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Angel Francisco BREARD
Rape
February 17,
Paraguayan national executed after appeals fail
JARRATT, Virginia (CNN) -- A Paraguayan man who
stabbed a woman to death was executed Tuesday night despite requests by
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the World Court that the
sentence be delayed.
Angel Francisco Breard, 32, died by injection at
Greensville Correctional Center. He was pronounced dead at 10:39 p.m.
Breard was flanked by an attorney and a spiritual
advisor when he entered the death chamber. His final words were "May
glory be to God," Department of Corrections spokesman Larry Traylor said.
The execution came after Virginia Gov. Jim Gilmore
refused Tuesday night to block the sentence and the U.S. Supreme Court
refused to intervene.
The high court refused his appeal at 8:30 p.m. and
Gilmore denied his clemency petition shortly after 10 p.m., more than an
hour after the execution originally was to take place.
Breard was convicted of the 1992 murder and attempted
rape of Ruth Dickie, an Arlington neighbor.
Case sparked international legal dispute
Last week, the World Court ruled the execution should
be stayed because Virginia authorities did not notify Paraguay of
Breard's arrest, as required by the Vienna Convention, an international
treaty signed by 130 nations including the United States. However,
rulings by the 15-member U.N. tribunal are not binding.
In an unsigned opinion, the Supreme Court said Breard
failed to assert his claim that the treaty was violated in state court
and therefore lost his right to raise the issue in federal court.
The justices said even if Breard had proven a treaty
violation, "it is extremely doubtful that the violation should result in
the overturning of a final judgment of conviction without some showing
that the violation had an effect on the trial. ... In this case, no such
showing could even arguably be made."
Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer
dissented from the ruling. "Virginia is now pursuing an execution
schedule that leaves less time for argument and for court consideration
than the court's rules provide for ordinary cases," Breyer wrote.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg voted to grant a stay of
execution to give the Supreme Court time to hear Breard's appeal.
High-level split
The case created a high-level split between two
federal agencies.
On Monday, Albright asked Virginia's governor to
voluntarily stay the execution, saying she was concerned the case could
jeopardize the safety of Americans arrested in other countries.
But the Justice Department, in a brief filed Monday,
recommended that the Supreme Court allow Virginia to execute Breard,
saying there was no legal basis for halting the execution.
In a two-page letter to the Virginia governor,
Albright said she was making the request to stay the execution with "great
reluctance" because of the "aggravated" nature of Breard's crime and
because of the lateness of the appeal.
But Albright wrote of "unique" international policy
concerns, primarily the need to protect the rights of U.S. citizens
detained abroad to have access to U.S. diplomats.
Governor 'concerned about safety'
The Virginia governor, who also had
considered a clemency petition filed by Breard's lawyers, had said he
would await guidance from the Supreme Court before making his decision.
In making his decision, Gilmore
said delaying the execution "would have the practical effect of
transferring responsibility from the courts of the commonwealth and the
United States to the International Court."
Virginia authorities have
acknowledged that they failed to inform Breard of his right under the
Vienna Convention to contact the Paraguayan consulate for assistance.
However, the Justice Department said in its Supreme Court brief that the
error was "no basis for requiring the undoing of the lawfully imposed
sentence of the courts of Virginia."
Breard's decisions at issue
Breard's lawyers have argued that
because of the absence of help from Paraguayan officials, he made a
number of "objectively unreasonable decisions" during the criminal
proceedings, which they say were conducted without translation.
Not understanding the "fundamental
differences between the criminal justice systems" of the United States
and Paraguay, Breard chose to risk the death penalty instead of pleading
guilty in exchange for life imprisonment, his lawyers said. U.S.
authorities deny such a plea offer was made.
Arthur Karp, the assistant
prosecutor who handled the case, said Breard had ample help from his
lawyers and that Paraguay did not raise any concerns at the time. "It's
difficult to believe anybody in the embassy cared," he said.
Paraguay, while making clear it is
not seeking Breard's release from jail, had sought to win him a new
trial. The country had called on Virginia again Tuesday to stay the
execution.
Robert Tomlinson, one of Breard's
two attorneys, said Breard "made choices against the advice of his
attorneys and other people close to him."
Breard was convicted of stabbing
Dickie, his 39-year-old neighbor, five times on February 17, 1992. He
told police he intended to rape her but ran away when he heard someone
knock on the door. Breard moved to the United States in 1986.
