in an emergency room or in a paramedic unit. Time will show
what I want to do with my life. The fact that I am in a situation
where I can plan my life ahead and say thing like "time will
show.." is something most of us take for granted. Of course we do.
That is what we call freedom. Greg is one of the real poor people
who have had that human right taken from him. He can not plan his
life ahead, he does not even know if he has a life in a year, two
years and so on. And why?; Because some attorney did not do his
job. It is this kind of justice which has failed in this case. A
man's fundamental human right of freedom is taken away from him. I
really hope that you who read this think the same as I, and are
willing to do something to help him out.
Wright v. State, 28 S.W.3d 526 (Tex.Crim.App.
2000.) (Direct Appeal).
Defendant was convicted in the trial court,
Dallas County, Robert Francis, J., of capital murder, and he
appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals, Johnson, J., held that:
(1) defendant failed to preserve alleged error or establish harm
from alleged error in appointment of counsel; (2) defendant was
not harmed by alleged error in attempted amendment of indictment
or failure of trial court to grant 10-day continuance following
amendment; (3) due process did not entitle defendant to additional
time for experts to analyze state's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
evidence; (4) defendant's presence was not mandatory under Code of
Criminal Procedure when judge excused juror; (5) defendant's
rights were not violated by trial court's limiting of form of
question in voir dire; (6) defendant did not establish that he was
harmed by trial court's denial of challenges to two jurors for
cause; and (7) testimony regarding conversation between accomplice
and officer, in which accomplice stated defendant committed murder,
was admissible. Affirmed.
JOHNSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which McCORMICK, P.J., and MEYERS, MANSFIELD, PRICE, HOLLAND,
WOMACK and KEASLER, J.J., joined.
Appellant was convicted of capital murder in
December 1997. tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a). Pursuant to the
jury's answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure article 37.071 §§ 2(b) and 2(e), the trial
court sentenced him to death. Art. 37.071 § 2(g).FN1 Direct appeal
to this Court is automatic. Art. 37.071 § 2(h). Appellant raises
sixteen points of error. Because he does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence to support either his conviction or
punishment, a statement of facts is not necessary. We affirm.
PRE-TRIAL ISSUES
In his second point of error, appellant
complains that the trial court failed to comply with the selection
process prescribed by Article 26.052 in appointing him a trial
attorney and that he was thereby deprived of “qualified” trial
counsel. Appellant also asserts that the legislature's use of the
language “attorneys ‘qualified’ for appointment” in Article
26.052(d), necessarily means that the legislature intended for
capital defendants to be appointed lawyers who would provide more
than the “minimally ‘effective’ representation” required by the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984). Appellant provides no support for this interpretation of
the statute.
Article 26.052 generally provides that, in
administrative judicial regions not served by a public defender's
office, a local selection committee shall be created and shall
adopt standards for the qualification of attorneys to be appointed
to death penalty cases.FN2 We note that appellant points to no
place in the record where he objected to the procedure used to
appoint him counsel or to the qualifications of his counsel; thus,
he failed to preserve this point for appellate review. tex.R.App.
P. 33.1(a)(1); see also Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602, 618 (Tex.Crim.App.),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 917, 118 S.Ct. 305, 139 L.Ed.2d 235 (1997).
However, because his complaint is that trial counsel was not
qualified, in the interest of justice, we will review the point.
FN2. Art. 26.052. Appointment of Counsel in
Death Penalty Case, Reimbursement of Investigative Expenses.(a)
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, this article
establishes procedures in death penalty cases for appointment and
payment of counsel to represent indigent defendants at trial and
on direct appeal and to apply for writ of certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court. (b) If a county is served by a public
defender's office, trial counsel and counsel for direct appeal or
to apply for a writ of certiorari may be appointed as provided by
the guidelines established by the public defender's office. In all
other cases in which the death penalty is sought, counsel shall be
appointed as provided by this article. (c) A local selection
committee is created in each administrative judicial region
created under Section 74.042, Government Code. The administrative
judge of the judicial region shall appoint the members of the
committee. A committee shall have not less than four members,
including: (1) the administrative judge of the judicial region;(2)
at least one district judge;(3) a representative from the local
bar association; and(4) at least one practitioner who is board
certified by the State Bar of Texas in criminal law.(d) The
committee shall adopt standards for the qualification of attorneys
for appointment to death penalty cases. The committee shall
prominently post the standards in each district clerk's office in
the region with a list of attorneys qualified for appointment. (e)
The presiding judge of the district court in which a capital
felony case is filed shall appoint counsel to represent an
indigent defendant as soon as practicable after charges are filed,
if the death penalty is sought in the case. The judge shall
appoint lead trial counsel from the list of attorneys qualified
for appointment. The judge shall appoint a second counsel to
assist in the defense of the defendant, unless reasons against the
appointment of two counsel are stated in the record.
Assuming, arguendo, that the statute was not
adhered to, we consider whether appellant was harmed by the
noncompliance. See Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).
Appellant has made no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
nor has he pointed to any specific instances of misconduct.
Further, our own reading of the record has not shown any obvious
inadequacies in representation.FN3 Without harm, appellant cannot
prevail on this point of error. Point of error two is overruled.
FN3. The record reveals that appellant's
attorney filed numerous pre-trial motions, conducted voir dire,
cross-examined the state's witnesses, made objections, and made
arguments at both phases of trial.
Appellant asserts in his third point of error
that the trial court erred by denying his motion to quash the
indictment, contending that the instrument had been improperly
amended without notice. In his fourth point of error, appellant
asserts that the trial court erred in failing to give him a ten-day
continuance because of the amendment, as required by Article
28.10.
The record reveals that on April 30, 1997, the
state filed an indictment alleging that appellant murdered Donna
Vick “on or about the 23 rd day of March A.D.1997....” On May 16
th, the state filed a motion to amend the indictment requesting
that “21 st” be substituted for “23 rd.” The indictment was
subsequently physically altered with the “23 rd” crossed out and
“21 st” handwritten in and initialed.FN4 Voir dire began on August
25 th, and various panels were told that the crime occurred on or
about March 21 st. Appellant did not appear to have recognized
that the date had been changed until the last week of voir dire in
early November. Approximately thirteen days after the conclusion
of voir dire, appellant filed a motion to quash the indictment,
claiming that he had not received notice of the amendment.
FN4. This was apparently done by the trial
court, although the initials are not entirely clear.
At a hearing on the motion to quash, the
prosecutor claimed that he had served the motion to amend the
indictment on defense counsel shortly after the trial court had
altered the date on the face of the indictment. Defense counsel
denied ever receiving the document and urged that, even if he had
received notice, service after amendment would have been improper
under Article 28.10. The trial court denied appellant's motion.
Following a recess, the state noted that it had
reviewed Article 28.10 and acknowledged that service after
amending the indictment was a violation of the statute. Hence, the
state conceded that the indictment had not been effectively
amended. The state urged the trial court to disregard the
amendment and proceed on the original indictment. Defense counsel
responded that, properly or not, the indictment had been
physically amended and it would take an additional amendment
complying with the Article 28.10 procedures to effectively
reinstate the original date on the document. Following Article
28.10, this amendment would then entitle appellant to a ten-day
continuance before the start of trial.
The trial court again denied the motion to
quash, but proclaimed that the attempted amendment from the date
of the 23 rd to the date of the 21 st was not effective. However,
the trial court refused to again physically alter the face of the
indictment to remedy the ineffective amendment. The indictment was
presented to the jury with the original language.FN5 The trial
court denied appellant's request for a continuance under Article
28.10.
FN5. The jury charge also contained the date of
March 23rd as originally returned in the indictment.
The thrust of appellant's argument is that
because he was not properly notified of the amendment to the
indictment, he was entitled to no less than a ten-day period to
address the change and prepare for trial. We need not determine
whether the amendment to the indictment was indeed effective or
whether the trial court erred in denying appellant ten days to
prepare for trial. Rather, we hold that appellant was not harmed
by these events. See tex.R.App. P. 44.2; Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d
262 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).
It is well settled that the “on or about”
language of an indictment allows the state to prove a date other
than the one alleged as long as the date proven is anterior to the
presentment of the indictment and within the statutory limitation
period. See Art. 21.02(6); Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253, 255-56
(Tex.Crim.App.1997); Mitchell v. State, 168 Tex.Crim. 606, 330 S.W.2d
459, 462 (1959). There is no statute of limitations period for
murder. See Art. 12.01(1). Hence, when appellant was indicted for
murder, he was put on notice to prepare for proof that the crime
happened any time before the presentment of the indictment. Sledge,
supra; Thomas v. State, 753 S.W.2d 688, 693 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).
Because both the original date and the date of the attempted
amendment, which differed by two days, were prior to the
presentment of the indictment, the indictment provided adequate
notice for proof of either date.FN6 Id. Points of error three and
four are overruled.
FN6. We note that the state filed the motion to
amend the date on the indictment more than five months before
trial on the merits began.
Appellant submits in his fifth point of error
that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance
to afford his defense expert an opportunity to review DNA analyses
recently developed by the state's experts. A motion for
continuance is regulated by statute. See Art. 29.01, et. seq.
Granting or denying such a motion is within the sound discretion
of the trial court. See Art. 29.01, et. seq. ; Janecka v. State,
937 S.W.2d 456, 468 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
825, 118 S.Ct. 86, 139 L.Ed.2d 43 (1997). In order to establish an
abuse of the trial court's discretion, an appellant must show that
the denial of his motion resulted in actual prejudice. Janecka,
937 S.W.2d at 468.
Appellant correctly notes that the United
States Supreme Court declared in Ake v. Oklahoma that due process
requires that a defendant be given access to the raw materials
integral to the building of an effective defense. Ake, 470 U.S.
68, 76-77, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1092, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). This access
includes the appointment of experts. Ake, supra. However,
appellant does not claim that he was denied a necessary expert;
rather, he argues that he should have been granted additional time
for his expert to review the state's evidence. We do not agree.
Although appellant knew early on that this case involved blood/DNA
analysis, and, although he had ample opportunity, he did not
request that a defense DNA expert be appointed until December 1,
1997, the first day of trial on the merits.
On September 29, 1997, the state tendered a
number of documents to appellant pursuant to a standing discovery
order. On this same day, appellant specifically asked the
prosecutor about the DNA testing results and was informed that the
report should be completed within the next two to three weeks. The
prosecutor also told appellant that the person preparing the
report and the other members of the staff at the laboratory where
the tests were performed would be available for interviews with
defense counsel and would go over any preliminary results of tests
that they already had. Yet, appellant did not request a defense
DNA expert.
On October 14, 1997, appellant received a
preliminary written report on the DNA testing results and on
November 11, 1997, he received a complete report. On November 25,
1997, the state informed appellant that it intended to have
testing performed on the same evidence by a second laboratory and
that the results of these retests would not be available until
December 1, 1997. Despite receiving these reports and
communications from the state about additional testing, appellant
still did not file a motion to have a defense DNA expert appointed
until December 1, 1997, when the trial court granted the motion in
its entirety.
Although appellant contends that the denial of
his motion for continuance resulted in an unfair trial, he does
not establish that the court's refusal to give him additional time
actually prejudiced him. See Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500,
511 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). Even if appellant could point to specific
prejudice under this point of error, he would not now be allowed
to profit from his own failure to act. Hence, appellant has failed
to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in failing
to grant his motion for continuance. Point of error five is
overruled.
VOIR DIRE
In his eighth point of error, appellant asserts
that the trial court should have held a hearing and allowed
questioning by the parties before excusing juror Downey. Because
the court failed to do this but, in fact, examined the
circumstances and excused the juror in the absence of both
appellant and the juror, appellant asserts that the trial court
violated his right to be present during trial. See Article 33.03.
Appellant does not complain of the excusal of juror Downey, only
that appellant was denied a hearing and his right to be present at
the hearing.
The record reveals that Downey was the second
juror to be seated in appellant's case. On the first day of trial,
but before the jury had been sworn in, the trial court informed
the parties that Downey had called the court obviously upset and
had explained that her mother had just died and that she was on
her way to the funeral. Downey made it clear to the court that she
was emotionally unable to proceed as a juror in the case. The
state had no objection to seating the alternate as the twelfth
juror in the case, but appellant objected that Downey had not been
shown to be disqualified and, therefore, a hearing, in which
appellant must be present, should be held. Nevertheless, the court
excused Downey in absentia and seated the alternate juror in her
stead.