It was the second time in seven
months that a national government has tried to stop a Virginia execution
because of a treaty violation. Mario Benjamin Murphy was executed
September 17 over objections from Mexico. The State Department also
pressured then-Gov. George Allen to stop Murphy's execution.
Execution carried out despite
stay calls
BBC News
Tuesday, April 14, 1998
A Paraguayan man, Angel Francisco Breard, has
been executed in the state of Virginia despite calls for a stay
and claims that the US may be in breach of international law.
The Governor of Virginia, James Gilmore, refused to
block Breard's execution for the 1992 murder and attempted rape of a 39-year-old
neighbour. Earlier, the US Supreme Court decided not to intervene.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and US
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had asked for the execution to be
stayed but the Justice Department disagreed.
Justice officials have argued there is no legal
reason to comply with the international court's request, and that to do
so might even harm Virginia's right to carry out its lawful executions
in a timely manner.
Paraguay claims that the United States violated the
1963 Vienna Convention, under which anyone arrested in a foreign country
has the right to confer with a consular official.
Violation of international law
The treaty in question is the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. This requires that any person arrested in a foreign
country be promptly notified of their right to contact their embassy or
consulate.
Diplomats are entitled to visit the accused and to
help him or her arrange a legal defence.
This did not happen in Mr Breard's case, and on April
9, the World Court in The Hague called on the US to halt the execution
while it decided whether Mr Breard had indeed been denied rights
guaranteed under the Vienna Convention.
Clemency Denied, Paraguayan Is Executed
By David Stout - The New York Times
April 15, 1998
A Paraguayan citizen was
executed tonight in Virginia for murder in a
case that began as a terrible crime and became
an international incident.
The inmate, Angel Francisco
Breard, 32, was put to death by lethal injection
in a state prison in Jarratt shortly before 11
P.M. He died some 2 1/2 hours after the Supreme
Court voted, 6 to 3, not to block the execution
and after Gov. James S. Gilmore 3d rejected a
clemency plea.
The Justices issued their
decision after considering a plea from the
International Court of Justice that Mr. Breard
be spared, and counterarguments from the Clinton
Administration that Virginia should be allowed
to mete out its punishment. Virginia has
executed more people (50, counting Mr. Breard)
since 1976 than any state except Texas.
Despite the seeming finality
of the Supreme Court ruling, the Paraguayan
Government began a rush of 11th-hour maneuvers
immediately afterward. Through its lawyers,
Paraguay sought a writ of habeas corpus from a
Federal District Court judge in Richmond. When
that judge denied the writ, the lawyers
unsuccessfully sought help from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
in Richmond, people close to the Governor say.
It was not immediately clear
what grounds the defense lawyers seized upon.
Writs of habeas corpus are typically sought when
lawyers assert that there are new factors that
were overlooked or could not have been known in
the original appeals.
In any event, Governor
Gilmore was not moved. ''As Governor of Virginia
my first duty is to insure that those who reside
within our borders -- both American citizens and
foreign nationals -- may conduct their lives
free from the fear of crime,'' he said late
tonight.
The Governor called Mr.
Breard's crime, the 1992 slaying of an Arlington
woman during an attempted rape, ''heinous and
depraved.'' He said that DNA testing had proved
Mr. Breard's guilt beyond doubt, and that the
defendant had admitted it.
Last week, the International
Court of Justice urged the United States not to
allow Mr. Breard to be executed. The
international court noted that he had not been
advised by arresting officers of his right to
confer with Paraguayan consular officials -- a
clear and undisputed violation of the Vienna
Convention.
Prosecutors had argued that
the violation could be remedied by a formal
apology, and need not lead to a reprieve for a
killer. The Supreme Court essentially agreed
this evening.
Justices John Paul Stevens,
Steven G. Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
dissented. Each said the issues in the case were
important enough to warrant a stay of execution.
While the international
court's plea was not legally binding in the
United States, it put a harsh spotlight on an
issue -- capital punishment -- that has divided
the United States from many other countries
where executions no longer take place.
The execution is sure to
aggravate, at least for a time, relations
between the United States and the small Latin
American country of Paraguay.