The trial court has broad discretion to excuse
prospective jurors for good reason. Butler v. State, 830 S.W.2d
125 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Article 35.03. This authority continues
even after an individual juror has been sworn and exists until the
entire jury is empaneled and sworn. Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d
267, 277-78 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Kemp v. State, 846 S.W.2d 289,
295, n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 918, 113
S.Ct. 2361, 124 L.Ed.2d 268 (1993). Accordingly, before the entire
jury has been empaneled and sworn, the trial court may excuse a
juror with or without the consent of the parties. Because the
trial court has such broad discretion to excuse a juror, appellant
was not entitled to a formal hearing, hence, appellant's presence
is not mandatory pursuant to Article 33.03 (mandating that a
defendant be present during trial and voir dire proceedings). See
Adanandus v. State, 866 S.W.2d 210, 216-20 (Tex.Crim.App.1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1215, 114 S.Ct. 1338, 127 L.Ed.2d 686
(1994).
Although appellant does not complain of the
excusal itself, we find that the trial court, after ascertaining
that Downey was unable to proceed as a juror, did not abuse its
discretion in excusing her. Point of error eight is overruled.
Appellant asserts in his eleventh and twelfth
points of error that the trial court violated his federal and
state constitutional rights by restricting his voir dire
examination of venire member Zablosky.FN7 Specifically, appellant
complains that he was prohibited from inquiring into whether
Zablosky would automatically find that a person is a continuing
threat to society simply because he was found guilty of capital
murder. The exchange of which appellant complains follows:
FN7. Appellant contends that the trial court
violated his right to effective assistance of counsel, his right
against cruel and unusual punishment, and his rights to due
process and due course of law.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Let's talk about a situation
where you have found the person on trial for capital murder guilty
as charged. As you've been told, you then move over to these three
questions. Now I-I read question 1, and sometimes I think that
that's kind of a-an illogical question, because I almost feel like
that if I've just found somebody- [THE PROSECUTOR:] Objection,
Your Honor. Can we approach on this? (Off-the-record bench
conference was had.)THE COURT: All right. Mr. Zablosky, if you
would do me a favor and step out in the hall for just a minute.
I'll bring you right back in. (Juror not present.) THE COURT: All
right. The-we're outside the presence of the juror. [Defense
Counsel], you may state your proposed question for the record. [DEFENSE
COUNSEL:] My question was, is this-I look at question number 1,
and I think that it might be illogical that if a person has just
been convicted of a capital murder, some people would think that
question 1 would automatically be answered yes. How do you feel
about that? THE COURT: I sustain the State's objection to the form
of that question. Defense counsel then moved on to other topics in
the voir dire examination.
Appellant is correct in his assertion that it
is a proper area of inquiry to ask a venire member whether a
finding of guilty would automatically dictate a result in his mind
as to the punishment questions. Howard v. State, 941 S.W.2d 102,
108-09 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Ex parte McKay, 819 S.W.2d 478, 483 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).
Further, a trial court would err if he refused to allow questions
in a proper area of inquiry. Id. However, this is not the
situation presented here.
In the exchange quoted above, appellant asked
his question and the state made a general objection and asked to
approach the bench. After a discussion outside the presence of the
venire member, the trial court sustained the objection as to the
form of the question. This ruling in no way prohibited appellant
from attempting to rephrase his question and ask it again, thereby
covering the desired topic with the venire member, but he did not.
As we stated in Howard, if the trial court
merely limits a question due to its form, trial counsel must
determine the basis of the limitation and attempt to fashion a
query which complies with the perceived inadequacy. Howard, 941
S.W.2d at 110-11. Here, appellant made no attempt to determine the
basis of the trial court's ruling and made no attempt to comply
with that ruling. Although appellant is authorized to ask proper
questions in a particular area of inquiry, he is not entitled to
ask questions in any particular form. Id. Because appellant did
not follow through on this topic, we cannot say that the trial
court improperly restricted his voir dire of this venire member.
Points of error eleven and twelve are overruled.
In points of error thirteen and fourteen,
appellant complains that the trial court erred in denying his
challenges for cause to two different venire members. To preserve
error, an appellant must demonstrate on the record that he
asserted a clear and specific challenge for cause, that he used a
peremptory challenge on the complained-of venire member, that all
of his peremptory challenges were exhausted, that his request for
additional strikes was denied, and that an objectionable juror sat
on the jury. Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 105 (Tex.Crim.App.1996),
cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1200, 117 S.Ct. 1561, 137 L.Ed.2d 707
(1997).
The record in the instant case shows that after
the parties accepted the eleventh juror, appellant exhausted his
fourteenth and fifteenth peremptory challenges. Appellant then
requested and received two additional challenges. After using
those challenges, appellant again requested additional challenges,
but the request was denied. The twelfth juror was seated
immediately thereafter over appellant's objection.
When the trial court errs in overruling a
challenge for cause against a venire member, the defendant is
harmed only if he uses a peremptory strike to remove the venire
member and thereafter suffers a detriment from the loss of the
strike. Demouchette v. State, 731 S.W.2d 75, 83 (Tex.Crim.App.1986),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 920, 107 S.Ct. 3197, 96 L.Ed.2d 685 (1987).
Because the record reflects that appellant received two extra
strikes in addition to the fifteen he was granted by statute, he
did not suffer the loss of two strikes. For appellant to
demonstrate harm, and thereby reversible error, he must show that
challenges for cause on at least three different venire members
were erroneously denied. Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 732 (Tex.Crim.App.1995),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 977, 116 S.Ct. 480, 133 L.Ed.2d 408 (1995);
Martinez v. State, 763 S.W.2d 413, 425 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert.
denied, 512 U.S. 1246, 114 S.Ct. 2765, 129 L.Ed.2d 879 (1994).
Because appellant has asserted error as to only two venire members,
he cannot show that he was harmed. Penry, supra. Points of error
thirteen and fourteen are overruled.
GUILT/INNOCENCE PHASE OF TRIAL
Appellant complains in his first point of error
that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the
testimony of Detective Dan Trippel detailing his conversation with
“accomplice” John Adams, who did not testify.FN8 Appellant asserts
that the evidence constituted hearsay and was the only direct
evidence that appellant personally stabbed the victim. Appellant
also asserts for the first time on appeal that the admission of
this evidence deprived him of the opportunity to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him. FN8. Appellant
characterizes Adams as an “accomplice.”
Trippel testified on direct examination that,
on the night of March 22, 1997, he was called to meet a man later
identified as John Adams. Pursuant to what Adams told him, he went
to another location where he found a car identified as belonging
to the victim, Donna Vick. When Trippel requested that other
officers check on Vick, they found her murdered in her residence.
During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Trippel if Adams
had claimed ownership of the knife used in the murder. Trippel
responded that he had.