Some experts in international
law have worried aloud in the past week that
American travelers may be less safe overseas,
now that their Government has at least
implicitly trivialized a violation of the Vienna
Convention, which requires that a person
arrested in a foreign country be quickly
notified of his right to communicate with his
home country's consular officials.
The United States' Justice
Department had argued that there should be no
interference in Virginia's executing Mr. Breard.
While Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright
officially asked Governor Gilmore to halt the
execution, citing her fears for the safety of
Americans abroad, she said that her request was
tinged ''with great reluctance'' and that she
recognized the horrible nature of the crime.
The Supreme Court announced
its decision about 8:20 P.M., 40 minutes before
the time originally set for the execution. ''The
failure to notify the Paraguayan consul occurred
long ago and has no continuing effect,'' the
opinion stated in part.
Depressed and drunk, Mr.
Breard, who had lived in
the United States since
1986, forced himself
into the apartment of
Ruth Dickie on Feb. 17,
1992, tried to rape her,
stabbed her several
times in the neck and
fled out the kitchen
window, investigators
said. He was arrested
six months later, after
another attempted rape,
and was soon linked to
the slaying.
His
defenders have argued
that, had he been
allowed to talk to
Paraguayan officials, he
might have been
persuaded to plead
guilty and accept a life
sentence. Instead,
against his lawyers'
advice, he pleaded not
guilty and testified
that a curse placed upon
him by his father-in-law
had impelled him to kill.
The jury disagreed and
recommended death for Mr.
Breard.
Angel Francisco Breard will die
today
Anusha.com
Within a few hours after this is posted, Angel
Francisco Breard will be dead. He is a Paraguayan citizen with no prior
criminal record.
In 1985, Breard sustained serious head injuries in a
car accident, which rendered him unconscious for several days. On 17
February 1992, Ruth Dickie was assaulted and stabbed to death in her
apartment. Breard was arrested and charged with attempted rape and
capital murder. He has never denied his involvement in the murder.
However, he has always insisted that he committed the murder because of
a satanic curse placed on him by his former father-in-law. He believed
that the jury would be more lenient if he admitted committing the crime
and expressed his remorse to them. This belief was based on his
impression of trial procedures in his native Paraguay. He was sentenced
to death on June 25, 1993.
The Consulate of the Government of Paraguay was not
notified that Breard was even in custody until 1996, three years after
the death sentence had been passed. This was a clear violation of the
obligations of the United States under an international treaty, the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
In a brief filed late Monday, the Clinton
administration told the justices of the United States Supreme Court that
despite an order last week by the International Court of Justice that
the United States "take all measures at its disposal" to stop Virginia
from executing a Paraguayan citizen, there was no legal basis for
granting requests by Paraguay and the prisoner for a stay of execution.
Americans are arrested overseas frequently. Each
country in which Americans travel know that when an American is arrested,
the US Consulate must be notified immediately. Having a consular officer
come to the jail cell shortly after the arrest and then make periodic
inquiries into the status of the case is an important factor in securing
the release of Americans from custody abroad.
There is no doubt that had the Government of Paraguay
been informed that Breard was in jail, he would not have been convicted
at all and, if convicted, he would have received a much lesser sentence
than death.
For example, the Government of Paraguay would have
been in the best position to inform Breard that his defense, which was
that he was "under a satanic curse", would not get him off the charges
in Virginia. Rather, that defense virtually guaranteed that religiously
fanatical Virginia would order his execution.
The reason why Breard has almost no hope absent a
miracle of escaping the death sentence today is that Virginia has
constructed a web of rules which make it almost impossible for any
wrongfully accused person to defend himself. In the case of Breard, his
habeas corpus claims will fail because of the Virginia rule on "procedural
default". The way this rule works is that there is one time and one time
only when a particular sort of defense can be raised.
For example, the defense of inadequate representation
of counsel is procedurally barred in a criminal appeal in Virginia,
although this defense is considered valid in all of the other 49 states.
Indeed, inadequate representation of counsel is probably the leading
grounds for appellate reversal in the other states. The fact that this
ground is not allowed in Virginia is probably the main reason why
criminal convictions are almost never overturned in Virginia.
In addition, Virginia is the only state which has not
waived its Eleventh Amendment right to Sovereign Immunity. As a result,
Virginia is not subject to federal laws which apply to the other states.
At the same time, because Virginia is not a country, it is not subject
to international law as well.
Furthermore, as sports broadcaster Marv Albert found
out last year, 90% of the defenses which the courts will entertain in
other states are not allowed in Virginia. For example, in Albert's case,
he was not allowed to inform the jury that the prosecutrix against him
had offered to bribe a witness $50,000 to lie to the jury about Albert.
The prosecutrix made it clear that this $50,000 would come from the
profits she expected to reap from selling her story after Albert was
convicted.
Albert's attorney, who was from another state, was
flabbergasted when he learned that the judge would not allow the jury to
learn anything negative about the background of the only witness against
Albert. Albert was eventually forced to plead guilty to a misdemeanor
rather than risk many years in prison, in a case which would have been
entirely thrown out of court in any normal state.
These are not isolated examples. The prisons of
Virginia are filled with thousands of innocent inmates who would never
have been convicted in any other state.
As I see it, Virginia will continue to engage in
these criminal acts until something very dramatic occurs. What needs to
happen, in my view, is that the present Governor of Virginia, James
Gilmore , who was also the Attorney General of Virginia when Angel
Francisco Breard was tried and convicted, needs to be prosecuted by the
International Court of Justice. Gilmore, who has ordered the execution
of Angel Francisco Breard in clear violation of international law, needs
to be picked up and transported to stand trial in The Hague, just the
same way that Bosnian Serb War Criminals are picked up and held for
trial there.
I must mention that I have a particular reason for
interest in this subject, because James Gilmore was also involved in the
kidnapping of my daughter, Shamema Honzagool Sloan, from Abu Dhabi,
United Arab Emirates in 1990.
Sam Sloan
134 F.3d 615
Angel Francisco Breard, Petitioner-appellant,
v.
Samuel v. Pruett, Warden, Mecklenburg Correctional
Center, respondent-appellee.
The Human Rights Committee of the
American Branch of The International Law Association,
Amicus Curiae
United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.
Argued Oct. 1, 1997.
Decided Jan. 20, 1998
Before HAMILTON and WILLIAMS,
Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by published opinion.
Judge HAMILTON wrote the opinion, in which Judge
WILLIAMS joined. Senior Judge BUTZNER wrote a
concurring opinion.
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge:
Following a
jury trial in the Circuit Court for Arlington
County, Virginia, Angel Francisco Breard, a
citizen of both Argentina and Paraguay, was
convicted and sentenced to death for the murder
of Ruth Dickie. He now appeals the district
court's denial of his petition for writ of
habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm.
I
* In February
1992, Ruth Dickie resided alone at 4410 North
Fourth Road, Apartment 3, in Arlington County,
Virginia. At about 10:30 or 10:45 p.m. on
February 17, 1992, Ann Isch, who lived in an
apartment directly below Dickie's, heard Dickie
and a man arguing loudly in the hall. According
to Isch, the arguing continued as she heard
Dickie and the man enter Dickie's apartment.
Almost immediately thereafter, Isch called
Joseph King, the maintenance person for the
apartment complex. Upon arriving at Dickie's
apartment, King knocked on the door and heard a
noise that sounded like someone was being
dragged across the floor. After receiving no
response to his knocking, King called the police.
When the
police arrived, they entered Dickie's apartment
with a master key that King provided. Upon
entering the apartment, the police found Dickie
lying on the floor. She was on her back, naked
from the waist down, and her legs were spread.
She was bleeding and did not appear to be
breathing. The police observed body fluid on
Dickie's pubic hair and on her inner thigh.
Hairs were found clutched in her bloodstained
hands and on her left leg. Dickie's underpants
had been torn from her body. A telephone
receiver located near her head was covered with
blood.
An autopsy
revealed that Dickie had sustained five stab
wounds to the neck; two of which would have
caused her death. Foreign hairs found on
Dickie's body were determined to be identical in
all microscopic characteristics to hair samples
taken from Breard. Hairs found clutched in
Dickie's hands were Caucasian hairs
microscopically similar to Dickie's own head
hair and bore evidence that they had been pulled
from her head by the roots. Semen found on
Dickie's pubic hair matched Breard's enzyme
typing in all respects, and his DNA profile
matched the DNA profile of the semen found on
Dickie's body.