On redirect, the state attempted to elicit the
remainder of that conversation, and appellant objected, claiming
that the remainder of the conversation was inadmissible
hearsay.FN9 In a hearing outside the jury's presence, the state
asserted that the remainder of the conversation was admissible
under the Rule of Optional Completeness.FN10 tex.R.Crim. Evid.
107.FN11 The trial court agreed and allowed the state to elicit
the evidence before the jury over appellant's continued objection.
FN12
FN9. Appellant also objected that the admission
of this evidence violated Articles 38.22 and 38.23; however, he
does not raise these issues on appeal, therefore we shall not
address them.
FN10. The Rule of Optional Completeness
states:When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or
recorded statement is given in evidence by one party, the whole on
the same subject may be inquired into by the other, as when a
letter is read, all letters on the same subject between the same
parties may be given. When a detailed act, declaration,
conversation, writing or recorded statement is given in evidence,
any other act, declaration, writing or recorded statement which is
necessary to make it fully understood or to explain the same may
also be given in evidence. “Writing or recorded statement”
includes depositions.
FN11. The Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence are
now the Texas Rules of Evidence. FN12. The testimony elicited was
as follows:[BY THE STATE:] Det. Trippel, I want to ask you about
the conversation that you had with John Adams in which he stated
that the knife had been used in the murder of Donna Vick. A. Yes,
sir. * * * Q. [W]ould you please relate to the members of the jury
the complete conversation that you had with John Adams while you
were in the car there in Lancaster. A. After we contacted
Lancaster Police Department and we asked DeSoto [Police Department]
to check on Mrs. Vick, I had a conversation with John Adams. I
wanted to know what he knew about this murder, what he had seen,
and he told me that several days earlier, while he was on the
street panhandling, [appellant] and Mrs. Vick, were riding in her
white Chrysler New Yorker.
He stated that they picked him up and took him
back to her home. While at home, Mrs. Vick had fixed [appellant]
and John Adams some lunch, and while [appellant] and John Adams
were eating, [appellant] told John Adams that he was going to rob
Mrs. Vick, and he took the knife belonging to John Adams.John
Adams said he didn't believe [appellant], but when Mrs. Vick went
into the bedroom, [appellant] followed her into the bedroom. [Adams]
said that while he was eating, he heard Miss [sic] Vick yelling,
saying, [appellant], why are you doing this? John Adams said he
got up and went into the bedroom, and when he went into the
bedroom, he saw [appellant] stabbing Mrs. Vick on the bed.Of
course, this is-this-he didn't know what to think of that, but
after [appellant] was stabbing her, the knife broke; and that [appellant]
went back into the kitchen and got a kitchen knife.[Appellant]
went back into the bedroom and continued to stab Mrs. Vick, where
he killed her.John Adams then said that [appellant] told him to
get her property and that they took her TV, computer equipment,
loaded it up in a white Chrysler New Yorker, and then they-they
left the scene.
By the plain language of the rule, when part of
a conversation is placed into evidence by one party, the other
party can put the remainder of the conversation into evidence to
explain the prior comments or otherwise make them fully understood.
tex.R.Crim. Evid. 107; Washington v. State, 856 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex.Crim.App.1993).
See also Kipp v. State, 876 S.W.2d 330, 340 n. 11 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).
Given the circumstances in the instant case that John Adams'
admission of ownership of the knife could have misled the jury
about who was responsible for the killing, the trial court was
within its discretion in determining that the evidence was
admissible.
Appellant also complains under this point that
the admission of this evidence violated appellant's right to
confront the witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment. At
trial, appellant objected only on hearsay and Rule 107 grounds.
Because he did not object to error under the Confrontation Clause,
appellant waives this argument on appeal. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d
735, 752 & n. 16 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); see also Briggs v. State,
789 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (stating that even
constitutional error may be waived); Ex parte Crispen, 777 S.W.2d
103, 105 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). Point of error one is overruled.
Appellant alleges in his ninth point that the
trial court erred by admitting into evidence the parties' oral
stipulations regarding both the date of the indictment and various
documents relating to John Adams without first obtaining and
approving appellant's written consent to stipulate as required by
Article 1.15. Appellant asserts that the record contains no
written agreement to stipulate to this evidence, therefore, the
trial court never signed an instrument officially approving the
stipulation agreement. Appellant misapplies Article 1.15.
[26] Article 1.15 states: No person can be
convicted of a felony except upon the verdict of a jury duly
rendered and recorded, unless the defendant, upon entering a plea,
has in open court in person waived his right of trial by jury in
writing in accordance with Articles 1.13 and 1.14; provided,
however, that it shall be necessary for the state to introduce
evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and
said evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its
judgment and in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon
his plea without sufficient evidence to support the same. The
evidence may be stipulated if the defendant in such case consents
in writing, in open court, to waive the appearance, confrontation,
and cross-examination of witnesses, and further consents either to
an oral stipulation of the evidence and testimony or to the
introduction of testimony by affidavits, written statements of
witnesses, and any other documentary evidence in support of the
judgment of the court. Such waiver and consent [to stipulate] must
be approved by the court in writing, and be filed in the file of
the papers of the cause.
By its plain language, Article 1.15 applies
only to cases in which a jury trial has been waived. See also
McClain v. State, 730 S.W.2d 739, 742 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). Because
appellant's case was tried by a jury, the requirements regarding
stipulations of evidence found in Article 1.15 have no application
here.FN13 McClain, 730 S.W.2d at 744, n. 1; Messer v. State, 729
S.W.2d 694, 699 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Point of error nine is
overruled.
FN13. We also note that Article 1.13(b)
provides that defendants in a capital felony case in which the
state seeks the death penalty cannot waive trial by jury.
PUNISHMENT PHASE OF TRIAL
Appellant asserts in his tenth point of error
that the “12-10 Rule” of Article 37.071 §§ 2(d)(2) and 2(f)(2) is
unconstitutional. We have previously addressed and rejected this
contention. Appellant raises no new arguments here. Cantu v. State,
939 S.W.2d 627, 644 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 994,
118 S.Ct. 557, 139 L.Ed.2d 399 (1997). Point of error ten is
overruled.
PAROLE LAW
In his sixth point of error, appellant claims
that the trial court erred in denying his motion to present
evidence on the law of minimum parole eligibility. In his seventh
point, appellant asserts he should have been allowed to voir dire
prospective jurors on this issue.