Breard was
indicted on charges of attempted rape and
capital murder. Following a jury trial, he was
convicted of both charges. The jury fixed
Breard's punishment for the attempted rape at
ten years' imprisonment and a $100,000 fine. In
the bifurcated proceeding, the jury heard
evidence in aggravation and mitigation of the
capital murder charge. Based upon findings of
Breard's future dangerousness and the vileness
of the crime, the jury fixed Breard's sentence
at death. The trial court sentenced Breard in
accordance with the jury's verdicts.
Breard
appealed his convictions and sentences to the
Supreme Court of Virginia, and that court
affirmed. See Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va.
68, 445 S.E.2d 670 (1994). On October 31, 1994,
the United States Supreme Court denied Breard's
petition for a writ of certiorari. See Breard v.
Virginia, 513 U.S. 971, 115 S.Ct. 442, 130 L.Ed.2d
353 (1994)
On May 1,
1995, Breard sought state collateral relief in
the Circuit Court for Arlington County by filing
a petition for writ of habeas corpus. On June
29, 1995, the circuit court dismissed the
petition. On January 17, 1996, the Supreme Court
of Virginia refused Breard's petition for
appeal.
Breard then
sought federal collateral relief in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia by filing a petition for writ of
habeas corpus on August 30, 1996. On November
27, 1996, the district court denied relief. See
Breard v. Netherland, 949 F.Supp. 1255 (E.D.Va.1996).
On December 24, 1996, Breard filed a timely
notice of appeal. On April 7, 1997, the district
court granted Breard's application for a
certificate of appealability as to all issues
raised by Breard in his application. See 28
U.S.C. § 2253; Fed. R.App. P. 22.
II
* The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA")
of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996), amended, among other things, 28 U.S.C. §
2244 and §§ 2253-2255, which are parts of the
Chapter 153 provisions that govern all habeas
proceedings in federal courts. The AEDPA, which
became effective on April 24, 1996, also created
a new Chapter 154, applicable to habeas
proceedings against a state in capital cases.
The new Chapter 154 applies, however, only if a
state "opts in" by establishing certain
mechanisms for the appointment and compensation
of competent counsel. In Lindh v. Murphy, ---
U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481
(1997), the Supreme Court held that § 107(c) of
the AEDPA, which explicitly made new Chapter 154
applicable to cases pending on the effective
date of the AEDPA, created a "negative
implication ... that the new provisions of
chapter 153 generally apply only to cases filed
after the Act became effective." Id. at ----,
117 S.Ct. at 2068. Thus, under Lindh, if a
habeas petition was filed before April 24, 1996,
the pre-AEDPA habeas standards apply. See Howard
v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 403-04 (4th Cir.1997)
(en banc ) ("Howard filed his habeas petition in
the district court prior to April 26, 1996, the
effective date of the AEDPA. We, therefore,
review Howard's claims under pre-AEDPA law." (footnote
omitted)). For habeas petitions filed after
April 24, 1996, then, the Chapter 153 provisions
apply, see Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97,
99-100 & n. 1 (4th Cir.1997) (applying amended §
2253 in case where state prisoner filed federal
habeas petition after the effective date of the
AEDPA), and the Chapter 154 provisions apply if
the state satisfies the "opt-in" provisions.
Breard filed
his federal habeas petition on August 30, 1996.
Accordingly, the Chapter 153 provisions apply.
See Howard, 131 F.3d 399, 403-04. With respect
to the Chapter 154 provisions, the district
court held that they did not apply because the
Commonwealth of Virginia did not satisfy the "opt-in"
provisions of the AEDPA. See Breard v.
Netherland, 949 F.Supp. at 1262. Because the
Commonwealth of Virginia has not appealed this
ruling and the record is not developed on this
point, we decline to address whether the
Commonwealth of Virginia's mechanism for the
appointment, compensation, and payment of
reasonable litigation expenses of competent
counsel satisfies the "opt-in" provisions of the
AEDPA. Cf. Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336,
1342 (4th Cir.) (declining to decide whether the
procedures established by the Commonwealth of
Virginia for the appointment, compensation, and
payment of reasonable litigation expenses of
competent counsel satisfy the "opt-in"
requirements, which would render those
provisions applicable to indigent Virginia
prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from
capital sentences if an initial state habeas
petition was filed after July 1, 1992), cert.
denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 503, 136 L.Ed.2d
395 (1996). However, we are confident that the "opt-in"
provisions are of no help to Breard.