We have noted in a number of cases that parole
is traditionally not a matter for jury consideration in a Texas
capital murder trial. Thus, we have held that it is not error for
a trial court to refuse to allow voir dire or admit testimony
concerning parole. See, e.g., Griffith v. State, 983 S.W.2d 282,
289 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). Points of error six and seven are
overruled.
CUMULATIVE ERROR
Appellant asserts in his fifteenth and
sixteenth points of error that the “cumulative effect” of all of
the above errors denied him due process under the federal
constitution and due course of law under the Texas constitution. A
number of errors may be found harmful in their cumulative effect.
Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).
However, such cumulative error has not been shown here. Points of
error fifteen and sixteen are overruled.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court. KELLER, J., concurred in the judgment.
United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
470 F.3d 581
Gregory Edward WRIGHT,
Petitioner-Appellant, v.
Nathaniel QUARTERMAN,
Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.
November 17, 2006
Appeal from the
United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas.
Before SMITH, GARZA and PRADO,
Circuit Judges.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
Gregory Edward
Wright moves for a certificate of appealability
("COA") to appeal the district court's denial of
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He argues that
reasonable jurists would find debatable whether:
1) his Confrontation Clause claim is
procedurally barred; 2) he received ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial; and 3) the state
suppressed evidence in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215
(1963).
I
* The evidence
at trial established that Donna Vick was stabbed
to death in her home in DeSoto, Texas, in the
early hours of March 21, 1997. Wright, who had
been staying with Vick in her home, was seen
with her at a VFW lodge on the night before the
murder.
Around 4:00
a.m. the next morning, Wright and his friend,
John Adams, drove Vick's car to purchase crack
cocaine from a drug dealer who was staying at
Llewelyn Mosley's home. Mosley testified that
Adams and Wright arrived at his house on the
night of the murder and told him that they had
some things from a woman in DeSoto that they
wanted to get rid of, including a television, a
weed eater, a rifle, a color printer, and a
microwave.
Several of
these items were later identified as belonging
to Vick. Wright negotiated with the dealer.
After exchanging some of the items, Wright and
Adams appeared cheerful and exchanged "high
fives."
The next day,
Adams asked Daniel McGaughey, an employee at a
video store, to call the police because he
wanted to turn himself in. Adams directed the
police to Vick's house and assisted in
recovering her car. DNA testing revealed that
blood found on the steering wheel belonged to
Wright. At the house, the police found Vick's
body on her bed and Wright's bloody fingerprint
on her pillowcase. In a trash can, the police
found a handwritten note reading, "Do you want
to do it?"
Adams also led
the police to a shack that Wright sometimes
stayed in, where they arrested Wright and seized
a bloody and gold-paint splattered pair of blue
jeans. Outside the shack, the police found a
bloody knife. DNA evidence established that the
blood on the knife and jeans was Vick's.
Several cans
of gold spray paint were found in Wright's home,
and witnesses testified that Wright had
previously been seen with gold paint on his face
and clothes. A police officer testified that he
had known people to inhale spray paint to get
high. The police also found mail addressed to
Adams at the shack. After Wright was arrested,
he phoned a friend from jail and asked her to
remove any of his clothing from the shack.
Adams also led
the police to a knife in a vacant lot near
Mosley's home. DNA testing revealed that the
knife had Vick's blood on it. A medical examiner
testified that Vick could have been stabbed by
more than one knife.
At trial, the
prosecution argued that both Adams and Wright
attacked Vick.1
The court instructed the jury that it could
convict Wright only in the event that it found
that he actually attacked Vick. The court did
not instruct the jury on a law of the parties
theory of liability.2
The jury found Wright guilty, and he was
sentenced to death.
Wright's
conviction was affirmed on direct appeal to the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ("TCCA").
Wright v. State, 28 S.W.3d 526 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).
He petitioned the state court for a writ of
habeas corpus. The state trial judge adopted the
State's proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law in their entirety and
recommended that relief be denied. The TCCA
adopted the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law and denied relief.
Wright
petitioned the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas for a federal
writ of habeas corpus. A magistrate judge
recommended denying relief on all of Wright's
claims. Wright v. Dretke, 3:01-CV-0472,
2004 WL 438941 (N.D.Tex. Mar.10, 2004). The
district court judge adopted the magistrate
judge's recommendation and denied the petition.
II
We issue a
certificate of appealability only when the
movant has made "a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). This requires him to "demonstrate
that reasonable jurists would find the district
court's assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d
542 (2000). At this stage, we are not permitted
to give full consideration of the factual or
legal bases in support of the claim. Miller-El
v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct.
1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). Instead, we merely
conduct an overview of the claims and a general
assessment of their merits. Id.
The movant's
arguments "must be assessed under the
deferential standard required by 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1)." Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S.
274, 282, 124 S.Ct. 2562, 159 L.Ed.2d 384
(2004); see Miller-El, 537 U.S. at
348-50, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that a court must consider 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)'s deferential standard of review when
ruling on motion for COA). A federal court may
not issue a writ of habeas corpus "with respect
to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits
in State court proceedings" unless the state
court's decision was "contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
A state
court's decision is contrary to clearly
established federal law if the court either: 1)
arrived at a conclusion of law opposite that
reached by the Supreme Court; or 2) arrived at a
result opposite that of the Supreme Court on
materially indistinguishable facts. Williams
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct.
1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A state court's
decision is an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law if the state
court derives the correct legal principle from
Supreme Court decisions but applies that
principle in an objectively unreasonable manner.
Id. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
* Wright
argues that his Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses against him was violated when
the trial court admitted into evidence the
testimony of Detective Dan Trippel. On direct
examination by the prosecution, Trippel
described a conversation he had with Adams, who
did not testify. Trippel testified that he
discovered Vick's body after meeting with Adams.
On cross
examination, Wright elicited testimony from
Trippel that Adams claimed that he owned one of
the knives used in the murder. On redirect,
Trippel testified that Adams told him that
Wright used Adams's knife to stab Vick. Wright
made a hearsay objection.
The
prosecution responded that the testimony was
admissible under the rule of optional
completeness. See TEX.R. EVID. 107 ("When
part of a ... conversation ... is given in
evidence by one party, the whole on the same
subject may be inquired into by the other
....").
Under the rule
of optional completeness, hearsay is admissible
when it serves to clarify other hearsay evidence
elicited by the opposing party. Bunton v.
State, 136 S.W.3d 355, 367 (Tex.App.—Austin
2004, pet. ref'd). The prosecution argued that
if the jury only heard that Adams admitted that
he owned one of the murder weapons, it might be
left with the mistaken impression that Adams
confessed to Trippel that he had killed Vick.
Wright responded that the rule was inapplicable
because the jury had not been given a false
impression. Wright did not argue to the trial
court that the Sixth Amendment prohibited
admission of this testimony.
On direct
appeal, Wright argued that the admission of
Trippel's testimony violated Texas evidentiary
rules3
and the Confrontation Clause. The TCCA deemed
Wright's Confrontation Clause argument waived
because his objection based on hearsay did not
alert the trial court to the federal nature of
his claim. Wright, 28 S.W.3d at 536;
see TEX.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A) (stating
that to preserve error for appeal, appellant
must have objected with sufficient specificity
to make trial court "aware of the complaint,
unless the specific grounds were apparent from
the context"). On subsequent habeas review, the
district court consequently deemed Wright's
Confrontation Clause claim procedurally
defaulted. Wright, 2004 WL 438941, at *6.
A federal
court may not grant a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus where the state court expressly
denied the claim based on an independent and
adequate state procedural rule. Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730, 111 S.Ct. 2546,
115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991).4
To be adequate, a state rule must be "firmly
established and regularly followed." Ford v.
Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24, 111 S.Ct.
850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991); see Barr v. City
of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149, 84 S.Ct.
1734, 12 L.Ed.2d 766 (1964); N.A.A.C.P. v.
Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288,
295-301, 84 S.Ct. 1302, 12 L.Ed.2d 325 (1964).
It is the
petitioner's burden to demonstrate that the
procedural bar is not regularly applied,
Stokes v. Anderson, 123 F.3d 858, 860 (5th
Cir.1997), or that the rule was exorbitantly
applied under the circumstances of the case,
Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376, 122 S.Ct.
877, 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002).
We review the
adequacy of a state law used to preclude federal
habeas review de novo. Rosales v. Dretke,
444 F.3d 703, 707 (5th Cir.2006). Wright argues
that his objection based on a Texas state
evidentiary rule was sufficient under Texas law
to preserve his Confrontation Clause claim and
that the TCCA's decision is therefore not an
adequate procedural bar.
Wright's
argument is contrary to Texas law, which
generally requires a defendant to make a
specific Confrontation Clause objection to
preserve such an error. In support of its ruling
that a hearsay objection does not generally
preserve a Confrontation Clause claim, the TCCA
relied on Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d
735, 752 n. 16 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). Wright,
28 S.W.3d at 536. Although Dewberry was
decided after Wright's 1997 trial, the TCCA had
applied the same rule as early as 1991 in
Holland v. State, 802 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).
Holland objected to the admission
of testimony concerning an out-of-court
statement on the ground of hearsay. Id.
at 700. He did not object that admission of the
evidence violated the Confrontation Clause.
Id. The TCCA held that the federal
constitutional claim was not preserved for
review. Id. Texas courts have frequently
held, both before5
and after6
Wright's trial, that where it is not clear from
the context of the trial that the defendant was
raising a Confrontation Clause claim, a hearsay
objection does not preserve the federal
constitutional error.
The cases
Wright cites are not to the contrary. None
addresses the specific question of under what
circumstances a hearsay objection is sufficient
to preserve a Confrontation Clause claim. Wright
primarily relies on Kittelson v. Dretke,
426 F.3d 306 (5th Cir.2005), in which we held
that the petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim
was exhausted when it had been fairly presented
in a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Because no
state court held that Kittelson's claim was
barred by a state procedural rule, id. at
316 (noting that state court did not rely on
procedural rule in disposing of Kittelson's
claim), we did not address whether Texas courts
consistently held that hearsay objections
generally did not preserve Confrontation Clause
claims. Kittelson, therefore, does not
control this case.7
Wright also
cites several cases applying Texas's statutory
exception to the hearsay rule for statements
made by child abuse victims. See TEX.CODE
CRIM. PROC. ART. 38.072. In Lankston v. State,
827 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (Benavides,
J.), for example, the defendant lodged a hearsay
objection to the testimony of an adult to whom
the alleged child victim of sexual assault had
reported the crime. Such testimony is admissible
under the statute so long as the prosecution
provided the defendant with a written summary of
the statement prior to trial. Id. at 909;
see TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 38.072, §
2(b).
The TCCA held
that a hearsay objection is sufficient to
preserve a claim that the proffered testimony
fell outside the written summary where it is
clear from the transcript that the trial court
understood the basis for the objection.
Lankston, 827 S.W.2d at 910-11; see
Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 535, 539 (Tex.Crim.App.2004)
(distinguishing Lankston on the ground
that the record "clearly showed that all parties
knew the nature of the objection"). The TCCA did
not consider in what context a hearsay objection
was sufficient to preserve a Confrontation
Clause claim.
Similarly, in
Gabriel v. State, 973 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tex.App.—Waco
1998, no pet.), the prosecution presented
testimony under the same statutory exception to
the hearsay rule. The defendant made a hearsay
objection on the ground that the prosecution
failed to provide notice of its intent to
introduce certain testimony concerning a child
victim's outcry statements. Id. at 718.
The court of
appeals held that the objection was sufficient
to preserve the error because "after a hearsay
objection is made, the State has the burden to
show it has complied with all the requirements"
of the statute. Id. at 719. Because
Wright's trial did not concern application of
Texas's statutory child-victim outcry exception
to the hearsay rule, Gabriel is not
contrary to the TCCA's decision in Wright's
case.8
We therefore
conclude it is not debatable amongst jurists of
reason that the Texas court's application of the
contemporaneous objection rule constitutes an
adequate and independent procedural bar to
Wright's Confrontation Clause claim.
B
Wright argues
that he received ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. We evaluate such claims under the two-prong
test established by Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner
must establish that his counsel's performance
was deficient and that he suffered prejudice as
a result. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Prejudice results when there is a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding
would have been different absent the error.
Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Wright claims
that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to make a Confrontation Clause objection
to the admission of Adams's hearsay statement.
As noted, that statement was in sum that Wright
used Adams's knife to kill Vick. Wright argues
that Adams's hearsay statement was critical
because the jury was not instructed on a law of
the parties theory of liability. The jury
therefore had to find that Wright personally
attacked Vick. Wright argues that Adams's
hearsay statement that he gave his knife to
Wright therefore substantially bolstered the
prosecution's case.