B
Initially,
Breard contends that his convictions and
sentences should be vacated because, at the time
of his arrest, the Arlington County authorities
failed to notify him that, as a foreign national,
he had the right to contact the Consulate of
Argentina or the Consulate of Paraguay pursuant
to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
see 21 U.S.T. 77. The Commonwealth of Virginia
argues that Breard did not raise his Vienna
Convention claim in state court and thus failed
to exhaust available state remedies.
Furthermore,
because Virginia law would now bar this claim,
the Commonwealth of Virginia argues that Breard
has procedurally defaulted this claim for
purposes of federal habeas review. The district
court held that, because Breard had never raised
this claim in state court, the claim was
procedurally defaulted and that Breard failed to
establish cause to excuse the default. See
Breard v. Netherland, 949 F.Supp. at 1263.
Breard's failure to raise this issue in state
court brings into play the principles of
exhaustion and procedural default.
In the
interest of giving the state courts the first
opportunity to consider alleged constitutional
errors occurring in a state prisoner's trial and
sentencing, a state prisoner must exhaust all
available state remedies before he can apply for
federal habeas relief. See Matthews v. Evatt,
105 F.3d 907, 910-11 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
--- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 102, 139 L.Ed.2d 57
(1997); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
To exhaust
state remedies, a habeas petitioner must fairly
present the substance of his claim to the
state's highest court. See Matthews, 105 F.3d at
911. The exhaustion requirement is not satisfied
if the petitioner presents new legal theories or
factual claims for the first time in his federal
habeas petition. See id. The burden of proving
that a claim is exhausted lies with the habeas
petitioner. See Mallory v. Smith, 27 F.3d 991,
994 (4th Cir.1994).
A distinct but
related limit on the scope of federal habeas
review is the doctrine of procedural default. If
a state court clearly and expressly bases its
dismissal of a habeas petitioner's claim on a
state procedural rule, and that procedural rule
provides an independent and adequate ground for
the dismissal, the habeas petitioner has
procedurally defaulted his federal habeas claim.
See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32,
111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991).
A procedural default also occurs when a habeas
petitioner fails to exhaust available state
remedies and "the court to which the petitioner
would be required to present his claims in order
to meet the exhaustion requirement would now
find the claims procedurally barred." Id. at 735
n. 1, 111 S.Ct. at 2557 n. 1.
Under Virginia
law, "a petitioner is barred from raising any
claim in a successive petition if the facts as
to that claim were either known or available to
petitioner at the time of his original petition."
Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1354 n. 1 (4th
Cir.) (internal quotes omitted), cert. denied,
--- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 630, 136 L.Ed.2d 548
(1996); Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-654(B)(2) ("No writ
[of habeas corpus ad subjeciendum] shall be
granted on the basis of any allegation the facts
of which petitioner had knowledge at the time of
filing any previous petition."). Breard contends
that he had no reasonable basis for raising his
Vienna Convention claim until April 1996 when
the Fifth Circuit decided Faulder v. Johnson, 81
F.3d 515 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S.
----, 117 S.Ct. 487, 136 L.Ed.2d 380 (1996).
In that case,
the court held that an arrestee's rights under
the Vienna Convention were violated when Texas
officials failed to inform the arrestee of his
right to contact the Canadian Consulate. Id. at
520. Breard further maintains that he could not
have raised his Vienna Convention claim in his
state habeas petition because the Commonwealth
of Virginia failed to advise him of his rights
under the Vienna Convention. These allegations,
however, are inadequate to demonstrate that the
facts upon which Breard bases his Vienna
Convention claim were unavailable to him when he
filed his state habeas petition.
In Murphy, we
rejected a state habeas petitioner's contention
that the novelty of a Vienna Convention claim
and the state's failure to advise the petitioner
of his rights under the Vienna Convention could
constitute cause for the failure to raise the
claim in state court. See 116 F.3d at 100. In
reaching this conclusion, we noted that a
reasonably diligent attorney would have
discovered the applicability of the Vienna
Convention to a foreign national defendant and
that in previous cases claims under the Vienna
Convention have been raised:
The Vienna Convention, which
is codified at 21 U.S.T. 77, has been in effect
since 1969, and a reasonably diligent search by
Murphy's counsel, who was retained shortly after
Murphy's arrest and who represented Murphy
throughout the state court proceedings, would
have revealed the existence and applicability (if
any) of the Vienna Convention. Treaties are one
of the first sources that would be consulted by
a reasonably diligent counsel representing a
foreign national.