The Texas
habeas court held that the decision not to make
a Confrontation Clause objection was the result
of a considered trial strategy on the part of
Wright's trial counsel. The court held that it
was "reasonable to speculate" that defense
counsel "realized that they could not vouch for
the reliability of the statements [that Adams
owned the murder weapon] and then object to the
introduction of the remainder of the statements
under the confrontation clause."
The district
court did not address this ground for the Texas
court's decision.9
The district court instead reasoned that the
state court could reasonably have concluded that
Wright could not establish that he was
prejudiced by his counsel's failure to make a
Confrontation Clause objection due to the
overwhelming evidence establishing that Wright
murdered Vick. Wright, 2004 WL 438941, at
*23.
In light of
AEDPA's deferential standard of review, we
decline to grant a COA on this issue because,
assuming arguendo that the objection
would have been sustained and the testimony
excluded, it is not debatable amongst jurists of
reason that the state court could have
reasonably concluded that Wright cannot
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his
counsel's failure to object.
First, in its
closing statement, the prosecution did not rely
on Adams's hearsay statement that he gave one of
the murder weapons to Wright. Second, and more
significantly, there was overwhelming evidence
establishing that Wright personally, and most
likely in conjunction with Adams, attacked Vick.
At the scene of the crime, the police found
Wright's bloody fingerprint next to the body and
his blood on a towel. Immediately following
Vick's death, Wright was seen driving Vick's car
and trading her belongings for drugs. His blood
was found on the steering wheel. At Wright's
shack, the police recovered a pair of blue jeans
with gold paint10
and Vick's bloodstains in Wright's shack. Wright
was a known inhaler of gold spray paint. Finally,
the police recovered two knives with Vick's
blood, one from near Wright's shack.
C
Finally,
Wright argues that the prosecution suppressed
the following evidence in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Brady v. Maryland:
1) that the State had agreed not to prosecute
Llewellyn Mosley in exchange for his testimony;
2) that Adams had confessed to the murder to
Jerry Causey at Mosley's house; 3) the tape of
the 911 call Daniel McGaughey made reporting
that Adams wanted to turn himself in; 4) police
notes recording a statement by Daniel McGaughey
to the police concerning Adams; and 5) evidence
that the police found papers belonging to Adams
in the shack.
The district
court rejected each of these claims on several
grounds. The court first noted that Wright had
procedurally defaulted his Brady claims.
Wright, 2004 WL 438941, at *6. Despite
holding that these claims were procedurally
defaulted, the district court proceeded to
consider and reject them on their merits. Id.
at *16-*20. The district court held that Wright
failed to establish that the prosecution
suppressed any agreement with Mosley, Adams's
confession to Causey, the 911 tape, or Adams's
papers. Id. In the alternative, the court
held that none of this evidence was material.
Id.
* Wright does
not dispute that his Brady claims are
procedurally defaulted. He argues, however, that
we should nevertheless consider the merits of
these claims because he is actually innocent of
the crime. See House v. Bell, ___ U.S.
___, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006);
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851,
130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995).
To establish
actual innocence under Schlup, Wright
must demonstrate that in light of all the
evidence, including that "tenably claimed to
have been wrongly excluded or to have become
available only after trial," id. at 328,
115 S.Ct. 851, "it is more likely than not that
no reasonable juror would have found [him]
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt," id. at
327, 115 S.Ct. 851.
The district
court summarized Wright's evidence of actual
innocence as follows:
1) exculpatory
scientific evidence regarding the bloody
fingerprint found at the crime scene; 2)
affidavits from Petitioner's two defense
attorneys averring that the jeans that the State
contended that Petitioner wore when he murdered
the victim were in actuality too small for him;
3) an affidavit from Daniel McGaughey, who was "hidden"
from the defense; 4) an affidavit from Jerry
Causey, a man to whom co-defendant Adams
allegedly confessed; 5) an affidavit from
another inmate to whom Adams allegedly confessed;
and 6) testimony from Adams' subsequent capital
murder trial which undermines the testimony of
State's witness Llewellyn Mosley.
Wright,
2004 WL 438941, at *7.
The district
court held that this evidence did not satisfy
the Schlup standard. Id. at *9. In
particular, it noted that although much of this
evidence was "newly presented," most of it was
available at the time of trial. Id. at
*7-*8. The affidavits from Wright's defense
attorneys regarding the size of the bloody jeans
was not new because those attorneys had made the
same argument to the jury in their closing
statements. Id. at *7.
The affidavit
of Daniel McGaughey, who called 911 on Adams's
behalf, did not differ from statements McGaughey
made to the police that were disclosed. Id.
at *8. And there was simply no evidence, new or
old, that undermined Mosley's testimony. Id.
The district court found the remaining evidence
insufficiently persuasive to meet the Schlup
standard. Id. at *9.
In this motion, Wright argues
that the district court erred in requiring him
to present "new" evidence. The courts of appeals
disagree as to whether Schlup requires "newly
discovered" evidence or merely "newly presented"
evidence. Compare Osborne v. Purkett, 411
F.3d 911, 920 (8th Cir.2005) ("Evidence is only
new if it was `not available at trial and could
not have been discovered earlier through the
exercise of due diligence.'" (quoting Amrine
v. Bowersox, 238 F.3d 1023, 1029 (8th
Cir.2001))), and Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378
F.3d 333, 340 (3d Cir.2004) (requiring new
evidence that was not available at the time of
trial), with Gomez v. Jaimet, 350 F.3d
673, 679 (7th Cir.2003) ("All Schlup
requires is that the new evidence is reliable
and that it was not presented at trial."),
and Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 963
(9th Cir.2003) (requiring "newly presented," not
newly available evidence).
Neither party
cites controlling case law from this court. We,
however, need not address this circuit split or
determine whether Wright has established actual
innocence because he has not demonstrated that
jurists of reason would find the merits of his
Brady claims debatable. Cf. Lucas v.
Johnson, 132 F.3d 1069, 1078 (5th Cir. 1998)
(assuming arguendo that petitioner had satisfied
Schlup and considering claim on the
merits)
2
The
suppression of evidence favorable to the accused
violates due process where that evidence is
material to guilt or punishment. Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555,
131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). This duty to disclose
extends to both impeachment and exculpatory
evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481
(1985). Evidence is suppressed when the
prosecution fails to disclose it even when it is
known only to police investigators but not the
prosecutor. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438, 115
S.Ct. 1555. Evidence is "material" when its
suppression creates a reasonable probability of
a different result. Id. at 433, 115 S.Ct.