Counsel in other cases, both
before and since Murphy's state proceedings,
apparently had and have had no difficulty
whatsoever learning of the Convention. See, e.g.,
Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th
Cir.1996); Waldron v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 511, 518
(2d Cir.1993); Mami v. Van Zandt, No. 89 Civ.
0554, 1989 WL 52308 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 1989);
United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529,
530 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Calderon-Medina,
591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir.1979); United States v.
Vega-Mejia, 611 F.2d 751, 752 (9th Cir.1979).
Id.
Murphy
forecloses any argument that Breard could not
have raised his Vienna Convention claim at the
time he filed his initial state habeas petition
in May 1995. Accordingly, Breard's Vienna
Convention claim would be procedurally defaulted
if he attempted to raise it in state court at
this time. Having reached this conclusion, we
can only address Breard's defaulted Vienna
Convention claim if he "can demonstrate cause
for the default and actual prejudice as a result
of the alleged violation of federal law, or
demonstrate that failure to consider the claim
will result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. at
2565.
In order to
demonstrate "cause" for the default, Breard must
establish "that some objective factor external
to the defense impeded counsel's efforts" to
raise the claim in state court at the
appropriate time. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986); see also
Murphy, 116 F.3d at 100 (applying Murray and
finding that petitioner failed to establish
cause to excuse the default of his Vienna
Convention claim)
For the same
reasons discussed above, Breard asserts that the
factual basis for his Vienna Convention claim
was unavailable to him at the time he filed his
state habeas petition and, therefore, he has
established cause. But, under Murphy, Breard's
showing is insufficient to allow this court to
conclude that the factual basis for his Vienna
Convention claim was unavailable. Consequently,
there is no cause for the procedural default.
Accordingly, we do not discuss the issue of
prejudice. See Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d
1350, 1359 (4th Cir.1995) (noting that once
court finds the absence of cause, court should
not consider the issue of prejudice to avoid
reaching alternative holdings), cert. denied,
517 U.S. 1171, 116 S.Ct. 1575, 134 L.Ed.2d 673
(1996).
Finally, we
find it unnecessary to address the issue of
whether the AEDPA abrogated the "miscarriage of
justice" exception to the procedural default
doctrine. Assuming arguendo that the AEDPA has
not eliminated the miscarriage of justice
exception articulated in Murray, 477 U.S. at
495-96, 106 S.Ct. at 2649-50 (miscarriage of
justice exception available to those who are
actually innocent), and Sawyer v. Whitley, 505
U.S. 333, 350, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2524-25, 120 L.Ed.2d
269 (1992) (miscarriage of justice exception
available to those who are actually innocent of
the death penalty, i.e., those habeas
petitioners who prove by clear and convincing
evidence that, but for the constitutional error,
no reasonable juror would have found the
petitioner eligible for the death penalty), no
miscarriage of justice occurred here. In no set
of circumstances has Breard made a showing that
he is actually innocent of the offense he
committed, see Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96, 106
S.Ct. at 2649-50, or innocent of the death
penalty in the sense that no reasonable juror
would have found him eligible for the death
penalty, see Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 350, 112 S.Ct.
at 2524-25. Accordingly, Breard is entitled to
no relief on his Vienna Convention claim.C
Breard also
contends that his death sentence violates Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d
346 (1972), and its progeny. In asserting this
claim, Breard argues that: (1) given the
prosecutor's alleged offer to forego the death
penalty if Breard would plead guilty, the
prosecutor violated his constitutional rights by
seeking and obtaining a death sentence once
Breard insisted upon pleading not guilty; (2)
the Commonwealth of Virginia imposes the death
penalty arbitrarily in capital murder cases; and
(3) his death sentence is unconstitutionally
disproportionate.
The first two
claims mentioned above were never raised in
state court. The remaining claim was raised on
direct appeal, but only as a state law claim,
and on the appeal from the denial of state
habeas relief the Virginia Supreme Court found
this claim procedurally barred under the rule of
Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680
(1974) (holding that issues not properly raised
on direct appeal will not be considered on state
collateral review). Because Breard has not
established cause for the obvious procedural
default of these claims or that a miscarriage of
justice would result by our failure to consider
any one of these claims, we cannot address the
merits.