1555. The materiality of all suppressed evidence
must be considered cumulatively. Id. at
437, 115 S.Ct. 1555.
Assuming
Wright's Brady claims are not
procedurally defaulted, a federal court must
apply a de novo standard of review.
Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 394 (5th
Cir.2003) (holding that review is de novo
where there has been no adjudication on the
merits in state court); Henderson v. Cockrell,
333 F.3d 592, 598 (5th Cir.2003) (same);
Johnson v. Cain, 215 F.3d 489, 494 (5th
Cir.2000) (same); Miller v. Johnson, 200
F.3d 274, 281 n. 4 (5th Cir.2000) (same).
The district
court held that Wright had failed to establish
that the State suppressed evidence of an
agreement not to prosecute Mosley, that Adams
confessed to Jerry Causey, that the police found
letters addressed to Adams in the shack, or the
tape of the 911 call by Daniel McGaughey
reporting Adams's desire to turn himself in.
Wright does not argue that the district court's
findings or conclusions of law with respect to
whether the State suppressed this evidence are
in error. He has therefore failed to establish
that the district court's resolution of these
claims is reasonably debatable.
Wright does
argue that the prosecution failed to disclose
timely a police note made during an interview
with Daniel McGaughey. McGaughey was working at
a video store when Adams informed him that he
wanted to turn himself in. According to the
police note, McGaughey told police that Adams
stated, "I murdered someone in DeSoto and I
can't deal with it." The prosecution did not
disclose this note until after Wright's trial
began.11
Although the
prosecution's disclosure of this note was
delayed, Wright conceded in his petition for
habeas corpus that he was timely provided with
the following nearly identical written statement
by McGaughey:
At about 7:00
pm on Saturday March 22nd, a man came and asked
me to call the police. I asked why and he told
me there was a murder and he wanted to turn
himself in. I asked him where this murder took
place and he got real angry. He told me it took
place in DeSoto and and [sic] could not live
with himself any longer to call the police give
them his description and he would be out by the
curb.
The district
court held that the suppressed note was not
material. Wright, 2004 WL 438941, at *19.
We hold that this conclusion is not reasonably
debatable. The allegedly suppressed note is
merely an abbreviated version of the more
complete and lengthy account of Adams's
confession that Wright timely received. Wright
fails to explain what additional use he could
have made of a second document containing the
same statement McGaughey gave to the police.
III
For the
foregoing reasons, we DENY Wright's motion for a
COA.
(R. 44, 76.) Wright
contends that during the sentencing phase of
the proceeding, the prosecution argued that
he acted alone. But the portion of the
transcript he cites in support of that
proposition, (R. 51, 17.), is his own
attorney's argument. The prosecution did
submit testimony relaying Adams's statement
to police that Wright alone killed Vick, but
the prosecution did not argue that this
portion of Adams's statement was credible.
We therefore find no support in the record
for Wright's contention that the prosecution
argued that Wright alone committed the
offense
During closing arguments,
the prosecutor repeatedly attempted to argue
that Wright could be found guilty as an
accomplice. Wright's counsel objected each
time, and the court sustained the objection.
In his closing argument, Wright's attorney
argued to the jury that the charge did not
permit conviction merely based on a finding
that "[Wright] is a party to this."
To the extent that Wright
now argues that the Texas courts misapplied
the rule of optional completeness, we note
that violations of state law are generally
not cognizable on habeas review unless they
render the trial fundamentally unfairHughes
v. Dretke, 412 F.3d 582, 591 (5th
Cir.2005).
An exception to this
doctrine exists where the petitioner
demonstrates either cause for the default
and actual prejudice as a result of the
alleged violation of federal law or that
failing to consider his claim will yield a
fundamental "miscarriage of justice."Coleman,
501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546. Wright has
not attempted to make such a showing in his
brief in this court, and any such argument
is now considered waived. Nixon v. Epps,
405 F.3d 318, 323 (5th Cir.2005) (citations
omitted).
Hutchins v. Wainwright,
715 F.2d 512, 518 (11th Cir.1983), upon
which Wright also relies, similarly concerns
whether a claim was presented to the state
court for purposes of exhaustion.
The remaining state court
cases Wright cites are not on pointCofield
v. State, 891 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tex.Crim.App.1994),
stands for the proposition that a hearsay
objection is sufficient to preserve a claim
that an exception to the hearsay prohibition
did not apply. Samuel v. State, 688
S.W.2d 492, 495-96 (Tex.Crim. App.1985),
holds that an objection to the introduction
of "statements made after [the defendant]
was under arrest" preserves a claim under
Texas state law prohibiting the introduction
of statements made by a defendant while he
was being detained by non-state actors.
Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517
(Tex.Crim.App.1977), holds that an objection
that evidence of a prior conviction was
improper because it was not yet final
preserves the issue of whether the
probationary period of the prior conviction
had expired. Coleman v. State, 644
S.W.2d 116, 119 (Tex.App.— Austin 1982, pet.
ref'd), concerns the adequacy of an
objection to the prosecution's comment on
the defendant's post-arrest silence where
the context of the objection made clear the
nature of the objection. See Heidelberg,
144 S.W.3d at 540 (distinguishing Coleman
on the ground that the basis for Coleman's
objection was clear).
Finally,
the federal cases Wright cites do not apply
Texas's procedural rules and instead concern:
1) whether a claim was presented to a state
court for purposes of Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction, Lilly v.
Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 123, 119 S.Ct.
1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999); or 2) whether
a state court's clearly erroneous ruling
that no objection whatsoever had been made
is an adequate bar to federal review,
Douglas v. State of Alabama, 380 U.S.
415, 422-23, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934
(1965).
In applying the "unreasonable
application" test of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a
federal court reviews only the state court's
ultimate decision that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief, not the state court's
reasoningNeal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d
230, 246 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc).
Wright submitted an
affidavit to the district court from his
state trial attorney, which states that the
jeans were too small for Wright. Wright's
attorney used the jeans for demonstrative
purposes while presenting this argument to
the jury. The jury could infer, however,
that the gold spray paint sufficiently
linked the jeans to Wright, a known user of
spray paint as an inhalant
So long as the defendant
receives the evidence in time for its
effective use at trial, the Due Process
Clause is not violatedUnited States v.
Walters, 351 F.3d 159, 169 (5th Cir.
2003) (collecting cases). Although Wright
received this evidence during the course of
the trial and appears to have had the
opportunity to put it to use, the State does
not dispute that the evidence was suppressed.