D
Finally,
Breard argues that the aggravating circumstances
instructions given by the trial court are
unconstitutionally vague. This claim is not
procedurally barred because the Supreme Court of
Virginia rejected it on direct appeal. See
Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d at 675. In
his brief, Breard concedes that we have upheld
similar instructions in the recent cases of
Bennett, 92 F.3d at 1345 (rejecting vagueness
challenge to the Commonwealth of Virginia's
vileness aggravating circumstance), and Spencer
v. Murray, 5 F.3d 758, 764-65 (4th Cir.1993) (rejecting
vagueness attack on the future dangerousness
aggravator).
Furthermore,
Breard states that he is raising this claim on
appeal only "to preserve this claim for future
review should such be necessary." See
Petitioner's Br. at 37. As a panel of this court,
we are bound by Bennett and Spencer, see Jones
v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (one
panel of this court may not overrule another
panel's decision); therefore, we must reject
Breard's attack on the constitutionality of the
aggravating circumstances instructions given by
the trial court.
III
For the
reasons stated herein, the judgment of the
district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
*****
BUTZNER,
Senior Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in
the denial of the relief requested by Angel
Francisco Breard. I write separately to
emphasize the importance of the Vienna
Convention.
* The Vienna
Convention facilitates "friendly relations among
nations, irrespective of their differing
constitutional and social systems." The Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, opened for
signature Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 78, 79 (ratified
by the United States Nov. 12, 1969). Article 36,
provides:
1. With a view to
facilitating the exercise of consular functions
relating to nationals of the sending State:
* * *
(b) if he so requests, the
competent authorities of the receiving State
shall, without delay, inform the consular post
of the sending State if, within its consular
district, a national of that State is arrested
or committed to prison or to custody pending
trial or is detained in any other manner. Any
communication addressed to the consular post by
the person arrested, in prison, custody or
detention shall also be forwarded by the said
authorities without delay. The said authorities
shall inform the person concerned without delay
of his rights under this subparagraph;
(c) consular officers shall
have the right to visit a national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or
detention, to converse and correspond with him
and to arrange for his legal representation.
They shall also have the right to visit any
national of the sending State who is in prison,
custody or detention in their district in
pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular
officers shall refrain from taking action on
behalf of a national who is in prison, custody
or detention if he expressly opposes such action.
2. The rights referred to in
paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised
in conformity with the laws and regulations of
the receiving State, subject to the proviso,
however, that the said laws and regulations must
enable full effect to be given to the purposes
for which the rights accorded under this Article
are intended. Id. at 101.
II
The Vienna
Convention is a self executing treaty--it
provides rights to individuals rather than
merely setting out the obligations of
signatories. See Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d
515, 520 (5th Cir.1996) (assuming the same). The
text emphasizes that the right of consular
notice and assistance is the citizen's. The
language is mandatory and unequivocal,
evidencing the signatories' recognition of the
importance of consular access for persons
detained by a foreign government.
The provisions
of the Vienna Convention have the dignity of an
act of Congress and are binding upon the states.
See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99, 5
S.Ct. 247, 253-54, 28 L.Ed. 798 (1884). The
Supremacy Clause mandates that rights conferred
by a treaty be honored by the states. United
States Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The provisions of
the Convention should be implemented before
trial when they can be appropriately addressed.
Collateral review is too limited to afford an
adequate remedy.
III
The
protections afforded by the Vienna Convention go
far beyond Breard's case. United States citizens
are scattered about the world--as missionaries,
Peace Corps volunteers, doctors, teachers and
students, as travelers for business and for
pleasure. Their freedom and safety are seriously
endangered if state officials fail to honor the
Vienna Convention and other nations follow their
example. Public officials should bear in mind
that "international law is founded upon
mutuality and reciprocity...." Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, 228, 16 S.Ct. 139, 168, 40 L.Ed.
95 (1895).
The State
Department has advised the states, including
Virginia, of their obligation to inform foreign
nationals of their rights under the Vienna
Convention. It has advised states to facilitate
consular access to foreign detainees.
Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike should
be aware of the rights conferred by the treaty
and their responsibilities under it. The
importance of the Vienna Convention cannot be
overstated. It should be honored by all nations
that have signed the treaty and all states of
this nation.